Lecture #3

5 October 2010
Copyright: Ronald B. Mitchell, 2010

I. Intro
A. Questions about assignment #1??
II. The big picture and the big question of institutions
A. Come out of PS205 with a sense that there is a competition between realist theory and institutionalist
theory regarding the role that institutions/regimes play in the international system. Raises several
questions:
1. Institutional formation: Why (and when) do states form international institutions in the first place?
2. Institutional design: Why, given that they do form them, do they design them in the ways they do?
3. Institutional influence: How, given that states cannot be coerced to do what they do not want to do,
do international institutions ever influence the behavior of states?
4. Non-state action: Why isn’t all this “international organization” limited to just states?
B. Note the puzzle involved in each question:
1. Puzzles in theory (of any sort) stem from a disconnect between a theoretical preconception or
expectation of what you expect to see and an unexpected empirical observation of something
different. Put differently, puzzle arise when you say “that’s surprising” or “that’s odd.”
2. So, can’t have a puzzle without having a theory!
3. Institutional formation: realist theory says states shouldn’t cooperate, but we observe them
negotiating agreements
4. Institutional design: IR theory generally says that states should design institutions in response to the
problems they are trying to solve (functionalism) but we aren’t even really clear what the empirical
prediction is here. How SHOULD institutions look and do they look that way? Weaker theory in
this realm.
5. Institutional influence: realist theory suggests that, if states are dumb enough to create institutions,
they certainly shouldn’t change their behavior in response to them if it is costly to do so.
6. Non-state action: realist theory suggests that states are the main actors in international relations, not
non-states. Yet we see lots of apparent non-state actor influence on state behavior AND we see
increasing amounts of non-state action that seems to be addressing international problems without
even involving the state.
III. Three types of interaction among states
A. States are, in some situations, interdependent: one country’s actions affects well-being of others
B. Harmony – INdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes, i.e., outcomes that
those actors who COULD push for change find sufficiently acceptable that they do NOT push for change.
1. “When harmony prevails, actors' policies automatically facilitate the attainment of others' goals”
{Keohane, 1988 #1628, 380}.
2. No need for international organization -- there is no problem that needs resolution.
3. Most IR theorists view these situations as common but UNinteresting.
4. Constructivists argue that, states may "get along" because of deep norms, developed over time that
"construct" identities and desires so states want the same things and hence get along. E.g.: lack of
conflict over colonization.
C. Conflict - INdependent decision-making produces undesirable, suboptimal, or "bad" outcomes, i.e., to
outcomes that those actors who COULD push for change find sufficiently UNacceptable that they DO
push for change. See Stein (next class readings) on this.
1. “When there is discord, actors' policies hinder the realization of others' goals, and are not adjusted to
make them more compatible” {Keohane, 1988 #1628, 380}.
2. Realist view: if states are in conflict, can’t remedy it except by force. Cases where one or more
states feels that its well-being is harmed by other states’ behaviors and hence there are opportunities
to improve their well-being if they can get other state to change behavior.
3. Various types of conflict exist that could benefit from remedies
D. Cooperation – INTERdependent decision-making produces desirable or "good" outcomes.
1. “When cooperation takes place, each party changes his or her behavior contingent on changes in the
other's behavior. We can evaluate the impact of cooperation by measuring the difference between

© Ronald B. Mitchell, do not use without permission: http://pages.uoregon.edu/rmitchel/ir/lectures/03-

ProblemStructure-Overview.doc
 the actual outcome and the situation that would have obtained in the absence of coordination: that is,
the myopic self-enforcing equilibrium of the game” {Keohane, 1988 #1628, 380}.
2. Stein nicely defines a regime as any situation in which there is interdependent decision-making. See
p. 317 example on arms races with and without a regime.
3. Integrative bargaining: Should we create a bigger pie? What type of bigger pie should we create?
How do we create a bigger pie?
4. Distributive bargaining: Who should contribute ingredients for the pie? Once we make the pie
bigger, who should get the additional parts of the pie we create?
5. Cooperation is "international organization", i.e., what comes out of efforts to address one of the
various types of conflict just outlined.
IV. Institutions / regimes
A. Krasner’s Definition: “Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and
decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international
relations” Krasner, 186.
B. Compare to Keohane’s definition: “"Institution" may refer to a general pattern or categorization of
activity or to a particular human-constructed arrangement, formally or informally organized” {Keohane,
1988 #1628, 382}.
1. Or “sets of governing arrangements” (Keohane and Nye).
2. NOT temporary arrangements -- set up to govern things over time.
3. Significant problem: Does an institution exist if no state follows its rules?
a) One solution: if you have formal rules (treaties, conventions, etc) as the basic empirical
definition of an institution, then it allows for you to see whether formal rules matter. If you
say “there isn’t an institution unless states are complying with it”, then you run into the
problem that you have defined away the major interesting question that Krasner highlights as a
subhead, namely “Do regimes/institutions matter?” (189). If an institution doesn’t exist unless
states are complying, then only those institutions that matter are defined as institutions.
b) Keohane says: “When we ask whether X is an institution, we ask whether we can identify
persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles”
{Keohane, 1988 #1628, 384}. But note that this creates the same problem -- if institutions are
only those rules that constrain activity, then they are by definition effective and that removes
an important question from the research agenda. Better to define institutions as: “persistent
sets of rules that are designed to constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe roles”
(which allows for the possibility that they do not).
4. Three views on the influence of institutions
a) Conventional structural, i.e., realist: institutions don’t matter
b) Modified structural, i.e., institutionalist: institutions matter under limited conditions
c) Grotian, i.e., constructivist: institutions exist whenever states follow certain norms of behavior
even if they haven’t agreed on them as constraining their behavior at all. For Grotians,
institutions are simply “patterns of behavior.” For example, no rules that say “women and
children first” but all states and IOs appear to abide by this rule (see R. Charli Carpenter’s
work)
C. Institutional formation: why do institutions form
1. Egoistic self-interest
2. Political power
a) Providing public goods that others can’t: benevolent hegemony (post-WWII US)
b) Extracting value for the powerful actor: asymmetric power (those who have issue-specific
power can get more of what they want) and imposed regimes (a la Young)
3. Norms, e.g., “laws of war” -- simply “how prisoners should be treated” initially but then provides
basis for doing so.
4. Usage and custom: Codification of norms that have already developed. 3 mile territorial sea.
5. Knowledge: can provide the basis for actors converging on a new approach to things, once they
understand the new knowledge about the benefits of that approach.
D. Regimes as intervening variables
1. Good rule of thumb for readings -- make sure you understand the title
2. What do regimes/institutions “intervene” between?

© Ronald B. Mitchell, do not use without permission: http://pages.uoregon.edu/rmitchel/ir/lectures/03-

ProblemStructure-Overview.doc
 a) Between “basic causal variables” and “behaviors” of states and “outcomes” of interactions
among states
b) Compare Figure 1 and Figure 2 of Krasner

c) Not sure the figures work but think about what they are trying to communicate
d) Basic point of article is to delineate question of how institutions intervene - that is, when states
form regimes, do they generate behaviors/outcomes different than they otherwise.
V. Keohane: Two Approaches (rationalist and reflective approaches)
A. Basic differences
1. Rationalist (this includes BOTH realist and institutionalist theories)
2. Reflective (usually called constructivist theory)
B. Goal of studying international organization: “To understand the conditions under which international
cooperation can take place, it is necessary to understand how international institutions operate and the
conditions under which they come into being. This is not to say that international institutions always
facilitate cooperation on a global basis: on the contrary, a variety of international institutions, including
most obviously military alliances, are designed as means for prevailing in military and political conflict.
Conversely, instances of cooperation can take place with only minimal institutional structures to support
them. But all efforts at international cooperation take place within an institutional context of some kind,
which may or may not facilitate cooperative endeavors” {Keohane, 1988 #1628, 380}.
C. Rationalistic theories of institutions
1. States form institutions for “potential gains from agreement” {Keohane, 1988 #1628, 386}.
2. They operate by reducing uncertainty and increasing transaction costs. They basically change the
costs and benefits of behaviors as they are operating pre-institutionally.
a) Stabilize expectations, especially about interpretation of facts and reciprocity
b) They distinguish among behaviors and need to explain actions
c) Allow monitoring and enforcement
3. Power matters in terms of what rules are agreed to: “More generally, the rules of any institution will
reflect the relative power positions of its actual and potential members, which constrain the feasible
bargaining space” {Keohane, 1988 #1628, 387}.
4. Discusses game theory, which we will go into detail on in next class.
5. Institutions are “sticky” -- they persist “after hegemony”: “Surely the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the United Nations are not
optimally efficient, and they would not be invented in their present forms today; but they persist”
{Keohane, 1988 #1628, 389}.
D. Reflective approach
1. Major changes in institutions can’t be changed? Why demise of slavery or colonialism?
2. Theory must explain “changes in institutions” and rationalism doesn’t do this well.
3. In particular, if institutions change in response to changes in state preferences and power, then the
most important question becomes why do state preferences and power change?
E. Keohane’s article is now 20 years old and much has changed
1. Lots more about discourse and framing in reflectivist/constructivist camp.
2. Much more evidence that norms play an important role
3. Thos interested - read articles by Ruggie, Carpenter, Tannenwald and others.

© Ronald B. Mitchell, do not use without permission: http://pages.uoregon.edu/rmitchel/ir/lectures/03-

ProblemStructure-Overview.doc