Professional Documents
Culture Documents
This volume describes the initial direction and strategy of the first major
though limited war that the United States was to fight on the continent of
Asia in the era of global tension that followed World War II. There are
marked similarities as well as some basic differences between the war in Korea
and the war that would follow a decade later in Southeast Asia, and certainly
the study of both is necessary to understand the limitations on armed conflict
under the shadow of nuclear holocaust. One can also discern in this volume
the importance of individuals in altering the course of human events and the
fate of nations, the wider concerns that preclude the massing by a world
power of its military strength in one direction, and many other facets of the
nation's recent military history it behooves all thoughtful Americans to
ponder.
Colonel Schnabel's work is the third to appear in a planned 5-volume
history of the United States Army in the Korean War. It complements the
detailed account of operations from June to November 1950, South to the
Naktong, North to the Yalu, published in 1961, and the sequel to it still in
preparation that will cover tactical operations through June 1951. The
volume entitled Truce Tent and Fighting Front, published in 1966, covers
the last two years of the war, and a logistical history of the Korean conflict
is also scheduled to appear.
Both military and civilian students and the scholarly reading public
should find in this book much that is illuminating and provocative of reflec-
tion, and not only about events that happened more than two decades ago.
vii
The Author
James F. Schnabel enlisted in the U.S. Army in July 1942 and, after
graduation from officer candidate school, the Field Artillery School, Fort Sill,
Oklahoma, was commissioned as a second lieutenant in January 1943.
Remaining in the service after World War II, he was assigned, as a captain,
to the Military History Section, GHQ, FEC, in late 1949. He served as a
historian in Tokyo until 1953, transferring in May 1953 to the Office of the
Chief of Military History, U.S. Army, in Washington, D.C., where he re-
mained until 1956. From 1956 until 1960 as a lieutenant colonel he held
the post of Chief Historian, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe,
and Allied Command Europe stationed in Paris, France. In 1960 he re-
turned to the Office, Chief of Military History, and became Historical Liaison
Officer to the Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. He retired from the
Army in 1964 and is presently a historian with the Office of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff.
A graduate of North Idaho Teachers College, Colonel Schnabel has pub-
lished several articles on the Korean War and has appeared as a guest lecturer
at the Army War College.
viii
Preface
ix
absence. Following my retirement from the Army in August 1964 further
revision was performed by Mr. Billy C. Mossman and by Dr. Stetson Conn,
then Chief Historian.
So many individuals have contributed to the present volume that it
would be impossible for me to thank all of them publicly. There are those,
however, to whom I owe special debts of gratitude. During the early years
of my work on this history I received particular encouragement and very
wise counsel from Col. Allison R. Hartman, then Chief, Historical Branch,
G-2, GHQ, FEC. Among those outside critics who have reviewed all or
part of the manuscript in its various stages and to whom I am indebted for
valuable comments and ideas are General J. Lawton Collins, General
Matthew B. Ridgway, Lt. Gen. Edward M. Almond, Mr. Robert Amory,
formerly Deputy for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, and Mr.
Wilber W. Hoare, Jr., Chief, Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Other individuals within the Office of the Chief of Military History
whose help and advice have been exceptionally valuable to me include the
Editor in Chief, Mr. Joseph R. Friedman, whose literary guidance has con-
tributed greatly in the final revision of the manuscript; Mr. Charles V. P.
von Luttichau, who is responsible for the fine maps which accompany the
text; Dr. Louis Morton and Dr. John Miller, jr., for their suggestions and
criticism while they were with the Office of the Chief of Military History;
Mr. David Jaffé, whose diligence and skill as an editor I have good reason
to appreciate; and Mrs. Stephanie B. Demma, who rendered most able
assistance to Mr. Jaffé. The index was prepared by Mr. Nicholas J. Anthony.
Finally, I would be remiss were I not to recognize gratefully the support
I received from the several Chiefs of Military History under whom I served
during the preparation of this volume: Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Maj. Gen.
Albert C. Smith, Brig. Gen. James A. Norell, Brig. Gen. William H. Harris,
and Brig. Gen. Hal C. Pattison.
That I have acknowledged the contributions made by those persons
named above in no way implies that they share responsibility for the inter-
pretations of this book or for any deficiencies that it may have. Responsi-
bility for them is mine alone.
Chapter Page
I. KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 1
T h e Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Korea's Past . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The United States and Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Korea 1945 .......................................... 6
The New Zones . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
xi
Chapter Page
VI. A NEW CONFIDENCE 100
First Visit From Washington . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Air Operations —July 1950 ...................... 108
The Withdrawal Continues ........................... 111
INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 417
Color Maps
No. Page
I. The North Korean Invasion, 25 June-4 August 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . 61
II. The Defeat of the North Korean Forces, 15-30 September 1950 . . . . 173
III. U.N. Forces Advance to the Yalu, 30 September-1 November 1950 . . . 205
IV. The November Offensive, 6-26 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
V. The CCF Offensive, 25-28 November 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
VI. U.N. Command on the Defensive, 31 December 1950-24 January 1951 308
VII. U.N. Command Strikes Back, 25 January-21 April 1951 . . . . . . . . . 334
VIII. U.N. Command on the Defensive, 21 April-19 May 1951 . . . . . . . . . 380
IX. U.N. Command Offensive, 20 May-24 June 1951 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389
Illustrations
Page
Syngman Rhee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Kim Koo 6
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur . . . . . . . . . . . 15
L t . Gen. John R . Hodge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Parade Held by Koreans for the American Advance Party 17
Russian Member Addresses U.S.-USSR Commission in Seoul 20
South Korean Mob Protests Proposed Trusteeship 21
K i m I l Sung . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
A South Korean Woman Casts Her Ballot 27
Ambassador Muccio With General Coulter 28
Members of the Korean Constabulary in Training at Taegu 31
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 1949 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
D a i Ichi Building, Tokyo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
L t . Gen. Walton H . Walker . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Page
Dean G. Acheson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
General J. Lawton Collins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
Louis A. Johnson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
Maj. Gen. John H. Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Generals MacArthur and Almond Confer With Ambassador Muccio 75
Lt. Gen. Charles L. Bolté . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Members of the 25th Division En Route to the Battle Front on
14 July 1950 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Refugees Fleeing From the Combat Area Near Taegu 111
Lt. Gen. Walton H. Walker and Maj. Gen. William F. Dean 113
American Artillerymen Protecting Pusan Perimeter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Replacements Board a Transport Plane at a Japanese Air Base for
Shipment t o Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
Maj. Gen. Edwin K. Wright . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
Maj. Gen. Hobart R. Gay 140
Rear Adm. James H. Doyle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
A Russian-Made T-34 Tank Knocked Out in Taejon 142
Maj. Gen. Oliver P. Smith 147
Lt. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd 151
Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
Admiral Arthur W. Radford Conferring With General MacArthur 156
Vice Adm. Dewey Struble . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
A Russian-Made 76-mm. Gun in Fortified Position on Wolmi Island 174
Inch'on Railroad Station After Bombardment by U.N. Naval Vessels 175
LST's Unloading on Wolmi Island . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
George C . Marshall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
Rhee Expresses Appreciation to General MacArthur at Liberation
Ceremonies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Chou En-lai . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., Arrives at Seoul Airbase 201
Maj. Gen. Leven C. Allen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
Tanks and Infantrymen Pursue Communist-Led North Korean Forces 203
U.S. Troops Pass Supply Wagons Abandoned by the North Koreans 204
Minesweeper Blows Up in Wonsan Harbor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
Radford, MacArthur, Pace, and Bradley at Wake Island Conference 211
President Truman 213
Equipment Air-Dropped in the Sunch'on Drop Zone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
Canadian Troops Cross the Imjin River . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
Troop Replacements From Thailand Arrive at Pusan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
Brig. Gen. Paik Sun Yup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
U.S. Men and Tanks Advance Through Hyesanjin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Page
Thanksgiving Day Services on Bank of Yalu River 265
Tracked Amphibious Vehicles Coming Off the Beach at Hungnam 302
USS Begor Ready To Load as Explosion Rips Harbor Installations 303
Vehicles To Be Loaded Aboard Ships at Hungnam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305
Korean Refugees Slog Through Snow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309
U.S. Infantrymen Enter the Walled City of Suwon 334
Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder and Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor Are
Greeted by Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 337
Troops Pile Into Assault Boats To Cross the Han River 355
Directing Artillery Fire on Chinese Positions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 361
General MacArthur Is Greeted by Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway 362
General MacArthur Receives Warm Welcome on his Return to the
United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
General Ridgway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 375
Lt. Gen. James A. Van Fleet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Buildings Burning in Village North of Ch'unch'on 388
In area, Korea equals the combined China reached the Korean scene first,
states of Tennessee and Kentucky, cover- making its impact felt on northern Korea
ing about 85,000 square miles. The several centuries before the beginning
facetious claim that Korea, ironed flat, of the Christian era. By the 7th century,
would cover the whole world has an A.D., the Chinese had forced their
element of truth, for the terrain through- thought, customs, and manners into the
out the peninsula is mountainous. Korean culture and had turned Korea
Roads and railways wind through tor- into a virtual satellite. Late in that
tuous valleys. Ice-free ports exist on century, a native dynasty, Chinese-con-
Korea's southern and western coasts, but trolled, unified the peninsula. Before
the latter shore is distinguished by some then Japan had occasionally invaded
of the most extreme tidal variations in southern Korea, but with little lasting
the world. On the eastern shore, there effect. Badly defeated by the Koreans
are only a few adequate harbors. Al- in 663 A.D., Japan retired for nearly a
though geographers place Korea in a thousand years.
temperate zone, the classification hardly Like China, Korea endured the Mon-
mitigates the harsh winters, particularly gol armies in the 13th century. For
in the wind-swept northern mountains, nearly a hundred years the savages from
or the sweltering, dusty, and no less the steppes ruled and ravaged Korea.
harsh summers in the south. Kublai Khan launched two abortive in-
vasions of Japan from Korea, ruthlessly
Korea's Past squandering Korean lives and property
in his depredations.
The forces shaping Korea into a na- With the gradual dissipation of Mon-
tion arose from its unfortunate proximity gol power by the mid-14th century,
to three powers, China, Japan, and Korea again basked in the reflected glory
Russia. The periodic surges of ambition of a revitalized China. Adapting Chinese
in each of these neighbors turned Korea culture to their own talents, the Koreans
into a battleground and a spoil. Some-
times described as a "dagger pointed at Korea and the Old Orders in Eastern Asia (Baton
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1946);
the heart of Japan," Korea became in- Yoshi Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Con-
stead Japan's steppingstone to the Asian tinent, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of Califor-
mainland. For China and, later, Russia, nia Press, 1937), vol. I; Ernest W. Clement, A Short
History of Japan (Tokyo: Christian Literature So-
Korea was a back gate both to be locked ciety, 1926); Andrew Grajdanzev, Modern Korea
against intruders and to be opened dur- (New York: The John Day Company, 1944); Cor-
ing any opportunity for expansion. nelius Osgood, The Koreans and Their Culture
(New York: Ronald Press, 1951); Harold M. Vinacke,
Korea's ice-free ports fronting the Sea A History of the Far East in Modern Times (New
of Japan were especially coveted by the York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1941), pp. 123-24;
Russians. Korea therefore has seldom A. Whitney Griswold, Far Eastern Policy of the
United States (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1938);
been completely free of domination by George M. McCune and John A. Harrison, Korean-
one of its stronger neighbors.1 American Relations, 3 vols. (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1951), vol. I; Tyler Dennett,
1
Unless otherwise cited, material on Korea's his- Americans in Eastern Asia (New York: The Mac-
tory is based on the following: H. Frederick Nelson, millan Company, 1922).
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 3
dustry almost exclusively to military use. aspirations, the flame of patriotism and
The heavy, sustained use of machinery independence remained alive in Korea.
without adequate maintenance during Revolutionary groups and movements
World War II ruined Korean factories sustained the Korean hope for freedom,
and equipment. The use of almost all defying the Japanese whenever possible.
chemical production, especially of nitro- One strong group working to free Korea
gen, in behalf of Japan's war effort caused from alien rule called itself the "Pro-
severe soil depletion in Korea.5 visional Government of the Republic of
Banning Koreans from responsible Great Korea." It originated on 1 March
positions and from educational oppor- 1919 when a declaration of independ-
tunities, the Japanese controlled key ence, signed by Korean students, was
governmental and economic functions. read before a student gathering in Seoul.
Comprising only 3 percent of the popu- The Japanese ruthlessly hunted down the
lation of Korea, the 750,000 Japanese instigators of this declaration, and many
residents were absolute masters of the patriots fled Korea to escape torture and
country. Nearly 80 percent of the death. On 10 April 1919 some of these
Korean people could neither read nor refugees met in Shanghai and estab-
write.6 lished the Provisional Government. Dr.
The Koreans deeply resented Japanese Syngman Rhee headed the group as
exploitation. Judged in Japanese courts Premier. After the Manchurian inci-
under Japanese laws, they received severe dent in 1931, the Provisional Govern-
sentences for minor offenses, more severe ment moved to Nanking and, later, to
than those given Japanese for similar in- Chungking.
fractions. The Japanese-controlled Bank This group sought to achieve complete
of Chosen charged Koreans interest rates independence for Korea and to establish
25 percent higher than those assessed itself as the Korean Government. Dif-
Japanese competitors. The Korean na- ferences on how these goals should be
tional debt increased thirtyfold between reached brought frequent clashes in the
1910 and 1945, and the taxation of leadership of the Korean Provisional
Koreans was oppressive. In most indus- Government. Two men, Rhee and Kim
tries, Japanese received twice as much Koo, emerged at the top. When Kim
as Koreans doing the same work. Large Koo became Premier in the mid-1930's,
numbers of farms were transferred from Rhee served as unofficial representative
Korean to Japanese owners.7 of the Provisional Government in the
Despite iron-handed Japanese rule United States. The group acquired a
that sought to crush Korean national considerable following among Koreans
in the United States and China and at-
5
Testimony of Hon. Paul G. Hoffman, Adminis- tracted widespread passive support
trator of the Economic Cooperation Administration
(ECA) before the House Committee on Foreign within Korea. Both Rhee and Kim were
8
Affairs, 81st Congress, 1st Session, 8 June 1949, in revered by the Korean people.
House Report No. 962, Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, June A strong Korean Communist party also
1949.
6
p. 9.
Ibid.
7 8
History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 2. Ibid., pp. 46-48.
6 POLICY AND DIRECTION
power vacuums in many areas of the veloped by Roosevelt and Stalin and
world and brought the differences be- agreed to by Prime Minister Winston S.
tween the United States and the Soviet Churchill only provided territorial and
Union into sharp focus. Countries newly other concessions to the USSR in the
freed from German or Japanese domina- Far East as conditions for Russian en-
tion assumed significance as possible trance into the war against Japan after
targets of clashing American-Soviet the defeat of Germany. Later, soon after
interests. Roosevelt's death, Stalin told Harry
Unlike the Soviet Union, the United Hopkins, President Harry S. Truman's
States attached little importance to representative in Moscow, that Russia
Korea as a strategic area. Korea sup- was committed to the policy of a 4-power
ported a relatively small population, and trusteeship for Korea.11
had neither important industrial facil- Though American military planners
ities nor many natural resources. If at ostensibly paid little attention to Korea,
some future date Korea fell into hands they had Korea in mind. On 25 July
unfriendly to the United States, the 1945, the Army Chief of Staff, General
United States recognized that the occu- of the Army George C. Marshall, sent a
pation of Japan might be hampered and note to President Truman at Potsdam,
American freedom of movement might advising him that some guidance on
be restricted in the general area. But handling Korea would assist the Joint
with China in 1945 under control of a Chiefs of Staff. General of the Army
friendly government, such a situation Douglas MacArthur, Commander in
appeared unlikely. Chief of the United States Army Forces,
Russia, on the other hand, maintained Pacific, had already received instructions
its traditional regard for Korea as a to prepare for occupying Japan, and
strategic area. As later events demon- shortly before Potsdam these orders were
strated, the Soviet Union would not broadened to include Korea. In re-
countenance control of Korea by another sponse to the additional directive, Gen-
power and sought to control Korea itself. eral MacArthur suggested that Tokyo
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and and Seoul have first priority for occupa-
Premier Josef V. Stalin at the Yalta Con- tion, Pusan second priority, and the
ference in 1945 touched upon Korea's Kunsan area on Korea's west coast, third
future. Roosevelt advocated a trusteeship priority. General Marshall then in-
for Korea administered by the United formed the President that MacArthur
States, the Soviet Union, and China. should be able to land a division at Pusan
Looking at American experience in the within a short time of the end of the war.
Philippines, he surmised that such a The other strategic areas in Korea, Mar-
trusteeship might last for twenty or 11
(1) Department of State, Foreign Relations of
thirty years. Stalin said he believed that the United States: The Conference at Malta and
Great Britain should also be a trustee. Yalta, 1945, Dept of State Publication 6199 (Wash-
No actual mention of Korea was made ington, 1955), pp. 770, 984. (2) Harry S. Truman,
Memoirs, 2 vols., vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope
in the document recording the agree- (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1956), pp.
ments at Yalta. The secret protocol de- 316-17.
8 POLICY AND DIRECTION
shall added, were Seoul, near the west Japan had been brought under control
coast, and Ch'ongjin, in the north on the and Japanese strength in South Korea
Sea of Japan. Marshall expected that was destroyed. Although the Chiefs of
the Russians, if they participated in the Staff developed ideas concerning the par-
occupation, would occupy Ch'ongjin and tition of Korea, Manchuria, and the Sea
would undoubtedly move into Man- of Japan into U.S. and USSR zones,
churia and perhaps into north China. these had no connection with the later
He considered it desirable, therefore, to decisions that partitioned Korea into
establish early control over any areas to northern and southern areas.14
be held by the United States.12 Russian entry into the war against
Korea was only briefly considered at Japan on 9 August, and signs of immi-
the Potsdam conference. Among the nent Japanese collapse on 10 August 1945
questions discussed were the Soviet time- changed U.S. Army planning from de-
table for entering the war in the Pacific feating Japan to accepting its surrender.
and the Allied proclamation demanding Military planners in the War Depart-
Japan's unconditional surrender. Look- ment Operations Division began to out-
ing ahead to the surrender of the Jap- line surrender procedures in General
anese on the Asiatic mainland, the Allied Order No. 1, which General MacArthur
military representatives drew a tentative would transmit to the Japanese Govern-
line across the map of Manchuria, above ment after its surrender. The first par-
which the Soviet Union was to accept agraph of the order specified the nations
surrender of Japanese forces. No men- and commands that were to accept the
tion was at first made of Korea. But surrender of Japanese forces throughout
15
since thousands of Japanese troops were the Far East.
stationed in Korea, there was a later dis- The Policy Section of the Strategy and
cussion of Allied operations in that Policy Group in the Operations Division
area.13 drafted the initial version of the order.
At Potsdam, the chief of the Russian
General Staff told General Marshall that 14
(1) McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict,
Russia would attack Korea after declar- pp. 24-25. (2) History of Occupation of Korea, vol.
II, ch. 3, p. 6. (3) Roy E. Appleman, South to the
ing war on Japan. He asked whether Naktong, North to the Yalu, UNITED STATES
the Americans could operate against ARMY IN THE KOREAN WAR (Washington,
Korean shores in co-ordination with this 1961), pp. 2-3. (4) See also discussions of 24 and
26 July in Department of State, Foreign Relations
offensive. General Marshall told him of the United States: The Conference at Berlin (The
that the United States planned no am- Potsdam Conference), 1945, 2 vols., Dept of State
phibious operation against Korea until Publications 7015, 7163 (Washington, 1960), II, 345-
52, 408-15. (5) There was widespread misconcep-
12
(1) Lt. Paul C. McGrath, U.S. Army in the tion that the division of Korea had been agreed
Korean Conflict, n.d., pp. 26-27, OCMH draft MS. upon at the high-level conference of the Big Three.
(2) Memo, Marshall for President (delivered at In June 1946, the Institute of Pacific Relations pub-
Potsdam), 25 Jul 45, file OPD 370.9, Case 17/8. lished a categorical statement that this agreement
13
(1) Interv, 1st Lt Paul C. McGrath with Vice had been made at Yalta. The New York Times in
Adm M. B. Gardner, 28 Jan 53, the Pentagon. (2) October 1946 named Potsdam as the place where
Interv, McGrath with Lt Gen Charles P. Cabell, Dir the agreement had been made.
15
of the Joint Staff, JCS, OSD, 27 Jan 53. Both in McGrath, U.S. Army in the Korean Conflict,
OCMH. p. 42.
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 9
When Bonesteel's draft paper reached wise, the Russian advance would render
the Joint Planners in the predawn hours academic the American acceptance of
of 11 August, Admiral M. B. Gardner the Japanese surrender in southern
suggested moving the surrender line Korea. At the same time, swift Russian
north to the 39th Parallel, a recommen- troop movements into key areas of south-
dation that the planners believed the ern Manchuria eliminated the possibil-
Navy Secretary, James C. Forrestal, ity of including Dairen in the American
favored. Gardner pointed out that the surrender zone.
39th Parallel would place Dairen in the Between 11 and 14 August, the State-
military zone to be occupied by the War-Navy Coordinating Committee and
Americans. General Lincoln, however, the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed the
felt that the Russians would hardly ac- wording of the surrender instrument.
cept a surrender line that barred them Meanwhile, General MacArthur in-
from Dairen and other parts of the formed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that he
Liaotung Peninsula; besides, American would adhere to three priorities for the
units would have great difficulty reach- use of the forces under his command.
ing the Manchurian port ahead of the After the Japanese surrender, the oc-
Russians. Calling Assistant Secretary of cupation of Japan would come first,
State James Dunn, Lincoln ascertained Korea second, China third.
that his opinion was shared. Mr. Dunn In Washington, the War Department
believed that Korea was more important Operations Division rephrased General
politically to the United States than Order No. 1 to the satisfaction of the
Dairen, and he felt this to be the view of Joint Chiefs of Staff and the heads of
Secretary of State James F. Byrnes. As a the State, War, and Navy Departments.
result, the 38th Parallel remained in the On 15 August 1945, clean copies of the
draft when the Joint Planners handed draft order were sent to Fleet Admiral
the general order to the State-War-Navy William D. Leahy's White House office.
Coordinating Committee. Within a few hours President Truman
While General Lincoln was shepherd- gave his approval, directing at the same
ing the document through the State-War- time that General Order No. 1 be sent
Navy Coordinating Committee on 11 also to the capitals of Great Britain and
and 12 August, the Russians invaded the USSR with requests for concurrence
Korea, landing on the northeast coast by the heads of those states. The Joint
near Rashin. Russian troops then Chiefs of Staff telegraphed the general
poured out of the maritime provinces order to General MacArthur and di-
of Siberia, down the Korean peninsula, rected that he furnish an estimated time
and into the Kaesong-Ch'unch'on area schedule for the occupation of a port
above Seoul, where they looted much in Korea.
equipment, including locomotives and Among the items it specified, General
rolling stock. Reports of the Russian Order No. 1 stated that Japanese forces
troop movements reaching Washington north of the 38th Parallel in Korea
underscored the need for concurrence would surrender to the Russian com-
in the proposed general order. Other- mander, while those south of the parallel
KOREA, CASE HISTORY OF A PAWN 11
South Korea had in 1940 turned out eight cement plants. Almost all the
about 74 percent of Korea's light con- electrical power used by South Korea
sumer goods and processed products. Its came from the north, as did iron, steel,
industry consisted of some large and wood pulp, and industrial chemicals
many small plants producing textiles, needed by South Korea's light industry.
rubber products, hardware, and ceram- Sharp differences between north and
ics. Many of these plants had been built south had traditionally been part of the
to process raw materials from North Korean scene. South Koreans consid-
Korea. ered their northern neighbors crude and
North Korea, a largely mountainous culturally backward. North Koreans
region, held valuable mineral deposits, viewed southerners as lazy schemers.
especially coal. Excellent hydroelectric During the Japanese occupation Koreans
plants, constructed during the last ten
in the north had been much less tractable
years of Japanese domination, ranked
than those in the south. Differences in
with the largest and best in the world.
Because of its power resources, North farming accounted for some of the social
Korea housed almost all of Korea's heavy differences in the two zones. A dry-
industry, including several rolling mills field type of farming in the north op-
and a highly developed chemical indus- posed a rice-culture area in the south
try. In 1940, North Korea produced 86 to produce marked variations in points
percent of Korea's heavy manufactured of view. In the south were more small
goods. The only petroleum processing farms and a high tenancy rate, while in
plant in the country, a major installa- the north larger farms and more owner-
tion designed to serve all of Korea, was farmers prevailed. Those differences the
located in the north, as were seven of 38th Parallel promised to exacerbate.
CHAPTER II
advance of occupation reflected an as- In the years before World War II the
sumption that fairly simple solutions President of the Korean Provisional
could be found for Korea's problems Government in Chungking, Kim Koo,
in close co-operation with Great Britain, and its representative in the United
the Soviet Union, and the Chinese Gov- States, Dr. Syngman Rhee, who styled
ernment of Generalissimo Chiang Kai- himself Chairman of the Korean Com-
shek. But neither in Washington nor mission in the United States, had sought
in the Far East were serious prepara- United States recognition and support
tions made for carrying out an American but without success. In the closing
program in South Korea that would take months of the war, these men increased
into account the entirely different Soviet their efforts, seeking not only recognition
outlook with respect to Korea's future. by the United States and other govern-
That General MacArthur expected ments, but membership in the United
problems with the Russians became Nations. American national policy for-
evident on 29 August when he warned bade such actions however and Rhee was
Hodge that the Russians might already told in June 1945, after an appeal to
be in Seoul when he arrived. He told President Truman, that "It is
Hodge to take over Seoul nevertheless, the policy of this Government in dealing
to make friendly contact with the Rus- with groups such as the 'Korean Provisional
sian commander, and to act with caution Government' to avoid taking action which
to avoid troublesome incidents. Mac-might, when the victory of the United Na-
Arthur believed that Korea would be oc- right tions is achieved, tend to compromise the
of the Korean people to choose the
cupied on a quadripartite basis, with ultimate form and personnel of the govern-
British, Chinese, Russian, and American ment which they may wish to establish." 5
participation, although he had no exact On 17 August, with the approach of
knowledge of the areas the four powers allied victory over Japan, Kim Koo
would occupy. General Hodge contin- petitioned President Truman, through
ued to believe that guidance from Wash- the United States Ambassador to China,
ington was inadequate. He contended for permission to send representatives
that unless he were provided more spe- of his Provisional Government to Korea
cific and positive policy instructions the and sought to participate in "all Coun-
United States would fail in Korea.4 cils affecting the present and future
4
(1) Rad, MacArthur to Hodge, 29 Aug 45, quoted destiny of Korea and Koreans." No
in History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. 1, pp. immediate action was taken on this re-
60-61. (2) The history written on this period by
officers of Hodge's headquarters and approved by
quest, but General Hodge, a few days
him states: "General Hodge had been given little after arriving in Korea, suggested to
or no practical guidance by his instructions on such General MacArthur that leaders of the
thorny questions as the eventuality of Korean inde-
pendence, methods of handling various political
Chungking government in exile be re-
factions or the severance of Korea from Japanese turned to Korea under allied sponsorship
influence, economic or otherwise. If Washington to act as "figureheads" until the political
or GHQ had given much constructive thought to
5
Korean problems, it had not been reflected in orders Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth
issued the Corps Commander." History of Occupa- and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1023, 1027,
tion of Korea, vol. I, ch. 1, p. 63. 1030-32.
GENERAL OF THE ARMY MACARTHUR
16 POLICY AND DIRECTION
may disturb public peace and safety will Secretary of State a disturbed and cha-
be punished severely." 9 otic situation in South Korea on 15
General Hodge appointed Maj. Gen. September. "USAFIK," he commented,
Archibald V. Arnold, commander of the
is operating under two great difficulties,
U.S. 7th Division—the initial occupa- neither of which can be corrected at this
tion force—Military Governor of South end. The first is that this headquarters has
10
Korea on 12 September 1945, and a no information in regard to the future
Department of State official had, at policy of the United States or its allies as to
Hodge's request, been assigned as his the future of Korea. What is going to hap-
pen to the nation and what will be the
Political Adviser. The latter, Mr. H. solution of the now almost complete divi-
Merrell Benninghoff, described for the sion of the country into two parts? What
will be our general policies beyond immedi-
9
Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth ate military necessity? The second difficulty
and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1043-44. is that USAFIK is in small strength, and has
10
USAFIK GO No. 7, 12 Sep 45. too few competent military government and
18 POLICY AND DIRECTION
sence in the country of Americans who and Hodge to be strong enough to instill
could speak or understand Korean. a sense of purpose into the politics of his
Americans were forced, in dealing with native land, reached Korea on 16 Octo-
Korean officials and the general public, ber 1945. Kim Koo arrived in Korea
to rely upon English-speaking Koreans. slightly later from Chungking, China.17
General Hodge used a Korean to inter- Their arrival coincided with the is-
pret his first press conference. A Korean suance to General MacArthur of specific
translated his first address to the Korean guidance from Washington. This guid-
public. The U.S. military government ance, which had been under preparation
became known among the people as a within the SWNCC since 1 September,
"government by interpreters." A sur- was sent MacArthur on 17 October. The
vey in October 1945 showed that Koreans basic initial directive stated that the
distrusted native interpreters and rated United States "ultimate objective" in
their influence on American officials Korea was "to foster conditions which
among the biggest problems disturbing will bring about the establishment of a
them. South Koreans strongly sus- free and independent nation capable of
pected that interpreters were dishonest taking her place as a responsible and
and were trying, in many cases success- peaceful member of the family of na-
fully, to influence occupation policy. tions." MacArthur was further in-
The situation improved as trained mil- structed, "In all your activities you will
itary government officers began arriving bear in mind the policy of the United
in Korea in increasing numbers late in States in regard to Korea, which con-
October.15 templates a progressive development
The Soviets had not been idle mean- from this initial interim period of civil
while. An inkling of their intentions affairs administration by the United
existed within the Department of State States and the U.S.S.R., to a period of
even before Japanese surrender. In a trusteeship under the United States, the
policy paper prepared in June 1945, United Kingdom, China, and the
State planners had predicted, "The U.S.S.R., and finally to the eventual in-
Soviet Government will, no doubt, es- dependence of Korea with membership
18
tablish military government in the por- in the United Nations organization."
tion of Korea under its control and may The presence of Syngman Rhee and
subsequently wish to establish a Korean Kim Koo coincided, perhaps accident-
regime friendly to the Soviet Union com- ally, with a noticeable rise in communist
posed at least partially of Korean leaders activity in southern Korea, all of it di-
groomed in the Soviet Union." 16 rected against the American occupation.
Dr. Rhee, whose prestige with the Other antioccupation groups, not neces-
Korean people was believed by Wash- sarily communist, stirred up increasing
ington officials and Generals MacArthur trouble. General Hodge criticized in-
15 17
(1) History of Occupation of Korea, vol. I, ch. History of Occupation of Korea, vol. II, ch. 1,
4. (2) History of USAMGIK, I, 69. p. 20.
16 18
Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth
and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 556-80. and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, pp. 1073-74.
20 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the United States, Great Britain, and to show that they had any thought of
the USSR. A seemingly constructive unifying Korea so long as American
plan of trusteeship for Korea was worked forces were present. "So far," he said:
out among these officials. Under this all discussion includes adjustment of the
plan a U.S.-USSR joint commission flow of everything from mail to persons
would be formed to recommend, after through central posts along the boundary.
consulting with Korean political parties My best guess now is that north and south
and social organizations, the creation of will never be really united until the Rus-
a provisional Korean democratic govern- sians are sure that the whole will be soundly
communistic. Based on current trends, I
ment for all of Korea. The ministers di- question our ability to stem the propaganda
rected the commission to consult with and controlled political maneuvering of the
22
this provisional Korean government and Soviets.
to draw up a program, which would be The Russian propaganda campaign in
considered by their own governments. Korea was indeed cleverly contrived and
The object would be an agreement to handled. Taking full advantage of
form a 4-power trusteeship of Korea for Korean sentiment, the Russians pre-
a period of up to five years.21 sented trusteeship to the Korean people
When news of the trusteeship pro- as the brainchild of the United States.
posal with its "up to five years" clause Tass made it appear that the Russians
reached South Korea, many of the had been trying to arrange for everything
Koreans reacted violently. Riots, which the Koreans wanted, including full and
had to be quelled by U.S. troops, broke immediate independence, but that the
out on 29 December. In contrast, the Americans were fighting for a 10-year
South Korean Communists, presumably trusteeship. General Hodge was bitter
acting on instructions from their Russian about the Russian success in this venture.
mentors, announced their support of the "As the significance of the Tass state-
trusteeship proposals on 3 January. ment . . . sinks in, the Korean people
The conference of U.S. and USSR are feeling that the U.S. has again 'sold
officials in Korea began on 16 January them down the river,' " he charged,
and ran for fifteen formal sessions "this time to the Russians instead of the
through 5 February 1946. The Ameri- Japanese."
23
cans wanted to integrate the two zones, After the military-level conferences,
but the Russians wanted to keep both which resulted only in some vague agree-
zones and merely to co-ordinate activities ments on an exchange of mail, an alloca-
between them. Since neither side would tion of radio frequencies, and military
budge on this basic issue, the sessions liaison, the Joint Commission of the U.S.-
produced little of consequence. On 2 USSR began deliberations at Seoul on
February, Hodge reported that there was 20 March 1946. The pattern of stale-
nothing in the attitude of the Russians mate was repeated. The Americans
21
(1) Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948,
22
Dept of State Publication 3305, FE Series (Wash- Rad, TFGCG 272, Hodge to MacArthur, 1 Feb
ington, 1948). (2) McCune, Korea Today, p. 61, app. 46.
23
A, Doc 1. (3) Truman, Memoirs, II, 319-20. Ibid.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 23
Finally, in October 1945, the Soviet traveling under the alias of Kim Il Sung.
commander slammed the door on any The Russians hailed him as the leading
further efforts by Hodge to work out exponent of Korean nationalism. The
agreements. The Communist official in- original Kim Il Sung had been a famous
formed Hodge by letter that there would leader of Korean resistance against the
be no negotiation of any sort at the mil- Japanese. The Russian-sponsored in-
itary level until decisions were made and terloper had served as a captain in the
relationships established at the top Russian Army. After going to Man-
political level. On 11 October the churia in 1930, he became a small-time
Russian liaison detachment was with- bandit leader, and finally disappeared
drawn from South Korea.25 into the USSR in 1941 or 1942. Backed
American and other observers who by the Russians, Kim Il Sung assumed
penetrated North Korea reported some control of the Korean Communist party
alarming developments. The Russians in late October 1945. At the same time
were molding North Korea into a model other Russian-trained Koreans took over
communist state. Korean political par- key posts in the North Korean regime.
ties which fitted the Soviet design were This seizure of power by the Korean
being placed in nominal power. Behind Communist party in North Korea was
a façade of native government the carried out boldly with complete Russian
Russians were communizing North backing.26
Korea without arousing the storms of A central North Korean government—
critical protest that met the Americans the Interim People's Committee—was
in their efforts to democratize South created on 12 February 1946. This
Korea. committee, headed by Kim Il Sung and
Russian policy in North Korea was dominated by Korean Communist party
aimed at creating an indigenous govern- members, gave wide publicity to Com-
ment which would be a replica of the munist measures and reforms. Within
Russian political system and subservient limits defined by the Russians and sub-
to the Soviet Union. The ready-made ject to their advisory control, the Korean
strong Communist organization in North Communists functioned with marked
Korea as well as the area's nearness to initiative. By mid-1946 the USSR
Manchuria and USSR territory made the position in North Korea had become
job easy for the Russians. They brought sufficiently secure to permit withdrawal
back to Korea thousands of Korean of all but 10,000 occupation troops.
expatriates who had lived, studied, and Thereafter, the occupiers further re-
become completely communized in the duced their interference in purely
USSR. A few had held government or administrative functions. Assured of re-
party posts in Moscow. liable leadership, the USSR could
On 3 October 1945 the Russians in- supervise developments in North Korea
troduced into their new nation one of
26
these Koreans, born Kim Sung Chu but (1) Department of State, North Korea: A Case
Study of a Soviet Satellite, Report No. 5600 (Wash-
25
Foreign Relations: The British Commonwealth ington, May 1951). (2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 320-
and the Far East, 1945, vol. VI, p. 1071. 22.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 25
tween the Commander in Chief, Far in the General Assembly, the USSR rep-
East (CINCFE), and the Commanding resentative protested that the United
General, USAFIK, was not to be affected, Nations had no jurisdiction over Korea
and CINCFE's military responsibilities and that foreign troops must withdraw
29
for Korea would remain unchanged. before creation of a unified Korean
The fanatic Korean dislike for trustee- government. His counterproposal was
ship meanwhile continued to foment that the occupying powers immediately
resistance to the Joint Commission, a re- withdraw their troops. This was re-
sistance in which Dr. Rhee was a princi- jected. When the General Assembly, on
pal factor. He kept up a continual attack 14 November 1947, approved a resolu-
against communism and against General tion supporting the United States
Hodge personally. But Rhee need not proposal and establishing the U.N. Tem-
have concerned himself with opposing porary Commission on Korea, Russia
the negotiations toward trusteeship: the refused to take part in the U.N.
Joint Commission got nowhere. In a commission.32
direct move to break the deadlock, the The Russians did more than refuse
United States proposed on 26 August to co-operate. The main source of hy-
1947 that the four major powers meet droelectric power for South Korea was
again to decide how the Moscow agree- located in their zone, and in November
ment could be carried out. China and 1947, upon the formation of the U.N.
Great Britain agreed, but the Soviet Temporary Commission, they cut in half
Union refused. Consequently, after two the amount of electricity allowed South
years of occupation, and with no arrange- Korea.
ment for unification and independence Elections took place in South Korea
of Korea yet in sight, the United States on 10 May 1948. The North Koreans
placed the problem before the General did not participate, nor did they recog-
Assembly of the United Nations on 23 nize the results of the elections. The
September 1947.30 U.N. commission itself was barred from
In a draft resolution on 16 October North Korea. But the elections brought
1947 the United States recommended out an estimated 80 percent of the eli-
that both zones of Korea hold elections gible voters in the south who chose
before 31 March 1948 under observation representatives for their National Assem-
of the United Nations. A United Na- bly, and the U.N. commission reported
tions temporary commission would view the results to be valid.33
the elections and supervise the formation The new assembly of the Republic of
of a national government. When a uni- Korea convened for the first time on 31
fied Korean government had thus been May 1948 and elected 73-year-old Dr.
established, foreign troops were to
withdraw.31 32
(1) Ibid., pp. 8-9. (2) Testimony, Hoffman,
During consideration of this proposal H.R. 5330, 7 Jun 49.
33
(1) Rpt, House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 81st
29
Rad, WARX 82849, WD to CINCFE, 25 Jul 47. Congress, 2d Session, Background Information on
30
Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, p. 5. Korea, House Report 2495, 11 Jul 50, pp. 11, 12.
31
Ibid., pp. 7-8. (2) Testimony, Hoffman, H.R. 5330, 7 Jun 49.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 27
Syngman Rhee as its chairman. After deputy, Maj. Gen. John B. Coulter, and
34
considerable debate, the assembly pro- he left Korea in August 1948.
duced a constitution in July 1948 and 34
For details of Rhee's biography and his oppo-
on the 20th of the month elected Rhee sition to Hodge, see the following: Current Biog-
President of the republic. Whereupon raphy Yearbook 1947 (New York: H. W. Wilson
General Hodge, because of his past dif- Company, 1948), pp. 534-36; Robert T. Oliver, Why
War Came in Korea (New York: Fordham Univer-
ferences with Rhee, recommended his sity Press, 1950), pp. 200-203; History of Occupa-
own relief as commanding general, tion of Korea, vol. II, ch. I, p. 33, and ch. 2, p. 50;
McCune, Korea Today, p. 244; Memo, CSUSA, 13
USAFIK. When Hodge left Korea in May 48, sub: Replacement of CG USAFIK, in G-3,
August 1948 he was succeeded by his DA file 091 Korea, sec. V, Case 22/2.
28 POLICY AND DIRECTION
low suit, and that after American troops officers would handle United States
withdrew the Russians had plans for interests in Korea.38
North Korean forces to seize South A month later than planned, on 15
Korea. The USSR delegation on the September, USAFIK units began to
Joint Commission suggested on 26 Sep- leave Korea. But new political develop-
tember 1947 that U.S. and USSR troops ments in both North and South Korea
be withdrawn simultaneously at the be- soon reduced the American departures.
ginning of 1948, and the Russian foreign On 9 September the North Koreans had
minister followed up on 9 October by formed a government, the Democratic
making the same suggestion to Secretary People's Republic of Korea, which im-
of State Marshall.37 mediately claimed jurisdiction over all
The USSR proposal was declined, but of Korea. The Soviet Union and its
on 29 September U.S. officials had de- satellites quickly recognized this govern-
cided to try for a Korean settlement ment. On 19 September the USSR noti-
which would let the United States with- fied the United States that all Russian
draw as soon as possible and with forces in Korea would depart by the end
minimum ill effects. Military leaders of the year and expressed the hope that
concurred inasmuch as the United States American troops would do likewise.
had little strategic interest in keeping Both the rise of the communist state in
forces or bases in Korea, and because the north and the Russian eagerness for
forces then in Korea were sorely needed the withdrawal of all foreign troops
elsewhere. President Truman, on 8 April argued against any rapid removal of
1948, called for every effort to create American forces. Furthermore, a rebel-
conditions which would allow a military lion within the South Korean defense
withdrawal by the end of the year. force in October, although short-lived,
The Department of State held that underlined the seething unrest within
American forces should remain in Korea the republic and prompted an appeal
until a strong South Korean military from President Rhee to President Tru-
force had been established, and a strong man for the retention of American troops
South Korean government formed. It until the complete loyalty of his own
also desired full United Nations ap- forces was assured and until the latter
proval of the withdrawal. But the Army were capable of dealing with any threat
had already started to plan its retire- from without or within. 39
ment. Planning dates, in which the De- Although a State Department repre-
partment of State eventually concurred,
set tactical withdrawals to start on 15 38
This Defense-State disagreement may be traced
August 1948. The ambassador and a in DA file P&O XO91 Korea, sec. V.
39
(1) Major Robert K. Sawyer, Military Advisors
military mission of sixty-one men and in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, ARMY HIS-
TORICAL SERIES (Washington, 1962) (hereafter
cited as Military Advisors in Korea), pp. 35-37. (2)
37
(1) Lt Gen A. C. Wedemeyer, Report to the Department of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 114-
President, Korea, Sep 47, pp. 13 and 25. (2) Depart- 15. (3) Rad, ZPOL 1936, COMGENUSAFIK (Muc-
ment of State, Korea, 1945 to 1948, pp. 6-7. cio) to Department of State, 20 Nov 48.
30 POLICY AND DIRECTION
vehicles, was available in Korea for only submitted by it to the United Nations.
about 25,000 troops. "Complete organi- If the United Nations accepts the prob-
zation of 100,000 can be organized and lem, decisions such as the one under
basically trained in from 8 to 12 months discussion will pass to it." 49
if equipment is supplied," Hodge said. American planners doubted that a
"It is believed that the equipping of 3 constabulary could be effective against
divisions and part of Army Service troops Russian-sponsored aggression. The Joint
could be accomplished in 90 days from Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC) told
date authority is given provided equip- the Joint Chiefs of Staff in January 1948:
ment is available in Japan." Hodge Present information indicates that the with-
recommended that, when his forces drawal of U.S. forces will probably result in
pulled out of Korea, equipment for a Communist domination, and it is extremely
Korean army of 100,000 be left behind doubtful if it would be possible to build up
and that small arms for an additional the constabulary in time and with facilities
100,000 also be provided.48 available ... to prevent Soviet encroach-
ment. Therefore eventual domination of
Even though raising an adequate force Korea by the USSR will have to be accepted
before an American withdrawal might as a probability if U.S. troops are with-
be impossible, Hodge recommended that drawn. However, an augmented constabu-
the constabulary at least be brought at lary might be a temporary deterrent to overt
once to its full authorized strength of acts by North Korean forces.50
25,000 and equipped with 81-mm. General MacArthur advised against the
mortars and 105-mm. howitzers. He establishment of a South Korean army
asked for authority to issue it U.S. equip- but proposed in February 1948 that the
ment at once. Whatever was done, he constabulary be increased to 50,000 men,
said, must be done in secrecy, for the equipped with heavy infantry weapons
51
North Korean communists seemed eager from stocks in Korea. The Joint
to invade the south. Although Hodge Chiefs of Staff authorized this action
doubted that the Russians would insti- on 10 March 1948. General Hodge
gate an invasion while they still had assigned more American officers to advise
forces in North Korea, he considered the constabulary and set up schools for
an attack on South Korea by North Koreans in the use of American
Korean armed forces likely if the equipment.
Russians withdrew their forces unilater- Because the Department of the Army
ally. General MacArthur threw cold had proposed early in 1948 that the
water on the whole proposition. "I augmented U.S. diplomatic mission to
believe no definite decisions can be made South Korea include a military section,
until action is reached by the United and because General MacArthur had
Nations," he told Washington on for- concurred in this proposal, President
warding Hodge's views. "Unilateral Rhee formally asked for a U.S. military
action by the United States at this time
would be inconsistent with the proposal 49
Ibid.
50
Rpt, JSSC to JCS, 1483/50, 30 Jan 48.
48 51
Ibid. Rad, CX 58437, CINCFE to DA, 6 Feb 48.
34 POLICY AND DIRECTION
North Korean air and naval forces.56 launchers, more than 40,000 vehicles of
The ROK Army, he felt, should be cap- all types, and a number of light artillery
able of offering "token resistance" to pieces and mortars with over 700,000
invasion, but should "be so organized rounds of ammunition for them. In-
as to indicate clearly its peaceful purpose dividual organizational equipment for
and to provide no plausible basis for an additional 15,000 men subsequently
allegations of being a threat to North arrived in Korea from American stocks
Korea." 57 in Japan. Although the United States
In June 1949, justifying an American Government made plans for further ma-
withdrawal from Korea, Maj. Gen. terial aid to the Republic of Korea and
Charles L. Bolté, Director, Plans and allotted Military Defense Assistance Pro-
Operations Division, Department of the gram funds for that purpose, low prior-
Army, announced that South Korean ities, administrative red tape, and
forces were better equipped than the procurement difficulties prevented this
North Korean troops. Bolté drew this aid from reaching Korea before June
conclusion from reports submitted by 1950.59
General Roberts, the KMAG chief. President Rhee sent an almost frantic
Largely on that basis, the Army, as the request for greater support to President
executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Truman in August 1949. He said:
Staff for the Far East, was not only
Unless I and my government with the aid
agreeable to the withdrawal of American of our friends, do find solutions, the im-
tactical units but was heartily in favor mediate future for our nation is bleak and
of it.58 bloody. . . . Some American advisors as-
When USAFIK withdrew from Korea sure us that the Communists will never at-
in 1949, it transferred to the ROK, under tack in force, and therefore we may rest
easily defended by our brave army. We
the Surplus Property Act through the Koreans believe that the Communists, un-
Office of Foreign Liquidation, military der Soviet direction intend to attack in
equipment that originally cost the force, that they will do so, and if they do,
United States approximately $56,000,000 it is we, the Koreans, civilian and military,
and that had a 1949 replacement value of who will pay the price, not the good-willed
American advisors. . . . American officers
about $110,000,000. The ground force tell me we have sufficient ammunition for
equipment was sufficient for a force of two months of combat; my own officers tell
50,000 men. It included 100,000 small me it is only sufficient for two days.
arms, 50,000,000 rounds of small arms He asked for more equipment and am-
ammunition, more than 2,000 rocket munition and for M2 howitzers to re-
56
place M3's of limited range. On 26
GHQ, FEC Annual Narrative History Rpt,1
Jan-31 Oct 50, app. IV, pt. 1, p. 9.
September 1949, President Truman as-
57
Memo, signed Maddocks for CSUSA, 7 Mar 49, sured Rhee that KMAG would continue
sub: Strength of SK Armed Forces, Tab A, in G-3,
59
DA file 091 Korea, sec. I-G, Case 11. Senate Comm on Armed Services and Senate
58
(1) Testimony, Maj Gen Charles L. Bolté, Comm on Foreign Relations, 82d Congress, 1st Ses-
Korean Aid, H.R. 5330, Jun 49, p. 120. (2) J. Law- sion, Hearings on Military Situation in the Far East
ton Collins, War in Peacetime (Boston: Houghton and the Relief of General MacArthur, 1951 (here-
Mifflin Company, 1969), p. 42. after cited as the MacArthur Hearings), pp. 1992-93.
36 POLICY AND DIRECTION
to make recommendations for the equip- border clashes, North Koreans placed
ping and support of the ROK Army and their artillery just beyond maximum
that, when Congress appropriated more range of the 105-mm. howitzer and
military aid funds for Korea, Mr. Muccio shelled at will. They also had the
would so advise him.60 The triumph of 120-mm. mortar. "The presence in
the Communists on the mainland of North Korea of high performance air-
China in late 1949 apparently had little craft of fighter and bomber type, artillery
effect on expediting further military aid of medium range and a preponderance
to Korea. of mortars are matters seriously affecting
In October 1949, the ROK Minister the spirit of the Security Forces." Colo-
of National Defense asked for 189 M25 nel Baird recommended F-51 aircraft
tanks. Col. William H. Sterling Wright, for the Republic of Korea, saying, "It is
acting for General Roberts who was in imperative that Korea be given some
Japan at the time, advised General J. means of defense against air attack." But
Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S. the only aircraft the Republic of Ko-
Army, against fulfilling the request. rea received were twenty liaison-type
The rough terrain, poor roads, and planes.62
primitive bridges, he said, militated The U.S. and ROK Governments
61
against efficient tank operations. signed a military assistance agreement
At almost the same time that Colonel on 26 January 1950. This authorized
Wright was minimizing the usefulness substantial aid to the new government
of tanks in Korea, Col. John E. Baird, and formalized the establishment of the
acting chief, KMAG, in the absence of military advisory groups. The final
both General Roberts and Colonel stipulation of this agreement came on
Wright, informed Ambassador Muccio 15 March 1950, when the United States
that the type and quality of matériel promised the Republic of Korea a total
available to South Korea were inade- of $10,970,000 in military aid. Of this,
quate for war. On 26 October 1949, he only a few hundred dollars' worth of
warned that the South Korean Army was signal wire reached the peninsula before
outnumbered in all weapons except in- 25 June, although signal equipment and
dividual arms and that the Russians had spare parts worth $350,000 were en route
given North Korea much better arma- from San Francisco.63
ment. North Korean artillery had
112-mm. howitzers with a maximum North Korea Prepares
range of 12,980 yards as against the South
Korean 105-mm. howitzer M3 which President Rhee's fears of attack from
could reach only 7,600 yards. During the north were not unreasonable. The
Soviet Government was developing a
60
(1) Ltr, Rhee to Truman, 20 Aug 49. (2) Ltr,
strong native army in North Korea.
Truman to Rhee, 26 Sep 49. Both in DA file P&O
62
091 Korea, sec. I-E, Book I, Case 16, Incl 1. Ltr, KMAG to Mr. Muccio, 26 Oct 49, sgd Col
61
Memo, Minister of National Defense, Seoul, for John E. Baird, CMP, Actg Chf, KMAG, in DA file
Gen Collins, 20 Oct 49, in G-3, DA file P&O 091 P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, Case 18.
63
Korea, sec. I, Case 18. MacArthur Hearings, pp. 1992-93.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 37
arrested.68 When the American troops The ROK Government claimed that its
began to withdraw from Korea, even forces had killed 5,000 guerrillas in
more serious attempts to seize control South Korea in the period from Septem-
70
developed. ber 1949 to April.
Just before the last American forces
left Korea, North Korean communists
launched their first open attack across Situation in Korea—June 1950
the 38th Parallel. On 3 May 1949, they Korea in 1950 was quite different from
struck across the border in the Kaesong the country entered by the Allies late in
area. ROK units repulsed them, but a 1945. Two political entities with widely
mass defection of two battalions of the divergent forms of government existed
ROK Army resulted, the ROK battalion on one small peninsula separated by an
commanders moving their units into artificial boundary. Each government
North Korea and surrendering their men
existed only through the support of op-
and equipment. About half of these
posing major powers. Indigenous in-
troops returned to South Korea later. dustrial and economic development
In July 1949, North Korean units remained impossible for either of the
again crossed the parallel near Kaesong, two portions of Korea. Political unity
only to be thrown back. Hundreds of
seemed out of the question, and bitter
small-scale assaults occurred in the next hatreds had developed between them.
year. In every case the ROK Army
From the autumn of 1949, the North
pushed the invaders back. While most Korean Government had intensified its
skirmishes were confined to small-arms "hate" campaign against the Rhee Gov-
fire fights, some involved artillery duels ernment. Increasing stress was placed on
and inflicted heavy casualties on both
service in the national defense as the
sides.69
highest duty to the communist state. By
A strong and effective guerrilla move-
June 1950, the North Korean military
ment in South Korea, subsidized and
machine was ready and the populace was
directed by the North Korean Govern-
psychologically prepared for war. As
ment, was also functioning under orders
part of this build-up, the communist
to overthrow the Republic of Korea. A regime conducted a "peaceful unifica-
series of uprisings on the island of tion" campaign. During the spring of
Cheju-do spread to the mainland by late 1950 it made a last effort at a guerrilla-led
1948, and keeping the guerrillas under overthrow of the Republic of Korea, but
control became a major task for the ROK
failed. At this juncture, under cover of
Army, but, by June 1950, the ROK
two unification proposals to the Repub-
Army had virtually stamped them out,
lic of Korea, offered on 7 June and 20
in some cases after full-scale battles. June 1950, the final steps for invasion
68
were taken, as the main body of the
George C. McCune, "The Korean Situation,"
Far Eastern Survey, XVII (8 September 1948), 197-
70
202. Statement by Ambassador Muccio, Hearings
69
KMAG, Semi-Annual Rpt, 31 Dec 49, sec. IV, Before Committee on Armed Services, MDP 1950,
p. 22. 81st Congress, 6 Jun 50.
THE HOUSE DIVIDED 39
North Korean Army moved to positions Russian-made tanks and 180 high-
along the parallel.71 performance combat aircraft.
73
The current estimates of ROK intelli- In March 1950, General Roberts still
gence agencies on 25 June 1950 set the believed that the ROK Army was
strength of the North Korean forces at stronger than its potential opponent in
10 infantry divisions, 1 tank division, the north, but he feared the air capabil-
1air force division, and an antiaircraft ity of North Korea. Pointing out that
gun regiment—120,000 infantry soldiers, the Russians had given their protégés
34,000 constabulary troops, 5,000 ar- about 100 combat-type high-performance
mored troops, and 2,000 air force person- aircraft, General Roberts said:
nel. Weapons strength, according to If South Korea were attacked today by the
ROK figures, amounted to 1,600 artillery inferior ground forces of North Korea plus
pieces, 50 T-34 tanks and SU-76 self- their Air Corps, I feel that South Korea
propelled (SP) guns, 211 YAK-9 fighters would take a bloody nose. Again, then,
and IL-10 attack planes.72 A State De- knowing these people somewhat, I feel that
they would follow the apparent winner and
partment report from Seoul as of 11 May South Korea would be gobbled up to be
1950, at some variance with these esti- added to the rest of Red Asia.74
mates, credited the North Korean Army The United States Government received
with 103,000 soldiers and constabulary a clear warning that the ROK Army was
troops of all types (excluding 25,000 not strong enough when Ambassador
provincial police), 65 tanks, including Muccio, in the same month South Korea
some T-34's, 296 light and medium was attacked, told the Senate Committee
artillery pieces, 780 medium and heavy on Armed Services that the matériel
mortars, and 356 45-mm. antitank guns. superiority of the North Korean forces,
Aircraft attributed to the North Korean particularly in heavy infantry support
Air Force were set at 100 YAK aircraft, weapons, tanks, and combat aircraft
70 IL-10 attack planes, and 10 recon- which the USSR had supplied, would
naissance planes. Later reports, believed provide North Korea with the margin of
more accurate, gave the North Korean victory in any full-scale invasion of the
Army 135,000 men organized into 8 in- republic. Ambassador Muccio told the
fantry divisions, 1 armored brigade, 2 legislators that it was vital that the ROK
half-strength divisions, 1 separate in- Army be maintained on an effective de-
fantry regiment, and 1 motorcycle re- fensive level of equality in manpower,
connaissance regiment. Many of these equipment, and training, in relation
troops were veterans from the armies of to those forces which immediately
the USSR and Communist China. In threatened it.75
addition to large amounts of artillery,
73
the North Koreans possessed 150 T-34 (1) Rad, No. 683, State Dept, Seoul, to Secy of
State, 11 May 50. (2) Appleman, South to the Nak-
71
Dept of State, North Korea: A Case Study of tong, North to the Yalu, p. 11.
74
a Soviet Satellite, pp. 17-18. Ltr, Gen Roberts to Gen Bolté, 8 Mar 50, in
72
ROK Army, Military History of Korea, trans- G-3, DA file OPS 091 Korea, sec. I-B, Book I, Case 4.
75
lated from Korean, by Hq, U.S. Army Forces, Far Statement, Mr. Muccio, Hearings Before Com-
East, Military Intelligence Service Group, p. 9, copy mittee on Armed Services, MDP 1950, 81st Congress,
in OCMH. 6 Jun 50, p. 80.
40 POLICY AND DIRECTION
National Defense
and the United States Army
It has become almost a truism that modernized those of its satellite nations.
nations inevitably try to prepare for the Thus, the United States was resolved to
war they have just won. Except for sub- contain Russian influence and prevent
stituting the Soviet Union in the role of threats to world peace and the independ-
chief adversary the United States pur- ence and stability of other nations by
sued a course between 1946 and 1950 resorting to collective security arrange-
that appeared to lend credence to this ments and acting through the United
theory. American military planning in Nations.
these years was shaped largely by World Beginning in 1948, the United States
War II experience and the priority af- gave military assistance to a number of
forded to Europe over the Pacific and friendly nations in Europe, the Middle
Far East. In 1950 the defense of western East, and Asia, to enable them to resist
Europe still held first claim on Ameri- communist encroachment and, if neces-
can military resources, and plans were sary, to join effectively with the United
devoted almost exclusively to general States in any war with the communist
war. Furthermore, reflecting its coali- bloc of nations. More significant was
tion effort, the United States sought to United States sponsorship of the North
strengthen nations that might be helpful Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
to it in any crisis with the Soviet Union, which in April 1949 bound the United
its most likely opponent in a time of in- States, Canada, and ten nations of west-
creasing frictions throughout the world. ern Europe together to prevent the
The Soviet Union and its allies were communist seizure of western Europe.
apparently superior to the United States As the most powerful single nation in
and its allies in conventional military NATO, the United States assumed a con-
strength, for except in nuclear weapons siderably enlarged obligation in Europe.
the United States military power dropped The successful explosion by the Soviet
sharply in the postwar years. Russia, on Union of a nuclear device in September
the other hand, kept powerful military 1949 nullified to some extent the Ameri-
forces in being and strengthened and can atomic advantage and intensified ef-
42 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; Chief of the military services. Operating under
Staff, U.S. Air Force; Chief of Naval the strategic direction of the JCS, each
Operations, and a chairman appointed by of these commands was directly super-
the President, comprised the top advisory vised by a particular chief of staff who
body in the United States Government acted as the executive agent of the JCS.
composed exclusively of military men. In 1950 the major overseas unified
They were designated by law as the prin- commands established by the JCS were
cipal military advisers to the President, the Far East Command, the Alaskan
the National Security Council, and the Command, the Caribbean Command, the
Secretary of Defense. Subject only to the Pacific Command, and the European
authority of the President and the Secre- Command. Within each of these, indi-
tary of Defense, the JCS was specifically vidual service commanders commanded
charged with the preparation of strategic the forces of their respective services—
plans and strategic direction of the mili- Army, Navy, or Air Force—but they were
tary forces; the preparation of joint logis- under the over-all supervision of a desig-
tic plans and the assignment of logistic nated commander in chief from one of
responsibility; review of the major re- the services, and he was named by and
quirements of military forces in the light responsible to the JCS.
of prepared plans; and the establishment
3
of unified commands in strategic areas. Army Strength and
After World War II, American armed Deployment—1950
forces in major overseas areas were
In June 1950, the strength of the active
brought under the operational control
Army stood at about 591,000 and in-
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the
cluded ten combat divisions. About
formal establishment of unified com-
360,000 troops were stationed within the
mands, which included contingents of all
zone of the interior (ZI). The remain-
3
In their capacities as members of the JCS, the ing 231,000 were disposed in overseas
individual members represented the entire military
establishment and not their respective services. The
commands, most of them performing oc-
Secretary of the Army, for example, had no direct cupation duties. The largest group over-
control over the Chief of Staff of the Army in the seas (about 108,500) was located in the
latter's role as a member of the JCS. The chairman
of the JCS had no vote, but presided over the meet-
Far East. In Europe, approximately
ings and deliberations of the body. He frequently 80,000 U.S. soldiers were stationed in
represented the entire membership before the Presi- Germany, 9,500 in Austria, and 4,800 in
dent, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense. Al-
though not a member of the NSC, the chairman of
Trieste. Slightly more than 7,000 were
the JCS usually accompanied the Secretary of De- assigned to the Pacific area and about
fense to the meetings of the NSC and explained 7,500 to Alaska. In the Caribbean were
or defended the views of the JCS, sometimes against
the opposition of the Secretary of Defense. For
about 12,200 troops. Several thousand
details of the composition, functions, and respon- more were assigned to military missions
sibilities of the JCS in 1950, see National Security throughout the world.4
Act 1947, PL 253, sec. 211B, 80th Congress; National
4
Security Amendments, 1949, PL 216, 81st Congress; (1) STW 1037, Weekly Estimate of Army Com-
Stanley, American Defense and National Security; mand Strength as of 26 June 1950, 2 Jul 50, AGO
MacArthur Hearings, p. 904; Hoare, "Truman (1945- Stat and Acc Br, copy in G-3 Deployments Br.
1953)," PP. 185-94. (2) These figures are at slight variance with those
44 POLICY AND DIRECTION
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF AT PENTAGON, November 1949. Left to right: Admiral
Forrest P. Sherman, General Omar N. Bradley, General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, and
General J. Lawton Collins.
5
The force designated to carry out the continental United States. The major
Army's emergency assignments was called General Reserve units on 25 June 1950
the General Reserve. Except for one were the 2d Armored Division, 2d Infan-
regimental combat team (RCT) in Ha- try Division, 3d Infantry Division, 82d
waii, this force consisted of five combat Airborne Division, 11th Airborne Divi-
divisions and certain smaller units in the sion (- 1 RCT), 3d Armored Cavalry
Regiment, 5th RCT (located in Ha-
contained in STM-30, Strength Report of the Army,
waii), and 14th RCT. In addition, there
1July 1950, which gives the following data on Army
5
forces as of 30 June 1950: Total Strength 591,487; For precise definition of General Reserve, see
Zone of Interior 347,224; Overseas Strength 244,263. SR 320-5-1, Dictionary of United States Army
(3) Total strength in both compilations excludes the Terms, Aug 50. See also Directory and Station List,
cadet corps at the Military Academy. U.S. Army, 30 Jun 50, copy in OCMH.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 45
were smaller combat support and service training lasted only eight weeks, and
support units.6 graduates sent overseas usually had to
Besides the General Reserve in the undergo further basic training before
United States and Hawaii, four tactical they could be assigned to units. The
divisions and one RCT were located in Army put in a 14-week training cycle in
the Far East Command. In Europe the March 1949 and, although this cycle did
Army maintained one tactical division, not provide for branch training (i.e.,
one RCT, three cavalry regiments, and artillery, engineers), it included a suffi-
one separate infantry regiment. One in- cient amount of basic subject material
fantry battalion was in Alaska, and two to give an adequate foundation on which
10
separate regiments were in the Caribbean to build individual and unit training.
area.7 This came rather late for the Korean
The authorized strength of the Army, War.
as opposed to its actual strength, was
630,201. Budget planning in the spring Army Supply Status
of 1950 contemplated a reduction of this The Army had sufficient stocks of most
figure to 610,900. The proposed cut items of matériel and equipment to sup-
would have eliminated one of the Army's port its peacetime program. Certain im-
ten tactical divisions; specifically, it balances—resulting from the cessation or
would have reduced the number of divi- curtailment of production, the surplus
sions in the FEC from four to three.8 property disposal program, and the
The strength of the United States breakdown of distribution systems—ex-
Army in 1950 was much less than Ameri- isted, but these presented relatively
can military leaders wished. But govern- minor problems and were usually local-
ment economies in the aftermath of ized.
World War II allowed no increase. From the standpoint of war-readiness,
the Army's supply position was much
Army Training
more serious. Army procurement after
Training programs were hampered by World War II was limited mainly to
lack of funds, and this, together with the food, clothing, and medical supplies. The
absence of a sense of urgency, detracted shift of American industry away from
from the combat readiness of Army forces military production forced the Army to
9
in being in 1950. Until 1949 basic operate almost exclusively with older and
6
obsolescent equipment. Nor was money
Memo for Gen Collins, 9 Jul 50, sub: Status
of Major Units of the General Reserve Which Have
available for new procurement. The
Not Been Committed to FECOM, unnumbered note- Army computed its requirements care-
book of Far East Br, G-3, DA, in G-3, DA files. fully, basing them on minimum essen-
7
(1) JSPC 853/6, 4 Jul 50, App C to Incl B, in
G-3, DA files. (2) Four training divisions also were
tials, only to find that appropriations
stationed in the United States.
8
Army Tentative Plans, FY 1952, Part I, p. 55. OCAFF), Part I, ch. I, pp. 5-9, ch. VI, pp. 2-3, 5-6,
9
For information in detail on Army training in ch. IX; ibid., 1950, vol. II, ch. XIV; Rpt of Activities
the postwar era, see: Annual History, Office, Chief AFF, 1945-49, PP. 8, 10, 54-55. All in OCMH.
10
of Army Field Forces (OCAFF), 1 January-31 De- Annual History of OCAFF, 1949, ch. VI, pp.
cember 1949 (hereafter cited as Annual History of 5-6.
46 POLICY AND DIRECTION
habitually fell far short of meeting them. dium M4A3 tanks, 1,376 unserviceable
For the fiscal year 1948, for instance, the ones. There were only 319 new M-46
13
Ordnance Department estimated it would General Patton tanks.
need $750,000,000 to cover procurement Development of new weapons and ve-
of essential ammunition and equipment, hicles continued, but at a decelerated
storage and distribution of ordnance ma- pace. New models being developed in
terial, maintenance of stand-by plants the spring of 1950 would not be avail-
and arsenals, training, and research and able for issue before the end of 1952.
development. The Bureau of the Budget Other research projects indicated many
cut this figure to $275,000,000, and the desirable improvements in weapons and
Congress reduced the appropriation in equipment, but funds were unavailable
final form to $245,532,000.11 to complete development and produc-
14
Maintenance of available equipment tion.
assumed greater importance as World Ammunition stocks in the United
War II items wore out under constant States were far out of balance. Training
use or deteriorated in storage depots. activities, both of the active Army forces
Rapid demobilization had hurt the and the civilian components, normal de-
Army's maintenance program by reduc- terioration, and transfers to foreign coun-
ing personnel and facilities to levels al- tries under military assistance programs,
lowing proper storage and continuing had eaten away much of the stockpile
maintenance on no more than a token remaining at the end of World War II,
basis. At the same time, replacement while economy budgets prevented sig-
parts and assemblies became critical in nificant new procurement. The result
many classes of equipment. 12 was a woefully inadequate reservoir of
15
Machine guns and towed artillery were several types of ammunition. In sum,
in plentiful supply, but heavy construc- the shortages of men and supplies com-
tion equipment, newly developed radios, bined with inadequate training to affect
self-propelled artillery, newer tanks, and adversely the combat readiness of the Far
antiaircraft guns were critically short. East Command just as they hindered the
Installations in the United States sup- effectiveness of the U.S. Army elsewhere.
porting the current 10-division Army re-
quired more than 38,000 commercial-type The Far East Command
motor vehicles, but in 1950 only 27,000
were on hand, and 23,000 of these were On 16 December 1946 the Joint Chiefs
six or more years old. There were of Staff designated General MacArthur
fewer than 900 serviceable light M-24 13
(1) Army Presentation Before JCS on Review
tanks in the United States, 2,557 un- of Service Establishment, Phase II, Part III for FY
serviceable ones; 1,826 serviceable me- 1951 Budget, 29 Jul 49, pp. 143-47. (2) DF, Supply
Div to Control Office, 11 Jul 51, sub: Supply Sit in
REC and U.S. as of 25 Jun 50, with 7 Incls, in G-4,
11
Statement, Maj Gen Everett S. Hughes, 14 Mar DA files.
14
47, Hearings Before House Subcommittee on Appro- Ibid.
15
priations, 80th Congress, 1st Session, pp. 941, 967. Summary Sheet, CSCLD/16027, DCofS G-4 (Gen
12
G-4 Review of the Month, 1 Apr 48, pp. 1, 29, Reeder) to CofS, 3 Apr 50, sub: Ammunition Re-
in G-4, DA files. serve, in G-4, DA files.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 47
Commander in Chief, Far East Com- ters, staffed almost entirely by Army per-
mand, effective 1 January 1947. No sonnel, and resembling the structure of
specific boundaries were established, but General MacArthur's World War II
forces placed under General MacArthur's headquarters.18
command were located in Japan, Korea, The Navy and Air Force felt that their
the Ryukyu Islands, the Philippines, the activities within the Far East were being
Mariana Islands, and the Volcano and directed by the Army staff under an Army
Bonin Islands. These determined in a commander. But General MacArthur
vague manner the geographic limits of considered his authority over naval and
the Far East Command.16 air forces too limited. He complained
The area was vast. It extended over that he could not exercise sufficient con-
265,000 square miles of island area in- trol over the internal organization of
habited by almost 100,000,000 people. these services in his area, direct the troop
Because of the preponderance of sea over control of their units, or supervise fully
land within the Far East Command and their logistical operations.19
because of the terrain and climatic condi- As Commanding General, United
tions, varying from sub-Arctic to tropical, States Army Forces, Far East (USAFFE),
the military garrison was compartmented General MacArthur controlled all Army
into geographical groups. The primary units and personnel within his area.
land area and the area containing the Since this function was inherent in the
largest number of U.S. troops was Japan.17 broader designation of CINCFE, he
MacArthur's authorities and responsi-
18
bilities as CINCFE were defined by di- (1) Ibid., Paper 5, pp. 2-6. (2) The directive
from JCS which established the command originally
rectives issued by the Joint Chiefs of had stated, "Each unified commander will have a
Staff. Three general missions were as- joint staff with appropriate members from the vari-
signed him. The first pertained to occu- ous components of the services under this command
pation of former enemy territories in in key positions of responsibility." General MacAr-
thur had not gone all the way in meeting the spirit
which he discharged U.S. occupation of unification. But a joint committee of top-ranking
responsibilities in Japan, Korea, and Army, Navy, and Air Force officers was an integral
former Japanese islands. The second part of GHQ and met each week, though only to
advise the Chief of Staff, FEC (an Army officer), in
broad mission was to support U.S. poli- "coordination of interservice matters." Additionally,
cies within the areas controlled by his frequent co-ordinating conferences were held by
forces. Third, CINCFE was to prepare MacArthur with the commanders of major air and
naval elements within his command. Another con-
to meet a general emergency at any time. cession to the principle of unification of command
The top headquarters within the Far within GHQ was the establishment of the Joint
East Command was General Headquar- Strategic Plans and Operations Group (JSPOG) to
"assist and advise the Commander-in-Chief Far East,
ters (GHQ) located in Tokyo, Japan. on matters pertaining to the exercise of unified com-
This was essentially an Army headquar- mand over Army, Navy and Air Forces allocated to
the Far East Command." The group consisted of
three Army officers, three Navy officers, and two
16
Study, Requirements, Means Available, and Air Force officers, but hardly constituted a joint staff
Procedures Evolved to Accomplish CINCFE Missions as envisioned by the JCS instructions of December
(hereafter cited as FEC Papers), Paper 1, 26 Oct 49, 1946. See JCS 1259/27, 14 Dec 46, and USAF in the
p. 2, in G-3, DA file P&O 333 Pacific, F/w-6/3. Korean Conflict, USAF Hist Study No. 71, p. 9.
17 19
Ibid., pp. 5-7. FEC Papers, Paper 12, 1 Oct 49.
48 POLICY AND DIRECTION
neither used the title commanding gen- ing that imposing an Army headquarters
eral, USAFFE, nor established a separate between subordinate Army units and
staff. Because there were within his GHQ FEC would duplicate the func-
command a major air force and a major tions of GHQ and detract from the
naval headquarters, Far East Air Forces essential and cohesive relationships be-
(FEAF) and Naval Forces, Far East tween CINCFE and the Supreme Com-
(NavFE), respectively, some resentment mander, Allied Powers (SCAP).20
developed because the coequal Army
20
headquarters, AFFE, was absent. That (1) Ibid., Paper 13, p. 4. (2) A succinct and
fairly accurate description of the FEC structure was
all Army combat forces were assigned rendered by a representative of the Department of
to subordinate Army commands had the the Army, Army War Plans Branch, who visited the
effect of placing these lesser headquarters command in October 1950. He said: "Although a
lack of balanced representation from the three serv-
on the same level with FEAF and NavFE. ices keeps GHQ FEC from being classified as a joint
General MacArthur defended this pecu- headquarters in the commonly accepted sense, cer-
liarity in the command structure by say- tain joint features do exist. . . . Intelligence is
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 49
to communist domination of the entire invasion from the north. He had had
nation. And since it was nevertheless his staff review the courses of action open
intended to evacuate American troops, to the United States in such an even-
eventual Russian control of Korea would tuality, and as a result he recommended
have to be accepted as a probability, even that, if an invasion took place, the U.S.
though establishing a ROK constabulary nationals be evacuated and the aggres-
force might serve as a temporary deter- sion immediately be presented to the
rent.21 United Nations Security Council as a
The definitive write-off of Korea as an threat to the peace. A U.N. composite
important strategic area came when the military force might be considered as a
Joint Chiefs of Staff asserted that no last resort.23
military security guarantee should be ex- Bradley's fellow members of the Joint
tended to the Republic of Korea because Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to bring
such action would risk a major war in this matter again before the National
an area where Russia would have nearly Security Council. They said:
all the natural advantages. As a result, From the strategic viewpoint the position
the President, on 4 April 1948, approved of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding Korea,
a policy that stated: "The United States summarized briefly, is that Korea is of little
should not become so irrevocably in- strategic value to the United States and that
volved in the Korean situation that an any commitment to United States use of
action taken by any faction in Korea or military force in Korea would be ill-ad-
vised and impracticable in view of the
by any other power in Korea could be potentialities of the over-all world situation
considered a 'casus belli' for the United and of our heavy international obligations
States." From that moment, Korea was as compared with our current military
of secondary importance to U.S. planners strength.24
22
and policy makers. General MacAr- This concept dominated American
thur had been relieved of his responsi- planning for the Far East. By 1950, the
bility for defending Korea when the last United States decided that, in the event
American tactical units had been with- of a Soviet attack in the area, American
drawn from that country in 1949. Forces would conduct a strategic defense.
In mid-1949 General Omar N. Brad- Specific missions charged to the Far East
ley, then Army Chief of Staff, challenged Command were: (1) defense of the Ryu-
the national policy toward Korea. On kyus and Japan; (2) protection of air and
the eve of the withdrawal of the last sea lanes in the FEC; (3) denial of For-
American combat troops from the penin- mosa to the enemy; (4) support of the
sula, General Bradley suggested taking Pacific Command, the Alaskan Com-
the Korean question again to the Na- mand, and the Strategic Air Command;
tional Security Council. He feared that (5) assistance to the Republic of the
U.S. withdrawal might be followed by an
23
JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun 49, Incl, Memo, CSA to JCS,
21
JCS 1483/50, Rpt by JSSC, title: U.S. Policy in 20 Jun 49, sub: Implications of a Possible Full-Scale
Korea, 30 Jan 48. Invasion From North Korea Subsequent to the
22
SANACC 176/39, 22 Mar 48, title: U.S. Policy Withdrawal of U.S. Troops From Korea.
24
in Korea. JCS 1776/4, 23 Jun 49.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 51
Philippines in defense of the islands; and strategy in the Far East, he excluded
(6) provision for the safety of U.S. per- Korea and Formosa from the American
sonnel in Korea. American airmen were defensive perimeter. Referring obliquely
to destroy or neutralize enemy air to Korea, Mr. Acheson stated:
power.25
So far as the military security of other areas
That Korea was considered of little in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear
strategic worth to the United States had that no person can guarantee these areas
scarcely been a matter of public knowl- against military attack. . . . Should such
edge until 12 January 1950, when Secre- an attack occur—one hesitates to say where
tary of State Dean Acheson said so in a such an armed attack could come from—
the initial reliance must be on the people
speech at the National Press Club in attacked to resist it and then upon the com-
Washington. Outlining the defensive mitments of the entire civilized world under
the Charter of the United Nations which so
25
FEOP 1-50, GHQ FEC, vol. I, 1 Feb 50, in G-3, far has not proved a weak reed to lean on
FEC files. by any people who are determined to pro-
52 POLICY AND DIRECTION
tect their26 independence against outside ag- lated risks in the allotment of manpower
gression. had to be accepted throughout the world.
In the light of Secretary Acheson's re- Allocating 134,000 troops (including
marks, it appeared that the United States 28,800 Philippine Scouts) to his com-
had no intention of fighting for South mand, they ordered him to keep 30,000
Korea. In the view of many observers, troops in Korea until elections had been
his statement was an invitation to Com- held there.29
munist China, North Korea, and Russia MacArthur protested. On 24 Febru-
that they could invade the republic with ary 1948 he charged that his personnel
impunity. resources were exhausted. He asserted
that there was no substitute for Army
MacArthur's Forces troop strength and that it was essential
to meet the dangers and difficulties that
The general decrease in Army strength
existed in the Far East.30
that took place in 1947 was reflected
There was actually a further decline.
sharply in the Far East. General Mac-
MacArthur's authorized strength for the
Arthur had commanded over 300,000
year beginning 1 July 1949 was to be only
troops, including 42,000 in the Army Air
27 120,000 men. Insofar as combat strength
Forces, in January 1947. Just one year
was concerned, the Far East Command
later he had only 142,000 men. When
reached its lowest ebb at this point, April
asked early in 1948 if he could maintain
1948. The Eighth Army, upon which
30,000 men in Korea, MacArthur told
the combat effectiveness of the command
Army officials that to do so would cause
depended, was authorized 87,215 men,
a breakdown in logistic support to the
but had an actual strength of only 45,561
Far East Air Forces and a breakdown in
and a combat strength of 26,494. This
the general effectiveness in his command.
combat strength was spread over five
The real cause of this situation, he
divisions and an antiaircraft artillery
charged, was Washington's failure to
group, making attainment of any satis-
send him even half the troops approved
factory degree of combat readiness very
for his command.28
difficult. MacArthur's protests con-
MacArthur warned of irreparable
tinued, but to no avail. Exemplifying
damage to United States national inter-
the general conditions within the Eighth
ests in the Far East unless his command
Army, two regiments of the 25th Divi-
was strengthened. In response, the Joint
sion had less than 250 men each.31
Chiefs of Staff informed MacArthur that
On 3 August 1948 MacArthur com-
all services were having trouble keeping
plained that his carefully analyzed mini-
up to authorized strength and that calcu-
mum requirements for Army strength
26
(1) Speech, Mr. Dean Acheson to National Press were being brushed aside. He was noti-
Club, 12 Jan 50, quoted in MacArthur Hearings,
29
pp. 1811-12. (2) See also Acheson, Present at the Rad, WARX 96357, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Feb 48.
30
Creation, pp. 354-58. Rad, CX 58837, CINCFE to DA, 24 Feb 48.
27 31
Strength Reports of the Army, Central Statisti- (1) Rad, WAR 81295, DA to CINCFE, 6 May 48.
cal Office, Office, Chief of Staff, 1 Feb 47, copy in (2) Rad, C 61072, CINCFE to DA, 29 May 48.
OCMH. (3) Rad, C 61943, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jun 48. (4)
28
Rad, CX 58131, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jan 48. Rad, WARX 86492, DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul 48.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 53
fied on 9 November 1948 that the na- command was to take the loss and during
tion's authorities were contemplating a a discussion with MacArthur in October
reduction in the strength of his Far East 1949 General Collins, Army Chief of
Air Forces. This news brought a sharp Staff, told MacArthur so. MacArthur,
rejoinder and a strategic estimate of his of course, objected. The Department of
position in the Far East Command. He the Army reversed its decision and kept
maintained that he could not understand ten divisions on duty.34 But, as noted
what devious thinking had prompted a above, the strength of the Far East Com-
proposal for reducing his military mand had dwindled to about 108,500
strength. He said that it would endan- Army troops by June 1950.
ger the nation's military position in the The budget limitations and the low
Far East beyond the acceptable point of enlistment rate forced the Department
calculated risk. MacArthur charged that of the Army to devise a troop program
the nation's planners should be contem- and troop list which could not be manned
plating an increase in his naval, air, and at 100 percent strength. This reduced
ground forces.32 over-all personnel ceiling reflected man-
Despite MacArthur's insistent protests, ning levels which, in turn, caused un-
the strength level in the Far East Com- avoidable reductions either by paring
mand continued with little substantive the strength of all subordinate units or
change. During visits to Tokyo by the by eliminating certain units entirely.
Department of the Army Staff, by the Since administrative requirements con-
Secretary of the Army, and by members tinued or increased, combat units suf-
of the JCS during 1948 and 1949, Gen- fered more than headquarters units.35
eral MacArthur presented his views and As reflected in the FEC, this condition
protests in person. He said consistently caused the elimination of certain basic
that the support which the Department elements from combat units in order to
of the Army was giving to forces in Eu- maintain the units within the command.
rope was out of proportion and that more Each of MacArthur's infantry divisions
support should and could be given to his had only one tank company instead of a
command in the Far East.33 tank battalion, and one antiaircraft bat-
The flow of replacements to the Far tery instead of an antiaircraft battalion.
East picked up somewhat in 1949 al- Each infantry regiment was short its
though budgetary limitations on the Table of Organization (T/O) tank com-
Army as a whole enforced restrictions on pany and lacked one infantry battalion;
replacements available to the Far East each of the divisional artillery battalions
Command. By late 1949, the shortage of was short one firing battery. Although
funds had become so pronounced that CINCFE had managed to retain the
the Department of the Army decided to 4-division structure of Eighth Army, he
reduce the number of divisions in the
Army from ten to nine. MacArthur's 34
(1) JCS 1800/54/56, Sep 49. (2) JCS 2079/3,
Oct 49.
32 35
(1) Rad, W 92269, DA to CINCFE, 9 Nov 48. Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug
(2) Rad, CX 65569, CINCFE to DA, 23 Nov 48. 50, with comments by Chief, OCAFF, in G-3, DA
33
Rad, WAR 82319, DA to CINCFE, 6 Jan 49. file 333 Pac, sec. I-A, Book I, Case 8/8 (1950).
54 POLICY AND DIRECTION
had had to eliminate the normal corps least 5 full-strength infantry divisions, 23
headquarters and corps special troops antiaircraft artillery battalions, and1
(artillery, engineer, and so forth). Serv- separate RCT.38
ice elements of Eighth Army were so Eighth Army, the main combat force
inadequate that over 150,000 Japanese of FEC, stood at about 93 percent of its
personnel were being employed in roles authorized strength on 25 June 1950.
normally performed by service troops.36 Each division had an authorized strength
The ratio of noncombat to combat of 12,500 men as compared to its author-
personnel in the Far East was excessive. ized war strength of 18,900 and none of
This stemmed from the Army's attempts the divisions was even up to its peace-
during the postwar years to make the time authorization. Each division was
Army an attractive career by leaving the short of its war strength by nearly 7,000
choice of arm or service largely to the men, 1,500 rifles, and 100 90-mm. anti-
individual. The combat arms, and espe- tank guns; 3 rifle battalions, 6 heavy tank
cially the infantry, failed to attract suffi- companies, 3 105-mm. field artillery bat-
cient men to keep their strength on a par teries, and 3 antiaircraft artillery bat-
with other arms and branches. Also the teries were missing from each division.
fact that a substantial percentage of the In terms of battle potential, the infantry
already inadequate output of stateside divisions could lay down only 62 percent
training divisions went to service schools of their infantry firepower, 69 percent of
for further training reduced the number their antiaircraft artillery firepower, and
of men available for assignment to com- 14 percent of their tank firepower.39
bat-type units except in specialist capaci- Until 1949 the primary responsibility
ties.37 of military units in the Far East Com-
MacArthur's combat forces in June mand was to carry out occupation duties.
1950 comprised 4 understrength infantry Engaged in these administrative and
divisions and 7 antiaircraft artillery bat- housekeeping tasks throughout Japan
talions in Japan, 1 infantry regiment and and the outlying areas, units had little
2 antiaircraft artillery battalions in Oki- time or inclination for combat training.
nawa. The major combat units were the The situation was aggravated by con-
1st Cavalry Division (actually infantry) stant understrength and excessive turn-
in central Honshu, Japan; 7th Infantry over of personnel. This turnover
Division in northern Honshu and Hok- amounted to 43 percent annually in the
kaido, Japan; 24th Infantry Division in FEC. Training in the rudimentary
Kyushu, Japan; 25th Infantry Division functions of the soldier was carried on as
in south central Honshu, Japan; and the time and facilities permitted during the
9th Antiaircraft Artillery Group in Oki- period from 1945 to 1949 with emphasis
nawa. General MacArthur had registered upon discipline, courtesy, and conduct.
frequent protests that his missions in the
Far East required a minimum force of at 38
FEC Papers, Paper 10.
39
Mono, 1st Lt Charles G. Cleaver, Personnel
36
FEC Papers, Paper 10, p. 7. Problems, in History of the Korean War, vol. III,
37
Rpt of OCAFF Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug Part 2, MHS, Hq, FEC, 15 Aug 52, p. 1, copy in
50. OCMH.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 55
No serious effort was made in these years one battalion of each division by 31 Oc-
to maintain combat efficiency at battalion tober 1950. Minimum proficiency levels
or higher level. to be attained were (1) company (bat-
This situation changed markedly in tery) levels by 15 December 1949; (2)
April 1949 when General MacArthur battalion (squadron or task force) level
issued a policy directive announcing that by 15 May 1950; (3) regimental (group
the stern rigidity which had character- or task force) level by 31 July 1950; (4)
ized the occupation of Japan until that division (air force or task force) level by
time was to be superseded by an attitude 31 December 1950; and (5) combined
of "friendly protective guidance." As and joint operations training to include
a result of this change in policy, combat amphibious exercises concurrently with
divisions of Eighth Army were progres- RCT and division-level training.41
sively relieved of the majority of their In a country so heavily populated and
purely occupational missions and di- predominantly agricultural as Japan, no
rected to undertake along with FEAF land was wasted and the maintenance of
and NavFE an intensified program which large military training areas would have
would lead to the establishment of a co- imposed a burden upon the Japanese
hesive and integrated naval, air, and economy which was not considered justi-
ground fighting team. Although large fied. Consequently, troops were gen-
numbers of officers and men were de- erally restricted in their training to small
tached from military government and posts of regimental size. Divisions could
civil affairs activities and returned to not be concentrated and trained together.
their parent combat units, there still On 8 August 1949 an area in the vicinity
remained many administrative features of Mount Fuji was acquired which would
of the occupation which could not be accommodate limited division exercises
relinquished and which constituted a over very rugged terrain. Every other
considerable barrier to the full develop- field training area was exploited to the
ment of the planned training program.40 utmost. Exploitation of the relatively
Main objectives of the new training few training areas during favorable train-
program announced by General Mac- ing weather, however, required that some
Arthur on 10 June 1949 called for the units undertake field firing problems and
rapid integration of Army, Navy, and tests ahead of the actual phasing of such
Air Force components into an efficient training in the Mobilization Training
team capable of performing its primary Programs. For example, the 7th Cavalry
military mission. Divisions were directed Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division
to complete RCT field exercises and completed its battalion tests before com-
develop effective air-ground combat pro- pleting basic individual training in order
cedures prior to 31 July 1950 and to com- to use that division's lone training area.42
plete amphibious landing exercises for The Army's Career Guidance Program
also worked to the disadvantage of the
40
(1) FEC Papers, Paper 3, pp. 2-4. (2) GHQ,
41
FEC Annual Narrative Historical Rpt, 1 Jan-31 FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 7-8.
42
Dec 49. Ibid., pp. 8-9.
56 POLICY AND DIRECTION
training program within the FEC accord- very high percentage of low intelligence
ing to General MacArthur's staff. Staff ratings and a much larger than usual
visits indicated that a wide variance number of men of questionable char-
existed between the experience of regi- acter. This situation was reflected not
mental commanders and their subordi- only in training, but in discipline, ad-
nate commanders. There was a great ministrative problems, and a larger num-
need for improved leadership of combat ber of individual incidents which caused
units at the company and battalion levels. criticism of American behavior. In April
Many officers possessing the qualities of 1949, 43 percent of Army enlisted per-
leadership and training experience neces- sonnel in the Far East Command rated
sary for proper development of FEC in Class IV and V on the Army General
combat units had been given directed Classification Test. On an average, en-
military occupational specialties (MOS) listed men of the FEC were several years
under the Career Guidance Program and younger than their counterparts of World
could not be placed in command of War II. Another factor which intensi-
troops where they were needed. From fied the difficulty of training for combat
the standpoint of the enlisted man the readiness was the incomplete basic train-
same situation seriously affected the flexi- ing received by recruits before shipment
bility of organization and training. In to the FEC. According to an FEC re-
their efforts to strengthen combat units port, recruits were not sufficiently indoc-
by transferring men from inactivated trinated to withstand the inactive period
service units, FEC commanders ran head of pipeline experience and had lost much
on into the Career Guidance Program of the benefit of basic training before
which prevented assignment of enlisted arriving in the Far East Command.44
men from one field to another.43 General Collins, Chief of Staff, U.S.
The readiness of combat units within Army, visited the Far East Command in
the FEC was not enhanced by the quality the autumn of 1949 and looked into the
of enlisted personnel assigned from the training program then in progress. He
zone of the interior. Replacements ar- was generally satisfied with what he saw
riving from the United States during and with what he was told in conference
1949, for instance, were said by General with General MacArthur. Reporting on
MacArthur's headquarters to have had a his findings to the Secretary of the Army
General Collins said:
43
As a result of the reductions in strength of
(1) Ibid., p. 10. (2) This complaint from the personnel . . . and because our troops were
FEC was verified at a later date by a team of
primarily engaged in occupation missions
observers sent to the Korean battlefield in the first
month of the war. These observers noted that clas- until recently, the troops of Eighth Army
sification and assignment procedures had placed in are not now in fighting condition. How-
battlefield command officers and noncoms lacking ever, they have recently been brought back
experience and proficiency. This kind of assignment up to strength, are making excellent prog-
had often resulted in poor leadership, especially at ress with realistic field training and are
the regimental and lower levels. The observers planning exercises with close fighter-bomber
concluded bluntly that the career program had been support by the early spring of 1950. Given
detrimental to combat efficiency. See Rpt of OCAFF
44
Observer Team to FEC, 16 Aug 50. FEC Papers, Paper 23, pp. 2-3.
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY 57
GENERAL COLLINS
Japanese industry under the direction four combat divisions on that date was
of a small American staff.47 derived from the rebuild program.49
The original objective of Operation Levels of supply on hand in the FEC
ROLL-UP was to support the FEC and to by mid-1950 amounted to a 60-day depot
equip Eighth Army's infantry divisions level plus 30-day levels in station stocks.
at minimum cost and with maximum use But supply resources were out of balance
of all matériel which could be reclaimed. both in quantity and quality. Some
It was planned that the project would be weapons such as medium tanks, 4.2-inch
completed by 30 June 1950. As an indi- mortars, and recoilless rifles could hardly
cation of the progress attained, 200,000 be found in the command. Only a
measurement tons of ordnance supplies trickle of supplies was moving through
were moved to Japan from Okinawa dur- the pipelines. Units deactivated in the
ing 1949. All types of vehicles, artillery command had turned in large quantities
pieces, and ammunition as well as other of equipment, but most of this was un-
items were affected by this program. serviceable. Eighth Army was author-
One result of Operation ROLL-UP was ized 226 recoilless rifles, but had only 21.
to prepare FEC repair and rebuild facili- Of 18,000 ¼-ton 4X4 vehicles in Eighth
ties, including Japanese industry, for the Army's stocks 10,000 were unserviceable,
great expansion necessary to support ex- and of 13,780 2½-ton 6X6 trucks only
tensive combat operations. In addition, 4,441 were in running condition.
thousands of military vehicles were avail- Total ammunition resources amounted
able in substantially better condition to only 45 days' supply in the depots and
than would have otherwise been the a basic load of training ammunition in
case.48 hands of units. The level of perishable
A shortage of supervisory personnel food supplies was also 45 days in depot
slowed the renovation program and made stocks and operating levels at various
unattainable the goal of completing Op- stations. Petroleum products on hand
eration ROLL-UP by 30 June 1950. When included a level of 180 days packaged
the North Korean attack came stocks of and 75 days bulk at depots, station levels
unusable equipment were still piled up of 15 days each of packaged and bulk,
50
in storage shops. An estimated 80 per- and 15 days with units.
cent of the Army's 60-day reserve of By mid-1950 American forces in the
armament equipment was unserviceable Far East had begun a gradual swing away
on 25 June. The Far East Command from their primary concern with occupa-
had received no new vehicles, tanks, or tion duties and had started to look more
other equipment since World War II. closely to their combat skills. This shift
Almost 90 percent of the armament came about more because of the growing
equipment and 75 percent of the auto-
motive equipment in the hands of the
49
Mono, Logistical Problems and Their Solutions,
47
Administrative History of the Ordnance Sec- Hq, EUSAK, ch. I, pp. 5, 7, copy in OCMH.
50
tion, GHQ, FEC, 1 January 1947-31 December 1949. MS, Maj James A. Huston, Time and Space,
48
Hist Rpt, Ordnance Section, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan- ch. V, p. 41, and ch. III, pp. 176, 186, copy in
31 Dec 49. OCMH.
60 POLICY AND DIRECTION
stability of occupied Japan than from overcome the inertia imposed by the
any real fear that time was growing years of occupation and the prevailing,
short. That these forces were under- if uneasy, peace. But on the eve of the
strength, inadequately armed, and sketch- storm the command was flabby and soft,
ily trained concerned mainly their still hampered by an infectious lassitude,
commanders. These commanders, within unready to respond swiftly and decisively
the limits of their resources, sought to to a full-scale military emergency.
CHAPTER IV
The North Korean Army invaded News of the invasion reached Seoul
South Korea at four o'clock in the morn- within an hour, before 0500. American
ing of 25 June 1950—three o'clock in officers there were alerted by 0630 and
the afternoon of 24 June 1950, in Wash- began to arrive half an hour later at their
ington, D.C. (Map I) Striking without duty posts. Belief that the attack was
warning in the predawn dusk, communist nothing more than a border raid soon
units gained complete tactical surprise faded. By 0800, it was obvious that
as they burst across the 38th Parallel many North Korean troops were in-
swiftly and in strength. Co-ordinated volved at many separate points. The use
columns of Russian-made tanks and Rus- of armor and the major orientation on
sian-trained infantry followed massed the approaches to Seoul were ominous.
artillery fires and rolled back the South ROK defenders at Ch'unch'on in central
Korean defenders, engulfing and destroy- Korea threw back the first attacks; but
ing whole units as they moved toward on the east coast, near Kangnung, an
their objectives in a well-conceived and enemy amphibious landing was unop-
carefully prepared military operation. posed.
North Korean planes, giving tactical sup-
port, were virtually unchallenged.1 The Intelligence Failure
1
(1) Unless otherwise cited all material in this
chapter dealing with events in Korea comes from Agencies of the United States Govern-
the following sources: Daily Opns Rpts, G-3, GHQ, ment failed to forecast adequately the
FEC, Jun 50; DIS, G-2, GHQ, FEC, Jun 50; Interv,
Dr. Gordon Prange with Lt Col A. J. Storey, Oct 50; North Korean attack. No report suffi-
Interv, Maj James F. Schnabel with Lt Col Leonard ciently valid or urgent reached Wash-
Abbot, Oct 50; Interv, Maj Schnabel with Capt Fred- ington officials before 25 June 1950
erick Schwarze, former ACofS G-2, KMAG, 17 Nov
53. (2) The international communist bloc later indicating that the attack would come
charged that the South Korean Army had invaded when it did. Some information sent to
North Korea, thus triggering a North Korean coun-
terattack. Two documents captured following the of the North Korean 4th Division and discovered
fall of North Korea have been authenticated as in Seoul on 4 October 1950, and Operations Order
official attack orders issued by North Korean mili- No. 4, North Korean 4th Division, were issued on
tary authorities to their commanders several days 22 June 1950. See ATIS Res Supp Interrog Rpts,
before the assault. Both documents, Reconnaissance Issue 2 (Documentary Evidence of North Korean
Order No. 1, issued in Russian to the Chief of Staff Aggression), Part 2.
62 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Washington from the Far East reflected a Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, the
strong possibility of action toward the FEC G-2, had on his own initiative al-
end of June, but faulty evaluation and ready established a surveillance detach-
dissemination prevented it from reach- ment in Korea called the Korean Liaison
ing the right people in the proper form. Office. In addition, according to Gen-
The invasion therefore took all the eral Willoughby, "The Embassy in Seoul
American political and military leaders maintained military attaché groups—
by surprise. Army, Navy, and Air, as well as their
The reasons for this intelligence failure own diplomatic and political specialists
are easy to understand. The United whose sole business was to gauge the
States had written Korea out of its trend of events." 4
national defense plans, and as a result in- Significant troop movements and con-
dications from Korea received less atten- centrations, forward stockpiling of sup-
tion than those from areas considered plies, border evacuation, and North
more vital to American interests. There Korean Army reinforcement in men and
was nevertheless an intelligence effort in matériel were some of the meaningful
Korea. KMAG officers worked closely indications reported to Washington from
with their ROK Army counterparts in the Far East before the June attack. But
assembling data on North Korean activi- this information was poorly evaluated in
ties. They sent this information to the field and at higher echelons. Secre-
Washington periodically and on occasion tary of State Acheson later testified:
made special reports. Other agencies
Intelligence was available to the Depart-
and units in the Far East reported to ment prior to the 25th of June, made avail-
appropriate officials in Washington.2 able by the Far East Command, the CIA,
KMAG, not General MacArthur, had the the Department of the Army, and by the
responsibility of securing intelligence State Department representatives here and
data on Korea. When General Collins overseas, and shows that all these agencies
were in agreement that the possibility for
visited Tokyo in early 1950, he asked an attack on the Korean Republic existed
whether MacArthur could furnish the at that time, but they were all in agreement
JCS information on some areas beyond that its launching in the summer of 1950
his sphere of responsibility. MacArthur did not appear imminent. 5
answered that he had promptly furnished Since October 1946, when General
such reports whenever specific items had Hodge had first reported that the North
been developed but that he was reluctant Koreans intended to attack South Korea,
to submit unsupported estimates. If the dozens of such reports had poured into
JCS wanted to give him new intelligence Tokyo and Washington. Upon the out-
responsibilities, he said he would be glad break of border fighting, the reports
to have them. He was confident that he
3
had enough personnel to handle them.
4
Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby and John
Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-1951 (New York:
2
Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 37ff. McGraw-Hill, 1954), p. 354.
3 5
Notes on Visit of JCS to FEC, 29 Jan-10 Feb. in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 123, 350, 436, 1832.
G-3, DA file P&O 333 Pacific, sec. I, Case 7/4. 1990-91.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 63
rent period could indicate preparation tion sent to him from the Far East Com-
for offensive action." On 23 May, in an- mand. "An analysis of reports received
other routine summary, he stated, "The by G-2, DA," General Bolling told Gen-
outbreak of hostilities may occur at any eral Collins,
time in Korea and the fall of Indochina
shows that all reporting agencies were aware
to the Communists is possible this of [the North Korean] capability to invade
year." 10 the Republic of Korea. There has been
A report forwarded routinely on 19 much publicity originating from Tokyo and
June 1950, six days before the North quoting Willoughby that he had informed
Korean assault, provided Washington the Department of the Army that North
Korean troops would invade South Korea
with strong evidence of an imminent in June. The statements made by Wil-
enemy offensive—extensive troop move- loughby are correct in part, but he failed
ments along the 38th Parallel; evacuation to indicate [in the publicity] his conclusions
of all civilians north of the parallel for that definitely discount the report referred
two kilometers; suspension of civilian to. In short, there is no intelligence agency
that reported a definite date for the open-
freight service from Wonsan to Ch'orwon ing of hostilities or stated that an invasion
and the transportation of military sup- was imminent. In fact, the general tenor
plies only; concentration of armored of reports indicated that the North Korean
units in the border area; and the arrival regime would continue to employ guerrillas
of large shipments of weapons and am- and psychological warfare together with
political pressure rather than resort to the
munition. But no conclusions were overt employment of military forces.13
drawn from these indications.11 On the
same day a report from General Wil- American intelligence failed to pre-
loughby in Tokyo concluded, "Appar- dict the time, strength, and actual launch-
ently Soviet advisers believe that now is ing of the attack because of reluctance
the opportune time to attempt to subju- to accept all the reports rendered by
gate the South Korean Government by Koreans, a distrust of Oriental agents and
political means, especially since the guer- sources, and a belief that the South
rilla campaign in South Korea recently Koreans were prone to cry wolf. Situa-
has met with serious reverses." 12 tions similar to that in Korea existed in
The Department of the Army G-2 pro- virtually every other land area around
tested charges made later that he had the periphery of the USSR. Some ap-
failed to interpret properly the informa- peared to be greater potential danger
spots and diverted the focus of interest
10
Memo, ACofS G-2, DA, for Gen Wade H. from Korea. Signs which marked the
Haislip, 24 Aug 50, in G-2, DA file SO 24366.
11
prelude of the North Korean attack had
Sec G-2, FEC, files, M.I.S., Item No. 684595, 19
become accepted as routine communist
Jun 50.
12
(1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2842, 19 Jun 50. (2) activity. The increased troop movement
General Willoughby later insisted that "Washing- and activity in North Korea in the spring
ton" had been fully informed of what to expect in of 1950 followed a pattern established
Korea and should not have been taken by surprise.
See Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-
1951, pp. 350-54. See also Douglas MacArthur, 13
Reminiscences (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. Memo, Gen Bolling for DCofS for Admin, DA,
323-24. 18 Oct 50, in G-3, DA file CofS 091, Case 28.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 65
in the execution of this resolution and to United Nations asked member nations
22
refrain from giving assistance to the to employ military force.
North Korean authorities." The Secu- No decision on Korea could properly
rity Council adopted the resolution by a be made without a careful analysis of
vote of nine to zero, with one abstention. USSR intentions. The United States
Meanwhile, officials of the Depart- believed Russia to be the real aggressor
ments of State and Defense had met in in Korea, in spirit if not in fact, and
impromptu session on Sunday morning. effective measures to halt the aggression
Department of State representatives out- might therefore provoke total war.
lined a plan for supporting the ROK Hence, a decision to meet force with
with munitions and equipment and with force implied a willingness to fight a
U.S. naval and air forces.21 full-scale war with Russia if necessary.
Early on Sunday evening, shortly be- The determinant for Korea was, then, as
fore the President arrived in Washing- always: "What will Russia do?" 23
ton, the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a The possible reactions of nations other
teletype conference with General MacAr- than Russia were also important. Each
thur. They notified MacArthur of the alternative open to the United States was
tentative plans made by Defense and accompanied by a strong chance of alien-
State officials to ship supplies and equip- ating nations upon whose continuing
ment, which MacArthur had already friendship and support American policy
started, and to extend his responsibility was based. Inaction would be con-
to include operational control of all U.S. demned by some nations as a betrayal of
military activities in Korea. They said the ROK Government. It would gravely
he might also be directed to commit cer- impair American efforts to maintain
tain forces, principally naval and air, to prestige in Asia as well as in other areas,
protect the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on area to and would cause such nations as Great
assure the safe evacuation of American Britain, Italy, and Japan to re-examine
nationals and to gain time for action on the wisdom of supporting the United
the measures then before the United Na- States. On the other hand, if the United
tions. Most significantly, they alerted States took unilateral military measures
him to be ready to send U.S. ground and against the North Korean attackers, Rus-
naval forces to stabilize the combat situa- sian charges of imperialistic action and
tion and, if feasible, to restore the 38th
Parallel as a boundary. This action, 22
Telecon, TT 3417, CINCFE and JCS, 2330Z,
they said, might be necessary if the 25 Jun 50.
23
American determination to resist communist
expansion is clearly reflected in President Truman's
21
(1) U.N. Doc S/PV/473. 25 Jun 50, Statement to later thoughts. He feared that if South Korea was
the Security Council by the Deputy Representative allowed to fall no other small nation would dare
of the U.S. to the U.N. (Gross). (2) U.N. Doc S/1501. resist threats and aggression by their stronger Com-
(3) Rpt to Senate Committee on Armed Services and munist neighbors. Not to challenge this aggression
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Record of would mean a third World War, just as similar
Actions Taken by JCS Relative to the U.N. Opera- failure to challenge aggression had led to World
tion in Korea From 25 June 1950 to 11 April 1951, War II. He also saw clearly that the very founda-
30 April 1951 (hereafter cited as JCS Rpt on Korea), tions and principles of the United Nations were at
pp. 5-6. stake. Truman, Memoirs, II, 332.
68 POLICY AND DIRECTION
fered to comment on Acheson's proposals, needed to destroy Soviet Far East air
Johnson asked each defense representa- bases if Soviet planes intervened in
tive in turn for an expression of opinion. Korea.
The responses came forth, and "A major Finally, President Truman called upon
portion of the evening was taken in the each man for his personal views. Every-
individual, unrehearsed, unprepared and one felt that whatever had to be done to
uncoordinated statements of the several meet the aggression in Korea should be
26
Chiefs and the Secretaries." done. No one suggested that the United
Earlier that day General Collins, the Nations or the United States back away
Army Chief of Staff, had received from from the challenge. Vandenberg and
General MacArthur a comprehensive re- Sherman had said that American air and
port on developing events in Korea, and naval aid would be sufficient to stop the
he outlined this to the group. All mem- North Koreans, but Collins believed that,
bers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff empha- if the ROK Army broke, American
sized the weakness of the American forces ground forces would be required.28
in the Far East and the absence of a gen- General Bradley summed up the pre-
eral plan for defending South Korea. vailing opinion. He said that the United
Collins then suggested and the Presi- States would have to draw the line on
dent approved that General MacArthur communist aggression somewhere—and
be authorized to send a group of officers that somewhere was Korea. He did not
as observers to Korea. Mr. Truman also believe that Russia was ready to fight the
approved a proposal that the Seventh United States, but was merely testing
Fleet be ordered to the waters off For- American determination. President Tru-
mosa and Korea at once, and Admiral man agreed emphatically. He did not
Forrest P. Sherman, Chief of Naval Op- expect the North Koreans to pay any
erations, left the meeting to start this attention to the pronouncement of the
movement.27 General Hoyt S. Vanden- United Nations, and he felt that the
berg, Air Force Chief of Staff, also United Nations would have to apply
29
left the room to initiate a concentration force. Before the meeting adjourned
of jet aircraft on Formosa. at 2300, President Truman approved the
The President ordered that all U.S. actions proposed by Secretary Acheson
intelligence agencies throughout the and already set in motion by General
world be alerted to recheck Soviet plans MacArthur.
and intentions. He called also for urgent The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Secretary
study to determine what would be of the Army Frank Pace, Jr., called Gen-
eral MacArthur into teleconference im-
26
MacArthur Hearings, p. 2580. mediately after the meeting and informed
27
President Truman identifies the proposal to him of the decisions reached. MacArthur
move the Seventh Fleet as having originated with
Secretary of State Acheson. Johnson, however, tes-
was to send all arms and equipment
tified before a Congressional committee that the needed to hold the Seoul-Kimp'o-Inch'on
move had been recommended by him and that the area, with enough air and naval cover to
President had immediately approved his recom-
28
mendation. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 334; Mac- Truman, Memoirs, II, 335.
29
Arthur Hearings, pp. 2580-81. Ibid.
70 POLICY AND DIRECTION
insure safe arrival. He was to use air Staff informed General MacArthur that
and naval forces to prevent the Seoul- the Secretary of State wished KMAG
Kimp'o-Inch'on area from being overrun, liaison officers to stay with ROK units so
thereby insuring the safe evacuation of long as these units remained effective
U.S. dependents and noncombatants. He fighting forces. Answering a request
was also told to send selected officers of from KMAG, General MacArthur said
30
his staff into Korea as a survey mission. that immediate action was being taken
The commitment of air and naval and that substantial logistic support was
units to Korea established a precedent on its way to the ROK forces.32
for the later commitment of U.S. ground The ROK Army acquitted itself well
troops. It was done without sanction in some areas, poorly in others. In sec-
of or reference to the United Nations tors where they were well led and prop-
and in the full knowledge that U.S. air erly deployed, the ROK Army units
and naval forces might engage in open fought bravely and well. Elsewhere, they
conflict with North Korean units. Al- fell back before the better-trained and
though generally viewed as less vital than better-equipped North Koreans without
President Truman's later decision of 30 offering determined or effective resist-
June to support the ROK with U.S. ance. All across the front the enemy's
ground forces, the authority to employ superior concentration of force, his well-
the Air Force and the Navy on 25 June planned tactics, his armor and artillery
rendered the later decision one of degree supremacy, and his consistently high cali-
rather than one of principle. General ber of leadership forced a general with-
Ridgway, who was present during the drawal.
transmission of initial instructions to Four of the eight existing ROK divi-
General MacArthur by teleconference, sions had been deployed widely through-
recalls in his memoirs: out the interior and southern sections of
South Korea, while the four divisions
I was standing by General Bradley at the
telecom when the directive went out au- along the 38th Parallel had about one-
thorizing the use of air and naval forces to third of their strength in defense posi-
cover the evacuation of American personnel tions and the remainder in reserve ten
from the Seoul and Inchon area, and I asked to thirty miles below the parallel. No
him whether this was deliberately intended ROK division was able to assemble its
to exclude the use of ground forces in
Korea. He told me, "Yes."
31 full combat strength in time to stem the
North Korean drive on Seoul. At
The officers to be sent to Korea as a Kaesong and Munsan-ni, in the Uijongbu
survey mission were to send back infor- corridor, and at Ch'unch'on, the ROK
mation and also to furnish overt evidence soldiers put up a good fight but were
to ROK authorities that they had not overwhelmed. An abortive ROK coun-
been abandoned. The Joint Chiefs of terattack in the vital Uijongbu corridor
30
Telecon, TT 3418, JCS and OSA with CINCFE,
32
260355Z, Jun 50. (1) Telecon, TT 3418, 2603552 Jun 50. (2) Rad,
31
General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier (New CX 56796, CINCFK to KMAG, 26 Jun 50. (3) Rad,
York: Harper, 1956), p. 192. CX 46852, CINCFK to KMAG, 27 Jun 50.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 71
failed on 26 June, and North Korean of 27 June (Korean time), FEAF trans-
entrance into Seoul seemed assured.33 ports and commercial aircraft brought
out others during two days of flights, and
Emergency Evacuation the remaining surface evacuation was
from Pusan.
The unexpectedly rapid and powerful A total of 2,001 people—1,527 of them
communist onslaught exposed some 1,500 U.S. nationals—were evacuated, all of
American civilians to immediate peril. them to Japan, 923 by air and the re-
The majority were families of AMIK mainder by surface transportation. Most
personnel, most of them in the Seoul Americans evacuated were members of
area. Additionally, more than a hun- AMIK, U.S. Government employees,
dred women and a sizable number of military personnel, and their dependents.
male employees were working at Depart- Missionaries comprised the next largest
ment of State, ECA, and KMAG installa- group of American evacuees.36
tions. Mounting in intensity, the battle for
According to the evacuation plan South Korea raged into its third day on
drawn in July 1949 by GHQ and named 27 June, with Seoul the prime objective
CHOW CHOW, the CG Eighth Army, CG of the North Korean attack. The com-
FEAF, and COMNAVFE were assigned munists apparently judged that with the
responsibilities to evacuate U.S. civilians, ROK capital in their hands the rest of
U.S. military personnel, and designated South Korea would yield easily. By the
foreign nationals. The plan estimated evening of 27 June, the main North
that North Korean forces would require Korean forces were fourteen miles north
at least ninety-six hours to overrun the of Seoul. Midnight found the northern
Seoul-Inch'on area.34 defenses of the city under small arms fire
In the early morning of 26 June with armor rumbling toward the out-
(Korean time) Ambassador Muccio or- skirts. At 0300, on 28 June, all Ameri-
dered all dependents of U.S. Government cans remaining in the city were ordered
and military personnel evacuated. Two to leave. The first artillery fire struck
commercial freighters at Inch'on, SS Seoul around 0600, 28 June. By that
Reinholt and SS Norge, were available, night the city had fallen to the invaders.
but the Norge was too dirty to be used
and nearly 700 passengers were evacuated ADCOM Arrives in Korea
on the 26th aboard the SS Reinholt, a
General MacArthur's survey group
vessel normally accommodating only
35 entered Korea at 1900, 27 June, and at
twelve passengers. From the morning
that time he assumed his newly author-
33
For a detailed account, see Appleman, South to ized control of all U.S. military activities
the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters III and V. in Korea. Maj. Gen. John H. Church,
34
There is a striking similarity between the evac-
uation on 26 June 1950 and the plan for evacuation who headed the group, which was desig-
prepared in GHQ almost a full year before. See nated GHQ Advance Command and
Staff Sec Rpt, G-3, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50, Liaison Group (ADCOM), had instruc-
p. 14, and supporting Doc 8.
35 36
War Diary, EUSAK, sec. I, Prologue, 25 Jun- Staff Sec Rpt, G-1, GHQ, FEC, 1 Jan-31 Oct 50,
12 Jul 50, p. 4. p. 61.
72 POLICY AND DIRECTION
The progressive decline of South Ko- and advice.43 He obviously felt no need
rean resistance and the increasingly ob- for Congressional approval, believing
vious evidence of North Korean military that his decisions were within his pre-
strength led Secretary of State Acheson rogatives as Commander in Chief. Later
to recommend that American air and objection by Congress that he had
naval forces be permitted to engage in usurped its authority was stilled effec-
combat operations to support the ROK. tively by widespread public approval of
He proposed also that the U.S. Seventh Mr. Truman's actions.44
Fleet be ordered not only to protect For- Although the President's decisions
mosa from attack but also to prevent an were decidedly toward complete resist-
attack from there on the mainland. The ance of aggression, without the slightest
President approved these measures, and tendency to conciliate or appease, the
after an hour the group adjourned. United States, on 27 June, had yet to
Within a few minutes after adjourn- choose whether to mount a unilateral
ment, the Joint Chiefs of Staff called effort or to promote United Nations
General MacArthur into teleconference. action. The advantages of acting under
They removed restrictions against air the auspices of the United Nations were
and naval operations against North Ko- apparent to all, but in the absence of
rean military targets below the 38th specific knowledge on the final attitude
Parallel. They informed him about the of that body, and in a full realization of
new missions of the U.S. Seventh Fleet the need for quick and effective action,
in Formosan waters. They urged him American officials pursued an independ-
to spread the news that American help ent course that could later be synchro-
was on the way to South Korea in order nized with any U.N. plan.
42
to maintain South Korean morale. On 27 June, after the ROK Govern-
The air of spontaneity and extempo- ment had appealed to the United Na-
raneousness which marked the actions tions for assistance, Warren R. Austin,
of the President and his advisers during United States Representative to the
the first week of the Korean War is mis- United Nations, addressed the United
leading. The key advisers called to in- Nations Security Council, denounced
formal meetings at the Blair House the North Korean action, and demanded
included all the members of the National stronger measures by the body than the
Security Council who were available in proclamation of 25 June, which was
Washington. Thus, although the some- having no effect.
times ponderous and always time- The Security Council condemned the
consuming normal procedures of the North Korean attack as a breach of the
council to develop positions on matters peace, called for an immediate cessation
of broad general policy were not fol-
lowed, the President received its views 43
Hoare, "Truman (1945-1953)," p. 191, states,
". . . the President was, for all practical purposes,
consulting the NSC, but telescoping its delibera-
tions."
42 44
Telecon, TT 3426, CINCFE and JCS, 270217Z See Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 31, and Ache-
Jun 50. son, Present at the Creation, pp. 413-15.
74 POLICY AND DIRECTION
of fighting, and recommended that mem- Although two YAK fighter planes of
bers of the United Nations ". . . furnish the North Korean Air Force appeared
such assistance to the Republic of Korea over Suwon and one dropped a bomb
as may be necessary to repel the armed at one end of the runway, MacArthur
attack and to restore international peace and his party landed safely. They went
45
and security in the area." This resolu- to a small schoolhouse where General
tion confirmed actions already taken by Church and the American officers of
the United States. ADCOM awaited them. President
Syngman Rhee, Mr. Muccio, and Gen-
MacArthur Visits Korea eral Chae were also there.
At General MacArthur's request, the
Given the grave danger of a complete meeting opened with a résumé of the
collapse of morale and fighting spirit current military situation by General
among the South Korean people, Gen- Church, who said he had been able to
eral MacArthur felt that only a dramatic locate only 8,000 of the ROK Army's
move would stiffen their resolve to resist. original 100,000 men. While he was
He decided to visit the country as im- speaking, he received a report that 8,000
mediate, symbolic proof of American more had been gathered and that Korean
backing. According to General Almond, officers hoped to have another 8,000 by
MacArthur's chief of staff, the visit was evening.
also a search for firsthand knowledge of After a few brief remarks from
what the Korean Army was doing, what Muccio, General MacArthur stated,
it intended to do next, and what Presi- "Well, I have heard a good deal theo-
dent Rhee and Ambassador Muccio had retically, and now I want to go and see
to say. these troops. . . ." MacArthur and his
Against the advice of his staff officers, group, in "three old, broken-down cars,"
who were apprehensive over extremely drove thirty miles north to the south
poor flying conditions and the threat of bank of the Han below Seoul, where
enemy air attack, General MacArthur they could see the enemy firing from
flew to Korea. He landed at Suwon Air- the city at targets near them. By mid-
field at 1115, 29 June 1950. Five mem- afternoon, MacArthur had seen all he
bers of his staff and four newsmen were needed to and returned to Suwon Air-
46
with him. field, then departed about 1600.
The fall of Seoul and the obvious
45
Department of State, Guide to the U.N. in weakening of the ROK forces demon-
Korea, Dept of State Publication No. 4299 (Wash-
ington, 1951), p. 13. strated the need of additional American
46
(1) This account of General MacArthur's visit
is based on an interview with Lt. Col. Anthony
Storey, General MacArthur's personal pilot, by Dr.
Gordon W. Prange, then Chief, Military Hist Sec, 1954), PP. 86-94; all quotations are as General
GHQ, FEC, FEC, UNC, in 1951, and on an account Almond gave them in his testimony. (2) See also
contained in General Almond's testimony before the Willoughby and Chamberlain, MacArthur, 1941-
Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judi- 1951, PP. 356-57, and Maj. Gen. Courtney Whitney,
ciary Committee on 23 November 1954, contained MacArthur, His Rendezvous With History (New
in U.S. News and World Report (December 10, York: Knopf, 1956), pp. 321-32.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 75
GENERAL MACARTHUR AND HIS CHIEF OF STAFF, GENERAL ALMOND, confer with
Ambassador Muccio during their 29 June 1950 visit to the battlefront.
efforts. Since the United Nations Secu- cold war position at our expense."47
rity Council had called for assistance by Bolté suggested that the Russians act-
member nations to repel the invaders, ually were testing United States deter-
more, obviously, could be done. mination to oppose their expansion. He
Army officials in Washington who pointed out that there was no way of
were analyzing the developments in knowing whether the Korean aggression
Korea unanimously felt that the USSR was a prelude to a "hot" war, but he
had deliberately fostered the outbreak reminded Pace of American emergency
in Korea. General Bolté, then the As- plans in case a shooting war with the
sistant Chief of Staff G-3, Department USSR came. These plans relegated the
of the Army, reported to Secretary Pace, Far East to a position of secondary stra-
on 28 June, "There can be no doubt but 47
Memo, Gen Bolté for Secy Army, 28 Jun 50,
that the invasion of South Korea is a sub: Sit in the Far East, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
planned Soviet move to improve their Case 25.
76 POLICY AND DIRECTION
could, if it became necessary, be sent control of the Seventh Fleet but only
into the Pusan area to hold the port and to neutralize Formosa.52
the airfield facilities there. Naval ves- There was a grave note of caution.
sels could also bombard targets auth- The Far East commander was reminded
orized for attack by aircraft.51 From that the United States decision to commit
stocks available in the Far East Com- naval, air, and limited ground forces in
mand, he was to furnish the Republic of support of the South Koreans constituted
Korea munitions and supplies to keep no decision to engage in a war with the
ROK forces in action. He was to submit Soviet Union should Soviet forces inter-
estimates of the amounts and types of aid vene in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
required by the Republic of Korea which concluded their instructions to their field
he was unable to provide from his own commander by pointing out: "The de-
sources. He was to have operational cision regarding Korea, however, was
51
taken in full realization of the risks
General MacArthur had not waited for this JCS
directive to order operations in North Korea. On involved. If Soviet forces actively op-
the flight to Korea, according to Colonel Storey, his pose our operations in Korea, your forces
pilot, MacArthur had issued orders via his plane should defend themselves, should take no
radio at 0800 (Korean time), 29 July 1950, saying to
FEAF headquarters back in Tokyo, "Partridge from action to aggravate the situation and
Stratemeyer. Take out North Korean airfields im- you should report the situation to
mediately. No publicity. MacArthur approves." Washington." 53
This action took place twenty-four hours before the
JCS authorized such action in accordance with the General MacArthur immediately di-
Presidential approval. Col. John Chiles, then SGS rected his air and naval commanders to
GHQ, UNC, told the author (September 1955) that carry out intensive operations against
he heard MacArthur give this order, dictating it to
General Stratemeyer. And one of the newspaper- the North Korean military machine.54
men who was present on the plane, Roy McCartney,
recounts the following narrative contained in Nor-
man Bartell, ed., With the Australians in Korea CINCFE's Personal Report
(Canberra: Australian War Memorial, 1954), pages
165-79: "On the way to Korea, MacArthur resumed Soon thereafter, General MacArthur
pacing, while weighing out loud how he could 'take dispatched to Washington his frank and,
out' the airfields from which North Korean Yak
fighters were operating. 'Where's the President's in some respects, gloomy impressions of
directive?' he asked his intelligence chief, Major his visit to Korea. He told Washington
General Charles A. Willoughby. 'How can I bomb officials:
north of the 38th Parallel without Washington
hanging me?' Willoughby, it turned out, had left I have today inspected the South Korea
Truman's directive in Tokyo. A half hour later battle area from Suwon to the HAN River.
MacArthur emerged from his private cabin and
remarked almost casually, 'I've decided to bomb
My purpose was to reconnoiter at first hand
north of the 38th Parallel. The B-29s will be out the conditions as they exist and to deter-
tomorrow. The order has gone to Okinawa.'" mine the most effective way to further sup-
General Whitney describes this incident in his book port our mission.
on General MacArthur and concludes, "Here was . . . Organized and equipped as a light
no timid delay while authorization was obtained force for maintenance of interior order [the
from Washington; here was the capacity for com-
52
mand decision and the readiness to assume respon- Rad, JCS 84681, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 50.
53
sibility which had always been MacArthur's forte." Ibid.
54
See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous With His- Rad, CX 56954, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and
tory, p. 326. FEAF, 30 Jun 50.
78 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Korean Army was] unprepared for attack by North Korean air, operating from near-by
armor and air. Conversely, they are inca- bases, has been savage in its attacks in
pable of gaining the initiative over such a Suwon area.
force as that embodied in the North Korean It is essential that the enemy advance be
Army. held or its impetus will threaten the over-
The Korean Army had made no prepara- running of all Korea. Every effort is being
tions for a defense in depth, for echelons of made to establish a Han River line but the
supply or for a supply system. No plans result is highly problematical. The defense
had been made, or if made, not executed of this line and the Suwon-Seoul corridor
for the destruction of supplies or matériel is essential to the retention of the only air-
in event of a retrograde movement. As a head in central Korea.
result, they have either lost or abandoned The Korean Army is entirely incapable
their supplies and heavier equipment and of counter-action and there is grave danger
have absolutely no means of intercommuni- of a further breakthrough. If the enemy
cation. In most cases, the individual sol- advance continues much further it will seri-
dier, in his flight to the south, has retained ously threaten the fall of the Republic.
his rifle or carbine. They are gradually The only assurance for the holding of the
being gathered up in rear areas and given present line, and the ability to regain later
some semblance of organization by an ad- the lost ground, is through the introduction
vance group of my officers I have sent over of US Ground Combat Forces into the Ko-
for this purpose. Without artillery, mortars rean battle area. To continue to utilize
and anti-tank guns, they can only hope to the Forces of our air and navy without an
retard the enemy through the fullest utiliza- effective ground element cannot be decisive.
tion of natural obstacles and under the If authorized, it is my intention to im-
guidance of example of leadership of high mediately move a United States Regimental
quality. Combat Team to the reinforcement of the
The civilian populace is tranquil, orderly vital area discussed and to provide for a
and prosperous according to their scale of possible build-up to a two-division strength
living. They have retained a high degree from the troops in Japan for an early coun-
of national spirit and firm belief in the ter-offensive.
Americans. The roads leading south from Unless provision is made for the full
Seoul are crowded with refugees refusing to utilization of the Army-Navy-Air team in
accept the Communist rule. this shattered area, our mission will be
South Korean military strength is esti- needlessly costly in life, money and prestige.
mated at not more than 25,000 effectives. At worst 55
it might even be doomed to
North Korean military forces are as pre- failure.
viously reported, backed by considerable
strength in armor and a well-trained, well- This message reached Washington an
directed and aggressive air force equipped hour before midnight on 29 June. Be-
with Russian planes. It is now obvious that cause of its urgent tone and extremely
this force has been built as an element of pessimistic outlook, General Collins con-
communist military aggression. sulted with General MacArthur in a
I am doing everything possible to estab- teleconference four hours later. He in-
lish and maintain a flow of supplies through
the air-head at SUWON and the southern
formed the Far East commander that one
port of PUSAN. The air-head is most vital, RCT could be moved to Pusan to guard
but is subject to constant air-attack. Since 55
(1) Rad, C 56942, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jun 50.
air-cover must be maintained over all air- (2) General Whitney states that MacArthur wrote
craft transporting supplies, equipment and the report during the return flight from Suwon,
personnel, this requirement operates to con- using a pencil and pad. See Whitney, MacArthur,
tain a large portion of my fighter strength. His Rendezvous With History, p. 332.
THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE 79
that port. MacArthur protested that knew how unprepared they were for
this hardly satisfied the basic require- large-scale combat. They were reluctant
ments. He urged speed in securing also to weaken the small General Reserve
permission to place American forces in in the United States, which represented
the battle area. the minimum essential for defense. De-
Lacking the authority to grant this ploying any part of the Reserve to the
request, Collins told MacArthur he Far East would be a risky, perhaps dis-
would try to gain Presidential approval. astrous, undertaking because of possible
Collins called Secretary of the Army Soviet involvement following American
58
Pace, who called the White House. The action.
President immediately approved dis- General MacArthur quite clearly had
patching one RCT to the battle area. tipped the balance in favor of troop
In less than an hour, word was flashed commitment. The risks had not
to Tokyo, "Your recommendation to changed or lessened, but the nation's
move one RCT to combat area is ap- leaders became convinced that com-
proved. You will be advised later as to munist seizure of Korea could not be
further build-up." 56 tolerated. MacArthur's personal appeal,
Throughout this period of intensive in fact, received even wider recognition
search for decisions, culminating finally on 30 June when he was told, "Restric-
in the decision to meet the aggressor in tion on use of Army Forces . . . are
ground combat, the President of the hereby removed and authority granted to
59
United States had been the ultimate utilize Army Forces available to you."
arbiter of each step. President Truman
57
had solicited the advice of those best Handwritten Note, to Memo, Dep Secy JCS for
JCCS, 28 Jun 50, sub: Preparation of Study.
qualified to judge the military effects and 58
Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense when the
requirements of each move taken. Gen- decision was made, subsequently testified to an
eral Collins briefed him daily, passing on almost neutral attitude on the part of himself and
his chief assistants. "Neither I nor any member of
the views of the Joint Chiefs. But the the Military Establishment in my presence recom-
President made the final choice himself. mended we go into Korea." Johnson recalled, "The
Earlier the Joint Chiefs of Staff had not recommendation came from the Secretary of State,
but I want to repeat that it was not opposed by the
favored the use of American ground Defense Department, all the members of which had
57
forces in Korea, primarily because they severally pointed out the trouble, the trials, tribu-
lations, and the difficulties." See MacArthur Hear-
56
Telecon, TT 3444, CINCFE and JCS, 300742 ings, p. 2584.
59
Jun 50. Rad, JCS 84718, JCS to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.
CHAPTER V
Emergency Conditions,
Emergency Measures
faltering South Korean Army. Many The small delaying force—part of the
KMAG officers stayed with ROK combat 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry—landed at
units, patrolling, feeding information to Pusan Airfield on 1 and 2 July, with Lt.
General Church, and doing whatever Col. Charles B. Smith in command. The
they could to stiffen ROK resistance artillery battery originally called for had
and morale.2 been replaced by two 4.2-inch mortar
American advice could not stop North platoons. A platoon of 77-mm. recoil-
Korean tanks and artillery. The South less rifles and six 2.36-inch bazooka teams
Koreans continued to fall back. General had also been added. Because of the
Church's command group pulled out of poor flying weather many trucks and
Suwon in the early evening of 30 June some soldiers could not be flown in
to Taejon. Vowing to "run no farther," until later.4
Church, together with Ambassador General MacArthur was concerned
Muccio, awaited the small 24th Division that the small force lacked artillery, and
task force. on 2 July he ordered General Walker to
Around midnight, General Almond fly in howitzers from Japan if he had to.
notified the American Embassy at It was unnecessary to do so, for elements
Taejon that bad flying weather had of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion were
forced the diversion of the task force to already on their way by LST, and they
Pusan, where it would land as soon as landed in Pusan that evening and moved
the weather improved; the first con- at once to the battle area.5
tingents of the main body of the 24th The commanding general of the 24th
Division would land at Pusan by ship Division, Maj. Gen. William F. Dean,
within twelve or fourteen hours. Gen- flew to Pusan early in the morning of 2
eral Almond emphasized that these men July. After spending 24 hours becoming
were not to be used as "Headquarters acquainted with conditions, he tele-
Guards" but to fight the North Koreans. phoned from Taejon to Tokyo and spoke
He was assured that the railroads from with General Hickey, Deputy Chief of
Pusan to Taejon were operating and that Staff, GHQ. Wanting his initial fight
there should be no problem in moving with the North Koreans to be fully co-
these troops to the line of battle. ordinated and supported, he told Hickey,
Almond instructed Church to concen- "This first show must be good. . . . We
trate railroad rolling stock near Pusan must get food and bullets and not go off
to keep it out of enemy hands and to half-cocked."
have it ready for the 24th Division.3 A few hours later, MacArthur named
Dean commanding general, USAFIK.
2
Interv, author with Gen Church, 16 Jul 50, copy Dean assumed control of KMAG and
in OCMH. all other U.S. Army troops in Korea.
3 (1) Rad, A 041, ADCOM to CINCFE, 30 Jun 50.
4
(2) Rad, JSOB/G G-2 to Capt Hutchinson, 1130, Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021810
1Jul 50. (3) Memo, CofS GHQ, FEC, no signature, Jul 50, in AG, FEC files.
5
1Jul 50, sub: Telecon Between CofS GHQ and First (1) Rad, CX 57073, CINCFE to CG FEAF and
Secy of American Embassy, Taejon, 1120. (4) Rad, CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul 50. (2) Memo, ACofS G-3,
CX 57009, CINCFE to ADCOM, 1 Jul 50. All in GHQ, for CofS ROK, GHQ, 021700 Jul 50. Both
AG, FEC files. in AG, FEC files.
82 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Church's GHQ, ADCOM, served as his All combat elements of the 24th Di-
temporary staff. At the same time, vision closed with the enemy along the
MacArthur set up the Pusan Base Com- main axis of his advance, but the North
mand, subordinate to USAFIK and Korean firepower and greater strength
under Brig. Gen. Crump Garvin.6 overwhelmed these units at every stand.
The other regiments of the 24th The men and officers of the 24th Division
Division—the 34th and 19th Infantry, fought bravely, but their small numbers
and the remainder of the 21st Infantry, and inferior weapons left no choice but
plus supporting units—moved to Korea retreat or annihilation.
rapidly. By 5 July, most of the division General Dean hoped that the 34th
was there. To provide more armor Infantry could delay the North Korean
General MacArthur ordered Company advance in the P'yongt'aek-Ch'onan-
A of the 1st Cavalry Division's medium Kongju corridor. But between 5 and 8
tank battalion to bolster the division.7 July the regiment, thrown into a fight for
Meanwhile, Colonel Smith's delaying which it was unprepared, was cut to
force, after reporting to General Church pieces. Weak in numbers, completely
at Taejon, was sent forward to engage outgunned, unable to protect its flanks,
the enemy on sight. Just above Osan, and short of ammunition the 34th re-
the task force dug hasty positions on the treated in some disorder, suffering
night of 4 July and awaited the ap- extremely heavy casualties.
proaching North Koreans. Shortly after The 21st Infantry held at Chonui and
0800 on 5 July, the North Koreans ap- Choch'iwon for three days, slowed two
peared. They struck the task force with enemy divisions, but, after losing heavily
infantry and about thirty Russian-made in men and equipment, had to give way
T-34 tanks. The Americans stood until on 12 July.
they expended their ammunition, then East of the main Seoul-Taegu rail and
abandoned the field, suffering heavy highway lines, the ROK Army tried to
losses in the process. Their weapons stem the North Korean drive through the
had proved to be almost useless against mountainous central and eastern regions.
the enemy armor. Without reserves and In bloody hand-to-hand fighting that cost
with open flanks, the task force remnants both sides dearly, the North Koreans
withdrew to avoid being surrounded and continued to advance. No defensive
destroyed. line appeared to offer the prospect of a
The pattern of this first engagement determined stand.8
was repeated during the following days.
8
(1) Rad, ROB 104, CG USAFIK to CINCFE,
6 Jul 50. (2) For a detailed account of these actions,
6
(1) Memo, 031140 Jul 50, sub: Telecon Between see Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the
ADCOM (Gen Dean) and CofS (Gen Hickey). (2) Yalu, pp. 59-108. (3) General MacArthur later tes-
Rad, CX 57153, CINCFE to CG 24th Div, 3 Jul 50. tified that he had sent the initial task force in the
Both in AG, FEC files. hope of establishing a "loci [locus] of resistance,"
7
(1) Memo, ACofS G-3, GHQ, for CofS ROK, an "arrogant display of strength" that would fool
GHQ, 2 Jul 50. (2) Ibid., 3 Jul 50. (3) Rad, CX the enemy into believing that much more American
57090, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 2 Jul 50. All resources were at hand than in actuality. See Mac-
in AG, FEC files. Arthur Hearings, p. 231.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 83
MEMBERS OF THE 25TH DIVISION en route to the battle front on 14 July 1950.
good "as any seen at any time in the last an additional army of four divisions
war." Enemy infantry was first class. climaxed a series of detailed requests for
There were unmistakable signs of Soviet men and units and marked the upper
leadership and technical guidance and limit of MacArthur's requests for Korea.
of Chinese Communist participation. On 5 July General MacArthur had
The attack could no longer be viewed ordered the 25th Infantry Division into
as an indigenous North Korean military combat, and by 9 July its first RCT had
effort. "To date," he admitted, "our cleared Japan for Korea. All regiments
efforts against his armor and mechanized of the 25th Division had arrived in or
forces have been ineffective." This fail- were en route to Korea by 14 July. They
ure, galling as it was, was not the fault went into battle at once. The 1st
of the fighting men. "Our own troops,"
Cavalry Division was by this time also
he pointed out, "are fulfilling expecta-
preparing for an amphibious landing
tions and are fighting with valor against
on the east coast of Korea. In order
overwhelming odds of more than ten to
to bring these two divisions and the 24th
one." 17 This appeal to Washington for
Division to some semblance of effective
17
Ibid. fighting strength, MacArthur stripped
86 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the remaining FEC combat force, the 7th hundred miles away and serving as its
Division, of trained officers and men. own zone of communications. For the
While this cannibalization of the 7th sake of convenience, forces in Korea were
fell far short of building up the other referred to as Eighth U.S. Army in Korea
units to a satisfactory war strength, it (EUSAK) and those remaining in Japan
left the 7th Division a skeleton, tem- were still referred to as Eighth Army or
porarily useless for combat.18 as Eighth Army Rear. General Walker
As the odds grew large that the greater retained command of both.
part of Eighth Army would have to fight When Walker assumed command in
in Korea, it became apparent that Gen- Korea, he had approximately 18,000
eral Walker would have to take personal troops spread along a defensive line run-
command there. USAFIK was a pro- ning along the south bank of the Kum
visional headquarters, hastily formed for River to a point just above Taejon,
a specific mission, and could not handle there curving northeastward through
a large operation efficiently. When Gen- Ch'ongju and across the Taebaek Range
eral Dean proposed on 7 July that his below Ch'ungju and Tanyang, finally
headquarters absorb GHQ ADCOM, bending southward to the east coast of
General MacArthur had already decided P'yonghae-ri.21
19
that General Walker would take over. Although General MacArthur had
Five days later, on 12 July, MacArthur hoped to save the 1st Cavalry Division
named Walker commander of the for a later amphibious operation, he
ground forces in Korea. The USAFIK yielded to battlefield necessity and sent
headquarters was dissolved, and General that unit to Korea in mid-July. The
Church's ADCOM group was ordered division loaded out of the Yokohama
to Tokyo.20 area between 11 and 17 July aboard
The extension of Eighth Army's area LST's, other U.S. naval craft, and
of responsibility to include Korea intro- Japanese-operated cargo ships. The unit
duced the unique situation of an army was prepared to make an amphibious
fighting on one land mass with responsi- landing on the east coast of Korea near
bility for its own logistical support, in- P'ohang-dong, against enemy opposition
cluding port operation and procurement if necessary. No enemy appeared, and
of supply, while administering occupied in the early morning of 18 July the units
territory on another land mass several started coming ashore.22
18
(1) Rad, CX 57258, CINCFE to CG Eighth
Army, 5 Jul 50. (2) Memo, G-4 GHQ for CofS
The Build-up
ROK, GHQ, 10 Jul 50, sub: Movement of 25th Inf
Div to Korea. (3) Memo, G-4 GHQ for CofS ROK,
The years of military privation since
GHQ, 14 Jul 50. (4) Rad, CX 57692, CINCFE to World War II had left their mark on the
DA, 12 Jul 50. All memos in AG, FEC files. ground forces of the United States. Not
19
(1) Ltr, CG USAFIK to CINCFE, 6 Jul 50, sub:
Org of USAFIK. (2) Ltr, CINCFE to CG USAFIK, 21
Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the
1st Ind, 9 Jul 50. (3) G-1 GHQ Log, Item 146, Yalu, p. 108.
22
9 Jul 50. (1) Draft Plan, JSPOG GHQ, FEC, Operation
20
(1) GO 13, GHQ FEC, 12 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX BLUEHEARTS, 2 Jul 50, in AG, FEC files. (2) War
57765, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 13 Jul 50. Diary, 1st Cav Div, Jul 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 87
only were they equipped with outmoded, units. In the United States, every in-
worn weapons and equipment, but their stallation was combed for individuals
numbers were scant. Both Army and who could be shipped quickly to Korea.
Marine troops had spread thin in their General MacArthur first asked for
efforts to perform their interim missions. 5,000 combat and 425 service replace-
Aside from scattered elements in the ments. On 1 July, he asked that these
Pacific, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the troops be added to the normal number
Army's leaders had only the under- shipped to his command each month,
strength General Reserve in the United stipulating that they be qualified and
States from which to draw immediately experienced, for they were "going di-
for fighting men to throw into Korea. rectly into the combat zone in Korea for
Additional ground strength could be an indefinite period. . . ." 23 This num-
developed through Selective Service and ber could be sent without difficulty, and
through the call-up of Reserve Com- most would reach Japan within the
ponent forces, but these methods would month, the remainder early in August.
take time. Thus, when General Mac- The Department of the Army gave
Arthur, reacting to North Korean victo- MacArthur special dispensations that
ries, impatiently demanded his due, the would improve the replacement status
nation's military leaders faced a dilemma in the Far East while not enfeebling mil-
of considerable complexity and prime itary strength elsewhere. He could re-
importance. The very safety of the na- tain enlisted men in his command even
tion stood, at times, in the balance. though their foreign service tours had
Demands for combat forces by Gen- been completed. He could keep Reserve
eral MacArthur in July and August 1950 officers after their category commitments
fell into three broad categories: replace- had expired, if they agreed. He could
ments, filler units and individual fillers, call to active duty limited numbers of
and reinforcing units. To meet his de- Reserve personnel already in the Far
mands in any of these categories would East.24
affect the balance of United States mil- Airlift of replacements from the
itary strength. Each tied in with prob-
lems far broader in scope than General 23
(1) Rad, CX 57013, CINCFE to DA, 1 Jul 50.
MacArthur's problems in Korea. Within (2) General MacArthur's 2-division estimate was the
basis for these figures. This estimate called for
the limits imposed by national policy, as deployment of 25,266 combat troops and 9,246 serv-
set by the President, the Joint Chiefs of ice troops in the combat zone. The formula ap-
Staff and the Department of the Army plied to this battlefield strength to determine
replacement needs was taken from FM 101-10, 10
made every effort to meet the urgent August 1949, and provided a surprisingly accurate
requirements developing in the Far East. figure. United States battle losses in July were
1.3 percent of total strength, whereas the formula
Replacements forecast had set expected losses at 1.35 percent. See
Rad, CX 58760, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul 50.
24
The sources of replacements within (1) Rad, C 57692, CINCFE to DA, 12 Jul 50.
(2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50, sub:
the Far East quickly dried up. Men were Casualties and Replacements. (3) G-1 GHQ Log,
taken from administrative and noncom- Item 41, 5 Aug 50. (4) Rad, C 58232, CINCFE to
batant duties and sent to the combat DA, 19 Jul 50.
88 POLICY AND DIRECTION
stripped battalions, companies, and bat- mand 2 full battalions and 3 battalion
teries from the General Reserve. It cadres from the 3d Infantry Division;
pulled trained noncoms from other units 1full battalion from the 14th RCT; and
and formed provisional cadres for Gen- 3 battalions from the 5th RCT on
eral MacArthur's command. These Hawaii. The remaining 2 battalions
drastic procedures not only vitiated the were taken from the 29th RCT on
combat readiness of the remaining units, Okinawa. This unit was already part of
but greatly reduced the mobilization base the Far East Command and its disposi-
for a later build-up of the Army General tion did not affect the General Reserve.
Reserve. The Department of the Army spared
The dangers of denuding the General the 82d Airborne Division and the in-
Reserve in the United States came under fantry units of the 2d Armored Division.
consideration only as a secondary factor The former unit was not touched be-
of the larger planning effort: how and cause General Collins felt he must keep
where the General Reserve should be a completely manned and effective unit
tapped to bring FEC units to war for last-resort operations. The armored
strength. The Department of the Army infantry battalions of the 2d Armored
took in stride the decision to accept the Division were not particularly suited to
great risk of military weakness in the the type of action taking place in Korea
continental United States as it accepted and were passed over for that reason.
at face value General MacArthur's The removal of battalions from the
statement of his needs.33 General Reserve would reduce the train-
ing and mobilization base in the United
Infantry Strength
States by one-sixth. The 3d Division,
The main considerations in selecting the 2d Armored Division, because of
infantry battalions for Korea were early losses other than in infantry units, and
arrival and combat effectiveness. Army the 14th RCT would be fit only to serve
authorities could have sent eleven cadres as nuclei around which to build new
for new infantry battalions, but new bat- units. Since it would require from
talions, even with full cadres and basic- twelve to fourteen months to rebuild
trainee fillers, needed six months to these combat units, the Army's ability
become combat ready. Only in the case to carry out emergency missions would
of the 7th Division, still in Japan, were be nullified for at least one year.34
three battalion cadres substituted for
ready-to-fight units. The General Re- Division Artillery Units
serve held only eighteen battalions of The same general criteria were used in
infantry at this time. From this small choosing division field artillery batteries
reservoir the Department of the Army from the General Reserve for shipment
finally selected for the Far East Com- to the Far East. Although taking only
33
(1) Memo, CofS USA for Gen Bolté, 17 Jul 50, battery cadres would have placed less
sub: Additional Units to Meet Immediate Require- strain on Regular Army units, complete
ments of the FEC. (2) MFR, 17 Jul 50, attached
34
to (1). (3) Memo, Study, same sub, 17 Jul 50. All Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate
in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 17. Requirements of FEC, Annex B.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 91
batteries were withdrawn. The 3d In- When the Chief of Staff, GHQ, and
fantry and 2d Armored Divisions each the Chief of Staff, Eighth Army, reached
furnished three 105-mm. howitzer bat- agreement in a telephone conversation
teries. Three batteries were originally on 12 July that two battalions of the 29th
scheduled from the 14th RCT and two Infantry on Okinawa should be sent
from the 6th Armored Field Artillery to Korea as soon as possible, General
Battalion. With the decision to commit MacArthur ordered the Commanding
the three batteries of the 5th RCT from General, Ryukyus Command, General
Hawaii, the levy on the 14th RCT was Beightler, to build these battalions to
reduced to two and that on the artillery war strength and send them to Japan
battalion was canceled. These eleven without delay.37 General Walker asked
artillery batteries were scheduled to that the two battalions be sent directly
reach Korea at about 60 percent strength to the battle area, bypassing Japan. He
and at an estimated combat effective- said he would give them any training
ness of 40 percent.35 The field artillery they needed. This request was granted,
mobilization base was cut about 30 per- and on 21 July the two battalions sailed
cent by these transfers to Korea, and the from Okinawa for Pusan, arriving four
ability of the Army to support other op- days later.38
erations with artillery was cut in half General Bolté, the G-3, Department
for a full year. of the Army, had suggested to the Deputy
Battalion-sized units could be ready Chief of Staff for Administration, Gen-
to leave their home stations two weeks eral Ridgway, on 1 July that the 5th
after receiving warning orders. But RCT stationed in Hawaii, be sent to
there was no hurry about alerting in- Korea.39 Ten days later, when General
fantry and artillery units, because all Collins paused in Hawaii on his way to
water shipping from the west coast was visit the Far East Command, he looked
tied up until about 15 August. The into the matter. In a teleconference with
Chief of Transportation, U.S. Army, re- Ridgway in Washington, Collins asked
porting that 30,000 men and 208,000 him to query key staff officers on whether
measurement tons of equipment were it would be better to send the 5th RCT
going to the Far East under the most as a unit or break it down into battalions
urgent priorities, recommended not and battalion cadres to bring other FEC
shipping the augmentation units until regiments up to war strength. His own
mid-August. General MacArthur was
37
notified that the new infantry and artil- CINCFE ordered these battalions sent at full
lery units would reach him before the war strength even though his existing troop basis
did not allow this.
end of that month.36 38
(1) Memo, CofS GHQ for ACofS G-3, 12 Jul
50. (2) Rad, CX 57798, CINCFE to CG RYCOM,
35
(1) Ibid., Annex C. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA 13 Jul 50. (3) Rad, E 33465, CG Eighth Army to
to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50. (3) Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE CINCFE, 14 Jul 50. (4) Rad, CX 57894, CINCFE
to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul 50. (4) Rad, WAR 87500, to CG EUSAK, 15 Jul 50. (5) Rad, CX 57799,
DA to CINCFE, 30 Jul 50. CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50. (6) Rad, WAR 85875,
36
(1) Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate JCS to CINCFE, 13 Jul 50.
39
Requirements of FEC. (2) Rad, CX 58506, CINCFE Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Ridgway, 1 Jul 50,
to CG EUSAK, 23 Jul 50 (passing on data from DA). sub: Anticipated Requirements of CINCFE.
92 POLICY AND DIRECTION
feeling was that the 5th RCT should be question the validity of any of Mac-
employed as a regiment, not canni- Arthur's demands. The continuing suc-
balized. Ridgway and other staff officers cess of the North Korean Army was
agreed, recommending that the regiment proving vividly that the Far East Com-
be sent to Korea at its existing strength mand needed fighting units. But as the
with all possible speed. On 13 July the calls for help mounted they threatened
Joint Chiefs of Staff authorized the com- to shrink the General Reserve unduly
manding general, U.S. Army Pacific, to and had to be considered in terms of
send the regiment to Pusan at once. national strategy and acted on at a level
The regiment sailed for Korea on 25 above the Department of the Army.
July with 178 officers and 3,319 men, The first request by General Mac-
entered Korea on 31 July, and went into Arthur for a major unit from the United
combat immediately. 40 States came when he sought a Marine
By late July, the build-up of FEC RCT with attached air support elements.
divisions to war strength was well under Made on 2 July, the request was ap-
way. Of the 11 infantry battalions re- proved on the next day by the Joint
quired, 8 had been sent or would reach Chiefs, and General MacArthur was told
General MacArthur's command within that the Marine unit would be sent to
thirty days. The shortage in division him as soon as possible.42
artillery of 11 light batteries was also A few days later came his first call for
being rectified. Three batteries arrived specific major Army units from the Gen-
with the 5th RCT. Three were en route eral Reserve. He asked, on 5 July, that
from the 3d Division, 2 from the 14th the 2d Infantry Division, then training
RCT, and 3 from the 2d Armored at Fort Lewis, Washington, be sent to
Division.41 Korea as soon as possible. He also asked
by name for smaller units which, if sent,
Reinforcement by Major Units would further reduce the capabilities
of the General Reserve. On 2 July Gen-
While he had been asking for replace-
eral MacArthur had pointed out that he
ments and filler units, General Mac-
must have more armored units since his
Arthur had also been calling for major
four heavy tank battalions were skeletons
trained combat units from the United
with only one company apiece. Two
States. Never in this early period did
were already in Korea and the remain-
the Department of the Army openly
ing two were going. He asked for
40
trained and organized tank companies
(1) Telecon, TT 3512, Collins (Hawaii) and from the United States to bring these
Ridgway (Washington), 11 Jul 50. (2) Rad, WAR
85696, DA to CINCFE (for Collins), 12 Jul 50. (3) battalions to full strength. He asked
Rad, WAR 85854, DA to CINCFE, 13 Jul 50. (4) also for three additional medium tank
Rad, WAR 85874, DA to COMGENUSARPAC, 13 battalions.
Jul 50. (5) Rad, RJ 64645, CG USARPAC to
CINCFE, 25 Jul 50.
41 42
(1) Rad, CX 8506, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 23 (1) Rad, C 57061, CINCFE to DA, 2 Jul 50. (2)
Jul 50. (2) Rad, WAR 86246, DA to CINCFE, Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. For
19 Jul 50. (3) Rad, WAR 87500, DA to CINCFE, details of movement of Marine and airborne units,
30 Jul 50. see below, Chapter IX.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 93
At the same time he made a bid for released two additional battalions to
an RCT from the 82d Airborne Division General MacArthur at once.44
and another for an Engineer Special While waiting for its recommenda-
Brigade. The weakness of his antiair- tions to be considered by the Joint Chiefs
craft artillery defenses impelled him of Staff, the Department of the Army
also to seek quick shipment of four addi- suggested to General MacArthur certain
tional battalions of antiaircraft artillery. priorities for shipping units if their de-
He backed up this request by pointing ployment was approved. "It is empha-
out that Sasebo, the principal Japanese sized," General MacArthur was told,
port of embarkation for Korea, was "that final decision by higher authority
completely undefended by antiaircraft to furnish major reinforcements re-
43
artillery. quested by you has not yet been taken."
These requests did not surprise De- The Department of the Army then out-
partment of the Army officials, but they lined a proposed shipment schedule for
did 'pose a serious problem and involve these units. General MacArthur reacted
major decisions. General Bolté advised immediately and, citing his most recent
General Collins to take units from the appraisal of the deteriorating combat
General Reserve and to send them to situation, underscored the "impelling
Korea as reinforcing units. The Chief urgency" of getting a favorable decision
of Staff accepted this view. General at once. He reversed the proposed order
Collins, however, reluctant to tamper of water shipment and asked that the
with the combat effectiveness of the 82d armored units come first, to be followed
Airborne Division, recommended that by the 2d Division, the antiaircraft ar-
an RCT of the 11th Airborne Division, tillery battalions, and the Engineer Spe-
which was less combat ready, be sub- cial Brigade. He asked also that the
stituted. He had at first felt that sending airborne RCT be flown to Japan at once,
45
four battalions of antiaircraft artillery together with its supporting airlift.
would be beyond the Army's capability. The Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that
He told the other members of the Joint the Army should send General Reserve
Chiefs on 3 July that, as their executive units to General MacArthur. But the
agent for the Far East Command, he issue was so important in terms of world-
had taken action to send two battalions wide commitments that the JCS on 7 July
to General MacArthur. This was the asked the Secretary of Defense to gain
maximum deployment of antiaircraft the approval of the President. Mr.
artillery he then believed could be made 44
Truman gave it, and the approved units inspecting the division in June that it
were immediately ordered to prepare would not be ready to fight for at least
for shipment.46 By 9 July, the 2d Di- four months. The division was approx-
vision, the 2d Engineer Special Brigade, imately 5,000 men short of war strength.
an RCT from the 11th Airborne Di- Used during the preceding year as an
vision, the 378th Ordnance Heavy Main- overseas replacement pool, it had under-
tenance Company, the 15th and 50th gone a personnel turnover of 138
Antiaircraft Artillery Battalions (AW), percent in that period.49 General Mac-
the 68th and 78th Antiaircraft Artillery Arthur's first move on being told that
Battalions (90-mm.), and the 6th, 70th, the division was coming to his theater
and 73d Tank Battalions had been had been to ask that it be brought to full
50
approved for shipment to General war strength before sailing.
MacArthur. 47 In order to comply, the Department
of the Army transferred hundreds of men
The 2d Division from other units at Fort Lewis to the
2d Division. But putting approximately
The deployment of the 2d Division 1,500 replacements awaiting shipment
from Fort Lewis, Washington, to the to the Far East from Fort Lawton into
battlefront in Korea began on 8 July the division evoked an objection from
48
when the unit was alerted for shipment. General MacArthur. He remonstrated
Nine days later, the first elements of that all replacements scheduled for his
the division sailed for Korea. One of its command must come to him directly and
regiments attacked the enemy in the field not to be used as fillers for the 2d Di-
a single month after the first alert. vision. He considered it "imperative
The speed with which this division that the meager strength authorized units
reached Korea as an effective fighting in combat be maintained." 51 The Army
force is remarkable-when the scale of had taken this action in order to get the
the shipment and its many complications 2d Division to Korea at full war strength
are considered. When it began prepar- as quickly as possible. The 1,340 re-
ing for shipment in early July, the 2d placements already assimilated by the 2d
Division was far from combat-ready. Division could not be retrieved. Further
General Mark W. Clark, then chief of diversions were stopped because of Gen-
Army Field Forces, had predicted after eral MacArthur's objection, even though
Army officials felt that their method
46
(1) Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, sgd Gen Brad- would have put the greatest number of
ley, 7 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A,
Case 6. (2) Rad, W 85359, DA to CINCFE, 10 Jul
50. (3) Note by Secys to Holders of JCS 2147, 11
49
Jul 50. 2d Div, Comd Rpt, vol. I, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50,
47
(1) Memo, G-3 for Gen Ridgway, 8 Jul 50, sub: prepared by Hist Sec, G-3, Hq, 2d Inf Div, pp. 9-22,
Action on Gen MacArthur's Request. (2) Memo, copy in AGO Departmental Records, 302.
50
Gen Thomas S. Timberman for Chief, Org and Rad, CX 57573, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50.
51
Training Div, G-3, DA, 9 Jul 50. (3) Ibid., 8 Jul 50. (1) 2d Div, Comd Rpt, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50, pp. 13-
All in G-3, DA files. 14. (2) Rad, AMGA 0720, CG Sixth Army to DA
48
Rad, WAR 85272, DA to CG Sixth Army, 8 Jul (citing CINCFE radio message), 6 Jul 50, G-1 GHQ
50. Log, Item 6, 15 Jul 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 95
men in the Far East Command in the place these men in the 7th Division, but
least period of time.52 changed his mind. On 28 July he di-
Army officials were anxious not only rected that they be assigned to the 2d
54
to meet the requirements set up by the Division upon reaching Korea.
Far East Command but also to do so in In the early stages of the division's
the manner designated by General preparations, General MacArthur had
MacArthur. On 19 July, they told him asked that it be shipped to Korea combat-
to decide whether he wanted combat loaded. Each increment would thus
replacements or a war-strength combat land in Korea with its weapons ready to
division. The second increment of the go, with organic vehicles and supporting
2d Division, scheduled to sail the next artillery on the same or accompanying
day, would leave at only half strength ships, and with each shipload able to
because men from other stations in the operate independently in combat for a
United States could not reach Fort Lewis reasonable period of time.
by sailing time. While Washington recognized some
The division commander opposed sail- advantages in combat-loading, there were
ing at only half strength, especially when compelling reasons why it was not prac-
3,500 men were at west coast ports of tical. The ships being used were not
debarkation awaiting shipment to the designed for combat-loading. Further-
FEC as replacements. Since airlift was more, combat-loading would have de-
very limited, these replacements could layed the division's arrival in Korea by
not reach the FEC for at least three at least two weeks because it was slower
weeks. Washington asked General Mac- than ordinary unit-loading. The pro-
Arthur for an immediate decision as to cedure also took nearly twice as much
whether 1,500 of these replacements shipping space. Since convoys were not
could be placed with the second incre- being used, unit-loaded shipments would
ment of the 2d Division when it sailed depart as soon as they were loaded.
the next day.53 Troops would travel on the same ship
General MacArthur's preoccupation as their own equipment insofar as pos-
with replacements led him to compro- sible. The rest of their equipment and
mise by agreeing that the maximum supplies would arrive on cargo shipping
number of men from the ports of de- loaded for selective discharge to match
barkation could be sent on the same the unit.55
ships as the 2d Division, but not assigned When the assistant division com-
to the division. "Anything," his reply mander of the 2d Division arrived in
stated, "that will speed up movement Tokyo late in July with the advance
of replacements to this theater is de-
54
sired." Fifteen hundred replacements (1) Rad, C 58193, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50,
G-1 GHQ Log, Item 25, 19 Jul 50. (2) Rad, W
sailed with the 2d Division on 20 July. 86606, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul 50. (3) Memo, G-3
General MacArthur had intended to GHQ for G-1 GHQ, 28 Jul 50, sub: Replacements
2d Inf Div and 7th Inf Div, G-1 GHQ Log, Item
52
Telecon, DA and CINCFE, 16 Jul 50, G-2 GHQ 54, 28 Jul 50.
55
Log, Item 1, 16 Jul 50. (1) Rad, CX 57546, CINCFE to DA, 10 Jul 50.
53
Rad, W 86378, DA to CINCFE, 19 Jul 50. (2) Rad W 85426, DA to CINCFE, 11 Jul 50.
96 POLICY AND DIRECTION
party, he reported that almost 1,800 en- battalion. He pointed out that his di-
listed men had been released from the vision commanders in Korea would be
division at Fort Lewis because they were forced, by the extensive frontages,
due to be discharged within three broken terrain, and the limited road
months. This information nettled Mac- nets, to employ their divisions by sep-
Arthur and he asked that these men be arate RCT's. With a projected Ameri-
retrieved and sent to him as replace- can force in Korea, based upon
ments. He would see that they rejoined JCS-approved deployments as of that
56
the 2d Division after its arrival. Gen- date, of 4 Army divisions and 1 Marine
eral MacArthur's concern was allayed RCT, there would be 13 American
when he was told that the Department regiments available in Korea. At least
of the Army had already decreed that ten of these regiments could normally be
men having thirty days' service remain- expected to be in the front lines at any
ing were eligible for shipment to the given time. Since only four battalions
Far East Command. Port officials had of 155-mm. howitzers would be present
already rounded up most of the men with division artillery units, six more
originally released and had shipped them battalions would be required if each of
on 20 July. The rest would be shipped the ten regiments was to have a medium
out as soon as statutory authority was artillery battalion when it was used as
granted to keep all enlisted men in the an RCT. Two 8-inch howitzer bat-
service for an additional year.57 talions and the 155-mm. guns would be
As fast as ships were loaded they left required for general support along the
for Korea. The first regiment of the whole front. Light battalions could
division unloaded in Korea on 31 July, either reinforce division artillery units,
while another regiment was still being or, if desirable, be committed in support
loaded on troop transports in the United of South Korean units. General Mac-
States. By 19 August the entire division Arthur noted that the profitable extent
had reached the Korean peninsula and to w h i c h American artillery should be
was on its way into action as a unit. 5 8 used in support of South Korean forces
was under study by his staff. He re-
Supporting Artillery ceived no immediate reply and asked
Lacking nondivisional artillery, Mac- again, only four days later, for early ar-
Arthur asked the Joint Chiefs on 13 J u l y rival of59 the artillery urgently needed in
to send him light, medium, and heavy Korea.
artillery battalions. He asked for six The General Reserve, weak in all its
155-mm. howitzer battalions, self-pro- components, was particularly deficient
pelled, as the first shipment. He also in nondivisional field artillery. Only
asked for an artillery group head- eleven battalions were in the United
quarters and a field artillery observation 59
(1) Rad, CX 57746, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50.
(2) Rad, CX 58055, CINCFE to DA, 17 Jul 50. (3)
56
Rad, C 58583, CINCFE to DA, 25 Jul 50. Rad, CX 57796, CINCFE to DA, 13 Jul 50. General
57
Rad, W 87191, DA to CINCFE, 27 Jul 50. MacArthur asked for the 155-mm. gun battalions
58
2dDiv, Comd Rpt, 8 Jul-31 Aug 50, pp. 23, after a conversation with General Collins on 13 July
27-28. in Tokyo.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 97
States and all were below war strength. that, since the necessary battalions were
Only four 105-mm. howitzer battalions, not available, they be activated and "an
five 155-mm. howitzer battalions, one intensive training program of appro-
61
155-mm. gun battalion, and one 8-inch priate scale be set in motion at once."
howitzer battalion could be expected to
be partially effective. But Washington Service Troops
Army officials ordered three of the Without an adequate support base be-
155-mm. howitzer battalions, the 8-inch hind the battle line in Korea and in the
howitzer battalion, an observation bat- larger service area in Japan, the fighting
talion, and the 5th Field Artillery Group units could not sustain their desperate
headquarters to Korea.60 defense, much less attack. Although the
General MacArthur protested vigor- greatest emphasis was placed on infantry,
ously upon being told that only five artillery, armored, and other combat-
artillery battalions of the fifteen he had type units and soldiers during July, the
requested could be furnished him. He demand for service units and troops
pointed out that fifteen battalions were increased steadily. Technical service
an essential minimum based on ten in- units to supply front-line soldiers, to
fantry regiments fighting on the line repair damaged weapons and equipment,
at any given time. He had now decided to keep communications in operation,
that there should be twelve U.S. regi- and to perform the hundreds of vital
ments in action at all times. "Beyond support operations required by a modern
doubt," he predicted, "the destruction army, had been at a premium in the FEC
of the North Korean forces will require when the war broke out. Japanese spe-
the employment of a force equivalent cialists and workmen performed in large
at least to six United States infantry di- part the peacetime version of service
visions in addition to ROK ground support for the Far East Command.
forces." Fighting in World War II had The few available service units had been
proven conclusively, according to him, depleted when specialists and other
that a field army could sustain a success- trained men had been handed rifles and
ful offensive against a determined enemy, sent to fight as infantry.
particularly over difficult terrain, only Some types of combat and noncombat
if it had nondivisional artillery in the support were needed more immediately
ratio of at least one for one as compared than other types. In view, for instance,
to division artillery. While General of the hundreds of tons of ammunition
MacArthur did not spell out these latest of all types on its way to the Far East
requirements, he implied that twenty- Command for the Korean fighting,
four battalions of nondivisional artillery ordnance specialists qualified to handle
would be needed. He recommended ammunition were needed at once. Gen-
60
(1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 9 Jul 50, eral MacArthur asked on 11 July that
sub: Strength and Training Status, FA Units, in several hundred officers and men quali-
G-3, DA files, Blue Book, vol. II, Status of Units
and Equipment. (2) Rad, WAR 86427, DA to Con- fied for this function be flown to his area
tinental Army Comdrs, Info to CINCFE, 18 Jul 50.
61
(3) Rad, WAR 86558, DA to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50. Rad, CX 58750, CINCFE to DA, 26 Jul 50.
98 POLICY AND DIRECTION
with all possible haste. The next day the edge off the Far East commander's
he sent a detailed requisition for Army most urgent requirements, Washington
technical service units, showing, in order officials withdrew cadres for retention
of priority within each service, the sup- in the United States and sent about
port units needed immediately and those eighty service support units of company
needed later to carry on the essential size to the Far East. Although these
service support operations in Japan by units were only at about 65 percent
replacing units scheduled for Korea. strength, their specialized composition
Support units coming from the United and the technical know-how of their men
States did not appear on this requisition and officers enabled them to function
of 12 July, but showed up two weeks profitably, even at reduced strength. 64
later on a second requisition. 62 As the scale of the Korean action be-
The stated requirements of the Far came clearer, General MacArthur on 25
East Command for technical service units July sent a supplemental list of tech-
were viewed in Washington as reasonable nical service units which would be
and just, but were beyond the capabil- needed. This list brought the total
ities of the Department of the Army to number of technical service units re-
supply. General MacArthur had re- quested in July to 501, totaling 60,000
quested over 200 company-sized units men and officers. Officials of the Far
from Chemical, Engineer, Medical, East Command knew that they would
Transportation, and other technical serv- not receive the bulk of these units for
ices. This requisition, if filled, would a long time, but they felt that Washing-
involve shipment of 43,472 men and ton should know their requirements for
officers. The Department of the Army planning purposes.65
had only about 150 company-sized service The need for combat soldiers re-
units in the United States. mained paramount. Of the service
Between the extremes of sending only troops sent to Japan as replacements in
cadres from such units and sending every July, for example, 60 percent were as-
technical service unit from the United signed to front-line fighting troops upon
States to the Far East, the Department arrival in Korea.66
of the Army charted a middle course. The filler units and reinforcing units
Cadres would have little immediate which the Department of the Army had
value in Japan and Korea. But the Gen- managed to scrape together for General
eral Reserve could not be stripped MacArthur in the first month of the
without disastrous effect upon the mo- campaign represented the maximum
bilization base.63 In order to preserve a force which the United States was able
minimum mobilization base and still take 64
Study, Additional Units to Meet Immediate Re-
62
(1) Rad, CX 57563, CINCFE to DA, 11 Jul 50. quirements of FEC, Annex D.
65
(2) Rad, CX 57693, CINCFE to DA, 12 Jul 50. Memo, Col Daniel H. Hundley for Gen Beider-
63
For example, General MacArthur requested a linden, 25 Jul 50, sub: Additional Technical Service
corps signal battalion. There was only one such Units, G-3 GHQ Log, Item 43, 25 Jul 50.
66
unit in the United States. It would have required Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50,
nine months to reconstitute such a unit after se- sub: Casualties and Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log,
lected personnel were available. Item 41, 5 Aug 50.
EMERGENCY CONDITIONS, EMERGENCY MEASURES 99
to furnish. These units might not be American defense officials would have to
enough, but no more were going to be determine just how far they were going
sent until the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in rebuilding the General Reserve.
other planners had a chance to take a Then they would have to see if sending
better look at the way things were going. additional forces to Korea was as im-
Department of the Army officials told portant to national security as having
the Far East commander on 21 July that them available for deployment elsewhere
they were in no position even to consider in the world.67
his request for another army of four di-
visions for the present. Before any de- 67
Rad, CM-OUT 86558, DA to CINCFE, 21 Jul
cision could be made on that request, 50.
CHAPTER VI
A New Confidence
The outbreak of war in June 1950 had tion but did not go nearly far enough
caught the United States flat-footed. The toward the goal of restoring peace in
nation had few forces immediately avail- Korea.
able and no plans for fighting in Korea. The Security Council resolution of 25
Nevertheless, American leaders had de- June had called upon members to re-
veloped in the post-World War II years frain from helping the North Koreans.
some policies and principles for meeting The United States Government directed
communist aggression which they could a more specific appeal to the Soviet Union
use as a basis for raising forces and mak- through its embassy in Moscow, asking
ing plans for Korea. These policies and that it prevail upon the North Korean
principles provided, broadly, that the leaders to halt the fighting. In response,
United States would work closely with the Soviet Government called South Ko-
its treaty allies and with other free na- rea the aggressor and, by implication,
1
tions to stop all forms of communist refused to mediate.
aggression, and that any military action Faced with Soviet refusal to give even
would be taken under the aegis, or at lip service to the United Nations resolu-
least with the sanction, of the United tion, and with a combat situation that
Nations, if at all possible. The United worsened hourly, the United States began
States earnestly desired to avoid uni- carefully to press for a stronger stand and
lateral action, however effective, which more effective action by the United Na-
might alienate its friends and possibly tions.
goad the Soviet Government into ex- On 3 July the Secretary General of the
treme action and all-out war. Too, it United Nations, Trygve Lie, circulated
wished to put to full use the military a proposed resolution to the delegations
resources of its allies rather than bear of the United States, the United King-
the entire burden single-handedly. dom, and France. It suggested that the
Within hours after word of the North Government of the United States would
Korean attack reached Washington, the direct the armed forces of member na-
United States had called on the United 1
(1) Leland M. Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U.S.
Nations. The resolutions of 25 and 27 Policy in the United Nations (New York: Council
June, drawn up in haste and under pres- on Foreign Relations, 1956), p. 106. (2) State Dept
sure, had been steps in the right direc- Bulletin, XXIII, 575 (July 10, 1950), 46-48.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 101
tions in Korea, but with the help of a were to deal directly with the com-
"Committee on Coordination of Assist- mander on assistance offers, for example,
ance for Korea." This committee would the top levels of the U.S. Government
co-ordinate all offers of assistance, pro- would be bypassed and forces accepted
mote continuing participation in Korea or rejected by a commander, very likely
by member nations, and receive reports an American, whose outlook would be
from the field commander. The exact restricted by his own local situation.4
extent of its control was not stated in In spite of sympathetic consideration
the proposal.2 of the proposal by France and the United
When, on 4 July, the Department of Kingdom, the United States rejected the
State sought the views of the Joint Chiefs projected U.N. committee, and a revised
of Staff on the resolution, the latter op- resolution developed. Because the
posed forming such a committee. They United States occupied a privileged posi-
felt that placing a United Nations com- tion in the terms of the resolution, it
mittee in the channel between the U.S. would not have been seemly for the
Government and the field commander American representative to introduce it.
would raise serious operational difficul- Accordingly, on 7 July, the delegations
ties. Even though the committee might of France and the United Kingdom
never try to control military operations, brought the draft before the Security
the possibility that it might do so brought Council. Seven votes in favor had been
the Joint Chiefs together in opposition. lined up in advance. The resolution
They told the Secretary of Defense that, therefore passed the Security Council, by
if a committee were needed for political a vote of seven to zero, with three na-
reasons, its powers must be defined and tions, Egypt, India, and Yugoslavia, ab-
restricted so exactly that it could never staining. The Soviet representative had
take on the nature of a U.N. command not yet returned to the council and cast
headquarters.3 no vote.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff wanted a This resolution made President Tru-
command arrangement in which the man executive agent for the council in
United States, as executive agent for the carrying out the United Nations fight
United Nations, would direct the Korean against aggression in Korea. The Secu-
operation, with no positive contact be- rity Council recommended that con-
tween the field commander and the tributing member nations furnish forces
United Nations. The major decisions, to a unified command under the United
especially those of political content, must States. It asked that the American Gov-
not in any way be made, or influenced, ernment select a commander for this uni-
by the officer commanding the U.N. fied command and that the United States
forces in Korea. If the United Nations submit periodic reports on the course of
operations in Korea. President Truman
2
Goodrich, Korea, A Study of U.S. Policy in the designated the Joint Chiefs of Staff his
United Nations, p. 119.
3
agents for Korea. To General Collins,
Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense, 5 Jul 50,
4
sub: Proposed U.S. Position With Regard to Forces JCS 1776/19, Rpt by JSSC, 5 Jul 50, sub: Pro-
in Korea. posed U.S. Position With Regard to Forces in Korea.
102 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Army Chief of Staff, fell the task of serv- forces to General MacArthur, stating in
ing the Joint Chiefs as their primary a letter transmitted through the U.S.
representative in Korean operations. At Ambassador to Korea:
the Army level, General Bolté, the G-3,
In view of the joint military effort of the
handled operational details for General United Nations on behalf of the Republic
Collins. Thus, with authority granted of Korea, in which all military forces, land,
by the United Nations, vested in the sea and air, of all the United Nations fight-
President, and running downward ing in or near Korea have been placed un-
through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the der the joint operational command and in
which you have been designated Supreme
United States Army became responsible Commander, United Nations Forces, I am
for planning and directing the military happy to assign to you command authority
operations of United Nations forces in over all land, sea and air forces of the Re-
Korea.5 public of Korea during the period of con-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended tinuation of the present state of hostilities,
such command to be exercised either by
that General of the Army Douglas you personally or by such commander or
MacArthur be placed in command of commanders to whom you may delegate the
United Nations forces.6 President Tru- exercise of this authority within Korea or
man accepted their recommendation and adjacent seas.8
notified General MacArthur of his ap- Although the Security Council asked
pointment on 10 July 1950. On 12 July the United States to report to the United
Department of the Army officials sent Nations on activities of the unified com-
detailed instructions to MacArthur. They mand, no procedure was specified. On
directed him to avoid any appearance of 13 July the Department of State pro-
unilateral American action in Korea. posed to the Secretary of Defense that
"For world-wide political reasons," they reports be sent to the Security Council
cautioned, "it is important to emphasize each week. These would keep world at-
repeatedly the fact that our operations tention on the fact that the United States
are in support of the United Nations was fighting in Korea for the United Na-
Security Council." In furtherance of tions, not itself. Apprehensive over
this, General MacArthur would iden- world reaction to the naval blockade of
tify himself whenever practicable as Korea ordered by President Truman on
Commander in Chief, United Nations 30 June, the Department of State was
Command (CINCUNC), and whenever convinced that the Security Council reso-
justified, would emphasize in his com- lutions of 25 and 27 June amply justified
muniqués the activities of forces of other the blockade, but wished the actual
member nations.7 blockade declaration reported to the Se-
Two days later, on 14 July, President curity Council in order to remove any
Rhee assigned control of his nation's doubt as to its legality. A report from
the unified command on the blockade
5
MacArthur Hearings, pp. 14, 989, 326, 1259, 1938. seemed in order.
6
Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 9 Jul 50, sub: Des-
8
ignation of a United Nations Unified Comdr by the Rad, State Dept Msg41, U.S. Ambassador, Taegu,
United States. to Secy State, 14 Jul 50, 17 Jul 50, containing text
7
Rad, WAR 85743, DA to CINCFE, 12 Jul 50. of Ltr, Rhee to MacArthur.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 103
This proposal focused the attention of tion of the operations in Korea on behalf
the Joint Chiefs on the need for a defi- of the United Nations lay the Joint
nite arrangement on how and when Chiefs of Staff. As advisers to the Presi-
reports should be made to the United dent, the Joint Chiefs concerned them-
Nations. Late in July they directed Gen- selves with every aspect of American
eral MacArthur to send them a report on military power and policy. They had to
the actions of his forces every two weeks. deal simultaneously with problems at
The Joint Chiefs would, in turn, submit home and abroad, in western Europe and
the report through the Secretary of De- in Korea.
fense to the Department of State for They did not make the national mili-
presentation to the Security Council of tary policy. Yet because they furnished
the United Nations by the American the President, normally through the Sec-
delegation at Lake Success, New York. retary of Defense, information and advice
General MacArthur was assured that he to help him set this policy, what they did
would be consulted in advance if political and what they thought held great im-
considerations made it necessary at any portance for the nation and for the Ko-
time for the Joint Chiefs to alter his rean War. By the very nature of their
reports.9 work, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to
On 24 July 1950 General MacArthur consider political factors in deliberating
issued orders establishing the United national military problems. So closely
Nations Command (UNC) with general intertwined were military and political
headquarters in Tokyo, Japan. With factors in the Korean War that they could
few exceptions, staff members of the Far not be isolated one from the other.
East Command were assigned comparable The mechanical process by which mili-
duties on the UNC staff. In effect, the tary policy recommendations evolved
GHQ, United Nations Command, was during the Korean War began with con-
the GHQ, Far East Command, with an sideration of a particular problem within
expanded mission.10 the military staffs, usually the Army staff,
At the central core of American direc- and within the joint staff of the JCS
9
(1) JCS 1776/39, Note by Secys, Rpts by U.S.
itself. The joint staff consisted of about
Government to UNSC, 18 Jul 50. (2) MacArthur two hundred officers selected from all the
Hearings, Part II, p. 1515. (3) Rad, JCS 84885, JCS services. These officers developed and
to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. (4) JCS 1775/62, Note by
Secys, Rpts by U.S. Government to UNSC, 28 Jul 50.
furnished recommended positions to the
10
(1) GO 1, UNC, 24 Jul 50. (2) The United Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Nations, at no time in the Korean War, sought to Once a final stand on a problem had
interfere in the control of operations which were been discussed and agreed upon by them,
the responsibility of the United States. General
MacArthur later testified to this when he told a the JCS presented their views in a memo-
Senate investigating committee, ". . . my connection randum to the Secretary of Defense. Any
with the United Nations was largely nominal . . .
everything I did came from our own Chiefs of Staff. political aspects of the matter would be
. . . The controls over me were exactly the same as worked out at this level between the
though the forces under me were all Americans. staffs of the Defense and State Depart-
All of my communications were to the American
high command here." See MacArthur Hearings, ments or, on occasion, between the re-
p. 10. spective secretaries personally. The
104 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Secretary of Defense then presented the constantly faced the major question,
views and recommendations thus devel- "How much of our military strength can
oped, with a clear statement of any diver- we commit to Korea without seriously
gencies, to the National Security Council damaging our ability to meet a global
or, if more appropriate, directly to the emergency?" A correct solution to this
President. On occasion, the procedure problem would enable them to deter-
varied but, normally, if there were time mine, for instance, if partial mobilization
things were done in this fashion. was needed. A second question was, "If
The issues raised by Korea could not we limit our commitments to Korea
be separated from those involved in plan- because of the greater global threat, can
ning for American defense on a world- we drive the North Koreans behind the
wide scale. The withdrawal of men and 38th Parallel?" 1 2
units from the General Reserve for em- Enemy victories in Korea forced the
ployment in Korea was incompatible Joint Chiefs to take action without await-
with existing plans. If the Korean out- ing answers to the vital questions.
break marked the initial stages of an all- Courses of action had to be considered
out war, it was unsound to tie up large individually as they arose. Decisions on
forces in an area of limited strategic sig- them were greatly influenced by General
nificance. But the United States was MacArthur's recommendations, but as
committed, short of global war, to re- each new move weakened the potential
pelling armed aggression in South Korea. means, without lessening the mission, it
Speculating on 13 July that develop- brought the need for answers to these
ments in Korea were part of a general questions into urgent focus.
USSR plan which might involve corre- By mid-July so much American mili-
lated actions in other parts of the world, tary strength had been drawn into the
the JCS planning staff said: Korean War that American military ca-
pabilities for action elsewhere had been
It is now apparent from Korea that Russia much reduced. Reserves of trained men
is embarking upon an entirely new phase and matériel diminished as MacArthur's
in her program of world-wide Communist units were brought up to war strength
domination. This is a phase in which she
is now utilizing for the first time the armed and given service support and replace-
forces of her satellites to impose by mili- ment. A further drain upon reserves of
tary strength a Communist-dominated gov- critical specialists and equipment would
ernment upon a weak neighboring state result as operations progressed.13 A key
considered incapable of successful military Army officer commented at this time,
opposition.11
"Our ground force potential is so seri-
ously depleted that further significant
A reappraisal of United States objec-
commitments of even a division or more
tives and resources thus became neces-
sary. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff
12
JSPC 853/7/D, 5 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091
Korea.sec. I-C, Case 16.
Korea,
11 13
JSPC 853/15, 13 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file091 Study, JCS 1924/20, 14 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file
A NEW CONFIDENCE 105
in size would vitally weaken our national have sent troops to Korea in the first
security at home." 14 place. American commitments would be
The possibility that U.S. troops might marked as unreliable by other nations
be thrown out of Korea was far from and considerable doubt would be cast on
academic. The Joint Intelligence Com- American ability to back up commit-
mittee (JIC) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ments in the future. The United Nations
pointed out on 12 July that the under- actions resulted mainly from U.S. initia-
strength U.S. 24th Division was facing tive, and withdrawal from intervention
9 North Korean divisions numbering on behalf of the United Nations could
80,000 men and equipped with a total of greatly weaken American leadership
from 100 to 150 modern tanks. The within the United Nations.
enemy not only had a great advantage Failure in Korea could force the
in numbers of men and in tanks and United States to revise drastically its
artillery, but was also well trained, and policy of general containment of commu-
was fighting determinedly and with great nism by reducing or limiting its com-
skill. The JIC concluded that the North mitments and by planning to combat
Korean Army was capable of threatening communist expansion only at selected
the security of Pusan within two weeks. points. The United States would un-
Lt. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgway, Deputy doubtedly have to start partial military
Chief of Staff for Administration, had and industrial mobilization to ready its
sketched the same depressing picture for forces for other, almost certain, aggres-
the secretaries of the armed services on sions; or, in another approach, to begin
10 July. He told these men that, while full mobilization so as to be prepared to
MacArthur's forces had definitely slowed threaten full-scale war in case of further
16
the enemy, they could not hold unless Soviet aggression.
they were substantially reinforced.15
Forced withdrawal of U.S. troops from First Visit From Washington
Korea would be a political as well as a
military calamity. It could weaken President Truman sent two members
American alliances and build up com- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Col-
munist political influence. It could dis- lins and General Vandenberg, to the Far
credit U.S. foreign policy and undermine East on 10 July 1950. They were to
confidence in American military capa- bring back firsthand information to use
bilities. Voluntary withdrawal could in establishing the scope of expansion of
be more damaging than a failure to the U.S. military program. Immediately
upon reaching Tokyo on 13 July 1950,
14
Quotation from Brig Gen Cortlandt Schuyler, Collins and Vandenberg talked with
Memo for Gen Lindsay, Adm Ingersoll, and Maj Gen General MacArthur and key members of
Oliver P. Smith, 14 Jul 50, sub: Estimate of the
Korean Sit, JSPC 853/11, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea.
his staff. General MacArthur impressed
15
JCS 1924/19, Decision on Estimate by JIC, 12 upon them the dangers of underestimat-
Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 46. The ing the North Koreans. He described
JIC "Estimate of the Situation" included in JCS
16
1924/19 was not approved but merely noted by the JCS 1924/19, Annex D, 10 Jul 50, in G-3, DA
JCS. file 091 Korea.
106 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the enemy soldier as a tough, well-led enemy's line of communications and his
fighter who combined the infiltration tac- withdrawal route. He conceded that his
tics of the Japanese with the armored forces were now too far south and too
tactics of the Russians in World War II. weak to carry out this plan. He had,
General MacArthur praised the North therefore, postponed its execution until
Korean Army's, ability to march, ma- the situation could be stabilized and re-
neuver, and attack at night. So far, his inforcements reached him. He placed
own forces had not been able to do the no blame on General Dean or his men.
equivalent successfully. The North Ko- General Dean had done as well as any
rean Army exploited its tank firepower man could. The troops had done every-
to the greatest advantage. Its armored thing possible, but they were outgunned,
tactics were extremely efficient and ap- outnumbered, and without adequate de-
proximated, in his words, "the norm of fense against the enemy's armor.19
tank effectiveness standard in the Soviet General MacArthur then outlined his
Army." The flexibility of the North recommendations for winning the fight
Korean commanders had been very ap- in Korea. In his opinion, the success of
parent in their quick adoption of night the United States in Korea and the speed
operations as a countermeasure against of achievement of that success would be
intensified air attacks by American in direct proportion to the speed with
forces.17 which the United States sent him rein-
General MacArthur confessed that the forcements. All American forces he
only hope he had seen a week earlier had could spare from Japan would have been
been "a desperate rearguard action," to sent to Korea by August. If the United
slow the North Korean Army by "throw- States backed this commitment with suffi-
ing everything in Japan into the fight." cient reinforcements from the zone of
He had done this as fast as he could the interior, there would be, in Mac-
although his own forces were, as he Arthur's mind, no question as to the re-
phrased it, "tailored for occupation duty sult. Without full support, the result
and not for combat." 18 would vary in direct proportion to the
By now he had taken a brighter view. support received. MacArthur contended
He told Generals Collins and Vanden- that if he were giving advice he would
berg that, while he could not predict say, "In this matter, time is of the es-
20
where the military situation would be sence."
stabilized, "that it will be stabilized is in- He expressed extreme impatience with
disputable." Originally, he had planned delay or partial measures. The strength
to stand near Suwon and then to envelop of any military stroke depended entirely
the north bank of the Han River. After upon its speed. Accordingly, General
recapturing Seoul, he would have cut the MacArthur wanted to "grab every ship
17
Memo, Lt Col D. D. Dickson for Gen Bolté, sub: in the Pacific and pour the support into
Rpt of Trip to FEC, 10-15 Jul 50, Tab A Remarks the Far East." He would not start mod-
:
of Gen MacArthur, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, sec. I, estly and build up, but would make the
Case 3. Quotations are taken from the notes kept
19
by Col Dickson. Ibid.
18 20
Ibid. Ibid.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 107
of ground fighting including such instal- cer from Willoughby's G-2 section, and
lations as factories, rail yards, warehouses, Air Force, Navy, and Army members.
and other vital points on enemy lines of This group was to advise on the use of
communication. Nevertheless, because Navy and air offensive power "in con-
of immediate needs and the lack of other formance with the day-to-day situation."
proper aircraft, General MacArthur de- The group would recommend targets
cided that these medium bombers would and priorities which the Air Force and
operate in support of ground troops Navy would bomb. The decisions of the
wherever necessary. General Stratemeyer target group were passed to the G-3, who
had ordered the medium bombers to op- passed on the orders to FEAF. Few of
erate only north of the 38th Parallel. the members appointed to the group
MacArthur overruled him on several oc- were experienced pilots and their method
casions in mid-July and ordered the of operation consisted of studying maps
mediums sent against enemy troop con- of Korea, selecting likely targets from
centrations and other tactical targets im- these maps, and directing that they be
mediately in front of the Eighth Army bombed. It was an unwieldy and im-
lines. MacArthur, on 15 July, also told practicable method.29
General Walker that future emergency According to Air Force officials, this
use of these medium bombers would be abnormal arrangement was not only un-
ordered by GHQ whenever Walker felt productive but wasteful. Since the tar-
it necessary.28 get group performed its function using a
When General Vandenberg and Gen- standard Army Map Service 1:250,000
eral Collins came to the theater in map to select targets for medium bomb-
mid-July, this aspect of the air-ground ers without checking its information from
relationship concerned both of them. other sources, an unusual situation de-
Vandenberg did not attempt to interfere veloped. Of 220 targets selected by the
since, if Eighth Army troops were driven group between 17 July and 2 August,
off the peninsula and the Air Force was 20 percent did not exist on the ground.
meanwhile employing its bombers to The FEAF commander called on Gen-
bomb remote industrial areas in North eral MacArthur and the latter's chief of
Korea, the resultant effect on public staff, General Almond, on 19 July to com-
opinion would have been most unfavor- plain of this procedure. Stratemeyer fol-
able. General Collins, on the other lowed this visit with a memorandum on
hand, expressed great interest in the way 21 July in which he recommended the
the B-29's were being employed and creation of a target selection committee
asked to be kept informed. which would include General Hickey,
To tighten his control of the air effort the FEC GHQ deputy chief of staff, Gen-
in Korea, General MacArthur on 14 J u l y eral Willoughby, the G-2, Lt. Gen. Otto
established a GHQ Target Group, com- P. Weyland, the vice commander for
posed of a chairman, a senior Army offi- operations of FEAF, and a Navy repre-
28 29
(1) Rad, CX 57893, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 15 (1) Check Sheet, Almond to All Staff Secs, GHQ
Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX57755, CINCFE to CG FEAF, FEC, 14 Jul 50. (2) Interv, Maj Schnabel with
13 Jul 50. Comdr Reilly, JSPOG, GHQ, Nov 51.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 111
to General Collins on 17 July that the quite a contrast with the glum prognoses
North Koreans hoped to capture Taegu issued earlier in the month. The North
mainly for the psychological effect. The Koreans, MacArthur told the President,
enemy commanders, having outflanked had lost their great chance for victory.
the Americans, were attacking as well The extraordinary speed with which
down the central corridor along the axis Eighth Army had been deployed from
Ch'ungju-Taegu, and were pushing back Japan and the brilliant co-ordinated sup-
the South Koreans. Almond assumed port by air and naval elements had forced
Collins that General MacArthur was the enemy into "continued deployments,
aware of this "vital threat" down the costly frontal attacks and confused logis-
middle. Referring to the plans for the tics. ... I do not believe that history
future which General MacArthur had records a comparable operation." His
sketched to him three days before, Al- forces still faced a difficult campaign.
mond reported: They would be hard pressed and could
Our proposed projects are developing as
expect losses as well as successes. But
planned and we are confident that while the the initiative no longer lay entirely with
enemy stubbornly persists in his efforts to the North Koreans, and United Nations
drive us back, we have blunted his principal troops held Southern Korea securely.
strikes, and he is bound to be getting more Apparently heartened by the recent
exhausted while we become stronger each promises of reinforcements which would
day and better organized to stop him. . . .
We have no fear of the outcome and thor- increase his own strength as attrition cut
oughly understand that current conditions the enemy's strength, General MacArthur
are the growing pains precedent to future assured President Truman, "We are now
operations. in Korea in force, and with God's help
General Almond did not believe that we are there to stay until the constitu-
Taejon could be held but was not unduly tional authority of the Republic is fully
32
alarmed. "It may not last there," he restored."
told Collins, "but the trend is much The 24th Division lost Taejon on 20
better." 31
July in a hard-fought 2-day battle. The
The 25th Division, although its first division commander, General Dean, was
elements had reached Korea on 9 July, captured after becoming separated from
had not yet met the enemy. Nor had the his troops during the withdrawal from
1st Cavalry Division, en route to Korea Taejon. Division casualties approached
while Almond was addressing Collins. 30 percent. On 22 July the 1st Cavalry
The 24th Division, weakened and dis- Division relieved the 24th at Yongdong.
organized, fell back upon Taejon alone, In a 17-day losing battle against two su-
the enemy hard on its heels. perior North Korean divisions, the 24th
When President Truman, on 19 July, had fallen back almost 100 miles, and had
asked General MacArthur for his esti- lost more than 2,400 men missing in ac-
mate of the Korean situation, he received
a reply that revealed a new confidence, 32
(1) Rad, WH 498, Truman (Personal) to Mac-
Arthur, 19 Jul 50. (2) Rad, C 58248, MacArthur
31
Ltr, Almond to Collins, 17 Jul 50. (Personal) to Truman, 19 Jul 50.
A NEW CONFIDENCE 113
Chiefs of Staff that he would seek their the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
comments on any force offered for Korea.7 The latter officials weighed the offer
As they moved to set up military con- against needs in the field and the prob-
trol over the procedure for accepting able effectiveness of the forces offered,
forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ques- keeping in mind General MacArthur's
tioned MacArthur in mid-July on his criteria. Their recommendations bore
standards for foreign units to be inte- great weight. If they were favorable, the
grated into the United Nations Com- nation then made a firm offer which was
mand. By this time, when it appeared accepted.
that the U.S. reserve of trained ground Offers of ground combat forces came
forces would be strained to its limit, the slowly at first, but gradually increased.
Joint Chiefs felt that some other nations By 23 August, the United States had ac-
should be asked to send ground forces to cepted forces offered by seven nations,
Korea. He recommended, in an immedi- totaling almost 25,000 ground combat
ate reply, that foreign units should be troops. Troops of four more nations had
sent at no less than reinforced battalion been accepted by 5 September.9 But
strength of about 1,000 men, mainly in- most of these troops were a long way
fantry, but having organic artillery sup- from Korea and many would not arrive
port. He would attach these battalions for months.
to his American divisions. If service
units were furnished, they should be
large enough to be usable at once.
8 Rebuilding the U.S. Army
The normal channel through which
Rushing thousands of men and officers
member nations of the United Nations
offered military forces and other forms
to the Far East left great gaps in the de-
fenses of the continental United States
of assistance to the unified command ran
and completely vitiated, for the moment,
from the Department of State to the De-
American plans for emergency operations
partment of Defense to the Joint Chiefs
in western Europe and other areas vital
of Staff. A nation offering assistance
usually approached the Department of
to the free world. Yet nothing substan-
tive had been done to repair the damage.
State with its proposal, but made no final
offer until after preliminary informal Nor did the Army's top planners have
talks. During exploratory conversations 9
(1) Memo, Col Williams, International Br, G-3,
the Department of State consulted the DA, for Gen Schuyler, sub: Status of U.N. Aid as
Secretary of Defense who, in turn, sought of 23 August, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 77.
(2) Rad, number unknown, DA to CINCFE, 5 Sep
7
(1) JCS 1776/23, Rpt by JSSC, 8 Jul 50, title: 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 59/16. (3) For
U.S. Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3, DA files. a detailed, comprehensive account of forces con-
(2) Memo, Adm Davis, Dir, Joint Staff, for Secy tributed to the U.S. command for the Korean fight-
Defense, 14 Jul 50, sub: JCS Views on Proposed ing, their operations, and problems arising from
State Dept Request for Assistance in Korea From their employment, see the following monographs:
Certain U.N. Nations. (3) Memo, Secy Defense for Maj. William J. Fox, Inter-Allied Cooperation Dur-
JCS, 21 Jul 50. (4) JCS History, The Korean Con- ing Combat Operations, Military Hist Sec, FEC, 15
flict, ch. III, p. 14. Aug 52; and Maj. Sam Gaziano, Problems in Utili-
8
(1) Rad, JCS 85971, JCS to CINCFE, 14 Jul 50. zation of United Nations Forces, Military Hist Sec,
(2) Rad, C 57957, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Jul 50. UNC, 10 Dec 53. Both in OCMH.
118 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Throughout July, Department of De- and at the same time meet American
fense officials were aware of the situation, commitments elsewhere. The first step
and national leaders had assumed, before in expanding the Army to take care of
Korea, that mobilization, if required, the immediate task in Korea without
would be all-out mobilization of national sacrificing its primary mission was to
military resources. The action in Korea raise the Army's authorized strength.
fell far short of global war, but proved Those directly concerned saw clearly that
big enough to involve the greater portion the void created in the General Reserve
of the nation's active ground forces by should, in the interest of the nation's
the end of the first month of fighting. safety, be filled as soon as possible. When
With American Reserve military strength they selected the 2d Division, the air-
so weakened, some degree of mobiliza- borne RCT, and the three medium tank
tion became mandatory. The nation's battalions from the Reserve in early July,
military leaders had to decide the degree the Joint Chiefs of Staff told their su-
of mobilization required and also the periors that these units would have to be
best method of recruiting additional ef- replaced. Both President Truman and
fective forces swiftly with the least dam- the Secretary of Defense agreed and on
age to the nation's morale and economy. 6 July approved an increase of 50,000.
The solution had to be reached under From this first increment, which raised
pressure and in haste.13 the authorized strength of the Army to
680,000, the Joint Chiefs of Staff set aside
Authorized Strength enough men for two antiaircraft bat-
The actual strength of the United talions for the General Reserve. They
States Army had been somewhat less than planned to use the rest, when available,
its authorized strength when the Korean as individual replacements for General
War began. But even had the Army's MacArthur's forces.14
vacant ranks been filled, it would have When the President raised the Army's
been too small to fight the North Koreans authorized strength to 740,500 a few days
later, the Joint Chiefs decided to use part
This memorandum gives a detailed breakdown of
the authorized and actual strengths of General Re- of these 60,500 new spaces to bring units
serve combat units on 6 August. The 82d Airborne going to the FEC to war strength, to
Division, authorized 17,490 men, had 15,805, while furnish more combat and service units
the 3d Division had only 5,179 of an authorized
18,894. for the FEC, and to replace losses in the
13
A comprehensive study of the many and com- FEC. But they set aside enough spaces
plex problems arising out of the nation's efforts to to activate an infantry division to replace
mobilize its armed strength widely, with analyses of the 2d Division in the General Reserve
each major personnel action, is contained in a mono-
graph by Maj. Elva M. Stillwaugh, History of the and to form two more antiaircraft artil-
Korea War, "Personnel Problems." Only the most lery battalions.15
significant measures will be discussed here. The 14
extremely detailed and involved steps taken by (1) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 7 Jul
Chief, Army Field Forces, in this early period to 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 6, I-A. (2) Memo,
raise troops and to mobilize units are set forth in Secy Defense for Secy Army, same file, Case 19.
OCAFF, Actions in Support of FECOM, 3 July-30 (3) JCS 1800/97, 6 Jul 50, CofS file 230.2, Case 35.
15
September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book. Both in (1) Memo, Secy JCS for ACofS, 10 Jul 50, sub:
OCMH. Personnel Requirements, SM 1477-50, with attached
120 POLICY AND DIRECTION
By 19 July the Joint Chiefs of Staff partment of the Army was relying almost
had asked for and received a third in- entirely on volunteers to fill its enlisted
crease in authorized military strength. ranks. Authority existed for procuring
The Army limit was lifted to 834,000, a new soldiers through the draft under the
jump of 93,500 spaces. Some of this ad- Selective Service Extension Act of 1950,
dition, too, was scheduled for the Far but the Army had made little use of it.
East Command as combat and service The increased need for manpower caused
support units and replacements. The the Department of the Army to call in
JCS set aside the lion's share for twenty late July for 50,000 draftees to be in-
more antiaircraft artillery battalions and ducted in September.17
other units to augment the depleted Gen-
eral Reserve.16 Recall of Reserves
But a paper army wins no battles and
deters no aggressor. The Army's author- Congressional action on 30 June 1950
ized strength had to be transmuted into gave the President the authority to order
actual strength quickly. Voluntary re- units and individual members of the
cruitment, Selective Service, recall of Organized Reserve Corps (ORC) and
individual Reservists, and ordering Na- units of the National Guard of the
tional Guard and Organized Reserve United States into active federal service
Corps units to active service were means for a period of twenty-one months.18 On
used to fill the Army's manpower needs. 19 July President Truman delegated this
When the Korean War began the De- authority to the Secretary of Defense,
handwritten notation, 1130, 13 Jul 50, sgd SGS (Gen
who further delegated it to the secretaries
19
Moore), G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 7. (2) Memo of the military departments.
JCS for Secy Defense 13 Jul 50, sub: Personnel Re- In the case of both officers and enlisted
quirements in Support of Current Opns in FEC, 2d
Increment, same file, Case 48.
men, the Army established and carried
16
(1) JCS 1800/104, Bradley for Johnson, 18 Jul out a policy of recalling individuals from
50, sub: Fiscal Year 1951 Force Requirements. (2) the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves. In
Memo, Johnson for Secys Army, Navy, and Air order to avoid enfeebling Active Reserve
Force, Asst Secy Defense (Comptroller), and Gen
Bradley, 19 Jul 50. (3) The major units for which
units, already understrength in most
the 834,000 Army strength would provide were at cases, and to enable these units, if it be-
this time 8 infantry divisions, 1 armored division, came necessary to call them into service,
2 airborne divisions, 8 separate infantry regiments,
4 separate armored regiments, 72 antiaircraft artil-
to come on duty in some semblance of
lery battalions, and 90 combat battalions of other
types, i.e., armored, field artillery, and engineer. 17
See JCS 1800/101, 18 Jul 50, in G-3, DA file 091 (1) Rpt, sub: Personnel Procurement, pp. 19-20.
Korea, sec. III, Book I, Case 48/2. (4) The Congress (2) Memo, Secy Army for OSD, 25 Jul 50, sub: Ad-
of the United States controls the size of the armed ditional Selective Service Call. Both in Annual
forces. In this emergency period, approval by the Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June 1950-8
President was a temporary measure, the only fea- September 1951, copy in OCMH.
18
sible procedure in view of the need for speedy PL 599, 81st Congress.
19
action. The President immediately asked for and (1) Rpt, sub: Personnel Procurement, Tab A,
secured Congressional approval in the form of legis- in Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, ACofS G-1, 25 June
lation removing all statutory personnel ceilings and 1950-8 September 1951. (2) Memo, 8 Nov 50, sub:
expanding budgetary appropriations. See JCS His- Call of Reserves, in CofS, DA file 320.2. (3) Memo,
tory, The Korean Conflict, ch. v, p. 20. Secy Defense for JCS, 21 Jul 50.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 121
combat readiness, the Army felt that it number of officers in the Volunteer Re-
should not take their officers and men. serve would be affected.
True, the men and officers in these units When the first order went out for the
had been receiving pay for attending involuntary recall of individual Reserve
drills and were, or could logically be ex- officers, no real distinction could be made
pected to be, more ready for active serv- between the Inactive and Volunteer Re-
ice than Inactive or Volunteer Reservists. serve since there were so many in the
Nevertheless, when it became necessary Volunteer Reserve who had been as in-
to fill Reserve and Regular units it was active as those assigned to the Inactive
deemed necessary to draw on the Inactive Reserve. The first recall program, au-
and Volunteer Reserves. Persons who thorized by the Extension Act of 1950 of
were members of the Active Reserve, as- the Selective Service Act of 1948, conse-
signed to units, drilling regularly, and quently specified that officers be recalled
receiving current training were not re- from either the Volunteer Reserve or the
called to active duty as individuals. Inactive Reserve without establishing a
Membership in the Inactive Reserves priority or any other distinction between
meant, in fact, that officers and men had the two categories.
accepted a Reserve status and all its at- The Army met numerous problems in
tached obligations but would not, or recalling Reservists. It had no clear pic-
could not, spend the time required for ture of the actual number who would be
training in the Active Reserve. The fact available for duty. It knew, for example,
that a man was in the inactive portion of that on 30 June 1950 it had 416,402 in
the Reserve did not, however, obviate the Inactive and Volunteer Reserves and
his obligation to serve if his country 184,015 in the organized units of the
needed him. Volunteer Reserves were Reserve. It did not know, however, how
those members of the Active Reserve who many of these were physically qualified
were not assigned to mobilization troop for duty. The required periodic physical
basis units. examinations for Reservists had been
Another factor bearing on the problem suspended in February 1947. Many more
was that an important provision of Pub- Reservists had to be called for physical
lic Law 810, Both Congress, was in the examination than the number needed
process of being implemented as of 30 because of the large numbers found
June 1950. This provision required physically disqualified. Considerable ad-
those members of the Volunteer Reserve ministrative overhead and delay hindered
who had not been sufficiently active to selections. Further, many Reservists had
earn the specified minimum number of undergone changes in economic status
retirement credit points under the above after entering the ORC which made ac-
law would be involuntarily transferred tive duty an undue hardship. The result
to the Inactive Reserve. The screening was authorization of large numbers of
of the Volunteer Reserve to determine justifiable delays which caused further
who should thus be transferred had just difficulty in filling quotas. Records on
begun when the Korean War broke out. Reserve officers were inadequate, and
It was known, however, that a large virtually did not exist for enlisted men.
122 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Finally, the recall of Inactive and Volun- the United States. General Collins was
teer Reservists engendered much ill-will extremely reluctant to advise the calling
from the public, the press, and the Con- up of National Guard divisions until he
gress. was sure that no other solution could be
Since officers, particularly in company-found to the grave manpower situation.
grade and combat arms, were needed His reasons for holding back stemmed
badly, the Department of the Army, on from his concern over the great impact
22 July 1950, appealed to Reserve offi- upon the economy and morale of home
cers to volunteer for active duty. So few areas of selected divisions. The other
responded that, on 10 August 1950, em- members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
powered by the Congressional authority, mid-July also opposed federalization of
the Department of the Army recalled in- any National Guard divisions so long as
voluntarily 7,862 male Reserve captains it could be avoided.22
and lieutenants of both the Volunteer Many National Guard units were not
and Inactive Reserves. On the same date divisional in nature, had specialized
it announced a program for recalling functions, and were made up of special-
1,063 Army Medical Service officers. ists and other men trained during World
These first involuntary recalls of Reserve War II. These units appeared to be a
officers were followed several months likely source of strength for MacArthur's
later by a larger program affecting almost forces, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, al-
10,000 company-grade officers of the com- though hesitating to call on National
bat arms.20 Guard divisions, asked for authority to
The shortage of trained enlisted spe- call to active duty some other National
cialists prompted the Department of the Guard units if required. "The Joint
Army to recall, also involuntarily, 109,- Chiefs of Staff," they told the Secretary
000enlisted men from the Reserves dur- of Defense on 14 July,
ing August. All of these men were
are of the opinion that the emergence of
specialists, slated to fill critical posi- the Korean situation cannot be fully met or
21
tions. in time by merely strengthening units al-
ready in existence or by filling them with
National Guard Divisions untrained men through the Selective Service
process or recruitment. Also it has devel-
The only source from which the Army oped that the requirements for units and
could draw complete, relatively ready, personnel cannot be met on the basis of
divisions other than from the General voluntary return of Reserves to active duty
Reserve was from the National Guard of for which approval presently exists. . . .
The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that the
20
(1) Rad, WCL 34125, DA to ZI Comds, 22 Jul
Secretary of Defense obtain at once author-
50. (2) Rad, WCL 37558, DA to ZI Comds, 10 ity for the three Services to call to active
Aug50.(3) Rad, WCL 37577, DA to ZI Comds, duty, within such personnel ceilings as have
10 Aug 50. (4) Ltr, DA, 15 Sep 50, sub: Recall of
22
Additional Reserve Officers to Active Duty, AGAO-S (1) JCS 1924/20, Rpt by JSPC, 14 Jul 50, title:
2104 (ORC), 15 Sep 50. Estimate of the Military Sit in Light of Events in
21
Hist Summary, 7 Nov 51, sub: Distribution of Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, I-C, Case 16.
Enlisted Replacements, prepared by Manpower Con- (2) MFR, Gen Moore, SGS, DA, 15 Jul 50, in G-3,
trol Div, ACofS G-1, DA, p. 2, copy in OCMH. DA files.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 123
Selective Service by 1 November 1950 the divisions selected. Clark said that
and would be ready for operational em- he and his advisers had considered this
ployment by 14 April 1951.27 point very carefully, but had given more
The question of which National weight to other factors. They had, for
Guard divisions should be called up had example, looked very closely at the
been under study for some time. Gen- leadership in the particular divisions,
eral Collins had, on 21 July, asked the wishing to avoid the difficulties experi-
Chief, Army Field Forces, for recom- enced at the beginning of World War
mendations. Less than a week later Gen- II when some of the National Guard
eral Bolté asked General Clark for an commanders had been relieved after call-
expanded study of the same problem. up. They had evaluated the compara-
In considering the problem, Gen- tive state of training of each division
eral Clark leaned heavily upon the con- and had also taken into consideration
tinental Army commanders, soliciting the divisional strengths in men and qual-
their recommendations as to which di- ified officers. On this latter point, the
visions within their areas were best Chief, Army Field Forces, felt it impor-
trained, best equipped, and most ready tant to keep to a minimum the number
to go. After careful study, General Clark of filler replacements which would have
submitted to the Department of the to be transferred into a particular Na-
Army his recommendations of six divi- tional Guard division to bring it up
sions most appropriate to be called on the to full strength. Ridgway then asked
grounds of training, manning, equip- Clark to consider the readiness status of
ment status, and general fitness. The divisions on the west coast since it might
divisions recommended in order of prior- be desirable to choose one division from
ity of selection were the 28th Division that area.
(Pennsylvania); the 29th Division (Vir- Later the same day, General Clark
ginia and Maryland); the 31st Division learned that four divisions would be
(Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th Di- chosen. He was asked if he had ad-
vision (Ohio); the 45th Division (Okla- justed his recommendations to conform
homa); and the 50th Armored Division with the necessity for a geographical
(New Jersey).28 spread. At that time he recommended
On 31 July, General Ridgway notified that four divisions be chosen from among
General Clark that the Secretary of the the 28th (Pennsylvania); the 29th (Vir-
Army and General Collins were fearful ginia and Maryland); the 31st (Missis-
of the political repercussions unless there sippi and Alabama); the 37th (Ohio);
was a better geographical spread among the 40th (California); and the 45th
27
(Oklahoma).
(1) JCS 2147/3 and Incl, Memo, Secy Defense for The National Guard divisions finally
Secy Army and JCS, 10 Aug 50. (2) MFR, CofS USA,
sub: Request for Four Divs in Korea, in G-3, DA called into service as of 1 September
file 320.2 Pac, sec. I-3, Book I, Case 19/7.
28
1950 were the 28th, the 40th, the 43d
OCAFF Rpt, Actions in Support of FECOM, (Rhode Island and Connecticut), and
3 July-30 September 1950, OCAFF, Blue Book,
entries of 21 Jul, 27 Jul, and 31 Jul 50, copy in the 45th. Also called were the 196th
OCMH. RCT (South Dakota) and the 278th
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 125
RCT (Tennessee). These units would 26 July, with the enemy pressing in on
be brought to full war strength. But Taegu where irreplaceable signal equip-
General Collins directed Bolté to limit ment was in danger of being lost, Walker
the number of troops called up to sup- called Tokyo and asked permission to
port the divisions. He felt that this move his command post back to Pusan.
restriction would not involve great risk, He did not imply in any way that he
since the Joint Chiefs of Staff had made wanted to pull his divisions back to the
no commitment to send the new divisions port city.30
overseas. If it should become necessary General Almond, who took Walker's
to send them to Korea later, they could call, told him that he, personally, ob-
get by with a far smaller ratio of corps jected to any such move. To remove the
and army support troops than had been command post to Pusan would damage
needed in World War II. General the army's morale. It might give the im-
Collins based this theory on his appraisalpression that the Eighth Army could not
of the terrain conditions and limited stay in Korea and might trigger a
road nets in the Korean area. If the new debacle.
divisions reverted to inactive status be- As soon as Walker hung up, Almond
fore deployment, the Army would store went to MacArthur and recommended
their equipment to have it immediately that MacArthur fly to Korea and talk
available for another emergency.29 to Walker at once. Apparently, Walker's
attitude had shaken Almond's faith in
The Theater Scene—August 1950 the Eighth Army commander's judg-
ment. Almond told MacArthur that he
In Korea, meanwhile, ROK and U.S. felt the situation in Korea had
forces fought off the North Korean Army reached the critical stage and required
with stubborn determination. General MacArthur's personal observation. Mac-
Walker used his small mobile reserves Arthur pondered briefly, then told
with great skill and his men, ROK and Almond that he would make the trip
American, fought bravely. The dearly the next day.
acquired battle experience and the fresh On 27 July, MacArthur, with a staff
strength pouring into Korea began to including General Almond, landed in
show in greater enemy losses and a slack- Taegu about 1000. This time, Mac-
ening of his advance. Nevertheless, the Arthur did not visit the front line, con-
Eighth Army lost ground and fell back tenting himself with conferences in
toward Pusan. Taegu. The most significant conference
Walker proved a determined and tena- took place between MacArthur and
cious commander. He well appreciated Walker. Only one other person, Gen-
the great danger of pulling back upon eral Almond, sat in on this 90-minute
his base of supply under continuous meeting.
pressure. He hated to give up any more MacArthur did not mention Walker's
ground to the North Koreans, but on request of the day before, nor did he
29 30
Min, 26th mtg, Army Policy Council, 2 Aug 50, Interv, Lt Col Roy E. Appleman with Gen
in G-3, DA file 334 (APC) 1950, Case 5. Almond, 13 Dec 50, copy in OCMH.
126 POLICY AND DIRECTION
AMERICAN ARTILLERYMEN fight off enemy efforts to break through Pusan Perim-
eter.
criticize Walker for any of his actions. Division. Walker stated that the Eighth
He merely talked over the tactical situa- Army would retreat no more, that there
tion, emphasizing that Eighth Army was no line to which it could retreat, and
must hold its ground. He told Walker that, in effect, every man in Eighth Army
that withdrawals would cease. Later, in would "stand or die" along the present
the presence of several members of the line.31
Eighth Army staff, MacArthur said that The defensive line behind which
there would be no evacuation from Walker intended his troops to "stand or
Korea—there would be no Dunkerque. die" lay mainly on the Naktong River
On 29 July as a result of MacArthur's barrier in the west and fanned out from
visit, Walker issued a widely publicized 31
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Landrum to Appleman, recd
order, in the form of a public statement 23 Nov 53. (3) War Diary, 25th Div, G-3 Jnl, Jul
during a speech to the staff of the 25th 50, Div Hist notes.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 127
Pusan. Rectangular in shape, measuring that, because they were too few, all his
nearly 100 miles from north to south and army staff members were overworked.
about fifty miles from east to west, the That they were not getting enough rest
area quickly became known as the Pusan was being reflected in the quality of their
33
Perimeter. (See Map I.)32 work.
Between 1 and 4 August, U.S. and The first weeks of August were marked
ROK units withdrew behind this line by savage North Korean efforts to break
and prepared for a last-ditch stand. Most through the Pusan Perimeter. Several
of the western edge of the perimeter was enemy penetrations across the Naktong
traced by the Naktong River with the into Eighth Army's lines came perilously
exception of about fifteen miles at the close to success, but in each case skillful
southern end of this line. The northern deployment of reserves along interior
border ran through the mountains above lines enabled Walker to contain and beat
Waegwan and Uisong to the sea, with back the enemy thrusts. Fresh units ar-
the town of Yongdok forming the eastern riving in the perimeter were quickly
anchor. ROK troops held this portion thrown into the fight at key points in the
of the line. perimeter. Elements of the 2d Division
General MacArthur sent his deputy arrived from the United States on 31
chief of staff, General Hickey, into the July, the 5th RCT reached Korea on the
Pusan Perimeter on 6 August to confer same day from Hawaii, and the 1st Pro-
with the Eighth Army commander. visional Marine Brigade closed at Pusan
Walker told Hickey he was worried on 3 August.
about the condition of the 24th Division. The mounting toll of American cas-
He appraised that unit's combat worth ualties and the depleted ranks of
as negligible after a month of hard fight- Walker's divisions underscored the great
ing. Before it could become effective need for fresh fighting men in Korea
again, it would have to be completely And every feasible means of meeting
rehabilitated. His other divisions were this need was being exploited by the
in somewhat better condition. The 25th Department of the Army.
Division, which had seen less action than
the 24th and which had been less severely Replacement Troubles
attacked by the enemy, was in fairly good By 5 August the Department of the
shape. General Walker expressed some Army had stepped up both air and water
doubts as to its offensive capabilities, as transportation to the Far East Command,
he felt it lacked leadership. The Eighth using military and commercial planes
Army commander told General Hickey and vessels. Most of the surface shipping
32
space had been taken for units and equip-
For a complete account of the valiant stand of
Walker's forces in the battle of the Naktong during ment, but airlift brought 340 replace-
August and September 1950, see Appleman, South ments each day. Still, the Eighth Army
to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters XV- was receiving more casualties than re-
XXIV. See also Lynn Montross and Capt. Nicholas
33
A. Canzona, U.S. Marine Operations in Korea, 1950- Memo, Gen Hickey, DCofS GHQ, UNC, for Gen
1953, vol. I, The Pusan Perimeter (Washington, Almond, CofS GHQ, UNC, 7 Aug 50, sub: Rpt of
1954). Visit to Korea, in CofS GHQ, UNC files.
128 POLICY AND DIRECTION
U.S. GROUND TROOPS board a transport plane at a Japanese air base for ship-
ment to Korea.
National Guard, and Reserve personnel Japan. About 25,000 men and officers
could be called to duty and made under control of Eighth Army remained
available.
34
in Japan at this time.36
The optimism expressed by Beider- The fighting in Korea prompted staff
linden on 5 August disappeared with agencies of GHQ FEC to seek more
startling speed two days later. General people. They took experienced replace-
Hickey's talk with General Walker ments, particularly officers, out of the
erased the slightly optimistic picture con- pipeline to Korea. At the same time,
jured by statistics and promises. Gen- GHQ section chiefs kept at desk jobs
eral Beiderlinden appealed to General many of their original men and officers
Almond on 7 August, pointing out that who could have been sent as replace-
every division in Korea was suffering ments. At other stations in the
critical shortages of men and officers. replacement stream from Japan to the
Almond approved an urgent call on battlefront, men and officers intended for
Washington for 8,000 men to reach the combat duty were diverted to administra-
FEC within fifteen days. All infantry tive and rear-echelon service. General
regiments in Korea were so weakened Beiderlinden warned fellow members
that unless these men reached them in of the GHQ staff about allowing this
two weeks, they would deteriorate so practice to grow. General Headquarters
badly that major steps would be neces- could hardly justify its strident pleas for
sary to rebuild them. Most urgently replacements if it kept these men from
needed were infantry and artillery sol- the fighting units. On 15 July he
diers, and company-grade officers. cautioned, "Until a flow of replacements
Almond urged, as a matter of highest commensurate with current critical needs
priority, that airlift be expanded to get materializes, it is mandatory that . . .
the 8,000 men to the theater by 20 the tendency to augment administra-
August.35 tive and rear-echelon service organiza-
The lack of replacements for Eighth tions ... be resisted." He urged the
Army's divisions resulted to a degree fullest use of Japanese and American
37
from the way in which replacements civilians in Japan.
were used after they reached the Far This chiding did not deter GHQ sec-
East Command. Less than half of the tion chiefs. General Beiderlinden told
16,000 replacements arriving in Japan the chief of staff, GHQ, in early August
between 1 July and 15 August went that he was still worried by the con-
straight to Korea. Some were used to
fill the 7th Division, but more were 36
(1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS, 16 Aug 50, sub:
assigned to nondivisional units within Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 45.
(2) Memo, Col Grubbs for Gen Beiderlinden, 8 Aug
50, sub: Assignment of Replacements, G-1 GHQ
34
Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 5 Aug 50, sub: Log, Item 36. (3) Memo, GHQ for Gen Hickey, 12
Casualties and Replacements, G-1 GHQ Log, Item Aug 50, sub: Replacements for EUSAK, G-1 GHQ
41.35 5Aug50. Log, Item 54.
37
(1) Ibid., 7 Aug 50, sub: Loss Replacements, Memo, G-1 GHQ for All Staff Secs, GHQ SCAP,
G-1 GHQ Log, Item 15. (2) Rad, CX 59519, CINC and FEC, 15 Jul 50, sub: Utilization of Personnel,
FE to DA, 7 Aug 50. G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7.
130 POLICY AND DIRECTION
now that should be changed or anything Washington, he met with the Army
further that we could do to back you up in Policy Council and, at the request of the
this critical struggle please don't hesitate to Secretary of the Army, reported his ob-
40
call on me.
servations on the combat situation.
General MacArthur made his needs Ridgway had come away from Korea
known to General Ridgway at once. He convinced that Walker would hold the
repeated the call already made by his Pusan Perimeter. Enemy pressure was
staff for 8,000 replacements by 20 August. still great enough to force limited tactical
When Ridgway passed this information withdrawals from the edges of the perim-
to General Collins, he expressed the eter and the actual final line had not yet
belief that the Department of the Army been developed, but the defensive line
could meet the full requirement. The would be held successfully and the beach-
enlisted Reserve specialists, particularly head kept intact. Regardless of his fa-
those with prior service, could, with a vorable prognosis, General Ridgway was
minimum period of three weeks for quick to point out that General Walker
processing and training, be sent to the had a serious problem. His forces still
FEC by September and would help cut faced a ruthless and savage foe. Any idea
down the shortages significantly. Gen- that the North Koreans would weaken
eral MacArthur had suggested that the or fall back was faulty and dangerous.
United States triple its transpacific ship- As an example, General Ridgway cited
ping by using commercial shipping enemy reaction to the strongest offensive
lines.41 thrust yet made by Walker's forces.
The principal request which the Far Eight American battalions had attacked
East commander placed upon the De- in the southern sector to stop an enemy
partment of the Army through General move at Pusan. Within an hour after
Ridgway was for the 3d Division. In the attack jumped off, the enemy
the relatively near future, Japan would counterattacked fiercely and effectively. 43
be completely stripped of American com- United Nations forces were still too
bat troops. So that the Japanese islands, few in number to carry on a defense
doubly vital now as a support base for according to the book. One division
Korean operations, might not be com- held a 21,000-yard front with six bat-
pletely defenseless against a possible talions. The enemy could infiltrate the
Soviet attack, General MacArthur felt thinly defended front at night and at-
that the 3d Division should be sent to tack from the rear the next morning.
Japan by mid-September.42 General Walker had not had time to
When General Ridgway returned to organize the ground effectively. General
40
MacArthur had told Ridgway that he
Ltr, Gen Collins to Gen MacArthur, 4 Aug 50, was pleased with the support given him
in CofS, DA file 323.3 FEC.
41
Memo, Gen Ridgway for Gen Collins, 18 Aug by Washington, but had asked for more.
50, in G-3, DA files.
42
After Ridgway reported to the council,
The National Police Reserve of Japan (NPRJ)
had been formed only recently, while American
43
forces left in Japan after September were mainly Min, Mtg of Army Policy Council, 8 Aug 50,
service and headquarters troops. in G-3, DA file 334 APC, Case 7.
132 POLICY AND DIRECTION
General Collins told Secretary Pace that General Collins that the 3d Division
the request for more men and units was could reach the Far East by 15 Septem-
already being studied by his staff, but ber, untrained and worthless for combat,
that he was gravely concerned by the but that the training and mobilization
demands.44 base in the United States would suffer as
At a special meeting of the Joint Chiefs a result. If General Collins could see
of Staff held later the same day to hear his way clear to delay the division until
General Ridgway's formal report and to December, it could be built up with
consider the Far East commander's needs, National Guard and Enlisted Reserve
General MacArthur's request for another Corps (ERC) fillers without ruining the
division occasioned a debate. Some ZI training base and could arrive in the
members of the Joint Chiefs wanted to Far East as a reasonably well-trained di-
send the 82d Airborne or a National vision. If General Collins considered it
Guard division instead of the under- absolutely necessary to give General
strength 3d Division. General Ridgway MacArthur another division by 15
recommended that the 3d Division be September, the 82d Airborne could be
sent since he felt that the combat-ready sent. According to General Bolté, the
airborne division must stay in the United 82d, already at about 85 percent strength,
States for use in a general emergency. would not need many fillers. Further-
After a 15-minute discussion, the tenor more, it would be ready to fight on ar-
of thought among the Joint Chiefs in- rival. Its departure, of course, would
clined toward the same view—namely, leave the continental United States
to send the 3d Division and to fill it up without a combat-ready division.46
from any and every source. No final General Bolté's views did not prevail.
decision was made at this time, but The JCS decided to send the 3d Division
General Collins and Admiral Sherman to FECOM. On 11 August President
were charged with examining the matter Truman approved its removal from the
47
urgently and reaching a recommendation General Reserve.
45
by 10 August. The 3d Division, although it had three
General Bolté, Army G-3, did not
believe that the 3d Division could be 46
(1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 10 Aug
filled and sent to General MacArthur 50, sub: Feasibility of Redeployment of 3d Inf Div
to the FEC by Mid-September, in G-3, DA file 320.2
without seriously delaying the Army's Pac, Case 19/7. (2) Transfer of men and officers
plans for rapid expansion of training from the 82d to the 187th RCT of the 11th Air-
activities in the United States. He told borne, which was being readied for shipment at this
time, had reduced the division to an approximate
44
Ibid. strength of 15,000. See Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen
45
Memos (handwritten), Lt Gen Alfred M. Gruen- Collins, 8 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case
ther, DCofS for Plans, for Gen Bolté, ACofS G-3, 6/20.
47
1110, 8 Aug 50; 1125, 8 Aug 50; 1150, 8 Aug 50. (1) Memo, Ridgway for Collins, 18 Aug 50. (2)
All in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 19/7. This series Memo, Bolté for Collins, 8 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file
of penciled notes sent out of the JCS meeting by 320.2 Pac, sec. I-A, Book I, Case 6/20. (3) JCS
General Gruenther reports the progress of the meet- 2147/4, Note by Secys, 10 Aug 50, title: Reinforce-
ing to the Army G-3, so that, in Gruenther's own ment of the FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac. (4)
words, "you won't get crash-landed" and "just to Memo, Johnson for JCS, 11 Aug 50, sub: Reinforce-
keep you off balance." ment of the FEC.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 133
regiments, was very much understrength. MacArthur asked that no press release be
Already it had furnished many men, offi- made until the division was actually en-
cers, and units to the Far East Command. gaged in combat. "Information of this
The division was short 2 infantry bat- sort," General MacArthur warned Wash-
talions, 1 tank battalion, and 2 field ington, "practically reveals our strategic
artillery battalions. Only drastic meas- concepts to an alert enemy." 49
ures would place the division in a reason- Unfortunately, General Ridgway had
ably effective status, even for occupation already alerted the Army Chief of In-
duty. By reducing one regiment to zero formation, Maj. Gen. Floyd L. Parks, to
strength and dividing its men and officers release the information on the 3d Di-
between the remaining two regiments, vision to the press. But the information
then assigning a separate regiment from had not yet gone out when MacArthur's
Puerto Rico to the division, the Depart- warning was received. General Ridgway
ment of the Army succeeded in building was opposed to withholding any such
up the division to a semblance of news from the public. "I saw no possi-
operational strength. bility short of instituting a strict censor-
On 10 August, General MacArthur ship," he said, "of concealing the fact
learned that the 3d Division, less one and if we acted otherwise, press reaction
regiment, was being ordered to his com- would be violent and prompt." When
mand. A supplementary message, ex- he went to General Collins and expressed
plaining that the 65th Infantry from this opinion, Collins considered a few
Puerto Rico had been ordered to the moments, then decided to go along with
FEC, where it would join the 3d Di- MacArthur anyhow. Ridgway was
vision as its third regiment, followed a obliged to notify Parks to make no official
few minutes later, but not quickly release on the 3d Division even though
enough apparently. Before receiving the both men knew that the news would
information on the 65th Infantry, Mac- leak out at once.50
Arthur fired back a radio objecting to General Collins was determined that
the dispatch of a 2-regiment division and there should be no misunderstanding as
pointing out, ". . . experience indicates to the great significance of removing the
the ineffectiveness of a two unit organi- 3d Division from the United States or
zation whether in battalions, regiments, to certain restrictions on its combat em-
or divisions." No answer to this reclama ployment. He sent a personal reminder
was necessary, of course.48 to General MacArthur underscoring
Fearful, also, that press reports of the both the risk taken by the Army in send-
planned movement of the 3d Division ing out the division and the need for
might tip his hand and warn the North special handling of the unit on arrival.
Koreans of his future plans, General "In withdrawing this division from the
General Reserve," General Collins
48
(1) Memo, Ridgway for Bolté, 10 Aug 50, sub: pointed out, "the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Additional Combat Forces for FEC, in G-3, DA files.
49
(2) Rad, WAR 88401, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug 50. Rad, C 59820, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug 50.
50
(3) Rad, WAR 88465, DA to CINCFE, 10 Aug 50. MFR, Ridgway, 11 Aug 50, in CofS, DA file
(4) Rad, C 59863, CINCFE to DA, 11 Aug 50. 370, Case 12.
134 POLICY AND DIRECTION
have accepted for the next few months 19 July, called on the Department of the
a further serious reduction in the United Army for two corps headquarters. He
States capabilities to meet other possible asked that these headquarters be sent
demands for combat ground forces, as as soon as possible with attached medical
well as a further serious reduction, dur- and military police units and with two
ing the same period, in the Army's capa- signal battalions. If feasible, these two
bility to train additional forces for your headquarters should be designated I and
theater." The Joint Chiefs were send- IX Corps.53
ing the 3d Division with the understand- A few days later, General MacArthur
ing that it would serve for the time being revealed that his plans called for using
in Japan, as a theater reserve. They one of these corps headquarters for an
were assuming also that General Mac- amphibious enveloping force, and stated
Arthur would, because of the division's that the operation could be deferred to
very low combat effectiveness level, per- no later than 25 September. Although
mit it "sufficient training time to reach General MacArthur had not said spe-
a minimum acceptance training level" cifically what use he intended to make of
before committing it to battle.51 the other corps headquarters for which
Late in August, after comprehensive he had asked, the Department of the
inspections of the 3d Division, its ranks Army planners assumed that it would be
now swelled from a low of about 5,000 placed under Eighth Army to serve in
to over 11,000, General Clark, Chief, the breakout and exploitation phase fol-
Army Field Forces, reported the division lowing the initial amphibious assault.
to be about 40 percent combat-ready. Officers of the DA G-3 section con-
There were no major equipment short- ferred on the matter with officers from
ages, and since the division was believed Army Field Forces and determined that
to be structurally sound General Clark the Army could produce only one corps
felt it could be brought to an excellent headquarters by the target date. The
state of combat readiness in about two available corps (U.S. V Corps) was at 75
and a half months. 52 percent combat effectiveness. Only one
signal battalion, the 4th, suitable for em-
Corps Headquarters ployment with a corps headquarters, was
By late July, it had become apparent in active service in the United States, and
that U.N. forces, comprising American it was at 60 percent strength. A lack of
divisions, ROK divisions, and units ex- critical signal specialists made its esti-
pected from member nations of the mated combat effectiveness 50 percent.
United Nations, would soon be so nu- Chances for a second corps looked slim
merous that tighter tactical control would to G-3's planners, particularly in view
be necessary. In anticipation of such a of the fact that no other corps signal bat-
development, General MacArthur, on talion was on duty in the United States
51 53
sonal)
Rad,forWMacArthur,
88954, DA12toAug
CINCFE,
50. Collins (Per- Rad, CS 58234, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50. I
and IX Corps had served under General MacArthur
52
Rad, OCAFF 810, Chief AFF to CofSUSA, 24 in Japan but had been inactivated in early 1950 as
Aug 50. an economy measure.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 135
and at least six months would be re- (IX Corps). He asked that the second
quired to train one. They concluded signal battalion be called in and sent
that furnishing one corps headquarters to him at once regardless of condition.56
with corps troops to the U.N. com- On 30 July the V Corps was redesig-
mander for use in the planned nated as the I Corps and began to pre-
amphibious operation was the maximum pare for movement, less certain cadre
capability of the Army. The tasks for personnel, to the Far East Command in
which the other corps was slated would early August. The 4th Signal Battalion
54
have to be given to Eighth Army. was to accompany the new corps head-
The Army Vice Chief of Staff, General quarters. Meanwhile, in response to a
Wade V. Haislip, disagreed vehemently. request from General MacArthur that
In his opinion, a second corps head- the corps commander and his planning
quarters could most certainly be formed staff come by air to Tokyo to plan the
insofar as the staff personnel were con- details of the forthcoming amphibious
cerned. Nor did he accept the G-3's operation, General Coulter, the com-
position that it would take six months manding general, and selected members
to train a signal battalion. He pointed of his staff landed at Tokyo on 10
out that the signal battalion to be used August.57
in defensive operations need not be so The IX Corps, activated by Fifth
highly trained as one slated for offensive Army, was to be prepared to move by
amphibious operations and directed G-3 15 September. No training time was
to restudy the problem.55 allowed. The 101st Signal Battalion was
As a result of General Haislip's in- called into service on 19 August to meet
terest, the Department of the Army told the requirement for an accompanying
General MacArthur that it would be signal unit.58
possible to activate and send to him a In mid-August, General MacArthur
second corps headquarters, untrained was notified that I Corps headquarters
but having all required staff members. and headquarters company, medical, and
An additional signal battalion could be military police units, and the 4th Signal
called into service and made available Battalion at reduced strength were ready
in six months. Or, if he wished, this to sail for his command. The signal
battalion could be sent, untrained and battalion could not be brought to full
at little more than cadre strength, in two
months. General MacArthur asked at 56
once for the earliest movement of the (1) Rad, WAR 87493, DA to CINCFE, 29 Jul
50. (2) Rad, CX 59246, CINCFE to DA, 29 Jul 50.
first corps (I Corps) and for immediate 57
(1) Memo, quoting DA radio for CG Third
activation and dispatch of the second Army, Info CINCFE, G-1 GHQ Log, Item 7, 31 Jul
50. (2) Rad, WAR 88025, DA to COMGEN V Corps,
4 Aug 50. (3) Rad, CX 58926, CINCFE to DA, 28
54
Memo, G-3 for CofS, 25 Jul 50, sub: Request Jul 50. (4) Rad, HICPAC 583, GHQ LNO to
for More Troops for FEC, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, CINCFE, 10 Aug 50.
58
Case 16/4. (1) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 29 Jul 50,
55
Memo, Col Morse for Col Howell, 28 Jul 50, sub: Request for More Troops for FEC, Tab A.
sub: Corps Headquarters Requested by Gen Mac- (2) Ibid., 8 Aug 50, same sub, in G-3, DA file 320.2
Arthur, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 16/4. Pac, Case 16/4.
136 POLICY AND DIRECTION
strength before 1 November. The IX The I Corps with attached units, includ-
Corps, less its signal battalion, could ing the 4th Signal Battalion at reduced
sail in about a month but would be un- strength, was on the high seas and due
trained. The IX's battalion could, if to reach Japan on 3 September. The IX
trained Enlisted Reserve Corps fillers Corps headquarters would arrive in
materialized as expected, sail for the Far Pusan about 10 October and would be
East Command about 1 November, but followed within three weeks by the
if trained as a unit in the United States artillery units and the 101st Signal
would not be ready until the end of 1950. Battalion.61
Artillery elements of both corps, in-
cluding the additional nondivisional ar- Reorganization, Far East Command
tillery units which General MacArthur Aware that General Walker could ill
had requested earlier and were being afford to divide his attention between
activated from Reserve and National the battlefield and his responsibilities in
Guard sources, would be only partly Japan, General MacArthur on 24 August
trained if they sailed with the other established a new and separate command
corps elements. The Department of the relieving the Eighth Army commander
Army suggested that, since MacArthur's of all duties not directly related to his
requirement for this artillery was not combat mission. He directed the estab-
immediate, the units be kept in the lishment of Japan Logistical Command
United States and trained until ready to (JLC), FEC, with headquarters located
fight.59 in Yokohama in the buildings vacated
General MacArthur apparently felt by Eighth Army. By this order, respon-
that, in this case at least, a bird in the sibilities and functions formerly assigned
hand was worth two in the bush. He General Walker within the geographical
wanted the corps as fast as he could get areas of the four main islands of Japan
it regardless of condition. "Walker is were delegated to the commanding gen-
now controlling four United States and eral of JLC, General Weible. Excluded
five ROK divisions," he pointed out. from his jurisdiction, although within
Believing that the green units could get these geographical limits, were posts,
their training faster under him than in camps, and stations assigned to the Com-
the United States, he asked that they be manding General, Headquarters and
sent to him as soon as they had been Service Command; General Headquart-
filled to authorized strength. His re- ers, FEC; COMNAVFE; and the
quest applied to all organic and attached Commanding General, FEAF.62
elements of both I and IX corps.60 On 28 August, with the concurrence
Late in August, arrangements were of GHQ, FEC, General Weible estab-
sufficiently advanced for a schedule giv- lished a subordinate command, the
ing anticipated arrival dates of the corps Northern, at Sapporo, Japan. The Com-
units to be sent to General MacArthur.
59 61
Rad, WAR 88864, DA to CINCFE, 15 Aug 50. Rad, WAR 89882, DA to CINCFE, 26 Aug 50.
60 62
Rad, C 60346, CINCFE to DA, 17 Aug 50. GHQ, FEC, GO 22, 24 Aug 50.
BOLSTERING THE FORCES 137
manding General, Northern Command, high and the major commanders confi-
Brig. Gen. Edwin W. Piburn, was made dent and optimistic. But there had been
responsible for the island of Hokkaido no letup in the enemy's determined
and certain areas on the northern portion pressure. The point of greatest concern
of Honshu. Somewhat later, on 19 Sep- to General Walker was still the slow
tember 1950, another subcommand of arrival of replacements in the combat
JLC was set up, designated as the South- zone. He told General Collins, on 22
western Command with headquarters at August at Taegu, that the replacement
Osaka, Japan. Brig. Gen. Carter W. flow was replacing only about 75 percent
Clarke was named commanding general of actual Eighth Army losses and his
of this new command with a zone of re- units were fighting at less strength than
sponsibility including the islands of that authorized them when they came to
Shikoku and Kyushu and all areas of Korea.64
Japan located southwest of Shiznoka and On the brighter side, the North
Nagano prefectures, exclusive of those Korean Army had assumed an unbal-
assigned to the British Commonwealth anced and vulnerable disposition. By
occupation forces and of posts, camps, the end of August, virtually all enemy
and stations under control of the combat troops were south of the 37th
Commanding General, FEAF, and Parallel and being supported over long,
COMNAVFE.63 exposed lines of communications. UNC
In addition to functions in support air and naval units, now in complete
of the occupation of Japan, the Japan command of the sky and sea around
Logistical Command took over the task Korea, kept these exposed routes under
of getting all supplies from Japan to constant attack so that North Korean
Korea. The new agency, actually a logistical problems worsened daily.
communications zone command for the General MacArthur, foreseeing the
Eighth Army, received requisitions for enemy's vulnerable disposition, had de-
supplies from Walker's headquarters, cided early in the war that the old pre-
placed requisitions on the proper agen- cept, "Hit 'em where they ain't," fitted
cies in the United States, and processed such a situation perfectly. The golden
and transported all supplies to the com- chance to strike deep behind the enemy's
bat theater, leaving Walker's forces free mass, cut his lines of supply, then smash
to fight without worrying about admin- his front-line divisions by attacking from
istrative matters in Japan. two directions was enticing to the gen-
The Chief of Staff, United States eral who, in World War II, had proved
Army, toured the Pusan Perimeter in so well the value of amphibious
late August, visiting all American di- envelopment against the Japanese.
visions and conferring with the army Indeed, a seaborne strike against the
commander. He found the morale of North Korean rear had long seemed the
the troops at the front to be uniformly logical solution to MacArthur. Of
64
Memo, Col Everett for ACofS G-3, 8 Sep 50,
63
(1) JLC GO 10, 28 Aug 50. (2) JLC GO 58, sub: Rpt of Visit to FEC and USARPAC, 19-30
18 Sep 50. August 1940, in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 5.
138 POLICY AND DIRECTION
course, before such a blow could be amphibious .force almost from the
struck, General Walker had to halt the ground up. By the opening of Septem-
North Korean Army short of Pusan and ber, both generals had progressed con-
General MacArthur had to build an siderably in meeting these essentials.
CHAPTER VIII
GENERAL GAY
GENERAL WRIGHT
General MacArthur confirmed the slowly drive the enemy north of the 38th
message which General Collins had car- Parallel.8
ried back to Washington on 23 July, General MacArthur's proposals for a
when he told the Joint Chiefs of Staff September landing reached Washington
that he meant to use the 5th Marine at a bad time. They came on the heels
RCT and the 2d Division for "major of the grim news that Taejon had fallen
amphibious operations" in mid-Septem- and while the North Koreans were ob-
ber. An airborne RCT would drop into viously preparing a double envelopment
the objective area soon after D-day to of Walker's defenses. MacArthur's
seize key communications centers im- term, "enemy reaction during . . . Au-
mediately ahead of the advancing assault gust," probably struck the Joint Chiefs
forces. MacArthur did not pinpoint of Staff as euphemistic. At any rate,
his objective area, but he described in they called General MacArthur to a
broad terms how the assault would go. teleconference on 24 July and asked
After the beachhead had been seized, pointedly whether, in the face of increas-
Eighth Army, by that time augmented ing enemy pressure and the stepped-up
by the additional infantry, artillery, and
tempo of the fighting all along the front,
he still believed it wise to schedule an
tank battalions, would attack from the
amphibious landing for mid-September.
south and destroy the North Koreans.
Confidently, General MacArthur as-
"Although the exact date of D-day sured them that, "barring unforeseen
is partially dependent upon enemy re- circumstances, and with complete pro-
action during the month of August," vision of requested replacements, if the
MacArthur reported to Washington: full Marine division is provided, the
I am firmly convinced that an early and
chances to launch the movement in
strong effort behind his front will sever his September would be excellent." Com-
main line of communication and enable us plete tactical surprise was essential to
to deliver a decisive and crushing blow. the success of the amphibious operation,
Any material delay in such an operation he declared, and warned Washington
may lose this opportunity. The alternative not to give away his intentions, saying
is a frontal attack which can only result in "I cannot emphasize too strongly the
a protracted and expensive campaign to
necessity for complete secrecy with refer-
ence to this matter. The spokesman for
Kunsan, and Plan 100-D, calling for a landing on
the east coast near Chumunjin. General Wright re- the Department of the Army should not
calls that alternate landings featuring Wonsan and reveal our grand strategy in the slightest
Chinnamp'o were also under consideration. General degree." The Joint Chiefs of Staff de-
Walker, Wright says, wanted a flexible plan with rived little assurance from their exchange
landings scheduled for either coast so that the main
effort could be mounted with little advance notice.
8
But from the standpoint of a communications com- Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 23 Jul
plex which could be used to support the breakout 50.
9
from the beachhead and the pursuit phase, Seoul- (1) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS and CINCFE, 24 Jul
Inch'on "stood out like a sore thumb," according 50. (2) Details of MacArthur's request for the "full
to General Wright. See Interv, author with Wright, Marine division" mentioned here are contained in
Dec 51. Chapter IX, below.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 143
with MacArthur. They could only pointed over the failure to check the
watch and wait for new developments.9 enemy advance down the Taejon-Taegu
The predicament of Walker's divisions axis in late July and early August.
in Korea concerned General MacArthur Because of the Eighth Army's precar-
far more than was apparent in his re- ious position, MacArthur took a drastic
assuring words to the Joint Chiefs of step which, seemingly, negated his plans
Staff. Walker's slowing but continued for a mid-September landing. He or-
withdrawal before the North Koreans dered the 2d Division and the 5th Marine
threatened to render plans for an am- RCT, both on the high seas and both
phibious operation in September purely scheduled for his amphibious assault, to
academic. Walker himself was worried sail directly to Korea where they entered
and disappointed because his divisions combat almost at once.
were not stopping the North Koreans. This move by MacArthur caused his
Troops often came close to panic and own planning staff to urge a reconsid-
commanders sometimes nearly lost con- eration of the timing of the proposed
trol. Walker was particularly disap- operation. To launch an attack by mid-
144 POLICY AND DIRECTION
September, with his entire assault force don his mid-September date was in-
now committed in the Pusan Perimeter, fluenced by his knowledge of the Inch'on
seemed to them almost impossible. If area as well as by his desire to relieve
the attack was to be made in September, the pressure on the Pusan Perimeter as
both the 2d Division and the Marines quickly as he could. October might well
would have to be taken away from be too late. Low seas were common in
Walker, or only the Marines withdrawn the Inch'on area from May through Au-
and teamed with the 7th Division for the gust, with September a month of transi-
amphibious landing. Officers of JSPOG tion to the high seas which prevailed
pointed out to General Almond that if from October through March. This left
General Walker needed the 2d Division September as the only autumn month
in August, he would most certainly need when conditions were suitable for land-
it in September. Also, pulling a division ing troops and equipment under fire.
out through the cluttered port at Pusan During only three days, even in Septem-
would tie up supplies and seriously ham- ber, would the tidal conditions favor a
per support of Walker's forces remain- landing. From 15 to 18 September the
ing on the line. These officers believed tidal surges would be high enough to
that any plan based on use of the 7th Di- cover the extensive mud flats that fronted
vision would be "visionary and imprac- Inch'on Harbor and landing craft could
ticable." That division, still in Japan, be brought in. The next opportunity
was at less than half strength, and was would not come until mid-October. By
not expected to reach full strength be- that time seas might be too heavy, and
fore 1 October or to be ready for am- there would be little good weather left
phibious operations before 1951. They for the pursuit and breakout phase of
recommended that General MacArthur the operation.11
postpone the target date for the He confided to the Joint Chiefs of
10
amphibious operation until 15 October. Staff on 29 July that, while the enemy's
One of General MacArthur's out- successes were upsetting his plans nearly
standing attributes, demonstrated quite as fast as they were made, he was still
often in World War II, was a keen sense holding to the September date. "In
of timing. He had not hesitated in the Korea," he said, "the hopes that I had
past to override the recommendations entertained to hold out the 1st Marine
of his staff whenever he felt his judg- Division [sic: Brigade] and the 2d In-
ment was more correct than its counsel. fantry Division for the enveloping coun-
Nor did he hesitate in this case. Ap- terblow have not been fulfilled and it
parently, he not only believed that forces will be necessary to commit these units
for the operation would materialize in to Korea on the south line rather
time for the landing in September, but than . . . along a separate axis in mid-
also, that he could not afford to wait September." He had not given up hope
beyond that date. of mounting the waterborne attack even
General MacArthur's refusal to aban- 11
Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing—Victory
10
Memo, JSPOG, for CofS GHQ FEC, UNC, 29 Over Time and Tide," Marine Corps Gazette (July
Jul 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. 1951), p. 28.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 145
though he now admitted it might have visions then in the Pusan Perimeter
to be staged out of the Pusan Perimeter could drive through the mountains to
rather than Japan. And he informed the the Kum River. Bridges were out all
Joint Chiefs that as soon as the 7th across the Eighth Army front. Walker
Division could be brought to approxi- was seriously short of trucks. But the
mate strength he was going to throw it biggest obstacle, according to the Eighth
into the fight.12 Army staff, would be the North Korean
General MacArthur realized that with- Army, which would be intact and ca-
out full support from Washington the pable of fierce and sustained resistance
landing could not be made. And sens- even though the amphibious assault in
ing, perhaps, a certain coolness among its rear was successfully carried out.
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or at least an Some of Walker's officers felt that the
absence of enthusiasm approaching his North Koreans would, if driven from
own, he included an evaluation of am- the roads, take to the surrounding hills
phibious landings with particular em- and prevent the American divisions from
phasis on Korea. "It is essential, in my breaking out to the north. One key
opinion," General MacArthur told his officer suggested that Eighth Army take
superiors, "to utilize our own strength the much longer coastal route up the
in naval and air forces in the form of west coast where roads were good and
amphibious envelopment. When and flank protection would be afforded by
if this can be accomplished, the ground the Yellow Sea. Eighth Army officers
initiative which the enemy now possesses generally agreed that after the landing in
will be wrenched from him and a the north Walker would need at least
decisive result made possible." two more divisions before he could
On 1 August General Walker had break out.13
ordered his entire force to break con- President Truman sent his special as-
tact with the enemy and to pull back sistant, Averell Harriman, to Tokyo on
behind the Naktong River, there to make 6 August, primarily to discuss Far East-
a final stand. On 6 August, General ern political matters with General Mac-
Hickey, Deputy Chief of Staff, GHQ, Arthur. General Ridgway and Lt. Gen.
flew into this perimeter, carrying with Lauris Norstad of the Air Force ac-
him a brief of the plans for the am- companied Mr. Harriman. While these
phibious landing. The hard-pressed officials were in Tokyo, General Mac-
Walker agreed with the concept and Arthur took the opportunity to express
with the detailed provisions of the plan. his views on the situation facing him
But members of General Walker's staff, in Korea, MacArthur believed that speed
particularly those of his G-3 section, was the keystone of victory over the
were skeptical of Eighth Army's ability North Koreans. He told Harriman and
to carry out the co-ordinated frontal as- the military officers that the United
sault provided by the plan. They States could not afford to wait for a slow
frankly and openly doubted that the di- 13
Memo, Lt J. B. Warren for Gen Wright, 7 Aug
50, sub: Trip to EUSAK, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC
12
Rad, C 58993, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Jul 50. files.
146 POLICY AND DIRECTION
build-up of forces in Korea. The United These plans for landing at Inch'on on
States must destroy the North Korean 15 September met opposition both
Army as early as possible. If not, the within MacArthur's own staff and in
Russians and Chinese Communists, Mac- other quarters. Navy and Marine offi-
Arthur feared, would be able to cers raised objection to the plans. These
strengthen their protégé by shipping in officers did not oppose an amphibious
more arms and supplies. MacArthur assault even though they felt that Army
also saw in a failure to settle the matter planners were minimizing the problems
speedily, political dangers. United Na- which the Navy and Marine Corps must
tions members would grow discouraged overcome in carrying and landing the
and Oriental peoples would be disap- assault forces on D-day. They did not
pointed with, and lose confidence in, want to land at Inch'on.16
the United States.14 Their concern over Inch'on arose from
On 12 August, shortly after these visi- its natural obstacles to military and naval
tors departed, another and more fully operations. From the standpoint of
developed draft of the landing plan was navigation, sea approaches, and landing
issued, setting a target date of 15 Septem- beaches, Inch'on ranked among the
ber. The strategic concept of this plan worst harbor areas in Korea. The Yel-
would be put into effect one month low Sea in its periodic surges into the
later without substantive change. With- harbor (changes in the sluggish, heavy
out naming major Army units, the plan tide exceeded thirty feet) had created
proposed committing the GHQ Reserve broad mudbanks and tidal flats which
and the 1st Marine Division in an am- fronted the entire harbor. These flats
phibious operation to seize the Inch'on- were so soft and the muck so deep they
Seoul area and to cut the main lines of would not support men on foot. Twice
enemy communications and supply to a day the tides rolled in to cover these
North Korean units in the south. In flats. The naval officers believed it
conjunction with the seaborne assault, would require a 23-foot minimum tide
the Eighth Army was to break out of before small landing craft could safely
its perimeter and drive northwest along operate over these flats and a 29-foot tide
the Taegu-Taejon-Suwon axis to link before Navy LST's could come into
up with the amphibious force. The Inch'on's beaches. This meant that they
Navy and the Air Force would carry could land men and supplies only from
out vital missions of transportation, se- the time an incoming tide reached
curity, naval gunfire support, carrier air- 16
This portion is based on the following: Chron-
craft support, and strategic bombing. icles by General Oliver P. Smith, USMC, 22-23
The 1st Marine Air Wing would furnish August 1950 (hereafter cited as General Smith's
tactical air cover for the landing.15 Chronicles), copy available in Hist Sec, G-3 USMC,
Hq, Washington, D.C.; Special Action Rpt (SAR),
1st Marine Div, 15 Aug-30 Sep 50, copy in same
14
Truman, Memoirs, II, 349-51. (2) See also Mac- files; Malcolm C. Cagle, "Inchon, Analysis of a
Arthur, Reminiscences, pp. 340-41. Gamble," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, vol. 80,
15
(1) Opn Plan 100-B, 12 Aug 50, in JSPOG, No. 1 (January, 1954), 47-51. See also, Field, History
GHQ, UNC files. (2) Special Rpt, U.S. X Corps, of United States Naval Operations, Korea, pp. 171-
Opn CHROMITE, copy in OCMH. 83.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 147
for the first time that the assault was could be over in one month after the
scheduled for 15 September. He had assault. General MacArthur insisted
been told before leaving the United that the North Koreans had committed
States that the target date was 23 Septem- all of their troops against the Pusan
ber. He found Admiral Doyle very, Perimeter, and he shared Almond's view
very skeptical about landing at Inch'on, that the Marines would meet no heavy
across mud flats, over docks and seawalls, opposition at Inch'on. When Smith ob-
and in the face of a city of sizable pop- jected that 15 September would be too
ulation. Doyle told Smith that he had early to assemble his forces, General
sent his reconnaissance parties in at var- MacArthur admitted that the landings
ious sites along the Korean west coast would have to be somewhat helter-
to find a better landing site than Inch'on. skelter. But he would not consider any
He had found what he regarded as a bet- date other than 15 September.
ter location for an amphibious assault. These doubts within MacArthur's own
This area, Posung-Myon, was about headquarters were matched at a higher
twenty miles south of Inch'on and almost level by mounting suspicions within the
due west of Osan. Navy underwater Joint Chiefs of Staff, suspicions arising
demolition teams had made several trial from ignorance of exactly what General
landings there and had found that beach MacArthur was up to. Under the di-
conditions were much better than at rectives given him by the Joint Chiefs of
Inch'on and would not restrict the land- Staff, as well as through precedent in the
ing to a particular day or hour. The considerable latitude granted compara-
area was not built up and, according to ble American commanders in the past,
Doyle, was in striking distance of the General MacArthur had authority to dis-
enemy's lines of communications south pose and employ his forces as he saw fit.
of Seoul. This authority reflected the fact that
That evening, General Smith reported planning for major operations of the
to the Dai Ichi Building for an interview Korean War and decisions of tactical and
with General MacArthur. He first met local strategic significance originated
General Almond to whom he briefly with General MacArthur. The Joint
raised his objections to Inch'on, without, Chiefs of Staff set for him broad objec-
however, mentioning Posung-Myon. Al- tives and sometimes voiced their concern
mond dismissed Smith's protests by over his handling of matters of political
telling him that the enemy had no or- significance. They entered into the plan-
ganized forces at Inch'on, that the diffi- ning picture most influentially in matters
culties to be met there were only involving allotment of forces and supply.
mechanical, and that the date and place But in the case of the proposed Inch'on
of the landing had already been fixed. landing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff grew
He then ushered Smith into General increasingly worried during August be-
MacArthur's office where the Marine cause MacArthur did not keep them in-
general received not only a warm greet- formed of the development of his plans.
ing, but assurance that the Inch'on land- He submitted no campaign plan to them
ing would be decisive and that the war and, aside from his requisitions for
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 149
forces, passed along only the bare outline August 1950, was attended by Generals
of his plans. MacArthur, Collins, Almond, and
Knowing full well the weakened con- Wright of the Army and Admirals Sher-
dition of American military resources man, Joy, Struble, and Doyle of the
at the time, observing the continued suc- Navy. Various other officers of lesser
cesses of the North Korean Army, but rank participated in the briefing.19
ignorant of the exact nature of Mac- Just before this briefing, General
Arthur's preparations and plans for an Smith had approached General Almond
amphibious counterblow, the Joint on the possibility of landing in the
Chiefs of Staff began to wonder if Mac- Posung-Myon area instead of at Inch'on.
Arthur was not getting ready to bite off General Almond stated very definitely
more than the United States could chew. that he was not interested in a landing
In order to determine more precisely there except perhaps as a subsidiary land-
what was taking place in Tokyo, the ing in connection with Inch'on. Almond
Joint Chiefs of Staff sent two of their told Smith that the real objective of this
members to the Far East. General operation was to capture Seoul at the
Collins and Admiral Sherman, accom- earliest possible date. Too, GHQ plan-
panied by a staff of Air Force and Army ning officers had looked into Posung-
officers, flew to Tokyo on 19 August to Myon and did not believe that the area
talk with MacArthur. 18 had the necessary road net to support
Meeting privately with General heavy vehicles in any breakout of the
Collins and Admiral Sherman upon their area.20
arrival in Tokyo, MacArthur covered Admiral Doyle's planning officers pre-
general aspects of the whole Korean sented the first portion of the briefing.
operation, and then staged a full-scale For nearly an hour they covered the
briefing on the proposed amphibious problems faced by the Navy in the land-
movement for top military and naval ing operation, emphasizing the great dif-
officials. This briefing, which took place ficulties and the risks involved. Their
in General MacArthur's conference room remarks were decidedly pessimistic. Ad-
on the 6th floor of the Dai Ichi Building
19
in Tokyo in the late afternoon of 23 (1) Ltr, Adm Joy to Col Appleman, 12 Dec 52.
(2) Ltr, Gen Almond to Col Appleman, 2 Dec 52.
18
(1) Rad, WAR 89118, DA to CINCFE, 18 Aug (1) and (2) in OCMH. (3) Walter M. Karig, Battle
40. (2) General Collins described the purpose of Report, The War in Korea (New York: Rinehart,
the visit as ". . . to find out just exactly what these 1952), pp. 166-67. Karig's work, which both Joy
plans were. Frankly, we were somewhat in the dark, and Almond describe as substantially correct and
and as it was a matter of great concern, we went out factual, is used as the basis for this account of the
to discuss it with General MacArthur. We sug- 23 August briefing. Modifications from Joy's and
gested certain alternative possibilities and places Almond's letters have been applied to Karig's ver-
and everything of that sort. . . ." Louis Johnson, sion where appropriate.
20
who as Secretary of Defense at this time claimed to (1) General Smith's Chronicles, 22-23 Aug 50.
have supported MacArthur wholeheartedly in his (2) Col John Chiles, SGS GHQ, and later G-3, X
proposals for landing at Inch'on, describes the pur- Corps, told the author during a conversation at the
pose of this visit differently. He stated, "General Army War College in February 1955 that he had
Collins . . . did not favor Inchon and went over examined charts of the Posung-Myon area, and
to try to argue General MacArthur out of it." See found the routes of egress entirely insufficient for
MacArthur Hearings, pp. 1295, 2618. an operation of the scale planned.
150 POLICY AND DIRECTION
23
Rad, JCS 89960, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50. est confidence that it would succeed." See Truman,
Ibid. Memoirs, II, 358.
152 POLICY AND DIRECTION
25
(1) Opns Order No. 1, GHQ, UNC, 30 Aug 50, copy in OCMH; and Malcolm C. Cagle, "Inchon,
copy with Annual Narrative Hist Rpt, GHQ, FEC, Analysis of a Gamble," United States Naval Institute
1Jan-31Oct 50, Annex IV. (2) For a more detailed Proceedings (January 1954), pp. 47-51.
26
study of this order and of the organization of land- Memo, Col Everett for Gen Bolté, 8 Sep 50,
ing and attack forces, see the following: USAF Hist sub: Visit to USARPAC and FEC, 19-30 Aug 50,
Study, United States Air Force Operations in the in G-3, DA file 333 Pac, Case 5.
27
Korean Conflict, 25 June-1 November 1950, ch. 5, Rad, JCS 90639, JCS to MacArthur, 5 Sep 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE CONCEPT AND THE PLAN 153
believed the Joint Chiefs of Staff were the prompt junction of forces would be
implying, small increments of reserves "dramatically symbolic of the complete
were fed into the Pusan area merely to collapse of the enemy," General Mac-
strengthen the perimeter instead of being Arthur certainly did not consider it a
used for the encircling attack, the cost in
vital part of the operation. Troops were
time, casualties, and matériel would be already embarking for the amphibious
immeasurably increased. He suspected, sweep, and preliminary naval and air
too, the Washington military officials preparations were going ahead on sched-
were looking at the map too closely and ule. "I and all of my commanders and
finding bugaboos. They seemed to fear staff officers, without exception, are en-
the result if Eighth Army failed to break thusiastic and confident of the success
out and join the landing force at Inch'on of the enveloping operation," General
30
on schedule. In General MacArthur's MacArthur concluded.
opinion, the success of the operation did Faced with these most vigorous views
not depend on a rapid joining of the from a man who was in a position to
two forces. The seizure of the heart of judge the theater situation more ac-
the North Korean distributing system in curately than anyone else, the Joint
the Seoul area would "dislocate the Chiefs of Staff acquiesced. They went
logistical supply of his forces operating further and obtained President Tru-
in South Korea" and ultimately result in man's approval for the landing. On 8
the disintegration of North Korean re- September, they gave General Mac-
sistance. Both American forces, Eighth Arthur the final green light for the
31
Army and the U.S. X Corps, would be landing at Inch'on one week later.
self-sustaining because of the complete 30
Rad, C 62423, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Sep 50.
31
American control of sea and air. While Rad, JCS 90958, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Sep 50.
CHAPTER IX
Almond that Admiral Arthur W. Rad- "A provisional command group selected
ford, Commander in Chief, Pacific, be from GHQ officers will not be a going
asked if the Marine headquarters could concern unless it has time to get together
be moved. "There is urgent need" and train in the field," he pointed out.
General Wright argued, "to get a head- "This is true no matter how efficient
quarters in being for the GHQ Reserve the individual officers are." Too little
operation. This headquarters must be time remained to form and train such a
one that can operate in the field as a go- group since, Wright warned, "With the
ing concern with such things as situation target date of 15 September, only thirty
reports, operations reports, communica- days remain in which to complete the
tions, etc., happening automatically." landing plan, embarkation plan and the
Forming a provisional headquarters from embarkation of the assault element."
theater officers did not appeal to Wright. Wright cited amphibious doctrine which
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 157
set from 90 to 150 days for planning. headquarters, observation battalion, en-
For this reason alone he felt that the gineer brigade, or engineer topographi-
trained headquarters from Hawaii should cal company. He recommended that this
be used if available. headquarters be moved to the field im-
General Hickey agreed with Wright. mediately since the target date of 15
Hickey told General Almond: September was fast approaching and the
group would have to be ready to load
Utilization of this headquarters and staff
which is already organized and functioning aboard ship by 10 September. Only
offers many advantages over the hasty throw- twenty-five days remained in which to
ing together of a provisional Corps head- complete corps-level plans, to condition
quarters and staff from available personnel units for the field, to develop standing
The latter would be at best only a half- operating procedures, and to give combat
baked affair and would contribute to re- 4
ducing the efficient functioning of GHQ2 training to headquarters personnel.
because of the key personnel withdrawn. General MacArthur accepted Wright's
recommendation and ordered the forma-
General MacArthur did not accept
tion of a provisional planning staff, fore-
Wright's suggestion. First of all, after
runner of the actual corps staff, from
the amphibious landing at Inch'on itself,
officers of his own GHQ staff. To con-
CHROMITE would be an overland cam-
ceal its true purpose, he designated this
paign. Secondly, and perhaps most
new group as the Special Planning Staff,
importantly, MacArthur wanted the de-
GHQ. General Almond chose the offi-
tailed CHROMITE planning accomplished
cers for this staff and on 15 August di-
under his own close and constant super-
rected them to begin part-time planning,
vision, and not by a group less subject
and to continue to work on their regular
to his direct view than his own GHQ
jobs only as necessary.
staff. Wright therefore made no further
Almond named Maj. Gen. Clark L.
attempt to bring in the outside head-
3 Ruffner, who had arrived from the
quarters.
United States on 6 August, as chief of
General Wright's second attempt to
staff of the Special Planning Staff. Ruff-
arrange a headquarters proved more suc-
ner assembled his staff in a bunker-type
cessful. "As your advisor on tactical
concrete structure near the Dai Ichi
organization and operations for forces,"
Building on 15 August. As a first step,
he told Almond on 10 August, "I strongly
these officers drew up a troop list and a
recommend that we immediately activate
standing operating procedure for the
a command for the GHQ Reserve."
landing. When General Ruffner asked
This command, in Wright's concept, was
what forces would be used for the land-
to be very similar to a corps headquar-
ing and breakout, MacArthur replied,
ters. Because of its specialized mission
"The 7th Division which is half-under-
the command would not need an artillery
strength, the Marine Brigade in Korea,
2
Memo, JSPOG for Gen Wright, 7 Aug 50, with other marines from the United States,
Ind, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.
3
(1) Ibid. (2) Ltr, Lt Gen Edward M. Almond to
4
Brig Gen Hal C. Pattison, Chief of Military History, Memo, Gen Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC, 10
Hq, DA, 10 Feb 67, OCMH files. Aug 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.
158 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Arthur assigned the code name, Opera- —the staff demonstrated a state of readi-
tion CHROMITE, to the planned landing ness far beyond expectations.11
at Inch'on; and, on 6 September, he
confirmed in writing what he had already
told his major commanders orally, that Marine Forces
D-day for Operation CHROMITE was
The vital factor of the landing opera-
15 September 1950.10
tion remained the availability of a strong,
With time running short and an
well-balanced, and specially trained and
ominous amount of detailed planning
equipped amphibious striking force, and
and co-ordination remaining, officers of
enough follow-up units to consolidate
the new corps headquarters worked
and exploit the initial landing. The
around the clock. General Almond
former could come only from Marine
crammed as much field training and test-
and Navy sources, while a full Army
ing into the few busy days before em-
division could provide the latter. Mac-
barkation as he could. On 1 September,
Arthur obtained these forces only after
his entire corps staff together with co-
two months of making insistent demands
ordinators and umpires moved to a
on Washington and by taking unusual
wooded area near Camp Drake in sub-
steps within his own command.
urban Tokyo and set up a field command
Like its sister services, the U.S. Marine
post. A tactical exercise prepared by
Corps had shrunk in size during the post-
General Willoughby was used to test the
war years. On 30 June, the Marine
readiness of the green headquarters. On
Corps had only 74,279 officers and men
the second day of the exercise, General
scattered widely among security, training,
Almond, to measure the mobility and
and administrative posts throughout the
flexibility of his staff, ordered the entire
world. The operating segment of the
group to displace to Atsugi, twenty miles
Marine Corps, 40,000 officers and men,
away, with no break in the continuity of
included the Fleet Marine Force, secu-
the maneuver. Realism in the maneuver
rity forces, and Marines afloat. The
was achieved by confronting the staff
Fleet Marine Force was, in turn, divided
with situations closely paralleling those
into Pacific and Atlantic sections. Each
expected at the actual landing. Four
of these had a reinforced but reduced
main situations were presented, covering
strength division and an understrength
the breakout from the beachhead, a
air wing. The Fleet Marine Force, Pa-
counterattack by enemy reserves, an op-
cific, held the 1st Marine Division and
posed river crossing, and the exploitation
1st Marine Air Wing while the Fleet
of the breakout. Results of this ma-
Marine Force, Atlantic, had the 2d Ma-
neuver, which ended on 3 September,
rine Division and 2d Marine Air Wing.
made it apparent that General Almond's
The combined strength of the 1st and 2d
choice of staff officers had been excellent
10 11
(1) GHQ, UNC GO 324, 26 Aug 50. (2) Rad, Rpt, JSPOG for CofS GHQ, sub: Map Ma-
C 61660, CINCFE to Major Comds and DA, 6 Sep neuver X, copy in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. This
50. (3) Ltr, CINCFE to All Major Comdrs, 6 Sep 50, exercise revealed that the corps had no proper
sub: Designation of D-day. equipment for bridging the Han River.
160 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Marine Divisions did not equal that of a General Almond upped MacArthur's
single war-strength Marine division. previous request, asking Collins for a
Early in July, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 2-division corps of Marines. The Army
had approved sending a Marine RCT Chief of Staff replied that the Marines
with supporting tactical air to the Far were in the same position as the Army,
12
East Command. The 1st Provisional very short of men, and that even if an-
Marine Brigade was activated at Camp other Marine division could be built, the
Pendleton, California, on 5 July around Joint Chiefs of Staff had other plans for
the 5th Marines, 1st Marine Division, it. But, before leaving Japan, General
and Marine Air Group 33 of the 1st Collins told General MacArthur pri-
Marine Air Wing. The provisional bri- vately that he believed one full Marine
gade began loading from the west coast division could be sent him.
almost immediately and sailed on 14 July In Washington, meanwhile, the Joint
with about 4,500 ground troops. This Chiefs of Staff had in Collins' absence
number included engineers, a tank com- agreed to bring the 1st Marine Division
pany, a light artillery battalion, a 4.2-inch to war strength. This decision received
mortar company, amphibious elements, strong backing from Admiral Radford
and three infantry battalions, and about who personally urged the Chief of Naval
1,350 men in the air group. As of 9 July, Operations to give General MacArthur
Admiral Radford judged this Marine a full Marine division as soon as possible.
force capable of specialized missions, in- Admiral Sherman supported Radford,
cluding amphibious landings, "under but with reservations. Radford's support
conditions where appropriate higher nonetheless proved instrumental in
echelon agencies are present." 13 The bringing the 1st Marine Division to war
information on the amphibious capabili- strength. 15
ties of the new force was well received by On 19 July, General MacArthur called
General MacArthur since it blended ad- again for the 1st Marine Division, this
mirably with plans then being developed time stipulating that all units of the di-
by his staff. He radioed Washington at vision and the air wing should arrive
once, asking that the Marine brigade, by 10 September. He also asked that
"in view of the extensive opportunity for equipment and personnel be sent at once
amphibious employment," be expanded to bring the 5th Marine RCT, already
to a full Marine division with appropri- on the way, to full war strength. 16
ate air support.14 To fill the 1st Marine Division, the
A few days after this request, General Marine Corps drew men and equipment
Collins arrived in Tokyo where, in a dis- 15
(1) Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, 15 Jul 50.
cussion of the need for forces on 13 July, sub: Visit to FEC, Tab B. (2) Rad, C 57814, CINC-
FE (Gen Collins) to DA (Gen Haislip), 14 Jul 50.
12
Rad, JCS 84876, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 50. (3) Note by Secy for JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac.
13
Rad, 0922322, CINCPACFLT to CINCFE, 9 Case 28. (4) Rad, 080941Z, CINCPACFLT (Rad-
Jul 50. ford) to CNO (Sherman), 8 Jul 50. (5) JCS 1776/25,
14
(1) Rad, CX 57553, CINCFE to JCS, 10 Jul 50. Memo, CNO for JCS, 9 Jul 50, sub: Recommenda-
(2) Rpt, Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve tions of CINCPACFLT Concerning Support of
in the Korean Conflict, Hist Sec G-3, Hq, U.S. CINCFE.
16
Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH. Rad, CX 58239, CINCFE to DA, 19 Jul 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 161
from all over the United States. So em- Unknown to MacArthur, an influen-
powered by Presidential authority, the tial ally had already come to his support.
corps called 138 units with a strength of Admiral Radford, before meeting with
1,800 officers and 31,648 enlisted Ma- the Chief of Naval Operations, had
rines, its entire Organized Ground Re- sought the advice of General Shepherd.
serve, to active service. It also brought The Marine general spoke out strongly
6,800 Regulars of the 2d Marine Division for General MacArthur and recom-
from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, to mended that his request for Marine
Camp Pendleton. An effort was made, forces be met in the manner desired.
however, to avoid stripping the Atlantic General Shepherd believed that the Fleet
area completely of Marines. Admiral Marine Force "as a whole" could pro-
Sherman felt that denuding the Atlantic vide the amphibious striking force and
area would be too dangerous; and at that it could do so without a serious or
Sherman's insistence, the Joint Chiefs of lasting impact on the Marine force's
Staff informed General MacArthur that readiness to meet other commitments.
they could not send him the full Marine "I feel," he told Admiral Radford, "that
division before November or December. there is a serious war in progress in
Nor could they determine the extent to Korea and employment of amphibious
which the 1st Provisional Marine Bri- forces will prove the key of achievement
gade could be strengthened until Ad- of a timely and economical decision for
miral Sherman conferred with Admiral our arms." He held that the Fleet Ma-
17
Radford in Hawaii. rine Force was ready "at this moment"
This threat to his plans drew fire from to send to Korea a force strong enough
MacArthur, and he urgently requested to lead the counteroffensive amphibious
the Joint Chiefs to reconsider. Provision movement, "the task for which Marines
of the full division by 10 September he are trained and constituted." 19
saw as an absolutely vital element of his Back in Washington, General Bolte
entire plan. "There can be," he charged, added his support to General MacAr-
"no demand for its use elsewhere which thur's plea for early arrival of the Ma-
can equal the urgency of the immediate rines. He recommended to General
battle mission contemplated for it." 18 Collins that the latter use his influence
17
with the Joint Chiefs to support Mac-
(1) Rad, JCS 86511, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Jul 50.
(2) Wilbur W. Hoare, Jr., The Joint Chiefs of Staff Arthur in his call for a full Marine di-
20
and National Policy, draft MS, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 13.
18
vision in the theater by 10 September.
(1) Rad, CX 58327, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Jul 50. The intervention of Generals Shep-
(2) This statement reflects General MacArthur's con-
viction that "Washington" followed a policy of
slighting his command in favor of the western Euro- emphasize too strongly my belief in the complete
pean area. General Whitney's account of this trans- urgency of my request.' He was turned down
action is interesting, if abbreviated. ". . . on July again." See Whitney, MacArthur, His Rendezvous
10," Whitney says, "MacArthur asked the Joint With History, p. 343.
19
Chiefs of Staff for the 1st Marine Division. Profiting Memo, Gen Shepherd, CG FMPAC, for Adm
by his experience with Washington's penchant for Radford, CINCPAC, in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files.
20
skeletonizing his forces, he carefully stipulated a di- Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 21 Jul 50,
vision at full strength. He was turned down flat. He sub: Augmentation of Provisional Marine Brigade,
patiently tried again five days later, saying: 'I cannot in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case 24.
162 POLICY AND DIRECTION
herd and Bolté prompted the Joint Chiefs bring it to division war strength less one
of Staff to reconsider. On 22 July, they RCT by mid-September. We have di-
notified General MacArthur that they rected that this be done. The third
would review their previous decision. RCT cannot be furnished until winter."
They asked him to help by telling them General MacArthur did not care for this
what he meant to do with the Marine compromise and remonstrated at once.
brigade between its arrival date in late "Subtraction of an RCT from the Ma-
July and 10 September. At the same rine division," he contended, "tends to
time, they ordered the brigade brought jeopardize the entire conception and
to full war strength and the Marine would involve risks that cannot be deter-
Air Group enlarged to full squadrons.21 mined finally at this time. I regard the
Replying immediately, General Mac- third RCT as essential." But Washing-
Arthur said that the 1st Provisional Ma- ton officials stood firm. They explained,
rine Brigade, when it arrived on about with forbearance, that the only trained
1August, would be kept in Japan as Marine battalions left after sending two
GHQ Reserve, "To be used in Korea regiments to the Far East Command
only in event of a critical situation." would be one battalion in the 2d Marine
Meanwhile, he would train, outfit, and Division, one afloat in the Mediter-
prepare the brigade for major amphibi- ranean, and a battalion of school troops
22
ous operations in September. at Quantico, Virginia. These they con-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had, mean- sidered the minimum for absolutely es-
while, been weighing General MacAr- sential needs in the Atlantic. 23
thur's need for a full Marine division by Still unhappy with the new arrange-
10 September against the dangers in cut- ments, MacArthur shelved the matter for
ting Marine strength in other parts of the time being. Other developments
the world. Admiral Sherman proposed were pressing. Whereas the 1st Pro-
and the other Joint Chiefs approved visional Marine Brigade had been headed
a compromise by which the Marine for Kobe, Japan, mounting pressure by
strength in the Far East Command the enemy against Walker's perimeter
would be built up to two war-strength and signs of a strong enemy force sweep-
RCT's by mid-September. Even this ing down the west coast to outflank
solution, which would put only two- Eighth Army forced MacArthur to aban-
thirds of a Marine division in Korea by don plans to keep the Marines as GHQ
15 September, would greatly reduce Ma- Reserve in Japan. On 25 July, he or-
rine security forces in the United States dered the ground elements of the brigade
and cause an extensive call-up of Re- diverted to Pusan, and to be prepared to
serves. The Joint Chiefs, in a telecon- execute a rapid nontactical debarkation.
ference on 24 July, told MacArthur that, Units and equipment peculiar to am-
"We have now determined it is prac-
ticable to further augment the Marine 23
(1) Memo, CNO for JCS, 24 Jul 50, sub: Deploy-
Brigade after its arrival in Japan and ment of Fleet Marine Forces to the FEC, cited in
Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Pol-
21
Rad, JCS 86778, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Jul 50. icy, vol. V, ch. IV, p. 14. (2) Telecon, TT 3573, JCS
22
Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul 50. and CINCFE, 24 Jul 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 163
phibious operations were kept on board The 1st Marines' additional rifle com-
ships and taken to Kobe. Upon landing panies and platoons to bring the 1st Pro-
at Pusan on 3 August, the ground troops visional Marine Brigade (5th Marines)
of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade up to war strength, and support and
were attached to General Walker's Eighth service units for the division had been
Army and went into a Reserve assembly building up at Camp Pendleton. These
near Masan.24 loaded at San Diego between 14 and
While hastily assembling another 24 August and reached Japan between
RCT in the United States for shipment 28 August and 2 September. The third
to the Far East Command for use by10 regiment was activated as the 7th Ma-
September, the Joint Chiefs on 10 Au- rines on 17 August at Camp Pendleton.
gust decided they need not wait until Two understrength battalions of the 6th
winter to send General MacArthur the Marines from Camp Lejeune and indi-
third regiment of the Marine division. vidual Regulars and Reserves were as-
On that date, they authorized the forma- signed to the new regiment. Its other
tion of the final regiment, the unit to battalion, the peace-strength battalion
arrive in the Far East Command during from the Mediterranean, sailed directly
September. In order that the Joint to Japan from its post with the fleet. A
Chiefs of Staff appreciate the impact of third rifle company and third platoons
their decision, Admiral Sherman sketched for the battalion's other two companies
for them the drastic measures that the formed with the main body of the 7th
Marine Corps had to take to give Mac- Marines.26
Arthur a full division. ". . . it will in- Admiral Sherman, during his visit to
volve," he told them, "moving to the the Far East Command in late August,
FEC the Marine battalion now in the queried his Washington headquarters on
Mediterranean, one battalion now at the arrival date of this final component
Camp Lejeune, and an RCT, less two of the division. He was touring the
battalions, to be formed at Camp Pendle- battlefront in Korea when the discourag-
ton. So doing will eliminate the capa- ing reply reached him. "The limiting
bilities of the Fleet Marine Force in the factor," Sherman learned, "is the readi-
Atlantic for several months." The bat- ness of Marine Corps troops, which can-
talion from the Mediterranean would not be advanced ahead of an already
have to come directly from Suda Bay tight schedule." Owing to the need for
through the Suez Canal and be hastily training, the two Marine battalions from
augmented with men sent directly to the the United States could not reach the
25
Far East Command. Far East Command until 19 September,
24
(1) Rad, CX 586628, CINCFE to COMNAVFE,
while the battalion coming from the
28 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CX 58763, CINCFE to COM Mediterranean would arrive in Korea on
NAVFE and CG Eighth Army, 26 Jul 50. (3) Rpt, 12 September. "It is impossible," Ad-
Mobilization of the Marine Corps Reserve, Hq U.S.
Marine Corps, ch. II, p. 1, copy in OCMH.
miral Sherman was told, "for the entire
25
(1) Hoare, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Na-
tional Policy, vol. IV, ch. V, p. 14. (2) Memo, CNO
26
for JCS, 11 Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case Lynn Montross, "The Inchon Landing—Victory
30/2. Over Time and Tide," p. 28.
164 POLICY AND DIRECTION
already left for Korea to pick up the Ma- RCT, to rendezvous with the 1st Marine
rine brigade and would have to return Division at Inch'on. 29
if it were to pick up the 32d Infantry.
Naval officers unanimously opposed Al-
mond's solution. Admiral Struble then The 7th Division
hit upon a compromise. He suggested
that one of the 7th Division's regiments Even before he realized that the 7th
be sent to Pusan, remaining aboard ship Division would have to make up his ma-
as a floating reserve. This Army regi- jor Army component for Inch'on, Gen-
ment would be available to General eral MacArthur had begun to rebuild
Walker in extreme emergency and the this depleted unit as much as he could.
Marine brigade would be released to the In mid-July, when the 2d Division was
1st Marine Division. Almond agreed to still slated for Inch'on, General Mac-
this plan. Arthur had ordered 20 percent of all
General Wright flew to Eighth Army combat replacements from the United
headquarters in Taegu on the next day, States diverted to the 7th Division in
telling Walker of the new arrangements. Japan. He had also halted all further
He relayed instructions from General levies against the division for men and
MacArthur to pull the Marine brigade equipment. By stabilizing the division,
out of the line not later than the night by feeding in such resources as could be
of 5-6 September and to send it straight spared from Eighth Army, and by inten-
sive training, he hoped to make the 7th
to Pusan. To compensate in some meas-
Division strong enough to fight effec-
ure for the loss of this valuable force, the
tively in Korea by October. On 26 July,
17th Infantry Regiment would arrive in
MacArthur ordered General Walker to
Pusan Harbor before 7 September. prepare the 7th Division "by intensified
Wright tendered further compensa-
tion when he told Walker that as soon 29
as the first RCT of the 3d Division, the (1) Ltr, Gen Smith to Col Appleman, copy in
OCMH. (2) Rad, CX 61738, CINCFE to CG
65th Infantry, arrived in the theater it EUSAK, 1 Sep 50, with penciled notations on copy
would be sent directly to Pusan for as- in 8th Army file AC 322, 24 Aug-13 Dec 50. (3)
signment to Eighth Army. This RCT MFR, 4 Sep 50, sub: Visit to EUSAK, by Maj Gen
Edwin K. Wright, in AG, DA files (CofS), FEC,
would arrive in Korea between 18 and UNC. (4) Col. John C. Chiles, formerly SGS GHQ,
20 September. Then, unless the 17th FEC, told the author on 17 February 1955, that he
had been present in the Dai Ichi Building during
Infantry had already been committed to the conference. According to Colonel Chiles, when
meet an emergency, it would be sent to General Almond telephoned General Walker that
rejoin its parent 7th Division in the he would have to release the 1st Provisional Marine
Brigade, General Walker became extremely excited
Seoul-Inch'on objective area. General and stated that he could not take the responsibility
Walker complied with his orders and for the safety of the Pusan Perimeter if the brigade
withdrew the 1st Provisional Marine was taken from him. Admiral Doyle, on the other
hand, said that he could not accept the responsi-
Brigade from the perimeter on the night bility for the Inch'on landing unless he was given
of 5-6 September. On 12 September it the brigade. According to Colonel Chiles, General
sailed from Pusan as the 5th Marines' MacArthur personally made the decision.
166 POLICY AND DIRECTION
training and re-equipping for movement will move to Korea, probably in late
to Korea at the earliest practicable date." September." 31
This instruction illustrates the dual By 4 August, MacArthur saw clearly
function then charged to General that if the amphibious force for the
Walker. While directing his divisions Inch'on landing included an Army di-
in combat against the North Korean vision, his own command would have to
Army, Walker, at the same time, re- provide it. He therefore called upon
mained responsible for the training and Walker to rebuild the 7th Division by
rebuilding of the 7th Division nearly a 15 September. Walker was to let Mac-
thousand miles away. The division then Arthur know at once of any difficulties
stood at less than half strength, with only in getting the necessary material and peo-
574 officers and 8,200 enlisted men. ple. MacArthur himself assisted the
Moreover, many of the division's enlisted rebuilding process by moving to the divi-
men had had little training, and few of sion from Okinawa 1,600 men originally
the specialists and experienced noncoms intended for a third battalion of the 29th
taken from the division to patch up units Infantry Regiment. He also diverted to
going into combat in early July had the division an antiaircraft artillery auto-
been replaced.30 matic weapons battalion newly arrived
Desperately short of men himself, Gen- from the United States, as well as two
eral Walker urgently appealed to Gen- companies of combat Engineers, and sent
eral MacArthur on 29 July for the 7th a rush call to the ZI port of embarkation
Division's 32d Infantry to be flown into asking that the three infantry battalion
his perimeter. This appeal came shortly cadres destined for the division be sent
before the 5th RCT, the 1st Provisional without delay.32
Marine Brigade, and the 9th RCT of the MacArthur held little hope that the
2d Division landed at Pusan. Knowing key men transferred from the division to
that these three regiments were to arrive Korea could be replaced in kind, either
and aware of the low combat potential from the United States or from Japan.
of the 32d Infantry, General MacArthur Efforts to recover these specialists reached
denied this request, explaining that a new high on 7 August, when General
granting it "would completely emascu- Hickey visited Korea and sought the re-
late present plans for the entire 7th Di- turn of 7th Division specialists. Walker
vision, which is being reconstituted and made a careful survey to determine if he
could give up any of these men, but
31
30 (1) Rad, CX 20657 KCO, CG, EUSAK to CINC
(1) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jul
FE, 29 Jul 50. (2) Rad, CINCFE to CG EUSAK,
50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 19 Jul 50, Item 62. (2)
30 Jul 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 30 Jul 50, Item 26.
Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 22 Jul 50, G-1, 32
(1) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 9 Aug 50,
GHQ Daily Log, 22 Jul 50, Item 38. (3) Memo, sub: Assignment of 29th Inf (less two battalions),
G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ, 24 Jul 50, sub: Replace- G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 9 Aug 50, Item 53. (2) Rad,
ments for 7th Div, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 24 Jul 50, CINCFE to SFPE (Stoneman), 12 Aug 50, G-1 GHQ
Item 36. (4) Rad, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 26 Daily Log, 12 Aug 50, Item 60. (3) Memo, G-1
Jul 50, G-1, GHQ Daily Log, 26 Jul 50, Item 52. GHQ for CofS GHQ, 10 Aug 50, sub: Replacements
(5) Rpt, CG 7th Div to CINCFE, 27 Jul 50, G-1, for 7th Inf Div, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 10 Aug 50,
GHQ Daily Log, 27 Jul 50, Item 52. Item 19.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 167
because of the low ebb in Eighth Army's the division lacked only 1,349 officers
fortunes and strength at the time, found and men of its full war strength.36
33
their release impossible. Compensating, numerically at least,
The lack of specialists and trained men for this slight understrength of the 7th
for the 7th Division was on General Division, MacArthur, after conceiving
MacArthur's mind when he talked on the idea that South Korea might be
7 August with Harriman, General Ridg- called on to provide soldiers for Ameri-
way, and General Norstad. MacArthur can units, attached more than 8,000 Ko-
furnished a complete list of the special- reans to the division. On 11 August he
ists he needed but who could not be directed General Walker to procure,
found in his command and asked why screen, and ship to Japan for use in aug-
the Department of the Army did not menting the 7th Division approximately
quickly recruit experienced noncommis- 7,000 able-bodied male Koreans. Fortu-
sioned officers from among the many who nately the ROK Government co-operated
had served in World War II. These since no American commander had au-
men could be sent to him by fast ship thority beyond merely requesting these
and by air.34 men. As a commentary on the despera-
Three days later, MacArthur informed tion out of which this measure was born,
the Department of the Army of the un- General Wright on 17 August talked to
usual steps he had taken to refurbish thethe chief of staff, GHQ, by telephone
7th Division. He estimated that 30 per- from Korea. He told him that about
cent of all replacements arriving in the 7,000 Koreans were being shipped out
theater before 10 September would be of Pusan that day. "They are right out
diverted to the 7th Division so that it of the rice paddies," he said, "and have
would be only 1,800 men understrength nothing but shorts and straw hats. I un-
by the CHROMITE target date. He had derstand they have been inoculated,
already exhausted all other sources of given a physical examination and have
replacements.35 some kind of paper. I believe we should
The high priority given the 7th Di- get busy on equipment." 37 These Ko-
vision worked hardships on the American rean men were brought to Japan,
divisions in Korea. All artillery replace- equipped and trained briefly, and then
ments and all infantry replacements hav- attached to the 7th Division. By 31 Au-
ing certain qualifications were channeled
to the division. These actions, while 36
weakening other units, proved effective (1) Memo, CofS GHQ Reserve (Gen Ruffner)
for CofS GHQ (Gen Almond), 28 Aug 50, sub:
in bringing the 7th Division to a reason- Strength of 7th Div, G-1 GHQ Daily Log, 28 Aug
able level. By 7 September, shortly be- 50, Item 55. (2) Memo, G-1 GHQ for CofS GHQ,
fore loading for the invasion at Inch'on, 8 Sep 50, sub: Status of 7th Inf Div Personnel, in
CofS GHQ, UNC files.
37
(1) Memo, G-3 GHQ for CofS ROK, GHQ, 17
33
Memo, Gen Hickey, DCofS GHQ, for Gen Aug 50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (2) Memo for
Almond, 7 Aug 50, sub: Rpt of Visit to Korea, copy Gen Beiderlinden, 8 Sep 50, sub: ROK Personnel
in OCMH. With U.S. Units, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. (3) Rad,
34
Truman, Memoirs, II, 351. CX 59818, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 11 Aug 50. (4)
35
Rad, CX 59802, CINCFE to DA, 10 Aug 50. Rad, CX 60020, CINCFE to CG EUSAK, 13 Aug 50.
168 POLICY AND DIRECTION
gust, 8,652 Koreans had joined the 7th achieved before embarkation. These in-
Division.38 cluded proficiency in amphibious op-
In a related action, General MacArthur erations. General MacArthur ordered
ordered General Walker to strengthen amphibious training for the 7th Division
each company and battery of American to begin as soon as possible, under the
troops under his command by adding a control and supervision of COM-
hundred Koreans as rapidly as individual NAVFE.41
arms and equipment could be procured.
The increase was to be made without Airborne Units
regard to the present or future strength
of the ROK Army. He authorized MacArthur had no airborne troops
Walker to raise the ROK Army to any when the fighting began in Korea. The
number he deemed practicable or advis- 11th Airborne Division, which had
able and to requisition equipment when served on occupation duties, had re-
the figure had been determined.39 But, turned to the United States more than a
by the end of August, little progress had year before. MacArthur now wanted
been made toward attaching Koreans to airborne forces badly. The ability of
American units other than the 7th Di- such airborne troops to drop behind
vision. The 1st Cavalry Division had enemy lines, to sever lines of communi-
739 Koreans, the 2d Division had 234, cations, and to disrupt rear-area activi-
the 24th Division had 949, and the 25th ties had been proven during World
Division 240.40 War II. The increasing vulnerability of
Admiral Joy recommended to General the North Korean Army to such tactics
MacArthur on 7 August that amphibious provided the perfect setting for airborne
training of the 7th Division begin im- employment, particularly in conjunction
mediately even though the unit was then with amphibious attack.
at less than half strength. He pointed His early attempts to procure airborne
out that the embarkation date for the troops included an effort on 8 July to
prospective assault amphibious landing have a complete regiment, with its equip-
was 5 September and that training a RCT ment, flown to Japan. He apparently
to conduct an opposed amphibious as- intended to use this airborne unit in
sault would delay it. He had already Operation BLUEHEARTS. General Van-
conferred with the commanding general denberg, Air Force chief of staff, offered
of the 7th Division and had instructed to fly the regiment and its equipment to
him on the training objectives to be Japan in C-119 aircraft if other members
38
(1) The complete story of this unique experi- of the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought it
ment is contained in Mono, Maj Elva Stillwaugh, necessary. But this emergency aerial
Personnel Policies in the Korean Conflict, copy in movement would have required the di-
OCMH. (2) Telecon, TT 3708, DA and CINCFE,
30 Aug 50. version of Military Air Transport Serv-
39
Rad, CX 59709, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, ice carriers and commercial planes which
9 Aug 50.
40 41
Rpt, unsigned, 31 Aug 50, sub: Strength of (1) Rad, 0707027, COMNAVFE to CINCFE, 7
South Koreans Attached to U.S. Divs as of 31 Aug, Aug 50. (2) Rad, CX 59636, CINCFE to CG Eighth
G-3 Opns Jnl, FEC and Pac Br, G-3, DA. Army and COMNAVFE, 8 Aug 50.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 169
already were flying huge cargoes of men troops. He assured General Almond that
and matériel to MacArthur. If Mac- the Joint Chiefs of Staff would do their
Arthur's estimates were correct, these best to furnish planes to drop the ve-
shipments were much more sorely needed hicles and howitzers of the RCT, but
than an airborne RCT, and should take cautioned against wasteful and improper
precedence. employment of these specially trained
For this reason, and because no air- troops. "Don't overestimate what one
borne RCT's, except for those of the 82d RCT can do," the Army Chief of Staff
Airborne Division, were ready to fight warned Almond. "Don't get too gran-
immediately, the Joint Chiefs of Staff diose in your planned utilization of the
denied MacArthur's July request.42 But limited troops available."
43
they did take steps to ready an airborne When using the phrase "limited troops
unit for deployment as soon as possible. available," Collins was not exaggerating.
Whereas MacArthur actually had asked The 11th Airborne Division had so few
for an RCT from the 82d Airborne Di- men that only one RCT, at less than half
vision, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided its authorized infantry strength, could
against weakening the only effective in- be formed on 15 July. Since the begin-
fantry division left in the United States ning of July Army authorities had been
and chose instead an RCT from the 11th assigning all officers and men completing
Airborne Division. The commanding the Army Parachute School at Fort Ben-
general of the 11th Airborne Division ning, Georgia, to the 11th, feeding in
had been informed of the possible de- about 400 trained jumpers each week.
ployment on 7 July, but with the decision General Bolté, investigating the readi-
against air transport to Japan, no im- ness date for the airborne RCT, was told
mediate action was taken. Planning con- that by transferring trained jumpers
tinued, however, for possible movement from the 82d Airborne, the 11th Air-
by ship. borne RCT could be readied for ship-
When General Collins learned during ment to MacArthur by 1 August. On
his conference in Tokyo that General the other hand, the current process of
MacArthur's plan for Inch'on included filling the RCT with graduates of the
a role for the airborne RCT, he was parachute school only would slow its de-
somewhat concerned. He told General parture until 20 September. The latter
Almond, after hearing the latter describe method did not disrupt the 82d Airborne,
the planned seizure of the north bank of however, and was therefore the method
the Han River by an airborne unit, that most acceptable to General Bolté and
the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take a General Collins. On 18 July, the De-
very personal interest in how General partment of the Army told General Mac-
MacArthur employed the airborne Arthur that the 11th Airborne RCT
42
(1) Rad, C 57379, CINCFE to DA, 8 Jul 50. would be ready at home station by about
(2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS, 8 Jul 50, sub: Troop 20 September. Asked to comment, he
Requirements Forwarded by General MacArthur to
43
the DA for the JCS, in G-3, DA file 320.2 Pac, Case Memo, Col Dickson for Gen Bolté, sub: Record
21. (3) Rad, WAR 85328, DA to CINCFE, Collins of Visit to FEC, 10-15 July 1950, in G-3, DA file 333
(Personal) for MacArthur, 9 Jul 50. Pac, Case 3, Tab 6.
170 POLICY AND DIRECTION
objected that his plans for the landing at strated once again, asking that the Joint
Inch'on required these troops in his thea- Chiefs of Staff expedite the arrival of the
45
ter by 10 September and urged every unit.
44
effort to have them there on time. Despite General MacArthur's protests,
The brief description presented orally General Ridgway and General Haislip
to General Collins during his visit ap- drew up a plan on 25 July to move the
parently had not justified sufficiently the 187th RCT of the 11th Airborne Divi-
need for immediate deployment of the sion to Japan with an operational readi-
RCT. Whereupon, Washington asked ness date in the Far East Command of
General MacArthur for a more detailed 21 October. Infantry fillers would be
explanation of the mission he would transferred to the unit from the 82d Air-
give the airborne RCT in the landing borne if necessary. One hundred C-119
operation. On 23 July, General Mac- aircraft would arrive in the Far East
Arthur replied that he planned to mount Command in time to allow the RCT fif-
an airdrop from Japan, landing the air- teen days of operational training prior
borne troops in the Inch'on objective to 21 October. On this basis, build-up
area as soon after D-day as the situation of the 187th Airborne RCT went for-
warranted. They were to seize a key com- ward during July and most of August.
munication center immediately ahead of By 19 August, the regiment had been
troops advancing out of the beachhead built up to nearly 4,000 officers and men
46
area. and was undergoing intensive training.
At this time, when it was not at all cer- Arrangements progressed ahead of the
tain that sufficient amphibious forces original schedule and General MacAr-
could be sent to MacArthur or that the thur was told that the 187th RCT would
landing at Inch'on would even be made, be at the port of embarkation by 12 Sep-
MacArthur's requirement for airborne tember. He again objected that in order
troops appeared, to Army officials, sec- to accomplish his planned operation he
ondary. The condition of the 11th Air- would have to have the unit and its re-
borne Division, moreover, remained such quired airlift in Japan by 10 September.
that the Department of the Army deemed But General Ridgway, himself an air-
it impractical to send any of the divi- borne officer, opposed any stepped-up
sion's regiments into combat in Sep- shipment of the airborne RCT. He ad-
tember. Army authorities informed vised General Collins, after studying
General MacArthur in teleconference General MacArthur's objections, " . . . I
that the RCT would be operational in think the only justification for compli-
Japan by 23 October, but that he could
not count upon using it in his landing 45
(1) Rad, C 58473, CINCFE to DA, 23 Jul 50.
operations. In turn, MacArthur remon- (2) Telecon, TT 3573, DA with CINCFE, 24 Jul 50.
46
(1) Memo, Gen Timberman, Opns Div, G-3,
44
(1) MFR, Col Dickson, G-3, DA, 17 Jul 50, sub: for Gen Bolté, G-3, DA, 25 Jul 50, sub: Movement
Readiness Date for the RCT of the 11th Abn Div. of RCT of 11th Abn Div to FECOM, in G-3, DA
(2) Memo, Gen Ogden, Chief, Org and Training file 320.2, Case 6/5. (2) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen
Div, G-3, DA, for Gen Bolté, G-3, DA, 15 Jul 50, Ridgway, 19 Aug 50, sub: Movement of RCT of
same sub. Both in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 6/5. 11th Abn to FEC, with 1st Ind by Gen Ridgway
(3) Rad, W 86323, DA to CINCFE, 18 Jul 50. (sgd F. F. Moorman) with Incls, same file.
OPERATION CHROMITE: THE FORCES 171
ance would be a situation so desperate tent, the 187th Airborne RCT could
that the addition of an RCT as a straight reach Sasebo, Japan, on 21 September.
infantry outfit was necessary to save the The unit could then complete prepara-
situation. It does not appear to me that tions for an airborne drop of the entire
such is the case." General MacArthur's regiment by 29 September, but no
objections were overruled and, in mid- earlier. "I strongly urge," General Col-
August, he was told not to expect the air- lins said, "it not be committed prior to
borne troops in time for his landing that date. The unit is presently capable
operation.47 of daylight operations only. However, I
General Collins, on a second visit to am confident that this unit will, in all
Tokyo late in August, found General respects, meet the high combat standards
MacArthur still insistent that the air- set by our airborne units in the last
borne RCT be sent in time to take part war." There appeared to be no appeal
in Operation CHROMITE. Collins prom- from these opinions of the Chief of Staff,
ised to do what he could and, upon re- and General MacArthur acquiesced, re-
turning to Washington, made a special plying that his plans would be adjusted.48
effort to expedite arrangements. His in- The 187th Airborne RCT left Camp
vestigation convinced him that his staff Stoneman, California, on 6 September
had been doing its best, and on 25 Au- and arrived in Japan on 20 September
gust he explained to General MacArthur with a strength of about 4,400 men and
that he had satisfied himself that an air- officers.49
borne RCT could not be sent by 10
September. He had even considered
The Assault in Readiness
taking a regiment from the 82d Airborne
instead of the 11th, but had found that The U.S. X Corps, at its embarkation,
this drastic action would have made no numbered slightly less than 70,000 men.
appreciable difference in the arrival date. Included as its major units were the 1st
For the delay was no longer caused by Marine Division, the 7th Division, the
personnel shortages but by difficulties in 92d and 96th Field Artillery Battalions,
procuring, assembling, and loading the the 56th Amphibious Tank and Tractor
specialized equipment required for air- Battalion, the 19th Engineer Combat
borne operations. General Collins felt Group, and the 2d Engineer Special Bri-
that every reasonable and practicable gade. The 1st Marine Division had a
measure had been taken to expedite the
48
arrival of the RCT but that the unit (1) MFR, sgd Lt Col Herrick, 29 Aug 50, sub:
Advancement of Date of Movement to FEC of 187th
would not be there for CHROMITE. RCT of 11th Abn Div, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case
In his final word to General Mac- 6/4. (2) Rad, W 90063, DA (Collins) to CINCFE
Arthur on 28 August, he pointed out (MacArthur), 25 Aug 50. (3) Rad, WAR 89967, JCS
(Collins) to CINCFE, 28 Aug 50. (4) Rad, C 71576,
that by expediting to the maximum ex- CINCFE (MacArthur) to DA (Collins), 30 Aug 50.
49
(1) Interv, Capt Charles Thebaud with Maj
47
(1) Rad, CX 59999, CINCFE to DA, 13 Aug 50. C. M. Holland, 187th Abn RCT, Beppu, Japan, 19
(2) Rad, W 88966, DA to CINCFE, 16 Aug 50. (3) Jan 52. (2) Ltr, Hq, 187th Abn RCT, to DA, 15
Memo, Gen Ridgway for CofS, 14 Aug 50, in CofS Dec 51, sub: Insignia. (3) War Diary, 187th Abn
DA file 370, Case 11. RCT, 1 Aug to 31 Oct 50.
172 POLICY AND DIRECTION
had swung into round-the-clock opera- and X Corps. For, although MacArthur
tion. When General Almond took had ordered General Walker to attack
command of all forces ashore in the out of the Pusan Perimeter beginning
Inch'on-Seoul area at 1800 on 21 Septem- on the day after the X Corps landing,
ber, he had almost 6,000 vehicles, 25,000 the North Koreans along the Naktong
tons of equipment, and 50,000 troops.3 fought as fiercely on 16 September as
Fortunately, the success of Mac- they had on the 14th, and for nearly a
Arthur's plan did not depend upon an week stood off all attempts by Eighth
immediate juncture of the Eighth Army Army to punch through their defenses.
3
The main body of the North Korean
(1) Rad, C 63187, CINCUNC to CINCFE and Army appeared unaware of the landing
JCS, 20 Sep 50. (2) Rad, X 10042 IN, CG X Corps
to CINCFE, 23 Sep 50. (3) Appleman, South to the at Inch'on, approximately 180 air miles
Naktong, North to the Yalu, p. 519. to its rear, and saw no reason to quit.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 175
Eighth Army intelligence officers had convinced that he could break out on
predicted this kind of enemy reaction, schedule, blamed equipment shortages
pointing out that a success at Inch'on for the delay. He complained to Gen-
would not necessarily relieve the pres- eral Hickey on 21 September that he
sure on Eighth Army, since the enemy was ". . . ready to break loose if it
could still move men and supplies against weren't for the physical trouble." He
the perimeter over alternate routes along could not get his armor across the Nak-
the east coast.4 Indeed, the Eighth Army tong, he pointed out, and, referring to
G-3 had pessimistically speculated that the greater logistic support given the X
the most likely enemy reaction to the Corps, noted, "We have been bastard
landing would be an all-out drive to push children lately, and as far as our en-
the Eighth Army into the sea. gineering equipment is concerned we are
General Walker, who had never been in pretty bad shape." He seemed anx-
4
Intelligence Annex (10 Sep 50), Eighth Army ious that General MacArthur's staff
Opns Plan 10, 6 Sep 50. should appreciate his plight, telling
176 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Hickey, "I don't want you to think that I were successful. At any rate, after three
am dragging my heels, but I have a river days of indecisive struggle along the
across my whole front and the two perimeter, MacArthur ordered General
5
bridges which I have don't make much." Wright to implement the alternate plan
Walker's failure to keep to his sched- for an amphibious landing at Kunsan,
ule made General MacArthur somewhat by using two of Walker's American di-
doubtful that the Eighth Army would be visions and one of his ROK divisions in
able to break out of the Pusan Perimeter the amphibious assault. Kunsan, on the
at all. He perhaps recalled earlier warn- west coast about one hundred air miles
ings by Eighth Army officers that south of Inch'on, had originally been
Walker's divisions could not fight their favored by General Collins as the pri-
way north even if the Inch'on landing mary objective area. A landing there
5
Telecon, Gen Walker with Gen Hickey, 21 Sep now, MacArthur felt, would threaten the
50, in CofS GHQ, UNC files. enemy's immediate rear and cause a
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 177
North Korean collapse. When General most significant of the Korean War.
Hickey discussed this plan with General The first of these, the decision to invade
Walker on 22 September, the latter ob- North Korea, stemmed in part from mil-
jected to giving up any of his forces for a itary expediency but the underlying
landing at Kunsan or anywhere else. But issues were mainly political. The second
the argument ended there. For by this decision, to use the X Corps in another
time, signs of an enemy collapse had ap- amphibious operation, was completely
peared and MacArthur shelved the military. General MacArthur figured
Kunsan plan. The signs proved correct to a large degree in the 38th Parallel de-
and by the next day the North Korean cision and personally decided how the
Army, at last feeling the effects of its X Corps would be used. Both decisions
severed lines of communications and the were made as the recapture of Seoul be-
presence of a formidable force in its rear, came a certainty; and both were reached
began a general withdrawal from the in the course of establishing a plan for
Pusan Perimeter. The withdrawal operations in Korea that would best
turned into a rout. During the next serve the interests of the United States
week, Eighth Army pursued the fleeing and the rest of the free world.7
enemy. On the morning of 26 Septem- President Truman, of course, bore the
ber, a task force from the 7th Cavalry full and final responsibility for choosing
Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, of a course of action for Korea. But from
Eighth Army met elements of the 31st his military and civilian advisers at sev-
Infantry, 7th Division, of X Corps near eral stations within the executive branch,
Osan to mark the juncture of the two he demanded and received the best ad-
forces.6 vice available on all aspects of a problem,
General Almond's corps meanwhile including the alternatives and conse-
had enlarged its holdings in the Inch'on- quences, before he took a stand.8 Before
Seoul area. By 26 September, the the Korean War was three weeks old,
Marine-Army team had wrested control and while American and ROK forces
of the South Korean capital from the were falling back on Taejon, the Presi-
enemy and North Korean resistance in dent called on these advisers to tell him
the sector was dwindling rapidly. whether MacArthur should eventually
send forces across the 38th Parallel.
The 38th Parallel—Genesis of the These advisers saw no need to test the
Decision legality of crossing the parallel. The
basic authority under which the United
Two decisions in the third week of
September 1950 were to rank among the 7
Except as otherwise indicated, this section is
6
(1) Opn Plan 100-C, JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. based on the 091 Korea file of G-3, Department of
(2) Rad, 063180, CINCUNC (Wright) to CINCFE the Army, for 1950, Cases 14/14, 14/16; 14/17, 14/19;
(Hickey), 19 Sep 50. (3) Memo, Gen Hickey for Gen 14/20, 14/22; 14/28, 14/30; 14/31, and 79/3.
8
Wright, 23 Sep 50, JSPOG files. (4) For details of Symbolic of his approach to decision-making, a
Eighth Army's breakout, see Appleman, South to small sign resting on President Truman's White
the Naktong, North to the Yalu, Chapters XXVII House desk carried the reminder, "The Buck Stops
and XXVIII. Here."
178 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Staff, the President had approved the intended entry, nor a threat to counter our
directive.13 operations militarily in North Korea. Un-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the di- der no circumstances, however, will your
forces cross the Manchurian or USSR bor-
rective to General MacArthur on 27 ders of Korea and, as a matter of policy, no
September, stipulating that it was being non-Korean Ground Forces will be used in
furnished to provide him with "ampli- the northeast provinces bordering the Soviet
fying instructions as to further military Union or in the area along the Manchurian
actions to be taken by you in Korea." border. Furthermore, support of your op-
erations north or south of the 38th Parallel
They warned him, "These instructions, will not include Air or Naval action against
however, cannot be considered to be Manchuria or against USSR territory.
final since they may require modification In the event of the open or covert em-
in accordance with developments." Ob- ployment of major Soviet units south of the
viously wary of what the Russians or 38th Parallel, you will assume the defense,
make no move to aggravate the situation
Chinese might do, they ordered Mac- and report to Washington. You should
Arthur "to make special efforts to deter- take the same action in the event your
mine whether there is a Chinese forces are operating north of the 38th
Communist or Soviet threat to the attain- Parallel, and major Soviet units are openly
ment of your objective, which will be employed. You will not discontinue Air
and Naval operations north of the 38th
reported to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as Parallel merely because the presence of
a matter of urgency."14 Soviet or Chinese Communist troops is de-
For the first time MacArthur had a tected in a target area, but if the Soviet
written directive to destroy North Union or Chinese Communists should an-
Korean forces. nounce in advance their intention to reoc-
cupy North Korea and give warning, either
explicitly or implicitly, that their forces
Your military objective is the destruction should not be attacked, you should refer
of the North Korean Armed Forces. In at- the matter immediately to Washington.
taining this objective you are authorized to In the event of the open or covert em-
conduct military operations, including am- ployment of major Chinese Communist
phibious and airborne landings or ground units south of the 38th Parallel, you should
operations north of the 38th Parallel in continue the action as long as action by
Korea, provided that at the time of such your forces offers a reasonable chance of
operation there has been no entry into successful resistance. In the event of an
North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese attempt to employ small Soviet or Chinese
Communist Forces, no announcement of Communist units covertly south of the 38th
Parallel, you should continue the action.
13
The genesis of this directive is not clear in MacArthur was directed to use all
President Truman's memoirs. He states that he
approved a statement of national policy on 11 information media at his command to
September and that the JCS sent a "directive" based turn "the inevitable bitterness and re-
on this policy to MacArthur on 15 September. The sentment of the war-victimized Korean
JCS sent only the substance of the policy statement
to MacArthur at that time, and did not send him people" away from the United Nations
the actual directive until 27 September. See Tru- and to direct it toward the Communists,
man Memoirs, II, 59-60. Korean and Russian, and, "depending
14
Rad, JCS 92801, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,
27 Sep 50. Because of its importance this directive on the role they play," the Chinese
will be quoted at length. Communists.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 183
told General Marshall, "I regard all Korea, MacArthur protested any thought
of Korea open for our military of meddling in the Department of State's
operations." 16 affairs. "I do not know precisely to what
your message refers," he said,
The ROK Government Returns to Seoul but I have no plans whatsoever except
scrupulously to implement the directives
General MacArthur, before landing at which I have received. I plan to return
Inch'on, had conferred with President President Rhee, his cabinet, senior members
of the legislature, the United Nations com-
Rhee and agreed informally that the mission, and perhaps others of similar offi-
government of the republic would be re- cial category to domicile in Seoul as soon
established in Seoul as early as possible. as conditions there are sufficiently stable to
The two had also discussed arrangements permit reasonable security.
for an election. In Washington, when MacArthur pointed out that this in-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff mentioned these volved no re-establishment of or change
dealings, great concern arose within the in government, since the ROK Govern-
Department of State. That agency, then ment had never ceased to function and
discussing means of a final settlement in would merely resume control over its
Korea with other U.N. members, de- areas liberated from enemy control.18
plored any participation by the military Conditions in Seoul were not yet quite
commander in ROK governmental mat- "sufficiently stable" for Rhee's return,
ters. Through the Secretary of Defense, for the X Corps had encountered ex-
the Department of State asked the Joint ceptionally bitter resistance in and
Chiefs of Staff to call upon MacArthur around the city. General Almond, un-
for a more complete accounting of his der pressure from MacArthur, pushed his
diplomatic activities. H. Freeman commanders to take the capital quickly.
Matthews of the Department of State By 26 September, his troops had seized
told the Secretary of Defense he did not all key points within it, and the prize
wish to use diplomatic channels for this seemed almost within grasp. "On this
inquiry, believing, ". . . it would be ex- basis," Almond said, "I advised General
tremely awkward for Sebald [Political MacArthur that he might expect to enter
Adviser to SCAP] to inquire into this Seoul on the 29th of September, that in
matter, and equally awkward for my opinion the city would be perfectly
Ambassador Muccio." 17 safe to restore President Syngman Rhee
When, acting on the request, the Joint to his rightful position at the Capital by
Chiefs of Staff asked General MacArthur that date." 19
for complete details of his plans for re- Almond also sent MacArthur a tenta-
storing President Rhee's authority in
18
(1) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 7 Sep
16
(1) Rad, C 65035, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 50, sub: U.S. Courses of Action With Respect to
30 Sep 50. (2) Rad, C 65034, CINCFE to DA for Korea. (2) Ltr, Mr. Matthews to Gen Burns, 18
Secy Defense, 30 Sep 50. Sep 50. (3) Rad, JCS 92329, JCS to CINCFE, 22 Sep
17
Ltr, Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under- 50. (4) Rad, C 64159, CINCFE to JCS, 23 Sep 50.
19
secy State, to Gen Burns, OSD, 18 Sep 50, in G-3, Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj James F. Schnabel,
DA file 091 Korea, Case 14/26. 8 Jul 55.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 185
tive program for the liberation cere- When MacArthur returned to Tokyo,
monies. But MacArthur replied: he received protests from the Depart-
ments of State and Defense. Both de-
Arrangements suggested by you are not
in accordance with those already set up by partments noted with surprise and alarm
me. Following is the plan. Arrive Kimpo that the American flag had been dis-
0930. No honor guard or other ceremony played with undue prominence over the
there. Will proceed direct to capital build- ROK Capitol during the ceremonies, and
ing for informal conference with you and complained that this placed too great an
General Walker before arrival of Pusan
party. Ceremony at 1200 hours. I will emphasis on the nature of the Korean
personally conduct the proceedings without War as a United States, rather than a
being introduced. There will be no invo- United Nations, operation.22 But con-
cation or benediction necessary as the spiri- gratulations also were in order. For, by
tual features are embodied in my own the end of September, MacArthur had
address. I will commence ceremony by five
minute speech to be followed by speeches achieved the objectives of his landing,
of similar duration by the Chairman UN and the Eighth Army and the X Corps
COK, American ambassador and President now controlled almost all of South Korea.
Rhee, and I will conclude the proceedings.20 Together, the two commands had routed
General MacArthur arrived in Seoul the North Korean Army, had killed or
on the 29th as scheduled. In his address captured huge numbers of its troops, and
he told President Rhee: had destroyed or forced the abandon-
ment of nearly all of its tanks, trucks,
In behalf of the United Nations I am and artillery.
happy to restore to you, Mr. President, the
seat of your Government, that from it you In congratulating MacArthur on 30
may better fulfill your constitutional re- September, President Truman said, in
sponsibility. It is my fervent hope that a part:
beneficent providence will give you and all
of your public officials the wisdom and No operations in military history can match
strength to meet your perplexing problemseither the delaying action where you traded
space for time in which to build up your
in a spirit of benevolence and justice, that
from the travail of the past there may forces, or the brilliant maneuver which has
now resulted in the liberation of Seoul. I
emerge a new and hopeful dawn for the peo-
ple of Korea. am particularly impressed by the splendid
cooperations of our Army, Navy, and Air
After leading his audience in the Lord's Force and I wish you would extend my
Prayer, MacArthur told Rhee, ". . . my thanks and congratulations to the com-
officers and I will now resume our mil- manders of these services—Lt. Gen. Walton
itary duties and leave you and your Gov- H. Walker, Vice Admiral Charles T. Joy,
and Lt. Gen. George E. Stratemeyer. . . .
ernment to the discharge of civil I salute you all, and say to all, from all of
21
responsibility." us at home, 'Well and nobly done.'
20
The Joint Chiefs of Staff joined in the
Rad, C 64724, CINCUNC to CG X Corps, 28
Sep 50. congratulations, praising MacArthur and
21
Text of message by General MacArthur on his men for a " . . . transition from de-
return of Government of Korea to Seoul, 29 Septem- fensive to offensive operations [that]
ber 1950, contained in MacArthur Hearings, page
22
3481. Rad, W 92972, DA to CINCFE, 30 Sep 50.
186 POLICY AND DIRECTION
was magnificently planned, timed and The X Corps and General Almond
executed." 23 were to have another opportunity for
General MacArthur passed along these recognition as a result of the 27 Septem-
compliments to all of his command, but ber directive from the Joint Chiefs of
they brought no particular joy to General Staff to MacArthur calling for the de-
Almond. For neither President Truman struction of the North Korean armed
nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff had specifi- forces. During the recent offensive large
cally credited the X Corps or Almond numbers of North Koreans had managed
with any contribution to the success of to slip away, particularly through the
the operations. Though the oversight eastern mountains, into their home
presumably was unintentional, Almond
territory.
complained that this absence of official
In connection with the assigned ob-
recognition adversely affected the morale
24 jective to destroy the North Korean
of his command.
armed forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
23
Rad, ZC 18525, CINCFE to All Comdrs, 30 Sep authorized MacArthur to broadcast a
50. surrender ultimatum to the North
24
(1) Ibid. (2) Telecon, Gen Beiderlinden with
Col Harrison, 2020-2100, 1 Oct 50, recorded in SGS Korean Government. The broadcast
GHQ, FEC 337 files, 1950. also was to instruct the North Korean
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 187
was the eastern terminus of the easiest promised Washington that he would use
route across the narrow waist of the only ROK troops for operations above
peninsula; and it was a road and rail the line Ch'ungju-Yongwon-Hungnam.
communications center. Wonsan, in "Tentative date for the attack of Eighth
fact, was the principal port of entry for Army," MacArthur reported, "will be
Russian supplies and military equipment not earlier than 15 October and not later
received by sea from the Vladivostok than 30 October. You will be provided
area and a key point on the rail line from detailed plans later." Washington's con-
the same area. Moreover, from Wonsan cern over possible Chinese or Russian
a military force could move inland and interference in the Korean fighting
west across the peninsula to P'yongyang prompted General MacArthur to report
or north to the Hamhung-Hungnam also that there was no indication of
region, the most important industrial "present entry into North Korea by
29
area in all Korea. major Soviet or Chinese Communist
General MacArthur readily accepted Forces." 31
the plan tailored to his specifications. On the following day, just before he
On 28 September he informed the Joint delivered his address in Seoul, Mac-
Chiefs of Staff: "If the North Korean Arthur summoned General Walker, Gen-
Armed Forces do not surrender in ac- eral Almond, Admiral Joy, and General
cordance with my proclamation to be Stratemeyer to a conference in a room
issued on 1 October 1950, dispositions on the second floor of the Capitol to tell
will be made to accomplish the military them of his new plan. Although the
objective of destroying them by entry Joint Chiefs of Staff had not yet approved
into North Korea." He sketched his the plan, he pointed out, approval was
plan briefly. He would send the Eighth expected with no material change in the
Army across the 38th Parallel through concept of the operation. He directed
Kaesong and Sariwon to capture Almond to relinquish the Seoul area
P'yongyang. Almond's X Corps would to Walker by 7 October, to plan on
land amphibiously at Wonsan, thereafter moving the 7th Division overland for
"making juncture with Eighth Army." embarkation at Pusan, and to embark
Presumably, this juncture would require corps troops and the 1st Marine Division
the X Corps to attack west along the from Inch'on. He tentatively set 20
Wonsan-P'yongyang road.30 October as the date for the Wonsan
Mindful of the warning contained in landing. 32
his latest directive, General MacArthur The actual plan for destroying North
Korean forces above the 38th Parallel
29
(1) JANIS 75, ch. VIII (Korea—Cities and was based on three assumptions. Two
Towns), pp. 52-53. (2) GHQ FEC Terrain Study 6, were correct, namely, that the bulk of
North Korea, XIV, 26-27, and Map No. 760, Won-
san City Plan, Plate 12. (3) War Diary, X Corps, the North Korean forces had been de-
Oct 50, Opns, pp. 18-19, and Diary CG X Corps, stroyed and that the United Nations
24 Oct 50. Command would conduct operations
30
(1) Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50.
31
(2) See also Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50.
32
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), pp. 357-60. Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj Schnabel, 8 Jul 55.
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 189
north of the 38th Parallel. The third, eration was completed that the X Corps
that there would be no outside inter- troops would be absorbed by Eighth
ference, was less sound. The plan called Army. . . ." 34 Subsequently, General
on the forces of the Eighth Army and MacArthur could not believe that these
the X Corps to advance to and hold a officers really disagreed with his decision.
line across Korea from Ch'ongju, through
To the contrary, the decision to retain a
Yongwon, to Hamhung. The target date function of GHQ command and coordina-
for the Eighth Army assault was set at tion between the Eighth Army and the X
twelve days after the Eighth Army had Corps until such time as a juncture between
passed through the X Corps in the the two forces had been effected was, so far
Inch'on-Seoul area. General Walker's as I know, based upon the unanimous think-
ing of the senior members of my staff. It
ground attack might precede General but followed standard military practice in
Almond's amphibious assault by three the handling and control of widely sepa-
to seven days. General Wright estimated rated forces where lateral communications
35
that it would take six days to load the were difficult if not impossible.
assault elements of the X Corps and four General Walker and the Eighth Army
days to sail to Wonsan.33 staff apparently felt very strongly that
Most of MacArthur's principal staff the X Corps should become part of the
officers had assumed, before seeing the Eighth Army. Walker seems to have
new plans, that the UNC commander had two plans in mind for the possible
intended to place the X Corps under employment of Almond's forces. In one
General Walker after Seoul was re- of these, the X Corps would drive over-
turned to ROK control. MacArthur had land from Seoul to seize P'yongyang, and
created the X Corps specifically for the the rest of the Eighth Army, after com-
landing at Inch'on, had tailored it hur- ing up behind the X Corps, would then
riedly, and had taken its key officers from move laterally from P'yongyang to
his own staff. As the corps completed Wonsan on the east coast where it would
its mission in late September, it could join the ROK I Corps as the latter moved
logically be assumed that the combat ele- up the east coast. Such a maneuver
ments of the corps would be assimilated might save a great deal of time, since
by the Eighth Army and that the key the X Corps was already in position to
officers would return to GHQ and their advance on P'yongyang, and would estab-
normal duties. Generals Hickey and lish a line across Korea at the narrow
Wright advised General MacArthur to waist that could cut off a large number of
follow this course; Maj. Gen. George L. North Koreans still trying to move north-
Eberle, MacArthur's G-4, also strongly ward through the central and eastern
favored Walker's taking over the X mountains. Meanwhile, the X Corps
Corps; and General Almond had always 34
(1) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Wright,
understood "that when the Inchon op- Feb 54. (2) Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Eberle,
12 Jan 54. (3) Ltr, Gen Almond to Maj Schnabel,
33
(1) Opn Plan 9-50, 29 Sep 50, in JSPOG, GHQ, 8 Jul 55.
35
UNC files. (2) Memo, Gen Hickey for JSPOG, Note Ltr, Gen MacArthur to Gen Snedeker, USMC,
2, Gen Wright to CofS, GHQ, UNC, 26 Sep 50, sub: G-3, Hq USMC, Washington, D.C., 24 Feb 56, copy
Plans for Future Opns. in OCMH.
190 POLICY AND DIRECTION
39
could move on above P'yongyang toward Army commander at an early date.
the Yalu River. The operations of both MacArthur, in fact, consulted neither
the X Corps and the Eighth Army could Walker nor Almond on the next opera-
be co-ordinated under Walker's com- tion until the plan was almost in final
mand; and both could be supplied from form.
Pusan and Inch'on until the Wonsan MacArthur's guidance to his planners
area fell, at which time the forces op- was tantamount to an order that they
erating in the east could be supplied by recommend another amphibious opera-
sea through Wonsan and Hungnam, tion by the X Corps. While MacArthur
farther north.36 did not specify that the X Corps would
General Walker's second plan was to make the amphibious landing, no other
approach Wonsan by a more direct, element of the United Nations Com-
diagonal route. Assuming that the X mand could have carried out the ma-
Corps became a part of the Eighth Army, neuver. Too, General MacArthur had
Walker would, in this instance, send a been most favorably impressed by Al-
corps to the east coast objective through mond's performance at Inch'on and by
the Seoul-Ch'orwon-Wonsan corridor.37 the over-all results of his operations.
If these were the plans Walker had in Furthermore, he saw amphibious ma-
mind, he did not ask authority to carry neuver as the best means of slashing deep
out either of them. Apparently unaware into North Korea, of cutting off escape
of what Almond's plans were he con- routes for thousands of fleeing enemy
tented himself with asking General Mac- soldiers, and of seizing a major port to
Arthur discreetly that he be let in on support his troops. This last-named
what was going on: "To facilitate ad- purpose was perhaps uppermost in his
vance planning for the approaching junc- thinking. Ammunition, food, gasoline,
ture with the X Corps, request this and most other supplies that kept the
headquarters be kept informed of the UNC divisions fighting in late Septem-
plans and progress of this Corps to the ber came into Korea through two ports,
greatest extent practicable. To date the Pusan and Inch'on. As troops moved
X Corps operations plans have not been farther north, Pusan's value dwindled,
received." 38 since the rail lines and roads over which
General MacArthur told Walker that matériel had to be brought from the port
as soon as X Corps had completed its to the combat units had been severely
CHROMITE missions, he would place it damaged in the earlier heavy fighting.
in GHQ Reserve in the Inch'on-Seoul The other port, Inch'on, had a limited
area and that he, MacArthur, would di- capacity for receiving vessels and could
rect its future operations. These opera- scarcely have supported, with its facil-
tions would be revealed to the Eighth ities, all U.N. forces involved in the
fighting. 40
36
Interv, Col Appleman with Maj Gen Leven C.
39
Allen, 15 Dec 53, copy in OCMH. Rad, CX 64610, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,
37
Ltr, Wright to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55. 27 Sep 50.
38 40
Rad, G 25090 KGO, CG Eighth Army to General Wright points out in this connection,
CINCFE, 26 Sep 50. "Inchon was not capable of fully supplying Eighth
CROSSING THE PARALLEL: THE DECISION AND THE PLAN 191
General Wright, in later analyzing the concentrated work by all the available
decision and the planning for entering engineer troops would be needed before
North Korea, said, even the main lines of communication
could be repaired as far as the 38th Par-
Both General MacArthur and General
Walker realized that any successful cam- allel, not to mention the area to the
paign in North Korea would need the full north where the next phase of the cam-
operation of an east coast port, preferably paign would be fought. But with the
Wonsan or Hungnam. And I believe that addition of the Wonsan port facilities,
their staffs were in full agreement. The MacArthur reasoned, two separate forces,
point at issue was simply that of how to
capture such a port and who should do it. 4 1 co-ordinated and supported from Japan,
could operate in Korea without impair-
Any campaign north of the P'yong- ing the effectiveness of either. 42 Of the
yang-Wonsan corridor would certainly two methods by which he could seize
encounter a most difficult logistical prob- Wonsan, amphibious encirclement took
lem. The northern Taebaek Range rose precedence over ground advance. The
to rugged heights in the east central part means were at hand in the X Corps, his
of the peninsula, forming a nearly track- directives specifically authorized am-
less mountain waste in the direction of phibious operations in North Korea, and
the Manchurian border. Few roads or he apparently hoped the waterborne
trails ran west and east. The principal movement would be as successful as the
lanes of travel were axial routes that fol- one at Inch'on.
lowed the north and south trend of deep The Joint Chiefs of Staff, having al-
mountain valleys. The only reasonably ready established the principle that Mac-
good lateral road connected P'yongyang Arthur could carry the fight into North
with Wonsan, where it joined the coastal Korea, did not quibble over MacArthur's
road running northward to Hamhung methods. They passed the plan on to
and Hungnam. A rail line crossed the the Secretary of Defense for final ap-
peninsula in the same general area proval, asking that he act with great
between P'yongyang and Wonsan. speed since "certain ROK Army Forces
General MacArthur apparently de- may even now be crossing the 38th Par-
cided that he could not supply both allel." President Truman and General
Eighth Army and X Corps through Marshall agreed to the plan at once, and
Pusan and Inch'on and over the crippled the Joint Chiefs of Staff told General
road and rail system in a campaign that he MacArthur to carry out his plan on
wanted to end quickly so that his forces schedule.43
would not have to fight during North
Korea's severe winter weather. Weeks of 42
Interv, Col Appleman with Gen Ruffner, for-
merly CofS X Corps, 20 Aug 51.
43
Army and I think a logistical check will show that, (1) Rad, JCS 92975, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Sep 50.
temporary handicap to Eighth Army as it was, the (2) Memo, Gen Bradley for Secy Defense, 29 Sep 50,
movement out of X Corps enabled Eighth Army to sub: Future Korean Opns. (3) To later critics who
provide itself with the logistic capability to perform noted that ROK troops captured Wonsan on11
its advance to the Pyongyang area." See Ltr, Wright October before American units were even disem-
to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55. barked and that MacArthur had noticed this, Gen-
41
Ltr, Wright to Schnabel, 14 Jun 55. eral Wright pointed out that General MacArthur
192 POLICY AND DIRECTION
had indeed noticed and was impressed by the re- control of ROK troops. While technically under
markable advance of ROK soldiers up the east coast his command, their subordination to him was based
of Korea where, by late September, they had driven merely on an understanding between himself and
almost to the parallel. But those same ROK troops President Rhee of the Republic of Korea. This fact,
had, only weeks before, shown themselves to be according to General Wright, made their conduct
extremely vulnerable to pressure and counterattack. under certain conditions problematical, and had to
And there was every good chance that these troops be considered in any planning for a major opera-
would run into guerrilla forces, reinforced by re- tion. In other words, any plan which hinged on
treating North Korean survivors, when they reached ROK troops to any degree (i.e., to seize and hold
the mountainous area west of Kaesong and Kojo. Wonsan) was felt to be leaning on a weak reed. See
Too, MacArthur did not feel that he had sufficient Ltr, Gen Wright to Maj Schnabel, 14 Jun 55.
CHAPTER XI
Secretary of Defense Marshall also support for the passage of the resolution.
wanted United States troops to stay out The United States could not work
of the picture during any occupation of through the Security Council as in earlier
North Korea. "I wish to state," Marshall days, since the USSR delegate to the
told Secretary of State Acheson on 3 council had returned to his seat in Au-
October: gust, bringing a veto power likely to be
used against any American-inspired reso-
that the Department of Defense continues
to believe that as few United States troops lution. Consequently, the American
as possible should engage in the physical delegation moved the Korean question
occupation and pacification of areas north before the General Assembly where the
of the 38th Parallel, once organized military USSR had no veto power and where
hostilities have ended. It remains impor- American greatly outweighed Russian
tant, therefore, to increase the number of
other United Nations troops sent to Korea, influence.
particularly from countries in Asia. 4 On 7 October the General Assembly
passed the resolution. It did not clearly
General Marshall deplored the lack of
call for the conquest and occupation of
an organized United Nations agency,
North Korea but gave implicit assent.
other than military, to handle "the tre-
The General Assembly recommended:
mendous problems that will follow hos-
tilities." He reminded Secretary Acheson (a) All appropriate steps be taken to ensure
conditions of stability throughout Korea;
that the United Nations Commission in and, (b) All constituent acts be taken, in-
Korea (UNCOK) was neither staffed nor cluding the holding of elections, under the
equipped to meet the problems that auspices of the United Nations, for the es-
would face it if the United Nations oc- tablishment of a unified, independent and
cupied North Korea. He called upon democratic Government in the sovereign
State of Korea. . . .
Acheson to sponsor the formation by the
United Nations of one combined or three This resolution also established the
separate agencies to handle the three United Nations Commission for the Uni-
major problems—relief and reconstruc- fication and Rehabilitation of Korea
tion, political unification, and security.5 (UNCURK) which replaced the old
6
The Department of State had already United Nations Commission in Korea.
drawn up a resolution for the United The Joint Chiefs of Staff had already sent
Nations to consider. This resolution a draft copy of the resolution to General
supported the political objectives of the MacArthur, at the same time informing
United Nations in Korea, including him that the United States Government
means for carrying them out through considered it as supporting operations
7
occupation if necessary. State Depart- north of the 38th Parallel.
ment officials talked informally with rep-
resentatives of friendly member nations MacArthur's Plans Change
in the United Nations and solicited their
"All appropriate steps" to "ensure con-
4
Ltr, Secy Defense (Marshall) to Secy State (Ache- ditions of stability throughout Korea"
son), 3 Oct 50, Incl to JCS 1776/129, 3 Oct 50, in
6
G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 99/11. State Dept Bulletin, XXIII (23 Oct 50), 648-49.
5 7
Ibid. Rad, JCS 93555, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 195
meant only one thing to General Mac- areas in carrying out the necessary sur-
Arthur, particularly since the enemy re- veying work. Direct communication
fused to answer his surrender demand. between the two commanders was author-
He went ahead with his preparations for ized. The U.N. commander, when it
destroying the North Korean Army on appeared that the enemy's lines of com-
its own ground. His original plans for munication and other facilities would
doing so were scarcely recognizable by soon be under his control and would be
the time they went into effect. In order needed in the advance into North Korea,
to keep pace with the swift advances in changed policy and forbade any further
the east and west, General MacArthur unnecessary destruction of railroad fa-
had to change his scheme of late Septem- cilities and equipment, bridges, and
ber. Other deviations from the pre- enemy airfields.8
pared plans became necessary because of The North Korean Army seemed to
unexpected conditions encountered at have melted away, so rapidly did it re-
Wonsan. treat. Even as MacArthur called for sur-
In late September, Walker's troops on render and while American divisions
the west and central fronts, although waited in the west, the ROK 3d Division
poised for the assault on North Korea, of the ROK I Corps on the east coast
had to be held in check temporarily. crossed almost unopposed into North
Walker's divisions were delayed, not by Korea on 1 October. MacArthur re-
reluctance or enemy opposition, but sim- ported the crossing to the Joint Chiefs
ply by a lack of sufficient food, fuel, and the next day: "Probings by elements of
munitions for sustained operations in the ROK Army are now well across the
North Korea. All supplies had to come 38th Parallel. Advances on the extreme
forward on badly damaged overland right are between ten and thirty miles in
routes; incoming cargo jammed limited the coast sector with practically no re-
port facilities; and all available air trans- sistance." These ROK troops were un-
port was busy rushing supplies into the der Walker's command.9
few usable airfields so that MacArthur's General MacArthur foresaw that he
troops might attack as soon as possible. might not need to use X Corps amphibi-
As the Eighth Army and X Corps ously, if successes in the east continued.
pressed into the crowded maneuver area "It is possible," he told the Joint Chiefs
along the border of west and central on 2 October, "if the enemy's weakness
Korea, MacArthur established a bound- is pronounced that immediate exploita-
ary between them. He made Eighth tion may be put into effect before or in
Army responsible for establishment and substitution for my prepared plans." 10
publication of complete bombline loca- Yet he sent no more troops into the
tions for all of Korea. Boundary control coastal operation in support of the ROK
points between areas of responsibility of
the two major commands were selected 8
(1) Rad, C 64621, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army
by General Walker who then notified and CG X Corps, 27 Sep 50. (2) Rad, CX 65139,
CINCFE to All Comds, 1 Oct 50.
General Almond. Walker received per- 9
Rad, C 65252, CINCFE to DA (JCS), 2 Oct 50.
10
mission to use roads through Almond's Ibid.
196 POLICY AND DIRECTION
drive, and on the same day issued orders General Almond had landed and indi-
for an overland attack north along the cated his readiness to assume responsi-
Kaesong-Sariwon-P'yongyang axis and bility for further operations ashore.
an east coast amphibious landing at On 3 October, General MacArthur
Wonsan to encircle and destroy North canceled his previous delineation of the
Korean forces south of the Ch'ungju- Inch'on-Seoul area as a X Corps objective
Kunu-ri - Yongwon - Hamhung - Hung- and took direct control of the 187th Air-
nam line. The Eighth Army was to borne RCT, which had entered Korea
make the main ground attack on P'yong- on 23 September and been operating in
yang, and the X Corps was to perform the Kimp'o area. General Walker re-
the amphibious movement. After the lieved General Almond of responsibility
Eighth Army had seized P'yongyang and for the Inch'on-Seoul area at noon on
the X Corps had invested Wonsan, each 7 October.12
was to attack toward the other along an By 1 October, the total ground force
east-west axis, join up, and cut off all strength within the United Nations Com-
enemy escape routes. On the ground, mand in Korea, divided among the
only ROK troops would operate north Eighth Army, X Corps, and service units,
of the line Ch'ongju-Kunu-ri-Yong- amounted to more than a third of a mil-
won-Hamhung-Hungnam, except on lion men. Far East Air Forces under
MacArthur's direct order. He ordered General Stratemeyer, on the same date,
Admiral Joy, COMNAVFE, to outload totaled 36,677, and U.S. Naval Forces,
X Corps. The assault force from the 1st Far East, under Admiral Joy numbered
Marine Division was to load at Inch'on; 59,438.13
the remainder of the corps, principally
the 7th Division, was to embark from The Likelihood of Chinese Intervention
Pusan. These orders were completely
within the authority granted General Political Signs
MacArthur on 27 September.11
General Walker would command all From the very beginning of U.N. op-
United Nations ground forces in Korea erations in Korea the United States and
with the exception of X Corps and the its allies had kept close watch on the
187th Airborne RCT; X Corps, under political and military reactions of Korea's
General Almond, would revert to GHQ giant neighbor, Communist China. Pos-
Reserve when passed through by Eighth sessed of a powerful army and led by
Army and remain under the direct com- men fanatically dedicated to commu-
mand of General MacArthur. Upon em- nism, China could have interfered with
barkation for the assault and while on serious effect during July, August, and
the water, X Corps would be controlled 12
(1) Rad, CX 65371, CINCFE to All Comdrs,
by Admiral Joy. The commander of 3 Oct 50. (2) Rad, X 10665, CG X Corps to CINC
Joint Task Force Seven would command FE, 8 Oct 50.
13
all forces in the amphibious assault until (1) Rpt, ROK and U.N. Ground Forces Strength
in Korea, 31 July 1950-31 July 1953, DA COA, 7 Oct
54. (2) Appleman, South to the Naktong, North
11
GHQ, UNC Opns Order No. 2, 2 Oct 50. to the Yalu, p. 605.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 197
Military Signs
Military indications of Chinese plans
to invade North Korea were hard to
come by. MacArthur on 29 June 1950
had been warned to stay well clear of
Manchurian and Soviet borders. This
order forced him to rely almost entirely
CHOU EN-LAI upon outside sources for information on
the strength and disposition of the
Because earlier threats had not ma- Chinese Communist forces in Manchuria.
terialized, and because of the assumption Using these sources, General Willoughby,
that the Chinese, if they really were seri- MacArthur's intelligence chief, reported
ous, would not give away their inten- on 3 July that the Chinese had stationed
tions, Chou's warning caused no change two cavalry divisions and four armies in
in MacArthur's orders. The fact that Manchuria. A Chinese army normally
the message came from Pannikar also possessed about 30,000 men but this
21
raised doubts that the warning was genu- figure varied.
ine. For Pannikar had shown distinct Other reports, often conflicting and of
Communist leanings and anti-American doubtful credence, told of troops of Ko-
feelings in the past. Only a few days rean ancestry being sent into North
earlier, moreover, when the United Korea by the Chinese. Throughout July
States asked India to advise Communist and August 1950, the Department of the
China that it would be in the latter's best Army received a mass of second- and
18
interest not to interfere in Korea, Pan- 19
nikar reported that China did not intend Memo, G-2 DA for DCofS for Plans, DA, 25 Sep
50, sub: Chinese Communist Attitude Toward Ko-
rean Hostilities, in CofS, DA file 000.1, Case 1.
18 20
Since the United States did not recognize the Truman, Memoirs, II, 362.
21
Peiping government, it did not deal directly with MS, Col Bruce W. Bidwell, History of the War
the Communist Chinese. Department Intelligence Division, Part VII, ch. V.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 199
third-hand reports that more Chinese agencies, particularly those allied with
troops were moving from south China the Chinese Nationalist Government on
to Manchuria. Willoughby estimated Formosa and others operating out of
by the end of August that the Chinese Hong Kong, relayed reports of Chinese
had moved nine armies totaling 246,000 Communist military movements.
men to Manchuria.22 Although there were no definite mili-
Indications that the Chinese Commu- tary indications after Inch'on that the
nists possibly intended to enter the fight- Chinese meant to enter the fighting in
ing continued to be reported to the Korea, General Willoughby speculated
Department of the Army by the G-2 Sec- that 450,000 Chinese troops were massed
tion of the Far East Command. In daily in Manchuria. The nation's planners
teleconferences between officers at the had given full consideration to Chinese
Department of the Army and MacAr- strength and the possibility of its employ-
thur's headquarters in Tokyo, General ment in Korea when they drew up their
Willoughby, or his officers, relayed the blueprint for national policy in Septem-
latest information of Communist Chinese ber.23 While the primary concern of
military activities. Each day, also, the these authorities continued to be the
United Nation Command's Daily Intelli- possibility of intervention by the USSR,
gence Summary (DIS) went to the De- much attention had also been given to
partment of the Army by courier, arriving whether or not Chinese forces would
several days later in Washington. This come into Korea, and if so, what course
summary carried all reports received should be followed by the United Na-
from intelligence sources on the Chinese tions Command. On 27 September, the
Communists and made an effort to evalu- Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General
ate these reports. At the top intelligence MacArthur to make a special effort to
level, the Central Intelligence Agency determine if the Chinese intended enter-
combined reports from its own sources ing the war.24 On the next day, General
with those of the United Nations Com- MacArthur assured them that there was
mand and then analyzed the actions and no present indication of the entry into
intentions of the Chinese for high-level North Korea by Chinese Communist
governmental agencies. forces.25
To determine through outward mani- On the day of Chou's warning, 3 Octo-
festations alone whether the Chinese ber, the UNC intelligence staff reported
intended to intervene was virtually im- some evidence that twenty Chinese Com-
possible. But by using such indications munist divisions were in North Korea
as movements of troops and supplies, and had been there since 10 September.
American intelligence agencies could They also commented on the reported
gauge this intention with some hope of warning from the Chinese Foreign Min-
accuracy. Penetration of Communist ister and other recent public statements
China to ascertain these movements was that "Even though the utterances . . .
an almost impossible task. But certain 23
DIS, GHQ, FEC, 2934, 21 Sep 50.
24
Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCFE, 27 Sep 50.
25
22
Ibid. Rad, C 64805, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Sep 50.
200 POLICY AND DIRECTION
are a form of propaganda they cannot be into Korea in early October were dis-
fully ignored since they emit from pre- counted by the Far East Command in-
sumably responsible leaders in the Chi- telligence officers since "no conclusive
nese and North Korean Communist evidence" existed; and the recent Chi-
Governments. The enemy retains a nese threat to enter North Korea if
potential of reinforcement by CCF American forces crossed the 38th Parallel
troops." 26 was characterized as "probably in a cate-
On 5 October, noting the purported gory of diplomatic blackmail." 28
entry into North Korea of nine Chinese Nevertheless, the possibility that the
divisions, GHQ intelligence officers ob- Chinese Communists might actually in-
served that recent reports were taking on tervene caused President Truman to di-
a "sinister connotation" and concluded rect the Joint Chiefs of Staff to give
that the potential "exists for Chinese General MacArthur instructions cover-
Communist forces to openly intervene in ing such an eventuality. On 9 October,
the Korean War if United Nations forces the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed Mac-
cross the 38th Parallel." 27 General Wil- Arthur that ". . . in the event of the
loughby told Washington officials that open or covert employment anywhere in
the USSR "would find it both convenient Korea of major Chinese Communist
and economical to stay out of the con- units, without prior announcement, you
flict and let the idle millions of Com- should continue the action as long as, in
munist China perform the task as part your judgment, action by forces now un-
of the master plan to drain United States der your control offers a reasonable
resources into geographical rat holes of chance of success. In any case you will
the Orient." He informed them that a obtain authorization from Washington
build-up of Chinese forces along the Ko- prior to taking any military action
29
rean-Manchurian border had been re- against objectives in Chinese territory."
ported by many of his sources and that One day earlier, the delicate balance
"while exaggerations and canards are al- of international relations received a sub-
ways evident, the potential of massing at stantial jolt when two of MacArthur's jet
the Antung and other Manchurian cross-
ings appears conclusive." According to 28
(1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, Nos. 2951, 2952, 2957, 8, 9,
his computations, between nine and 14 Oct 50. (2) The Indian Ambassador to China
asserts that on 9 October, Ernest Bevin, U.K. Foreign
eighteen of the thirty-eight Chinese di- Minister, sent him a message to be transmitted to
visions believed to be in Manchuria were Chou En-lai personally and which was ". . . friendly
massing at the border crossings. Yet, in tone and contained vague assurances . . . that
the Korean Commission would give the Chinese
MacArthur's intelligence chief did not, views their most careful consideration." Dr. Pan-
as far as is known, attempt to dissuade nikar sent along this message which, in his view-
General MacArthur from crossing the point, added insult to injury since the Korean
Commission consisted of such countries as the Philip-
parallel. Moreover, continuing reports pines and Siam. "In any case," Pannikar notes,
of Chinese Communist troops crossing "Bevin's approach was too late, for the Chinese
armies were already in Korea." See Pannikar, In
26
DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2946, 3 Oct, and 2947, 4 Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 111-12.
29
Oct 50. (1) Rad, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Oct 50. (2) Tru-
27
DIS, GHQ, UNC, 2948, 5 Oct 50. man, Memoirs, II, 362.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 201
Also on 9 October, basing his action forces under your command, in whatever
on the new U.N. Security Council reso- part of Korea situated, to lay down your
lution, General MacArthur made a sec- arms and cease hostilities." He assured
ond attempt to persuade the North the enemy that the people of North Ko-
Koreans to surrender. "In order that the rea would be treated fairly and that the
decisions of the United Nations may be United Nations would rehabilitate their
carried out with a minimum of further devastated country as part of a unified
loss of life and destruction of property," Korea. But he warned that unless he
he told enemy leaders by radio, "I, as the got an immediate agreement from the
United Nations Commander-in-Chief, North Korean Government, "I shall at
for the last time call upon you and the once proceed to take such military ac-
204 POLICY AND DIRECTION
U.S. TROOPS pass supply wagons abandoned by the North Koreans in their haste
to escape from P'yongyang.
tions as may be necessary to enforce the fighting awaited on the road to P'yong-
decrees of the United Nations." 34 yang. ROK intelligence agents described
Kim Il Sung, the North Korean Pre- extensive North Korean fortifications
mier, rejected this demand out of hand. and other defensive preparations, includ-
He knew that, even as MacArthur's mes- ing the moving up of new units of fresh
sage reached him, Walker's divisions in troops who had not fought in South
the west were entering North Korea Korea.35
while in the east the ROK I Corps was In the U.S. I Corps zone, patrols from
fast approaching Wonsan. the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division crossed the
Information on North Korean activi- 38th Parallel on 7 and 8 October; and on
ties north of the parallel had already 9 October, the full division struck across
convinced the Eighth Army that hard the boundary north of Kaesong. The
34 35
Radio Broadcast, CINCUNC to CINC NKPA, EUSAK PIR Nos. 82, 89, and 90, dated 2, 9, and
9 Oct 50. 10 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 205
British 27th Brigade, the ROK 1st Divi- got the confirmation on the way to you
sion, and the U.S. 24th Division also took by wire regarding those elements you
part in the drive. The attackers encoun- mentioned. They are to be considered
tered prolonged and fierce resistance at as members of the team and working
Kumch'on, but on 14 October they seized with the team in whatever area they may
37
that battered town and by 16 October be employed."
the enemy front lines ceased to exist. ROK units on 11 October captured
American, British, and ROK troops then Wonsan, the objective area for the pend-
raced toward P'yongyang. (Map III) ing X Corps assault. General Walker
The progress of the two divisions of flew into the city on the day of its cap-
the ROK I Corps along the east coast of ture. He was so impressed by the ROK's
Korea was even faster, and at times spec- successes that he tacitly established his
tacular. Although enemy resistance ap- own plan for cutting a line across Korea
pears to have been lighter in the area, from P'yongyang to Wonsan. By taking
the ROK advance nevertheless reflected Wonsan before X Corps arrived the
a creditable offensive spirit. 36 The speed ROK units had changed considerably the
with which these South Korean soldiers tactical picture existing at the time of
pursued their adversaries up the penin- the issuance of Operations Order No. 2,
sula made inevitable the bypassing of nine days before. The ROK forces
comparatively large numbers of enemy seemed to be in a position to carry out
troops in the east coast mountains. the original mission assigned to X Corps,
These troops later turned to guerrilla advancing along the Wonsan-P'yongyang
warfare and proved an annoying, even axis to link up with other Eighth Army
dangerous, thorn in the side of U.N. forces and sealing off Korea to that line.
forces. The success scored by the ROK I Corps
Because General Walker was not sure and mounting evidence of landing prob-
of how much control he held over ROK lems at Wonsan had already caused Gen-
units, General Allen, when he talked to eral MacArthur to think of changing the
General Hickey on 7 October, had asked employment of X Corps. He had di-
for guidance. Referring to the attack rected his planners to modify plans for
order from GHQ, Allen said, "In the Almond's landing and to prepare for a
order you notice, there is a line up be- possible landing by the Marines at Hung-
yond which certain people [ROK] go. nam instead of Wonsan. The 7th Divi-
. . . Is KMAG under our control and sion would land administratively a few
logistic support? We would like to know miles north of Wonsan, then strike out
if we can organize the ROK Army it- overland for P'yongyang. The Marines,
self." Hickey was not able to provide an in the meantime, from their base at
immediate answer, but called Allen back Hungnam would head toward P'yong-
fifteen minutes later saying, "Red, I've yang also. On 8 October, General
Wright presented General MacArthur
36
General MacArthur paid tribute to the ROK with such a plan. This plan pointed
forces engaged in this operation by stating that
37
"In . . . the exploitive pursuit they are unequaled." Telecon, Gen Hickey and Gen Allen, 1115, 7
See MacArthur Hearings, p. 4. Oct 50, and 1130, 7 Oct 50.
206 POLICY AND DIRECTION
out that the Hungnam area was a feasi- be swept clear of GF mines as soon as
39
ble location for an amphibious assault possible.
operation. After reviewing the plan, General MacArthur had no intention
General MacArthur called in Admiral of leaving X Corps out of the operations.
Joy, pointed out that ROK units were He made this very clear to Walker, re-
even then approaching Wonsan, and told moving any delusions that Eighth Army
him that he was considering this alterna- was going to expand its mission. "Won-
tive method of landing. Joy strongly san port facilities will be secured and
opposed the change. He pointed to the utilized for operations of X Corps in
great disadvantages of splitting the two accordance with the United Nations
forces, the lack of time for detailed naval Command Operations Order No. 2," he
planning, and the impracticability of instructed General Walker. He told him
clearing both Wonsan and Hungnam that the Navy would continue its sweep-
harbors of mines in the short time left ing operations to remove mines from
before the landing was to take place. Wonsan Harbor and would maintain its
General MacArthur accepted Joy's views, gunfire and air support of ROK divi-
gave up the idea of changing landing sions. But no additional LST's for carry-
places, and on 10 October ordered all ing supplies to the ROK troops could
major commanders to carry out the orig- be furnished until after X Corps troops
inal plan as scheduled.38 had landed. MacArthur also told Walker
General Walker, on the next day, re- that the Eighth Army would lose the
ported to General MacArthur, "The I ROK forces in the Wonsan area when
ROK Corps has entered Wonsan and is X Corps came in. "I now plan to place
now mopping up enemy resistance. The X Corps in operational control of I ROK
II ROK Corps [is] advancing north on Corps. . . ." 4 0
the Wonsan area from the vicinity of
Chorwon-Kumhwa-Kumsong." Then,
apparently believing that this welcome The X Corps Prepares
news gave him sufficient license, General At the close of September, at X Corps
Walker announced some plans of his headquarters in Ascom City near Inch'on,
own: General Almond briefed his division
commanders and principal staff officers
In order to support the planned operations
of the ROK Army in securing the Wonsan on the coming amphibious operation.
area and advance to the west to Pyongyang General Smith, commanding the 1st Ma-
in conjunction with the advance of the rine Division, viewed the plan skepti-
U.S. I Corps from the south and southeast, cally, especially the concept of marching
it is vital to provide for the supply of five westward across the peninsula to contact
divisions of the ROK Army through the
port of Wonsan. Request that the harbor Eighth Army. "It involved a movement
39
(1) War Diary X Corps 8 Oct 50, Wonsan-Iwon
38
Karig, Battle Report, The War in Korea, ch. 25, Landings. (2) Rad, GX 25744, CG EUSAK to
pp. 301-02. (2) Rad, C 55002, CINCFE to All CINCFE, 11 Oct 50.
40
Cindrs, 10 Oct 50. (3) Opn Plan CINCFE 9-50 Rad, CX 66169, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army,
(Alternate). 11 Oct 50.
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 207
of 125 miles across the rugged central was responsible for supplying the X
mountain chain of Korea," he wrote Corps without having any control over
later. "There were many defiles and the corps' operations. This arrangement
many stretches of the road were one-way. added confusion and misunderstanding
The Eighth Army in its rapid drive to an already unusual relationship
north from the Pusan Perimeter had by- between the two major commands. Mac-
passed thousands of North Korean troops. Arthur may have felt that Almond's ex-
These enemy troops had faded into the tremely tight time schedule in preparing
central mountains and were making for the amphibious move, the general
their way north to a sanctuary some- dislocation of Almond's forces during the
where in North Korea. In a drive across transfer of divisions, and the weaknesses
the central mountain range, the protec- inherent in corps logistical facilities as
tion of the MSR would present a serious compared to an army, justified saddling
problem, as the drift of the North Ko- Walker with this additional responsibil-
reans would be across the MSR." The ity. Too, there was reason to believe
matter was not for Smith to decide, how- that the Wonsan operation would be
ever, and the division officers began plan- completed within a matter of weeks,
ning for the new operation at once.41 thus rendering Walker's obligation a
The 1st Marine Division, scheduled temporary measure of short duration.
to assault the Wonsan beaches, began Colonel Smith, X Corps G-4, had de-
assembling in the Inch'on area on 4 Octo- cided views on the effect of MacArthur's
ber. By 7 October, the division and a decision to make Eighth Army responsi-
regiment of South Korean marines ble for X Corps supply. "The prepara-
moved into staging areas at Inch'on and tion for the East Coast landing," Smith
on 9 October began boarding ship for the commented:
830-mile sea voyage to Wonsan.
was further complicated from a logistic
The other major component of the X viewpoint by action taken by GHQ to revise
Corps, the U.S. 7th Division, started channels during the out-loading so that the
moving south to Pusan by road and rail Eighth Army became responsible for logis-
on 5 October. Several times during the tic support of the Corps instead of Corps
long trip, groups of bypassed enemy sol- dealing directly with logistical agencies in
Japan. Through direct contact of X Corps
diers attacked the column, but were staff with JLCOM [Japan Logistical Com-
beaten off. The leading regiment of the mand] Agencies, detailed supply plans had
7th Division reached Pusan on 10 Octo- been completed. . . . The introduction of
ber. By the 12th, all units were in their Eighth Army into channels interrupted
Pusan assembly areas; and on 16 and 17 these arrangements at a critical time.
Although Eighth Army made every effort
October, the division boarded ship. to assist the Corps in out-loading in con-
By General MacArthur's direction, formance with the plan, the loss of direct
the Eighth Army was responsible for the contact with JLCOM resulted in resupply
logistical support of all United Nations difficulties during the unloading phases.
forces in Korea. Thus, General Walker Rations arrived on large ships, bulk loaded.
In order to assemble logical menus for issue
41
to troops, almost the entire ship had to be
General Smith's Chronicles, p. 371. unloaded before a balanced meal could be
208 POLICY AND DIRECTION
(2) Rad, CX 67066, CINCFE to DA, 21 Oct 50. duties at the earliest moment consistent
(3) Comd and Hist Rpt, NAVFE, Sep-Nov 50. with the fulfillment of our obligations as a
THE INVASION OF NORTH KOREA 211
member of the United Nations. Naturally, the Army Pace as his military advisers.51
I shall take advantage of this opportunity In addition to his two military experts,
to discuss with General MacArthur other
50
matters within his responsibility. 51
For the details of the Wake Island Conference,
the author has relied upon a compilation of notes
President Truman had intended to by General Bradley. These notes, which were kept
take all of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with by the Washington conferees, were augmented by
him. But after being advised of the shorthand recordings taken by a secretary who lis-
tened to the meeting from an adjacent room. Gen-
danger of taking them all from Wash- eral MacArthur later objected that he had no
ington under conditions then existing in knowledge that a verbatim transcript was being
Korea and in other potential trouble taken, or that, indeed, any record of the conference
was kept. General Bradley states that five copies of
spots, the President took only the chair- this material were forwarded to General MacArthur
man, General Bradley, and Secretary of on 19 October 1950 and that one of General Mac-
Arthur's aides signed for them on 27 October 1950.
50
Rad, 101910Z, DA to SCAP, 11 Oct 50. According to his own testimony, General MacArthur
212 POLICY AND DIRECTION
mander replied, "Very little." He felt U.N. air bases in Korea, "if the Chinese
that the Red Chinese had lost their tried to get down to Pyongyang there
chance to intervene effectively. He would be the greatest slaughter." This
credited the Chinese with having 300,000 broad assurance from MacArthur must
men in Manchuria, with between have done much to allay any fears enter-
100,000-125,000 men along the Yalu, tained by Mr. Truman and the other
and estimated that 50,000-60,000 could top authorities that China meant to
be brought across the Yalu. But the intervene.52
Chinese had no air force, according to 52
See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to
General MacArthur; hence, in view of the Yalu, pp. 760-61.
CHAPTER XII
Signs of Victory
1 2
Rad, C 66549, CINCFE to CG Army Eight, 16 Rad, C 66553, CINCFE to COMNAVFE and CG
Oct 50. X Corps, 15 Oct 50.
216 POLICY AND DIRECTION
tactical air support to the airborne troops day, sending the 187th Airborne into
throughout the operation.3 the Sukch'on-Sunch'on area in the first
On 17 October, as Walker's troops ap- airdrop of the Korean campaign on 20
proached P'yongyang, MacArthur issued October. The Eighth Army assumed
new orders designed to wring every ad- operational control of the 187th RCT
vantage out of the favorable battlefield after it hit the ground.
situation. He set up a boundary be- From his own plane, General Mac-
tween the Eighth Army and the X Corps Arthur, accompanied by Generals Strate-
to become effective on his further order. meyer, Wright, and Whitney, watched
MacArthur wanted the Eighth Army to the parachute troops land and assemble.
advance on the left of the new boundary He then flew to P'yongyang, where he
to the general line Sonch'on-Chongs- commented to reporters that the air-
anjangsi-Koin-dong-Pyongwon. The X borne landings seemed to have com-
Corps would advance to the eastern pletely surprised the North Koreans and
extension of this line, Toksil-li-Pungsan- that "This closes the trap on the enemy."
4
Songjin. For this general advance, Mac- When he returned to Tokyo on 21
Arthur removed the restrictions against October, he predicted that "the war is
using any but ROK forces north of the very definitely coming to an end
line Ch'ongju-Kunu-ri-Yongwon-Ham- shortly." 6
hung. But he directed that only ROK On the east coast, General Almond
troops would operate north of the new went ashore at Wonsan by helicopter on
objective line. His new concept, of 19 October to take charge of the ROK
course, also canceled his previous plan to I Corps which was still moving rapidly
cross and seal off the peninsula between to the north. By that date, the 1st
P'yongyang and Wonsan. For the new Marine Air Wing had been flying out
objective line ranged from 80 to 130 of Wonsan Airfield for five days; and
miles north of the P'yongyang-Wonsan shore parties, engineers, and advance
road and approached within 40 miles of billeting parties were in Wonsan pre-
the Manchurian border.5 paring for the landing of the 1st Marine
7
P'yongyang fell on 19 October, where- Division.
upon MacArthur started the all-out drive Although to Admiral Struble, com-
toward the new objective line. He mander of the Seventh Fleet, Almond
stepped up the airborne operation by one expressed unhappiness over the delayed
landing of his remaining forces, Struble
3
(1) UNC Opn Order No. 3, 16 Oct 50. (2) Rad, would not authorize a landing until he,
CX 66591, CINCUNC to All Comds, 16 Oct 50.
4
The new boundary ran westward along the 39th himself, was satisfied with mine clearance
Parallel from the Sea of Japan to a point at 126 operations. Hence, transports arriving
degrees 45 minutes east longitude, then generally to
the north and northeast through Sinup at 39 de-
6
grees, 28 minutes north, 127 degrees, 8 minutes east, (1) Pacific Stars and Stripes, October 21, 1950,
and Changjin at 40 degrees, 54 minutes north and p. 1, col. 6. (2) New York Times, October 21, 1950,
127 degrees, 10 minutes east, to Huch'ang at 41 p. 1, col. 8, Parrott dispatch; also p. 3, col. 1 and
degrees, 24 minutes north and 127 degrees, 4 minutes p. 16, col. 2. (3) EUSAK War Diary, 22 Oct 50,
east. Daily News Bulletin.
5 7
UNC Opns Order No. 4, 17 Oct 50. General Smith's Chronicles, pp. 404-10.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 217
off Wonsan with the 1st Marine Division south of Wonsan, to relieve ROK
on 20 October steamed back and forth soldiers guarding a supply dump there.
outside the harbor, a maneuver that the Since Japanese and ROK LST's had
Marines promptly dubbed "Operation put into Kojo even though the adjacent
Yo-yo." Meanwhile, the 7th Division waters had not been swept, Almond felt
remained idly afloat in Pusan Harbor that Navy LST's could do the same. But
awaiting word to proceed to the objective Admiral Doyle did not consider a Kojo
area. landing urgent enough to justify jeop-
General Almond did not easily give ardizing the troops and ships.
up his efforts to get Marines ashore be- On 22 October, Admiral Doyle esti-
fore the minefields were completely mated that the Wonsan landing would
cleared. On 21 October, he asked that a not be feasible for another two or three
battalion of the 1st Marine Division be days. A longer delay appeared possible
landed at Kojo, about thirty-nine miles on 23 October when a new row of mag-
218 POLICY AND DIRECTION
netic mines was encountered. But on MacArthur defended his action with
the 24th, the results of sweeping opera- characteristic vigor. He held that his
tions indicated that the magnetic mines order had been prompted by military
were about cleared out, and that the necessity since his ROK forces had
troop landings could therefore soon be neither sufficient strength nor enough
made. skilled leadership to take and hold the
border areas of North Korea. As to the
Another Change legality of his decision, MacArthur
On the same date, General MacArthur pointed out that the Joint Chiefs had
in an extraordinary order commanded told him that the directive of 27 Septem-
Walker and Almond to drive forward ber was not final, that it might require
with all possible speed using all forces at modification in accordance with develop-
their command. The objective line he ments. For additional justification, Gen-
had set up only a week before was merely eral MacArthur emphasized that the
to be an initial objective; and the restric- Joint Chiefs had not actually banned
tion he had placed on using other than the use of other than ROK forces but
ROK forces was removed since, as he re- had merely stated that it should not be
minded his commanders, the prohibition done as a matter of policy. Finally, in
had been established only in view of a his mind, the instructions from the Sec-
possible enemy surrender.8 retary of Defense on 30 September,
This order conflicted with the in- which had assured him, "We want you
structions the Joint Chiefs of Staff had to feel unhampered tactically and stra-
sent MacArthur on 27 September tegically to proceed north of the par-
wherein they had told him that "as a allel," had certainly modified any prior
matter of policy no non-Korean ground instructions from the Joint Chiefs and
forces will be used in the northeast he had proceeded to issue his orders on
province bordering the Soviet Union or that basis. He made no move to placate
in the area along the Manchurian bor- his superiors. While he assured them
der." The Joint Chiefs, upon learning that he understood their concern, he
of MacArthur's new order, objected in also hinted of dire developments if he
the form of an inquiry. "While the took any other course and clinched his
Joint Chiefs of Staff realize," they told argument by claiming that "This entire
him, "that you undoubtedly had sound
subject was covered in my conference at
reasons for issuing these instructions they
Wake Island." 10 Thereafter, the Joint
would like to be informed of them, as
Chiefs allowed General MacArthur's
your action is a matter of some concern
here."9 order to stand.
8
Rad, CX 67291, CINCUNC to All Comdrs, 24
Oct 50.
9 10
(1) Rad, JCS 94933, JCS (Personal) for Mac- Rad, C 67397, CINCFE for JCS, 25 Oct 50.
Arthur, 24 Oct 50. (2) General Collins later pointed None of the other persons attending the conference
to this instance as an example of violation of orders on 15 October recorded any mention of the use of
by the U.N. commander in MacArthur Hearings, non-ROK soldiers along the Manchurian and Soviet
pp. 1240, 1301-02. borders.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 219
11
(1) X Corps WD, Oct 50. (2) General Smith's
12
Chronicles, pp. 404-10. Rad, W 93721, DA to CINCFE, 10 Oct 50.
220 POLICY AND DIRECTION
wide elections had been held under the committee's action might have a bad
jurisdiction of the United Nations.13 effect on U.N.-ROK relations. "I have,"
Neither the United States nor the he told Mr. Truman, "been shaking in
United Nations intended that Rhee's my boots ever since I saw the United
government should automatically assume Nations resolution which would treat
control of liberated areas of North Korea. them [South Koreans] exactly on the
General MacArthur had been so advised same basis as the North Koreans." Presi-
by the Joint Chiefs on 27 September dent Truman sided with MacArthur and
when they had told him, "political ques- stated that the United States would con-
tions such as the formal extension of tinue to support the ROK Government.
sovereignty [ROK sovereignty] over But the President announced no de-
North Korea should await action by the cision to place the Rhee government in
United Nations to complete unification control of captured North Korean
of the country." On 9 October, he was territory.16
reminded that the authority of the Re- When President Rhee learned of the
public of Korea over North Korea had U.N. resolution, he protested hotly to
not been recognized and that as United General MacArthur. Never temperate in
Nations commander he would not his approach to the unification of Korea,
recognize any such authority. 14 the veteran statesman accused the U.N.
A fuller explanation of this potentially committee of reviving and protecting
explosive issue came on 12 October when communism by its resolution, and as-
the Interim Committee of the General serted that his government was "taking
Assembly of the United Nations for- over the civilian administration when-
mally resolved that the United Nations ever hostilities cease." MacArthur
recognize no government as having "legal passed Rhee's protest along to President
17
and effective control" over all of Korea. Truman.
The committee asked that the unified The President attributed Rhee's re-
command (U.S. Government) assume action to an incomplete understanding
provisionally all responsibilities for the of the U.N. committee's resolution. The
government and civil administration of American Government continued to sup-
all parts of North Korea coming under port the U.N. position that the jurisdic-
control of the U.N. forces "pending tion of the Republic of Korea did not
consideration by the United Nations automatically extend over North Korea
Commission for the Unification and Re- and that the U.N. commission would
habilitation of Korea of the administra- arrange for elections and other con-
tion of these territories." 15 stituent acts required to unify the
At the Wake Island Conference, Gen- country. 18 On 29 October, this policy
eral MacArthur had expressed fears that 16
Substance of Statements, Wake Island Confer-
ence, 15 Oct 50.
13 17
Ibid. Rad, CX 66554, CINCFE to CG USARPAC,
14
(1) Rad, JCS 92801, JCS to CINCFE (Personal) MacArthur (Personal) for Truman, 16 Oct 50.
18
for MacArthur, 27 Sep 50. (2) Rad, WAR 93721, (1) Rad, JCS 94710, JCS to CINCFE, transmit-
DA to CINCFE, 9 Oct 50. ting message from President Truman, 20 Oct 50.
15
Rad, W 94093, DA to CINCFE, 12 Oct 50. (2) Rad, WAR 94472, DA to CINCUNC, 18 Oct 50.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 221
use of funds than over the question of withdrawn from Korea. The plan as-
whether the Army had violated a princi- sumed that the fighting would end in
ple and usurped authority rightfully be- the destruction of organized enemy
longing to the Congress. He directed forces, but that North Korean guerrillas
a careful and thorough re-examination would still resist in the mountains. The
of all Army programs under the assump- plan also assumed that neither Soviet
tion that the United States require- nor Chinese Communist forces would
ments in Korea would be much less than intervene. 24
originally contemplated.23 General MacArthur, as Commander in
Chief, United Nations Command, would
Signs of Retrenchment carry out such missions and functions as
became necessary to bring things to a
Throughout October, optimism grew
satisfactory conclusion in Korea. The
that the fighting would soon end. Con-
X Corps was named to stay in Korea for
sequently, the Department of the Army's
occupation duty. It would have one
planners began to anticipate a need to
American division, plus all other U.N.
curtail much of the support developed
units in Korea, ROK Army units, and
for Korea. The efforts of responsible
KMAG. The U.N. units would be with-
officials had started a dynamic flow of
drawn progressively, with European
men and matériel to the Far East Com-
units leaving first. Insofar as possible,
mand which, if allowed to continue at
no forces other than ROK would be
its current rate after the fighting stopped,
stationed in South Korea.
would flood that theater with unneeded
The Eighth Army headquarters, along
forces and supplies. Millions of dollars
with its original four American divisions,
would be wasted because of poor storage
would return to Japan; and the 5th RCT
facilities in Japan and Korea and the
would go back to Hawaii. Within
great cost of returning men and supplies
Japan, after the return of the Eighth
to the United States.
Army, the Northern and Southwestern
General MacArthur, after returning
Commands would be dissolved and their
from Wake Island, ordered the JSPOG
functions assumed by the Eighth Army.
staff to prepare detailed plans for the
The Japan Logistical Command would
withdrawal of forces from Korea and for
be retained to perform all army logistic
keeping certain units as occupation
functions in Japan. 25
troops. He based his instructions on
agreements and understandings that he 24
On the day the plan was issued, the GHQ Daily
felt had been reached on this general Intelligence Summary carried what it termed a "re-
topic at Wake Island. On 20 October, liable report" that 400,000 Chinese Communist sol-
diers were in border-crossing areas, alerted to cross
JSPOG issued CINCFE Operations Plan into North Korea. To detect any such crossings, the
No. 202 outlining procedures to be fol- U.N. Command ordered daily air reconnaissance
lowed after combat operations had dwin- flights over the border area.
25
(1)CINCFE Opn Plan No. 202, 20 Oct 50,
dled, so that some U.N. forces could be in JSPOG, GHQ, UNC files. (2) General Smith, the
Marine division commander, gives some hint of the
23
Min, Army Policy Council, 2 Oct 50 and 5 Oct effect of this planning and what he calls the "end
50, in CofS DA file 334 APC. of the war atmosphere." He recalls, "On 21 October
SIGNS OF VICTORY 223
This plan had scarcely reached the from him. He explained his under-
interested staff members of General Mac- standing of the arrangements agreed
Arthur's headquarters when word from upon at Wake Island, saying he was
Washington disrupted its entire concept. ". . . under the impression that this pro-
On 21 October, the Joint Chiefs of Staff posal had received approval of all con-
told General MacArthur that demands cerned. I resubmit it at this time for
for American troops in other parts of the your consideration." 27
world were forcing them to withdraw the The Joint Chiefs of Staff had not
2d and 3d U.S. Divisions from the Far hastily reached their decision to take
East Command as soon as possible after both divisions. The American force in
fighting ended in Korea. Consequently, western Europe badly needed strength-
the forces to guard Japan and also to ening; and on the basis of estimates from
occupy Korea would have to come from General MacArthur and other sources,
the four divisions originally based in they had concluded that the Far East
Japan.26 Command would soon revert to its pre-
MacArthur had left Wake Island un- Korean War status. Since their planning
der the impression that the 3d Division was global and took in the needs of the
would be kept in Korea as part of the American defense system as a whole,
occupation force. For General Bradley they undoubtedly felt that their decision
had asked only that one division, either should not be unduly influenced by the
the 2d or 3d, be made available for opinions of a theater commander who
Europe by January 1951, and MacArthur was understandably biased in favor of
had recommended the 2d. He therefore his own needs. On the other hand, the
objected when he learned that the Joint Korean fighting had not yet ceased and
Chiefs planned to take both divisions the Far East Command was still on a
I received a dispatch from COMNAVFE stating
wartime basis. So they made no final
that upon the conclusion of hostilities it was the in- decision for the moment.
tention to recommend to CINCFE that the 1st When General Bolté went to the Far
Marine Division, less one RCT, be returned to the East in late October, he discussed the
United States. The RCT not returned to the United
States would be billeted at Otsu, Japan. I was re- matter with General MacArthur. He
quested to comment. On 24 October, we learned that sent a full report of these talks to Gen-
X Corps had received a document, for planning pur-
poses only, to the effect that the present Corps com-
eral Collins, sketching the current status
mander would become Commander of the Occupa- of the 3d Division and recommending
tion Forces. One American division, probably the that the Joint Chiefs modify their pre-
3d Infantry Division, would remain in Korea as part
of the Occupation Forces. Under this plan the
vious decision slightly. General Mac-
Eighth Army would return to Japan. The receipt Arthur had ordered the 3d Division to
of information such as that cited above could not embark for Korea from Japan on 9
help but spread the impression that the war was
about over. There was a noticeable let-down. How-
November to operate initially in the
ever, it was only a matter of days until the opera- southern sector of North Korea and later
tions at Kojo brought home to us forcefully the fact to serve as the only U.S. occupation di-
that the war was not over. Talk of redeployment
was never heard again." See General Smith's Chroni- vision. "When I departed Washington,"
cles, p. 403.
26 27
Rad, JCS 94651, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50. Rad, C 67065, CINCFE to JCS, 21 Oct 50.
224 POLICY AND DIRECTION
General Bolté recalled, "the final dis- reserve corps personnel presently scheduled
position of the 3d Division was unre- for October and November except 17,000
solved." MacArthur had apparently NCO grades.
raised some very convincing arguments, Normal rotation of foreign service tours
30
for Bolté told General Collins, "From would resume in January 1951.
what I have learned here regarding the Some of the other nations committed
many administrative and organizational to support the United Nations in Korea
problems in reconstituting the FECOM read the handwriting on the wall and
balanced force coupled with the require- found it encouraging. The United
ment for a division now to accomplish Kingdom had offered the 29th Infantry
operational tasks in North Korea, I Brigade for service in Korea and its first
recommend that FECOM be authorized echelon had sailed from England on 4
to retain the 3d Division until elections October. The heartening news from
in North Korea are held but not later Korea led the British General Staff to
than 1 May 1951." He concluded by conclude that requirements had dimin-
pointing out that if later required in ished and that some remaining elements
western Europe, the 3d Division could of the 29th Infantry Brigade need not
be placed in an effective status of train- be sent. They proposed to withdraw the
ing and combat readiness as rapidly in armored regiment, the 8th Hussars, from
the Far East Command as elsewhere.28 the brigade since "the possibility of
The Joint Chiefs, probably on the basis future battles in Korea in which heavy
of General Bolté's recommendation, sus- armor will be required seems remote"
pended the provisions previously set up and "in the event of a general war the
for the 2d and 3d Divisions, but notified 8th Hussars would be required else-
General MacArthur to be ready to move where." But General Bolté objected.
the 3d Division from the theater within He considered the future course of the
sixty days of receipt of orders. The 3d war in Korea, for the moment and for
Division could be kept in the theater some time to come, too uncertain, at least
29
until 1 May 1951. until all of North Korea was cleared of
In the same vein, Washington pro- enemy and the intentions of the USSR
posed a cutback of personnel support to and the Chinese Communists could be
General MacArthur. He was told on determined. Too, the probability of a
25 October: general war in the near future was not
great enough to justify withholding
Reduction of the scale of operations in 31
Korea compels immediate reconsideration forces from the Korean effort.
of the number of service enlisted fillers and General Collins took the matter up
replacements previously scheduled for ship- informally with the other Joint Chiefs
ment to FECOM. To reduce this number on 4 October and was instructed to ad-
to the minimum, Department of the Army vise the British representative in Wash-
proposes to cancel shipment of enlisted
ington that the United States felt the
28 30
Rad, C 677985, Bolté (Personal) for Collins, Rad, S 94985, DA to CINCFE, 25 Oct 50.
1Nov
29
50. 31
Memo, G-3 (Bolté) for CofS (Gruenther), 4
Rad, W 95625, DA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50. Oct 50, in CofS DA file CX 370, Item 21.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 225
fighting in Korea was far from over and By late October, troops of five nations,
that if the British engaged the enemy, totaling about 9,000 men and officers,
General MacArthur had no surplus tanks were serving alongside U.S. and ROK
available for supporting them. The troops in Korea. Two British units, the
British Government pursued the topic 2-battalion infantry brigade from Hong
no further and the 8th Hussars Kong and a marine commando unit, and
accompanied the 29th Brigade to a 5,000-man Turkish infantry brigade
Korea.32 were already in Korea. Additional U.N.
Canada during this period also pro- units, totaling 27,000 men, were either
posed to cancel the shipment of a special en route to the battlefront or preparing
fighting force which had been slated for for departure from their home countries;
Korea. This proposal, together with the and infantry brigades from Great Britain,
earlier suggestion from the British Gov-
Canada, and Greece, infantry battalions
ernment, brought the need for a policy
from Belgium, the Netherlands, France,
on continuing United Nations support
Australia, and Thailand, and an artillery
into sharp focus. General Bolté took
the stand that all U.N. forces in Korea battalion from New Zealand had been
and scheduled to arrive there might be offered to the unified command by the
required to conclude the fighting suc- respective countries and these offers ac-
cessfully and would certainly be needed cepted. But the developments in Korea,
to provide an adequate occupation force. and particularly the favorable prognosis
He voiced concern to General Mac- brought back from the Wake Island Con-
Arthur over the fact that recent opera- ference by the returning conferees, had
tional successes were fostering a growing a profound effect on General Bolté's
tendency among other United Nations attitude and on that of all concerned
members to consider additional forces with deciding what should be done about
unnecessary. He suggested that Mac- curtailing the shipment of forces to the
Arthur include in his next report to the battlefront. On 23 October, General
United Nations a special statement to Bolté advised the Chief of Staff that he
encourage additional contributions from felt a total of 36,000 U.N. troops other
these other nations. General Bolté force- than U.S. and ROK soldiers was too
fully recommended to General Collins great and that the time was now ripe
that, as a matter of policy, the Depart- for reducing the current and projected
ment of the Army should oppose the re- strength of such troops to about 15,000.
lease of foreign U.N. military units "In view of the state of operations in
previously accepted for service in North Korea," Bolté said:
Korea.33
32
and in general consonance with the Wake
MFR, sgd Gen Collins, 5 Oct 50, CofS DA file Island conversations, it is considered desir-
CS 370, Item 21.
33
(1) Rad, WAR 93605, DA (Bolté) to CINCFE,
able to review current and projected plans
6 Oct 50. (2) Memo, Gen Bolté for Gen Collins, 13 for utilizing other United Nations in Korea.
Oct 50, sub: Continuing Need for U.N. Forces in The problem is to reduce logistic burdens
Korea, in G-3, DA file CS 091, Case 25. on the United States and at the same time
226 POLICY AND DIRECTION
point where some of the U.N. units these units. They decided also to ask
could be dispensed with. Basing his Canada and Greece to reduce their re-
final judgment on all the factors— spective brigades to battalion size and
logistic, political, and operational—Gen- for the redeployment of the Philippine
eral Collins then recommended changes battalion and the British marine com-
in the U.N. lineup. mando unit to their own countries.
After considering Collins' views, the Finally, the U.K. 27th Brigade would be
Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that the re- returned to British control as soon as
quest for the Belgian battalion, the the U.K. 29th Brigade arrived from
Netherlands battalion, the French bat- Hong Kong to replace it. General Mac-
talion, the New Zealand artillery bat- Arthur was notified of these decisions at
talion, and the additional Australian once, and the Secretary of Defense was
battalion should be canceled and the asked to co-ordinate with the Secretary
countries concerned asked not to send of State in obtaining the concurrence of
228 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the countries concerned. On 2 Novem- said, "are that hostilities in Korea may
ber, Secretary Marshall wrote the Sec- end at an early date (VK-day)." He
retary of State asking that he make the ordered his staff to begin planning on a
proper arrangements.35 priority basis for the cutback and di-
Equally as pronounced a reaction to version of excess supplies en route, for
the success of United Nations operations the roll-up of supplies in excess of FEC
came from those persons charged with needs, and for the movement and hous-
logistic support planning for the Korean ing of forces diverted and redeployed
fighting. During a visit to the Far East from the Far East. But in order to plan,
Command in late September, Lt. Gen. his staff had to know how many troops
Thomas B. Larkin, the Department of were going to be stationed in the Far
the Army G-4, conferred with General East and Korea after the war ended, and
MacArthur on the matter of cutting back what levels of supply and special re-
the wartime flow of supplies to his serves would be needed for the U.S.
theater. He asked particularly that Mac- Army, the ROK Army, and the other
Arthur take steps to reduce substantially U.N. forces. He asked General Bolté to
his requisitions for ammunition and provide that information as soon as pos-
other items.36 The Army's supply ex- sible, "due to the possibility of early
perts were very worried because the bulk suspension of major hostilities in Korea
of the Army's supplies and equipment and the probable necessity of diverting
were being drawn to the Far East. Be- cargo ships on the high seas." 38 Bolté
cause of the rapid developments in Korea saw the problem but had no ready answer
since July, the Far East Command had and turned to the Chief of Staff for
not been able to get its inventory and advice. Bolté pointed out that the Army
stock reports in good condition and there could not make plans until the Joint
was a tendency to draw out of the United Chiefs had determined what forces were
States larger amounts of supply and going to be kept in the Far East when
equipment than were needed.37 the war was over and how much support
Upon his return from Japan, General was going to be given the ROK and
Larkin expressed concern that no real Japanese security forces. He insisted
plans to reduce the logistic support of that the matter should receive the high-
the Far East Command to conform with est possible priority.39 General Collins
posthostilities requirements had yet been on 3 October asked the Joint Chiefs to
made. "Present indications," Larkin start considering the problem.40 Bolté,
giving Larkin such information as he
35
(1) Ibid. (2) JCS 1776/144 and 2d corrigendum could without waiting for a decision by
thereto, 25 Oct 50. (3) Memo, Secy JCS (Adm
38
Lalor) for CofS USA (Collins), 27 Oct 50, sub: Cut- Memo, DA G-4 (Larkin) for DA G-3 (Bolté),
hack in Ground Forces in Korea. (4) Ltr, Secy De- 26 Sep 50, sub: Post-Korean Hostilities Basis for
fense (Marshall) to Secy State (Acheson), 2 Nov 50. Logistic Support, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 99.
39
All in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 111-111/6. Memo, Gen Bolté (G-3) for CofS, 27 Sep 50,
36
Min, 43d mtg Army Policy Council, 19 Oct 50, sub: Responsibilities for Supply in FEC, Post-
CS37 334. hostilities in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case
Min, 42d mtg Army Policy Council, 5 Oct 50, 99/6.
40
CS 334. JCS 1776/124, 3 Oct 50.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 229
the Joint Chiefs, told him on 3 October jected size of his command once the
that levels of supply in FECOM after campaigns in Korea were over. In a
the fighting ceased should be those in definite move toward retrenchment, the
effect before the fighting started. But, Department of the Army also asked him
in addition, MacArthur's theater should to cancel immediately all outstanding
be given a 90-day reserve at combat rates requisitions for supplies from the ZI and
for a 4-division balanced force which, it to resubmit his requests on the basis of
was contemplated, would constitute the the anticipated posthostilities force.42
posthostilities troop basis. The Army Several logistic actions taken within
planned to continue moving those troop the Far East Command indicate that the
units and casuals which were en route or Department of the Army officials were
scheduled for shipment for the Far East not alone in foreseeing an early end to
as of that date. This procedure would the fighting. On 22 October, General
permit the use of the incoming filler Walker requested authority from Gen-
personnel to complete the organizational eral MacArthur to divert to Japan all
structure of units already in the theater. bulk-loaded ammunition ships arriving
Furthermore, the few service troops who in Korea after 20 October. Ammunition
were alerted for the Far East would be already in Korea, Walker believed, could
needed to support the revised 4-division take care of the North Koreans and still
troop basis for the FEC. Future ship- leave a balance for posthostilities re-
ments of units and soldiers not already quirements. MacArthur granted this
alerted for the theater would be carefully request and ordered Japan Logistical
screened to prevent unnecessary rede- Command to take the necessary actions.
ployment. Two days later Bolté fur- In the same vein General Weible, com-
nished Larkin with a list of American mander of Japan Logistical Command,
units tentatively planned to garrison the asked MacArthur to authorize the return
Far East Command after the fighting to the United States of six ships loaded
ceased. He accompanied this with an with 105-mm. and 155-mm. artillery am-
Army plan for the deployment of troops munition and aerial bombs. Both Gen-
from the Far East Command.41 eral MacArthur and General Stratemeyer
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff con- agreed that this ammunition was in ex-
sidered the problem of the posthostilities cess of the needs of the Korean theater
troop basis and supply needs in the Far in view of the existing tactical situation.
East Command, and before they could MacArthur, on the other hand, felt it
arrive at a final decision, the problem would be highly desirable to have a re-
was overtaken by events. Nevertheless, serve stock of ammunition placed at
the Department of the Army took its Hawaii for use in the event of another
planning seriously, and on 15 October emergency and asked the Department
informed General MacArthur of the pro- of the Army at least to consider diverting
41
these ammunition ships to Hawaii be-
Memo, Bolté for Larkin, 3 Oct 50 and 5 Oct fore ordering them back to the United
50, with Incls, sub: Post-Korean Hostilities Basis
for Logistic Support, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
42
Case 99/6. Rad, W 94227, DA to CINCFE, 15 Oct 50.
230 POLICY AND DIRECTION
States. General Weible also requested infantry RCT, 1 airborne RCT, and1
the San Francisco Port of Embarkation infantry regiment, all at full strength.44
to cancel all outstanding requisitions for If the Chinese intervened and further
ammunition and to unload any ammu- reinforcements were required, the situ-
nition-carrying vessels that had not left ation would be a little tight. The most
port.43 readily available source of nondivisional
unit reinforcement were 108 units pre-
A Minority View—Just in Case viously allocated for shipment to the
Regardless of the general feeling of FEC. The nondivisional artillery and
optimism and the retrenchment moves, a Engineer units on this list would be op-
disturbing, low-key concern over a pos- erationally ready by 1 January and could
sible Chinese intervention still remained. materially strengthen the combat capabil-
Consequently, while planning for the ity of the United Nations Command.
mundane aftermath of victory in Korea, The four National Guard divisions fed-
the Army staff gave some attention to eralized in September would be trained
what might happen if the Chinese sud- and ready about 1 June 1951. The 82d
denly moved against MacArthur. On Airborne Division was ready at any time
11 October, a survey of MacArthur's re- and could be committed within thirty
sources for meeting such an attack was days if necessary. An additional marine
completed and sent to General Bolté by division, to be ready by June 1951, had
Brig. Gen. Ridgely Gaither, Chief of the been organized and was now in training.
Operations Division, G-3, Department The rest of the General Reserve in the
of the Army. Gaither's survey showed United States, including the 2d Armored
that U.N. members other than the Division, 11th Airborne Division, 14th
United States were scheduled to furnish RCT, 196th RCT, and 278th RCT, was
additional troops to the U.N. Command just beginning a program of reconstitu- 45
to bring the total up to 29,700 troops by tion but could be ready by June 1951.
March 1951; General MacArthur had Underscoring the Chinese threats of
indicated his intention to activate five intervention early in October, another
more ROK divisions, one each month warning was sounded, if faintly, on 18
beginning in November, with each di- October when American reconnaissance
vision having an approximate strength of planes flying close to the Yalu found
11,000; 60,000 fillers for American units almost one hundred Russian-built fight-
were scheduled to be furnished between ers lined up on An-tung Airfield across
10 November and late December; and the river in Manchuria. MacArthur's
by 31 December, American strength in air commander, General Stratemeyer,
the Far East Command would total 6 minimized this ominous discovery by
Army divisions, 1 marine division,1 telling General Vandenberg in Washing-
ton that the planes were probably there
43
(1) Rad, CX 7506, CINCFE to CG Army Eight
44
and CG JLCOM, 26 Oct 50, with MFR on file copy, Memo, Gen Gaither (Opn Div G-3) for Gen
SGS files, GHQ. (2) Rad, CX 67702, CINCFE to Bolté (G-3), 11 Oct 50, sub: Reinforcement of U.N.
DA, 28 Oct 50, and Memo for Record on file copy, Forces in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 109.
45
SGS, GHQ. Ibid.
SIGNS OF VICTORY 231
purposely to lend "color and credence Korea would consult with all interested
to menacing statements and threats of parties on this and other problems which
Chinese Communist leaders, who prob- might come before it. Since Communist
ably felt that this display of strength China qualified as an interested party
involved no risk in view of our apparent to any operation along the Manchurian
desire to avoid border incidents." Strate- border, this could be construed as a
meyer certainly did not believe that the willingness by the commission to deal
Chinese meant to use these fighters to with Communist China on matters in-
attack his planes since they had not done volving Korea. The Joint Chiefs felt
so when the observation aircraft, an easy such an announcement would be mil-
target, had come close. "I believe it itarily undesirable. They were, how-
especially significant," he told Vanden- ever, directed by President Truman to
berg, "that, if deployment for possible send the suggestion to MacArthur. They
action in Korea were under way, it would did so, telling him he could issue the text
be highly unlikely that aircraft would of the announcement if he wished. "It is
have been positioned to attract attention considered desirable," they concluded,
from south of the border." 46 "that President Rhee be advised with
Almost at the same time that Chinese regard to this action if it is to be
fighters appeared on the border, the De- taken." 47
partment of State suggested to the Joint General MacArthur did not feel that
Chiefs that General MacArthur be in- the time was propitious for such an an-
structed to disavow publicly any inten- nouncement, especially since the Suiho
tion of destroying certain hydroelectric Hydroelectric Power Plant at Sinuiju
power facilities along the Manchurian was not under United Nations control
border. This suggestion stemmed from and no determination could be made at
some evidence that the Chinese intended long range of how much power was being
to move down into Korea to protect the turned out or where it was going. Mac-
Suiho Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Arthur did not propose, if he could
installations along the Yalu. An an- avoid it, to tie his own hands with a com-
nouncement by MacArthur would have mitment that he might later find
the dual purpose of allaying Chinese militarily inconvenient.
Communist fears of trespassing into Man-
There would certainly be no intent on the
churia by the United Nations Command part of this command to disturb any peace-
and of showing the rest of the world that ful and reasonable application of this power
his expedition into North Korea was not supply, and it would be repugnant to de-
primarily destructive in purpose. The structively interrupt any constructive uses
State Department asked also that General to which it is being applied. If, however,
this power is being utilized in furtherance
MacArthur's announcement contain a of potentially hostile military purposes
statement that the U.N. Commission for through the manufacture of munitions of
the Unification and Rehabilitation of war or there is a diversion of it from the
minimum peaceful requirements of the Ko-
46
rean people, most serious doubts would at
Rad, A 25438 INT-IE, CG, FEAF to CS USAF,
47
20 Oct 50. Rad, JCS 94799, JCS to CINCFE, 21 Oct 50.
232 POLICY AND DIRECTION
once arise as to our justification for main- border, apprehensions subsided as the
taining status quo. end of the month approached without
Nor did MacArthur feel that he should Chinese intervention. Likewise, the dif-
speak for the United Nations Commis- ficulties of supplying the Eighth Army
sion for the Unification and Rehabilita- and the unexpected hitch in landing the
tion of Korea by predicting any of its X Corps at Wonsan became mere an-
future policies or decisions. The Joint noyances as Walker's forces moved deep
Chiefs did not press the matter and the into western North Korea and as the
announcement was never made.48 force that Almond so far commanded
Despite Mao Tse-tung's early October ashore, the ROK I Corps, moved far up
threats and the midmonth discovery of the east coast. The Wake Island Con-
fighter aircraft just over the Manchurian ference truly had been the catalyst
that generated wide confidence in
48
Rad, C 67154, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Oct 50. MacArthur's march to victory.
CHAPTER XIII
stepped far ahead of the others and on lift. Supplies available were sufficient for
26 October pushed its reconnaissance bare maintenance of combat operations of
troops all the way to the Yalu at one reinforced American division and four
ROK divisions against light opposition with
Ch'osan. There was little elation over no possibility of accumulating reserves to
this feat, for almost simultaneously other meet heavier opposition. An ambush and
ROK divisions of the ROK II Corps ran surprise attack by fresh, well-organized and
head on into very strong Chinese units. well trained units, some of which were Chi-
Not only was the ROK 1st Division badly nese Communist Forces, began a sequence
of events leading to complete collapse and
mauled, but the regiment of the ROK disintegration of ROK II Corps of three di-
6th Division on and near the border visions. Contributing factors were intense,
also was cut off by the Chinese and psychological fear of Chinese intervention
nearly destroyed. The climax of this early and previous complacency and overconfi-
Chinese intervention came on the night dence in all ROK ranks. There were no
indications that Chinese troops had entered
of 1-2 November when the 8th Cavalry Korea prior to contact. The presence of
Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, was at- Chinese troops increased materially the will
tacked by a full Chinese division in posi- to fight of remaining and reconstituted
tions near Unsan and very roughly North Korean units. The ROK Corps re-
handled.5 treated in confusion to a position in the
vicinity of KUNURI, 13 miles from the
As soon as Walker saw what was hap- only crossing area into the I Corps combat
pening, he ordered the advance halted zone, before some semblance of order could
and withdrew his forces back across the be restored. Losses in equipment and per-
Ch'ongch'on, holding only a shallow sonnel were large. The collapse on the
bridgehead above the river. When Gen- east flank together with heavy attack on the
1st ROK Division and 8th Cav RCT on
eral MacArthur learned that Walker had the east flank of the I US Corps seriously
stopped driving toward the border, he threatened the only road supplying the
directed his acting chief of staff, General I Corps and dictated temporary withdrawal
Hickey, to telephone Walker in Korea of exposed columns of 24th Inf Div on the
and find out why. Hickey reached west, a regrouping of forces, an active de-
fense, a build-up of supplies pending re-
Walker's chief of staff, General Allen, sumption of offensive and advance to the
who furnished an interim explanation on border. By intense effort progress is being
1November. Walker a few days later made in reorganization and stabilization of
followed this with a fuller and more de- II ROK Corps, however, it is at most only
tailed explanation in a letter to General fifty percent effective at present. The 2d
US Division has been brought up in a posi-
MacArthur in which he said: tion to take over in the event of collapse by
On 26 October Eighth Army was advanc- ROK forces.
ing on a broad front in widely separated There has never been and there is now
columns in pursuit of defeated North Ko- no intention for this Army to take up or
rean Forces. The advance north of Pyong- remain on a passive perimeter or any other
yang was based upon a calculated logistical type of defense. Every effort is being made
risk involving supply almost entirely by air- to retain an adequate bridgehead to facili-
tate the resumption of the attack as soon as
5
See Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to conditions permit. All units continue to
the Yalu, pages 689-708, for detailed account of these execute local attacks to restore or improve
actions. lines. Plans have been prepared for re-
236 POLICY AND DIRECTION
sumption of the offensive employing all its attack to the west and then north
forces available to the Army to meet the again. The rear areas around Wonsan-
new factor of organized Chinese Commu- Hamhung were to be guarded by the 3d
nist Forces. These plans will be put into
execution at the earliest possible moment Division, which was en route from Japan
and are dependent only upon the security after having completed a very brief train-
of the right flank, the marshalling of the ing period.7 Until the 3d Division ar-
attack troops and the restoration of vital rived, the 1st Marine Division had the
supplies. In this connection there now responsibility for securing the Wonsan-
exists in the forward areas only one day of
fire. Opening of Port of Chinnampo and Hamhung area and therefore would not
be entirely free to concentrate for its
extension of railroad to Pyongyang is essen-6
tial to movement of supplies and troops. advance to the Changjin Reservoir.
It was while moving toward this reser-
Meanwhile, traces of further Chinese
voir that the ROK 26th Regiment had
participation in the west faded quickly as
on 25 October found its way blocked by
the new enemy pulled back into the
strong Chinese forces at the small village
mountain masses from which he had
of Sudong. Prisoners taken in the heavy
come.
fighting identified the unit opposing the
ROK regiment as the CCF 124th Di-
X Corps and the New Enemy vision. The ROK regiment fell back
and for the next few days made no head-
Across the Taebaek mountain range way. But the 7th Marines, U.S. 1st
far to the east of the Eighth Army and Marine Division, coming up from Ham-
completely out of physical contact with hung, took over from the ROK unit on
Walker's forces, General Almond mean- 2 November and in a fierce running en-
time had landed the rest of his American counter, marked by the first and last
forces and was preparing to carry out his appearance of Chinese tanks in the area,
part of General MacArthur's directive virtually destroyed this Chinese division.
to advance with all possible speed to the The 124th was barely accounted for,
border. His plan of advance called for however, before the Marines picked up
the ROK I Corps to drive up the east prisoners from a fresh division, the 126th.
coastal road to the northeastern border It was now quite clear that the even-
of Korea. He ordered the U.S. 7th Di- tuality so long discussed by American
vision, which had landed at Iwon, to planners, Communist China's entry on
drive up the corridor from Pukch'ong the side of North Korea, was no longer
through Pungsan and Kapsan to the Yalu hypothetical. Yet there was great re-
River at Hyesanjin. To the U.S. 1st luctance at Eighth Army and X Corps
Marine Division, Almond assigned the headquarters, at GHQ in Tokyo, and in
task of pushing up from Hamhung to the Washington to accept this intervention
Changjin Reservoir, from where it could at face value.
either drive north to the border or shift
7
War Diary, X Corps, 4 Nov 50, G-1 Rpt, Notes
6
Memo, Gen Walker for Gen MacArthur, 6 on Conference Between CG X Corps and Gen
Nov 50. Partridge, CG 5th AF, 4 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 237
productive capacity, and its trained When General Brooks, the Department
military leadership." 10 of Army G-1, asked Beiderlinden for an
On 6 November, the Joint Chiefs of explanation at the next teleconference,
Staff agreed that the time was no longer it became apparent from the reply that
propitious for reducing contributions Beiderlinden had accepted Chinese Com-
from other nations and set out to amend munist intervention as a proven fact and
the steps they had already taken in that that he expected the worst. He pointed
direction. They recommended to the out that battle casualties had risen from
Secretary of Defense that, "due to the 40 per day in October to 326 per day in
fluid situation in Korea," action on cut- the first week of November and that this
ting back United Nations forces be de- upward swing was no flash in the pan.
ferred. The Secretary of Defense He based his theory on a number of dis-
subsequently passed this recommenda- turbing considerations, and felt that the
tion to the Department of State and the United Nations Command faced a situa-
11
move to retrench was halted. tion as dangerous as that of the Pusan
From the Far East Command, the G-1, Perimeter. He noted that the new enemy
General Beiderlinden, again demanded would be better trained and equipped
replacements. "This theater has been than the North Koreans, and that the
operating throughout hostilities seriously fighting would be carried on in bitter
understrength," he charged on 5 Novem- winter weather. Furthermore, the
ber. "The shortage of essential replace- Eighth Army was already experiencing
ments is continuing and reaching critical transportation, supply, and evacuation
stage." The current situation made it difficulties which would multiply; com-
mandatory that replacement schedules bat divisions were understrength; periods
be revised and that substantial num- which the individual soldier must spend
bers of men be shipped at once. General in combat would probably increase; and
Beiderlinden admitted that it would be there had already been a great drop in
difficult to estimate what the losses would morale among combat men at the pros-
be in November and December, but he pect of continued heavy fighting.12
maintained that the trend was upward to At a higher level, General MacArthur
a marked degree. Department of the on 7 November appealed to the Joint
Army officials were unable to under- Chiefs of Staff for more combat strength.
stand, since there was no accompanying He told them that the appearance of the
explanation, on what basis Beiderlinden Chinese Communist forces in strength
was predicting increased battle casualties. had completely changed the over-all situ-
ation and asked that all previous plans
10
(1) Memo, Robert A. Lovett, Dep Secy Defense for sending men and units to his com-
for JCS, 4 Nov 50, sub: Reduction in Forces to be mand be put into full effect immediately.
Deployed in Korea, (2) Memo, G-3 (Duff) for CofS,
USA, 6 Nov 50, sub: Utilization of U.N. Ground Holding that it was essential for the re-
placement flow to his theater to be re-
Forces Contingents, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Cases
111/8,111/10.
11 12
(1) Decision on JCS 1776/152, 6 Nov 50. (2) Ltr, (1) Rad, CX 68300, CINCFE to DA, 5 Nov 50.
Secy Defense to Secy State, 16 Nov 50, in G-3, DA (2) Telecon, TT 3982, DA and GHQ (Brooks and
file 091 Korea, Cases 111/8, 111/2. Beiderlinden), 7 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 239
sumed at full force, MacArthur asked Chinese intervention was the effect on
also that all Army combat and service personnel policy in the Far East with
units previously requested be sent respect to the ROK soldiers who had
without delay. He could not say at that been integrated into American units in
date whether more Army, Air Force, September. The Far East Command had
and Navy units than had already been established a policy during the period of
asked for would be required, but he was October optimism of releasing South
certain "that the full requirement for Korean soldiers to ROK Army control
balanced forces as stated during the as American replacements arrived to take
earlier phases of the campaign must now their places. As of 7 November, over
be met with possible appreciable aug- 8,000 of these Korean soldiers had been
mentation thereof." "The alternatives," released from Eighth Army's units. On
General MacArthur warned, "are either that date, however, the practice was sus-
a stalemate or the prospect of losing all pended because of the new threat, and
13
that has thus far been gained." more than 20,000 Koreans remained in
Department of Army officials had al- American divisions.15
ready taken action to send 40,000 replace-
ments to the Far East in November and
A Time for Reappraisal
December, and it was estimated that all
units in the Far East would be up to One of the first intelligence reports on
strength by March 1951. With regard the Chinese intervention to reach Wash-
to the additional units, 112 combat and ington was that of General Willoughby,
service units of various types had been who revealed on 2 November that 16,500
recommended for shipment to the Far Chinese Communist soldiers had entered
East, although shipment of 92 of these North Korea. The Chinese Communist
was contingent upon approval to send government reputedly was labeling these
civilian component units overseas. On troops "volunteers." The Sinuiju radio
16 November, the Chief of Staff told had announced that these troops formed
the United Nations commander that the "Volunteer Corps for the Protection
steps to fulfill his needs were being of the Hydroelectric Zone" and had
taken. "In view of the gravity of the entered Korea expressly to prevent the
current situation," Collins said, ". . . the destruction of hydroelectric facilities
flow of Army replacements has been re- along the Yalu. General Willoughby
sumed at an increased rate and you will admitted that the increasing resistance
be informed earliest of the combat and being met by MacArthur's forces had
service type units alerted for movement removed the problem of Chinese inter-
to your command."14 vention from the realm of the academic
One interesting outgrowth of the and turned it into "a serious proximate
13
threat." He was puzzled by the Chinese
Rad, CINCFE to DA, 7 Nov 50. device of committing "volunteers" in
14
(1) Memo, Bolté for CofS USA, 10 Nov 50, sub:
Regarding CCF in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
15
Case 14/42. (2) Rad, WAR 96672, DA (Collins) to Telecon, TT 3992, DA (Brooks) and GHQ
CINCFE, 16 Nov 50. (Beiderlinden), 9 Nov 50.
240 POLICY AND DIRECTION
"special units" instead of in regular or- On the next day, Willoughby reported
ganized regiments of the Chinese Com- 316,000 regular Chinese ground forces
munist Army. He speculated that the and 274,000 Chinese irregulars, or secu-
Chinese, who he acknowledged were ex- rity forces, in Manchuria. Most of the
tremely subtle and obsessed with "saving regulars were believed to be along the
face," might be doing this in order to Yalu at numerous crossing sites.18
have their cake and eat it too. By label- These disclosures had an extremely
ing their troops "volunteers" and claim- ominous ring and, coupled with the
ing that no recognized units of their news of the withdrawal of Eighth Army
army were in Korea, the Chinese would before Chinese forces already in Korea,
avoid the appearance of intervention. caused the Joint Chiefs of Staff to call
Nor would they involve the prestige of on General MacArthur for an evaluation.
the Chinese Communist Army if de- They requested his earliest "interim ap-
feated. On the other hand, by furnish- preciation of the situation in Korea and
ing troops to North Korea, China could its implications in light of what appears
claim credit for helping North Korea to be overt intervention by Chinese Com-
in its hour of need. MacArthur's in- munist units." 19
telligence chief concluded by warning: MacArthur's reply scarcely enlight-
Although indications so far point to piece- ened them. He told them, "It is im-
meal commitment for ostensible limited possible at this time to authoritatively
purposes only, it is important not to lose appraise the actualities of Chinese Com-
sight of the maximum potential that is munist intervention in North Korea."
immediately available to the Chinese Com- MacArthur posed four courses of action
munists. Should the high level decision for
full intervention be made by the Chinese which the Chinese Communists might be
Communists, they could promptly commit following. The first was open interven-
29 of their 44 divisions presently deployed tion with full force and without re-
along the Yalu and support a major attack straint; the second possibility, covert
16
with up to 150 aircraft. intervention concealed for diplomatic
On the same day, 2 November, the reasons; the third course might be the
American Consul General in Hong Kong use of "volunteers" to keep a foothold
sent Washington a report that in August, in Korea; the fourth, Chinese forces
at a conference of top Sino-Soviet leaders, might have entered Korea assuming they
a joint decision had been made that would meet only ROK units which they
Communist China would enter the could defeat without great difficulty.20
Korean War. According to his report, Full intervention, according to Gen-
the formal decision had come on 24 eral MacArthur, would represent a
October at a meeting presided over by "momentous decision of the gravest inter-
Premier Mao Tse-tung. An estimated national importance." "While it is a
twenty Chinese Communist armies had
been sent to Manchuria.17 18
Telecon, TT 3971, DA and GHQ UNC, 3
Nov 50.
16 19
Telecon, TT 3968, G-2 DA (Boiling) with G-2 Rad, WAR 95790, CSUSA to CINCFE, 3 Nov 50.
20
FEC (Willoughby), 2 Nov 50. Rad, C 68285, CINCFE to DA for CSUSA for
17
Intelligence Rpt, 2 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files. JCS, 4 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 241
distinct possibility," he told the JCS, that 415,000 regular troops were located
"and many foreign experts predict such in Manchuria, ready to cross if ordered.
action, there are many fundamental Two days later, General Willoughby
logical reasons against it and sufficient warned that the Chinese Communist
evidence has not yet come to hand to forces had the potential to launch a large-
warrant its immediate acceptance." Al- scale counteroffensive at any time.23
though he made no definite prediction, The appearance of Chinese military
MacArthur felt that a combination of formations in Korea, and evidence that
the last three courses of action by the these forces were being augmented rap-
Chinese were, at the moment, the most idly, caused MacArthur to call for an all-
likely. In a cautious mood, he told the out air effort to smash them. On 5
Joint Chiefs, "I recommend against hasty November, he directed General Strate-
conclusions which might be premature meyer to throw the full power of the Far
and believe that a final appraisement East Air Forces into a 2-week effort to
should await a more complete accumula- knock the North Koreans and their new
tion of military facts." Nothing in the allies out of the war. "Combat crews,"
tone or content of General MacArthur's he ordered, "are to be flown to exhaus-
report implied that an emergency existed tion if necessary." He instructed Strate-
or that the situation even showed signs meyer to destroy the Korean ends of all
of getting out of hand. His report was, international bridges on the Manchurian
21
in a sense, reassuring. border. From the Yalu southward, and
On the same day that General Mac- excluding only Rashin, the Suiho Dam,
Arthur sent this appraisal to Washing- and other hydroelectric plants, the Far
ton, the Chinese Communist government East Air Forces would "destroy every
in an official statement charged that the means of communication and every in-
United States was bent on conquering stallation, factory, city, and village."
not only Korea but also China, as "the MacArthur warned that there must be no
Japanese imperialists have done in the border violations and that all targets
past." The statement, possibly made to close to or on the border must be at-
prepare the Chinese people for further tacked only under visual bombing
moves in Korea, claimed that in order conditions.24
to protect China, Chinese military forces On 6 November, General MacArthur
must now assist North Korea.22 notified Army authorities that he in-
Chinese troops had crossed and were tended to have his B-29's take out im-
continuing to cross into North Korea mediately the international bridges
over a number of international bridges across the Yalu between Sinuiju and
leading in from Manchuria. By 3 An-tung. He hoped, by destroying these
November, General MacArthur's head- bridges, to prevent or at least slow down
quarters accepted the possibility that
34,000 Chinese had entered Korea and 23
DIS GHQ, FEC UNC, No. 2977, 3 Nov 50 and
No. 2979, 5 Nov 50.
21 24
Ibid. USAF Hist Study No. 72, United States Air
22
Telecon, TT 3975, DA and GHQ, UNC, 5 Force Operations in the Korean Conflict, 1 Novem-
Nov 50. ber 1950-30 June 1952, ch. I, p. 22.
242 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the flow of Chinese military strength into Acheson and Lovett agreed that Mac-
Korea. MacArthur conveyed this in- Arthur's attack should be held up until
formation to Washington in a routine the Korean situation became much
manner during a teleconference with clearer, particularly in view of Rusk's
the Army staff at the Pentagon.25 comments. Lovett then called Secretary
Had this matter been handled rou- Marshall and informed him of the de-
tinely by the Army staff and merely re- tails. Marshall agreed that unless a
ported through channels, the mission mass movement across the Yalu was
might have been well under way before threatening the security of MacArthur's
the nation's leaders learned of Mac- forces, the planned bombing was un-
Arthur's intentions. However, General wise. Lovett then directed the Air
Stratemeyer, apparently feeling that his Force Secretary Thomas K. Finletter,
chief's decision held more than passing to tell the JCS of the feeling at State and
interest, sent to Air Force authorities in Defense that the action by MacArthur
Washington a message describing his should await a decision from the Presi-
orders from MacArthur. Within min- dent himself. As a final step, Acheson
utes, Under Secretary of Defense Lovett called the President who was in Inde-
had been informed and the fat was in the pendence, Missouri. President Truman
fire.26 stated that he would approve this bomb-
Lovett doubted very seriously that the ing only if there was an immediate and
advantage of bombing the Sinuiju- serious threat to MacArthur's forces.
An-tung bridges would offset the great Since MacArthur had reported no such
danger of bombing Chinese territory. threat and, indeed, only two days before
He went at once to discuss the problem had cautioned Washington against pre-
with Secretary of State Acheson and with cipitate judgment and had recommended
the Assistant Secretary of State for Far a wait-and-see attitude, the puzzlement
Eastern Affairs, Dean Rusk. The latter of Mr. Truman and his chief advisers
pointed out that the United States had was natural. The President directed
promised the British Government not to that the attack be put off and that Mac-
take action which might involve attacks Arthur be asked to explain why he
on Manchuria without consulting the found this potentially dangerous action
British. Also, the United States was even suddenly so necessary.
then taking steps to have the Security The Joint Chiefs of Staff, acting on
Council pass a resolution calling on the the President's instructions, immediately
Chinese to halt action in Korea, a resolu- directed MacArthur to call off until fur-
tion that surely would be jeopardized if ther orders any bombing of the interna-
bombs fell in Manchuria. Rusk was con- tional bridges. "Consideration is being
cerned, too, over possible Soviet reaction urgently given to the Korean situation
if China should invoke the mutual- at the governmental level," they told
assistance treaty with the Soviet Union. him.
25
Telecon, TT 3976, DA and GHQ, UNC, 6 One factor is the present commitment not
Nov 50. to take action affecting Manchuria without
26
Truman, Memoirs, II, 374. consulting the British. Until further orders
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 243
postpone all bombing of targets within five declared. "Every hour that this is post-
miles of the Manchurian border. Urgently poned will be paid for dearly in Ameri-
need your estimate of the situation and the can and other United Nations blood."
reason for ordering bombing of Yalu River
bridges as indicated.27 He had intended hitting the main cross-
ing at Sinuiju within the next few hours
This order from Washington brought but in accordance with the Joint Chiefs's
from General MacArthur an immediate order had suspended the strike "under
protest couched in strong terms which the gravest protest that I can make."
portrayed the situation in Korea in the He pointed out that his original order
most pessimistic vein since July and to bomb the bridges was, in his opinion,
August. He warned on 6 November that entirely within the scope of his directives,
"men and materiel in large forces are the rules of war, and the resolution made
pouring across all bridges over the Yalu by the United Nations. It constituted to
from Manchuria," and, for the first time him no slightest act of belligerency
since Chinese entry had become evident, against Chinese territory.
admitted that the situation was serious. It is interesting to note MacArthur's
"This movement not only jeopardizes reference to the resolution of the United
but threatens the ultimate destruction Nations since he received his operating
of the forces under my command." He instructions and directives from the very
described for them how the Chinese were quarter at which he was lodging his
moving across the bridges under cover protest, the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
of darkness. Chinese troops could be resolutions of the United Nations were
committed without being attacked effec- merely guides which the United States
tively by air because of the short dis- Government, as the Unified Command
tances from the river to the front lines. under the United Nations, used in de-
"The only way to stop this reinforce- termining the specific policies for the
ment of the enemy is the destruction of United Nations Command in Korea.
these bridges and the subjection of all General MacArthur seemed sure that the
installations in the north area supporting Joint Chiefs did not realize the disastrous
the enemy advance to the maximum of effect, both physical and psychological,
our air destruction," General MacArthur that would result from the restrictions
27
they were imposing. In an extraordi-
(1) Rad, JCS 95878, JCS (Personal) for Mac-
Arthur, 6 Nov 50. (2) This series of actions reveals
nary request, he asked that President
clearly the speed with which important decisions Truman be informed of the restriction,
could be taken and the "streamlining" of the normal saying, "I believe that your instructions
policy-making methods. Stratemeyer's message had
been received in Washington about three and one-
may well result in a calamity of major
half hours before his planes were scheduled to take proportion for which I cannot accept the
off on their missions. In the interim every appro- responsibility without his personal and
priate official within the Defense and State Depart-
ments had been consulted and the Presidential direct understanding of the situation."
decision based on their advice had been reached. He concluded by asking immediate
The JCS had sent out the order to MacArthur only reconsideration of the decision.28
an hour and twenty minutes before the B-29's were
28
scheduled to take off from Japan. See Truman, Rad, C 68396, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 6 Nov
Memoirs, II, 374-75. 50. That MacArthur did not fully understand the
244 POLICY AND DIRECTION
The sense of grim urgency conveyed But in view of the apparent emer-
by MacArthur's protest and his accom- gency, with men and matériel pouring
panying picture of a sudden, mammoth across the Yalu bridges, the Joint Chiefs
build-up of Chinese Communist forces of Staff told MacArthur that he could
in Korea surprised Washington. Gen-bomb these bridges but with certain re-
eral Bradley called the President and strictions. ". . . you are authorized to
read to him MacArthur's message. Still go ahead with your planned bombing in
concerned over the dangers of bombing Korea near the frontier including targets
Manchuria by mistake, Mr. Truman at Sinuiju and Korean end of the Yalu
nevertheless agreed to let MacArthur go bridges." This did not mean, General
ahead with his plans. President Tru- MacArthur was cautioned, carte blanche
man, because MacArthur was on the to bomb any dams or power plants on the
scene and felt very strongly that this was Yalu River. The Joint Chiefs expressed
of unusual urgency, told Bradley to give deep concern that careless action by the
him the green light.29 United Nations Command near the Yalu
Nevertheless, it was evident that both might trigger a crisis which would cause
Truman and the military planners in the fighting to spread. They specifically
Washington were gravely concerned by warned MacArthur on this, urging him
the tone of MacArthur's protest. The to enforce extreme care to avoid Man-
Joint Chiefs of Staff told MacArthur in churian territory and airspace and to
an immediate reply that the situation tell them promptly of any hostile action
he now depicted had changed consider- from Manchuria. They chided him
ably from that described in his last obliquely for being lax in reporting new
report of 4 November. They agreed developments, prompted no doubt by
that destruction of the bridges in ques- the great discrepancy between his de-
tion would probably alleviate the im- scription of the situation on 4 November
mediate problem but that the cure might and that of 6 November. Certainly the
be worse than the ailment. It might well routine and special reports from his
bring increased Chinese Communist ef- command had not indicated so great a
fort and even Soviet contributions in re- change in the Chinese Communist situ-
sponse to what the Communists might ation as appeared to have actually taken
construe as an attack on Manchuria. place. "It is essential," the Joint Chiefs
Not only would this endanger Mac- maintained, "that we be kept informed
Arthur's forces, it would enlarge the area of important changes in the situation as
of conflict and American involvement to they occur and that your estimate as re-
a dangerous degree.30 quested . . . be submitted as soon as
possible." 31
mechanical procedures by which the instructions he
American intelligence agencies had
received were evolved in Washington is evident. He been busy, meanwhile, preparing the best
seems to have assumed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff possible estimate of Chinese intentions
had ordered a halt to his planned attack without
Presidential backing.
based on the pooled information from all
29
Truman, Memoirs, II, 376.
30 31
Rad, JCS 95949, JCS to CINCFE, 6 Nov 50. Ibid.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 245
their sources. This estimate was fur- Arthur declared, "that such forces will
nished all high-level planning and policy be used and augmented at will, probably
groups, including the Joint Chiefs of without any formal declaration of hostil-
Staff, on the same day General Mac- ities." He emphasized that if the
Arthur's pessimistic report arrived. The Chinese augmentation continued it could
estimate concluded that between 30,000 force the United Nations Command to
and 40,000 Chinese were now in North perform a "movement in retrograde."
Korea and that as many as 700,000 men, But he affirmed his intentions to resume
including 350,000 ground troops could his advance in the west, possibly within
be sent into Korea to fight against the ten days, and to try to seize the initiative,
United Nations forces. These Chinese provided the enemy flow of reinforce-
forces would be capable of halting the ments could be checked. In his first
United Nations advance by piecemeal reference to what he later termed a "re-
commitment or, by a powerful all-out connaissance in force," General Mac-
offensive, forcing the United Nations to Arthur told the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
withdraw to defensive positions farther "Only through such an offensive effort
south. The report concluded with a can any accurate measure be taken of
significant warning: enemy strength." 33
Once again he reiterated his con-
A likely and logical development of the
present situation is that the opposing sides viction that the bridges had to be
will build up their combat power in succes- bombed "as the only resource left to me
sive increments to checkmate the other until to prevent a potential build-up of enemy
forces of major magnitude are involved. At strength to a point threatening the safety
any point the danger is present that the of the command." This bombing was,
situation may get32 out of control and lead
to a general war. in his eyes, so plainly defensive that he
could hardly conceive of its causing in-
This chilling prognosis was followed creased intervention or provoking a gen-
at once by another report from the eral war, as the Joint Chiefs had
United Nations commander. He con- intimated it might do. He promised
firmed that the Chinese threat was a real that there would be no violation of the
and developing one. That Chinese Manchurian or Siberian borders and that
forces were engaging his troops was he would not destroy the hydroelectric
unquestionable although their exact installations along the Yalu.34
strength was difficult for his commanders Twelve railroad and highway bridges
to determine. They were strong enough spanned the Yalu and Tumen Rivers
to have seized the initiative from from Manchuria and Russia into Korea.
Walker's forces in the west and to have The most important of these were the
materially slowed Almond's advances rail and highway bridges at Sinuiju and
in the east. "The principle seems An-tung. These bridges were 3,000 feet
thoroughly established," General Mac- long and very sturdy. The highway
32
Intelligence Estimate, 6 Nov 50, sub: Chinese
33
Communist Intervention in Korea, in G-2, DA Rad, C 68465, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7 Nov 50.
34
files. Ibid.
246 POLICY AND DIRECTION
bridge at Sinuiju had been built in 1900 bombers joined in the effort to destroy
by the American Bridge Company and the bridges. All during November, the
perhaps equaled in strength any in the aerial attacks against the bridges con-
world. Despite the swift current, winter tinued but the results were disappoint-
ice, and spring floods, the builders had ing. By the end of the month, the air
laid the foundations on bedrock. The effort had succeeded, at great cost, in
Japanese had built an equally sturdy cutting four of the international bridges
double-track rail bridge of twelve trusses and in damaging most of the others. But
in 1934, 350 yards north of the highway by this time the Yalu was frozen over in
bridge. It was the largest rail bridge many places and enemy engineers were
ever built by the Japanese.35 Near building ponton bridges across the Yalu
Sakchu a double-track railway bridge at critical points. On 5 December, the
36
spanned the Yalu, while at Manp'ojin bridge attacks were suspended.
both a rail and footbridge crossed the
river. Other highway bridges were lo- 36
(1) USAF Hist Study No. 72, U.S. Air Force Op-
cated at Ongondong, Ch'ongsongjin, erations in the Korean Conflict, 1 November 50-30
Lin-chiang, Hyesanjin, Samanko, and June 1952, ch. 1, pp. 27-31. (2) Maj. Gen. Emmett
Hoeryong. "Rosie" O'Donnell, Commander, FEAF Bomber
Command, during the period in question, testified
As authorized by the President, Mac- before the Senate committee investigating General
Arthur sent his bombers, starting on 8 MacArthur's relief to the difficulty of destroying
the Yalu bridges in November 1950. General O'Don-
November, against the bridges at Sinu- nell said, "We were not, however, allowed to violate
iju, Sakchu, Ch'ongsongjin, Manp'ojin, Manchurian territory, and by violation of territory
and Hyesanjin. But bombing the Yalu Imean we were not allowed to fly over an inch of
it. For instance, the Yalu has several very pro-
River bridges involved almost insur- nounced bends like most rivers before getting to
mountable difficulties. Antiaircraft fire the town of Antung, and the main bridges at An-
from Manchuria forced the bombers tung we had to attack in only one manner. There
was only one manner you could attack the bridge
above 20,000 feet, and enemy jet fighters and not violate Manchurian territory, and that was
threatened them on their bomb runs. a course tangential to the southernmost bend of the
MacArthur's orders positively forbidding river. So you draw a line from the southernmost
bend of the river to the bridge and that is your
any violation of Manchurian airspace course, and these people on the other side of the
severely limited the possible axes of ap- river knew that, and they put up their batteries
proach to the bridges and permitted right along the line and they peppered us right
down the line all the way. . . . In addition to that,
enemy antiaircraft artillery to zero in they had their fighters come up along side; while I
on the flight path of the bombers. Also, didn't see them myself, the combat mission reports
the provision that the bridges could be indicate that they would join our formation about
2 miles to the lee and fly along at the same speed on
attacked only under visual bombing con- the other side of the river while we were making our
ditions meant that any cloud cover at approach, and just before we got to bombs-away po-
the target diverted the bombers to sition, they would veer off to the north and climb
up to about 30,000 feet and then make a frontal
secondary or last-resort objectives. quarter attack on the bombers just about at the
On 12 November, carrier-based Navy time of bombs-away in a turn. So that they would
35
be coming from Manchuria in a turn, swoop down,
(1) DA WIR No. 91, 17 Nov 50, p. 38, NK fire their cannon at the formation, and continue
Border Crossings. (2) FEC Intelligence Digest, vol. the turn back into sanctuary—and the boys didn't
I, No. 13, 16-30 June 1953, p. 26. like it." See MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3069-70.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 247
The Sanctuary and Hot Pursuit ber, the Joint Chiefs told the Secretary
of Defense, "The need for air interdic-
On at least three separate occasions, tion operations in areas contiguous to
American pilots, through error, had pre- the international boundaries of Korea
viously violated their instructions and is sufficient justification for not fur-
attacked targets in Manchuria and Si- ther delimiting air operations." They
beria. Although the U.S. Air Force pointed out that it appeared to them that
attributed these incursions upon neutral all United Nations forces would be
territory to pilot and navigational error, required to operate clear up to the inter-
these incidents, regardless of their cause, national boundaries of Korea. "There-
were serious matters. It was entirely fore," they said, "it is not considered
possible that either China or Russia desirable from the military point of view,
could have used the incidents as an ex- to deny these ground troops air and naval
cuse for expanding the war or for support in these areas, nor would ac-
retaliating in other forms.37 Indeed, ceptance of the loss of life entailed by
after mid-August, Chinese antiaircraft such denial be justified."
39
batteries in Manchuria fired at U.N. The efforts to bomb out the interna-
aircraft flying south of the Yalu. By tional bridges brought the question into
late October one American plane had sharp focus. The sorties against these
been shot down and another damaged.38 bridges continued to be strongly op-
The Department of State had been posed. Russian-built jet aircraft, later
particularly apprehensive lest further identified as MIG-15's presumably
such encroachments should provide the piloted by Chinese pilots, had been en-
Russians or Chinese a semblance of countered by American pilots in the
justification for overt attacks against the area since 1 November, when one such
United States. In a series of pointed aircraft made a nonfiring pass at a U.N.
questions addressed to the Secretary of plane; and when the U.N. air force
Defense, the Secretary of State had asked undertook the bombing of the Yalu
whether it was necessary for American bridges on 8 November the enemy jet
air and naval forces to operate along pilots attacked in earnest. One MIG
the North Korean border and whether was sent down in flames on the first day
the Joint Chiefs should not caution Mac- of the attacks.
Arthur against such operations. Sec- The enemy jets did not stray far from
retary Marshall had requested advice the Manchurian border, and since Amer-
from the Joint Chiefs. The Joint Chiefs, ican planes were forbidden to cross,
who had already instructed General enemy pilots enjoyed an almost insur-
MacArthur on the matter of border vio- mountable advantage. They could
lations, felt that MacArthur was fully break off combat whenever things got
aware of the necessity for avoiding such
incidents and that they could not curtail 39
(1) Memo, Ch Intnl Br, G-3, for Gen Schuyler,
his mission. Consequently, on 1 Novem- sub: Delimitation of Air Opns Along the Northern
Border of Korea, JSPC 853/60. (2) JCS 2150/9,
37
USAF Hist Study No. 72, ch. 5, pp. 80-81. Incl A, Memo, JCS for Secy Defense, 1 Nov 50, in
38
Rad, CX 67701, CINCFE to DA, 28 Oct 50. G-3 DA file 091 Korea, Case 115.
248 POLICY AND DIRECTION
too hot for them and dash across the immediate reply to the United Nations
border to safety. American Air Force commander they told him that "urgent
commanders naturally complained to necessity for corrective measures" was
General MacArthur about the protec- being presented for highest United
tion afforded enemy pilots by their States-level consideration.41
Manchurian sanctuary. Meanwhile, other member nations of
MacArthur had already sought help. the United Nations had noted the situa-
"Hostile planes are operating from bases tion growing out of Chinese intervention
west of the Yalu River against our forces and American border violations with
in North Korea," General MacArthur mounting alarm. The French Govern-
informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 7 ment made two proposals designed to
November. These planes were increas- reassure the Chinese that the United
ing in number; and the distance from Nations Command meant to respect their
the Yalu to the main line of contact was territory. The French first proposed that
so short that it was almost impossible the United Nations General Assembly
to deal effectively with the hit-and-run should publicly call upon the United
tactics that enemy pilots were employing. Nations Command to refrain from
"The present restrictions imposed on bombing the Yalu River power installa-
my area of operation," MacArthur as- tions "except the military necessity
serted, "provide a complete sanctuary for arises." The second proposal was in
hostile air immediately upon their cross- the form of a resolution to be passed
ing the Manchurian-North Korean bor- by the General Assembly which would
der. The effect of this abnormal assure the Chinese that the United Na-
condition upon the morale and combat tions Command considered the Chinese
efficiency of both air and ground troops border "inviolate." The Joint Chiefs
is major." General MacArthur pre- had no objection to the first French
dicted that unless corrective measures proposal since General MacArthur had
were promptly taken the air problem already assured them he did not intend
could assume serious proportions, and to bomb the power installations. Be-
asked for instructions for dealing with sides, the phrase "military necessity" was
this new and threatening development.40 extremely elastic. But they considered
He did not, it should be noted, ask the second French resolution wholly un-
specifically for permission to bomb acceptable because the term "inviolate"
Manchurian air bases or to follow enemy would convey an impression to the
planes across the border. Chinese that the United Nations would
The Joint Chiefs could not tell Mac- not, under any conditions, trespass be-
Arthur to send his fighter planes into yond the border, whereas there was no
Manchuria after the fleeing Chinese guarantee that the United States might
pilots. All they could do was push the not have to operate across the Chinese
matter with their superiors, and in an frontier even before the General As-
40
Rad, CS 68411, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 7
41
Nov 50. Rad, CX 95978, JCS to CINCFE, 7 Nov 50.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 249
be fatal to weaken the fundamental and Korea," and cited British action at
basic policy of the United Nations to Munich in 1938 as historic precedent for
51
destroy all resisting armed forces in their present attitude. He went fur-
Korea and bring that country into a ther and referred to a State Department
united and free nation," he charged. criticism of the British appeasement of
General MacArthur proclaimed his faith Hitler to lend emphasis to his statement.
in the effectiveness of air interdiction by He charged that any such appeasement
telling the Joint Chiefs that he could, of the Communists carried the germs of
with his air power, keep the number of ultimate destruction for the United Na-
Chinese reinforcements crossing the Yalu tions. "To give up any portion of North
low enough to enable him to destroy Korea to the aggression of the Chinese
those Chinese already in Korea. He Communists," General MacArthur de-
meant to launch his attack to destroy clared, "would be the greatest defeat
those forces about 15 November and to of the free world in recent times. In-
keep going until he reached the border. deed, to yield to so immoral a proposi-
"Any program short of this," he tion would bankrupt our leadership and
explained: influence in Asia and render untenable
our position both politically and mili-
would completely destroy the morale of my
forces and its psychological consequence tarily." MacArthur asserted that by
would be inestimable. It would condemn moving to halt his forces short of the
us to an indefinite retention of our military Yalu River American authorities "would
forces along difficult defense lines in North follow clearly in the footsteps of the
Korea and would unquestionably arouse British who by the appeasement of recog-
such resentment among the South Koreans
that their forces would collapse or might nition lost the respect of all the rest of
even turn against us. Asia without gaining that of the Chinese
segment." 52
He charged that anyone who hoped that
the Chinese, once they had succeeded in 51
A current news report had stated that Mr.
establishing themselves in North Korea, Bevin favored a buffer zone south of the Yalu. Dr.
would abide by any agreement not to Pannikar recalls that in mid-November Mr. Bevin
move southward would be indulging in sent a message through his minister in Peiping to
50 be conveyed to Chou En-lai or the highest accessible
wishful thinking at its very worst. Chinese official. Pannikar says of this message to
The Joint Chiefs had told MacArthur which he apparently was given access, "It was a
that consultation with the British Gov- strange communication, an elucidation of the objec-
tives of the United Nations in Korea, an assurance
ernment on any new course of action from Britain that Chinese boundaries would be
against China was an integral part of respected. . . . when Hutchinson [the British Minis-
American policy. In an unusually vehe- ter] discussed the matter with me I frankly told him
that I doubted whether the Chinese would look at
ment burst of impatience, MacArthur any proposal which did not include an offer of di-
directed a scathing comment at what he rect negotiations of the whole issue with them; and
termed, "The widely reported British that I considered that the idea of Britain assuring
China of the inviolability of her boundaries was pa-
desire to appease the Chinese Commu- tronizing, to say the least." See Pannikar, In Two
nist by giving them a strip of Northern Chinas: The Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 114-15.
52
Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd Mac-
Arthur, 9 Nov 50.
252 POLICY AND DIRECTION
ing military forces against the United States in manpower, materiel, and money
Nations Command, the Joint Chiefs saw to conduct an undeclared war in that
three possibilities, although none of these area over a long period." Conversely,
had as yet been made clear by Chinese the Chinese, being next door to Korea,
actions either in Korea or in Manchuria. would find it comparatively inexpensive,
The Chinese might wish to protect the with their practically unlimited man-
Yalu River and the Changjin-Pujon power and Soviet equipment, to carry
Reservoir power complexes and establish on such a war indefinitely. The con-
a cordon sanitaire in North Korea; they tinued involvement of United States
might wish to continue the active but un- forces in Korea would, in the opinion of
declared war in Korea to drain American the Joint Chiefs of Staff, be in the in-
resources without expending too much terests of Russia and of world commu-
of their own military strength; or they nism by imposing a heavy drain on U.S.
could be planning to drive the United military and economic strengths. They
Nations forces from Korea. If the still considered Korea a "strategically
Chinese Communists were prevented, unimportant area" and felt that, in the
through United Nations action, from ob- event of a global war, fighting in Korea
taining electricity from the Yalu power would leave the United States off-balance
systems, Manchuria's economy would while Russia completed its plans for
suffer severely. Consequently, if the global conquest. The Joint Chiefs could
Chinese Communists had intervened in also visualize quite clearly a situation
North Korea solely to protect the power whereby the United States, through con-
plants, it might be well, the Joint Chiefs centrating its strength to defeat the
of Staff told the Secretary of Defense, to Chinese in Korea, might, "win the skir-
announce an unmistakably clear guaran- mish in Korea but lose the war against
tee that the United Nations would not the USSR if global war eventuates." 57
infringe on the sovereignty of Man- The Joint Chiefs did not truly believe
churia, would not damage the power that the Chinese Communists intended
plants, and would not interfere with to drive the United Nations forces from
their operation. If the Chinese Com- all of Korea. While it was possible that
munists rejected such a guarantee, the the Chinese did have that intention, the
United States could feel fairly certain Joint Chiefs felt they could not force
that they had had some other objective MacArthur's men off the peninsula
in intervening.56 "without material assistance by Soviet
That the Chinese might be planning naval and airpower." If Russia did in-
a limited war of attrition in Korea to tervene to that extent, it would be evi-
tie down and dissipate United States dent that World War III had begun and
strength was also a real possibility. As the United States should get its divisions
the Joint Chiefs pointed out, "Korea is out of Korea as fast as possible.58
at such a distance from the United States If the Chinese intervened in full
that it would be expensive for the United
57
Ibid.
56 58
Ibid. Ibid.
254 POLICY AND DIRECTION
strength, the Joint Chiefs foresaw three diplomatic channels of nations that had
possible courses of action for United recognized Communist China and thus
Nations forces: to continue the action had some access to the leaders of its
as planned; to set up a defensive line government. Insofar as General Mac-
short of Korea's northern border; or to Arthur's assigned mission in Korea was
withdraw. In the first instance, some concerned, the Joint Chiefs were willing
augmentation of United Nations mil- to await clarification of the Chinese Com-
itary strength in Korea might be neces- munists' military objectives before rec-
sary if a drive to the Yalu were to ommending a change in the plan to drive
succeed, even if no more Chinese troops to the Yalu. But with respect to Ameri-
entered the fighting. The second course, can preparedness elsewhere, they recom-
pause and dig in, was, in the eyes of the mended that plans and preparations be
Joint Chiefs, perfectly feasible and, in- made on the basis that the risk of global
deed, perhaps expedient in the face of war had been substantially increased by
60
unclarified military and political prob- the Chinese action.
lems raised by Chinese entry. But they At the very important meeting of the
rejected withdrawal because "if con- National Security Council on 9 Novem-
ducted voluntarily it would so lower the ber in Washington, General Bradley pre-
world wide prestige of the United States sented views developed by the Joint
that it would be totally unaccept- Chiefs of Staff with regard to possible
able. . . ." If the United Nations forces intentions of the Chinese Communists
were compelled to leave Korea involun- in Korea. Bradley ventured a personal
tarily it "could only be accepted as the opinion that U.N. forces could hold in
prelude to global war." With specific the general area of their present positions
reference to global war, the Joint Chiefs but that the question of how much
maintained that current conditions did Chinese pressure these forces would have
not conclusively indicate that global war to take before being impelled to attack
was imminent, only that the risk of the Manchurian bases would become in-
59
global war had been increased. creasingly urgent. He pointed out, how-
One significant conclusion drawn by ever, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff had
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from the evi- agreed that any decision to attack
dence which they had was that the Chinese territory would have to be a
United States should, as a matter of U.N. decision since under the terms of
urgency, make every effort to settle the U.N. authority, which now was the guid-
problem of Chinese intervention by ing force behind MacArthur's directives,
political means. They recommended no such attack was authorized. Bradley
that, through the United Nations, the told the assembled leaders that he did
Chinese be reassured concerning the not agree with MacArthur that the
intentions of the United Nations Com- bombing of the Yalu bridges would stop
mand and, if necessary, that direct ne- the Chinese from entering Korea in
gotiations be carried on through the strength should they choose to continue
59 60
Ibid. Ibid.
THE CHINESE TAKE A HAND 255
their incursions. General Smith added eign troops from Korea. This would
that within fifteen to thirty days the Yalu have the effect of abandoning Korea to
would be frozen anyway, rendering the the Communists.63
entire question of bridge bombing After studying these various views and
academic.61 recommendations, the National Security
When Secretary of Defense Marshall Council recommended certain interim
questioned the disposition of X Corps, measures to the President of the United
which he felt was in some danger be- States. These recommendations rep-
cause of its great dispersion and lack of resented the combined sentiments of the
depth, Bradley defended MacArthur's nation's policy-makers, and largely aimed
reasons. He pointed out that in deploy- at a possible political solution to the
ing his troops MacArthur sought to problem of Chinese Communist inter-
carry out his directives to occupy all of vention and in keeping with the estab-
North Korea and to hold elections. On lished policy of avoiding, by every
this same point, Secretary Acheson honorable means, a general war.
pressed Bradley to tell them whether The President later recalled that
there was not a better line for Mac- November 1950 found the United States
Arthur's forces to occupy in Korea. mainly concerned with three moves with
Bradley agreed that, from a purely mil- regard to Korea. The United States was
itary point of view, the chances of de- attempting to reassure its European
fending a line in Korea would increase allies, especially England and France,
as that line was moved south of the Yalu. that it did not intend to widen the con-
But he noted also that any backward flict or to abandon Europe for new
movement on MacArthur's part would entanglements in Asia. Secondly, in the
reduce U.N. prestige and might ad- United Nations the United States was
versely affect the will of the South attempting to gain maximum support for
Koreans to fight.62 resistance to Chinese Communist inter-
Acheson then recommended consid- vention, at the same time avoiding any
eration of a buffer zone twenty miles United Nations move toward military
deep, ten miles on each side of the Yalu. sanctions against Peiping—which would
He felt that the Russians were interested have undoubtedly meant war. Third,
in such an arrangement. Insofar as the the United States was making every effort
Chinese were concerned, he saw them to ascertain the strength and direction
as having two interests, first, to keep the of the Chinese Communist effort.64
United States involved and, secondly and Although these moves may seem to
less important, to protect the border and have been inadequate in light of the
its power plants. The Chinese, of course, problem that developed later, it should
would, if such a buffer zone were pro- be remembered that the problem itself
posed, insist on the departure of all for- was then in the formative stage. The
61 63
Truman, Memoirs, II, 378-80. Ibid.
62
Ibid. Ibid.,381.
64
256 POLICY AND DIRECTION
moves, at the time, did present a logical work of the policy that the United States
basis from which to proceed as the prob- pursued until changes were forced by
lem developed, and formed the frame- the pressure of events.
CHAPTER XIV
The gauntlet cast down by the Chinese dent over the ultimate outcome. Walker
in late October and early November left assured Bolté that he had no intention of
American intelligence experts guessing. going on the defensive and had with-
Were the Chinese merely saving face? drawn only as a temporary regrouping
Were they bluffing? Or did the Commu- measure. Walker, at the time, was bring-
nist Chinese seriously mean to throw ing up his IX Corps on the right of his
their vast armies into Korea to defeat I Corps in order to renew the attack in
MacArthur's United Nations forces? greater strength.1
American and other intelligence analysts Walker intended to advance three
might disagree on Chinese motives and corps abreast, the U.S. I Corps on the
intentions. But all corroborated that west, the U.S. IX Corps in the center,
Chinese armies had massed in great and the ROK II Corps on the east. He
strength along the Yalu in Manchuria, had set D-day at 15 November and given
disposed for early action in Korea if the his army the mission to "attack to the
signal came, and that an unknown num- north destroying enemy forces, and ad-
ber had entered Korea. It was indeed a vance to the northern border of Korea
time for careful treading and sober con- in zone." 2
sideration. Walker's main concern in preparing
for the attack lay in alleviating a shortage
of supplies in his forward areas. Since
Eighth Army's Plans and Problems moving above P'yongyang, the Eighth
The temporary setbacks in early No- Army had been supplied mainly by air-
vember did not alter MacArthur's plans. lift. General Milburn, commanding the
He continued to prepare for the north- I Corps, told General Bolté that his corps
ward advance in the face of proof that was operating with only one day of fire
Chinese Communist forces had entered and one and one-half days of POL in
Korea. General Bolté had visited Korea reserve. General Walker felt that he
1
just after, as he described it, "the Chi- Memo, G-3 (Bolté) for CofS USA, 14 Nov 50,
nese had destroyed the 8th Cavalry Regi- Area, Visit
sub: of Gen Bolté and Party to the Pacific
in G-3, DA file Pac, Case 8/2.
mental Combat Team." He found 2
(1) EUSAK Opns Plan No. 14, 6 Nov 50.
General Walker apprehensive but confi- (2) War Diary, EUSAK G-3 Sec, 6 Nov 50.
258 POLICY AND DIRECTION
could not improve this dangerous situa- vember, the transportation officer of the
tion in the face of the limited trans- Far East Command sketched the situa-
portation, the poor roads, and the long tion with regard to ports and lines of
distances involved, unless the Chin- communication in Korea. Pusan was
namp'o port was in full operation. Gen- handling about 15,000 metric tons of
eral Bolté thought that the solution to supply daily, and Inch'on about 8,000
these supply problems lay in greater metric tons. Chinnamp'o, a vital port
effort by the Air Force. He pointed out since it was much closer to the front, had
that the Air Force was lifting 1,000 tons been opened for partial operation but
daily but could double this with more could handle only shallow-draft vessels.
flight crews and better maintenance. The port had not been completely mine-
"Cargo aircraft stand idle and supply is swept, and the large tidal basin at the
critical," Bolté complained to Washing- port had silted up considerably. Some
ton, "Cannot this be remedied soonest? LST's were being unloaded even though
I emphatically recommend more help they rested on the bottom of the harbor
including triple crews immediately." 3 at low tide.
5
In the face of the enemy strength evi- of forces moving along an established
dent in General Almond's area and in the direction would be retained; North Ko-
Eighth Army's zone, General Wright's rean forces would not have time to dig
JSPOG staff closely examined the orig- in and resist; logistics difficulties within
inal plan developed for X Corps opera- the X Corps would be minimized; and
tions. The Eighth Army attack was to the route of the 1st Marine Division's
be the main U.N. effort. Wright's staff advance (to Changjin thence north to
looked at the X Corps' plans from the the Yalu) would pose a threat of envel-
standpoint of "how can X Corps best opment to the enemy. On the other
assist Eighth Army?" The JSPOG plan- hand, certain disadvantages would result
ners had either not consulted or did not if the X Corps carried out the operation
believe intelligence estimates forwarded as then planned. The X Corps' drive
to Washington by Willoughby, since would not immediately affect enemy
their planning assumptions credited the forces facing the Eighth Army. The di-
Chinese with less strength than shown rection of movement of the center of
in Willoughby's reports of the same date. mass in the X Corps would be away from
According to JSPOG assumptions on 12 the main strength of the enemy. The
November, the Eighth Army faced 18,000 most significant observation was the state-
Chinese troops, and the X Corps, 7,500. ment that by continuing to advance to
These troops were in addition to 50,000 the north, "X Corps incurs the danger
North Koreans fronting the X Corps' of becoming seriously over-extended,"
path of advance. The Chinese were and that if progress by the right flank of
credited with the ability to reinforce at the Eighth Army was appreciably slower
the rate of 24,000 men per day.12 than X Corps', the left flank of the X
As JSPOG officers saw it, Almond's Corps would be exposed.14 For all prac-
plan called for an advance to the Korean tical purposes, that flank was already
border and destruction of enemy forces; exposed.
keeping contact with the Eighth Army; A prophetic warning was contained in
protection of the Eighth Army's right the portion of the staff study discussing
flank against enemy forces sideslipping the advance of the Marine elements of
into it from the north; elimination of the X Corps:
guerrillas; administration of his area.
As the 1st Marines move toward Changjin
These projected operations would not they will tend to be extended. The left
provide direct assistance to the Eighth flank of the Marines will be on the moun-
Army in its attack, but JSPOG officers tainous ridge that divides the watersheds of
noted that successful completion of X the peninsula. It is generally impassable
Corps plans would be of considerable for heavy military traffic. However, pris-
oner reports show that the 124th CCF Di-
incidental aid to the Eighth Army.13 vision entered North Korea at Manpojin
Advantages seen in the X Corps' and is now in the Choshin [Changjin]
planned operation were that momentum Reservoir area. If the 1st Marine Division
12
attacks north beyond this route well ahead
Staff Study, X Corps Assistance to Eighth Army.
12 Nov 50, JSPOG files.
13 14
Ibid. Ibid.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 261
You will recall that during your recent to exist but these routes would have to be
visit with us at WONSAN we presented X verified when that area is reached.
Corps capabilities of making an all-out Thus, X Corps Operation Order No. 6,
effort, with not less than two US divisions, 11 November 1950, directing advance in
to the west in the event of an enemy break- zone to the north border of Korea is in
through or envelopment of Eighth Army's accordance with Part II, CX67291, and is
right flank. We have devoted continuing I believe, at present the most important
efforts in planning possible operations not contribution we can make to the overall
only to further the CinC's overall objective operation in Korea. The success of this
of securing all of North Korea within our advance will result in the destruction of
assigned zone as expeditiously as possible Chinese and North Korean forces in the
but also to assist Eighth Army's effort. reservoir area, which might otherwise be
With the containment by Eighth Army employed on the Eighth Army front, and
of the Communist offensive in that area, will place X Corps units in a position to
coupled with the unchanged overall mis- threaten or to cut enemy lines of commu-
sion, it now appears to me to be inadvis- nication in the Eighth Army zone. As a
able, at this stage of Eighth Army and X corollary, X Corps will secure the important
Corps operations, for X Corps forces to hydroelectric power installations in its zone
operate in any strength to the west. The and will be well along toward completing
principal reason for this conclusion is that its ultimate mission prior to the advent of
the only two feasible vehicular routes to severe winter conditions.
the westward in X Corps zone, short of I fully appreciate the CinC's desire for
CHOSIN Reservoir,23 are the YONG- us to assist the Eighth Army in every possi-
HUNG-TAEPYONG-NI and the WON- ble way. I trust that my analysis of present
SAN-YANDOK roads. Since both of these X Corps capabilities explains our views
routes enter the Eighth Army zone in rear here and hope that energetic execution of
of General Walker's present front lines, my Operation No. 6 will place assistance
any advance in strength to the westward to the Eighth Army before the cold weather
over them would appear to be a fruitless now upon us is much more severe.24
operation. Even contacting the Eighth
Army right flank in the vicinity of General Willoughby continued to re-
ONYANG-NI with more than foot troops port a crucial build-up of forces in the
would require a major engineer road-build- Changjin-Pujon Reservoir area north of
ing effort in the mountains to the eastward Hamhung-Hungnam. Even as Almond
thereof. and Wright exchanged views on the best
In view of the foregoing, I am convinced
that X Corps can best support Eighth course of action for the X Corps, Wil-
Army's effort by continuing its advance to loughby informed Washington that his
the north, prepared to move westward if study revealed a great vulnerability of
desirable when X Corps elements are well the open west flank of the X Corps and
north of CHOSIN Reservoir, and they will of the main supply route leading from
be prepared to trap and destroy any enemy
forces engaging Eighth Army which depend Hungnam to the Changjin Reservoir.
upon a line of communication through Almost 10,000 enemy troops had been
MANPOJIN. North of CHOSIN Reservoir spotted immediately west of this vital
suitable lateral routes to the west appear line. In addition, the enemy had the
Chosin Reservoir is the Japanese name for the equivalent of four divisions in the Chang-
23
Changjin Reservoir, and is the name by which U.N. jin-Pujon area. With this strength, the
forces best knew this body of water. The Pujon Chinese could counterattack to the south-
Reservoir, east of the Changjin, was also best known
24
by its Japanese name, Fusen. Ltr, Gen Almond to Gen Wright, 14 Nov 50.
264 POLICY AND DIRECTION
U.S. MEN AND TANKS advance through the rubble-strewn streets of Hyesanjin,
near the Manchurian border.
east with troops from the Changjin area On 20 November General Almond,
in an effort to isolate X Corps forces acting on instructions from General Mac-
northeast of Hungnam, could conduct Arthur, warned his command that mini-
active guerrilla operations against corps
mum forces only were to advance to the
lines of communications, could throw a
combined offensive against X Corps immediate vicinity of Korea's northern
using guerrillas and other forces, or could border. No troops or vehicles were to
launch an offensive against the gap be- go beyond the boundary into Manchuria
tween the Eighth Army and X Corps by or the USSR, and no fire was to be ex-
sideslipping to the southwest from the changed with, or air strikes brought
Changjin Reservoir area.25
down on, forces north of the northern
25
Telecon, TT 4028, DA and GHQ, 17 Nov 50. boundary. Damage, destruction, and
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 265
THANKSGIVING DAY SERVICES being held for members of the U.N. forces on the
bank of the Yalu river.
disruption of power plants were to be 7th Division has reached its objective and
avoided.26 I am confident that you will hold it."27
Troops of the 17th Infantry, 7th Divi- Almond meanwhile ordered a plan
sion, reached the Yalu River at Hyesanjin made for a westward advance along the
on 21 November. General MacArthur Hagaru-ri-Mup'yong-ni axis. He di-
immediately congratulated General Al- rected that the road to the Changjin
mond, who, in turn, commended the Reservoir be developed as a corps supply
7th Division for "an outstanding mili- road and that an RCT of the 7th Divi-
tary achievement." Almond's message sion be assigned to seize Changjin town
ended on an optimistic note when he and to protect the east flank of the 1st
told Maj. Gen. David G. Barr, "The Marine Division. The two objectives,
26 27
Rad, X 12811, CG X Corps to All Comdrs, 20 Rads, X 2867 and X 2859, CG X Corps to CG
Nov 50. 7th Division, 22 Nov 50.
266 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Changjin and Mup'yong-ni, were too der and took a consistently darker view
widely separated to be assigned to a of it than did the United States. On
single division. General Almond also 13 November, the Australian Prime Min-
directed that the planners take into con- ister informed the United States through
sideration that extreme winter tempera- diplomatic channels that the Australian
tures of 30 to 40 degrees below zero Government now believed that Chinese
Fahrenheit would severely restrict both intervention had created a new situation
friendly and enemy operations. in Korea which called for careful exam-
On 23 November, Colonel Chiles, X ination. He recommended "military
Corps operations officer, took this plan tocaution" and forecast that the conse-
Tokyo where he discussed it with Gen- quences of Manchurian border incidents
eral MacArthur's staff. On 24 Novem- could be so grave that it might be best
ber, General MacArthur directed that "temporarily to ignore Chinese Commu-
the plan be carried out with one modifi- nist provocation to the extent possible." 31
cation, a shift of the proposed boundary From embassies located in Peiping came
between the X Corps and Eighth Army other warnings. The Swedish Ambassa-
farther west and south in the zone of the dor to Communist China reported in
1st Marine Division. General Almond mid-November that Chinese Communist
28
was told to designate his own D-day. movements toward Korea were on a large
The details of the corps plan were passed scale. The Burmese Embassy in Peiping
on to General Walker and the Eighth at the same time expressed the view that
Army staff by visiting GHQ officers on the Chinese Communists were ready to
29
24 November. go to any length to aid the North Ko-
General Almond ordered his troops to reans and that they were fostering mass
advance at 0800, 27 November. The hysteria based upon an alleged United
final assignment of tasks directed the 1st States intention to invade Manchuria.
Marine Division to seize Mup'yong-ni The Netherlands on 17 November passed
and advance to the Yalu, the 7th Division along to the United States Government
to attack from the Changjin Reservoir information from Peiping that Chinese
and advance to the Yalu, and the ROK intervention in Korea was motivated by
I Corps to advance from Hapsu and fear of aggression against Manchuria.
Ch'ongjin areas to destroy the enemy.30 If U.N. forces halted fifty miles south
of the Yalu, the Netherlands believed,
The Cautious View there would be no further intervention.
General MacArthur was prescient in
Other friendly nations meanwhile his apprehension that steps might be
were concentrating on the threatening taken to prevent his advance to the
situation developing along the Yalu bor- northern border of Korea. Strong senti-
ment was developing among other mem-
28
Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps, 24 bers of the United Nations and within
Nov 50.
29
the Department of State for a solution
Rad, CX 69661, CINCFE to CG X Corps and
CG Eighth Army, 23 Nov 50.
30 31
X Corps Opns Order No. 7, 25 Nov 50. Intelligence Rpt, 13 Nov 50, in G-2, DA files.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 267
Since there are many political and militaryeastern sectors, could not easily be de-
implications involved in these ideas and fended. Only along the river line itself,
since other nations would be involved, no a line which he was not proposing to
action along these lines is contemplated
until full opportunity has been given for sacrifice once achieved, were there nat-
further consideration of your views, final ural defense features to be found such as
in no other defense line in all of Korea.
decision by the President and, possibly dis-
cussion with certain other countries.42 "Nor would it be either militarily or
General MacArthur turned thumbs politically defensive," he asserted, "to
down on the proposals. But his reply, in yield this natural protective barrier safe-
contrast to his earlier blast against any guarding43 the territorial integrity of
form of restriction upon his advance, Korea."
was temperate. The tone of his reply General MacArthur feared, aside from
approached, in some respects, patient the military foolishness of such a move,
forbearance. The anticipated move to that the political results would be
halt his advance had come, not as an "fraught with most disastrous conse-
order, but as a suggestion which could quences." Any failure on the part of the
become an order only after time-consum- United Nations Command to keep going
ing negotiation. Walker's forces had al- until it had achieved its "public and oft-
ready jumped off toward the border and repeated" objective of destroying all
well might reach it before further politi- enemy forces south of Korea's northern
cal action could be taken. boundary would be viewed by the Ko-
"The concern underlying the search rean people as betrayal. The Chinese
for the means to confine the spread of and all other Asians would, he main-
the Korean conflict is fully understood tained, view it as weakness and appease-
and shared here, but it is believed that ment of the Communist Chinese and
44
the suggested approach would not only Russians.
fail to achieve the desired result but He presented a novel secondary argu-
would be provocative of the very conse- ment against establishment of any sort of
quences we seek to avert," General Mac- buffer zone by pointing out that political
Arthur stated. He had just returned to tension between Manchuria and Korea
Tokyo from a tour of the battlefront required that the international boundary
where he had flown over the Yalu River be closed to minimize bandit raids and
area in a "personal reconnaissance." smuggling. His study of Russian and
This flight had convinced him beyond Chinese propaganda caused him to doubt
all doubt that it would be utterly im- that either nation was actually concerned
possible to stop upon commanding ter- over the fate of the Yalu power installa-
rain south of the Yalu if he were to keep tions. The ROK unit which had reached
the lines of approach to North Korea the Yalu at Ch'osan in October had
from Manchuria under effective control. found that the power plants there had
The terrain, ranging from the lowlands
in the west to the rugged central and 43
Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA
for JCS, 25 Nov 50.
44
Ibid.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 271
been shut down for a full month with the advice and assistance of United Na-
47
much of the machinery and equipment tions authorities.
removed, and nothing had been said by If this plan did not effectively appeal
the Russians or the Chinese about the to reason in the Chinese mind, Mac-
loss of power. "In view of these factual Arthur maintained, ". . . the resulting
considerations," he said, "one is brought situation is not one which might be
to the conclusion that the issue of hydro- influenced by bringing to a halt our mili-
electric power rests upon the most tenu- tary measures short of present commit-
45
ous of grounds." ments." But by resolutely meeting those
General MacArthur continued his commitments and accomplishing the
argument by emphasizing that the entry publicly proclaimed military mission of
of Chinese Communist forces into the destroying enemy forces in Korea, the
Korean conflict was a risk which the United States could find its only hope
United States had taken with its eyes of checking Soviet and Chinese aggres-
wide open when it sent troops into Korea. sive designs before those countries were
"Had they entered at the time we were committed to a course from which
beleaguered behind our Pusan Perimeter ". . . for political reasons . . . they
beachhead," MacArthur surmised, "the cannot withdraw." 48
hazard would have been far more grave General Bolté urged the Chief of Staff
than it is now that we hold the initia- to subscribe to these views and recom-
tive. . . ." United Nations forces were mended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff
committed to seize the entire border area, reiterate their approval of the idea of a
and had already, in General Almond's full force advance to the border. But
sector, occupied a sector of the Yalu events were to overtake any such action
River. Yet, in his opinion, there had by the Joint Chiefs.49
been no noticeable political or military
46
reaction by the Chinese or Russians. MacArthur Attacks
He then outlined his plans for the fu-
ture in Korea, telling the Joint Chiefs of Across most of the battlefront during
Staff that as soon as his men consolidated mid-November the enemy seemed to be
positions along the Yalu River he would withdrawing. Cautious probings by
replace American troops with ROK U.N. units occasionally brought strong
forces. He would then order, through local reaction, but American command-
public announcement so the Chinese ers noted a definitely defensive trend.
could not fail to hear, the return of On 20 November, as the Eighth Army
American forces to Japan, and the parole moved into position for the coming drive
of all prisoners of war to their homes, northward, the United Nations Com-
and would leave the unification of Korea mand reported to Washington that the
and the restoration of the civil proce-
dures of government to the people, with 47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Memo, Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 27 Nov 50,
45
Ibid. sub: U.S. Courses of Action in Korea, in G-3, DA
46
Ibid. file 091 Korea, Case 121.
272 POLICY AND DIRECTION
enemy had broken contact and was ap- reached their line of departure by 17
parently withdrawing to positions farther November. Since the logistical picture
north in Eighth Army's zone. But in had improved and promised to improve
the eastern sector, Almond's troops were more in the near future, Walker an-
still meeting resistance. "Recent re- nounced to his commanders that the
ports seem to indicate," MacArthur's attack northward would start on 24 No-
staff informed Washington on 20 No- vember.52
vember, "that the enemy is organizing The Joint Chiefs of Staff had been
the ground to take advantage of rough kept informed of the situation as it de-
terrain, but it is still not clear as to just veloped throughout the month, and on
what this general limited withdrawal ac- 18 November General MacArthur noti-
tivity may portend." These officers noted fied them that the Eighth Army would
that similar withdrawals by the enemy launch its attack as scheduled on 24 No-
in the past had preceded offensive ac- vember. He emphasized that the delay
tions. "On the other hand," they pointed in mounting the offensive had been
but to Army officials in Washington, "the caused by logistical difficulties, not enemy
sudden reversal coupled with limited action. Rather euphemistically perhaps,
withdrawals and considerable activity in in light of later events, he assured the
the vicinity of strong defensive points Joint Chiefs that intensified air attacks
may indicate a high level decision to by his air forces during the preceding
defend from previously selected and pre- 10-day period had been very successful in
pared positions." 50 isolating the battle area, stopping troop
Another enemy, North Korea's win- reinforcement by the enemy, and greatly
ter weather, had made its unwelcome reducing his flow of supplies.53
appearance. On 14 November, the tem- There was an almost complete absence
perature across the entire front plum- of enemy contact on the entire Eighth
meted to readings ranging from ten Army front as Walker's men assumed
degrees above zero in the west to twenty their starting positions on 22-23 Novem-
degrees below zero in northeastern ber. General MacArthur, suspicious of
Korea. this unusual quiet and somewhat wor-
General Walker's orders to his com- ried over the gap between the X Corps
manders reflected a considerable degree and Eighth Army, ordered General
of caution and some respect for the Stratemeyer to patrol this gap with great
enemy forces facing Eighth Army. He care. But American pilots flying from
directed a closely co-ordinated attack by twelve to sixteen sorties in daylight hours
phase line in order to have the army and a half-dozen sorties at night located
under control at all times for any sudden no enemy forces in the gap.54
tactical change required by enemy ac- General Willoughby reported to the
tion. The days of the reckless pursuit
had apparently ended.51 Most units 52
RAD, 172100, CG EUSAK to CG IX Corps, CG
X Corps, and CG ROKA, 17 Nov 50.
50 53
Telecon, TT 4036, DA and GHQ, 20 Nov 50. Rad, C 69211, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Nov 50.
51 54
(1) EUSAK Opn Plan No. 15, 14 Nov 50. (1) Rad, CX 69453, CINCFE to CG FEAF, 21
(2) War Diary, EUSAK, G-3 Sec, 11 and 14 Nov 50. Nov 50. (2) Rad, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 22 Nov 50.
THE THRESHOLD OF VICTORY 273
Department of the Army on the day be- of the jump-off, 24 November, Wil-
fore the attack that he felt the Chinese loughby's intelligence staff predicted that
Communist Army was having supply the U.N. forces were opposed, in Korea,
problems of its own and intimated that, by 82,799 North Korean soldiers and a
if the Chinese did try to stop Eighth Chinese Communist military force of be-
55
Army, they would be at a disadvantage. tween 40,000 and 70,935.
He told Washington military authorities In a communique issued only hours
that the Chinese had "embarked on their before Walker's divisions started north-
Korean venture in some cases with only ward, the United Nations commander
three days rations" and that constant con- sketched an optimistic picture of what he
tact with U.N. ground forces and the referred to as his "massive compression
pounding from American air had un- envelopment." He felt that the Air
doubtedly depleted the enemy's ammuni- Force had sharply curtailed enemy
tion reserves. "Constant United Nations reinforcement and resupply. General
pressure along the entire line during the Almond's forces had "reached a com-
past few weeks," Willoughby stated, manding enveloping position cutting in
"should make it perfectly clear to the two the northern reaches of the enemy's
Reds that this drain on fire power is cer- geographical potential," and Walker's
tainly not apt to be decreased but in- forces were now to move forward to
creased." He did not consider it likely "complete the compression and close the
that the Chinese high command would vise." "If successful," General MacAr-
make any appreciable effort to alleviate thur declared, "this should for all prac-
56
the supply shortages of their forces, tical purposes end the war."
". . . as the Chinese have always been, 55
Telecons, TT 4058 and TT 4063, DA and GHQ,
by western standards, notoriously poor 24-25 Nov 50.
56
providers for their soldiers." On the day CommuniquéNo. 12, GHQ UNC, 24 Nov 50.
CHAPTER XV
subterfuge now has the slightest validity.change in tactics, the opening episode of
We face an entirely new war." 4 Instead the Chinese offensive had reversed the
of fighting fragments of the North Ko- course of the war. The Chinese opening
rean Army reinforced by token Chinese success was due largely to the skillful
forces, Walker and Almond apparently execution of well-laid plans, in particular
now faced a total Chinese force of about to the achievement of complete surprise.
300,000.5 That surprise was not wholly the result
MacArthur claimed that Walker's 24 of superior Chinese camouflage and
November advance had forced the Chi- march discipline. Intelligence received
nese to attack prematurely, theorizing by MacArthur and his senior command-
that the Chinese originally planned to ers had been incompatible and inconclu-
launch their offensive in the spring of sive. But this intelligence did provide
1951 when better weather and greater clear warnings that Chinese forces were
supply and troop resources would be at poised between United Nations troops
hand. But even if his claim were cor- and the northern border of Korea. Much
rect, the Chinese attack gave MacArthur of the surprise achieved by the Chinese
no real advantage. For he was finding stemmed from the tendency of U.N. lead-
it increasingly difficult, and so admitted
ers to discount these warnings.
to Washington, to interdict enemy routes As a defense of his own judgment and
of reinforcement and resupply from the efforts of the theater intelligence
Manchuria because the Yalu River was officers MacArthur insisted ". . . that the
now freezing hard enough to permit the intelligence that a nation is going to
Chinese to cross without using bridges. launch war, is not an intelligence that is
Furthermore: available to a commander, limited to a
small area of combat. That intelligence
It is quite evident that our present strength
should have been given to me." 7
of force is not sufficient to meet this un-
declared war by the Chinese with the in- But at the national level, authorities
herent advantages which accrue thereby todeclared that Chinese intentions had not
them. The resulting situation presents anbeen sufficiently clear to permit a definite
entire new picture which broadens the
judgment. General Bradley, in fact,
potentialities to world-embracing considera-
maintained that the Department of De-
tions beyond the sphere of decision by the
Theater Commander. fense had had no intelligence that the
8
Having thus shifted responsibility for Chinese would enter the war.
the next decision to Washington, Mac- The daily estimates given MacArthur
Arthur announced that for the time by his own intelligence staff were supple-
being he intended to pass from the mented by General Willoughby in pri-
offensive to the defensive, making local vate presentations. Whether Willoughby
adjustments as the ground situation gave MacArthur different information
required. 6 from that contained in the daily estimates
As reflected in MacArthur's abrupt is not known, but beyond doubt, Wil-
4
loughby's presentations amplified the
Rad, C 69953, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50.
5 7
Ibid. MacArthur Hearings, p. 18.
6 8
Ibid. MacArthur Hearings, p. 759.
276 POLICY AND DIRECTION
routine staff reports. On the assumption of trained soldiers in Korea. Three days
that the G-2's published estimates and later he was told that "it would appear
personal briefings were similar, Mac- logical to conclude that Chinese Com-
Arthur must have learned of the enemy's munist leaders are preparing their people
capabilities and the order in which those psychologically for war." On the same
capabilities might be employed. But he day that the Eighth Army struck north-
possibly found the reports also puzzling ward in its general offensive, Willoughby
and contradictory. On 15 November, reported that "Even though Chinese
Willoughby's staff forecast that the most Communist strategy may not favor an
likely sequence of enemy moves would immediate full-scale war, preparations
be (1) Conduct of offensive operations. for such an eventuality appear to be in
(2) Reinforce with communist forces progress." 10
from outside Korea. (3) Conduct guer- On the second day of the attack, before
rilla operations. (4) Defend. Then, in the Chinese had fully committed them-
amplification of this forecast, Willough- selves, Far East Command intelligence
by's officers reported: officers changed the predicted order of
enemy courses of action, placing rein-
Information received from Chinese Na-
tionalist military sources, during the past forcement from outside Korea at the top
few days gives strong support to an assump- of the list, and the conduct of offensive
tion that the Chinese Communists intend operations in second place. But again
to "throw the book" at United Nations MacArthur received contradictory esti-
forces in Korea. . . . It is fast becoming mates of Chinese intentions when he was
apparent that an excessive number of troops
are entering Northeast China. . . . Such a told:
marshalling of troops cannot be explained Although too early for concrete evaluation,
in terms of redeployment . . . or demo- there are some indications of a withdrawal
bilization. It seems doubtful that the Chi- of Chinese Communist forces to the Yalu
nese Communists, if intending to intervene or across the border into Manchuria. . .
in Korea would wait until this late in the On the other hand, there are many reports
war. On the other hand it seems incredible of Chinese Communist plans to strengthen
that the Chinese Communists have deluded their intervention forces now in Korea and
themselves with their own propaganda and all indications point to a heavy troop build-
fear a United States attack on Manchuria. 9 up in Northeast China and Manchuria.
Such contradictions could scarcely have . . . Also there are many indications that
the Chinese Communists will stubbornly
been of much help to MacArthur in de- defend reservoir and11 power installations
ciding for himself what the enemy most along the Yalu. . . .
probably would do. These vacillatory daily reports con-
On 16 November, General MacArthur tained too many qualifying clauses to
was told that the Chinese Communists permit a positive forecast. But in the
had probably deployed twelve divisions sense that they indicated a continuing
9 10
(1) DIS, GHQ, FEC No. 2989, 15 Nov 50. (1) DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2990, 16 Nov 50.
(2) General Willoughby's later explanation of intel- (2) DIS GHQ, FEC, No. 2993, 19 Nov 50. (3) DIS
ligence failure sheds no light on the mystery but GHQ, FEC, No. 2998, 24 Nov 50. On 16 November,
is of interest to readers wishing greater detail. See about thirty CCF divisions were in Korea.
11
Willoughby, MacArthur, 1941-1951, pp. 378-90. DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2999, 25 Nov 50.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 277
Chinese build-up in Manchuria and Ko- tervene in Korea, would wait until this
rea and that they did point out psycho- late in the war." 13
logical and other preparations for an MacArthur did not fear the Chinese
offensive against United Nations forces, and felt that in the event he was mistaken
these reports possessed some validity. and the Chinese were not bluffing, his
The reasons that prompted General forces were capable of taking care of both
MacArthur to persist in his drive to the the Chinese and the North Koreans.
border in the face of the very obvious For, as noted earlier, he had pointed out
Chinese potential to meet his advance to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that Chinese
with considerable military force, must Communist entry was a risk taken in
remain conjectural. He was aware of full knowledge of the situation. Chinese
the presence in Korea of substantial num- entry during the Pusan days would have
bers of Chinese soldiers; and his own been extremely dangerous. But now
staff had warned him of the great Chinese that the UNC held the initiative and had
potential for immediate reinforcement. less area to defend the risk was much
He had never been told, however, that smaller.14 Only a few days before, he
the enemy had as many divisions in had told the Joint Chiefs that his air
Korea as actually were present. forces had succeeded in isolating the
MacArthur's determination to pursue battle area and in cutting off enemy re-
his mission to the bitter end appears to inforcement and choking off enemy
have had its basis in three concepts. supply.15 MacArthur seems to have over-
First, MacArthur apparently thought estimated the power of his own command
that the Chinese build-up and threaten- vis-à-vis the Chinese. Both the Eighth
ing posture were part of a gigantic bluff Army and the X Corps, he reasoned,
and that the Chinese, since they could were victorious, battle-tested military
not afford to go to war with the United forces. His naval and air forces gave him
States, would not attack his forces. The complete control of the sea and air. Fur-
tenor of his message to the Joint Chiefs thermore, Chinese troops, during World
of Staff on 24 November, turning down War II, had proven inferior to Japanese
their suggestion that he establish a hold- troops and thus, by inference, to Ameri-
ing line some distance short of the Yalu, can troops.
clearly shows that he minimized the Chi- A significant factor was MacArthur's
nese menace.12 He felt, it is also clear, belief that his air power could isolate the
that it was pretty late in the day for the battlefield. MacArthur still persisted in
Chinese to be entering Korea, and that this view on the eve of the attack to the
if they had been serious in their inten- Yalu. He announced on 24 November,
tions they would have intervened when "My air force for the past three weeks,
United Nations forces were still in the in a sustained attack of model coordina-
vicinity of the 38th Parallel. Wil- tion and effectiveness, successfully inter-
loughby, too, doubted ". . . that the dicted enemy lines of support from the
Chinese Communists, if intending to in- 13
DIS, GHQ, FEC, No. 2998, 15 Nov 50.
14
Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC to DA, 25 Nov 50.
12 15
Rad, C 69808, CINCUNC to DA, 25 Nov 50. Rad, C 69211, CINCUNC to DA, 18 Nov 50.
278 POLICY AND DIRECTION
north so that further reinforcement mander's estimate," and that "to delay
therefrom has been sharply curtailed and action in an emergency because of in-
essential supplies markedly limited." complete information shows a lack of
General Wright contends that this belief energetic leadership, and may result in
in the effectiveness of air power was one lost opportunities. The situation, at
of General MacArthur's greatest weak- times, may require the taking of calcu-
nesses in dealing with the Chinese.16 lated risks." This is borne out by his
But, from all indications, the overrid- explanation later of his northward ad-
ing consideration in MacArthur's de- vance as a "reconnaissance in force."
cision to push on to the Yalu was his firm He stated the alternatives which faced
conviction that his mission, "the destruc- him on 24 November. ". . . One," he
tion of the North Korean Armed Forces," testified, "was to ascertain the truth of
dictated his line of action, and could be the strength of what he [the enemy] had;
accomplished only by an advance to the the other was to sit where we were. Had
border. This mission, in spite of notice- we done that he would have built up his
able tendencies on the part of Washing- forces, and undoubtedly destroyed us.
ton toward its modification, was not The third was to go in precipitate re-
altered, largely because of MacArthur's treat, which would not have been coun-
vehement protests during November.17 tenanced, I am quite sure."20
When the Joint Chiefs of Staff had MacArthur also vindicated his advance
told MacArthur on 8 November that by insisting that ". . . the disposition of
". . . this new situation indicates that those troops [Eighth Army and X Corps],
your objective . . . the destruction of in my opinion, could not have been im-
the North Korean armed forces may have proved upon, had I known the Chinese
to be re-examined,"18 MacArthur re- were going to attack." 21 Actually, the
torted in extremely strong terms that any Eighth Army, when hit by the Chinese,
course short of complete destruction of was deployed on a broad front with its
the enemy would be tantamount to abject right flank open and was supported by
surrender and a breaking of faith with few reserves. Almond's corps was strung
the peoples of Asia.19 out in widely separated columns advanc-
There is little doubt that MacArthur ing through extremely rugged terrain.
ardently believed in his mission and that Not only was the X Corps' left flank un-
he was more than willing to call what he protected, but Chinese forces of consid-
regarded as a Chinese bluff in order to erable strength had been reported on that
carry out that mission. He may well flank.
have recalled those tenets of American
military doctrine which hold that "the Emergency Meeting—Tokyo
mission is the basic factor in the com-
16 General MacArthur called an emer-
(1) GHQ, UNC Communiqué No. 12, 24 Nov
50. (2) Interv, Gen Wright with Col Appleman, gency council of war in Tokyo on the
copy in OCMH.
17
night of 28 November. Generals Walker
Rad, JCS 69808, CINCUNC to JCS, 25 Nov 50.
18 20
Rad, JCS 96060, JCS to CINCFE, 8 Nov 50. MacArthur Hearings, pp. 20-21.
21
19
Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to JCS, 9 Nov 50. Ibid., p. 19.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 279
But MacArthur remained solidly operate over the rough terrain in the gap
against any junction of the Eighth Army between the X Corps and Eighth Army.29
and X Corps at this time. Joining the MacArthur doubted that the Joint
two forces, he explained to his Washing- Chiefs fully realized the great changes
ton superiors, would produce no signifi- wrought by the Chinese entry. He tabu-
cant added strength. It would, on the lated for them the latest of his intelli-
other hand, endanger the freedom of gence agencies' estimates of enemy
maneuver deriving from their separate strength. Twenty-six Chinese divisions
lines of supply by sea.28 had been identified in combat and an
General MacArthur again offered additional 200,000 men were either in
other objections. He called the develop- reserve or being committed. This for-
ment of a defense line across the waist midable array of enemy strength was
of the peninsula infeasible because of further augmented by the remnants of
the numerical weakness of his forces and the North Korean Army which were be-
the distances involved. He called to the ing reorganized in rear areas. ". . . There
attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the stands, of course, behind all this, the
necessity of supplying his two major entire military potential of Communist
forces from ports within their respective China." 30
areas; and he reminded them of the geo- The terrain on which the fighting was
graphical division of the peninsula into taking place was having a twofold effect
two compartments by the Taebaek on the course of battle. It diminished
mountain range which ran north and the effectiveness of MacArthur's air arm
south between the Eighth Army and X in trying to channelize and interrupt the
Corps. A continuous line across the nar- Chinese system of supply. Secondly, the
row waist would be approximately 120 rough ground aided the enemy in his dis-
airline miles, or 150 road miles, in length. persion tactics. These drawbacks, Mac-
MacArthur explained: Arthur maintained, greatly reduced the
normal benefits which would be expected
If the entire United States force of seven
divisions at my disposal were placed along from complete control of the air. His
this defensive line it would mean that a naval potential, too, was greatly mini-
division would be forced to protect a front mized by the concentration of enemy
of approximately twenty miles against forces in areas inaccessible to naval gun-
greatly superior numbers of an enemy whose fire. Under these circumstances, Mac-
greatest strength is a potential for night Arthur held, the potential destructive
infiltration through rugged terrain. Such
a line with no depth, would have little force of the United Nations combined
strength, and as a defensive concept would arms was greatly reduced and the ques-
invite penetration with resultant envelop- tion was becoming more and more one
ment and piecemeal destruction. of the relative combat effectiveness of
MacArthur apparently had changed his ground forces.31
mind about the ability of the Chinese to Commenting on the condition of his
29
Ibid.
28 30
Rad, C 50332, CINCUNC to DA for JCS, 3 Dec Ibid.
31
50. Ibid.
282 POLICY AND DIRECTION
own forces, MacArthur pointed out that pessimism unmistakably. He told the
while they so far had exhibited good authorities in Washington:
morale and marked efficiency, they had This small command, actually under pres-
been in almost incessant combat for five ent conditions, is facing the entire Chinese
months and were mentally fatigued and nation in an undeclared war, and, unless
physically battered. Moreover, with the some positive and immediate action is taken,
exception of the 1st Marine Division, hope for success cannot be justified and
each American division then in Korea steady attrition leading to final destruction
can reasonably be contemplated.34
was at least 5,000 men understrength.
The Chinese troops, on the other hand, Faced with General MacArthur's
appeared to be fresh, very well organized, strong objection to a defensive line across
splendidly trained and equipped, and the peninsula, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
apparently in peak condition for actual yielded to his judgment. On 4 Decem-
operations.32 ber, after obtaining President Truman's
MacArthur concluded that unless he approval, they told MacArthur that they
promptly got ground reinforcements of now regarded the preservation of his
the greatest magnitude, his command forces as the primary consideration and
would be forced either into successive agreed to the consolidation of forces into
withdrawals with diminishing powers of beachheads.35
resistance after each such move, or into Eight thousand miles away from the
taking up beachhead positions which, fighting, however, the Joint Chiefs of
while insuring a degree of prolonged Staff could not fully sense conditions in
resistance, would afford little hope of Korea. Consequently, General Collins
anything beyond defense. He charged flew to the Far East for conferences with
that his directives were now completely MacArthur, Walker, and Almond and
outmoded. The strategic concepts which for a firsthand view of the battle. Collins
had been evolved for operations against intended to find out from MacArthur
the North Korean Army were not suit- what chance he had to defend success-
able for continued application against fully, what general line or area he could
the full power of the Chinese. Without hold, and for how long. Secondly, Col-
being specific, MacArthur then called lins wanted to obtain MacArthur's opin-
for sterner measures than he was then ion of a cease-fire.36
authorized to employ. "This calls for
political decisions and strategic plans in Collins Visits Korea
implementation thereof, adequate fully
to meet the realities involved," he de- Collins arrived in Tokyo on the morn-
clared. "In this, time is of the essence, ing of 4 December, conferred briefly
as every hour sees the enemy power in- with General MacArthur, then flew to
crease and ours decline." 33 In clear
terms, the United Nations commander 34
Ibid.
35
issued a prognosis which expressed his (1) Rad, JCS 97917, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Dec 50.
(2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 393.
32 36
Ibid. Draft msg for JCS Representative, 1 Dec 50, in
33
Ibid. G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 127/8.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 283
Korea for talks with General Walker and ence on 6 December, Collins met with
to inspect the Eighth Army's lines. General MacArthur, Admiral Joy, and
Walker's troops had been withdrawing General Stratemeyer, and with key staff
southward as agreed at the 28 November officers, Hickey, Willoughby, and Wright,
Tokyo conference, and although enemy for a full discussion of what moves to
pressure had lessened, were, at the time take against the Chinese. As a frame-
of Collins' inspection, dropping back work for their talks, they projected three
below Sukch'on and Sunch'on to posi- hypothetical situations covering the next
tions not far north of P'yongyang. few weeks or months.
Walker had already told MacArthur that In the first, they posited that the Chi-
he could not hold P'yongyang and esti- nese would continue their all-out attack,
mated that the enemy would unques- but with MacArthur forbidden to mount
tionably force him to pull south of the air attacks against China; that no block-
38th Parallel to the vicinity of Seoul. ade of China would be set up; that no
Walker told Collins that he could con- reinforcements would be sent to Korea
tinue the withdrawal without serious by Chiang Kai-shek; that there would be
losses unless he were ordered to defend no substantial increase in MacArthur's
the Seoul-Inch'on area. If this happened U.S. forces until April 1951 when four
the Chinese could encircle him. Walker National Guard divisions might be sent
felt, and General Collins concurred, that MacArthur; and that the atomic bomb
an evacuation from Inch'on would be might be used in North Korea. General
very costly. If evacuation became neces- MacArthur spoke strongly, charging that
sary, Walker wanted to withdraw from placement of such limitations on his com-
Pusan, not Inch'on. He was confident mand while it remained under strong
he could get his forces safely into the Chinese attack would represent essen-
Pusan area, and even considered it possi- tially a surrender. Under these condi-
ble that he could hold there indefinitely tions the question of an armistice would
if the X Corps reinforced him.37 be a political matter, helpful perhaps,
Walker's troops passed below P'yong- but certainly not requisite from a mili-
yang on 5 December, destroying many tary standpoint. His forces would have
supplies there and falling back to new to be withdrawn from Korea in any case,
positions to the south. On the next day, and the United States should therefore
General Collins flew to Hamhung to see not be hasty in seeking an armistice un-
General Almond. He found Almond der these conditions. He agreed with
confident that he could hold the Ham- Walker and Almond, as did General
hung-Hungnam area for a considerable Collins, that the United Nations forces
time without serious losses, and that he could be safely withdrawn from Pusan
could withdraw successfully and cheaply and Hungnam respectively, with or with-
when so ordered. Collins agreed with out an armistice.
Almond's estimate. Under the second set of conditions,
Returning to Tokyo for a final confer- the conferees assumed a situation in
37
Memo, Gen Collins for JCS, 8 Dec 50, sub: which the Chinese attack would con-
Rpt on Visit to FECOM and Korea, 4-7 Dec 50. tinue, but with an effective naval
284 POLICY AND DIRECTION
for a meeting of the National Security budget to take care of the increased costs
Council.44 of greater military readiness.
General Bradley told the council that The Secretary of State told the council
the Joint Chiefs of Staff considered the that the Chinese attack on U.N. forces
new turn in Korea to be very serious but had moved the United States much closer
not so devastating as newspaper reports to general war. Always to be kept in
indicated. He stressed the dangers of mind in approaching the Korean prob-
MacArthur's command being attacked lem, he stressed, was that the real an-
from Manchurian airfields, but advised tagonist, the power behind the scene in
against authorizing MacArthur to bomb Korea and elsewhere, was Russia. There-
those airfields. fore, any action that President Truman
Secretary of Defense Marshall recom- might eventually take must be taken
mended in strongest terms that neither with full knowledge that a war with
the United States nor the United Nations Russia could be the result. If, for ex-
become involved in a general war with ample, the United States successfully
China. He was joined in this view by bombed Chinese airfields in Manchuria,
all the service secretaries and by the Joint the President believed that Russia would
Chiefs of Staff. Reflecting the emphasis have cheerfully entered the fight.45
which U.S. military planners were plac- The foreign policy of the United
ing on the defense of western Europe, States was, and had been for the past
General Bradley warned that if the three years, predicated on containing the
United States allowed itself to become USSR within its 1947 limits. Now, if the
embroiled in an all-out fight with China United States took action in or against
it would not be able to continue the Chinese territory and entered the USSR's
build-up of forces in Europe. General perimeter of special influence and inter-
Marshall added that it was essential for est, it would risk a war it might not win.
the United States, in dealing with this Acheson believed that there were a num-
new and very serious aggression, to keep ber of ways in which the United States
strictly within the framework of the could damage the Chinese without going
United Nations, regardless of the difficul- to war with them, although he did not
ties which might arise. enumerate these means. But he had
The council was in general agreement concluded that it would be best for the
that the Chinese intervention made it United States to find some way to end
extremely urgent for the United States the fighting in Korea.
to build up its military forces and to en- Over the next several days, President
large its efforts to procure both men and Truman held more meetings with his
materials. The President also agreed top advisers and with Congressional lead-
with this view and with the necessity for ers but made no decisions on courses of
sending to Congress a supplementary action. MacArthur, in his call for politi-
cal decisions, had not explained what he
44
(1) Truman, Memoirs, II, 385-87. (2) The fol- meant by the term. But certainly new
lowing section is based, in addition to specific cita-
tion, on an interview by the author with Mr.
45
Truman at Independence, Missouri, in June 1961. Truman, Memoirs, II, 387-88.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 287
The NATO nations, people and lead- proposed conferences between himself
ers alike, distrusted General MacArthur's and President Truman. These were
strategic judgment. They feared that his quickly arranged and scheduled to begin
stature and influence might enable him on 4 December.50
to appeal so forcibly to the American In the interim, Attlee conferred with
people for more drastic military action leaders of the other Commonwealth na-
as to override the more temperate ap- tions and with the French Premier and
proaches to the Chinese which seemed to Foreign Minister. Apparently, he was
be favored by Washington. also to represent the viewpoints of these
At times, even Washington officials set nations in his talks with President Tru-
NATO nerves on edge with public state- man.
ments. On 30 November, at a press con- On the day before Attlee's arrival in
ference, President Truman remarked, no Washington, and primarily in prepara-
doubt extemporaneously, that the use of tion for his visit, the Secretary of De-
the atomic bomb was under active con- fense, the Secretary of State, Presidential
sideration, unintentionally implying to Adviser Averell Harriman, and the Joint
some oversensitive observers that its use Chiefs of Staff met to discuss the possible
would be left to the discretion of General courses of action open to the United
MacArthur. Even though subsequently States. One matter of paramount con-
he attempted to subdue the storm of cern was how to solve the current crisis,
protest and consternation which followed and at the same time preserve solidarity
by pointing out that only he could au- in the United Nations, especially with
thorize use of the atomic bomb and that the British Commonwealth nations. At
he had not given such authorization, he this meeting, the nation's top authorities
could not avoid the real issue that any reached general agreement that the mili-
decision to use the bomb would be a tary posture of the United States should
United States, not a United Nations, be strengthened without delay. The
decision.49 Army staff was already making studies to
The United Kingdom was predomi- determine what increase in production
nant among the anxious advocates of the schedules and in Army forces and per-
NATO viewpoint. The most respected sonnel should be made.51
leaders of that nation, including Winston With particular regard to Korea, one
Churchill and Anthony Eden, and of the suggestion was that the United States
Commonwealth of Nations, were seri- should press the United Nations for a
ously disturbed by rumors that Mac- resolution calling for a cease-fire on the
Arthur wanted stern measures against condition that the Eighth Army leave
China. As a result of the mounting ten-
50
sion which, conceivably, could have shat- The President received a message from the
tered NATO and the western bloc of the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, on 30
November, asking to visit Washington and to dis-
United Nations as well, Clement Attlee, cuss, face to face, the meaning of events in Korea
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and the possible courses of future action. See Tru-
man, Memoirs, II, 393.
49 51
(1) New York Times, December 1, 1950. Rad, WAR 97929, DA to CINCFE (Personal),
(2) Truman, Memoirs, II, 395-96. for Collins from Haislip, 3 Dec 50.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 289
North Korea and pull back across the Just before the arrival of Attlee, De-
38th Parallel. Any such resolution partment of State officials examined the
would obviously have to be passed before reasons behind his unusual request for a
the Chinese pushed the Eighth Army conference with President Truman and
across the parallel by force. There was Attlee's attitude on the Korean situation.
also much concern over the price that The occasion for Mr. Attlee's visit, they
the Chinese would demand for agreeing concluded, was "the sudden change in
to a cease-fire. the situation in Korea." 53
Another point discussed was whether The growing British concern over
the United Nations forces, in the absence the U.S. foreign and defense policies
of a cease-fire, should evacuate as soon as stemmed in part from what Department
they had withdrawn into beachheads or of State officials described as "the de-
wait until the enemy forced them out. terioration in the position of the West
The conferees also examined the no less vis-à-vis the Soviet Union." The British
important question of whether the did not entirely trust the discretion of
United States should attack Communist the United States. Their concern was
China by air and sea after the United heightened by uncertainty as to the con-
Nations were forced out of Korea. No sequences of some United States policies
definite recommendations for the Presi- and actions. This concern was not pe-
dent as to courses of action evolved from culiar to the British but was known to
this meeting. It was agreed that such be shared by other western powers.54
recommendations must await the return The Department of State forecast that
of General Collins, then still in Korea, Attlee would express to Truman the
as well as the results of the conferences genuine fear shared by all British peoples
which were to begin next day between that the United States was drifting to-
President Truman and Prime Minister ward a third world war and that even
Attlee. though an open war with Russia might
The British Prime Minister was be avoided, the United States would be-
thought to be particularly disturbed by come more completely embroiled in an
President Truman's remarks on possible exhausting war with Communist China.
use of the atomic bomb. The British The two particularly sensitive points in
position was that the atomic bomb should this connection were the immediate situ-
certainly not be used without consulta- Truman announced that he was thinking of using
tion—and probably not without agree- the atom bomb in Korea. But the Chinese seemed
ment—with them and perhaps other totally unmoved by this threat. . . . The propa-
ganda against American aggression was stepped up.
members of the United Nations; and they The 'Aid Korea to resist America' campaign was
were strongly opposed to its use in made the slogan for increased production, greater
China.52 national integration, and more rigid control over
anti-national activities. One could not help feeling
52
(1) Rad, DA (Haislip) to CINCFE (Collins via that Truman's threat came in very useful to the
Larsen), unnumbered, 3 Dec 50. (2) The reaction leaders of the revolution to enable them to keep up
of the Chinese, as described by the Indian Ambassa- the tempo of their activities." See Pannikar, In
dor, to the statement of President Truman seems Two Chinas: Memoirs of a Diplomat, pp. 116-17.
53
to have been opportunistic. "It was the next morn- JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl B.
54
ing (the 1st of December)," Pannikar recalls, "that Ibid.
290 POLICY AND DIRECTION
ation facing U.N. forces in Korea and that he should make no commitment to
the U.S. policy on Formosa.55 Attlee restricting the freedom of action
The Department of State officials told of the United States on use of the atomic
the Joint Chiefs of Staff: bomb. The President should tell Attlee
that the United States did not desire to
With respect to Korea there is profound
concern that actions have been and may use the atomic bomb and stress that the
continue to be taken which unnecessarily United States fully realized the dire con-
aggravate the situation and bring us closer sequences of using the bomb. He should
to war with China. Germane to this is also tell the British Prime Minister that
the rather widespread British distrust of the United States desired and expected
General MacArthur and the fear of politi-
cal decisions he may make based on mili- to move in step with the 58
British in meet-
tary necessity. Bearing on this is the British ing the current crisis.
belief in the buffer area and their stand The Department of State proposed
against attacks across the Yalu. Also in- that President Truman should discuss
volved is the fear of the effect on Asiatics with the British Prime Minister two
of use of the Atomic Bomb or even open
consideration of its use.
56 possible courses of action in Korea. The
first of these involved a withdrawal of
The Joint Chiefs of Staff were in com- U.N. forces to a line on the 38th Parallel
plete agreement with that portion of the in conjunction with a possible cease-fire
Department of State's conclusion which agreement. The second course was the
stated: evacuation of all of Korea. In the event
We believe that the British are very sincere of military necessity, the Department of
in their concern over the above matters State held, the X Corps should withdraw
and that they should be handled with full from Korea to Japan and an attempt
understanding and appreciation of that should be made to stabilize the situation
fact. Although we approach them with
understanding and sympathy and meet them by a political cease-fire agreement, with
wherever reasonably possible, we should not the line of demarcation between forces
give them cause to think that we are fully along the 38th Parallel. The Depart-
satisfied with British actions and policies. ment of State wanted President Truman
In particular, the occasion should be taken to tell Attlee that MacArthur intended
to emphasize to them the importance and
urgency of getting along with the defense to assemble his forces into three beach-
effort. They are inclined sometimes to heads: in the Seoul-Inch'on area, at
regard the world situation as primarily a Hamhung, and at Pusan. The X Corps
United States-Soviet problem and therefore could be evacuated to Japan in any way
to keep
57
the sights for their own efforts too that proved militarily practicable.59
low.
The proposal held:
Insofar as the specifics of action in
Korea were concerned, the Department Before the Chinese Communists have
of State recommended to the President, reached the 38th Parallel in strength we
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concurred, should try to establish a cease-fire on the
basis of the 38th Parallel with the armies
55
56
Ibid. 58
(1) Ibid. (2) Memo for Secy Defense, 4 Dec 50,
Ibid. sub: Use of Atomic Bomb.
57 59
Ibid. JCS 2176/1, 3 Dec 50, Incl B.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 291
separated by a demilitarized zone. The withdraw at any time. They also ob-
principal purpose of this effort would be jected to the Department of State pro-
to deny success to aggression and to con- vision that would have compelled the
solidate an overwhelming majority of the
United Nations members behind the cease- Eighth Army to withdraw on the Seoul-
fire effort. Arrangements for a cease-fire on Inch'on area.61
the basis of the 38th Parallel would not, In the Department of State's recom-
however, be conditioned on agreement to mendation to President Truman regard-
other issues, such as Formosa and the seat- ing the possible necessity of evacuating
ing of Communist China in the United
Nations. Korea was the explanation that the De-
partment's position did ". . . not ex-
During the cease-fire effort (apparently clude the possibility of some military
before a cease-fire had been agreed to by action which would harass the Chinese
both parties), the United Nations would pending their acceptance of a United
retire on the Seoul-Inch'on area, but Nations settlement for Korea and would
would not begin any evacuation until not exclude any efforts which could be
the results of the cease-fire were deter- made to stimulate anti-Communist re-
mined.60 sistance within China itself, including
While the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the exploitation of Nationalist capabili-
their planning staff agreed that a cease- ties."62
fire might be militarily advantageous for It is significant, in view of the early
the United Nations Command under December date, that the Joint Chiefs of
conditions then obtaining, they wanted Staff seized upon this discreetly worded
to be sure of two things. First, the con- hint of retaliatory measures and re-
siderations offered the Chinese in ex- worded it, not only in stronger terms,
change for a cease-fire agreement must but by adding several possible retaliatory
not be too great, and, secondly, the measures later proposed by General Mac-
United Nations commander must not be Arthur, to include a naval blockade of
operationally restricted. Such a plan as China and bombing of Chinese lines of
the Department of State proposed, dic- communication outside of Korea.63
tating not only the area into which the President Truman and Prime Minister
Eighth Army would retire but also re- Attlee met at the White House on 4 De-
stricting the conditions under which cember and on each day thereafter for
MacArthur might evacuate his troops, five days. Also present at these meetings
was unacceptable. The Joint Chiefs of were Secretary of Defense Marshall and
Staff, in revising the Department of State Secretary of State Acheson as well as the
proposals, cut out any reference to the British Ambassador to the United States.
evacuation of the X Corps. "Arrange- Discussion was frank, open, and occa-
ments for this cease-fire," the Joint Chiefs
of Staff maintained, "must not impose 61
conditions which would jeopardize the (1) JCS 1776/167, with Incls, 3-4 Dec 50.
(2) Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:
safety of United Nations forces." In (JCS 1776/7) Korea. Both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
other words, MacArthur must be free to Case 129. 62
Ibid.
60 63
Ibid. Ibid.
292 POLICY AND DIRECTION
sionally heated, but ended in agreement were accepted and the Chinese later
on most major issues.64 started fighting again, the United States
It was very clear that the British, and would fight as hard as it could.
by inference the other NATO nations, Acheson agreed that an immediate
while they had no intention of deserting cease-fire in Korea would be of advantage
the United States, could not reconcile to the United Nations. But to buy that
themselves to what they believed to be cease-fire in the fashion suggested would
its unrealistic and extremely dangerous be unacceptable to the United States.
policy in relation to Red China. Attlee The American leaders were opposed to
took the position at first that there was Attlee's suggestions on the ground that
no choice under current conditions but they would actually reward China for her
to negotiate with the Chinese Commu- acts of aggression and would seriously
nists, with such negotiations most cer- weaken the position of the United States
tainly extending beyond Korea and in the Far East, politically as well as
amounting to the surrender of Formosa militarily. As for U.S. retaliation against
to the Communists, a grant of United China, no promises were made by Ameri-
Nations status to the Chinese Commu- can authorities that they would not take
nists, and the recognition of their govern- more active measures such as blockade
ment by the United States as the price or bombardment of the mainland; but
for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of Attlee was assured that few of the Presi-
Chinese troops from the Korean penin- dent's key advisers were urging this
sula.65 course and that, as a basic principle of its
President Truman emphasized that it policy, the United States was determined
was not the American policy to desert its to avoid any enlargement of the conflict
friends when the going got rough. He if at all possible.
pointed out that the United States did Following their meeting on 7 Decem-
not make distinctions between little ag- ber, Attlee and President Truman agreed
gressions and big aggressions. President that there would be no general voluntary
Truman's position coincided with that of evacuation of Korea at that time. Gen-
the Joint Chiefs of Staff when he told eral Collins, having returned from Ko-
Attlee that if a cease-fire were proposed, rea, on 9 December briefed the two heads
the United States would accept it, but the of government on the military situation.
United States would pay nothing for it. After the briefing he told reporters that
If a cease-fire were not accepted, or if it MacArthur's forces would be able to take
64
care of themselves without further seri-
(1) This resumé of the discussions is based on ous losses.66
messages sent to General MacArthur by the Depart-
ment of State informing him of the progress: Rad, After more discussions between the
CM-IN 18584, State to SCAP, 8 Dec 50; Rad, CM- two heads of state, certain agreements
IN 19784, State to SCAP, 12 Dec 50. (2) Truman, were reached. Among these was agree-
in his memoirs, gives a good deal of information on
the trend of these talks and of his private conversa- ment that neither the United States nor
tions with Attlee. See Truman, Memoirs, II, the United Kingdom would object to
396-413. and Acheson, Present at the Creation,
66
pp. 480-85. New York Times, December 7, 1950 and De-
65
Rad, CM-IN 18584, State to SCAP, 8 Dec 50. cember 9, 1950.
FACING NEW DILEMMAS 293
any appeal by Asiatic nations to the Chi- China out of the United Nations, and
nese Communists for a cease-fire. It was there was agreement that the Chinese
agreed that the objective of both nations Communists would not be granted any
was to achieve a free and united Korea. payment for a peaceful solution in Ko-
A cease-fire and peaceful solution of the rea, such as Formosa or Indochina. If
current conflict with the Chinese Com- no solution could be obtained, American
munists was desirable in the immediate and British troops would fight in Korea
future if it could be secured on honor- until they were forced out.67
able terms. There was no disagreement 67
Rad, CM-IN 19784, Secy State to SCAP, 12
on the matter of keeping Communist Dec 50.
CHAPTER XVI
to run its course before significant de- promised 33,000 could not even be pro-
ployments ( other than the 82d Airborne vided. The best estimate of shipments
5
Division) could be made. Furthermore, during December was placed at 23,000.
"The greatly increased possibility that
global war will eventuate from the cur- Chinese Nationalist Forces
rent crisis makes it mandatory that the In search of additional troops, Mac-
United States make no further deploy- Arthur had reminded the Joint Chiefs
ments that are not in consonance with of Staff of Chiang Kai-shek's July offer
the strategic concept of the current to send 33,000 troops to serve under him
emergency war plan." 2 in Korea. This offer had been turned
down on his own advice and on the
Replacements advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But
Furnishing individual replacements MacArthur felt that the Chinese inter-
was an equally insoluble problem. vention put an entirely different light
When the Chinese struck, each of Mac- on the offer, and on 28 November ap-
Arthur's divisions had lacked about 30 plied to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the
percent of its men and officers. This services of Chiang's troops. He felt that
weakness, acceptable during operations the original refusal had been prompted
against an enemy of inferior strength, or at least influenced by the belief that
became intolerable after the Chinese in- the use of Chinese Nationalists in Korea
tervened.3 MacArthur made this very might give the Chinese Communists an
clear on 28 November when he appealed excuse for coming into the war.
for more than twice the number of re- Another reason had been the need for
placements then scheduled for his com- the Chinese Nationalists to conserve
mand. He had been notified that 33,000 their strength to meet threatened attacks
replacements would arrive in December. against Formosa by the Chinese Com-
He claimed that he now needed 74,000 munists. Neither reason remained valid,
replacements to compensate for losses MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs
suffered in the Chinese attack and to of Staff. He maintained that the Chinese
bring his units up to strength. This force on Formosa was the only source
figure did not include losses anticipated of trained manpower available to him
for January.4 for early commitment against his new
The Department of the Army recog- enemy. He estimated that these troops
nized MacArthur's need but could in- could reach Korea within two weeks and
crease neither the number nor the rate in far greater strength than the 33,000
of replacement shipments. In fact, the originally offered. "I strongly recom-
mend," MacArthur urged the Joint
2
Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub: Chiefs, "that the theater commander be
Further Reinforcements for Korea, in G-3, DA file authorized to negotiate directly with the
091 Korea, Case 125. Chinese Government authorities on
3
Briefing, Gen Gaither to Army Comdrs' Confer-
ence, 4 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 337, Case 12/2. Formosa for the movement north and
4
(1) Rad, CX 69983, CINCFE to DA, 28 Nov 50.
5
(2) Rad, WAR 97786, DA to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50. Rad, WAR 97786, DA to CINCFE, 1 Dec 50.
296 POLICY AND DIRECTION
incorporation in the United Nations pact which might disrupt the unity of
Command of such Chinese units as may the nations associated with the United
be available and desirable for reinforcing States in the United Nations and even
our position in Korea." 6 isolate the United States from its allies.8
Washington authorities did not share On 18 December, General MacArthur
these views. They felt that the intro- made another attempt to procure major
duction of Chinese Nationalist forces reinforcements, although not for Korea,
into the Korean conflict would precipi- when he asked that the four National
tate a full-scale war with Communist Guard divisions called to active duty in
China and might trigger a global war for September be sent to Japan at once. He
which the United States was unpre- pointed out that a recent build-up of
pared. Furthermore, the use of Chiang USSR propaganda interest in Japan and
Kai-shek's men would likely be unac- the increasing tempo of international
ceptable to some, if not all, of the United Communist pressure upon the remain-
Nations members with troops in Korea. ing free segments of Asia were alarming
The Commonwealth nations, for in- the Japanese. In order to provide rea-
stance, would very probably refuse to sonable safeguards against any USSR
have their forces employed alongside thrust at Japan, he urged that these four
Chinese Nationalist troops. In case of divisions be moved to Japan to com-
a general war with China, moreover, it plete their training. The Joint Chiefs
would be better to use Nationalist forces of Staff told MacArthur that it did not
on the mainland rather than in Korea. appear probable that the National Guard
Also, in view of an increasingly critical divisions could be sent him, although
supply situation, complicated by recent General Collins, then away on a trip to
substantial losses in Korea, Washington Europe, would have to give the final
was reluctant to equip Chinese Nation- decision. Every effort would continue
alist troops for Korea. Politically, the to bring MacArthur's units to full
move would commit the United States strength and to keep them there.
to the Chinese Nationalist regime to an "Meanwhile," the Joint Chiefs of Staff
unacceptable extent. In any case, Wash- suggested, "you may wish to consider
ington doubted that the employment of moving a portion of X Corps to Japan
33,000 Chinese Nationalist troops, which without prejudice to future disposition."
represented the only firm offer made, After General Collins' return, the Joint
would decisively influence the situation Chiefs of Staff agreed that since no de-
in Korea.7 cision had been made at the govern-
The Joint Chiefs of Staff gave no im- mental level as to the future United
mediate, definite answer to MacArthur, States course of action in Korea, no
merely replying that they were consider- additional divisions would be deployed
ing the proposal. But they warned that to the Far East for the time being.9
the matter could have a worldwide im- 8
Rad, JCS 97594, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Nov 50.
6 9
Rad, C 50021, CINCFE to JCS, 28 Nov 50. (1) Rad, C 51599, CINCFE to DA, 18 Dec 50.
7
Draft Memo for JCS Representative, 1 Dec 50, (2) Rad, CM-OUT 99274, JCS to CINCFE, 19 Dec
with Annex 1, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 127/8. 50. (3) Rad, JCS 99616, JCS to CINCFE, 23 Dec
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 297
13
on the United States or its allies. Con- Memo, Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub:
Courses of Action To Be Taken as a Result of De-
velopments in Korea, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea,
11
(1) MFR, 3 Dec 50, sub: Korean Sit. (2) Memo, Case 134.
14
Gen Bolté for CofS USA, 3 Dec 50, sub: Course of Rad, JCS 98172, JCS to All Comdrs, 6 Dec 50.
15
Action To Be Taken as a Result of Developments MFR, 3 Dec 50, sub: Korean Sit, G-3 091
in Korea, both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 134. Korea, Case 134.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 299
were taken to increase the strength of the scheduled for June 1954 to be created
Army and greatly broaden the mobiliza- by June 1952. The National Security
tion and production bases. The National Council agreed to this action on 14
Security Council, acting on recom- December. As a result of this accelera-
mendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tion policy, the Department of the Army
had approved on 22 November a military in December called two more National
program for fiscal 1951 providing an Guard divisions, the 31st and 47th, to
army of sixteen combat divisions within active Federal service, beginning in
18
a total Army strength of 1,263,000. By January 1951.
30 June 1954, the Army would reach a Various military authorities, includ-
strength, through gradual expansion, ing General Collins and General Ridg-
of 1,353,000, with eighteen combat way, had expressed the opinion that the
divisions.16 President should proclaim a national
Secretary of the Army Pace expressed emergency. Such a proclamation would
the views of many Army officials when place in force the statutory provisions
he told the Army Policy Council on 6 and authorizations normally granted the
December that as a result of the Chinese President in time of war and facilitate
intervention Americans were now living the expansion of the nation's armed
in a world essentially different from the forces and industrial facilities in support
19
kind of a world they had been living in of these forces. On 15 December, in
a week before. The Army's require- a radio address to the nation, President
ments of 6 December were quite different Truman declared that a state of national
from those of 30 November. He em- emergency existed. On the following
phasized that the Army's program of an day, he affixed his signature to a procla-
orderly build-up was not good enough mation which said, in part:
nor fast enough to meet the emergency
NOW, THEREFORE, I, HARRY S. TRU-
situation. General Ridgway, speaking MAN, President of the United States of
for General Collins in the latter's ab- America, do proclaim the existence of a
sence, told Pace that the Army staff had national emergency, which requires that the
prepared a plan for quick expansion to military, naval, air, and civilian defenses
a 21-division army of 1,530,000 strength. of this country be strengthened as speedily
as possible to the end that we may be able
Pace approved this concept for planning
17
purposes only. 18
(1) Memo, Gen Ridgway for Gen Haislip, 7
Still, the immediate threat posed by Dec 50, sub: Briefing for the Chief of Staff, in CofS,
Chinese action and the larger threat of DA file 337, Case 14. (2) MFR, 11 Dec 50, sub:
Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45. (3) His-
possible global war gave some impetus tory of DA Activities Relating to the Korean Con-
to Army expansion. On 5 December, flict, 25 June 1950-8 September 1951, ACofS G-3,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended Army War Plans Br, p. 4. (4) MFR, 11 Dec 50, sub:
Augmentation of the Army to Eighteen Divs in G-3,
an accelerated rate of Army expansion DA file 320.2, Case 45.
with the 18-division force originally 19
(1) Min, 51st mtg Army Policy Council, 6 Dec
50, in CofS, DA file 334 (APC). (2) MFR, 11 Dec
16
JCS 2101/25, 22 Nov 50. 50, sub: Conference, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Case 45.
17
Min, 51st mtg Army Policy Council, 6 Dec 50, (3) PL 450, 82d Congress, 2d session, H. J. Resolu-
in CofS, DA file 334 (APC). tion 477 as amended by PL 12, 83d Congress.
300 POLICY AND DIRECTION
to repel any and all threats against our riods each day. Pusan had pier-crane
national security. . . 20 facilities for all types of heavy lift, while
Washington officials asked MacArthur Inch'on had none. The turnaround
to sound out opinion within his com- time from Japan to Pusan, moreover,
mand on the President's proclamation. was only one-fourth that from Japan to
MacArthur replied that because of lim- Inch'on. By conservative estimate, Gen-
itations of time and the "far flung dis- eral Wright believed that all U.N. units
tribution" of his various subcommands and equipment could be taken out of
no real sampling of reactions to the Pusan five times as fast as from Inch'on.
speech could be obtained. But, as far Wright realized, too, that air operations
as he could judge, the reaction was fa- against the Chinese would be more effec-
vorable. "There can be little doubt, tive as the enemy moved deeper into
however," MacArthur concluded, "but Korea. If the evacuation took place
that most would concur in my own from Pusan, it could be inferred that
personal opinion that the crucial reali- MacArthur's forces had delayed succes-
ties of the nation's present circumstances sively and that rear airfields would be
impel the immediate and complete maintained and protected. Once these
mobilization of our full military forces reached the old Pusan Perimeter,
potential." 21 Japanese airfields could be used to
continue effective support of the
evacuation.22
X Corps Is Ordered Out of North Korea Following this line of reasoning, Gen-
The possibility that evacuation might eral Wright then recommended that
be forced by enemy pressure was being Almond's corps be sealifted from the
considered in Tokyo at this same time. northeastern portion of Korea at the
On 6 December, General Wright gave earliest practicable date and relanded at
General MacArthur a detailed study of Pusan or P'ohang-dong. Wright further
the problem of quitting Korea should recommended that X Corps be absorbed
it become necessary. Wright pointed by the Eighth Army. Thus strengthened,
out that an evacuation through Inch'on the Eighth Army would make with-
would be slow and dangerous. Pusan, drawals in successive positions—if neces-
on the other hand, offered every ad- sary, to the Pusan Perimeter.23
vantage for speedy and efficient outload- General MacArthur was most re-
ing of men and equipment. At Pusan, luctant to place Almond under Walker's
twenty-eight ships could be berthed command, but yielded to what appeared
around the clock while Inch'on could to him to be the overriding wisdom of
handle only LST's and similar assault consolidating his strength in Korea. On
craft and then only for two 4-hour pe- 7 December, he approved General
Wright's recommendations and notified
20
(1) Presidential Proclamation 2914, 16 Dec 50.
22
(2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 3520. (1) Memo, Gen Wright for CofS, GHQ, UNC, 6
21
(1) Rad, DA 99090, DA to CINCFE, 17 Dec 50. Dec 50. (2) Comd Rpt, GHQ, UNC, Dec 50, Annex
(2) Rad, C 51515, CINCFE to DA for Haislip, 18 4, Part III, "A" 741.
23
Dec 50. Ibid.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 301
the planning and carrying out of the would be of value to the enemy. On 19
evacuation of such great numbers of December, in a teleconference with the
troops and such great quantities of equip- Far East Command's representatives,
ment from an area under constant enemy they asked what plans had been made
pressure. There was no time, either, for for the evacuation or destruction of X
research or experimentation. Unlike Corps' supplies and whether or not it
Dunkerque, the evacuation plan called appeared that these plans could be car-
for the removal of all equipment and ried out successfully. These officials
30
supplies. were reassured by General MacArthur's
Department of the Army officials were staff, who told them that the evacuation
apprehensive lest Almond's force leave plan called for the transfer of X Corps'
behind supplies and equipment which supplies to the Eighth Army area. Such
30
X Corps Special Rpt, Hungnam Evacuation items as were excess or damaged but re-
December 1950. pairable would be sent to Japan. Any
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 303
USS BEGOR LIES AT ANCHOR ready to load the last U.N. landing craft as a
huge explosion rips harbor installations at Hungnam.
relatively light pressure being exerted came acting commanding general of the
by North Korean forces against the Eighth Army. The possibility that
Eighth Army did not point in that di- Walker might be killed had been dis-
rection. In order to find out just what cussed earlier by General MacArthur and
was going on, General MacArthur di- General Collins during the latter's visits
rected Walker to conduct aggressive to the Far East. General MacArthur
ground reconnaissance to a considerable had told Collins that if Walker were lost
depth through the North Korean screen he wanted General Ridgway, Deputy
with particular attention to finding prob- Chief of Staff for Operations and Ad-
able routes of enemy advance, locations, ministration, Department of the Army,
strengths, and to capture Chinese and one of General Collins' key assistants
36
prisoners for interrogation. in Washington, as Eighth Army com-
General Walker was killed in a vehicle mander. MacArthur was familiar with
accident near Uijongbu, Korea, on the Ridgway's fine combat record in World
morning of 23 December 1950. General War II and realized that Ridgway, in his
Milburn, the I Corps commander, be- position at the Department of the Army,
was in extremely close touch with the
(1) Telecon, TT 4147, DA and GHQ, 19 Dec Korean situation and capable of stepping
36
50. (2) Telecon, TT 4156, DA and GHQ, 21 Dec 50. in at once. Upon Walker's death, an
306 POLICY AND DIRECTION
immediate call was made from Tokyo to versals. No major decisions as to future
General Collins, who obtained clearance courses of action had yet been reached
from Secretary Marshall and President although numerous exploratory steps had
Truman on the designation of Ridgway been taken. As in November, once the
37
as the new Eighth Army commander. enemy relaxed pressure, the nation's
General Ridgway left Washington al- planners seemed to slacken their efforts
most immediately and reached Tokyo at to find a solution. The problems facing
midnight on Christmas Day. the United States and the United Na-
No American outside the Far East tions Command were more political than
knew more about the Korean situation military. Such decisions as whether or
than General Ridgway. In his position not to take action against the Chinese
as deputy chief of staff for administra- aggressors outside Korea had been raised
tion all reports, studies, and recommen- but not answered. The problem of
dations on Korea at the national level whether or not to evacuate had also been
had passed through his hands. It was he raised, but had been put aside as a result
who had taken much of the action to of lessening enemy pressure. The same
speed the shipments of units and replace- fact had befallen the closely related
ments to MacArthur in July and August. cease-fire problem. The question of
He had gone with the President's special whether or not to reinforce the Far East
representative, Mr. Harriman, to Tokyo Command was half answered by the
in August during the touch-and-go bat- nation's inability to do so, and the rest
tles around Pusan. He had conferred of the answer was obscured by the fog of
with MacArthur and seen the Eighth indecision surrounding the core of the
Army's plight at first hand. problem, "What is the best course of
Ridgway's whole career had prepared action now."
him to command the Eighth Army. As
a young officer he had served in China Ridgway Takes Over
and in the Philippines. During World
War II he had commanded an airborne Christmas found the Eighth Army
division, later, a corps. He had led his halted uneasily near the 38th Parallel,
troops brilliantly through Sicily and awaiting its new commander and the
Normandy, through the Battle of the new enemy. Signs were increasing that
Bulge, and to the Baltic at the war's end. the Chinese were closing the gap and
After the war, in a variety of staff and were advancing down the peninsula in
command assignments, Ridgway had a co-ordinated effort to feel out the
gained valuable knowledge of Commu- Eighth Army's defenses before launch-
nist methods, purposes, and strategies. ing another major attack. A tense calm
He was convinced they had to be stopped hung over the battle area. In a tele-
in Korea. phone report from Korea on 26 Decem-
Ridgway took command of forces in ber, General Allen, Chief of Staff, Eighth
Korea that had suffered a month of re- Army, told GHQ officers, "We got
another army. Pick up another one
37
MacArthur Hearings, pp. 588, 1201-02. about every day. They are just build-
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 307
ing up. Don't know when they will hit. told Ridgway that he was to act as he
That is all we have. Otherwise dead thought best. "You will make mistakes
quiet." 38 in Korea," MacArthur said, "we all do.
MacArthur told Ridgway that the best But I will take full responsibility." He
he could hope for was a tactical success, also told Ridgway that the X Corps
possibly holding and defending South would pass to his control as soon as it
40
Korea. He remarked, "We are now arrived in South Korea.
operating in a mission vacuum while When Ridgway questioned MacArthur
diplomacy attempts to feel its way. . . ." more specifically as to his authority in
Any substantial military success by Ridg- directing operations in Korea, including
way's Eighth Army would greatly a possible attack, MacArthur simply
strengthen the hands of the diplomats. said, "Matt, the Eighth Army is yours."
Tactical air power had proven disap- "No field commander could have asked
pointing to MacArthur, who now for more," Ridgway says of this full
41
charged that it could not isolate the grant of authority.
battlefield or stop the flow of enemy re- General Ridgway thus went into Korea
inforcements into the battle. Mac- carrying a carte blanche to employ the
Arthur reiterated that the Chinese were Eighth Army as he found best and with-
dangerous opponents and that the en- out reference to Tokyo for instructions.
tire Chinese military establishment was Ridgway could attack, defend, or with-
coming into Korea to win. Touching draw; the decision was left to him. But
on his recommendations to Washington, while he was not required and never did
MacArthur remarked that the Chinese ask confirmation of his actions, he did
mainland was wide open in the south notify MacArthur in detail of his in-
for attack by forces on Formosa. He had tentions. But MacArthur never ques-
recommended that such an attack be tioned him. Whereas Walker had been
made since it would relieve the pressure kept under close supervision and control,
in Korea.39 Ridgway was not.42
Ridgway found MacArthur discour- 40
Ibid.
aged by the swing of events in Korea 41
Ibid.
and ready to turn over to him a great 42
General Ridgway recalls that between the time
deal of authority and latitude in direct- he assumed command and March 1951, after the
Eighth Army had begun its northward march, Gen-
ing combat operations. MacArthur in- eral MacArthur stayed aloof from tactical decisions
dicated to Ridgway that he was to be and visited Korea only twice. Thereafter he visited
both empowered and expected to plan Korea and Ridgway weekly. Ridgway also ex-
pressed the belief that, had he thought it necessary,
and carry out all military operations of he could have led the Eighth Army out of Korea
the United Nations forces in Korea. He without recrimination from his superiors. General
Hickey, who was acting chief of staff under Mac-
Arthur and, later, chief of staff under Ridgway, was
38
General Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean of the opinion that Ridgway was under no restric-
War, Issues and Policies, June 1950-June 1951, pp. tions on withdrawing, and that it was Ridgway's
350-53, MS, copy in OCMH. decisions and actions that eventually tipped the
39
(1) Ibid. (2) See also Matthew B. Ridgway, balance and kept the Eighth Army fighting in Korea.
The Korean War (New York: Doubleday and Co., See Intervs, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51, and
1967), pp. 82-83. Appleman with Hickey, 10 Oct 51.
308 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Fear that the Eighth Army might were not carried out"; and he warned
evacuate Korea obsessed the South his staff, "I am going to attack to find
Koreans. Admittedly, the specter had out where the enemy is since G-2 cannot
substance. The final decision awaited give me clear evidence." 44
the outcome on the battlefield but the With characteristic directness, Ridg-
prospects were not bright at the moment. way began forcing the army to turn its
One of Ridgway's first acts on reaching eyes to the front. Step by step, in de-
Korea was to call on President Rhee liberate and carefully conceived actions
in Seoul and to assure him, "I am glad to and orders, he bore down on his new
be here and I aim to stay." To the men command. By example and by exhorta-
of his new command, Ridgway an- tion, he began shaking his staff, com-
nounced bluntly, "You will have my manders, and men out of the defeatist
utmost. I shall expect yours." 43 mood. Where toughness was required,
During his conference with General he was tough; where persuasion was in-
MacArthur, Ridgway had asked for and dicated, he persuaded; and where per-
received permission to attack in order sonal example was needed, he set the
to regain lost ground, and when he went example.
to Korea he fully intended to attack as
soon as possible. But he found not only A Decision Hangs Fire
his major commanders but also his
Eighth Army staff extremely skeptical The enemy, meanwhile, had com-
of such an attack. They were not, in pleted his concentrations and other
Ridgway's words, "offensive minded." preparations for attacking the Eighth
Under the circumstances and in view Army, and on the night of 31 December
of these attitudes, Ridgway decided introduced the New Year with a general
against an attack in the immediate fu- offensive south of the 38th parallel.
ture, at least during the remainder of (Map VI) The Chinese attacked on a
December. But he ordered plans made 44-mile front stretching east from Kae-
at once for offensive operations and he song on Ridgway's left flank to a point
set about instilling an "attack" spirit northwest of Ch'unch'on on the east
into his staff. "I skinned Eighth Army central front. The main effort came
staff officers individually and collectively down the Yongch'on-Uijongbu-Seoul
many times to have them do what I axis, obviously aimed at the seizure of
wanted," Ridgway later recalled. "I Seoul and Inch'on. General Ridgway,
told them heads would roll if my orders in reporting the attack to General Mac-
Arthur, predicted that the Chinese in-
43
Ridgway's activities and reactions during the vasion of South Korea was a prelude to
first several weeks after his assumption of command
are well covered in his manuscript, The Korean
an attempt by the Chinese to drive his
War, Issues and Policies, June 1950-June 1951; in command from the Korean peninsula by
his books, Soldier and The Korean War; in various sheer manpower. "The Army Eight,"
interviews and conversations with the author; and
in interviews with Dr. John Miller, jr., Major Owen
Ridgway told MacArthur, "will continue
Carroll, and Mr. B. C. Mossman, 30 November
44
1956, copies in OCMH. Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 309
its present mission, inflicting the max- Imjin River to a line slightly north of
imum punishment and delaying in suc- the Han River that formed a deep
cessive positions while maintaining its bridgehead around Seoul. But when
major forces intact." 45 the enemy swiftly followed up this with-
The great strength of the Chinese as- drawal, Ridgway on 3 January decided
sault in the west and the imminent dan- to move south of the Han and to aban-
ger of a breakthrough and envelopment don Seoul. He was determined that this
down the east central corridors, de- rearward move would be fought as a de-
fended largely by ROK units, forced laying action and so instructed his corps
General Ridgway reluctantly to direct commanders. On 4 January, the Eighth
certain withdrawals in early January. Army started back to a line extending
On 1 January, Ridgway ordered his from P'yongt'aek on the west coast east-
western divisions to fall back from the ward to the coastal village of Samch'ok.46
45
Reports reached General Ridgway that
Msg, C 52524, CINCFE to DA (quoting Ridg-
46
way), 2 Jan 51. Comd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51, Narrative, p. 56.
310 POLICY AND DIRECTION
in withdrawing from the Han River munist military moves against other sen-
some of his major units failed to damage sitive areas and heightening the tensions
the enemy materially or even delay him between the Soviet bloc and those na-
appreciably. Some units actually had tions allied with the United States. The
broken contact with the enemy to fall Joint Chiefs of Staff pointed this out to
back. Ridgway addressed his corps com- MacArthur and told him bluntly, "We
manders sternly on this matter, empha- believe that Korea is not the place to
sizing that he expected them to exploit fight a major war." If more American
fully every opportunity to damage the divisions were sent to Korea, American
enemy.47 commitments throughout the world, in-
cluding protection of Japan, would be
49
The Joint Chiefs of Staff seriously jeopardized.
Consider Options This news came as no surprise to Mac-
Arthur. Collins had told him sub-
Even before this January demonstra- stantially the same thing three weeks
tion of Chinese power, the Joint Chiefs earlier when he had pressed for an in-
of Staff had concluded that the Chinese crease in the strength of other United
Communists had enough strength to Nations contingents to a total of 75,000
drive MacArthur out of Korea. But men. The Joint Chiefs now told him
they wanted MacArthur to stay if he that this could not be done either. "It
could. A quick, massive build-up of is not practicable to obtain significant
the forces in Korea, much greater than additional forces for Korea from other
that for Operation CHROMITE five members of the United Nations," they
50
months earlier, might keep the Eighth said.
Army from being shoved into the Sea In the minds of the Joint Chiefs of
of Japan; but a major build-up, espe- Staff, the best way for MacArthur to keep
cially a quick one, was out of the question from being pushed off Korea was to
in view of shortages of combat divisions fight and to fight hard. If the Eighth
in the United States and the worsening Army fought and killed enough enemy
world situation. On 30 December, the troops, Chinese and North Korean com-
Joint Chiefs of Staff scotched any ves- manders might give up any attempt to
tigial hopes which MacArthur might drive the United Nations out of Korea
have held for additional ground forces by as too costly. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
telling him that they would not send any expected no miracles. But if the Eighth
more American divisions to fight in Army could, without losing too many
Korea at that time.48 men and too much equipment, stop and
Chinese successes in Korea had, con- hold the Chinese, not necessarily north
comitantly, increased the threat of a of the 38th Parallel, MacArthur would
general war, encouraging further Com- have done his nation a great service.
For the prestige, both military and polit-
47
Ibid., p. 12.
48 49
Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur, Ibid.
50
30 Dec 50. Ibid.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 311
ical, which the Chinese Communists had It seems to us that if you are forced back
lately acquired by defeating the United to positions in the vicinity of the Kum
Nations Command in North Korea, was River and a line generally eastward there-
from, and if thereafter the Chinese Com-
exceedingly detrimental to the national munists mass large forces against your posi-
interests of the United States; and Mac- tions with an evident capability of forcing
Arthur could deflate that prestige by us out of Korea, it then would be necessary,
staging a military comeback. under those conditions, to direct 52you to
The events of the past month had commence a withdrawal to Japan.
shown clearly that General MacArthur's When the Joint Chiefs sought Mac-
military mission assigned on 27 Septem- Arthur's ideas on the timing of such a
ber stood in need of revision. The Joint withdrawal, MacArthur assured them
Chiefs revised it in these words: "You that there was no need to make a de-
are now directed to defend in successive cision for evacuation until his forces
positions. . . ." These positions were were actually forced back to what he
those which MacArthur had already de- called the "beachhead line." Since the
scribed to his major commanders on 7 term beachhead line could be inter-
December. In addition to defending preted several ways, the Joint Chiefs
these positions, MacArthur was to dam- asked MacArthur to be more specific.
age the enemy as much as possible, "sub- General Collins had brought back from
ject to the primary consideration of the the Far East a marked map showing nine
safety of your troops." 51 possible defensive positions to be oc-
But the Washington authorities fully cupied by the Eighth Army in its with-
realized that mere words and military drawal down the peninsula. One line
directives would not halt the Chinese and marked positions held by the Eighth
that enemy pressure might, in spite of Army along the Naktong River in early
MacArthur's best efforts, force him to September, and the Joint Chiefs asked
evacuate Korea. They saw, too, that it MacArthur if this line was the beachhead
was advisable to determine, in advance line he had in mind. He stated that it
if possible, the last reasonable opportu- was, but pointed out that exactly where
nity for MacArthur's command to evacu- the line would run should be regarded
ate in an orderly fashion. This was as completely flexible. "In an actual
especially important since the enemy evacuation under pressure there would
threatened not only Korea, but, in league be progressive further contractions to a
with the Soviet Union, posed, by no great final inner arc," he told them. "The
stretch of the imagination, a real threat operation would probably be generally
to Japan. With Japan gone, Mac- similar to that at Hungnam." General
Arthur's command could only fall Collins still did not understand which
back on Okinawa, Formosa, or the line MacArthur meant. He reminded
Philippines. MacArthur that three lines on his
The Joint Chiefs of Staff told General marked map could be interpreted as a
MacArthur: beachhead line, and asserted that when
51 52
Ibid. Ibid.
312 POLICY AND DIRECTION
the Eighth Army had been forced back to done under enemy pressure. There
the northernmost of the three, the time would be little similarity between a
for final decision would have arrived.53 Pusan evacuation and the removal of
forces from the Hungnam beachhead.
Evacuation Plans Both in scale and difficulty, the Pusan
operation would surpass that at Hung-
The rumor of a United Nations with- nam. Consequently, the length of time
drawal from Korea spread quickly among required to move troops and supplies
men and officers of the ROK Army. would be much greater, and Burke there-
General Ridgway pointed out to General fore urged the early completion of ad-
MacArthur on 8 January that the ap- vance plans. He advised Wright to
prehension among ROK soldiers as to designate at once the division which
their future was dangerous and could would hold the final perimeter at Pusan.
seriously affect his command. Ridgway Burke recommended the 1st Marine Di-
suggested that MacArthur make a public vision since it had special training in
statement which would serve to banish naval procedures, including the require-
the fears of the ROK fighting forces. ments for naval gunfire support, and had
MacArthur passed this suggestion to the proven its combat effectiveness on more
Joint Chiefs of Staff with the comment than one occasion. For employment on
that "A reassuring statement by me such the intermediate perimeter, which would
as General Ridgway suggests is impossi- probably be manned by two divisions,
ble unless and until the basis for such a Burke felt that any of the Army divisions
statement is established by policy would do.55
determination at governmental level." 54 No divisions were ever designated for
MacArthur had already directed his these duties, since by the middle of Jan-
staff to continue planning the evacuation uary the military situation gave General
procedures. Since an actual evacuation Wright some reason to believe that a
would be largely a Navy task, General forced withdrawal might not materialize.
Wright, the G-3, turned to the Navy for By 16 January, in fact, Wright was will-
advice. Rear Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, ing to speculate that, unless political
Deputy Chief of Staff, COMNAVFE, on considerations required or indicated
7 January addressed Wright on the prob- withdrawal as the best course of action,
lems and factors to be considered. If it would be possible for the United Na-
the evacuation took place from Pusan, tions Command to remain in Korea as
there was a strong likelihood it would be long as higher authority dictated. He
hesitated to establish an evacuation tar-
53
(1) Ibid. (2) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Per- get date even for planning purposes
sonal) for JCS, 30 Dec 50. (3) Rad, DA 80149, Col- since, in his mind, the proper date would
lins (Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan 51. (4) Rad,
C 52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan 51. (5) Rad, DA be dictated by enemy action and "po-
80253, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 4 Jan 51. litical considerations." He did estimate
(6) Rad, C 52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins,
55
4 Jan 51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for Memo, COMNAVFE for Gen Wright, 7 Jan 51,
MacArthur, 9 Jan 51. sub: Plans for Possible Re-Employment From Pusan
54
Msg, C 52964, CINCFE to JCS, 8 Jan 51. Area, GHQ, UNC, G-3 files.
THE BRINK OF DISASTER 313
the time required for a complete with- man rested in a recent ROK petition to
drawal. On the basis of tonnage to be the United States for aid in strengthen-
removed from the peninsula, estimated ing ROK forces. In December, the
at 2,000,000 metric tons, the best possible ROK Minister of Foreign Affairs had
out-loading time, using all possible ports asked Secretary of Defense Marshall to
of exit within the contracted defense "release to us all the light arms which are
perimeter, would be fifty days.56 available, in order that our young men
As a further step in evacuation plan- may hurl themselves in the face of the
ning, General Collins, while on another advancing enemy." At the same time,
visit to the theater, informed General the Korean Ambassador, Dr. John M.
MacArthur on 15 January that if a UNC Chang, had urged the Department of
evacuation became necessary, President State to arm the so-called Korean Youth
Truman wanted all members of the Corps, which Chang claimed consisted
ROK Government, ROK Army, and of 500,000 young men, all eager to fight
ROK police forces taken out. General the Chinese. The Department of State
MacArthur expressed satisfaction with recommended to the Department of De-
this directive, stating that he thought fense that this be done, but only after
it essential. Plans for the evacuation these Korean youths had been formed
were immediately begun, and when into organized units under the control
Collins returned from Korea on 19 Jan- and discipline of the military authorities
uary the situation was laid before him. in Korea.57 General Marshall directed
General Hickey pointed out that more the Joint Chiefs of Staff to look into
than a million Koreans would have to be these requests and to obtain General
evacuated under the President's order. MacArthur's views on their propriety.
This figure included 36,000 ROK gov- In General MacArthur's mind, the
ernmental officials and their dependents, whole problem of giving more arms to
600,000 ROK police, and 260,000 ROK the ROK Government centered not on
soldiers. These latter two groups had whether these units could be created and
about 400,000 dependents. As to the armed but on whether any advantage was
place to which these people would be to be gained by so doing. MacArthur
removed, Collins and MacArthur agreed emphasized that large numbers of small
that as many ROK soldiers as possible arms had already been given ROK police
would be placed on the off-shore island units, antiguerrilla security forces, and
of Cheju-do in order to maintain, after special ROK organizations for use in
evacuation, a legal status for continuing enemy-held territory. But friendly
to fight in Korea. guerrilla forces lacked strong-willed
A possible complication in planning leadership and were accomplishing little
and achieving any evacuation of ROK in enemy rear areas. Enemy guerilla
personnel as directed by President Tru- 57
(1) Ltr, B. C. Limb, ROK Minister of Foreign
Affairs, to Gen George C. Marshall, Secy Defense,
56
Memo, Gen Wright for CofS GHQ, UNC (Gen 12 Dec 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 149.
Hickey), 16 Jan 51, sub: Disposition of U.N. Forces (2) Ltr, H. Freeman Mathews, Depy Under Secy
in Korea in Event of Withdrawal From Korea, G-3, State, to Maj Gen James H. Burns, OSD, 12 Dec
GHQ, UNC files. 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 137.
314 POLICY AND DIRECTION
units, on the other hand, continued to policy was sufficiently clear. Further,
operate effectively throughout South if evacuation became necessary he did not
Korea.58 want a bigger ROK Army to evacuate.
General MacArthur believed that The big question in MacArthur's
checking the enemy would depend upon mind, now as before, was whether there
setting up a defense with U.S. divisions was to be a change in national policy
deployed in depth and in mutually sup- that would make evacuation unnecessary.
porting positions. This observation If there was such a change, and the steps
strongly indicates that MacArthur felt, which MacArthur had proposed were
in early January, that his forces would taken, evacuation would not be neces-
have to withdraw back to the Pusan sary. But if the nation's leaders ap-
Perimeter or even farther. He expressed peared unwilling to make this policy
the opinion that, because of the probably change, MacArthur felt that eventual
restricted area of the battlefield in whichevacuation was inevitable and that there
the United Nations forces might be fight- was no reason why the Joint Chiefs of
ing in the near future, and the greater Staff should not issue their evacuation
value per rifle that might be gained by directive to him right away. If some
arming the Japanese National Police Re- slight chance existed that national policy
serve, training and arming of additional might be changed, even if not immedi-
ROK forces appeared questionable. He ately, General MacArthur felt that the
recommended that the extra South Joint Chiefs of Staff could delay issuing
Korean manpower be used to replace the evacuation directive until the Eighth
losses in existing ROK units, concluding: Army had been forced back to the ninth
and final marked position he had drawn
The long range requirement for or desir-
ability of arming additional ROK personnel around Pusan in the hope that an exten-
appears to be dependent primarily upon sion of military activity against the
determination of the future United States Chinese might be allowed and evacuation
military position with respect to both the staved off.60
Korean campaign and the generally critical
situation in the Far East.59 60
(1) Rad, JCS 99935, JCS (Personal) for Mac-
Arthur, 29 Dec 50. (2) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur
MacArthur had once again taken the (Personal) for JCS, 30 Dec 50. (3) Rad, DA 80149,
opportunity to point out to the Washing- Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 3 Jan 51. (4) Rad,
C 52586, CINCUNC to DA, 3 Jan 51. (5) Rad, DA
ton officials that he did not feel their 80253, Collins (Personal) for MacArthur, 4 Jan 51.
(6) Rad, C 52712, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins,
58
Rad, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51. 4 Jan 51. (7) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for
59
Msg, C 52879, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 6 Jan 51. MacArthur, 9 Jan 51.
CHAPTER XVII
The changes in policy to which Gen- to reinforce the troops in Korea with
eral MacArthur constantly referred in- part of the Chinese Nationalist garrison
volved decisions by the President to take, on Formosa; and the fourth, to allow
or not to take, certain specific military diversionary operations by the National-
actions against the Chinese. General ist troops against vulnerable areas of the
MacArthur first suggested such measures Chinese mainland. These measures, he
in conversations with General Collins was certain, could not only relieve the
early in December, and throughout the pressure on United Nations forces in
term of his command in Korea insisted Korea but could indeed severely cripple
with increasing emphasis that the actions Communist China's war-making poten-
he had sponsored be carried out. tial and thus save Asia from a Commu-
MacArthur's view of the world situa- nist engulfment that otherwise faced it.
tion, with particular emphasis on his own While he realized that such actions pre-
theater, was simple in its approach but viously had been rejected for fear of
exceedingly complex in its implications. provoking Communist China into a
He reasoned that the Chinese had, omit- major war effort, he now insisted that
ting only the formality of open declara- Communist China was already fully com-
tion, gone to war against the United mitted and that the retaliatory steps
Nations Command. The Chinese were therefore could not prompt it to greater
prosecuting this war, in MacArthur's efforts. He also realized that there might
view, with all the resources at their dis- be some danger of Russian interference
posal and were being supported logisti- if the courses he described were adopted.
cally by the Soviet Union. But he discounted this risk, reasoning
On 30 December, he posed four re- that any Russian decision to start a gen-
taliatory measures that he believed feasi- eral war would be reached solely on a
ble and that would require a relatively basis of Russia's own estimate of relative
small commitment of military forces. strength and capabilities of the United
The first was to blockade the China States and itself.1
coast; the second, to destroy Communist If Communist China was permitted to
China's war industries through naval 1
Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS,
gunfire and air bombardment; the third, 30 Dec 50.
316 POLICY AND DIRECTION
get away with what he called its "flagrant of emergency, in areas more strategic
aggression," and if the United Nations than Korea. MacArthur explained to
Command evacuated Korea without at- his superiors that sending additional
tacking the Chinese mainland, Mac- forces to the Far East would foster rather
Arthur believed that the Asian peoples, than hinder the development of military
including the Japanese, would be greatly resources in those strategic areas, particu-
dismayed. He implied that the United larly in western Europe. "I understand
States would lose so much face with these thoroughly the demand for European
peoples that a material reinforcement of security and fully concur in doing every-
the Far East Command would be neces- thing possible in that sector," MacArthur
sary even to hold the littoral island de- continued, "but not to the point of ac-
fense chain, including Japan.2 cepting defeat anywhere else—an accept-
MacArthur pointed out that the evacu- ance which I am sure could not fail to
ation of his forces from Korea under any insure later defeat in Europe." He noted
circumstances, forced or otherwise, would that the preparations for the defense of
at once release the bulk of the Chinese Europe were, by the most optimistic esti-
Army then occupied in Korea and leave mates, based upon a condition of readi-
them free to attack other areas—quite ness two years in the future, and he
probably areas of far greater importance argued that sending him more American
than Korea itself. MacArthur claimed: divisions could not possibly prejudice
On the other hand, the relatively small
these preparations. Rather, it would in-
command we now have in Korea is capable sure thoroughly seasoned forces for later
of so draining the enemy's resources as to commitment to Europe synchronously
protect the areas to the south which would with Europe's own build-up of military
in itself be possibly a greater contribution strength.4
to the general situation than could be made Touching briefly upon the Joint
by such a force disposed in other areas for
purely defense purposes, but not possessing Chiefs' tactical estimate of the situation
the power to pin down and localize so mas- in Korea and the danger of forced evacu-
sive a part of the enemy's potential as now ation, General MacArthur agreed that
committed in Korea. their estimate was sound under the con-
The ROK Army, if a general evacuation 4
(1) Ibid. (2) On 19 December 1950, President
took place, would disintegrate or become Truman had, at the request of the NATO Council,
of negligible value. Japan itself would appointed General of the Army Dwight D. Eisen-
become extremely vulnerable following hower Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Eisen-
hower was to establish in western Europe an
the loss of Korea.3 integrated allied command to which the member na-
MacArthur again assailed the refusal tions of NATO would contribute such forces as they
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send rein- were able. MacArthur knew of this. At this date,
however, the plans for an allied defense of Europe,
forcements to his aid in Korea. This including the extent of United States participation
refusal had been based on the possibility had not been prepared. For the story of this plan-
of a greater need for these forces, in case ning and the later build-up of NATO forces in
western Europe, see Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Secre-
tary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
2
Ibid. tion, NATO: The First Five Years, 1949-1954
3
Ibid. (Utrecht: Bosch-Utrecht, 1955).
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 317
ditions then existing. These conditions causing the Korean fighting to mush-
6
were, as he enumerated them: no rein- room and of alienating allied powers.
forcements, continued restrictions upon
Chinese Nationalist action, no military The Retaliatory Measures: An
measures against continental China, and Examination
the concentration of China's strength
solely upon the Korean sector.5 American leaders studied the specific
The various actions MacArthur recom- courses of possible retaliation against
mended against the Chinese outside of Communist China carefully, seeking in
Korea were quite plainly acts of war. each case to determine how effective it
The United Nations was not committed, would prove if applied; if it were prac-
and all indications pointed toward a ticable; the effect of its application on
great reluctance on the part of its mem- the unity of United States allies; and,
ber nations to commit themselves to a looming larger than all the other points,
war with China. The United States if it would cause a general war. The
could endorse MacArthur's recommenda- existing national policy approved by
tions on its own behalf, but the President President Truman stated, "The United
lacked authority to send any but Ameri- States should not permit itself to become
can forces against China outside of Korea. involved in a general war with Commu-
If he ordered MacArthur to carry out nist China." 7 Russia and Communist
the recommended actions, the United China had concluded a "peace and uni-
States, ipso facto, would be at war with versal security" treaty which was made
China. Thus far, the Chinese Govern- public on 15 February 1950. This treaty
ment had not declared war against the could be invoked by either party against
United States and had, in fact, disclaimed "a state which indirectly or directly
responsibility for the actions of Chinese unites with Japan in acts of aggression,"
armies in Korea. While this was purely or where "important international ques-
a technicality it was an important one. tions touching on the mutual interests
8
Confining the fighting in Asia to a of the Soviet Union and China exist."
limited arena in Korea and preserving Hence, the treaty materially increased
the unity of the bloc of nations allied
6
with the United States against Commu- President Truman's thoughts on this controver-
nist aggression were basic principles of sial subject are pertinent. In his view, the United
States was in Korea in the name of and on behalf
established national policy. With these of the United Nations. The unified command un-
aims uppermost in their minds, the na- der General MacArthur was a United Nations Com-
mand and neither the President nor MacArthur
tion's top policy-makers weighed and would have been justified in exceeding the mission
analyzed each of the actions proposed originally established by the United Nations Gen-
by General MacArthur to determine eral Assembly. Unrestricted military action against
whether or not the benefit to be derived China, however attractive, had to be avoided if for
no other reason than that it was a huge booby trap.
from it would justify the great risk of 7
8
Rpt
JCSby1924/35.
the JSSC to the JCS on Possible Action
The military capabilities of the Chi- were strongly opposed to direct attack on
nese Nationalist forces on Formosa were China. Since China had no great indus-
extremely limited. General MacArthur trial centers, the most profitable targets
was quite aware of this, having visited would be military and air installations,
Formosa on 31 July 1950. In compari- railroads, and shipping facilities. But
son to mainland China, with its popula- experience in World War II had shown
tion of 452,000,000 and an army of over that in spite of the best intentions and
2,000,000 men, the Nationalists on For- most accurate bombing, the civil popula-
mosa had a population under their con- tion suffered along with such targets;
trol of only 7,500,000 and an army of and any heavy loss of civilian life un-
428,000 men. The Nationalist Army doubtedly would be sure to turn many
had comparatively few arms; and these Asiatic nations against the United States.
were a mixture of American, Japanese, There was little question, moreover, that
Russian, and German weapons which China, if faced with this bombing, would
were poorly maintained. The ratio was call upon the USSR to come to its rescue.
one individual weapon for every two and Most American leaders were therefore
a half men. American leaders were un- not willing to risk bombing China except
der no illusion that the Nationalists as a last resort.
could mount any sort of significant attack In all the discussions of "privileged
against the Chinese mainland unless the sanctuary" enjoyed by the Chinese in
United States furnished the materials and Manchuria no mention had been made
transportation. Nor could this be done by MacArthur, or by the Joint Chiefs of
easily and quickly, even if the United Staff for that matter, of a similar privi-
States should decide to divert resources leged sanctuary enjoyed by the United
from other vital areas to support opera- Nations Command in Japan. Both naval
tions by Chiang Kai-shek.12 and air operations against Korea were
mounted from Japanese bases, and Japan
Considerations in Bombing China was the main staging area from which
Direct air and naval surface attacks on thousands of U.N. troops were sent to
the Chinese mainland were probably the fight in Korea. Consequently, if the
most immediate way of striking a hard United States bombed Manchuria to de-
blow against the Communists. These stroy enemy bases, the Chinese might
were also the actions most likely to pre- bomb Japan. Whether the Chinese pos-
cipitate a full-scale war.13 All of the sessed such a capability was certainly a
nations allied with the United States moot point; but it seemed reasonable to
against Communist aggression in Korea assume that with Russian help it would
not take them long to acquire such a
12
JCS 2118/15, 29 Jan 51, in G-3, DA file 381 capability.
China, Case 6/3.
13
Other than broadly hinting that the atomic
President Truman stated that he had
bomb would be effective in Korea, MacArthur did never been able to believe that Mac-
not recommend officially or, as far as is known, un- Arthur, seasoned soldier that he was, did
officially, that the decision be taken to use the
atomic bomb against either the North Koreans or not realize that introducing Chinese
the Chinese, in or out of Korea. Nationalist forces into mainland China
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 321
would be an act of war. Certainly, a The Joint Chiefs of Staff sent Mac-
commander who had been in the fore- Arthur an interim denial of his proposals
front of world events for thirty-five years on 9 January. They told him that his
must realize that the Chinese people suggestions were being carefully consid-
would react to the bombing of their cities ered but that, for the time being at least,
in much the same manner as the people little chance existed for a switch in the
of the United States would have done. national policy. The blockade of the
The President did not believe, either, China coast, for instance, if imposed,
that MacArthur with his knowledge of would not take place until the United
the Orient could really think that he Nations Command had either stabilized
could cut off the vast flow of materials the situation in Korea or had evacuated
from Russia merely by bombing Chinese the peninsula. Nor would American
cities. The next step would have to be authorities undertake such a blockade
the bombing of Vladivostok and the without British approval, in deference
Trans-Siberian railroad. Because he was to the extensive British trade with China
sure that MacArthur could not possibly through Hong Kong. The Joint Chiefs
have overlooked these considerations felt also that any blockade required the
President Truman was left with the concurrence of the United Nations
simple conclusion that MacArthur was Organization.16
ready to risk general war. The President The naval and air attacks which Mac-
was not.14 Arthur wished to launch on the Chinese
Because they were not privy to Mac- mainland would, in the opinion of the
Arthur's intentions or to the instructions Joint Chiefs at this time, be authorized
given him, British officials grew con- only if the Chinese attacked American
cerned that he might do something that forces outside of Korea, but no decision
would cause the conflict to spread beyond would be made on the matter until the
Korea. When these misgivings were eventuality arose. Nor did the Joint
brought to the attention of President Chiefs, doubtful that Chiang Kai-shek's
Truman, he attempted to allay British troops could have any decisive effect on
fears by assuring Prime Minister Attlee: the outcome of the Korean campaign,
There has not been any change in the intend to approve their use in Korea.
agreed United States-United Kingdom posi- They noted that these troops might have
tion that resistance to aggression in Korea a greater usefulness elsewhere in the
should continue in Korea unless and until future.17
superior force required evacuation of our Neither did they believe that Mac-
troops. Present tactical situation does not
reflect any change in this position but rather Arthur should or could count on action
essential adjustments to cover increased outside of Korea to ease the pressure on
jeopardy to United Nations troops resulting his forces. They directed him to defend
from recent marked decrease in effectiveness in successive positions, inflicting the
of sorely tried South Korean divisions.15 greatest possible damage on enemy forces,
14 16
Truman, Memoirs, II, 415-16. Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for MacArthur,
15
Rad, State to SCAP (including quotation of 9 17Jan 51.
Truman msg to Attlee), 12 Jan 51. Ibid.
322 POLICY AND DIRECTION
"subject to primary consideration of the oppose the North Korean Army. There
safety of your troops and your basic mis- had been no intent that the United
sion of protecting Japan." At the same Nations Command should engage the
time, they granted him authority to with- armies of Communist China, MacArthur
draw from Korea to Japan if in his judg- claimed; and he doubted very seriously
ment evacuation was essential to avoid that his troops would have been sent to
18
severe losses of men and matériel. Korea at all if it had been foreseen that
The Joint Chiefs of Staff had given they would have to fight the Chinese.20
MacArthur two major interlocking His men were capable of holding a
courses of action to follow. Whereas he beachhead line in Korea for a limited
was to defend Korea, this defense was time, the United Nations commander
secondary to his mission of saving his believed, but not without losses. Whether
troops from destruction and protecting or not these losses could be termed
Japan from invasion. The second course, "severe" depended, MacArthur said,
withdrawal, must have been, in the minds "upon the connotation given the term."
of the Joint Chiefs, the natural sequel of He angrily decried the unfavorable pub-
the first. But MacArthur chose to inter- licity given the withdrawals of the Eighth
pret the directives strictly and found Army and X Corps. "The troops are
them, therefore, incompatible. Arguing tired from a long and difficult campaign,"
that both directives could not be carried he complained heatedly,
out simultaneously, MacArthur on 10
embittered by the shameful propaganda
January asked for clarification of his which has falsely condemned their courage
orders. He tied to this request another and fighting qualities in the misunderstood
hint that American political objectives retrograde maneuver, and their morale will
needed looking into. He said: become a serious threat to their battle effi-
ciency unless the political basis upon which
In view of the self-evident fact that my com- they are asked to trade life for time is
mand as presently constituted is of insuffi- clearly delineated, fully understood and so
cient strength to hold a position in Korea impelling that the hazards of battle are
and simultaneously protect Japan against cheerfully accepted.
external assault, strategic disposition taken
in the present situation must be based upon With these words, MacArthur seemed to
the over-riding political policy establishing be asking, in the name of his troops, that
the relativity of American interests. the measures he had recommended be
It seemed that he was asking the Joint put into effect or that an explanation be
Chiefs to decide which of his missions rendered to him and his men.21
they considered most important when, Citing the limitations under which he
in fact, they already had told him.19 was being required to carry on the cam-
General MacArthur pointed out to the paign against the Chinese—namely, no
Joint Chiefs of Staff that his command reinforcements, continued restrictions
originally had been sent to Korea to upon Chinese Nationalist military action,
no measures permitted against China's
18
Ibid.
19 20
Rad, C 53167, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS, Ibid.
21
10 Jan 51. Ibid.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 323
Washington, they freely admitted. But and to the survival of free peoples every-
they were quite concerned about the where." Mr. Truman took special care
effect on his men, especially on ROK to emphasize that what he said did not
soldiers, if news of imminent evacuation constitute a directive. He merely wanted
should reach them. In JCS opinion, to let MacArthur know what was being
any instructions to evacuate would be- considered in Washington. Mr. Truman
come known almost at once, despite called upon MacArthur for assistance in
security measures, and any resulting col- solving some of the problems facing the
lapse of ROK resistance could seriously United States. "We need your judgment
endanger the Eighth Army's ability to as to the maximum effort which could
reach a secure beachhead about Pusan reasonably be expected from the United
and hold it long enough for actual evacu- Nations forces under your command to
ation. "Your estimate is desired," they support the resistance to aggression which
told MacArthur, "as to timing and condi- we are trying rapidly to organize on a
tions under which you will have to issue world-wide basis," the President told
instructions to evacuate Korea." Mean- MacArthur, and enumerated the political
while, their current directives remained advantages which would come with a-
26
in effect. United Nations victory in Korea.28
The President was deeply disturbed by President Truman cautioned Mac-
this. MacArthur was saying, in effect, Arthur obliquely on the latter's propo-
that the course of action decided upon sals for more direct action against China.
by the National Security Council and the He warned:
Joint Chiefs of Staff and approved by the
Pending the build-up of our national
President was not feasible. He was say- strength, we must act with great prudence
ing that his forces would be driven off in so far as extending the area of hostilities
the peninsula or, at the very least, suffer is concerned. Steps which might in them-
heavy losses. MacArthur had always selves be fully justified and which might
been kept informed but apparently few lend some assistance to the campaign in
Korea would not be beneficial if they
of the important papers had really found thereby involved Japan 29or Western Europe
their way to his desk. President Truman in large-scale hostilities.
therefore resolved to send a personal let-
The President fully appreciated the
ter to General MacArthur setting forth
seriousness of the United Nations Com-
the political aspects of the situation from
27 mand's military position in Korea at that
the standpoint of the nation's leaders.
time and was in no way minimizing the
"I want you to know," President Tru-
danger. He recognized that continued
man wrote MacArthur on 13 January,
resistance in Korea might not be mili-
"that the situation in Korea is receiving
tarily possible; but he suggested that, if
the utmost attention here and that our
MacArthur thought it practicable, re-
efforts are concentrated upon finding the
right decisions on this matter of the grav-
sistance might still be continued, after
est importance to the future of America 28
Rad, JCS to CINCFE, JCS 81050, Truman (Per-
26
Ibid. sonal) for MacArthur, 13 Jan 51.
27 29
Truman, Memoirs, II, 434-37. Ibid.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 325
already been advised that these divisions spent two days with General Ridgway,
had not been called up for that purpose touring the front lines and talking with
and refused to make any commitment on corps and division commanders. Both
sending the requested units.33 the Army Chief of Staff and the Eighth
Army commander made statements of
great significance at a press briefing held
Encouraging Signs in Korea on 16 January in Taegu. General Col-
The first real chance for a co-ordi- lins told the newsmen, "As of now, we
nated, though limited, attack since the are going to stay and fight," while Gen-
abortive advance of 24 November, de- eral Ridgway seconded this by saying,
veloped in mid-January and General "There is no shadow of doubt in, my
Ridgway quickly took advantage of it. mind that the Eighth Army can take care
An enemy build-up was discovered north of itself in the current situation." 36
of the Eighth Army's defensive line When Collins returned to Tokyo on
between Osan and Suwon, and on 14 17 January, he sent a most encouraging
January General Ridgway ordered an report to his fellow members of the Joint
armor-supported co-ordinated attack Chiefs of Staff in Washington. He told
against this enemy concentration. them that the Eighth Army was in good
He decided on this attack against the shape and improving daily under Gen-
advice of his staff. "To a man, the eral Ridgway's leadership. He had found
Eighth Army staff was against offensive morale very satisfactory, all things con-
action north and I alone had to make the sidered. The weakest link in the United
decision," Ridgway stated.34 Ridgway's Nations team was the ROK component.
purpose was to kill as many enemy sol- General Collins considered this force still
diers as possible and then to withdraw capable of holding off North Korean
to main positions, leaving a covering units, but believed it lacked confidence
force in the area. The attack, known as and instinctively feared the Chinese. He
Operation WOLFHOUND, jumped off on had seen no signs of dissatisfaction or
15 January and inflicted some enemy collapse in the ROK Army, but warned
casualties. The attack was most notable, that such reactions could develop quickly
however, as a sign that the Eighth Army in case of a serious reverse.37
was no longer entirely on the defensive
and as a harbinger of the offensive spirit 36
Comd Rpt, EUSAK, Jan 51, Narrative, p. 75.
that General Ridgway was bent on de- While it is axiomatic that a field commander must
keep a stiff upper lip and issue optimistic statements
veloping in his new command.35 under the most adverse conditions in order to
Generals Collins and Vandenberg ar- strengthen the will of his forces and to avoid giving
rived in Korea while Operation WOLF- comfort to the enemy, these statements, both by
Collins and Ridgway, were not to that end. There
HOUND was in progress. General Collins is every indication that Ridgway believed exactly
what he said at this point and that Collins, trusting
Ridgway's judgment, was for the first time since late
33
Ibid. November satisfied that a successful stand could be
34
Interv, Appleman with Ridgway, Oct 51. made by Eighth Army troops.
35 37
Rad, CX 101066 KGOO, CG Army Eight to Rad, C 53613, Collins (Personal) for Bradley,
Corps Comdrs, 14 Jan 51. 17 Jan 51.
THE SEARCH FOR POLICY 327
What he had seen of the enemy made of the sea and air by the United Nations,
General Collins optimistic. The Chinese and with the enemy's lengthening lines
had made no major move to push south of communication, the Chinese would
from the Han River, and when counter- never be able to bring up enough sup-
attacked had usually fled. He had de- plies to enable them to drive his forces
tected signs also of enemy supply from Korea. But he reiterated strongly
difficulties and indications of a lowered his belief that the decision to evacuate
morale among the Chinese. "On the Korea was a purely political matter and
whole," Collins reported, "Eighth Army should not be decided on military
40
is now in position and prepared to punish grounds.
38
severely any mass attack." The effect of Collins' cheering report
General Vandenberg, meanwhile, had on the nation's leaders and on the na-
inspected Air Force installations in Ko- tional policy can hardly be exaggerated.
rea. In making both aerial and ground For the first time since late November,
reconnaissance, a most remarkable pro- authorities in Washington saw reason-
cedure for a man of his high position, he able hope that catastrophe might be fore-
flew by helicopter twelve miles in front stalled in Korea and that all was not as
of the main U.N. positions and joined a black as had been painted. Recommen-
ground patrol.39 dations and plans for national policy
Both officers met with MacArthur in that had been predicated on almost com-
Tokyo once more before leaving for the plete United States helplessness to con-
United States. Collins read to Mac- tinue the action in Korea faded in
Arthur the message that he had sent to significance.
General Bradley forecasting a more favor- Clearly, the man most responsible for
able future for the United Nations Com- bringing about this radical change in the
mand. General MacArthur agreed that situation was General Ridgway. There
things did indeed look brighter and, is little question that when Ridgway
after reviewing the military situation as took command of the Eighth Army in
he now saw it, stated that his forces could December, he was under no restrictions
hold a beachhead in Korea indefinitely. as to making further rearward move-
He felt that with continued domination ments. He could have continued falling
back without serious recrimination, in
38
Ibid. view of the prevailing belief in Wash-
39
MacArthur Hearings, p. 329. Vandenberg's ex- ington and GHQ that enemy strength
cursion beyond the lines is one of the most remark- was great enough to force the United
able sidelights of the entire Korean conflict. While
speaking well for his courage, it reflects some doubt Nations Command out of Korea. His
on his judgment. Probably no other single indi- leadership turned the tide, kept the
vidual was in possession of a greater wealth of Eighth Army fighting in Korea, and
knowledge of the status, plans, and developments of
the United States Air Force at this time. If the paved the way for advances that were
Communists were allowed to choose the individuals soon to come.
they would most like to have at their mercy, Van-
40
denberg would doubtless have ranked well toward Memo for JCS, sub: Consultation with Gen
the top of their list; and that Vandenberg risked MacArthur, 15-18 Jan 51, sgd by Collins and Van-
capture is certainly apparent. denberg.
328 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Chiefs of Staff and the counterrecom- card. "As the result of this change in the
mendations of the National Security military situation from that which pre-
Council Senior Staff were reviewed. But vailed during the early part of January,"
no decision was reached. Mr. Truman Marshall testified:
then directed a continuation of the study
by the Secretary of State and the Secre- It ... [became] unnecessary to put into
effect all of the courses of action outlined
tary of Defense in connection with a joint in the Joint Chiefs' memorandum of Janu-
review of American politico-military ary 12. None of these proposed courses of
strategy. action were vetoed or disapproved by me
General Marshall has stated that as a or by any higher authority. Action with
respect to most of them was considered
result of the encouraging view of the inadvisable in view of the radical change in
military situation brought back by Col- the situation which originally had given
lins and Vandenberg, the courses of rise to them.44
action contained in the Joint Chiefs'
January 12 study went into virtual dis- 44
MacArthur Hearings, p. 324.
CHAPTER XVIII
By late January 1951, local successes by sent to the Chinese Communist Govern-
United Nations forces and a renewed ment with an invitation to negotiate a
offensive spirit within Ridgway's com- cease-fire. The Chinese countered with
mand had altered the combat scene and a few principles of their own which in-
had improved the outlook. No longer cluded their acceptance into the United
was the threat of forced evacuation so Nations Organization and the with-
real. Nor was the need for new decisions drawal of American forces from the For-
on national policy so pressing. mosa area. The Chinese must have
Attempts by United Nations leaders to known the United Nations would not
arrange a cease-fire in Korea continued agree to these terms, and therefore were
fruitlessly throughout the winter. A 14 probably not surprised when the terms
December resolution by the U.N. Gen- were rejected.1
eral Assembly had established a Cease Since the beginning of the Korean
Fire Group, but otherwise had led to War, relations between the United States
nothing. The Chinese rejected every and its most important allies, Britain and
overture to negotiate except on their own France, had been strained to some degree,
terms. In mid-January, the First Com- particularly after the October crossing
mittee of the General Assembly estab- of the 38th Parallel. The western na-
lished several principles as the basis for tions had not yet reconciled their diver-
a cease-fire: withdrawal of all non-Korean gent points of view on the conduct of the
forces from Korea; free elections under
United Nations supervision and arrange- campaign, relations with the Chinese
ments for interim administration; and, Communists, and the disposition of For-
after a cease-fire, a conference including mosa. But as a result of the Chinese
Communist rejection of the United Na-
representatives of the United States,
tions cease-fire proposal, there for the
USSR, and Communist China on settle-
first time appeared to be some ground
ment of Far Eastern problems. The
for a common allied approach to the
United States voted for this arrangement
even though some American authorities 1
Department of State, U.S. Policy in the Korean
were very skeptical about it. Conflict, July 1950-February 1951 (Washington,
A statement of these principles was 1951), pp. 27-37.
332 POLICY AND DIRECTION
2
problems posed by the Chinese. In fol- France had supported continued re-
lowing up this slight advantage, Ameri- sistance in Korea, but was eager for a
can leaders undertook to gain acceptance peaceful settlement if possible, and had
of the American viewpoint by Rene expressed great opposition to extending
Pleven, French Prime Minister, when he hostilities outside of Korea. The Depart-
visited President Truman in Washington ment of State therefore recommended
on 29-30 January 1951.3 that President Truman assure Pleven
In anticipation of Pleven's visit, De- that the United States would continue to
partment of State planners prepared for try to confine the fighting to Korea.5
the President a statement of American About this time, the United States was
objectives in Korea and the probable pressing the United Nations to pass a
paths toward those objectives. This com- resolution branding Communist China
pilation of views amply illustrated that as an aggressor. The Department of
while the American Government had a State therefore urged the President to
broad pattern for Korea, no specific assure Pleven that in the American view
means to work out this pattern had yet the passage of this resolution would not
been developed. constitute authorization for the exten-
The Korean venture was of necessity sion of hostilities to China, and that the
a partnership arrangement. Most of the United States had no intention of asking
partners who had to be consulted by the the United Nations for authority to take
United States, the senior partner, hesi- any measures involving operations against
tated to subscribe to any step which Chinese territory. But the United States
might enlarge the area of conflict or in Government, in its capacity as the Uni-
some other way prove detrimental to fied Command, reserved the right to take
their national interests. The United action essential for protecting the United
States had no desire, and indeed no in- Nations forces under its command. Con-
tention, to stand alone against the Com- sequently, the Department of State felt
munists in Korea. The Department of that Pleven should know that in the
State insisted that the United States event of large-scale air attacks against
should continue to urge the United Na- U.N. troops from Manchurian bases, the
tions to adopt a policy of bringing to United States would bomb the bases from
bear the greatest possible collective pres- which the attacks originated, and that if
sure upon the Communist aggressor in the Chinese Communists attacked Ameri-
Korea. This policy, it was felt, would can forces outside of Korea, the United
increase the chances of reaching an States would take counteraction. The
honorable solution in Korea and would Joint Chiefs of Staff thought that the De-
4
deter similar aggressions elsewhere. partment of State was right and placed
their seal of approval on these views.6
2
Memo, Gen Duff, Dep ACofS G-3, DA, for
President Truman and Prime Minister
CofS, USA, 23 Jan 51, Incl 3, in G-3, DA file 320.2, Pleven, on the first day of their talks,
Case 60. concentrated on the situation in Asia.
3
(1) JCS 1776/187, 26 Jan 51. (2) JCS 1776/186,
5
24 Jan 51. Both in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 151. Ibid.
4 6
Ibid. Ibid.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 333
The President told the French Prime People's Republic of China an aggressor
Minister substantially what his ad- nation and calling for the achievement
visers had recommended. He stated of United Nations objectives in Korea by
forcefully that he saw no way for the peaceful means.9 India and Burma voted
United States to recognize the Commu- against calling Communist China an ag-
nist regime in Peiping, and that he was gressor. Seven nations of the non-Com-
convinced that the Communists had munist world and Yugoslavia did not
10
moved into Korea because they feared participate in the voting.
the progress being made by the western
powers in the Far East. He assured The Combat Scene
Pleven that the United States was striv-
ing for world peace, but that only collec- Regardless of political efforts to find
tive security could bring this about. The common ground for negotiation, the
United States therefore would not nego- issue between the Communists and the
tiate with the Chinese to restore peace in United Nations in Korea continued to
Korea at the price of collective security be decided at this stage of the war on the
and national self-respect.7 battlefield. The success or failure of the
Since the first intervention by the Chi- United Nations political efforts would,
nese, the United States, through Am- it appeared, depend on the success or
bassador Austin, had championed a failure of the United Nations military
resolution before the General Assembly measures. During late January and Feb-
of the United Nations which would ruary, General Ridgway concentrated on
brand China an aggressor nation and at means of exploiting to the very limit the
the same time provide a method of bring- capabilities of the forces under his com-
ing about a cease-fire. Many member mand. Conferring with his I and IX
nations of the United Nations, fearing Corps commanders on 21 January, he
that such a step would only increase the ordered them to mount a strong combat
scope of the fighting and widen the reconnaissance into the area bounded by
breach between Communist China and the Suwon-Ich'on-Yoju road and the Han
themselves, hesitated to support the reso- River to develop enemy dispositions, dis-
lution. But President Truman urged rupt hostile concentrations, and inflict
passage of the measure in line with his maximum destruction on the enemy.11
determination that "For my part, I be- This reconnaissance, designated Opera-
lieve in calling an aggressor an aggres- tion THUNDERBOLT, jumped off on 25
sor." 8 Finally, on 1 February, after January and made consistent progress
much hesitancy on the part of some mem- against generally light resistance. (Map
ber nations and complete opposition by 9
UN Doc A/1771, quoted in Department of State
the USSR and its satellite member na- Pub 4263, U.S. Policy in the Korean Conflict, July
tions, the United Nations General As- 1950-February 1951, p. 37.
10
Memo, Dr. Ralph J. Watkins for Maj Gen Max-
sembly adopted a resolution naming the well D. Taylor, 1 Mar 51, in G-3, DA file 381 China,
7
Case 8/8.
Truman, Memoirs, II, 437-38. 11
Memo, Notes on Conference with CG I Corps,
8
(1) Statement by the President, 25 Jan 51. CG IX Corps, and Vice Comdr 5th AF, Gen Ridg-
(2) Mac Arthur Hearings, p. 3513. way, 21 Jan 51, in GHQ, UNC SGS.
334 POLICY AND DIRECTION
VII) By the end of January, the enemy's This was being done, Ridgway claimed,
main line of resistance still had not been at the same time that complete co-ordi-
developed; but Ridgway's forces had nation within and between the corps was
reached a line four to six miles north of insuring the integrity of all major units.
the line Suwon-Kumyangjang-ni-Ich'on General Ridgway reported that his forces
and were continuing their advance. in the western sector were moving for-
Understandably encouraged by the ward in phased, closely co-ordinated ad-
January advances, General Ridgway in vances to develop the enemy dispositions
early February outlined plans for the on that front and to kill as many of the
immediate future and his ideas on enemy as possible with a minimum of
longer-range moves. Ridgway informed friendly losses. Ridgway told MacArthur
MacArthur that the Eighth Army was in- that if it proved tactically sound and
flicting maximum losses upon the enemy militarily possible, he would send his
and delaying to the utmost enemy at- troops as far as the Han River where they
tempts to push farther into South Korea. would hold. He also planned a co-ordi-
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 335
nated attack on the central front in the Likewise, any attempt at the moment
very near future to reach and hold the to retake the South Korean capital would,
general line Yongp'yong-Hoengsong- in General Ridgway's opinion, be foolish
Yangnung.12 from a purely military viewpoint. To
In General Ridgway's opinion, the ad- occupy Seoul would place an unfordable
vance to the Han, at least as far east as river through or behind his defensive
Yongp'yong, was a sound operation with positions. Therefore, unless a sudden
potentially high results so long as enemy opportunity arose to trap and destroy a
resistance did not stiffen to the point major enemy force, in which the retak-
where United Nations losses canceled ing of Seoul was incidental, he would
out military gains. But from Yongp'yong leave Seoul to the Chinese.14
eastward to the Sea of Japan, a distance Ridgway set forth five major assump-
of ninety airline miles, the Korean front tions: the enemy would continue a major
ran through a rugged, wooded area lack- effort to force the Eighth Army from
ing roads and any natural terrain line on Korea or to destroy it in place; there
which to base defensive positions that would be no major reinforcement of the
could be easily or profitably held. Gen- Eighth Army; the basic plan and direc-
eral Ridgway had no illusions about tives under which the Eighth Army was
setting up a static defense or making operating were sound and required no
substantial advances in that sector. With present modification; the 38th Parallel
regard to this part of Korea, he said, could not be defended with forces then
"Assuming as I do, a continuation of a available; and elsewhere north of the
major effort to destroy us, prolonged ef- Han, terrain lines across the peninsula
forts to hold any such line, would in my were not good enough to justify the losses
view, require far greater forces than are required to take and defend them. He
now available, and entail a heavy attri- asked General MacArthur for his views
15
tion, with little or no commensurate on these concepts.
gain." Ridgway made it plain to Mac- General Ridgway's analysis and plans
Arthur that he saw little wisdom in a presented MacArthur, according to Gen-
general advance beyond the line of the eral Whitney, ". . . with a dilemma."
Han River in view of the great risks. He Whitney explained later that MacArthur
would recommend such an advance only placed far greater stress on the factor of
if the Chinese forces should voluntarily supply ". . . than Ridgway apparently
withdraw north of the 38th Parallel. As did." MacArthur had not changed his
to the 38th Parallel, General Ridgway opinion that Seoul was a vital supply hub
told MacArthur that he considered it which had to be seized if enemy supply
indefensible with his present forces. If was to be effectively curtailed and that
Eighth Army tried to hold any part of sound psychological advantages lay in
the former boundary too many men capturing the ancient capital city.
would be lost.13 "Therefore," Whitney recalls, "he had
12
no intention of holding the Eighth Army
Ltr, Gen Ridgway to Gen MacArthur, 3 Feb
14
51, in GHQ, FEC SGS files. Ibid.
13 15
Ibid. Ibid.
336 POLICY AND DIRECTION
south of the Han River. Yet he under- Ridgway's air support in forward areas.
stood fully that Ridgway's caution was He said that if Inch'on and Kimp'o pre-
natural because of the heavy blow the sented "easy prey," they should be taken.
army had sustained when he had sought In closing, MacArthur commended Ridg-
to hold the Seoul area before. . . . Mac- way highly, saying, "Your performance
Arthur worded his reply carefully." 16 of the last two weeks, in concept and in
MacArthur did, indeed, word his reply execution, has been splendid and worthy
carefully, so carefully that he seemed to of the highest traditions of a great cap-
agree with all of Ridgway's proposals and tain." 18
ideas. MacArthur informed Ridgway on The enemy had not forgotten the Sep-
4 February, "I interpret your objective tember landing at Inch'on. American
to be such advance with concomitant intelligence agencies learned that the
pressure by your own forces as will de- Chinese were very worried over the possi-
velop the enemy's main line of resist- bility of another amphibious landing
ance." If this line developed south of either at Inch'on or at the narrow waist
the Han, MacArthur agreed that no at- of Korea. Ridgway asked MacArthur to
tempt should be made to push farther. consider exploiting these enemy fears by
If, on the other hand, the Eighth Army naval feints to simulate possible land-
reached the Han without serious resist- ings. MacArthur ordered these diver-
ance, MacArthur believed that Ridgway sionary actions, which, at Inch'on, forced
should drive forward until either the the employment of at least one North
enemy line had been developed or the Korean division to guard the port against
fact established that the enemy had no the threatened attack. Later on, this
such line. Ridgway had said essentially enemy division was pulled out of Inch'on
the same thing when he recommended an and thrown against Ridgway's advance
advance only if the Chinese had volun- from the south in Operation THUNDER-
tarily withdrawn north of the parallel.17 BOLT. Noting this, Ridgway asked
MacArthur's thinking on retaking MacArthur to resume the naval demon-
Seoul seemed to parallel that of the strations to draw enemy forces away from
Eighth Army commander. He agreed the front. Hence, high-speed amphibi-
that the military usefulness of Seoul was ous ships sailed from Pusan and again
practically nil, but that its occupation by simulated actual landing operations in
Ridgway's forces would yield certain the Inch'on area.19
valuable diplomatic and psychological On 5 February, General Ridgway or-
advantages. More tangible advantages 18
(1) Ibid. (2) Cementing on this exchange, Gen-
would accrue from taking the Inch'on eral Whitney noted, "Here was one of the marks of
port facilities and Kimp'o Airfield. Use leadership; MacArthur thus got his conflicting views
of these would greatly reduce the supply across to Ridgway without doing violence to sensi-
bilities which had been suffering acutely in the
difficulties and increase the power of difficult campaign." See Whitney, MacArthur: His
Rendezvous with History, p. 461.
16 19
Whitney, MacArthur: His Rendezvous with His- (1) Comd Rpt, G-3 UNC, Jan 51, App. 4, Part
tory, pp. 460-61. III, Incl 48. (2) Rad, CG-2-621 KGOO, CG Army
17
Rad, C 54811, CINCUNC to CG Army Eight Eight to CINCFE, 6 Feb 51. (3) Rad, COMNAVFE
(Personal) for Ridgway, 4 Feb 51. to CTF 90 and CTF 95, 6 Feb 51.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 337
GENERAL REEDER (left) AND GENERAL TAYLOR (center) arrive at Taegu Airstrip
to begin their tour of inspection of the fighting front. They are greeted by
Maj. Gen. Henry I. Hodes, Deputy Chief of Staff, U.S. Eighth Army.
dered the X Corps to attack in the central partment of the Army on 10 February,
sector. For several days, Almond's troops General Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2,
made good progress in their advance, adopted a justifiably optimistic tone.
known as Operation ROUND-UP; but He claimed that the enemy was not vol-
enemy resistance increased steadily as the untarily withdrawing from any of his
X Corps approached the main enemy positions but was being forced to do so.
positions. In the west, meanwhile, other He pointed out that once Ridgway seized
Eighth Army units drove ahead, piercing the Han River, the enemy could find no
the enemy's defenses south of Seoul and defensive positions short of the old North
forcing the Chinese back across the Han Korean defense line along the 38th
River in the Seoul area on 10 February. Parallel. Any enemy withdrawal to the
In reporting these successes to the De- 38th Parallel would have to be viewed,
338 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Willoughby claimed, as a decision forced expressed it, "to flush the enemy from
on them by a series of defeats in the field concealment where he may have escaped
with an accompanying attrition in men air attack." MacArthur promised that if
and matériel. He told staff officers in his attacks showed that the enemy was
Washington that the enemy had defi- not present in strength south of the 38th
nitely been kicked back and so long as Parallel, he would immediately notify
United Nations pressure could keep the the Joint Chiefs of Staff and request in-
enemy off-balance, the initiative would structions before moving farther north.
remain with MacArthur.20 He was obviously preparing well in ad-
But just what MacArthur intended to vance to refute any possible charges that
do next in Korea was not clear to offi- he intended to make another crossing of
cials of the Department of the Army. In the parallel without full authority from
an effort to get abreast of the situation, higher headquarters.22
Maj. Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor, General Although the measures he had recom-
Bolté's successor as Department of the mended against the Chinese outside of
Army G-3, asked General MacArthur to Korea had not been taken and no rein-
explain his plans. High-level talks in forcement had arrived, MacArthur's com-
which Army officials were to take part in mand had not been driven out of Korea
the very near future made it necessary as he had predicted. Yet he still insisted
that MacArthur submit his views on that he be allowed to bomb Manchuria.
probable short-range military develop- "It can be accepted as a basic fact," he
ments. Taylor asked MacArthur spe- told Taylor, "that, unless authority is
cifically if he intended to push north and, given to strike enemy bases in Man-
if so, if he also intended to move his churia, our ground forces as presently
prepared defense base forward.21 constituted cannot with safety attempt
MacArthur based his reply on the ex- major operations in North Korea."
change of views with General Ridgway Where previously he had insisted that
earlier in the month. In fact, had he bombing China was necessary to permit
transmitted Ridgway's letter to General his forces to stay in Korea, General Mac-
Taylor without change, the effect would Arthur had modified this view to the
have been the same. "It is my purpose," extent that he now felt it was necessary
MacArthur told Taylor, "to continue the to bomb China in order to operate in
ground advance until I develop the North Korea.23
enemy's main line of resistance or the MacArthur said that it was evident to
fact that there is no such line south of him that the enemy had lost his chance
the 38th Parallel." A constant advance, of a decisive military decision in Korea.
MacArthur pointed out, would keep the But he still considered that the Chinese
Chinese and North Koreans off-balance. retained the potential, so long as their
This would allow his own forces to take base of operations in Manchuria was im-
full advantage of their superior artillery mune from air attack, of resuming the
firepower and armor and, as MacArthur 22
Rad, C 55315, MacArthur (Personal) for Taylor,
20
21
Telecon, TT 4364, GHQ and DA, 10 Feb 51. 1123Feb 51.
Rad, DA 83262, DA to CINCFE, 11 Feb 51. Ibid.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 339
offensive and forcing a withdrawal upon progress in Korea. He hoped that this
his command. "We intend to hold the step would curb any wrong trend in
25
line of the Han up to the point of a public thinking on the matter.
major and decisive engagement," the General MacArthur visited the battle-
U.N. commander claimed. He no longer front in mid-February for a first-hand
feared forced evacuation, but he did look at the situation in the field. When
anticipate being forced back from the he returned to Tokyo, he issued a public
Han, how far he could not say. Once statement which warned that, in spite of
forced back from the river, however, his recent advances by his forces, the future
forces would be able to stabilize the line of the Korean fighting depended upon
because logistic difficulties would prevent international considerations and upon
the enemy from full exploitation of the high-level decisions which had not yet
initial advantage. "The capability of been received by his headquarters. It is
the enemy is inversely and geometrically obvious that he still had not abandoned
proportionate to his distance from the hope that his recommendations to bomb
Yalu," is the way MacArthur expressed China, use Nationalist troops, and block-
it. MacArthur also made a plea for ade Chinese ports would be approved.
security of his plans by telling Taylor, Or, if he had abandoned hope, he at least
"It is earnestly requested that no esti- wanted to keep these recommendations
mate of the situation be released in alive in the public mind.26
Washington." He claimed that in the With reference to the battlefield situa-
past his plans had been jeopardized by tion of the past several months, Mac-
leaks to the press of his secret reports Arthur credited his strategy of rapid
and by "injudicious speculation which withdrawal before the Chinese in De-
has emanated from more or less authori- cember with lengthening the enemy's
tative sources." He reminded Taylor supply lines and "pyramiding his supply
that reports and estimates should be re- difficulties." But he insisted that recent
leased only at the discretion of the field tactical successes by the Eighth Army un-
commanders.24 der Ridgway not lead to overoptimism.
Secretary of the Army Pace grew con- The Chinese, MacArthur cautioned, still
cerned lest the success of early February retained a tremendous potential for fur-
probing attacks lead to overoptimism on ther offensive operations. In this last
the part of the American public. He contention MacArthur was correct.27
feared this might give rise to speculation
as to whether United Nations forces Chip'yong-ni
might not again advance to the Yalu While the successes were being
River. He notified MacArthur on 13 achieved in the west, Operation ROUND-
February that the actual situation was 25
Rad, W 83277, DA to CINCFE, 13 Feb 51.
being depicted for press officials, and that 26
This public statement was duly noted by Wash-
they were being cautioned against put- ington authorities and later cited as an example of
ting out unjustifiably glowing reports on MacArthur's violation of the 6 December directive.
See MacArthur Hearings, p. 3539.
27
Statement, General MacArthur in Pacific Stars
24
Ibid. and Stripes, February 14, 1951.
340 POLICY AND DIRECTION
UP was beating itself out against strong For the Eighth Army, there was no
resistance and enemy counterattacks in resting on laurels. Even before the front
the central sector north of Hoengsong. lines stabilized, General Ridgway opened
The U.S. X Corps and the ROK III Operation KILLER to destroy the enemy
Corps met increasingly heavy enemy con- east of the Han River line and south of
centrations in their attempts to advance. the general line Yangp'yong-Hyonch'on-
American intelligence already had ni-Haanmi-ri. The main effort was di-
warned that the enemy was shifting most rected along the Wonju-Hoengsong and
of his forces from the west to the central Yongwol-P'yongch'ang axes. Ridgway
zone. Unable to hold in the west, the issued strict orders that this would be no
enemy apparently was massing his runaway drive north. He demanded
strength against the relatively weak cen- close lateral co-ordination within and be-
ter of the United Nations line. tween the two attacking corps, the IXth
On the night of 11-12 February, two and Xth, and emphasized that his pur-
Chinese armies and a North Korean corps pose was to kill enemy troops.
struck the central front, scattered three General Ridgway took American news-
ROK divisions, and forced the troops in men in Korea into his confidence on
this sector to abandon Hoengsong and Operation KILLER, but with the strict
withdraw southward toward Wonju. provision that they would not disclose
The enemy was obviously aiming his the plan until after the attack had
attack at the communications centers started. By so doing, Ridgway hoped to
of Wonju, near the center, and Chip'- prevent publication of rumor or conjec-
yong-ni, near the west flank of the X ture from compromising his intentions
Corps sector, whose seizure would assist to attack. But on 20 February, General
further advances to the south and west. MacArthur flew into Korea and during
General Ridgway therefore resolved that a press conference at Wonju that day
Wonju and Chip'yong-ni would be held. announced to the newsmen that he was
At nightfall on 13 February, three going to launch an offensive in a day or
Chinese divisions opened attacks against two. This startled and amazed General
Chip'yong-ni. For three days, the 23d Ridgway, not only because MacArthur
Regiment of the U.S. 2d Division, with had disclosed Ridgway's intentions to the
the French battalion attached, staved off enemy, but also because the planned
all efforts by the Chinese to overrun the offensive had originated with the Eighth
town and killed thousands of the enemy. Army, not General MacArthur. The
Although the Chinese were stopped in premature announcement, however, had
the Chip'yong-ni area, enemy forces no effect on the outcome of Operation
farther east bypassed Wonju and ad- KILLER. When the Eighth Army jumped
vanced south almost to Chech'on before off on 21 February, the enemy faded
the Eighth Army could halt them. away; and within eight days, Ridgway's
28
Weakened by great losses in men and troops reached their assigned objective.
ham-strung by an inadequate logistic
system, the Chinese and North Koreans 28
Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies,
then called off their attack and withdrew. p. 403.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 341
substitute for trained combat replace- these men to MacArthur within the next
37
ments. four to six weeks. Collins expressed the
"To date," MacArthur pointed out, hope that MacArthur's needs could be
"Army divisions have been fighting from met almost in full and that, ultimately,
twenty to fifty percent below authorized the Army could send him 27,000 men
strength in infantry and artillery units." above and beyond the normal flow of
He expressed particular concern because replacements.39
this lack of replacements would not let On 30 January Collins sent to Mac-
him rotate combat-weary soldiers. Gen- Arthur a full explanation of the steps
eral MacArthur also pointed out that the the Army was taking to give him suffi-
shortage of combat soldiers within Ridg- cient soldiers. "You can rest assured that
way's divisions necessitated extended we here are aware of your personnel
frontages which were susceptible to in- shortages and the effect upon your opera-
filtration and which exposed not only tions," Collins said. He explained that
combat elements but supply and com- since the number of men being trained
munications lines as well. This latter and shipped to the Far East from the
condition had resulted in abnormally replacement training centers in the
high casualties in rear areas. Only the United States had proved inadequate, he
Marine division in Korea did not suffer was calling on the General Reserve. Of
from lack of men. MacArthur pointed the 14,300 men to be taken from the Re-
out to Collins that this division was at serve, the great majority would be infan-
full strength and had been for some try and would arrive in the Far East
time.38 during the last week of February. This,
The shortage of replacements within while not meeting the needs entirely,
the Far East Command amounted to ap- would at least bring the fighting divisions
proximately 40,000 men. General Col- closer to authorized strength. Collins re-
lins decided that the only way to take care minded MacArthur of their talks in
of this deficiency, at least temporarily, Tokyo earlier in the month. At that
was to pull more men away from the time MacArthur had agreed with Collins
General Reserve. He did not intend to that any sizable levy upon the General
repeat the experience of the previous Reserve would cause a great delay in
autumn when the General Reserve had bringing units within the United States,
been stripped to virtual ineffectiveness, including those destined for Europe, to
but he did approve a levy of 14,300 men a satisfactory state of combat readiness,
in February. Most of this levy was to be and had further agreed that this would
placed on the four National Guard divi- be a most serious mistake.40
sions and the two RCT's called to active Collins also informed MacArthur that
duty the previous September. General the shortages of trained combat troops
Collins directed the Department of the throughout the entire Army were such
Army G-1 to start action-at once to ship that he had directed an Army-wide reduc-
37 39
Rad, C 54360, MacArthur (Personal) for Collins, Min, 59th mtg Army Policy Council, 30 Jan 51.
40
29 Jan 51. Rad, DA 82320, Collins (Personal) for Mac-
38
Ibid. Arthur, 30 Jan 51.
344 POLICY AND DIRECTION
MacArthur insisted that these divisions 40th and 45th Divisions, both National
be shipped to Japan for the defense of Guard, be ordered to Japan to bolster
Japan. "Indeed," he told Washington, the defenses there. There were, at that
"it was my understanding, in which I time, no American divisions in Japan.
may have been in error, that the four The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed and for-
National Guard divisions called to active warded the recommendation to the Sec-
duty in September were for ultimate retary of Defense at once. MacArthur
employment here should the necessity was informed of this development as soon
arise. . . ." In early January, while the as it took place.48 After relatively
issue of forced evacuation was still in lengthy consideration which involved
serious doubt, the Joint Chiefs of Staff weighing the interests of the European
hinted that, if Eighth Army's line could theater against those of the Far East, the
be stabilized with the forces already in Secretary of Defense consented to the
Korea, two partly trained National transfer of the two major units. On 25
Guard divisions could be sent to defend February, the Joint Chiefs of Staff noti-
Japan. But if evacuation took place, fied the U.N. commander that the 40th
Japan would have to be defended by and 45th Divisions would reach his com-
troops removed from Korea.46 mand sometime in April. He was spe-
After General Collins returned to the cifically ordered to leave these divisions
United States from his mid-January visit in Japan and not to employ them against
to the Far East, he reviewed again the the enemy in Korea.49
possibility of furnishing National Guard
divisions to MacArthur. The Eighth Bombing of Rashin
Army was giving a good account of itself
In the early months of the Korean
in Korea and was stabilizing its position
fighting, General MacArthur had been
with the forces already available to it.
furnished a list of targets in North Korea
Under these conditions it seemed appro-
which the Joint Chiefs of Staff thought
priate to carry out the half-promise of
suitable for destruction by strategic
9 January to send two partly trained Na-
bombing. Among these key targets was
tional Guard divisions to Japan. On
the port city of Rashin. Rashin, lying
23 January, he told General MacArthur
only nineteen air miles south of the
that if things in Korea kept going as well
Soviet border on Korea's east coast,
as at present and the Chinese could be
housed a major port and extensive rail
contained, two divisions might be sent
47 yards. At the time of its selection as a
him to increase the security of Japan.
bombing target, General Ridgway, then
A week of continued successes in the field
on the Department of the Army staff, had
followed, and on 30 January Collins
noted Rashin's proximity to the Russian
recommended to the other members of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the U.S.
48
46
(1) Rad, DA 82320, Collins (Personal) for Mac-
(1) Rad, C 52391, MacArthur (Personal) for JCS, Arthur, 30 Jan 51. (2) Min, 59th mtg Army Policy
30 Dec 50. (2) Rad, JCS 80680, JCS (Personal) for Council, 30 Jan 51.
49
MacArthur, 9 Jan 51. Rad, DA 84232, CofS USA to CINCFE, 25
47
Rad, DA 1706, DA to CINCFE, 23 Jan 51. Feb 51.
346 POLICY AND DIRECTION
border and had questioned its selection.50 transportation and supply system effec-
Nevertheless, Rashin remained on the tively, Rashin would have to be attacked
target list and was bombed effectively on and destroyed. According to Strate-
one occasion. Another bombing strike meyer, the month of February offered
mounted on the port was diverted be- the best weather for visual attack on
cause of weather conditions. When re- Rashin. Thereafter, the weather would
ports of the Rashin bombing reached the progressively deteriorate. Stratemeyer
Department of State, officials there ex- assured MacArthur that his aircraft could
pressed concern over the possibility of attack and demolish the city without
violations of the Soviet border, and asked violating the international border, and
that targets close to that border no longer reiterated that he considered it almost
be bombed.51 The Joint Chiefs of Staff mandatory that his forces be allowed to
on 8 September 1950 had directed Gen- attack.53
eral MacArthur to make no further aerial General MacArthur, in a switch from
attacks against Rashin and asked his his previous stand, agreed with his air
views on the matter. On 10 September, commander that Rashin should be hit.
General MacArthur replied that he con- He felt that the city was the keystone of
curred in the restriction on Rashin and the enemy's logistic system in the east and
had ordered suspension of all further at- was being used at peak activity since the
tacks against the port.52 enemy had correctly guessed that Rashin
The matter lay more or less dormant might be immune. Accordingly, he rec-
until mid-February 1951 when the Com- ommended to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
manding General, Far East Air Forces, 15 February that their restrictions against
General Stratemeyer, appealed to Gen- bombing Rashin be removed. He
eral MacArthur for permission to attack pointed out that specific targets in the
Rashin once more. Stratemeyer pointed Rashin area—large marshaling yards, ex-
out that the enemy continued to receive tensive storage facilities, and dock areas
reinforcements and supplies in spite of —were particularly susceptible to visual
his severely crippled transportation sys- bombing during February; and he as-
tem, while Rashin, an important link in sured them that his bombers could, with-
the enemy's supply system, remained out question, destroy Rashin without
immune from attack. Aerial reconnais- violating the international border.54
sance of the Rashin area indicated a high Before making a decision on the mat-
level of activity in the city. To disrupt ter, the Joint Chiefs thought they should
and destroy the North Korean coast know more about Rashin and asked Mac-
Arthur to send more specific information
50
Note, handwritten, signed AMG (Gruenther), 2 with regard to the types and degree of
Aug 50, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 22/2.
51
military activity in the city as well as the
Memo (Tel Call), Mr. Matthews, State Dept, for exact location of installations.55 Mac-
OSD, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 103.
52
(1) Rad, JCS 90943, JCS to CINCFE, 9 Sept 50.
53
(2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 15 Feb 51, sub: Ltr, CG FEAF to CINCFE, 14 Feb 51, sub: At-
Instructions to the Commander in Chief, FEC, Re- tack on Rashin, in GHQ, UNC AG 13686.
54
specting the Bombing of Rashin, in G-3, DA file 091 Rad, CX 55601, CINCFE to JCS, 15 Feb 51.
55
Korea, Case 159. Rad, JCS 83773, JCS to CINCFE, 17 Feb 51.
THE UNITED NATIONS STRIKE BACK 347
Arthur admitted that he could not list leading south from Rashin down the
the precise nature or quantity of sup- coast was not completed, greatly lessen-
plies in the Rashin area, but he insisted ing Rashin's value as a supply point.
that great depot accumulations of vari- Furthermore, even though bombing
ous types were located there. "Rashin might accomplish the immediate destruc-
is the last major profitable strategic tar- tion of the particular stores then located
get in North Korea and has remained in Rashin, the enemy need only transfer
virtually untouched," he maintained. If his logistic activities a few miles north of
he could destroy this last vital link in the Russian border, to Vladivostok for
the enemy's east coast transportation sys- example, and enjoy the same advantages
tem the enemy would have suffered a afforded by Rashin.58 The Joint Chiefs
major loss. Conversely, Rashin's im- of Staff therefore turned down Mac-
munity from attack remained a major Arthur's appeal for permission to bomb
threat to MacArthur's forces.56 Rashin.59
General Taylor, the Department of the
Army G-3, supported MacArthur and Bombing of Power Installations
told the Chief of Staff that he felt it was
In late December, before the Chinese
operationally essential that MacArthur's
had attacked across the parallel, the Joint
request be granted. He admitted that
Chiefs of Staff had asked for MacArthur's
the major risk was that USSR aircraft,
maintaining surveillance in the area,
advice on whether to bomb and destroy
the power installations on the Korean
might, as a local defense measure, in-
vestigate U.N. aircraft involved and set side of the Yalu and the power dams on
off an air battle. There was also a lesser the river itself. They were contemplat-
risk that attacks upon Rashin, even if the ing such destruction only if the Chinese
did drive south across the 38th Parallel.
border were not violated, might provide
a basis for Russian propaganda claims
MacArthur had informed his superiors
alleging violations of their border.57 that the hydroelectric installations in
There were other reasons why Washing- northeast Korea were inactive. These,
ton felt it not advisable to bomb Rashin
of course, had been physically inspected
by X Corps units. The power plants in
at this time. The Department of State
still objected vigorously to the possibility northwest Korea, which his forces had
of border violations or USSR claims of never seized, were an unknown quantity
border violations. Too, there was excel- insofar as power output was concerned.
lent chance that USSR shipping, which But MacArthur felt that none of these
used the harbor freely, might be de- installations had any further military
stroyed and cause a serious international significance. Their destruction, if ac-
incident. Militarily, the Joint Chiefs of complished, would necessarily therefore
Staff did not feel that Rashin was as vital be a political matter. He pointed out
as MacArthur claimed. The railroad that he had been instructed firmly in the
56 58
Rad, C 55830, CINCFE (Personal) for JCS, 18 MacArthur Hearings, pp. 356, 431, 750, 1063,
Feb 51. and 1331.
57 59
Memo, G-3 (Taylor) for CofS USA, 15 Feb 51. Ibid., p. 17.
348 POLICY AND DIRECTION
past to refrain from destroying these in- stallations was predominantly a political
stallations and that these instructions had rather than a military matter, they did
been widely publicized as evidence of the not believe he should bomb the power
United Nations peaceful intent toward facilities.61
countries north of the Yalu. He stated
that his medium bombers could certainly The Improved Outlook
destroy these power plants and dams, but
reminded his superiors that this change By the end of February, limited but
in policy "involves considerations far very real combat successes had dissi-
beyond those of the immediate tactical pated the last traces of the specter of
campaign in Korea." 60 The Joint Chiefs forced evacuation under Chinese Com-
of Staff, understandably, let the matter munist pressure. General MacArthur
drop since there were no apparent politi- cheerfully reported that he was ". . . en-
cal advantages to be gained. tirely satisfied with the situation at the
But on 26 February, General Mac- front, where the enemy has suffered a
Arthur once more brought the bombing tactical reverse of measurable propor-
of the power installations to the attention tions. His losses have been among the
of the Joint Chiefs, telling them that bloodiest of modern times." Visibly
General Stratemeyer had urgently re- pleased by the northward progress of his
quested permission to destroy the entire forces in the field, the United Nations
North Korean power complex, including commander noted, "The enemy is find-
those plants on the Yalu River. Strate- ing it an entirely different problem fight-
meyer believed that by so doing he could ing 350 miles from his base than when
slow down Communist support of their he had this 'sanctuary' in his immediate
war effort, undermine the enemy's mo- rear, with our air and naval forces prac-
rale, and cut down any surplus power tically zeroed out." 62
going to Manchuria. MacArthur sug- The soundness of General Ridgway's
gested that the political considerations tactics was praised by MacArthur.
which prevented earlier bombings might Our strategic plan, notwithstanding the
have changed. He requested instruc- enemy's great numerical superiority, is in-
tions as to what he was to do. The De- deed working well, and I have just directed
a resumption of the initiative by our forces.
partment of the Army G-3 recommended All ranks of this international force are cov-
to the Chief of Staff that MacArthur be ering themselves with distinction and I again
told to carry on without destroying these wish to especially commend the outstand-
power plants since political considera- ing teamwork of the three services under
tions had certainly not changed to any the skillful direction of their able field com-
manders, General Ridgway,63Admiral Stru-
great degree. On 1 March, the Joint ble, and General Partridge.
Chiefs advised MacArthur that, in view 61
of his previous statement that the preser- (1) Rad, CX 56453, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 26
Feb 51. (2) Memo, G-3 DA for CofS USA, 26 Feb
vation or destruction of the power in- 51, sub: Bombing of Power Plants in North Korea,
in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 147/4. (3) Rad,
60
(1) Rad, JCS 99713, JCS to CINCFE, 26 Dec 50. JCS 84577, JCS to CINCFE, 1 Mar 51.
62
(2) Rad, C 52125, CINCFE to DA for JCS, sgd Rad, C 56709, CINCFE to DA, 1 Mar 51.
63
MacArthur, 27 Dec 50. Ibid.
CHAPTER XIX
The Crossroads
Although the war had again shifted have to be decided in haste or out of a
in favor of United Nations forces, the feeling of desperate weakness.
Eighth Army successes through the end The original purpose of United Na-
of February 1951 could not be considered tions military operations in Korea—to
an indication of eventual victory. The repel the aggression and to restore peace
most that could be predicted was that and security in the area—of course re-
the enemy forces then arrayed in Korea mained unchanged. So did the longer
would be incapable of forcing the Eighth range and long-standing objective of the
Army from the peninsula. United Nations, and particularly of the
For anyone committed to the view- United States since Cairo, "to bring
point that a war offers its participants about the establishment of a unified, in-
only the alternatives of victory or defeat, dependent and democratic Korea." The
the current situation was intolerable. achievement of these goals, particularly
General MacArthur represented this the longer range objective, by military
viewpoint in his suggested counterac- means, however, had become less likely
tions to the Chinese intervention. The after the impact of Chinese intervention
rejection of his proposals, he maintained, and the American decision in December
would lead to disaster, their acceptance not to commit additional forces to Korea.
to victory. He neither sought nor sug- The alternatives consequently narrowed
gested any middle course. to some sort of accommodation that
President Truman, on the other hand, would provide a halt or at least a lull in
recognized other alternatives and was the fighting during which diplomatic
willing to examine them. Consequently, negotiation might salvage the prestige
by the close of February, he had not yet of the United States and the United Na-
granted any of MacArthur's calls for tions and at the same time bring some
increased action against Communist result not too far short of the basic
China. Furthermore, the resurgence and objectives.
stiffening of the Eighth Army under Through March 1951, the United
Ridgway had created an atmosphere in States, as the Unified Command of the
which the next course of action did not United Nations, continued to fight with-
350 POLICY AND DIRECTION
out having elected any new political or moves by the United States remained
military courses of action. Neither the obscure, the Joint Chiefs recommended
Department of State, responsible for ad- no military course of action other than
vising the President on political matters, a continuation of an aggressive defense.2
nor the Joint Chiefs of Staff, his principal The Department of State nevertheless
military advisers, seemed willing to state informed American allies participating
definitely a proposed course of action in Korea of the five alternative courses
until the other party had done so. of action that the United Nations might
Frequent meetings took place between consider.3
State and Defense representatives, but The Secretary of State took the posi-
each Department deferred to the other tion on 23 February 1951 that neither
for a clear statement of what should be the United Nations nor the United States
done in Korea.1 had assumed any obligation to unify
During exploratory talks on 6 Febru- Korea by military means. The 7 Octo-
ary, the representatives of the Depart- ber 1950 resolution of the General As-
ment of State had listed five courses of sembly was permissive but not mandatory
action which the United Nations might on this point. Secretary Acheson be-
follow: an all-out military effort to con- lieved that most governments having
quer all Korea and unify the country troops in Korea, including the principal
by force; complete abandonment of allies of the United States, would not
Korea to the Communists; extension of support unification as a war aim but
hostilities to China, thus removing pres- would continue to support it as a
sure on Korea; an indefinite military political objective.4
stalemate at approximately the present The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not
battle line; or a peaceful settlement sure that the political objectives were
through negotiation. The initiative in still valid and recommended to the Sec-
the first three courses would have to be retary of Defense on 27 February that
taken by the United Nations, but in the these objectives be reviewed for either
fourth, stalemate, neither side would reaffirmation or modification. Once
have to take the initiative. In view of these objectives were firmly established,
the Communist rejection of overtures by the Department of State should be able
the United Nations, the initiative for at least to develop some short-range po-
bringing about a peaceful settlement, litical courses leading toward those polit-
the fifth step, now lay primarily with the ical objectives. The Joint Chiefs of
Communists. Staff felt they would then be able to
The Joint Chiefs maintained that they analyze the military capabilities of the
could not intelligently choose any one United Nations and recommend military
of these steps without knowing what courses of action to be taken in conjunc-
political course the United States meant
to follow; and since future political 2
(1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) JSSC
1
(1) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 920-21. (2) Sum- Rpt to JCS, p. 119.
3
mary of Notes on JCS-State Mtg, 13 Feb 51, JSSC Rad, DA-IN 3983, 21 Feb 51, in G-3, DA files.
4
Rpt to JCS, p. 123. JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
THE CROSSROADS 351
tion with and in furtherance of these stituted could not safely attempt major
political courses of action.5 operations in North Korea. He had at
the same time, of course, told Taylor
The 38th Parallel Again that even if he found it possible to cross
the parallel in force, he still would not do
The 38th Parallel assumed an ominous it until he had received instructions
significance in the eyes of some United from Washington.7
Nations members in February and General MacArthur's directives with
March as MacArthur's forces again drove regard to the 38th Parallel had not
northward and it appeared that the changed. He still possessed the authority
Eighth Army, after pushing forward to cross granted him on 27 September
slowly, would soon be able to cross over. by the United States and tacitly con-
Many officials, allied and American, firmed on 7 October by the United Na-
viewing the thrice-crossed parallel as a tions General Assembly. But the
symbolic barrier beyond which Mac- Department of State was keenly aware of
Arthur's men should not again venture the concern felt by some of the mem-
lest the enemy strike even harder in re- bers of the United Nations over the
taliation, became greatly concerned. advisability of re-entering North Korea.
General MacArthur had fended off To allay this concern, and in anticipation
newsmen's questions on the subject in of the arrival of United Nations forces
mid-February by telling them that for at the parallel, Secretary Acheson on 23
the time being any talk of crossing the February asked Secretary Marshall to
parallel except by patrol actions was consider revising the 27 September di-
purely academic. MacArthur took this rective so as to limit MacArthur's
opportunity to reaffirm his belief that advance. Acheson added that any sub-
the Chinese should be attacked on their sequent decision to move substantial
own soil, holding that the existing supe- forces above the parallel would require
riority of the Chinese Communist enemy preliminary discussions with other
8
must be materially reduced before he governments having troops in Korea.
could seriously consider conducting Acheson enclosed a memorandum the
major operations north of the 38th tenor of which was generally pessimistic
Parallel.6 and which he suggested Marshall send
This was merely a public airing of the the President. In it, Acheson pointed
view he had already expressed to Gen- out that any decision to press for the
eral Taylor on 11 February, when he unification of Korea by military action
had pointed out that unless he received would mean a vast increase in United
authority to strike enemy bases in Man- States military commitments; would al-
churia, his ground forces as then con- most certainly require the extension of
hostilities to Communist China; would
5
Memo, JCS, sgd Bradley, for Secy Defense, 27 greatly increase the risk of direct Soviet
Feb 51, sub: Action to be Taken by U.N. Forces
7
With Respect to the 38th Parallel. Rad, C 55315, MacArthur (Personal) for Gen
6
Statement, Gen MacArthur, 13 Feb 51, in Mac- Taylor, 11 Feb 51.
8
Arthur Hearings, p. 3539. JCS 1776/192, Incl B, App. to Annex A.
352 POLICY AND DIRECTION
intervention; and would require a major main objective. Nor did Acheson pro-
political effort to obtain the agreement pose to forbid MacArthur's men to set
of other directly interested nations to foot across the parallel; rather, he pro-
take such action.9 posed that no major crossing should be
Acheson judged that virtually all mem- made. He recognized that so long as
bers of the United Nations, including fighting in Korea continued, MacArthur
most of those actively participating in must be free to attack with naval and
Korea, strongly opposed any general ad- air power across the parallel and to take
vance across the 38th Parallel. This such ground action in North Korea
opposition was based on the belief that as was required to interrupt enemy
once the enemy had been driven out of offensive preparations.11
South Korea the primary objective of It is evident that the Department of
repelling the aggression had been accom- State officials were looking forward to a
plished; that an advance in North Korea possible settlement of the Korean crisis
would make an early negotiated settle- by negotiation. They considered it im-
ment of the Korean fighting impossible, portant that United Nations military
since the enemy would accept nothing action produce a desire on the part of
less than the status quo ante bellum; that the enemy to negotiate rather than to
crossing the parallel would greatly in- fight, and at the same time not create a
crease the pressure for extending the situation in which he would balk at a
hostilities into China and in turn would negotiated settlement. In other words,
involve American military resources to MacArthur's forces should inflict so many
an increased extent in indecisive opera- casualties on the enemy that he would
tions in Asia; and that a crossing would be anxious to negotiate, but on the other
greatly increase the risk of Soviet hand, this punishment should take place
involvement and general war.10 in the vicinity of the parallel and not in
A major advance across the parallel, the course of pushing the enemy so far
Acheson claimed, would require full back that he would refuse to accept a
consultation with major allies and their settlement at the line where the fighting
12
agreement, which under current circum- ended.
stances would be extremely difficult to Secretary of the Army Pace, Secretary
obtain. Any unilateral re-entry into of the Air Force Finletter, and Secretary
North Korea by the United States, on the of the Navy Dan A. Kimball examined
other hand, would create a severe crisis the Acheson proposals and found them
within the free world and could lead to reasonable. All three agreed that Mac-
the withdrawal of certain allies from Arthur should not attempt a general
the Korean War. Acheson did concede advance north of the 38th Parallel ex-
that all of South Korea must be captured, cept to take advantage of favorable ter-
claiming that such would constitute a rain for defense. Secretaries Pace and
major victory for United Nations forces Finletter wanted the United States to
since it would deny the enemy their adopt this policy of restraint and to an-
9 11
Ibid. Ibid.
10 12
1bid. Ibid.
THE CROSSROADS 353
TROOPS OF THE 1ST BATTALION, 35TH REGIMENT, 25TH DIVISION, pile into assault
boats to cross the Han River, south of Seoul, 7 March 1951.
United States ground troops, the high believed that Ridgway's punishing at-
casualties suffered, the long months of tacks might have rendered the Chinese
unrelieved combat duty, and the desira- more amenable to a political settlement.
bility of reassigning experienced soldiers To both Departments, it appeared
to form cadres for mobilization of new that the most logical beginning of a
units in the United States and of re- negotiated settlement was for President
deploying battle-tested units to other Truman to appeal directly to the Chinese
strategic areas made it all the more im- Communists. For while earlier attempts
perative that U.S. units in Korea be to bring about negotiations had failed,
23
relieved. President Truman had in none of these
Mr. Lovett wanted real, not token, as- instances been the one to suggest opening
sistance from these other nations, and negotiations. Furthermore, the situation
requested that the Department of State seemed particularly propitious because
once again prevail on such countries enemy forces were being pushed back
having trained manpower resources to into North Korea and could therefore
provide contingents of worthwhile size negotiate on the basis of their prewar
and to equip these units and support status.25
them themselves. He particularly had in The Department of State drafted such
mind the Commonwealth nations of a Presidential declaration and after ob-
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, all taining the Joint Chiefs' approval of its
of which could, he felt, well afford to content, began to clear it with the other
increase the size of their contingents in United Nations members having troops
Korea. He thought also that Great in Korea.26 In substance, the President
Britain might be able to furnish a full was to point out that the aggressors in
division, while Latin American countries Korea had been driven back to the gen-
such as Brazil and Mexico appeared to eral vicinity from which their unlawful
have the military manpower necessary to attack had first been launched and that,
24
send sizable units to Korea. therefore, the principal objective of re-
pelling North Korean and Chinese Com-
President Truman Is Displeased munist aggression against the Republic
of Korea had been achieved. He would
Almost by default, a political course of assert further that United Nations ob-
action began to emerge in mid-March. jectives, such as unification and the
Encouraged by the results of Operation establishment of a free government in
RIPPER, which proved that the military all of Korea, could and should be ac-
initiative in Korea no longer lay with complished without more fighting and
the enemy, U.S. policy planners decided bloodshed. The Chinese Communists
that efforts to achieve a negotiated settle- were, in effect, to be invited to cease fire
ment should be renewed. These plan- and to negotiate a settlement of the out-
ners, from both Defense and State, now standing issues. They were also to be
23
Ltr, Actg Secy Defense (Lovett) to Secy State,
25
31 Mar 51, in G-3, DA file 091 Korea, Case 148/19. MacArthur Hearings, p. 343.
24 26
Ibid. Ibid., pp. 343-44.
358 POLICY AND DIRECTION
warned that if they refused to negotiate, that his current directives were adequate
29
the United Nations would be forced to and should not be changed.
continue the fighting.27 The proposed Presidential announce-
On 20 March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ment was never made. For while it was
alerted General MacArthur to the still being prepared, General MacArthur
planned Presidential announcement. He issued a public statement on 24 March
was also informed that some nations that in the eyes of Washington officials
consulted believed that an advance by completely vitiated the contemplated
major forces of the United Nations Com- political move. In his statement, Mac-
mand across the 38th Parallel would Arthur declared that the tactical suc-
endanger further diplomatic efforts, and cesses of his forces clearly showed
was reminded that time would be needed Communist China to be a vastly over-
to determine the reactions of all con- rated military power weak in everything
cerned, including the Communist gov- but human resources. Continuing, he
ernments. The Joint Chiefs of Staff said, "Even under the inhibitions which
had already told the Department of State now restrict the activity of the United
that the 38th Parallel had no tactical Nations forces and the corresponding
significance, a judgment with which the military advantages which accrue to Red
Department of State now agreed. But China, it has shown its complete inability
State had asked the military advisers to accomplish by force of arms the con-
just what freedom of action MacArthur quest of Korea." The confident tone of
should have for the next few weeks in this statement contrasted sharply with
order for him to maintain contact with MacArthur's reports to Washington two
the enemy and at the same time insure months earlier. He also reiterated his
the safety of his forces; and the Joint oft-aired contention that ". . . the fun-
Chiefs, in turn, asked MacArthur to damental questions continue to be po-
make his own recommendations as to litical in nature and must find their
what latitude he required.28 answer in the diplomatic sphere." 30
MacArthur interpreted the latter re- Unmindful of the President's sched-
quest as a possible prelude to an order uled call on the enemy for negotiation,
forbidding him to cross the 38th Parallel MacArthur then declared :
and immediately recommended that no
Within the area of my authority as the
further military restrictions be imposed military commander, however, it should be
upon his command. He explained that needless to say that I stand ready at any
since he was forbidden to use his naval time to confer in the field with the Com-
and air arms as he had suggested, and mander-in-Chief of the enemy forces in the
since the enemy's ground potential so far earnest effort to find any military means
whereby realization of the political objec-
exceeded his, it remained completely tives of the United Nations in Korea, to
impractical anyway to attempt to clear which no nation may justly take exception,
North Korea. In sum, MacArthur felt
29
Rad, C 58203, CINCUNC (MacArthur) to DA
27
JSSC Rpt to the JCS, p. 131. for JCS, 21 Mar 51.
28 30
Rad, JCS 86276, JCS to CINCFE, 20 Mar 51. MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 387-88.
THE CROSSROADS 359
might be accomplished without further field, you immediately report that fact
bloodshed. to the JCS." 32
President Truman was angered by Mac- General MacArthur had not known
Arthur's statement since it tacitly pre- the contents of the proposed Presidential
empted the President's prerogatives and declaration. The information he re-
criticized, by implication at least, the ceived from the Joint Chiefs on 20 March
national policy. Besides infuriating the did little more than tell him that some
President, MacArthur's announcement sort of Presidential announcement was
brought down upon Washington a rash to be made. Also, in his own offer to
of inquiries from allies of the United confer in the field with the enemy com-
States as to whether MacArthur's words mander, MacArthur had stressed the
were the precursor of a drastic change terms, "Within the area of my authority
in national policy.
31
as a military commander . . . ," and
President Truman, on the same day he ". . . to find any military means. . . ."
heard MacArthur's statement, called in Evidence that such a move would have
Acheson, Rusk, and Lovett to discuss been quite proper is available. Shortly
what response to MacArthur's act would after the Inch'on landing, when it was
be appropriate. They agreed that the 6 thought the North Koreans might sue
December directive to MacArthur and for peace terms, the Deputy Under Sec-
the other commanders made plain what retary of State told the Department of
they could and could not say without Defense, "A cease-fire should be a purely
prior clearance. They further agreed military matter and accordingly they
that MacArthur had violated this di- (the North Koreans) should communi-
rective. But MacArthur was not cen- cate their offer to the Commanding Gen-
sured for this violation, only reminded eral of the unified command . . . who
once again of the directive itself. In is the appropriate representative to ne-
an immediate dispatch, the Joint Chiefs gotiate any33 armistice or cease-fire
notified MacArthur, "In view of the in- agreement."
formation given you 20 March 1951 any On the related issue of recrossing the
further statements by you must be co- 38th Parallel, General MacArthur did
ordinated as prescribed in the order of not intend to hold the Eighth Army be-
6 December. The President has also di- low the line unless so ordered by Wash-
rected that in the event Communist mil- ington. Nevertheless, he instructed
itary leaders request an armistice in the General Ridgway on 22 March not to
move above the parallel in force until
(1) Ibid. (2) The President interpreted Mac- specifically authorized to do so. To any
31
Arthur's action as threatening the enemy with an press inquiries on the probability of a
ultimatum, implying that the United States and its crossing, Ridgway was to reply that the
Allies might attack China without restraint. This
had implications far greater than usurpation of a decision would have to be made by Mac-
prepared statement which the President had in-
32
tended to make. In the President's mind, Mac- MacArthur Hearings, pp. 344, 3542.
33
Arthur had once again openly defied the policy of Ltr, Dept of State (Deputy Under Secy Mat-
his Commander in Chief. See Truman, Memoirs, II, thews) to OSD (Gen Burns), 15 Sep 50, in G-3 DA
442-43. file 091 Korea, Case 99, App. to JCS 1776/105.
360 POLICY AND DIRECTION
fluence of the Han and Yesong Rivers on no intention of outrunning his logistical
the west coast and the town of Yangyang support. MacArthur approved Ridg-
on the Sea of Japan. Ridgway explained way's plan without hesitation, and
37
that operations to reach this line would without referring it to Washington.
have as their objective not the seizure Ridgway opened the first phase of this
of terrain but the maximum destruction advance (Operation COURAGEOUS) on 22
of enemy troops and matériel, and that March, moved steadily forward all along
they would be conducted with particular the front, and attained positions gen-
care to maintain major units intact and erally along the 38th Parallel by the 30th.
to keep casualties to a minimum. He 37
Rad, G-3 412 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) for
assured MacArthur further that he had MacArthur, 22 Mar 51.
THE CROSSROADS 363
Except for a small area in the west, South advance beyond it carefully limited and
40
Korea thus was cleared of organized controlled.
enemy forces. The latter suffered On 5 April, MacArthur notified the
enormous casualties, although as a re- Joint Chiefs of Staff that the Eighth Army
sult of the relatively slow Eighth Army had jumped off in its drive across the
advance compelled by Ridgway's in- parallel to destroy enemy forces and sup-
sistence on careful co-ordination and the plies south of Line KANSAS. MacArthur
preservation of lateral security, the also informed the Joint Chiefs that Ridg-
enemy units themselves managed to way intended to follow Operation
withdraw intact.38 RUGGED with Operation DAUNTLESS
By the time the Eighth Army regained which would take the Eighth Army
the parallel, Ridgway, on 29 March, twenty miles farther into North Korea,
completed the details of instructions for in the west central zone, and enable it
the next forward step, which he called to seize Line WYOMING and thereby gain
Operation RUGGED. The new objective, control of an area known to be a point of
Line KANSAS, differed slightly from Ridg- concentration for enemy troops and sup-
way's 22 March concept by starting at the plies. MacArthur explained that, once
junction of the Han and Imjin Rivers, Lines KANSAS and WYOMING had been
not the Han and Yesong, then run- seized, he intended to maintain contact
ning northeastward and eastward to with the enemy only by patrols of bat-
Yangyang.39 talion size. The existing logistical limi-
General MacArthur flew into Korea tations, combined with the terrain,
on 3 April to discuss this next step north- weather conditions, and intelligence of
ward with General Ridgway and to look enemy dispositions, had convinced him
at the ground situation. At that time, that a further advance in force beyond
Ridgway explained that when he had the present objective lines was not
sought approval for an advance to the feasible.41
Yesong-Yangyang line, he had believed The enemy did not strongly resist the
he would find good hunting in the west- crossing of the parallel. By 9 April, all
ern area between the Imjin and the units in the U.S. I and IX Corps and
Yesong. But recent intelligence had re- ROK I Corps had fought their way for-
vealed very few enemy forces in that ward to positions on Line KANSAS; and
region and Ridgway therefore had de- although the U.S. X and ROK III Corps
cided not to advance as far as the Yesong. in the central and east central sectors
Ridgway told MacArthur that the strong- had been slowed down by rugged terrain
est possible line he could seize was the and inadequate supply routes, these two
one toward which he was now aiming, corps by the same date were drawing
Line KANSAS. MacArthur agreed and near their KANSAS objectives. Through-
told Ridgway he wanted him to make a out this early April advance, Ridgway
very strong fight for this line, with any and MacArthur were aware that the
40
38
Ridgway, The Korean War: Issues and Policies,
Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, Mar 51.
39 41
Ibid. Rad, C 59397, CINCFE to DA, 5 Apr 51.
364 POLICY AND DIRECTION
enemy, particularly the Chinese, was plans to contain the expected offensive
building up in rear areas and was daily by rolling to the rear with the enemy's
increasing his capability to launch an punch. On 12 April, he issued Opera-
offensive. The enemy build-up was es- tion Plan AUDACIOUS, which called for an
pecially notable in the Ch'orwon-P'yong- orderly, fighting withdrawal through
gang-Hwach'on triangle in the west successive phase lines. This withdrawal
central area, which in turn accounted for would be made only on Ridgway's order
Ridgway's plan to seize this area by ad- and would be conducted in such a man-
vancing to Line WYOMING. On 31 ner as to inflict maximum losses on the
March, General MacArthur had reported enemy and to preserve all friendly units
to the Department of the Army that an intact.43
enemy offensive of great strength might About the time Ridgway issued this
be expected at any time after 1 April. plan, he became aware that publishing
He estimated that the Chinese had 274,- it would be one of his last acts as the
000troops in Korea and 478,000 regular Eighth Army commander. As a result
troops in Manchuria. The North Ko- of a decision made by President Truman
reans were believed to have approxi- two days earlier, the general who had
mately 198,000 men, including guerrillas, revitalized the Eighth Army was about
available for an attack.42 to be elevated to higher command, not
Keeping the enemy's offensive capa- primarily because of Ridgway's accom-
bility constantly in mind, Ridgway made plishments, but more because of the
President's exasperation with General
42
(1) Rad, CX 59065, CINCFE to DA for G-2, 31 MacArthur.
Mar 51. (2) Telecon, TT 4597, DA and GHQ, 13
43
Apr 51. (3) Telecon, TT 4603, DA and GHQ, 15 Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Apr 51, Narrative, pp.
Apr 51. 11-13.
CHAPTER XX
The focus shifted from military opera- mittee on Foreign Relations of the
tions after President Truman suddenly United States Senate. No definite con-
relieved General MacArthur of all his clusions were drawn, but testimony given
military commands. The President took the committees provided some indication
this step following five days of consulta- of the reasons which impelled President
2
tion with his chief military and civilian Truman's decision. Charges that Mac-
advisers. The culmination came on 10 Arthur's removal was fostered, and ac-
April when he directed General Bradley tually engineered, by certain nations
to send General MacArthur a message allied with the United States in Korea,
stating: particularly the British, were not well
I deeply regret that it becomes my duty as founded. While these nations, through
President and Commander in Chief of the press media and even through official
United States Military Forces to replace you channels, criticized General MacArthur's
as Supreme Commander, Allied Powers; conduct of the campaign and expressed
Commander in Chief, United Nations Com-
mand; Commander in Chief, Far East; and
2
Commanding General United States Army, The Joint Committee on Armed Services and
Far East. You will turn over your com- Foreign Relations which conducted these hearings
mands, effective at once, to Lieutenant Gen- was composed of Senator Richard B. Russell, Chair-
man; Senator Styles Bridges; Senator Alexander
eral Matthew B. Ridgway.1 Wiley; Senator H. Alexander Smith; Senator Bourke
The abrupt dismissal of so distin- B. Hickenlooper; Senator William F. Knowland;
Senator Harry P. Cain; Senator Owen Brewster; and
guished a soldier as General MacArthur Senator Ralph E. Flanders. Witnesses appearing
aroused considerable furor in the United before the committee included General MacArthur;
States and elsewhere. Charges of "cava- Secretary of Defense Marshall; General Bradley;
General Collins; General Vandenberg; Admiral
lier treatment" and "foreign pressure" Sherman; Secretary of State Acheson; General
as well as broad hints of political mach- Wedemeyer; and former Secretary of Defense John-
ination followed his dismissal. The en- son. Among its indefinite conclusions the com-
tire matter was aired extensively between mittee reached the following: "The removal of
General MacArthur was within the constitutional
May and August 1951 before the Com- powers of the President but the circumstances were
mittee on Armed Services and the Com- a shock to the national pride," and "There was no
serious disagreement between General MacArthur
1
Rad, JCS 88180, Bradley (Personal) for Mac- and the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to military strategy
Arthur, 11 Apr 51. in Korea." See MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3601-02.
366 POLICY AND DIRECTION
he had taken this action because, "the matters being considered by the Depart-
occupation of Formosa by Communist ments of State and Defense, MacArthur
forces would be a direct threat to the might prefer to send a senior officer to
security of the Pacific area and to United Formosa on 31 July, and to proceed later
States forces performing their lawful and himself. They added, however, that if he
necessary functions in that area." He felt it necessary, he should feel free to
11
also fended off any charge that the United go since the responsibility was his own.
States intended to seize the island strong- MacArthur chose to make the initial
hold by declaring, "The determination Formosa visit in person so that he could
of the future status of Formosa must resolve uncertainties arising out of con-
await the restoration of security in the flicting reports from the island about the
Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, status of Chiang's government and its
or consideration by the United Na- armed forces.12
tions." 8 MacArthur, accompanied by Admiral
When visited by General Collins in Struble, flew to Taipeh on 31 July where
mid-July, General MacArthur had told for two days he conferred with Chiang
the Army Chief of Staff that as soon as Kai-shek and his generals. But not until
the Korean situation had become suffi- five days after his return to Tokyo did
ciently stabilized he intended to visit MacArthur report to the Joint Chiefs of
13
Formosa for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. Staff. Meanwhile, press reports specu-
The Joint Chiefs on 28 July 1950 in- lating that MacArthur had made binding
formed MacArthur that the Chinese agreements and political promises to
Communists had announced their inten- Chiang Kai-shek caused Washington offi-
tion of capturing Formosa and would cials considerable uneasiness since they
probably succeed unless the Chinese could not judge the validity of these re-
Nationalists made timely efforts to de- ports. In addition, the Department of
fend the island. They had recommended State heard from its representative in
to the Secretary of Defense, they stated, Taipeh that MacArthur was about to
that the Nationalists be permitted to transfer fighter squadrons to Formosa, a
break up hostile concentrations through move not authorized by Washington,
military action, even if it meant attacks and a move which General MacArthur
14
on the mainland.9 had not actually planned. Chiang Kai-
MacArthur gave full concurrence to shek added fuel to the flame by issuing a
this proposal, and informed the Joint public statement that could be inter-
Chiefs of Staff that he and a selected preted as indicating the existence of
staff would visit Formosa about 31 July
to survey the situation.10 In reply the 11
Rad, JCS 87492, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jul 50.
12
Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that, pend- Rad, C 59032, CINCFE to JCS, 30 Jul 50.
13
MacArthur considered his report to be timely.
ing new instructions on certain policy He stated later, "Full reports on the results of the
visit were promptly made to Washington." See
8
Statement by the President of the United States, MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 340.
14
27 Jun 50, MacArthur Hearings, p. 3369. (1) Rad, JCS 87878, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Aug
9
Rad, JCS 87401, JCS to CINCFE, 28 Jul 50. 50. (2) Hoare, The JCS and National Policy, vol.
10
Rad, C 58994, CINCFE to JCS, 29 Jul 50. IV, pp. 20-21.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 369
extensive secret agreements between him- flights over certain of the coastal areas
self and MacArthur.15 There was also of China, and familiarization flights by
an erroneous but widespread belief that small groups of United States aircraft to
MacArthur had made the trip to For- include temporary and refueling land-
mosa without the knowledge or approval ings on Formosa.18
of the nation's leaders. President Truman subsequently sent
Nevertheless, the uninformed specula- Averell Harriman to Tokyo, reputedly
tion in the press and the lack of real to caution MacArthur not only to keep
knowledge as to what MacArthur had the President better informed, but, on
done on Formosa, coming at a time when other than military matters, to make
the United States was trying to convince recommendations, not decisions. After-
Communist China that there were no ward, Harriman stated that General Mac-
ulterior motives lurking behind Presi- Arthur had not overstepped his military
dent Truman's action toward Formosa, bounds in making the trip to Formosa;
caused the President, in a sternly worded President Truman announced his satis-
message over Secretary of Defense John- faction with General MacArthur's per-
son's signature, to caution MacArthur. formance; and General MacArthur
On 4 August, MacArthur was reminded declared that anyone who hinted of fric-
in no uncertain terms, "No one other tion between himself and the President
than the President as Commander-in- was guilty of "sly insinuations, brash
19
Chief has the authority to order or speculations and bold misstatements."
authorize preventive action against con- Communist nations made much of
centrations on the mainland. The most President Truman's order neutralizing
vital national interest requires that no Formosa and charged that the United
action of ours precipitate general war or States intended to take over and occupy
give excuse to others to do so." 16 the island. In August, the Peiping
MacArthur replied the next day that regime accused the United States of ag-
he fully understood and was operating gression against Formosa and asked the
meticulously in accordance with the United Nations Security Council to order
President's decision of 27 June.17 Then, the withdrawal of ". . . all of the United
on 7 August, he submitted a full report States armed invading forces from Tai-
of his conference with Chiang Kai-shek. wan. . . ."20 In refutation of this
He indicated Chiang's willingness to charge, President Truman on 25 August
co-operate and that there was a real directed United States Ambassador Aus-
potential in the armed forces on For- tin to address the Secretary-General,
mosa, although substantial improve- Trygve Lie, on the matter. Austin sent
ments would be necessary. He explained
18
that he had directed periodic sweeps of Rad, C 59569, CINCFE to JCS, 7 Aug 50.
19
the Formosa Strait by elements of the report(1)toTime, August 21, 1950. (2) For Harriman's
President Truman on this visit, see Tru-
Seventh Fleet, periodic reconnaissance man, Memoirs, II, 349-53; for MacArthur's reaction
to Harriman's visit, see MacArthur, Reminiscences,
15
MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3383-84. p. 341.
16 20
Rad, WAR 88014, JCS to CINCFE, 4 Aug 50. State Dept Bulletin, XXIII (4 September 1950),
17
Rad, C 59418, CINCFE to JCS, 5 Aug 50. P. 396.
370 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Lie a complete account of the official ate continental Asia. Those who speak
22
American attitude toward Formosa, in- thus do not understand the Orient."
cluding a 19 July statement to the Con- This strong statement evoked an
gress by President Truman in which he equally strong reaction from President
declared ". . . that the United States Truman when he was informed of it by
has no territorial ambitions whatever Harriman on 26 August before its
concerning that island, nor do we seek publication. The President read MacAr-
for ourselves any special position or thur's paper to Harriman, General Brad-
privilege on Formosa." On 28 August, ley, and Secretary Johnson, then directed
the President sent Austin more ammuni- that MacArthur withdraw the statement.
tion with which to demolish the Com- Secretary Johnson immediately cabled
munist charges concerning Formosa by MacArthur that the President directed
telling him that the United States would him to withdraw the message ". . . be-
welcome United Nations consideration cause various features with respect to
of the case of Formosa.21 Formosa are in conflict with the policy
A week earlier, General MacArthur, of the United States and its position in
who had been invited to speak at the the United Nations." 23
Fifty-First National Encampment of the According to Johnson, when the Presi-
Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) in dent learned that MacArthur's rather
Chicago, sent instead a paper which he lengthy statement to the VFW had been
proposed be read at the meeting. In this transmitted through Army communica-
paper, MacArthur stressed the strategic tions facilities from Japan, he was par-
importance of Formosa and insisted that ticularly indignant. Johnson testified
the United States must, at any cost, retain before the Senate committee, later in-
control of that island. He strongly vestigating the relief of General Mac-
hinted that the United States would be Arthur, that on 26 August President
able to use Formosa as a base in any Truman discussed with him the advis-
future operations against the Asiatic ability of relieving MacArthur as the
mainland. He pointed out also that For- commander in Korea, but decided to take
24
mosa would be a formidable threat to no such action at that time.
American security if controlled by an General MacArthur's immediate re-
unfriendly power, terming it an "un- sponse to the Presidential order was to
sinkable aircraft carrier and submarine fire a protest to the Secretary of Defense,
tender." "Nothing could be more fal- claiming that his VFW message had been
lacious," he charged, "than the thread- carefully prepared to support fully the
bare argument by those who advocate President's policy decision of 27 June
appeasement and defeatism in the Pa- with respect to Formosa and pointing
cific that if we defend Formosa we alien- out that the subject of Formosa had been
freely discussed in all circles, "Govern-
21 22
(1) Ltr, Ambassador Austin to Secy-Gen Lie, Quotation in Whitney, MacArthur: His Ren-
25 Aug 50. (2) Ltr, President Truman to Ambas- dezvous with History, pp. 378-79.
23
sador Austin, 28 Aug 50. (3) MacArthur Hearings, MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2586, 3480.
24
pp. 3473-76. MacArthur Hearings, pp. 2587, 3665.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 371
had been instructed. But he did not closures changed abruptly. Smarting
openly criticize that directive. from the defeat his forces had suffered,
During November, as signs that the MacArthur spoke out sharply in his own
Chinese were intervening in Korea began defense, and in published statements in
to appear, signs of differences between early December charged that the limita-
MacArthur and Washington officials also tions upon his operations were an enor-
began to develop. MacArthur's order mous handicap "without precedent in
for bombing the Yalu River bridges on military history," and intimated that
6 November, for instance, aroused con- selfish interests in Europe were causing
sternation in Washington. More than support to be withheld from his forces.33
that, the order was not in accordance These statements were widely assessed
with the instructions issued him on 29 as a criticism of the United Nations
June, warning him to stay well clear of policy of limited war in Korea and as
the USSR and Manchurian borders in an oblique criticism of the Truman ad-
conducting his air operations. When ministration in its conduct of the war.
three days later the Joint Chiefs of Staff They were probably not so intended.
suggested that MacArthur's mission in General MacArthur pointed out quite
Korea might have to be changed in view rightly that at no time had he asked for
of Chinese intervention, he hotly pro- authority to retaliate beyond the invio-
claimed his disagreement30 and his mis- late northern boundary of Korea. His
sion was not changed. The 11th-hour statements, issued at a time when the
suggestion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, administration was trying earnestly to
prompted by the conviction of other na- reassure uneasy allies, were nonetheless
tions participating in the Korean fight- of great concern to President Truman
ing that MacArthur should check his and his advisers. British fears that Mac-
attack along a line short of the Yalu, was Arthur might involve the west in a large-
likewise roundly condemned by General scale war with Communist China made
MacArthur. 31 Yet at no time in this his pronouncements especially regretta-
period did General MacArthur argue his ble. Too, his insistence on blaming
case publicly, although he did deny that operational restrictions for the situation
he had received any suggestion from "any in Korea was taken in Washington as a
authoritative source" that he should stop reflection on the judgment of the man
at any line short of the international who had decided to impose those restric-
boundary.32 tions. This inference was unfortunate,
With the intervention by Chinese even if not intended as such, for the
Communist armies, however, General Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that Mac-
MacArthur's attitude toward public dis- Arthur was partly responsible for his
own predicament. They had been per-
30
Rad, C 68572, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 9 Nov 50. suaded to approve his plans for the No-
31
Rad, C 69808, MacArthur to DA for JCS, 25
33
Nov 50. (1) Statements, Gen MacArthur, 2 Dec 50, in
32
(1) Statement, Gen MacArthur (in reply to ques- U.S. News and World Report, December 8, 1950, pp.
tion from Arthur Krock), New York Times, Decem- 16-22, and in the New York Times, December 2,
ber 1, 1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, p. 3496. 1950. (2) MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3532-34.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 373
General Marshall later said that Mac- But the stage had already been set for
Arthur's statement of 24 March offering the final act. On 20 March General
to negotiate with enemy leaders in the MacArthur, in reply to a personal letter
field was the culminating factor in Presi- from Joseph W. Martin, House of Rep-
dent Truman's decision to relieve Mac- resentatives Minority Leader, sent a
Arthur. Marshall charged that this relatively mild commentary to the Con-
statement contained a thinly veiled hint gressman on American foreign policy.
that the enemy should either negotiate or There was nothing new in what he said,
the war would be carried to the Chinese nor was it said in a particularly inflam-
mainland. He based this view on that matory manner. MacArthur merely
portion of MacArthur's statement which reiterated his views that the Asian
said, "The enemy therefore must by now theater was fully as important as the
be painfully aware that a decision of European and that the United States
the United Nations to depart from its must prosecute the Asian war until vic-
tolerant effort to contain the war to the tory was achieved. MacArthur later
area of Korea through expansion of our testified that the letter to Congressman
military operations to his coastal areas Martin was, in his mind, so trifling a
and interior bases would doom Red matter that he could scarcely recall it.41
China to the risk of imminent military But it was no trifling matter to President
collapse." 39 Truman; and when Martin chose to
The President found this to be a most make public the contents of the letter
extraordinary statement for a military on 5 April 1951, the President reacted
commander of the United Nations to strongly and quickly. On 6 April, he
issue on his own responsibility. He con- called together his special assistant,
strued MacArthur's statement as defiance Averell Harriman, Secretary of State
of his orders as Commander in Chief and Acheson, Secretary of Defense Marshall,
a challenge to his authority. Addition- and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs
ally MacArthur was, in the President's of Staff, General Bradley, and put the
view, flouting the policy established by matter squarely before them. What
the United Nations. By this act General should be done with General Mac-
MacArthur had left the President no Arthur? Harriman told Truman that
choice. He felt he could no longer MacArthur should have been fired two
40
tolerate MacArthur's insubordination. years ago.42 But Secretary Marshall ap-
President Truman nonetheless delayed a preciated the possible repercussions that
final decision; neither the general public
nor General MacArthur was aware of 41
(1) MacArthur Hearings, p. 113. (2) See also
President Truman's steadily mounting MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp. 385-86 and 389.
42
dissatisfaction. Harriman was referring to MacArthur's plea
in 1949 that he was too busy when requested to re-
turn to the United States to discuss matters concern-
39
(1) Ltr, Secy Marshall to Sen Russell, 17 Aug ing the occupation of Japan, and to subsequent
51, in MacArthur Hearings, pp. 3655-66. (2) State- difficulty in convincing MacArthur to withhold ap-
ment of Gen MacArthur, 24 Mar 51, in MacArthur proval from a bill of the Japanese Diet which was
Hearings, p. 3541. contrary to the approved economic policy for the
40
Truman, Memoirs, II, 441-42. occupation. See Truman, Memoirs, II, 447.
THE RELIEF OF MACARTHUR 375
GENERAL RIDGWAY
might come with MacArthur's dismissal be relieved, but only after a unanimous
and advised caution. He observed that decision to do so by the Joint Chiefs of
if the President relieved General Mac- Staff.
Arthur it might be difficult to get pend- President Truman had already de-
ing military appropriations through cided to relieve General MacArthur but
Congress. General Bradley approached he kept this decision to himself for the
the question from the point of view of time being. He asked all four of his
military discipline. He believed that advisers to return again the next day
MacArthur had acted in an insubordi- for more discussion, and directed Sec-
nate manner and that, consequently, he retary Marshall to restudy all messages
deserved to be relieved of his command. exchanged with General MacArthur in
But he told Truman that he wished to the past two years. The next morning,
talk with General Collins before making 7 April, the same group met again in
a final recommendation. Secretary President Truman's office. Secretary
Acheson believed that MacArthur should Marshall told the President that after
376 POLICY AND DIRECTION
communications power unit in Pusan.45 came from his wife. One of MacArthur's
In the meantime, late on 10 April, indi- aides had heard the news on a radio
cations appeared that the action to be broadcast and told Mrs. MacArthur who
taken had become known publicly. It then informed her husband. The official
was then decided by President Truman notification, MacArthur claimed, did not
to accelerate the transmission of the of- reach him until half an hour later.47
ficial notification to General MacArthur MacArthur immediately ordered Gen-
by approximately twenty hours.46 eral Hickey to telephone General Ridg-
According to General MacArthur, his way in Korea and to notify him of the
first inkling that he had been relieved change in command. He turned over to
Hickey the functions of command until
45
MacArthur called the communications failure General Ridgway could leave the front
"incredible. . . . He [Pace] was in Korea at the and fly to Tokyo to take over in person.48
moment in immediate message contact with my
47
headquarters, which had similar contact with Wash- (1) Ibid., p. 155. (2) See also MacArthur,
ington." See MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 395. Reminiscences, p. 395.
46 48
MacArthur Hearings, p. 345. MacArthur Hearings, p. 155.
CHAPTER XXI
As the controversy within the national fense, in notifying Ridgway of his own
defense structure heightened and finally appointment as United Nations com-
culminated in General MacArthur's re- mander, had added that Van Fleet was
lief, tension also mounted steadily at the being sent to Korea for "such duties as
battlefront. Pushed back by Ridgway you may direct." Immediately after
in March and April, enemy forces had meeting with MacArthur, Ridgway tele-
compressed like a huge spring, and ap- phoned Secretary of the Army Pace and,
parently were about ready to burst forth expressing uncertainty as to his authority
again in a major attack. Just before in choosing a commander for the Eighth
MacArthur's removal, Ridgway had Army, asked how he was expected to use
called his American corps commanders General Van Fleet. But Secretary Pace
together and warned them that, if the knew no more about the matter than
Chinese struck in full strength, the did Ridgway and could only refer the
Eighth Army might be in for the worst question to Secretary Marshall.3
period since it had entered Korea.1 The Joint Chiefs of Staff promptly set
General Ridgway learned of the start- the matter straight. They notified Ridg-
ling command change late on 11 April. way that the President had personally
The next day he flew to Tokyo, where approved Van Fleet as the successor to
he found MacArthur "amazed" by the the command of the Eighth Army. They
President's action in relieving him but themselves suggested the phrase, "for
not outwardly bitter or resentful. Mac- such duties as you may direct," since
Arthur briefed Ridgway on some of the they realized the imminence of a major
key problems of the command, then Chinese offensive and felt that General
wished Ridgway well in his new Ridgway might wish to retain direct
assignment.2 command in the field for the time being,
The change of commanders was at- presumably until the threatening enemy
tended by some confusion as to General offensive had been turned back. Until
Van Fleet's role. The Secretary of De- that time, they suggested, Van Fleet
1
Ridgway, The Korean War, Issues and Policies,
3
pp. 418-19. Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Apr 51, sec. II, Book
2
Ibid., p. 160. 1, OCG.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 379
River. Nor could he consider the region this responsibility is ever present. It is a
above the waist of Korea as a general responsibility not only to superior authority
objective area, but he could, subject to in the direct command chain, but inescap-
ably to the American people. It can be
the restrictions on troops and targets, discharged only if every commander is fully
operate north of the 38th Parallel.14 alive to the possible consequences of his
Finally, he had authority to command acts; if every commander has imbued his
all military forces assisting the Republic command with a like sense of responsibility
of Korea which were placed under the for its acts; has set up, and by frequent tests
has satisfied himself of the effectiveness of,
unified command of the United States; his machinery for insuring his control of
to use ROK soldiers and civilians in the offensive actions of his command and of
North Korea so long as they were desig- its reactions to enemy action; and, in final
nated as United Nations instrumental- analysis, is himself determined that no act
ities under his control; and to dispose of of his command shall bring about an exten-
sion of the present conflict, except when
prisoners of war in such a manner as such act is taken in full accordance with the
would least interfere with military op- spirit of the accompanying letter of instruc-
16
erations, providing such disposition was tions.
in consonance with the provisions of Ridgway emphatically pointed out that
15
the Geneva Convention. international tensions within and bear-
Once aware of what was expected of ing upon the Korean theater had created
him by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General acute danger of World War III, and that
Ridgway sent his major commanders the instructions from Washington re-
written instructions telling them ex- flected the intense determination of the
actly what he expected of them. As be- American people, as well as of all free
came apparent to these subordinates, peoples of the world, to prevent World
Ridgway's approach to the Korean con- War III, if it could be done without
flict differed completely from that of appeasement or sacrifice of principle.
General MacArthur—Ridgway's greatest "In the day to day, in fact the hour to
concern seemed to be that some rash act hour, performance of his duties," Ridg-
of his command might cause the conflict way concluded, "I therefore desire that
to spread to other areas. every responsible commander, regardless
General Ridgway warned his principal of rank, bear constantly in mind that
commanders, "The grave and ever pres- the discharge of his responsibilities in
ent danger that the conduct of our this respect is a sacred duty." 17
current operations may result in an ex- In his instructions to General Van
tension of hostilities, and so lead to a Fleet, General Ridgway warned that un-
world-wide conflagration, places a heavy til American intelligence agencies had
responsibility upon all elements of this determined otherwise, Van Fleet was to
command, but particularly upon those assume that the enemy forces were de-
capable of offensive action. "In accom- termined to drive the Eighth Army from
plishing our assigned missions," Ridgway Korea or to destroy it in place, and that
emphasized, 16
Rad, C 60965, CINCFE to JCS, 25 Apr 51, quot-
14
Ibid. ing memo from Ridgway to All Comdrs, 22 Apr 51.
15 17
Ibid. Ibid.
382 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Russia might at any time attack the will direct the efforts of your forces," he
United Nations Command. "You will ordered Van Fleet, "toward inflicting
further base your operations," he told maximum personnel casualties and ma-
Van Fleet, terial losses on hostile forces in Korea,
on the assumptions that your own forces
consistent with the maintenance intact
will be brought to and maintained at ap- of all your major units and the safety
proximately TO&E strength, but that you of your troops." Indicating that he was
will receive no major reinforcements in satisfied with the way things were going
combat organizations or service support in Korea, Ridgway further stated:
units; that the duration of your operations
cannot now be predicted; that you may, at The continued piecemeal destruction of
any time, be directed by competent author- the offensive potential of the Chinese Com-
ity to initiate a withdrawal to a defensive munist and North Korean armies contrib-
position and there be directed to defend utes materially to this objective, while
indefinitely; that you may at any time be concurrently destroying Communist China's
directed by competent authority to initiate military prestige. . . . Acquisition of ter-
a retirement designed to culminate in an rain in itself is of little or no value.21
early evacuation of the Korean peninsula.18
Although General Ridgway had not
General Ridgway then charged Van yet been so directed, he fixed a line
Fleet with a mission which appears to beyond which the Eighth Army could
have been Ridgway's own idea, a balance not advance without his permission.
between what the Joint Chiefs of Staff Clearly, Ridgway intended to keep a
had directed him to do and the military much tighter rein on the new field com-
capabilities which he felt he possessed. mander than MacArthur had kept upon
"Your mission," he told Van Fleet, "is him. In similar instructions to Admiral
to repel aggression against so much of Joy and General Stratemeyer, Ridgway
the territory (and the people therein) gave strict warnings against violating the
of the Republic of Korea, as you now borders of China and the USSR, and
occupy and, in collaboration with the forbade these commanders to employ
Government of the Republic of Korea, their forces except in support of United
to establish and maintain order in said Nations operations within a 20-mile
territory." 19 range of USSR territory or within a 3-
Keeping in mind constantly the re- mile range of Chinese Communist
strictions upon his own authority, Gen- territory.
eral Ridgway cautioned Van Fleet that,
while he could operate north of the 38th
Parallel, he could only use Korean troops
New Orders for CINCUNC
in the areas bordering on Manchuria and Ridgway's responsibilities as com-
Russia and that he must prevent any mander in chief, Far East Command, and
border-crossing by these forces.20 "You commander in chief, United Nations
Command, while nominally separate,
18
Ltr of Instructions, Gen Ridgway to Gen Van were nonetheless closely related, and on
Fleet, 22 Apr 51.
19
Ibid. 21
20
Ibid. Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 383
23
occasion became so intertwined as to degree, unclear. On the related mat-
interfere with each other. This had been ter of employing other than American
one of the major causes of General Mac- and ROK forces against a Russian at-
Arthur's professed inability to under- tack, Ridgway, as he probably expected,
stand or reconcile his instructions. was told that he would not plan on using
This conflict between roles became such forces for that purpose "pending
24
especially noticeable when General Ridg- further instructions."
way on 17 April asked that the Joint Prompted by Ridgway's request, the
Chiefs authorize him, at his own dis-Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the Army
cretion, to withdraw United Nations Chief of Staff to prepare for General
forces from Korea in the event of a Ridgway a directive governing the con-
USSR attack and to use them to defend duct of Korean operations. Exhaustively
Japan. He must have known that such a analyzing all outstanding JCS directives
unilateral procedure would certainly ex- to CINCFE and CINCUNC, the Army
ceed his authority as a United Nations G-3, General Taylor, furnished General
commander, and probably made the re- Collins with a proposed new set of in-
quest to emphasize not only the threat structions for General Ridgway. Collins
of a Russian attack on Japan but also presented it to the Joint Chiefs who
the need for making his missions and passed it on to the Secretary of Defense
25
authorities clearer by distinguishing be- and the President for final approval.
tween the United Nations in Korea and In the meantime, General Ridgway
the United States in the Far East. In had been doing his own analyzing and
this purpose, if such it was, he was emi- on 30 April sent to the Joint Chiefs of
nently, but not immediately, successful.22 Staff a draft directive to himself, which
The immediate response of the Joint he proposed they approve and return to
Chiefs of Staff was to turn Ridgway him as his authority for operating in
down. They agreed in principle to a Korea. But General Ridgway had
withdrawal of United Nations forces waited too long. The President had al-
from Korea in the event of Russian at- ready approved the set of instructions
tack, but retained the right to control prepared for Ridgway by the Army G-3,
such a withdrawal. They notified Ridg- and on 1 May these instructions were
26
way that "Subject ... to the immediate sent to him.
security of your forces both in Korea and But even this newest directive did not
Japan, you will initiate major with- clearly separate Ridgway's responsibil-
drawal from Korea only upon instruc- ities as CINCUNC from those as
tions furnished you after receipt of CINCFE. The over-all mission assigned
information from you as to conditions to Ridgway as CINCUNC was "to assist
obtaining." Since Ridgway's first con-
cern in the event of a Russian attack 23
Rad, JCS 88950, JSC to CINCFE, 19 Apr 51.
24
undoubtedly would be the security of Ibid.
25
his forces, these instructions were, to a Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS, 21 Apr 51, sub:
Directive to CINCFE for Opns in Korea, in G-3, DA
file 381 Korea, Case 6.
22 26
Rad, C 60308, CINCFE to JCS, 17 Apr 51. Rad, JCS 90000, JCS to CINCFE, 1 May 51.
384 POLICY AND DIRECTION
that the forces available to Ridgway were ground forces totaled about 542,000 men,
too weak to destroy the North Korean according to intelligence estimates on
and Chinese Armies. But, they pointed 1May. Smaller in numbers, but still
out optimistically, if the Chinese with- dangerous, the North Korean Army
drew, this condition might change. In numbered more than 197,000. Across
any event, they considered the mission the Yalu in Manchuria, an additional
currently assigned to Ridgway to be in Chinese force of almost 750,000 stood
keeping with existing national objectives. waiting. Van Fleet, on the other hand,
These objectives were at the time, of commanded 269,772 U.S. Army, U.S.
course, under intensive review. "De-Marine, and allied troops and 234,993
43
pending on actions of the President on ROK Army troops.
recommendations of the National Secu- In view of the likelihood of another
rity Council," the JCS informed Ridg- enemy offensive, Van Fleet's most profit-
way, "your mission will be made to able tactics were to keep the enemy
accord therewith." But, Washington off-balance, break up enemy attack
authorities bluntly told Ridgway, for the formations, and reconnoiter to discover
time being, "Your mission remains un- enemy dispositions and plan of attack.
changed." 41 Besides, General Ridgway had ordered
Van Fleet on 25 April to "maintain the
offensive spirit of your Army and retain
The Chinese Attack Again the initiative." General Van Fleet there-
fore directed on 4 May that each of his
The Chinese and North Korean front-line divisions establish a patrol
Armies fell back to recover in early May. base, manned by a complete RCT sup-
But it was clear that they had not been ported by corps armored units, in
decisively defeated, and equally plain advance of its main position. These
that they were replacing losses and re- regimental patrol bases were set up seven
building their offensive strength for
or eight miles in front of the main line
another try at destroying the United
of resistance, and from them armor-
Nations forces. Prisoner reports and
supported patrols ranged ten to twelve
other intelligence sources, in fact,
had long indicated that the enemy
miles into enemy territory to carry the
spring offensive would come in two fight to North Korean and Chinese
installments.42 screening units. Other elements of Van
Despite great losses in the first install- Fleet's forces meanwhile cleared the
ment, the enemy still had a numerical Kimp'o Peninsula west of Seoul and
advantage over Van Fleet. The Chinese made substantial advances up the
main arterials leading north and east
41
Ibid.
42 43
(1) Comd Rpt, GHQ UNC, May 51, Annex IV, (1) Enemy statistics from Order of Battle. CCF
Part 1, p. 3. (2) Telecons TT 4668, DA and GHQ, and NKA 1 May 1951, DIS, FEC, UNC 3159, 4 May
3 May 51; TT 4680, 5 May 51; and TT 4682, 7 51. (2) Data on U.N. forces from Comd Rpt, Eighth
May 51. (3) Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, U.S. Army, Narrative, May 1951, p. 29 and Plate
May 51. No. 12, sec. II, Book 2.
388 POLICY AND DIRECTION
from Seoul, recapturing Uijongbu and ning an advance and tentatively set 12
44
Ch'unch'on. May as the opening date.46 But in the
At the same time, when General Ridg- week following, intelligence sources pro-
way visited Korea on 3-4 May, Van vided clear signs that the enemy was all
Fleet announced that if the enemy did but ready to move out once more in a
not attack soon, he intended to open a full-scale offensive. On 12 May, Gen-
general offensive himself. Ridgway eral Ridgway reported to Washington,
agreed.45 "It appears the enemy is again in the
Accordingly, Van Fleet began plan- advanced stages of preparation for the
44
resumption of the offensive which he can
(1) Comd Rpt, Eighth Army, Narrative, May
1951. (2) Comd Rpt, GHQ UNC, Introduction,
46
May 51. Rad, CX-1483, CG Eighth Army to All Comdrs,
45
Rad, C 61848, CINCFE to DA, 5 May 51. 9 May 51.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 389
launch at any time, probably within the the pressure on IX and X Corps by
47
next 72-96 hours." By that date, Van threatening vital enemy lateral com-
Fleet already had postponed his own munications through Chorwon." He
advance indefinitely.48 held high hopes for this strategy and told
From the disposition of enemy forces General Van Fleet that if the contem-
Ridgway predicted that five Chinese plated counterattack were successful,
armies would make the main effort down "unlimited opportunities for major
51
the west central sector toward the lower exploitation would result."
Han River corridor, along with a sec- After reconnoitering the front on 19
ondary drive on Seoul by three Chinese May, Ridgway ordered Van Fleet to at-
armies and one North Korean corps. tack immediately not only up the
He expected a lesser attack farther east Uijongbu-Ch'orwon corridor, but across
by two Chinese armies and three the entire front. The enemy had obvi-
North Korean corps striking down the ously overextended and Ridgway hoped
Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis.49 But the to catch him off-guard.52
enemy mass shifted eastward during the Consequently, even as the enemy was
period 10-16 May; and late in the after- still attempting to move south along a
noon of the 16th, five Chinese armies 40-mile front in the east central sector,
launched the main enemy effort down Van Fleet ordered his forces forward.
the Ch'unch'on-Hongch'on axis. In the (Map IX) The sudden reversal of direc-
west the enemy made only strong probing tion caught the enemy by surprise. As
50
attacks. (See Map VIII.) a result, not only were substantial ground
To General Ridgway it appeared that gains registered, but also in a single day
the Chinese had concentrated their prin- the Eighth Army claimed to have killed
cipal strength of seven armies on a 21,000 enemy and wounded 14,000.53
25-mile front from Ch'unch'on north- Along the entire front, U.N. troops
eastward to the Hwach'on Reservoir, and continued their counterattack against
that only four enemy armies remained moderate to weak resistance. By the end
in the 40-mile sector to the west. Ridg- of May, Van Fleet's forces had just about
way estimated it would take the Chinese made their way back to Line KANSAS,
a full week, probably longer, to shift and perhaps more important, had killed
their mass again to the Ch'orwon-Seoul the enemy at a rate higher than ever
axis in the western sector, and therefore previously achieved by Eighth Army.
saw an opportunity " . . . for the Eighth With the enemy's much-vaunted offen-
Army to deliver strong attack on the sive transmuted into rout and confusion
Uijongbu axis, using at least two U.S. and the Chinese and North Korean
divisions with the objective of relieving forces reeling back into North Korea,
47 51
Telecons, TT 4682, DA and GHQ, 7 May 51 Rad, C 62789, Ridgway (Personal) for Van
and TT 4704, 12 May 51. Fleet, 18 May 51.
48 52
Rad, GX-5-1176 KGOO, CG Eighth Army to Rad, G (TAG) 172 KCG, Ridgway (Personal)
All Comdrs, 11 May 51. for Collins, 20 May 51.
49 53
Rad, CINCFE to DA, 12 May 51. (1) Rad, GS-5-3290, CG Eighth Army to All
50
Rad, G (TAG) 172 KCG, Ridgway (Personal) Comdrs, 19 May 51. (2) Rad, BCX 6355DI, CG
for Collins, 20 May 51. FEAF BOMBCOM to All Comdrs, 22 May 51.
390 POLICY AND DIRECTION
General Ridgway was justifiably confi- Ridgway judged that "A plainly evident
dent in reporting to the Joint Chiefs of disorganization now exists among both
Staff on 30 May that the enemy had the Chinese Communist forces and the
suffered a major defeat in Korea. The North Korean Peoples Army forces." 55
estimate by field commanders of the The outlook for the United Nations
total number of enemy soldiers killed Command, in contrast to that for
in late May was so high that General the enemy, was comparatively bright.
Ridgway could not, he told the Joint "Eighth Army," General Ridgway told
Chiefs, accept it as credible. Neverthe- his superiors, was "at near full strength
less, he assured his superiors in Wash- with morale excellent and logistic capa-
ington that the Communist casualties bilities little affected to date by deterio-
far exceeded those they had suffered rating weather. . . ." 56 He concluded
during the 22 April offensive; and since his report to the JCS with a significant
the majority of enemy casualties were prognosis: "I, therefore, believe that for
infantrymen, the loss of combat effective- the next sixty days the United States
ness by major enemy tactical units was Government should be able to count
much greater than a mere reduction in with reasonable assurance upon a mili-
numbers would indicate. Also, the rel- tary situation in Korea offering optimum
atively primitive nature of enemy med- advantages in support of its diplomatic
ical and evacuation facilities would negotiations." 57
reduce the number of wounded returned
to duty, and would thus compound en- Efforts at Political Settlement
emy losses. Moreover, nearly 10,000
prisoners, the vast majority of whom The recent U.N. success in blunting
were Chinese, had been taken by the two major enemy drives took place
54
Eighth Army. against a background of continuing re-
Huge quantities of enemy matériel, examination of the nation's goals and
Ridgway reported, had been and were the laying of plans for achieving those
still being captured. Artillery, mortars, goals. The opposition of American al-
and automatic weapons were seized in lies to increased involvement in Asia,
amounts exceeding anything previously the apparent reluctance of the American
taken in the Korean fighting. Accom- public to increase operations in Korea,
panying these enemy losses, understand- and the uncommitted war potential of
ably, was a noticeable drop in the the Chinese Communists all emphasized
fighting spirit of Chinese Communist the wisdom of negotiating a settlement.
forces. A shortage of food was also Hence, the thinking of most of the
lowering enemy morale. Captured nation's officials tended strongly in that
Chinese reported that their units had direction.
had to eat grass and roots because of the In the course of a meeting on 19
exhaustion of ration supplies. In sum, March 1951 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
55
Ibid.
54 56
Rad, C 63744, CINCFE to DA (for JCS), 30 Ibid.
May 51. 57
Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 391
58 59
Memo for Secy Defense, 27 Mar 51, sub: U.S. Ibid.
60
Position Regarding an Armistice in Korea. Ibid.
392 POLICY AND DIRECTION
forces tied up in Korea. On the other and seating the Chinese Communists in
hand, if Russia's immediate objectives the United Nations. (2) Dependable
were in the Far East, they would be South Korean units should be generated
fostered if the United Nations forces left as rapidly as possible and in sufficient
Korea.61 strength to take over the major part of
Conversely, under either of the two the burden from United Nations forces.
conditions cited, the Communists would (3) Preparations should be made im-
profit by leaving their military forces in mediately for action by naval and air
Korea. An armistice which left Com- forces against the mainland of China.
munist armies in Korea would be to the (4) Action should be taken as a matter of
great disadvantage of the United Nations, urgency to ascertain the policies and ob-
and would place a heavy drain on U.S. jectives of the allies toward Korea spe-
military reserves by forcing the retention cifically and the Far East in general, and
of troops in Korea. also to discover the degree and nature of
But the Joint Chiefs of Staff sounded the support which the United States
the keynote of subsequent American could expect from them if, while contin-
policy toward Korea, both military and uing the present military course of ac-
political, when they told the Secretary tion in Korea, operations against the
of Defense, "The Korean problem can- mainland of China were initiated.63
not be resolved in a manner satisfactory It grew more apparent each day, partic-
to the United States by military action ularly in view of the much-publicized
alone." The Korean problem was a hearings on the relief of General Mac-
symptom of world tension which could Arthur which started on 3 May in Wash-
only be relieved in a manner satisfactory ington, that the United States badly
to the United States when, and if, there needed a clear, workable statement of its
was a general relaxation of the world military and political objectives with re-
tensions.62 gard to Asia and, particularly, to Korea.
They concluded with four signifi- Not only had the American people be-
cant recommendations, recommendations come confused over the issues; they did
Inter integrated into the basic policy de- not fully understand or appreciate the
veloped by the National Security Coun- reasons why the United States had
cil as a statement of American objectives pressed for UN intervention. American
and procedures in facing the Communist military and political strategists had
threat in the Far East. These were: (1) themselves failed to agree on the proper
The United States forces in Korea must objectives, much less the proper ways and
pursue their current military course of means of attaining them. General Mac-
action there until a political objective Arthur's return, accompanied as it was
for that country appeared attainable by vituperative and bitter attacks on
without jeopardizing United States posi- national policy, only served to cloud the
tions with respect to Russia, Formosa, issues further.
61
Finally, in mid-May, after long and
Memo, JCS (Bradley) for Secy Defense, 5 Apr
51, sub: Military Action in Korea.
62 63
Ibid. Ibid.
NEW DIRECTION, NEW POLICY 393
careful consideration of the views of all United States aims could not be fully
main advisory bodies, including the Joint accomplished.65
Chiefs of Staff, the National Security The significant portion of the new
Council submitted to the President a policy was, of course, the American Gov-
statement of policy which the council ernment's intention to seek through
believed the U.S. Government should United Nations machinery a settlement
now follow in facing the Communists in acceptable to the United States which
Korea and throughout Asia. This state- would as a minimum terminate hostil-
ment of policy was approved by President ities under appropriate armistice ar-
Truman on 17 May. In accepting the rangements. But until such an armistice
advice of the National Security Council, could be brought about, the United
the President decided that the United States would "continue to oppose and
States would retain as an ultimate ob- penalize the aggressor." In the absence
jective a political, not military, solution of a negotiated settlement, " . . . rec-
which would provide for a united, in- ognizing that there is no other acceptable
dependent, and democratic Korea. At alternative . . . ," the United States
the same time, he directed all govern- would keep up the current military
mental agencies to do whatever required course of action ". . . without commit-
to put the policy in effect at once.64 ment to unify Korea by military
The significance of this blueprint for force . . . ," but with the purpose of
American action in Asia can hardly be inflicting heavy losses on the enemy,
overstated insofar as its effect on the preventing the seizure of South Korea,
Korean problem is concerned. For it and limiting Communist capabilities for
was this blueprint, with some modifica- aggression elsewhere in Asia. While the
tion, that the United States followed United States was determined to avoid
from that day forward in bringing a con- extending hostilities beyond Korea, it
clusion to the fighting in Korea. There intended to deflate the military strength
was nothing startlingly new in this policy. and prestige of the Chinese by inflicting
Seemingly by instinct, the United States heavy losses upon them in Korea at every
had been following most of the precepts opportunity. Furthermore, the Joint
right along. But by setting forth in a Chiefs were to prepare detailed plans for
single statement the best possible an- punitive action against China itself
swers to all the questions which had been should China take aggressive action out-
repeatedly asked for many months, the side Korea or if United Nations forces
National Security Council took a firm were compelled by military action to
step toward the immediate goal of sta- evacuate Korea. These punitive actions
bilizing the situation in Korea. The would include those previously recom-
statement implied no hope of military mended by General MacArthur—block-
victory in Korea; but it did bespeak a ade, military operations against China,
certain confidence that Communist de- and exploitation of Chinese Nationalist
signs could be thwarted even though forces.66
65
Ibid.
66
64
JCS 1992/82. Ibid.
394 POLICY AND DIRECTION
The major differences between the Communist China operating within the
revised directive and the one given geographic boundaries of Korea and waters
Ridgway on 1 May lay in a definite di- adjacent thereto, in order to create condi-
tions favorable to a settlement of the Ko-
vision of his responsibilities as CINCFE rean conflict which would as a minimum:
and as CINCUNC and in a drastically (A) Terminate hostilities under appropriate
changed statement of his mission. No armistice arrangements; (B) Establish au-
changes were made in the restrictions thority of the ROK over all area south of a
upon his operations in Korea. But as northern boundary so located as to facili-
tate, to the maximum extent possible, both
a result of the National Security Council administration and military defense, and
policy decision, approved by the Presi- in no case south of the 38th Parallel; (C)
dent on 17 May, certain new instructions Provide for the withdrawal by appropriate
were given him with regard to develop- stages of Non-Korean Armed Forces from
ment of ROK forces, and on planning Korea; (D) Permit the building of a suffi-
cient ROK military power to deter or77 repel
for retaliatory action against Communist a renewed North Korean aggression.
China.76
With regard to his duties as The restriction against a general advance
CINCUNC (his duties as CINCFE beyond Line KANSAS-WYOMING (defined
were stated separately), by far the most by the JCS as a line passing approxi-
important feature of this new directive mately through the Hwach'on Reservoir
was the altered mission with which area) was retained in the new directive.
Ridgway was charged. Influenced both Nor was General Ridgway granted per-
by Ridgway's protestations that he could mission to withdraw from Korea at his
not clear all of Korea, and by the recent own discretion.
decision to settle the Korean situation by Ridgway now knew clearly what was
political means, the Joint Chiefs of Staff expected of him, and what limits were
instructed Ridgway to: set upon his authority as commander
in chief, United Nations Command.
Inflict maximum personnel and materiel These goals and restrictions would ob-
losses on the forces of North Korea and tain throughout the remainder of his
76
Memo, ACofS G-3 for CofS USA, 22 May 51, term of duty.
sub: Proposed Changes in Directives to CINCFE,
App. A. 77
Ibid.
CHAPTER XXII
Signs of Armistice
General Van Fleet proposed late in lines. Furthermore, since it was impossi-
May to carry the fight well behind enemy ble to clear all of Korea of enemy forces
lines. He asked General Ridgway to let under conditions then obtaining, it
him mount an amphibious landing on would be unwise to risk heavy casualties
Korea's east coast to surround and pinch merely for a chance to inflict equal cas-
off a large segment of the Chinese and ualties on a more numerous enemy.
North Korean Armies. Basically, Van Van Fleet tried to counter these argu-
Fleet had in mind a maneuver resem- ments, but Ridgway stood fast and the
bling Operation CHROMITE, a deep am- plan was shelved.2
phibious encirclement co-ordinated with Ridgway did authorize a limited ad-
an overland drive. His target area lay vance on the east coast beyond the line
well up the east coast, nearly to Wonsan.1 set by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He told
General Ridgway opposed the landing. Van Fleet that he could seize a line
First, the objective area lay beyond the running from the east end of the
limiting line set by the Joint Chiefs of Hwach'on Reservoir to the east coast,
Staff. This line, of course, could be a move which would advance Line
altered for sufficiently valid reasons. But KANSAS well north of its position as de-
Ridgway also objected that the advan- fined in April. Ridgway did not con-
tages to be gained, even if the operation sider this move to be a general advance
were successful, did not justify the great because its purpose was to maintain con-
risks involved. For Ridgway's main tact and to keep the enemy off-balance.
mission in Korea was to destroy the Nor did the Joint Chiefs of Staff object
greatest possible number of enemy forces when Ridgway notified them of his
with the least possible loss of his own decision.3
men; and he had decided that he could
2
best do this by a gradual advance to the (1) MFR, 31 May 51, sub: Conference Between
Line KANSAS-WYOMING, not by an am- Gen Ridgway and Gen Van Fleet, copy in GHQ
UNC, SGS files, (2) Hearings on Ammunition Short-
phibious landing deep behind enemy ages in the Armed Services, Senate Committee on
Armed Services, 83d Congress, 1st Session, April
1
Rad, GX-5-5099 KGOP, CG Eighth Army to 1953 (hereafter cited as Van Fleet Hearings), Testi-
CINCFE, Van Fleet (Personal) for Ridgway, 28 mony of Gen Collins, pp. 1-5.
3
May 51. Rad, C 63730, CINCFE to JCS, 30 May 51.
398 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Adhering to General Ridgway's con- these areas, and, after short occupation,
cepts, Van Fleet on 1 June ordered the a return to Line KANSAS-WYOMING.5
fortification of Line KANSAS. For the The Eighth Army reached Line
time being, the attacks toward Line KANSAS-WYOMING by mid-June; and on
WYOMING would continue, and once the 14th, General Ridgway, basing his
that line was occupied patrol bases would predictions on General Van Fleet's re-
be established beyond it. If the enemy port, sketched for the Joint Chiefs of
launched another major offensive, the Staff a picture of what could be expected
forces on Line WYOMING might with- in Korea during the coming two months.
draw to Line KANSAS to defend there. The enemy's logistic situation was worse
Otherwise, "From positions along the than that of his own forces. Enemy lines
line WYOMING and the patrol base line," of communications were too long. Re-
Van Fleet ordered, "limited objective cent heavy rainfall and effective inter-
attacks, reconnaissance in force, and diction by U.N. air forces were further
patrolling to the maximum capability aggravating Chinese supply problems.
will be conducted ... to inflict damage The Eighth Army, on the other hand,
on the enemy, confuse him and keep currently enjoyed adequate logistic sup-
him off balance." 4 port. This support would remain ade-
On 9 June, General Ridgway received quate, Ridgway pointed out, provided
Van Fleet's estimate of probable develop- Van Fleet made no general advance
ments within Korea during the next north of Line KANSAS-WYOMING during
sixty days. This estimate closely par- the period. To advance, Ridgway
alleled his own. The enemy, despite the claimed, would "tend to nullify EUSAK's
beating he had taken, still had numer- present logistic advantage over the
ical superiority and retained the capa- enemy." 6
bility to launch at least one major Regardless of a poor supply situation,
offensive within the next two months. the sheer weight of superior numbers in
Van Fleet himself fully expected the North Korea and Manchuria made
Chinese to strike again as soon as they enemy forces capable of keeping the
had built up enough strength, and over-all initiative and of launching at
planned to counter this enemy threat, least one major offensive in the next
at least locally, by vigorous limited sixty days. Happily, the terrain along
offensives which would, when combined Line KANSAS-WYOMING offered excellent
with deception, keep the enemy off- defensive positions if properly orga-
balance or cause him to attack prema- nized. Ridgway intended to hold Eighth
turely. Van Fleet had made plans for Army along this general line, at least
three such limited offensives, all calling for the next two months, and to
for the swift seizure of objective areas, keep punishing the enemy by mak-
the destruction of enemy supplies in
5
MFR CofS GHQ from SGS, GHQ, 13 Jun 51,
4
Ltr of Instructions, CG EUSAK to All Corps in GHQ, FEC SGS files.
6
Comdrs, 1 Jun 51, copy in JSPOG Staff Study, Ad- Rad, CX 64976, CINCFE to DA for JCS, 14
vances North of the 38th Parallel. Jun 51.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 399
ing limited offensive operations with Since General Ridgway had been di-
7
KANSAS-WYOMING as a base. rected to create conditions favorable to
a settlement of the Korean conflict under
Political Factors Influence the appropriate armistice arrangements, he
gave considerable thought to the best
Battle Line
location of a cease-fire line. The Joint
The new national policy, now based Chiefs of Staff, as of 27 March, had
on a political settlement as opposed to a judged that the demilitarized zone should
complete military victory, of course de- be an area about twenty miles in width
terred any grander plans for a general centered at, or north of, the 38th Par-
offensive. Even if the enemy might be allel, although they realized that the
defeated, the cost in lives would be exact location would be determined on
considerable; and certainly nothing was the basis of the positions of opposing
to be gained by paying a high price for ground units in combat at the time of a
terrain which might very possibly be cease-fire.
returned to the enemy at the conference General Ridgway took special note of
table. Indeed, behind the national this last fact and, in early June, asked for
policy lay factors and conditions beyond Van Fleet's views on the best location
the power of the theater commander, or for his forces during a cease-fire. Van
for that matter, of national leaders to Fleet replied that Line KANSAS would be
control. The decision to seek a solution the most feasible location. "It is as-
by political means in Korea was an out- sumed," Van Fleet told Ridgway, "that
growth of world-wide considerations.8 the Communist forces will violate the
terms of the treaty as they have in the
7
Some officials later charged that the U.N. forces
did not take sufficient advantage of the enemy's viction is that the magnificent Eighth Army could
weakened condition in early June 1951, asserting have driven the Chinese beyond the Yalu—if this
that they could have destroyed the "remnants" of country had been willing to pay the price in lives
the Chinese and North Korean Armies in Korea. such action would have cost. Personally, I strongly
General Van Fleet later commented on this matter doubt that such a victory would have been worth
in press statements in 1952 and during a hearing the cost—particularly in light of the fact that our
before the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services Government seemed to have no firm policy on what
in March 1953. When asked whether he had been steps to take thereafter. Seizure of the line of the
correctly quoted that the United Nations could Yalu and the Tumen would have been merely the
have won the war in Korea, General Van Fleet ad- seizure of more real estate. It would have greatly
mitted that while he did not believe complete vic- shortened the enemy supply lines and greatly
tory was possible in June 1951 he had felt that at lengthened our own. It would have widened our
that time he had the Communist armies on the front from 110 miles to 420, and beyond that front
run. " . . . They were hurting badly, out of supplies, would lie Manchuria and the whole mainland of
completely out of hand or control; they were in a Asia, in which all the wealth and manpower of
panic, and were doing their best to fall as far back this country could have been lost and dissipated.
as possible, and we, stopped by order, did not finish So it is useless to speculate on what might have
the enemy." When asked if he had recommended been. I was not privy to the councils of our leaders
the counteroffensive be resumed, Van Fleet replied, at home when they decided to accept the Russian-
"Oh yes, I was crying for them to turn me loose." sponsored overtures for a truce. But in retrospect,
Van Fleet Hearings, p. 32. I do not feel constrained to quarrel with that de-
8
"Our whole policy in Korea, in fact, both mili- cision." See General Matthew B. Ridgway, "My
tary and political," Ridgway later maintained, "will Battles in War and Peace, the Korean War," Sat-
be a question for historians to debate. My own con- urday Evening Post (February 25, 1956), p. 130.
400 POLICY AND DIRECTION
past by improving their potentialities for remember that the enemy might at any
unexpected renewal of aggression." time choose to negotiate a political set-
This being so, Van Fleet insisted that tlement, and if this happened, a 20-mile-
his forces must occupy ground suitable wide demilitarized zone might be
for strong defense even during a cease- established on the basis of the locations
fire; and Line KANSAS met that require- of opposing ground units in combat
ment. Furthermore, in anticipation of at the time. "Therefore," Ridgway
some type of diplomatic agreement which pointed out, "successive main lines of
would require a 10-mile withdrawal from resistance should be selected with a suit-
the line of contact, Van Fleet considered able outpost line, and when and if
it essential that his forces be at least ten negotiations appear imminent, every
miles in advance of the terrain they effort should be made to make contact
would eventually occupy during a with the enemy ten miles in advance of
cease-fire.9 the outpost line of resistance." This
Ridgway's own Joint Strategic Plans line of contact would be known as the
and Operations Group had been work- "cease-fire" line. If negotiations were
ing on the same general problem, ex- successful, a demilitarized zone would
amining various schemes of maneuver probably be set up twenty miles in depth,
that would carry the Eighth Army above having as its center line the cease-fire line.
Line KANSAS so that this line would not Within the terms of the agreement, both
be lost in any withdrawal required by sides would likely withdraw at least ten
cease-fire arrangements. On 13 June, miles from the cease-fire line. This
JSPOG officers briefed Ridgway on four would place Van Fleet's forces on the
such schemes; and after hearing them, outpost line in advance of his selected
Ridgway concluded that Van Fleet main line of resistance. Ridgway of
should devise long-range plans for a course had no information that the
general advance to the line P'yongyang- enemy intended to negotiate. But he
10
Wonsan. On the 19th, he directed Van directed Van Fleet to submit his opera-
Fleet to plan the seizure of the P'yong- tion plan by 10 July.12 For if negotia-
yang-Wonsan line with a main effort tions began in the near future, General
over the Seoul-Wonsan axis and a sec- Van Fleet's concept of using Line
ondary drive up the Seoul-P'yongyang KANSAS as his main line of resistance to
axis. Since Van Fleet earlier had stated be occupied during a cease-fire would
that he could make no general advance apply. Consequently, Ridgway wanted
for at least the next sixty days, Ridgway Van Fleet to be at least twenty miles in
11
left the target date up to him. advance of KANSAS at the beginning of
He cautioned Van Fleet constantly to any negotiations. This, of course, would
9 permit the 10-mile withdrawal and the
Ltr, Van Fleet to CINCUNC, 9 Jun 51, sub: Lo-
cation of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire (Military manning of the outpost line of resistance.
Viewpoint).
10
He assured Van Fleet that he would try
MFR, 17 Jun 51, sub: Planning Directive, sgd to warn him of any imminent negotia-
Lutes.
11
Ltr, CINCFE to CG Eighth Army, 19 Jun 51,
12
sub: Planning Directive. Ibid.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 401
tions so that Van Fleet could move at authorize him to "conduct such tactical
least part of his troops up to a general operations as may be necessary or desir-
line of contact twenty miles in advance able to support your mission ... to
of KANSAS.
13
insure the safety of your command; and
The wisdom of preparing a cease-fire to continue to harass the enemy." 15 In
line had apparently occurred to the Joint actuality, it did not really matter whether
Chiefs of Staff about the same time. By or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff removed
mid-June, in view of their increasing their restriction on his advance, since the
conviction that political negotiations realistic restrictions imposed by terrain,
might soon develop, they had begun to logistics, troop strength, and the enemy
doubt the wisdom of limiting Van Fleet's would, in the final analysis, limit his ad-
advance. At a meeting on 15 June, they vance anyway. But the Joint Chiefs of
decided that it was desirable to revise the Staff asked for his ideas on how any fu-
current directives to General Ridgway; ture advance into North Korea would
and General Collins received the task of affect the target area of his air force,
preparing a proposed revision that would whether an advance would trigger enemy
remove any restrictions on ground opera- air attack, and what would be the effect
tions except those inherent in Ridgway's of longer lines of communication.
mission as CINCFE for the defense of General Ridgway concurred in the
14
Japan. proposed removal of any restriction on
General Collins and General Vanden- his advance. But he asked to be allowed
berg wondered if it might not be wise to to defer answering the questions about
let Ridgway operate in strength as far to operations deeper into North Korea since
the north as his resources would permit. he had directed the Eighth Army com-
They saw the current enemy disorganiza- mander to submit plans for a general
tion and his comparative weakness on the advance not later than 10 July and
immediate front as an excellent oppor- wished to have Van Fleet's ideas before
16
tunity to seize more terrain and to better answering the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Eighth Army's position in the event of a But Ridgway continued to evince great
cease-fire. On 20 June, they asked Ridg- interest in the selection of a cease-fire
way what he thought of a change that line, explaining that it should be at least
would remove "any undue restrictions twenty miles out in front of Line KANSAS,
upon your ability to exploit tactically preferably extending from the confluence
the current situation," and that would of the Han and Yesong Rivers in the
13
west, generally northeast past Ch'orwon
Ltr, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, sub: Lo-
cation of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. and Kumhwa to Kosong on the east coast.
14
Memo, Gen Taylor for Gen Collins, ACofS G-3, Ridgway pointed out that this cease-fire
DA, for CSUSA, 16 Jun 51, sub: Revision of Direc- line did not include the Ongjin and
tive to CINCFE for Opns in Korea, in G-3, DA file
381 Korea. General Taylor noted that approval of
15
such a revision would better enable Ridgway to (1) Memo, Col Arns, Dep Secy JCS, for Gen
exploit tactically the current or subsequent situa- Taylor, 19 Jun 51, sub: Possible Change in JCS
tion. On the other hand, the requirement that 92831. (2) Rad, JCS 94501, JCS to CINCFE, 20
CINCFE maintain the security of his forces would Jun 51.
16
serve to limit his advance. Rad, C 65529, CINCFE to JCS, 22 Jun 51.
402 POLICY AND DIRECTION
timely warning of any imminent negotia- I am informed that you may wish a meeting
tions so that Van Fleet might move forces to discuss armistice providing for the cessa-
forward twenty miles above Line KANSAS. tion of hostilities and all acts of armed
forces in Korea with adequate guarantee
But on 26 June, after Ridgway and Van for the maintenance of such armistice.
Fleet toured the battlefront and weighed Upon receipt of word from you that such a
the situation anew, the two generals de- meeting is desired I shall be prepared to
cided against any advance beyond Line name my representative. I would also at
KANSAS-WYOMING. They agreed that that time suggest a date at which he could
such an advance was feasible tactically meet with your representative. I propose
and logistically, but that the probable that such a meeting could take place aboard
a Danish Hospital ship in Wonsan harbor.
cost in casualties was too great a price to
21
pay. Ridgway broadcast this message as di-
Enemy forces meanwhile had not slack- rected.23
ened their build-up nor tempered their On the date of Ridgway's broadcast,
reactions to the Eighth Army's probing,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff gave Ridgway
especially on the central front. General
instructions for conducting cease-fire
Ridgway's intelligence staff concluded
talks with the Communists should such
that the enemy was, regardless of armi-
stice moves, regrouping in preparation talks develop. They told him that the
for further offensives. Air sightings in principal military interests of the United
the last week of June indicated that Nations in an armistice lay in the cessa-
enemy offensive preparations were well tion of hostilities in Korea, in assuring
advanced; numerous forward supply that the fighting would not resume, and
dumps, artillery positions, and troop in guaranteeing the security of United
movements were reported in the central Nations Command forces. Further, any
area; and prisoners reported the enemy's cease-fire talks were to be limited strictly24
intention to launch a Sixth Phase Offen- to military questions related to Korea.
22
sive sometime in July. Upon receiving these guidelines, Ridg-
The enemy build-up, however, became way and his Joint Strategic Plans and
of secondary importance on 29 June Operations Group developed an agenda
when General Ridgway received instruc- to be proposed to the Communists at the
tions from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to first session, selected a delegation to rep-
approach the enemy on possible armistice resent the United Nations Command at
negotiations. President Truman had di- the conference table, and worked out the
rected that at 0800 on 30 June, Ridgway physical arrangements for maintaining
was to broadcast a message to the com- the United Nations Command delega-
mander in chief, Communist Forces in tion, including communications, trans-
Korea, saying: portation, security liaison, and other
routine matters. On 3 July, the Joint
21
(1) Ltr, Ridgway to Van Fleet, 22 Jun 51, sub:
Location of EUSAK During a Cease-Fire. (2) Van
23
Fleet Hearings, p. 651. Rad, JCS 95258, JCS to CINCFE, 29 Jun 51.
22 24
Telecons, TT 4846 and TT 4884, DA and GHQ, Rad, JCS 95354, JCS to CINCFE, (Personal) for
20 Jun 51 and 28 Jun 51. Ridgway, 30 Jun 51.
404 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Chiefs of Staff approved Ridgway's plans The mere promise that negotiations to
without change.25 end the fighting in Korea might be forth-
Meanwhile, on 1 July, the Communist coming had in the meantime prompted
leaders replied to Ridgway's message in widespread speculation in the American
a broadcast sponsored jointly by Kim Il press. Such expressions as "Let's Get the
Sung, Supreme Commander of the Ko- Boys Back Home" and "The War Weary
rean People's Army, and Peng Teh-huai, Troops" were beginning to appear in
who styled himself Commander of the the more irresponsible journals. Gen-
Chinese Volunteers. They agreed to eral Ridgway took violent exception to
meet with United Nations Command these sentiments. "I can hardly imagine
representatives but proposed that the a greater tragedy for America and the
place of meeting be in the Kaesong area free world," he informed the Joint Chiefs
rather than aboard the Danish ship, and of Staff on 4 July, "than a repetition of
that the meetings begin between 10 and the disgraceful debacle of our Armed
15 July.26 Forces following their victorious effort
The enemy proposal to meet at Kae- in World War II. We can never efface
song, while not entirely unacceptable to that blot on the record of the American
Ridgway, was interpreted as only a fur- people on whom the responsibility
ther demonstration of a known Commu- squarely rests." Ridgway vowed that he
nist policy never to accept a proposal in would do everything within his power to
toto. Ridgway therefore told the Joint eliminate such thinking among the offi-
Chiefs of Staff that he planned to accept cers and men of his command. "If this
Kaesong as the conference site and to be 'thought control' then I am for it,
28
halt combat operations along the Mun- heart and soul."
san-Kaesong road and in the Kaesong Ridgway also feared that public pres-
area. On 3 July, he notified the Com- sure for an armistice might force him
munists that he was prepared to meet into military concessions. He told the
their representatives at Kaesong on 10 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "I wish with great
July "or at an earlier date if your repre- earnestness to point out the importance
sentatives complete their preparations I attach to the retention by United Na-
before that date." He proposed, in order tions forces of so much of Korea as will
to insure efficient arrangement of the permit occupation and defense of Kansas
many details for the meetings, that three line with a suitable outpost zone for its
liaison officers of each side meet in Kae- protection." He reiterated the view that
song on 5 July or as soon thereafter as KANSAS was the strongest defensive line
practicable. The Communists agreed to in the general area.
this procedure, but set the date for the It is the most advanced strong defensive
meeting of liaison officers at 8 July.27 terrain which the tactical situation under
your directives permits me to reach, and
25
(1) Rad, CX 66160, CINCFE to JCS, 1 Jul 51. there, logistically to support my forces. . . .
(2) Rad, JCS 95438, JCS to CINCFE, 3 Jul 51.
26
Any position taken by our government
Rad, CX 66188, CINCFE to JCS, 2 Jul 51. which would compel me to abandon the
27
(1) Ibid. (2) Rad, DA-IN 11098, Ridgway to
28
JCS, 5 Jul 51. Rad, C 66323, CINCFE to JCS, 4 Jul 51.
SIGNS OF ARMISTICE 405
30
Ibid.
won it a front-rank position as a military
Memo, Gen M. B. Ridgway for General and
Flag-Officer Members of the U.N. Delegation, 7 Jul power While offset to some degree by
51, in GHQ, UNC SGS files. a lack of an atomic capability and a de-
406 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Chief of Staff Daily Folders pared by the FEC was the Annual Narra-
tive Historical Report, required by Army
Prepared by the SGS, GHQ, for pres-
regulations. The FEC had prepared
entation to the Chief of Staff each morn-
such a report for 1949 and subsequently
ing, these folders contained copies of
prepared a report for the period 1 Janu-
all pertinent communications between
ary-31 October 1950. Thus the period
Washington and Tokyo and between
25 June-31 October 1950 is covered, not
CINCUNC and his subordinate com-
by a monthly Command Report (see
manders. Memorandums for record of
below), but by the Annual Report which
important telephone calls, copies of mis-
is less detailed. Nevertheless, the staff
cellaneous memorandums for record on
sections of GHQ/FEC, particularly the
meetings, and liaison officer reports on
ACofS, G-3, included in this Annual
visits to Korea are among the particularly
Report unique information and docu-
valuable items in these files not else-
ments on Korean planning and opera-
where available. These files, comprising
tions. In this connection, the Eighth
twelve file drawers of material, were
Army was relieved of the requirement
turned over to the Military History Sec-
for submitting a historical report cover-
tion, GHQ, FEC/UNC, in October 1951.
ing the period 25 June-31 October 1950
JSPOG Files and such historical records of Eighth
Army's activities as exist for that period
Under control of the ACofS G-3, consist of War Diaries. The period
GHQ, FEC/UNC, the Joint Strategic 1January to 25 June 1950 is not covered
Plans and Operations Group maintained by a historical report from the Eighth
separate files comprising all the joint Army.
planning files of the theater. These files,
arranged in books by subject, contained The Monthly Command Report,
detailed staff studies of contemplated FEC/UNC
operations, operations plans and opera- Beginning on 1 November 1950,
tions orders, interspersed with attached GHQ, FEC/UNC, prepared and sub-
handwritten comments by key officers of mitted each month to the Department
command. of the Army a Command Report, de-
scribing in detail the operations, activi-
FEC Reports ties, and problems of the command. The
basic narrative report is accompanied by
Several recurring reports prepared annexes from each General and Special
within the FEC have provided informa- Staff Section of GHQ FEC/UNC. The
tion and views on Korea not available most valuable of these annexes, from the
elsewhere. These are: historian's viewpoint, are those of the
ACofS, G-3, the ACofS, G-2, and those
The Annual Narrative Historical
prepared by the Commander in Chief
Report, GHQ FEC
and the Chief of Staff GHQ FEC/UNC.
At the outbreak of the Korean War, The latter annex did not appear until
the only recurring historical report pre- April 1951 when the Military History
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 409
Military Units—Identification
Antiaircraft Artillery
Armored Command
Army Air Forces
Artillery, except Antiaircraft and Coast Artillery
Cavalry, Horse
Cavalry, Mechanized
Chemical Warfare Service
Coast Artillery
Engineers
Infantry
Medical Corps
Ordnance Department
Quartermaster Corps
Signal Corps
Tank Destroyer
Transportation Corps
Veterinary Corps
Airborne units are designated by combining a gull wing
symbol with the arm or service symbol:
Airborne Artillery
Airborne Infantry
Size Symbols
The following symbols placed either in boundary lines or
above the rectangle, triangle, or circle inclosing the identifying
arm or service symbol indicate the size of military organization:
Squad
Section
Platoon
Company, troop, battery, Air Force flight
Battalion, cavalry squadron, or Air Force squadron
Regiment or group; combat team (with abbreviation CT fol-
lowing identifying numeral)
Brigade, Combat Command of Armored Division, or Air Force
Wing
Division or Command of an Air Force
Corps or Air Force
Army
Group of Armies
EXAMPLES
The letter or number to the left of the symbol indicates the
unit designation; that to the right, the designation of the parent
unit to which it belongs. Letters or numbers above or below
boundary lines designate the units separated by the lines:
Company A, 137th Infantry
8th Field Artillery Battalion
Combat Command A, 1st Armored Division
Observation Post, 23d Infantry
Command Post, 5th Infantry Division
Boundary between 137th and 138th Infantry
Weapons
Machine gun
Gun
Gun battery
Howitzer or Mortar
Tank
Self-propelled gun
Index
Abe, General Nobuyuki: 18 Airborne operations
Acheson, Dean G. See also State, Department of. at Inch'on, plans for: 152
air-naval commitment proposed by: 73 plans for: 169-70, 215-16
and air operations: 242, 247, 249-50, 286 World War II experience: 168
and armistice proposals: 278, 390-91 Airborne Regimental Combat Team, 187th: 93-94,
Attlee, conference with: 291-92 108, 119, 142, 169-71, 196, 215-16
and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249-50, 255, Airborne units
268 requisitions for: 168-71
and Chinese intervention: 286 training program: 169-70
and Communists, negotiating with: 268 Aircraft
and continental China, operations against: 329-30 B-29 bombers: 109-10, 241-44
and financial aid to Korea: 30 C-47 cargo (transport): 341
on intelligence failure: 62 C-119 cargo (transport): 168, 170
and Korea as strategic area: 51-52, 68 losses: 247
and limited offensives: 402 ROKA strength: 40
on MacArthur relief: 365n, 374-75 shortages of: 109
and matériel supply to ROKA: 68-69 transports, shortage of: 88
and Nationalist China, use of troops: 116 Aircraft, enemy
and North Korea, operations in: 255, 275 IL fighters: 39
on objectives in Korea: 352 losses: 247
and political settlement proposals: 359 MIG fighters: 247
and Soviet intervention: 286, 352 strength: 39
on 38th Parallel, advance across: 351-52 YAK fighters: 39, 74
and U.N. troops, requisitions for: 227-28, 238, 356 Airfields
and unification as objective: 350 construction and repair: 261, 341
and U.S. troops, deployment and withdrawal: 79n defense of: 300
Active Reserves. See Army Reserve; Reserve com- enemy demolition of: 195
ponents. Airlift operations
Advance Command and Liaison Group (ADCOM) ammunition supply by: 229
departure from ROK: 86 control of: 108-09
mission: 71-72 plans for: 157
USAFIK, proposed merger with: 86 to Pusan: 80-81
as USAFIK staff: 81-82 of supplies: 195, 235, 257-58, 301, 341-42
Adviser groups. See Military Advisory Group to of troops: 87-88, 127-29, 215-16
ROK (KMAG); Military missions; Provisional ALABAMA line: 379-80
Military Advisory Group to ROK (PMAG). Alaskan Command: 43, 45
Advisers, Truman reliance on: 177-79 Allen, Maj. Gen. Leven C.: 202, 205, 235, 306-07
Aggression, U.S. attitude toward: 292 Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M. See also Corps, X.
Air Force, Department of the. See United States Air and air operations, control of: 109-10
Force; Vandenberg, General Hoyt S. and airborne units, deployment of: 169
Air Force, Thirteenth: 49. See also Turner, Maj. as chief of staff, GHQ, FEC: 49
Gen. Howard M. (USAF). and Chinese border, inviolability of: 264-65
Air operations: 69-70, 73-74, 77, 80. See also Stra- and Chinese intervention: 236, 259
tegic air operations; Tactical air operations, Church, directive to: 80-81
control of: 109-11 Collins, conference with: 283
FEAF, control by: 108-09 and corps organization: 159
proposed: 242, 247, 249-50, 286 and credit for X Corps, oversight in: 186
Air operations, enemy: 76-77 dual role of: 158
Airborne Divisions estimates of situation by: 111-12
11th: 44, 93-94, 108, 168-71, 230, 294 and GHQ Reserve, headquarters for: 155-58
82d: 44, 90, 93, 118, 132, 153, 169-71, 230, 294 at Hungnam: 301
418 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Almond, Lt. Gen. Edward M.—Continued Armored fighting vehicles. See Tanks.
at Inch'on: 141, 148-49, 158-59, 172, 190, 196 Army, Department of the. See also Pace, Frank, Jr.;
MacArthur, conference with: 188-89 United States Army; War Department.
and Marine Corps units, employment of: 160, co-ordination of plans with: 152-53
164-65 MacArthur, directives to: 102
and matériel losses and destruction: 301-04 Army area organization: 42n
North Korea, operations in: 233, 236, 245, 257, Army Field Forces: 42. See also Clark, General Mark
259-66, 271-73, 274, 278-84 W.
and power plants, preservation of: 264-65 Army Policy Council: 123, 131, 221-22, 234
at Pusan: 125, 301 Army Reserve. See also Reserve components.
replacements, requisitions for: 129 Army expansion, role in: 120-22
and Seoul, recovery of: 184-85 call-up of: 88, 120-21, 122
supply system and operations: 259, 297 troop units, strength: 121
at Tokyo conference: 278-82 Arnold, Maj. Gen. Archibald V.: 17
training program: 159 Artillery. See Antiaircraft artillery; Field artillery.
troop units needed, estimates of: 107-08 Artillery fire support: 81, 84, 96-97, 109, 303, 338
U.N.-ROK ground troops, control of: 215-18 Artillery losses: 111. See also Matériel, losses and
Walker, conference with: 125 destruction.
in withdrawal operations: 301-06 Ascom City: 206-07
at Wonsan: 188-90, 195-96, 202, 205-10, 212,Asiatic 216- troops, proposal for commitment: 193-94
19, 232 Atomic bomb, potential use: 283-84, 288, 289-90,
Ambush operations, enemy: 235 320n
American Mission in Korea (AMIK): 34 Attlee, Clement R. See also United Kingdom.
Ammunition Acheson, conference with: 291-92
deficiencies and shortages in: 84, 202 and armistice proposals: 292-93
estimate of requirements: 45-47 and atomic bomb, potential use: 289-90
requisitions for: 229-30 and Communist China, concessions to: 292-93
supply of: 46, 59, 229-30, 236, 257 and Communist China, U.N. seating: 292-93
supply by airlift: 229 expansion of conflict, concern over: 289-90, 292,
supply to ROKA: 35, 66 321
Amnesty proclamation, plans for: 180 Marshall, conference with: 291-92
Amphibious Group One, USN: 147, 172 Truman, conference with: 288-93
Amphibious operations, enemy: 61, 65 Attrition tactics: 333-34, 361-64, 382, 396, 397
Amphibious operations and training: 55, 57, 85-86, AUDACIOUS: 364
134-35, 137-40, 141n, 156, 160-63, 168, 177, 187- Austin, Warren R.: 73, 333, 369-71
91, 195-96, 205-10, 336, 397 Australia
Amphibious Tank and Tractor Battalion, 56th: 171- and Chinese intervention: 266
72 military assistance from: 115
Antiaircraft artillery, stocks on hand: 46 troop units, deployment of: 225, 227, 356-57
Antiaircraft artillery battalions: 94
Antiaircraft Artillery Group, 9th: 54 Baillie, Hugh: 284
Antiaircraft artillery units, requisitions for: 93, 166 Baird, Col. John E.: 36
Antiaircraft defense, enemy: 246-47 Bank of Chosen: 5
Antitank defense Barr, Maj. Gen. David G.: 265
deficiencies in: 84 Beach conditions, effect on operations: 140-41, 146-
NKA strength: 39 47
An-tung: 179, 200, 230, 241-42, 245-46 Beiderlinden, Maj. Gen. William A.: 88, 128-30, 238
Argentina: 356 Beightler, Maj. Gen. Robert S.: 49
Armed Forces Organization Act, ROK: 34 Belgium and Belgian troops: 225, 227
Armistice proposals: 183, 197, 283-84, 287-93, 331- Benninghoff, H. Merrell: 17-18
33, 358-59, 384-85, 390-92, 396, 399-405. See Bevin, Ernest: 200n, 251n, 360-61. See also United
also Political settlement proposals. Kingdom.
Armor units. See Tank units. BLUEHEARTS: 139-40, 168
Armored Cavalry Regiment, 3d: 44-45, 118 Bolling, Maj. Gen. Alexander R.: 63-64
Armored Divisions Bolté, Maj. Gen. Charles L.: 132, 152, 257
2d: 44, 90-92, 230, 294 and airborne units, deployment of: 169
50th: 124 and Army expansion planning: 118
Armored Field Artillery Battalion, 6th: 91 and Chinese border, inviolability of: 266-68
INDEX 419
Bolté, Maj. Gen. Charles L.—Continued Casualties—Continued
and Chinese intervention: 298 Communist China: 389-91, 405
and emergency declaration: 298 Communist-inflicted: 37-38
and Far East, security of: 75-76 Eighth Army: 127-28, 297
and General Reserve, levies on: 91, 93 FEC estimates: 88
MacArthur, conferences with: 223-25, 237 guerrillas, enemy: 38
and Marine Corps units, employment of: 161-62 at Inch'on: 173, 247
and National Guard, levies on: 123-25 North Korean Army: 405
and North Korea, operations in: 181-82 as percentage of strength: 87n
and replacements, requisitions for: 223-24, 228- Republic of Korea Army: 235, 405
29, 237, 271, 294, 298 United Nations Command: 238, 405
ROKA equipment, view on: 35 U.S. Army: 127-28, 297, 405
and Soviet intervention: 75-76, 298 X Corps: 297
and supply system and operations: 258 Cates, General Clifton P. (USMC):261
and U.N. troops, employment of: 224-27 Cavalry Division, 1st: 54
Walker, conference with: 237 amphibious operations, plans for: 85-86, 139
and withdrawal operations: 298 combat effectiveness: 80n
Bombardment, aerial. See Air operations; Strategic deployment to combat: 86, 112-13, 140-41
air operations; Tactical air operations. Koreans attached to: 168
Bonesteel, Col. Charles H.: 9-10 North Korea, operations in: 235
Bradley, General of the Army Omar N.: 285, 327. at P'yongyang: 204-05
See also Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cavalry Regiments. See also Armored Cavalry Reg-
and air-naval commitment: 70 iment, 3d.
and Chinese intervention: 234, 254-55, 275, 286 7th: 55, 177
and EUCOM, deployment of troops to: 223, 286 8th: 235, 257
and Formosa, security of: 370 Cease-fire. See Armistice proposals; Political settle-
and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-75 ment proposals.
and North Korea, operations in: 255 Cease-fire line. See Demilitarized zone (DMZ).
and occupation troops, withdrawal of: 50 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA): 65, 199
and ROKA, expansion and training: 394 Chae Byong Duk, General (ROKA): 72, 74
and Soviet intervention: 69 Chang, John M.: 313
and strategic air operations: 244, 286 Changjin Reservoir area: 216n, 236, 252-53, 259-66,
at Wake Island conference: 211-14 279-80, 297, 301
Brazil: 356-57 Chech'on: 340
Brewster, Owen: 365n Cheju-do: 38, 313, 324-25
Bridges Chemical units, requisitions for: 98
demolition of: 195, 241-47, 258, 303-04, 372 Chiang Kai-shek: 368. See also China, Nationalist.
enemy construction and repair: 246 and Formosa, security of: 368-69
shortages of equipment: 159n MacArthur, conference with: 368
Bridges, Styles: 365n Struble, conference with: 368
British Army troops. See United Kingdom. troop units, offer of: 116, 283-84, 295
British Commonwealth. See commonwealth by Chief of Naval Operations. See Sherman, Admiral
name; United Kingdom. Forrest P.
Brooks, Lt. Gen. Edward H.: 118, 238 Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force. See Vandenberg, Gen-
Bureau of the Budget: 46 eral Hoyt S.
Burke, Rear Adm. Arleigh A.: 312 Chief of Staff, U.S. Army. See Collins, General J.
Burma: 266, 333 Lawton.
Byrnes, James F.: 10 Chief of Transportation: 91
Chiles, John H.: 65n, 266
Cain, Harry P.: 365n China, Communist. See also Chou En-lai; Mao
Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6, 349 Tse-tung.
Camouflage operations, enemy: 275 4th Field Army: 233
Camp Drake: 88n, 130 124th Division: 236, 260-61
Canada: 115, 225, 227, 356-57 126th Division: 236
Career Guidance Program: 55-56 aggressor, named by U.N.: 332-33
Caribbean Command: 43, 45 air reconnaissance of: 328
Casualties air violations by USAF: 247
civilian: 405 armistice, terms rejected by: 331-32
420 POLICY AND DIRECTION
China, Communist—Continued Chinnamp'o: 140, 141n, 187, 236, 258
assets frozen: 318 Chip'yong-ni: 339-40
atomic bomb, attitude toward: 289n Choch'iwon: 82
blockade of proposed: 102, 283-84, 289, 291-92, Ch'ongch'on River: 234-35, 258
315, 318, 321, 328-29, 339, 393 Ch'ongjin: 7-8, 266, 269
border, inviolability of: 188-89, 196-202, 212-14, Ch'ongju: 86, 216
235-36, 240-41, 248-56, 264-71, 277, 283-84, 372, Chongsanjangsi: 216
380, 382, 384-85 Ch'ongsongjin: 246
casualties: 389-91, 405 Chonui: 82
combat effectiveness: 83, 84-85, 105-06, 238, 277, Ch'orwon: 206, 364, 389, 401-02
327, 358, 398 Ch'osan: 234-35, 270
concessions to, proposed: 292-93 Chosin Reservoir: 263n. See also Changjin Reser-
disclaimer for military actions: 317 voir area.
economic sanctions against, proposed: 318, 328 Chou En-lai: 197-98, 199-201, 234, 251n. See also,
Formosa, threat to: 197, 366-69 China, Communist.
industry, proposed destruction of: 315 CHOW CHOW: 71
intervention by: 85, 178-90, 196-202, 212-14, 222, CHROMITE. See Inch'on (CHROMITE).
239-42, 250-57, 259, 266-67, 271, 274-78, 285- Chumunjin: 141n
89, 298-99, 308-12, 318, 322, 327-30, 333, 372 Ch'unch'on: 10, 61, 65, 70-71, 354, 387-89
matériel losses: 390 Ch'ungju: 86, 112, 188-89, 195-96
military power status: 405-06 Chungking, as seat of Korean provisional govern-
morale: 390 ment: 5
naval operations against, proposed: 320-21, 329 Church, Maj. Gen. John H.: 74
North Korea, pledges support to: 197, 233, 240-41 as adviser to ROKA: 80-81
offensives by: 379-80, 387-90, 398-99, 403 Almond, directive from: 80-81
operations against, proposed: 291, 315-18, 319-25, defensive measures by: 72
328-30, 332, 339, 351, 369, 373, 380, 384, 386,
enemy effectiveness, report on: 83
392-93, 396 heads GHQ Advance Command: 71-72
prisoner of war losses: 233, 236, 390 MacArthur, briefed by: 74
propaganda campaigns: 289n Churchill, Winston S.: 7, 288
rations, shortages of: 390 Civil affairs. See also Occupation,
recognition of, proposed: 292, 332-33 conduct of: 25, 221
Soviet Union, relations with: 197, 201, 317, 320 transfer from military: 25
strategic air operations against, proposed: 283-84, Clark, General Mark W.: 134
289, 292, 320 and Army expansion goals: 118
tank operations by: 236 on combat readiness of 2d Division: 94
territorial violation charged to U.S.: 197 and National Guard, levies on: 124-25
troop movements, reports on: 179, 198-200, 233- Clarke, Brig. Gen. Carter W.: 137
34, 238-41, 259, 263, 273, 276-77 Climate: 2. See also Weather, effect on operations.
troop units, deployment to North Korea: 179, Close air support. See Tactical air operations.
222n, 233-34 Coast Guard, ROK: 34
troop units, strength in Korea: 241, 244-45, 259n, Collective security
380, 384-85, 387, 405 arrangements for: 41
U.N., proposals for admission to: 197, 290-93, 331 need for expressed: 333
withdrawal operations: 389-90 Collins, General J. Lawton
China, invasion of and influence on Korea: 2-3
and AAA units, deployment of: 93
China, Nationalist. See also Chiang Kai-shek; For-
and airborne units, deployment of: 169-71
mosa.
and Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6 Almond, conference with: 283
combat effectiveness: 320 and Army troops to halt invasion: 69
intelligence reports from: 199, 276 and Chinese border, inviolability of: 268-70
logistical support of: 328-29 and Chinese intervention: 234
military assistance, offer of: 116 and combat effectiveness, enemy: 327
troop units, employment proposed: 116-17, 295- and combat effectiveness, U.S.: 56-57, 292
96, 307, 315-17, 319-21, 329, 339, 393 and emergency declaration: 299
troop units, strength: 320 estimates of situation by: 327
trusteeship, agreement on: 13, 26 and FEC troop unit strength: 53
weapons, deficiencies in: 320 functions and chain of authority: 42
INDEX 421
Independence, movements toward: 5-6 Infantry Regiments. See also Regimental Combat
India: 101, 198, 333 Teams.
Indochina: 293 17th: 165, 264-65
Infantry Divisions 19th: 82, 111
combat TOE authorized: 88-90 21st: 82
2d: 44, 119, 212, 297 23d: 340
combat effectiveness: 94, 108 24th: 81, 89n
deployment to combat: 92-96, 127, 142-44, 29th: 90-91, 108, 166
165-66 32d: 164-66, 177
Han River operations: 340 34th: 82
Koreans attached to: 168 65th: 133, 165, 215
North Korea, operations in: 235 Inje: 304, 379-80
withdrawal planned: 223-24 Intelligence
3d: 44, 212 estimates and reports: 62-64, 101-04, 139-40, 179,
combat effectiveness: 132-34 198-202, 204, 208, 222, 237, 244-45, 257, 259-60,
deployment to combat: 118n, 131-34, 165, 215 263, 272-73, 274-77, 285, 304-05, 308, 337-40,
Hungnam operations: 303-04 354, 363, 387-89, 403
levies on: 90-92 failures in: 61-62, 65
North Korea, operations in: 236, 279 at Inch'on: 174-75
occupation duty: 222n, 223-24 from Nationalist China: 199, 276
withdrawal planned: 223 from U.S. embassy: 62-63
4th: 294 Interim People's Committee: 24
7th: 54, 129 Iwon: 208, 219, 236, 259
combat effectiveness: 80n, 85-86, 90, 107-08,
166-67 Japan
deployment to FEC: 144-45, 165, 171-72 air threat to, enemy: 320
Inch'on operations: 157-58, 173-77 contract shipping from: 209-10
Koreans attached to: 167-68 contractors, use by FEC: 209-10, 341
levies on: 85-86, 165-66 industrial exploitation of Korea: 4-5
North Korea, operations in: 236, 259, 264-66, industry as aid to FEC: 58-59
269, 279-80 interest rates to Koreans: 5
reconstitution for combat: 165-68 invasion and occupation of Korea: 2-6
Wonsan operations: 188, 196, 205, 207-08, legal discrimination against Koreans: 1
216-17, 219 mine clearance by: 209-10, 217
24th: 54, 85-86. See also Task Force Smith, USA. National Police Reserve: 131n, 314, 386
casualties: 108, 111-13 nationals employed by FEC: 54, 58, 97
combat effectiveness: 80n, 127 occupation policy, MacArthur's: 55
deployment to combat: 80-82 officials in high Korean posts: 18
enemy strength faced: 105 population in Korea: 5
Koreans attached to: 168 quick U.S. entry into Korea, appeals for: 16
North Korea, operations in: 235 rebellions against: 4
P'yongyang operations: 204-05 security of: 75-76, 131, 301, 307, 316, 322-23, 325,
Taejon, defense of: 112-13 344-45, 383-86
Soviet threat to: 311
25th: 54
Soviet Union enters war against: 8
combat effectiveness: 80n, 127 surrender procedure: 8-11, 13, 49-50
deployment to combat: 85, 112, 141 as U.N. sanctuary: 320
Koreans attached to: 168 Japan Logistical Command: 136-37, 207-08, 222, 229.
troop unit strength: 52 See also Weible, Maj. Gen. Walter L.
28th: 124-25, 294 Japan Sea: 335, 361
29th: 124 Jessup, Philip C.: 211-12
31st: 124, 299 Jet aircraft support. See Fighter aircraft support,
37th: 124 enemy.
40th: 124-25, 294, 345, 385 Johnson, Louis A. See also Defense, Department of.
43d: 124-25, 294 Army expansion, approval of: 119-20
45th: 124-25, 294, 345, 385 and Formosa, security of: 366, 367, 369-70
47th: 299 and Formosa as strategic area: 68
426 POLICY AND DIRECTION
Johnson, Louis A.—Continued Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continued
functions and chain of authority: 42 MacArthur, recommended as U.N. commander:
on ground troops commitment: 79 102
resigns as Secretary of Defense: 181 and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-76
role in military decisions: 103-04 and Marine Corps units, deployment of: 92,
Seventh Fleet movement, proposed by: 69n 160-63
and Soviet intervention: 76 and morale: 323-24
and U.N. military assistance from: 115-17 and National Guard, levies on: 122-25, 130, 317,
and U.S. policy toward Korea: 181 344-45, 385
Joint Chiefs of Staff. See also Bradley, General of and national policy, clearance of statements on:
the Army Omar N.; Collins, General J. Law- 285
ton; Sherman, Admiral Forrest P.; Vandenberg, and Nationalist China, logistical support of:
General Hoyt S. 328-29
and air reconnaissance of China: 328 and Nationalist China, use of troops: 116-17,
air-naval operations, directives on: 73, 76-77 295-96, 319, 321, 329
airborne units, decision to deploy: 169 and naval operations against China: 321, 329
and armistice proposals: 291-92, 384-85, 390-92, and North Korea, drive on: 179-84, 191
396, 403-05 and North Korea, operations in: 180, 193-94,
and Army expansion: 118-20, 298-99 250, 272, 279-82, 285-86, 288, 290
and China, blockade of: 318, 321, 328-29 and objectives in Korea: 179-84, 186-87, 323, 325,
and Chinese border, inviolability of: 248-49, 252- 332, 349-51, 386-87, 391-93
55, 268, 384-85 occupation, directives on: 196
and Chinese intervention: 199-200, 231-32, 234, and occupation troops, withdrawal of: 30
236, 240, 250-55, 298, 310-12, 327-30 occupation zones planned by: 8
Collins as Korea representative: 101-02 planning and decisions, problems in: 103-04
composition: 42-43 and political settlement proposals: 357-59, 391-92,
constabulary expansion, approved by: 33 400-401
and continental China, operations against: 291, prisoners of war, directive on: 186-87
321-23, 329-30, 384, 392 and power plants, bombardment of: 347-48
courses of action considered: 295-96 and Rashin, bombardment of: 346-47
and DMZ, establishment of: 384, 399-402 and replacements, requisitions for: 79, 92, 93-
and economic sanctions against China: 328 94, 99, 119-20, 132-34, 224, 310, 328, 384
and emergency declaration: 298 Ridgway, directives to: 381-87, 395-96, 401-02
enemy strength, appraisal of: 384-85 ROK, policy on U.N. occupation: 180
and EUCOM, security of: 223, 319 and ROK government, support of: 180, 184, 328
and expansion of conflict: 242, 244-45, 247, 254 and ROKA, control of troops: 218
FEC, directive to: 50-52 and ROKA, effect of withdrawal on: 323-24
and Formosa, security of: 368 and ROKA, expansion and training: 392, 396
functions and chain of authority: 42-43 and Soviet border, inviolability of: 384-85
and General Reserve, levies on: 79, 87, 99, 119-20 and Soviet intervention: 77, 253, 883, 391-92
and guerrilla operations: 329 and Soviet use of allies: 104
guidance on Korea sought by: 7 and strategic air operations: 242-44, 247, 249,
and Inch'on, reported opposition to: 184n 321, 329, 345
and Inch'on operation: 148-51, 153-54 and supply system and operations, enemy: 384
and Japan, security of: 301, 307, 345, 384-85 surrender ultimatum, directive on: 186-87
and Japan, Soviet threat to: 311 and 38th Parallel, advance across: 353-54, 358,
Japanese surrender procedures, role in: 9-10 396
KMAG ordered with ROK units: 70 troop strength, justify cuts in: 52
and Korea as strategic area: 50-52, 253, 310 and U.K. concern over U.S, policies: 290
limited offensives, directives on: 384-85, 396, 397, and U.N., military assistance from: 115-17
401-02 U.N. agent for operations: 101-03, 243
MacArthur, commendation of: 185-86 U.N. command chain, opposes committee in: 101
MacArthur, conferences with: 67, 69, 73, 142-44 and U.N. objectives in Korea: 392
MacArthur, directives to: 67, 69-70, 76-77, 116, and U.N. troop units, requisitions for: 224-28,
148, 150-51, 153-54, 161n, 180-84, 186-87, 194- 237-38, 344, 356-57, 384
98, 200, 218, 220, 242-44, 268-69, 278-80, 282, unified commands, control of: 43
310-12, 321-25, 329, 351, 353, 358-60, 371-73 USAFIK, control of: 25
MacArthur, mission assigned to: 47 and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378
INDEX 427
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Con- MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Con-
tinued tinued
and Manchuria, air operations in: 241-46, 251, Rhee, conference with: 74
272-73, 277-78, 281, 283-84, 291, 320-25, 338- Ridgway, conferences with: 145-46, 167, 307, 378
39, 351 Ridgway, relations with: 305-07
and Marine Corps units, requisitions for: 92, 139, Ridgway commended by: 336, 348
142, 143, 159-64, 165n and RIPPER: 354-55
Martin, Joseph W., letter to: 374 ROK, responsibilities in: 34
and matériel losses and destruction: 301-03 and ROK government, restoration and security:
medical units, requisitions for: 98 180, 183-87, 313
military career: 13 ROK proclaimed by: 28
mission, adherence to: 106-07, 179, 183-84, 186- and ROKA, attachment to U.S. units: 167-68,
87, 190, 195, 234, 245, 252, 262, 270, 277-78, 342-43
282 and ROKA, control of troops: 102, 188, 191n,
missions assigned by JCS: 47 215-16, 218
and morale: 322 and ROKA, expansion and training: 168, 230,
Muccio, conference with: 74 313-14, 394
and National Guard, levies on: 296, 325-26, and ROKA, withdrawal of: 312-13, 316
344-45 and security, maintenance of: 133, 339
national police, plans for: 30-33 and Seoul, operations around: 14, 72, 335-36
national policy, disagreements with: 284-85, 287n, service units, use of: 97-98, 342-43
322-23, 325, 349, 358-59, 366, 371-74, 376 and Seventh Fleet, control of: 77
and Nationalist China, use of troops: 295-96, Sherman, conference with: 149-51
307, 315-17, 319-20, 339 shipping, requisitions for: 106-07
NATO, distrust of: 288 signal units, requisitions for: 134-35
and naval gunfire support: 281 Smith, conference with: 148
naval operations, plans for: 336 and Soviet border, inviolability of: 372
Navy units, requisitions for: 239 and Soviet intervention: 188-89, 315, 325-26
and North Korea, drive to: 107, 179, 183-91 and Soviet propaganda campaigns: 296
and North Korea, operations in: 193-202, 205-10, and Soviet Union, air operations against: 321
215-19, 278-84, 361-64, 371-72. See also Yalu specialists, requisitions for: 139, 155, 166-67
River, operations around, Stratemeyer, conference with: 188
objectives in Korea, directive on: 180-84, 349 Struble, conference with: 149
occupation directives and plans: 7, 10, 19, 25-26, Struble commended by: 348
180, 219-21 supplies, requisitions for: 81-86, 228-30, 297
offensive, maintenance of: 338 and supply system and operations: 335, 360, 363
ordnance specialists, requisitions for: 97-98 and supply system and operations, enemy: 327,
overoptimism, cautions against: 339 339, 346-47
and patrol actions: 363 and surrender demand: 187-88, 193, 195, 203-04
plans for supporting: 83 tact, demonstration of: 336n
and political settlement proposals: 358-59, 360- and tactical air operations: 109-10, 215-16, 307
61, 374 tactical plans: 106-07, 113-14, 126, 145-46, 177,
and power plants, air operations against: 231-32, 195-96, 205-06, 212-14, 215-19, 245, 271, 275,
241, 244-45, 248, 269-71, 347-48 279, 290, 311-12, 314, 315, 328, 335-36, 338-39,
press correspondents, statements to: 340, 351, 358- 348, 349, 360
59 and tank support: 338
prisoners of war, plans for rescuing: 215 tank units, requisitions for: 92-93
proclamation on occupation: 16 and Task Force Smith: 82n
and Pusan operations: 176, 314 and 38th Parallel, advance across: 338, 351-54,
and Rashin, air operations against: 345-47 358-60
reconnaissance, aerial: 270 timing, sense of: 144
relief of: 364, 365-67, 374-77 at Tokyo conference: 278-82
replacements, requisitions for: 87, 89-99, 131-33, training, directives on: 130, 165-66, 168
136, 153, 155, 166-67, 238-39, 282-84, 294-95, transportation units, requisitions for: 98
316, 325-26, 342-44 and troop unit strength, enemy: 212-14, 274-77,
and replacements, shipment priorities for: 93-94 280-81, 364
report on post-invasion events: 69 troop unit strength, protests cuts in: 52-53
Rhee, address to: 185 troop units, requisitions for: 83-86, 106-08, 118
430 POLICY AND DIRECTION
MacArthur, General of the Army Douglas—Con- Marine Divisions—Continued
tinued 1st—Continued
Truman, commendation by: 185-86, 325 in Wonsan operation: 188, 196, 205-08, 216-
U.K., attitude toward: 251 17, 219, 236
U.K., distrusted by: 288, 290, 365-66, 372 2d: 159-62
UNC, named commander of: 102 Marine Provisional Brigade, 1st: 127, 144, 157, 160-
UNC activated by: 103 66
UNO, directive on reports to: 102-03 Marine Regiments
and UNO, military assistance from: 117 1st: 163
and UNO, military control by: 103n 5th: 142-44, 160, 163, 165, 172
Vandenberg, conferences with: 105-06, 140, 325-27 6th: 163
VFW, message to: 370-71 7th: 163-34, 171-72, 236
visits to combat areas: 74-79, 216, 301, 307n, 339, Marshall, General of the Army George C. See also
363 Defense, Department of.
at Wake Island conference: 210-14, 218, 220, 222- and armistice proposals: 390
23, 232, 371 Atlee, conference with: 291-92
Walker, conferences with: 125-26, 188-90 and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249
Walker, relations with: 307 and continental China, operations against: 329-30
and withdrawal operations: 30, 180, 222-30, 237, Korea, seeks guidance on: 7
271, 290, 294, 300-303, 311-14, 316-17, 322-23, and limited offensives: 402
327, 338-39 and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 374-76
Yalu River, operations around: 250-56, 257, 262, named Secretary of Defense: 181
266, 268-73, 274, 276-78, 287, 290, 372 and National Guard, levies on: 345
Machine guns, stocks on hand: 46. See also and North Korea, drive on: 183-84, 191
Weapons. and North Korea, operations in: 194, 218, 255,
Maintenance and repair programs: 59 286, 288
Malik, Jacob and objectives in Korea: 181-82
and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249 occupation priorities proposed by: 7-8
political settlement proposed by: 197, 402 and political settlement proposals: 374
UNO, boycott by: 66, 101, 194 Ridgway, directive to: 383
Manchuria: 179, 182, 191, 198-201, 216, 218, 230-32 and ROK government, restoration of: 184-85
air operations in, proposed: 235, 241-46, 251, 272- and ROKA, arming of: 313, 394n
73, 277-78, 281, 283-84, 291, 320-25, 338-39, Soviet occupation foreseen by: 8
351, 386 and strategic air operations: 242, 247, 249
air reconnaissance of: 328 and 38th Parallel, advance across: 353-54
as enemy sanctuary: 274, 320 and U.N. troops, requisitions for: 227-28, 238, 356
occupied by USSR: 10-11 and Van Fleet, assignment of: 378
Manp'ojin: 246, 260-61, 263 and withdrawal operations: 395
Manp'ojin-Kanggye road: 261-62 Martial law declared: 25
Mao Tse-tung: 232, 240, 405-06. See also China, Martin, Joseph W.: 374
Communist. Matériel
Mariana Islands: 49 estimate of requirements: 45-46
Marianas-Bonins Command (MARBO): 49 losses and destruction: 112-13, 238, 283, 297,
Marine Air Group, 33d: 160 301-04
Marine Air Wings losses and destruction, enemy: 390
1st: 146, 159-60, 162, 216 reclamation and supply: 58-60
2d: 159-60 shortages in Eighth Army: 175
Marine Divisions state of: 45-46
1st supply to ROKA: 35, 77
combat effectiveness: 108, 159-160, 312 World War II, disposition of: 58
deployment to combat: 146, 160-61, 163-65, Matthews, Francis P.: 42n
171-72 Matthews, H. Freeman: 184
at Inch'on: 173-77 Medical units
North Korea, operations in: 236, 259-61, requisitions for: 98
265-66, 274, 279-82 reservists called up: 122
in Pusan operation: 312 Mexico: 356-57
troop unit strength: 171-72, 343 Milburn, Lt. Gen. Frank W.: 202, 233, 257, 305.
withdrawal planned: 222n See also Corps, I.
INDEX 431
United Nations Command (UNC). See also Mac- United Nations Organization (UNO)—Continued
Arthur, General of the Army Douglas; Ridg- Temporary Commission on Korea: 26, 40
way, General Matthew B. and 38th Parallel, advance across: 351, 353
activated: 103 and troop units, control of: 103n
casualties: 238, 405 and troop units, requisitions for: 224-28, 237-38,
and Chinese troops, reports on: 199-200 344, 356-57, 384
and CINC, reports from: 102-03 and Truman as Security Council agent: 101
CINC, U.S. asked to appoint: 101-02 U.K. introduces agent resolution: 101
evacuation of Korea considered: 289, 290 U.S. action confirmed by: 73-74
FEC staff doubles for: 103 U.S. as agent: 317n
JCS opposes committee command: 101 U.S. brings problem to: 26
MacArthur named CINC: 102 U.S. commitment without sanction of: 70, 73
objectives attained: 405-06 and withdrawal operations: 331
supply in augmentation of: 356 United States. See also Roosevelt, Franklin D.;
troop units, number employed: 117, 405 Truman, Harry S.
troop units, withdrawal of: 222 and Cairo Declaration on Korea: 6
troop units strength: 196, 225, 230, 405 China territorial violation charged to: 197
UNC-ROKA forces, control of: 215-18 and collective security: 41
United Nations Organization (UNO) communism, policy toward containing: 100
aggressor resolution, vote on: 332-33 Communist China, recognition proposed: 292
and armistice proposals: 288-90, 331, 333 elections proposed by: 26
and Chinese border, inviolability of: 249, 268 Europe as chief interest: 41
Commission in Korea (UNCOK): 194 independence, policy toward: 14
Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation invasion plans: 8
of Korea (UNCURK): 194, 212, 220, 231-32, 269 Korea, relations with: 3-4
Committee on Coordination of Assistance for Korea, treaties with: 3
Korea (CCAK): 100-101 language barrier, effect of: 18-19
Committee of Good Offices: 360 military assistance from: 35-36
Communist China, admission proposed: 197, 290- military missions to ROK: 4, 29-30
93, 331 military policy: 41-42
and Communist Chinese intervention: 242, 266- national defense, effect of commitment on: 104-05
67 Nationalist China, relations with: 319
and continental China, operations against: 317, nationals evacuated: 67-69, 71
320 NATO, role in: 41, 287
DMZ, proposals for: 290 and objectives in Korea: 292, 349-50
elections, supervision of: 219-20, 269, 331 occupation objective defined: 19
Far East problems, conference to settle: 331 occupation zone defined: 11
and Formosa issue: 369-71 policies, foreign concern over: 289-93
France introduces agent resolution: 101 and provisional government, return of: 16, 22
invasion, reaction to: 66-67 ROK, recognition of: 14, 28
JCS as agent for: 101-03, 243 Soviet Union, calls on to intervene: 100
joint action, resolution on: 73-74, 100-102, 177- Soviet Union, differences with: 6-7, 23-25
78, 185, 369-71 trusteeship, agreement on: 21-22, 26
joint action, U.S. proposal for: 68, 73, 100 U.K., relations with: 331
jurisdiction protested by USSR: 26 U.N., problem brought to: 26
Korean stability, resolution on: 193-94 as U.N. agent: 317n
Malik proposal rejected: 197 U.N. joint action proposed by: 68, 73, 100
military assistance from: 61, 115-17 U.N. sanctions action: 73-74
and Nationalist China, use of troops: 319 unification, proposals for: 20-23
objectives in Korea: 349, 392 United States Air Force. See also Air Force, Depart-
occupation, control by: 219-21 ment of the; Far East Air Forces (FEAF); Van-
occupation, directives on: 220-21 denberg, General Hoyt S.
occupation troops ordered withdrawn: 30 China, air violations of: 247
reports to, directive on: 102-03 commitment proposed: 70, 73
ROK admission sought: 14 no FEC staff representation: 108
ROK appeals to: 73 GHQ, relations with: 47
seen as composing differences: 23 intelligence reports, evaluation by: 63
Soviet boycott of: 66, 101, 194 Soviet territory, violations of: 200-201, 247
442 POLICY AND DIRECTION
United States Air Force—Continued Unsan: 235
strategic air operations, concept of: 109-10 U.S. News & World Report: 284, 371
units, requisitions for: 239 Utchin: 152
United States Army. See also Army, Department of
the; Pace, Frank, Jr.; War Department. Van Fleet, Lt. Gen. James A.
ammunition stocks: 46 and amphibious operations: 397
antiaircraft guns, stocks of: 46 arrival in Korea: 379
Army area organization: 42n assignment of: 378-79
Army Reserve, role in expansion of: 120-22 commands Eighth Army: 376, 378-79
casualties: 405 and DMZ, establishment of: 399-400
combat effectiveness: 56-57, 282, 292, 322-23 estimate of situation by: 398
Congress approves expansion: 120n at KANSAS-WYOMING lines: 380, 387-89, 398-403
construction machinery stocks: 46 and limited offensives: 398, 400-402
divisions, number in: 53 patrol bases, operations from: 387-88, 398
expansion and reduction: 118-22, 238, 297-99, Ridgway, directives from: 381-82
307-09 and ROKA, control of troops: 382
field artillery stocks: 46 and ROKA, expansion and training: 394
Kim Il Sung on tactics of: 114n and ROKA, U.S. officers to command: 394-95
Koreans, number attached to: 167-68, 171-72, 239 tactical plans: 379, 387-89,397-98,400-401
matériel, state of: 45-46 tank support, use of: 387-88
matériel, World War II, disposition of: 58 troops, number commanded by: 387
mobilization base, effect of levies on: 90-91 victory, comment on chances of: 339n
motor vehicles stocks: 46 and withdrawal operations: 379-80
national defense, structure in: 42-43 Vandenberg, General Hoyt S.: 168, 330. See also Air
National Guard role in expansion: 120, 122-25 Force, Department of the.
NSC, role in expansion: 298-99 and air forces to halt invasion: 69
radio stocks: 46 and airlifts, plans for: 157
ROKA, officers to command: 394-95 and airlifts, supply by: 258
Selective Service role in expansion: 120-24 Formosa, orders aircraft to: 69
strategic planning, post-World War II: 41-42 and limited offensives: 401
strength of, expansion and reduction: 46, 86-88, MacArthur, conferences with: 105-06, 140, 325-27
119-20, 221-22, 239, 288, 299 and MacArthur, relief of: 365n, 376
tanks in stock: 46 and reconnaissance, aerial and ground: 327
troop strength, periodic: 43, 45, 53, 123, 221 strategic air operations, concept of: 110
weapons, deficiencies in: 86-87 visits to combat areas: 108, 327
weapons research and development: 46 Veterans of Foreign Wars: 370-71
United States Army Forces in Korea (USAFIK) Vishinsky, Andrei A.: 371. See also Soviet Union.
ADCOM, proposed merger with: 86 Vladivostok: 188, 268, 279, 321, 325, 347
governmental authority ends: 28 Volunteer Reserves. See Army Reserve.
Hodge succeeded by Coulter: 26-27
inactivated: 86 Waegwan: 127, 202
JCS, placed under control of: 25 Wake Island conference: 210-14, 218, 220, 222-23,
United States Embassy, Seoul: 62-63, 65 232, 371
United States Marine Corps Walker, General Walton H. See also Eighth Army.
air support by: 216, 303-04 Almond, conference with: 125
Reserve forces, levies on: 160-62 and ammunition supply: 229-30, 236, 257
troop units, employment of: 92, 139, 142-43, 159- and amphibious operations: 141n
65 Bolté, conference with: 237
troop units, strength: 86-87, 159-60 and Chinese intervention: 235-36
United States Navy. See also Kimball, Dan A.; Collins, conferences with: 137, 282-83
Naval Forces, Far East (NavFFE); Navy, De- combat and training, dual role in: 165-66
partment of the; Sherman, Admiral Forrest P. commands Eighth Army: 49
air support by: 216, 246, 303-04 commands EUSAK and Eighth Army Rear: 86
commitment proposed: 70, 73 commands UNC ground forces: 196
no FEC staff representation: 108 commands U.S. ground forces: 86
GHQ, relations with: 47 death of: 305
units, requisitions for: 239 enemy troop strength, estimates by: 274
Unity of command, principle exemplified: 114-17 ground units, deployment by: 91
INDEX 443