The Chinese equation

The Arabs and the Holocaust: the Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, Metropolitan Bo
oks, New York, 2010." class="rcol"> Gilbert Achcar

Discussion with Gilbert Achcar, professor at the School of Oriental and African
studies of the University of London (SOAS).
How should we judge the rise to power of China, positively or negatively?
That depends on the point of view that you start from. The rise to power of Chin
a will be judged in a different way according to whether you look at it from the
point of view of the United States, of Europe, or the Third World. It will take
on a different significance according to the perspective adopted, economic or p
olitico-military. From an anti-imperialist point of view, one can say that the r
ise to power of China, insofar as it contributes to rebalancing a world that had
become unipolar after the fall of the USSR, is unquestionably positive. From an
economic standpoint, China, from the considerable weight that it has acquired i
n the world economy, plays an incontestably positive role. This could be verifie
d again at the time of the last world economic crisis. The big question is to kn
ow whether this rise to power of China is likely to exacerbate a cold war dynami
c which already exists, but which could be aggravated and lead to strong politic
al and military tensions that would be dangerous for humanity.
Some experts envisage that in 2025 the American and Chinese economic curves will
intersect. Is there not a risk of cold war and confrontation?
Some people envisage that it will happen even earlier than that. The Chinese eco
nomy once again experienced a very high growth rate in 2010, almost 10 per cent,
provoking fresh fears of overheating. If this strong growth lasts, the intersec
tion could thus take place very soon. We can see on this subject, on the Western
side, a certain anguish, caused by seeing - for the first time since the emerge
nce of industrial capitalism - a country with a political system that is differe
nt from that of the Western democracies becoming the leading economy in the worl
d. This is something completely new, in a world where this status was held by Gr
eat Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States since then, and up u
ntil today. Does this rise to power of China automatically imply a risk of cold
war? From the point of view in international relations that is known as structur
alist, the rise of a new power inevitably creates tension with the power that ex
ists, within the framework of relationships of forces that are conceived of as a
zero sum game . I think however that it is not a question of structural inevitabil
ity, but of a political decision. In the last analysis, what is decisive is the
attitude adopted by the power of the moment, namely the United States. The attit
ude of Washington is decisive: it has been up to now, and it is increasingly the
case The United States, today as yesterday, tries to thwart this rise of China.
They have put in place what is perceived, seen from Beijing, as a strategic enc
irclement. If they maintain this behaviour, the cold war dynamic, which already
exists, will certainly become sharper. I entitled my 1999 book, published just a
fter the war in Kosovo, The New Cold War . This formula of new cold war designated th
e increasing tensions between Moscow and Beijing on the one hand and Washington
on the other. The evolution of the international situation seems me to have conf
irmed this prognosis on the tendency of politico-military relations between thes
e powers. With what was called the unipolar moment , the triumphalism of the United
States inspired a hegemonic policy not only towards the traditional vassals of
Washington, but also towards Moscow and Beijing, and not only under the administ
ration of George W. Bush, but since 1990-91. The conduct of this imperial policy
by George W. Bush led to the disastrous balance-sheet that we know, even puttin
g into question the credibility of the United States as a superpower . The economic
 crisis has further reinforced this loss of prestige. Today Washington is procee
ding to a re-examination of its policy, with the Obama administration inclined t
o adopt a more conciliatory attitude with regard to Moscow and Beijing. In the l
ong term, either Washington succeeds, in the interest of the whole world as well
as that of the population of the United States, in adapting to an international
modus vivendi on the basis of collective institutions, of the UN and internatio
nal law, and the dynamics of cold war could be stopped; or else Washington, in p
articular after a change of personnel at the top (which is possible in the short
term), continues to follow an aggressive policy on the borders of China and Rus
sia, in which case it is obvious that the dynamics of cold war will intensify. F
or the moment, China is far from parity with the United States on the military l
evel. The latter remains the leading world military power, and by a long chalk,
spending in this field the equivalent of the expenditure of the rest of the worl
d. Chinese military expenditure is very modest compared to American military exp
enditure. It is nevertheless progressing quickly, in parallel with the economic
position of China. In this respect, it is the total volume of GDP which is decis
ive, and not GDP per capita, on which level China will remain for a long time ye
t far from the United States. US military expenditure amounts to almost 5 per ce
nt of GDP, which is enormous. With China s GDP tending to catch up with, and soon
surpass that of the United States, Beijing will be able soon to increase its mil
itary expenditure to the equivalent of Washington s, and even beyond. A new planet
ary arms race would increase considerably the already enormous volume of world m
ilitary expenditure, to the detriment of the development and the wellbeing of po
pulations, without forgetting that you do not accumulate armaments without that
not leading to wars, direct or by proxy, in a climate of confrontation such as t
hat which opposed the United States and the USSR.
Would a Chinese desire for hegemony be realizable, beyond a simple rebalancing w
ith the United States?
The first question which should be posed is to know whether there really exists
a Chinese desire for hegemony. Obviously for the hawks of the Western world, thi
s desire is given as a starting postulate. But if we observe China s behaviour in
a more neutral, more objective way, we really do not find evidence to support su
ch a characterization. Admittedly the behaviour of China includes an unstoppable
logic of economic expansion, in the sense that the dynamism of its economy and
its exports provide it with an immense monetary reserve. And it needs fructify t
his reserve, no longer- or less and less - by acquiring American treasury bills,
as it has done on a large scale over the last few years. China has in fact subs
idized the deficit of the American budget. It has thus, to some extent, subsidiz
ed the armaments and the wars of the United States. The foreign-exchange reserve
s of Beijing are very close to 3000 billion dollars today, which is gigantic. Ch
ina is doing today what the capitalist economies at the end of the nineteenth ce
ntury did, in their imperialist mutation. As it has an enormous amount of money to
invest, it is no longer satisfied to export goods, but increasingly exports cap
ital, whether towards developing countries or towards Western economies, and eve
n offers to re-inflate countries like Greece and Portugal. It hopes in return fo
r better access to international markets, the development of commercial exchange
s, privileged access to raw materials, and the political influence that goes wit
h that. The loans for aid to development lavished by China today exceed those of
the World Bank. On the military level however, that has not, or not yet, been e
xpressed in the manner of the imperialism of the end of the nineteenth century,
by militarism and gunboat diplomacy aimed at extending politico-military dominat
ion. There is not yet anything comparable in the attitude of China. China s priori
ties in the military sphere are primarily of a defensive nature: China s obsession
today is encirclement by America. The United States controls the energy sources
of China, in particular the Middle East on which China is much more dependent f
or its oil than is the United States. It is a striking paradox that China is the
principal customer of the Saudi kingdom, which is an American protectorate on t
he politico-military level. The United States has its hands on most of the taps
which feed oil to China. It controls the maritime routes of China s trade. That ob
viously worries Beijing. China is surrounded by American military bases, from Ce
ntral Asia and Afghanistan to Japan. It fears that the United States is seeking
to compensate for or slow down its loss of economic supremacy by economic or oth
er forms of obstruction, based on its military supremacy. American blackmail cou
ld thus affect energy sources, trade and many other aspects (technology, etc). I
n the field of naval power, the United States has an enormous force of projectio
n: it has eleven aircraft carriers, whereas China does not have any. America s nav
al strength is a force of projection of power. T hat is not the case for China,
whose logic is defensive. The Chinese are developing their fleet of submarines,
which is the naval arm in which they come closest to parity, at least on the qua
ntitative level, with what the United States has. They are in the course of deve
loping a ground-to-sea ballistic missile against the US aircraft carriers. This
is a way for them of avoiding American naval domination. I go back to the starti
ng point of my argument: the ball is in the court of the United States, and the
Americans are still able to fashion the world as they affirmed in their strategic
documents of the 1990s. They still have the initiative; they are the ones who, u
p until now, set the rules of the game. Either they choose to adopt a new attitu
de, understanding that the unipolar moment was only an ephemeral moment , and that it
is advisable to build a framework of peaceful international relations on the ba
sis of collective institutions, with the rules of the game applicable to everyon
e. Or else they continue their foolish attempt to prevent any emergence of a str
ategic equal. In that case, the dynamics of cold war can only worsen and even de
generate.
Can t Europeans maintain closer relations with China, which could make it possible
to loosen the grip of the United States?
This is in any case what Beijing wants. Its intervention to contribute to re-inf
lating the euro is part of its desire to promote a multipolar world, a desire th
at Moscow shares. Strategic multipolarity flows from economic multipolarity. Chi
na s currency is starting its mutation into an international currency. This econom
ic approach shows that Beijing is well-disposed towards Europe, and that it want
s to develop with it a partnership based on mutual interests. It is up to Europe
to know how to grasp this outstretched hand. That implies calling into question
its alignment behind the United States, which has lasted for decades. Europe co
uld turn the page on this alignment behind Washington, and understand that anoth
er policy is essential in order to build a twenty-first century which cannot be
a new American century . It is a question of political choice, because there is no
structural automatism. We are all directly concerned.
Interview conducted by Jacques Le Dauphin, January 2011
-Gilbert Achcar grew up in Lebanon and teaches political science at London s Schoo
l of Oriental and African Studies. His best-selling book The Clash of Barbarisms c
ame out in a second expanded edition in 2006, alongside a book of his dialogues
with Noam Chomsky on the Middle East, Perilous Power . He is co-author of The 33-Day
War: Israel s War on Hezbollah in Lebanon and It s Consequences . His most recent boo
k is The Arabs and the Holocaust: the Arab-Israeli War of Narratives, Metropolit
an Books, New York, 2010.

Unease over China grows

Beijing is flaunting its superpower ambitions and claws too
* By Manik Mehta, Special to Gulf News
* Published: 00:00 February 13, 2011
* Gulf News
 * Reader comments (0)
Pledge to help
* Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao
* Image Credit: AFP
Since its "opening" to the outside world about three decades back, China religio
usly followed the advice of its paramount leader Deng Xiaoping that one should c
onceal ambitions and also the claws.
With its astounding economic and military ascent, China is today not only flaunt
ing its superpower ambitions, but also sharpening its claws, creating uncertaint
y and angst amongst neighbours Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Asean states and
India. The US is equally unnerved by China's growing economic and military might
.
In 2010, the year of the tiger, China snarled not only at its neighbours, but al
so at the world's sole superpower, as witnessed during Chinese President Hu Jint
ao's visit to Washington last month, when he categorically rejected US criticism
of currency manipulation, human rights, the fate of the missing human rights la
wyer Gao Zhisheng and the imprisoned Nobel Peace laureate Liu Xiaobo.
China also had its share of setbacks last year, the most glaring being its inabi
lity to move the international community to boycott the Nobel Peace Prize ceremo
ny in Oslo for Liu Xiaobo. Only a handful of countries like North Korea, Myanmar
and Pakistan followed the boycott call.
The episode ended with a lot of egg on China's face.
However, China's assertiveness will become even more pronounced in the future wh
en the power struggle amongst candidates jockeying for positions and power for n
ext year's leadership changes intensifies. This assertiveness manifested itself
when it recently tightened its grip on the internet and media and intensified it
s already repressive policies in Tibet and Xinjiang whose local populations dist
rust and resent Beijing's Han leadership.
China is also raking up thorny issues such as the Spratly Islands in the South C
hina Sea or the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, riling its neighbours who are
, obviously, not amused.
China, once fearful of being encircled by its neighbours at the West's behest, i
s now itself encircling its neighbours, forming strategic coalitions by offering
economic, political and ideological support.
Resorting to doublespeak
Experts say that China increasingly resorts to doublespeak: its words do not mat
ch its actions. For weeks, China stopped its rare-earth exports to Japan but, in
public utterances, kept insisting that this was not the case. During his visit
to Delhi a few weeks back, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao almost denied the e
xistence of the problem of stapled Chinese visas for Indian passport holders res
iding in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. Finally, it was agreed that a joint grou
p would sort it out.
China has riled India in other ways too. It sent Chinese troops to Pakistan-admi
nistered Kashmir to build projects; China also occupies a chunk of Kashmir's rea
l estate which, India says, Pakistan unlawfully gave away to China.
India is "taken for granted", as some strategists say, because Prime Minister Ma
nmohan Singh's leadership is perceived as weak. They point out that George Ferna
ndes, India's former defence minister in the cabinet of prime minister Atal Biha
ri Vajpayee, sent shock waves to Beijing with his strong message that the Pokhra
n nuclear tests were a response to China's aggressive posturing against India. C
hina was put on the defensive.
Many urge India to use Tibet and Taiwan as bargaining chips against China. By no
t blindly reciting the "one-China-policy" in the joint communique issued after W
en's visit, India demonstrated its capability of playing its trump card as well.
The same goes for Tibet, which India can call a "disputed territory" just as Ch
ina needles India by calling Kashmir a "disputed territory".
China's extensive modernisation of its armed forces is also causing unease among
its Asian neighbours.
America is equally uneasy that China could challenge its air and sea dominance i
n the Pacific. Admiral Robert Willard, who heads the US Pacific Command, recentl
y said that the Chinese "exceeded most of our intelligence estimates of their mi
litary capability".
While China says it is merely interested in a "peaceful rise", the aggressive mo
dernisation of its armed forces is at variance with its official rhetoric. Some
experts suggest that China started to bolster its defence because it was shocked
by the ease with which US demolished the occupying Iraqi army of Saddam Hussain
in Kuwait. Like the Iraqi army, which relied on Soviet military technology, Chi
na's army also has a lot of Soviet-styled hardware.

- Manik Mehta is a commentator on Asian affairs.