Professional Documents
Culture Documents
EDUCAT)ON
T H E W 0 A I D 8 A N K
The Politics of Education Reform:
Bolstering the Supply and Demand; Overcoming Institutional Blocks
JavierCorrales
Page
AbouttheAuthor
............................................................ III
Acknowledgements
............................................................ V
Executive
Summary
............................................................ VIl
Introduction
............................................................. 1
Part1.TheObstacles
to EducationReform
................................................... 3
ThreeImpediments
to Reform
......................................... ................... 4
Concentrated
Costs,DiffusedBenefits
.................................................. 4
LessPowerfulandLowIncidenceof PolicyEntrepreneurship 7
in Education.
Education
Reformvs. EconomicReform
.................................................... 7
Implication
1: Instability
andShortTenureat the MinistryLevel........................ 9
Implication
2: DifferentBargaining PowerbetweenMinisters 11
andTeachers' Unions........................................................................
Decentralization:
TheMixedandInsincereMotivesof States
..................... 12
Part2. Overcoming
Obstacles
to Reform
....................................................... 15
FourStrategies
for Overcoming
PoliticalObstacles
....................................... 17
ReformType............................................................ 18
Bolstering
theSupplySide............................................................ 23
Bolstering
theDemandfor Reform........... ........................................... 28
Neutralizing
ReformOpponents;
Overcoming
Institutional
Obstacles
........... 33
Conclusion
............................................................ 41
AppendixI ............................................................ 43
References
............................................................ 47
l
About the Author
Illl
Acknowledgements
V
Executive Summary
Thispaperexplores thepolitical
conditions thatmayenhance or hindertheadoptionof education
reforms.It doesnotofferdefinite,statistically
testedconclusions.
Instead,
thispaperreliesonex-
istingstudiesof reformadoptionto extracthypotheses thatseemapplicable in somecasesand
testablein others.Thispapershouldbereadmoreasa reviewof theliterature anda guidetofu-
tureresearch thanasan endorsement ofspecificrecommendations.
ViI
Changesin Reformn
Type:
* Combiningaccesselementswithqualityreform
Corollary:Politicalcompensation
of thoseadverselyaffectedby reformmaybe moreimportantthanmaterialcompen-
sation
* Followingan incrementalratherthanall-encompassing approach
* Packaging educationreformswithothertypeof reforms(of thestateorthe economy)
* Entrustingeducabonreformsto ministrieswithlowtumoverrates
* Increasinglinkswiththeoutsideworldor globaleconomy
* Creatingindependent pro-reformadvisorycouncils
Vill
Introduction
1 Forpurposes ofthispaper,
success isdefinedinpolitical
(rather
thantechnical)
terms,
i.e.,whether
there-
formsbecome politically
accepted,following
eitherlegislative
approval
oranexplicitpactamong recognized
actors.Thisdefinition
expresses
littleabout
whether thereformsachieve
theirintended
educational
objectives,
e.g.,improving
studentandteacher performances.
1
The Obstacles to Education Reform
Second,highqualityeducationhasbecomesynonymous withself-sustained
domesticde-
velopment,notjust intemational
competitiveness.
Sincethe 1970s,the mantraof educa-
tionspecialists
has beenthat improvingeducationis a necessaryprecondition
for higher
livingstandards.However,govemments
seldomlistened.Instead,theytreatededucation
moreas a socialrightor entitlementwhichtheyprovideto citizensdependingon theex-
tent of theirsocialcommitment,fiscalresources,or inclination
to usethe educational
sys-
temas a mechanism
of politicalco-optation.Today,thisattitudeis changing.Ratherthan
viewingeducation
onlya socialobligationof the state,govemments
havebegunto seeit
as a necessarycatalystfor developmentIn 1993,the WorldBankconcludedthat a cru-
cialfactorin the economicsuccessof EastAsia fromthe 1970sto the 1990swas invest-
mentin humancapital,especiallythroughwell-targeted
educationalinvestments.Many
govemments
arefinallytakingthisconclusion
seriously.
2
SeealsoGinsburg(1991:12-20) fora discussionof howwoddsystem
pressureseiffer haveen-
couraged
or siflededucation
reformefforts.
3
The Politics of Education Reforn
Finally,education has become a top priority for both the political right and left in many
countries. Advocates of market economicsconcede that education, which promises to
make labor markets more competitive,remains a legitimatearea for state action. Advo-
cates of state involvementin the economy value educationalreformas an opportunityto
produce progressiveresults. Althoughtheir views on strategy differ-the politicalright a d-
vocates greater school choicewhereas the politicalleft supports more inclusionarystate
intervention (see Plank and Boyd 1994)-there is universalconsensus on the need to
make schools moreaccountable.
In sum, education reform in the 1990s has enjoyeda new impetus in policy circles, both
domesticallyand intemationally,and across differentideologies.
4
Part One
5
The Politics of EducationReform
large and incumbentpoliticiansdraw some benefits (e.g., a more educated society), but
these benefitsare too general, spread across a large number of actors, and mostlyper-
cepbble in the long term. On their own, beneficiariesare unlikely to tum into powerful
championsfor reform. In additon, beneficiarieswho are better positoned to make political
demands-the middle sectors3 -often have exit possibilities,such as private schoolsand
privatetutoring,which lessentheir propensityto demandreforms.4
Cost-bearers,on the other hand, create huge stirs. They include unions that lose privi-
legesand non-accountability;bureaucratsinthe centralgovemmentwho give up decision-
making authority;students(especiallyat the universitylevel) who lose subsidies or free
services; providersof schoolsuppliesand textbookswho lose contracts as a result of cur-
riculum reforms; educabonofficialswho must accept the embarrassmentassociatedwith
recognizingfailingsin the system; politicalpartfeswho might lose the capacityto disburse
patronagethroughthe educationalsystem; and the local elite who will confront new local
rivals as a result of decentralization(see Crouch and Healey 1997:1-3).Almost by defini-
ton, systemic reforms such as the decentralizabonof educabonentail distributingcosts
and reallocatingpoweramong these groups (see Kemmerer1994).
41 amgratefulto Yasuhiko
Matsudafor bringingthisto myattention.
6
Part One
Educatfon
Reformvs.EconomicReform
S Therearenotableexceptons.Inthemid-1980s,
Jordan'sKingHusseinbecamedirectlyinvolvedin
hiscountry'seducationreform,evenentnusting theCrownPrnceas the principaloverseerof quality
reforms(Berryman1997).In NewZealand,the PrimeMinister(Lange)tookoverthe education min-
istryand appointeda reformspecialist(Ballard)to leadthe implementation (Perris1997). In El Sal-
vador,by invitingpresidential
candidates to participate in variousfora to discussthe reformns,reform
advocates succeeded in makingeducationreforma primaryissuein the 1994presidential elections
(Reimers1997a).In Brazil,in orderto signalgovemmental commitment, PauloRenatoSouza,the
Ministerof Educationduringthefirstadministration of FemandoHenriqueCardoso(1994-1998), be-
camethe first cabinetmemberto be re-appointed duringCardoso'ssecondadministrabon (1998-
2002).
7
The Politics of Education Refom
Moreover,many govemrnments
traditionallyrelied on educationalsystems as mechanisms
for politicalco-optation. Teachingpositions are often treated as a form of employmentof
last resort, very often in compensationfor some type of politicalfavor. Mexico is a good
example. Followingthe 1968 massacre of students, the Mexican govemmentattempted
to alleviatestudentdiscontentby launchinga massiveexpansionof the educationsector.6
Duringthe "lost decade' of the 1980s,as standardsof livingdeclined,the govemment al-
most doubled the membershipin the main teachers'union,the SindicatoNacionalde Tra-
bajadoresde la Educaci6n(SNTE),from 548,355members in 1978to close to 1 million in
1989 (see Torres1991). There is no questionthat the expansionof educationin Mexico in
the 1970s-which covered all three levels,not just the universitysystem-was a response
to unmetdemand. In 1978,for instance,approximately3 millionchildrenlackedaccess to
primary schools. However,it is difficultto deny that with this expansionof spending and
union size the state intended to score political points among the urban middle class, a
sector in which the ruling party was deemedto be losing electoralsteam. This unioniza-
ton allowedthe govemmentto sheltersegmentsof the populationfrom the impactof eco-
nomic adversity. Qualityeducationreformsjeopardizethe capacityof govemmentsto use
the bureaucracyfor these types of politicalpurposes.
8
Part One
qualityeducation.Loanconditionality
is seldomstipulated
on the basisof stringenteduca-
tionreformaccomplishments.
Investorsandlendersdo notleavea country,at leastin the
shortand mediumterm,simplybecausegovernments
postponetheirpromiseto enhance
education.
Evidenceof weakpolicyentrepreneurship
in the areaof educationmaybe foundin the
hightumoverratesin ministriesof education.Becauseheadsof govemmentaredisin-
clinedto engagein educationreformbattes,theywill usethe ministryof educationfor aI-
temativepoliticalpurposes:to rewardpoliticalsupporters,to "park"politicalallieswhom
theywishto promote,to compensate
oppositionparties,etc. The resultis hightumover
ratesin ministerial
positons(seeChart1). Appendix1 liststhe ministersof education
and
ministersof economy/financefrom 21 countriesin variousregionsof the world that
launchededucationreformin the 1980sand 1990s,and that are mentionedthroughout
thispaper.Someof thesereformsadvancedpolitically
(Argentina,
Australia,
Chile,El Sal-
vador,Jordan,Indonesia,Mexico,NewZealand,Romania,SouthKorea,Spainand Uru-
guay),whileothersstumbled(Colombia,
Liberia,Pakistan,PapuaNewGuinea,Peru,P o-
land,SouthAfrica,Venezuela
andZimbabwe),
as discussedlaterin thepaper.
7For instance,
theMexican President,
Emesto Zedillo(1994-2000),
advanced
politically
afterserving
as theminister
of education
underPresident CarlosSalinasde Gortari
(1988-1994).Thecurrent
presidental
candidate
oftherulingcoalibon
in Chile,Ricardo
Lagos,
wasalsominister
ofeducationin
theearly1990s.
9
The Politics of EducationReform
Argentina
Australia_
Chile _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
Colorbiet_
El Salvador_
Indornsis
Jordan
Ubeds
Mexico _
| NowZrmtand
Pakisttn' _ _|Finance
PapuaN4w GaLir | Education
Pord _
Romxania
SoLthAfrics
SouLhKora"
Spain -
Thadand
Uruguay
Veneuea |
Zimb * uumu -
o 1 2 3 4 5 6
CasesExperiencingGreaterPolitical
Setbacks
in QualityEducatonReformn
in the 1990s.
Source:Appendix1'.
Threeobservationsemerge:
* There is a high tumoverrate in the ministriesof education;in most cases, the average
tenure in officeis less than 2.5 years.
10
Part One
The weakness in the supply side has implicatons: it diminishes the govemment'sbar-
gaining power and its capacity to counterbalancereform opponents. This becomes evi-
dent by comparingthe incentivesand constraintsfacing politicianswho head ministriesof
educabonwith those of politcians who head teachers' unions. High ministerialtumover
means that education ministers,even those who would like to initiate sound quality re-
forms, have relativelyshorterterms of office (Hausmann 1994). Insofar as ministersex-
pect shortertenuresand quick movesto alternativepoliticalposts, theyare less inclinedto
perseverewith costly and unpopular reforms, preferringconflict avoidance solutionsin-
stead. One result is a preferencefor yieldingto pressuresfrom below.
11
The Politfcsof EducationReform
12
Part One
13
The Politbcs of Education Reform
(Hanson1989). In Colombia,municipalitiesultimatelyopposeddecentralization,because
it would have entaileda greaterfinancial burden-the cost of providingeducation(Camoy
and Castro 1997).
14
Overcoming Obstacles to Reform
15
The Politcs of EducationReform
16
Part Two
The analysis in Part 1 fails to predictthese cases of reform because its focus is too nar-
row. Concentratingexclusivelyon a cost-benefitanalysisof interestgroup politics,or on
the low probability of policy entrepreneurshipin the supply side leaves unexploredthe
many strategies that executives can pursue and insttutonal factors that can be rear-
ranged in order to overcomepoliticalobstacles. Lessonsleamed from these and other,
less-successful,cases may provide insight into conditions under which countries can
overcomethe politicalimpedimentsto qualityreform.
The hypothesesare grouped into four broad categories:1) type and style of reform;2) po-
libcalstrategiesto bolsterthe supplyof reform; 3) politicalstrategiesto bolsterthe demand
for reform; and 4) institutionalfeaturesthat magnifyor diminishthe power of veto groups.
The discussion of each hypothesisbegins with a brief statementabout why, at least in
theory, the proposed hypothesismight have a causal impact on the chances of reform
adoption. Then, examplesfrom one or morecases are providedto illustratethe viabilityof
the hypothesis. Finally,some caveats aboutthe validity of the hypothesesare discussed.
These caveats do not invalidatethe hypotheses,but they raise issues that researchers
and practitoners must consider. The discussionis not meantto establish conclusivelythe
validity of the hypotheses,but to identify theoreticallyinformed hypothesesthat may or
17
The Politics of EducationReform
may not be confirmedby further research. Due to time and resourceconstraints,the dis-
cussionof cases relieson secondarymaterials.Appendix 1 listsall cases discussed.
Reform Tym
Hypothesis1:Combiningaccesselementsinto qualityreformenhancesre-
formadoption.
18
Part Two
The failed access reform was the Nai Roshni schools program, consistng of drop-in
schoolsfor childrenaged 10-14 who had left or never attendedschool. Like the mosque
program,the Nai Roshnireformmade use of existingfacilites: schoolswere asked to ofler
'° Thediscussion
of Pakistan
drawsfromWarwicket al.(1990).
19
The Politics of EducationRefonn
20
PartTWo
Examples:Haddadillustrates
his argumentby comparingreformsin Jordan(1970s)and
Thailand(1960s)with thosein Peru (late 1960s-early1970s). All threereformswere
launchedundernon-democratic
regimes.ThePeruviancaseevenincludedfar morecon-
sultationwithcitizens.Yet,the Peruviancaseexperienced
the mostseriousimplementa-
tion difficulties. He arguesthat a crucialexplanationwas that Jordanand Thailand
adoptedan incremental
approachduringthefirststageof reforms,whereasPeruplunged
directlyintoa synopticapproach(Haddad1994:55-57).
21
The Politics of EducationReform
Examples: There are numerous examples of deep education reforms packaged with
broader publicsector reforms,includingthose in Australia,Argentina,Chile, New Zealand,
Romania,Spainand, sincethe 1997crisis,Thailand.
Or, govemments might devote more attention to the other components of the reform
package. Education reforms may fall through the cracks, or be sacrificedon behalf of
other goals. In South Africa, the need to abide by democraticprinciplesand to create a
governmentof nationalunity has placed brakes on education reforms. On the one hand,
the rulingAfrican NationalCongress(ANC)party has agreed to slow spendingand access
reforms in response to reservabonsraised by the main opposition party, the National
Party.13 On the other hand,the ANC has had to resistsome populistdemandsby various
radical educationgroups, many of which have strong links to the ANC, leading to violent
protests.'4 In response,the ANC sloweddown some efficiency-orientedreforms. The re-
sult has been a reform impasse. The exigenciesof consolidatinga democracyrespectful
of minorityparties and economic restraintscreated obstacles for access reforms, while
radical pressuregroups affiliatedwith the ruling party blocked quality reforms(see Pape
1998).
14 ANClegislators
haveopposeda govemment
proposalfor the introduction
of compulsory
school
fees on a sliding scale based on family income. The legislatorsdemanded free educationinstead
(see McGregor1996; Vergnani1993).
22
Part Two
Hypothesis1:Entrustingeducationreformsto ministrieswithlowturnover
rates enhancesthe chanceof reformadoption.
23
The Politics of Education Reform
Hypothesis2: Greater links with the outside world or the global economyen-
hance the chance of reform adoption.
Argument: Given that part of the new impetus for reform comes from extemal sources
(see Part 1), it would follow that greater receptivityto the outsideworld resultsin greater
incentivesto pursue quality education reform. Openness to global forces exposes coun-
tries to the systemicimperativeof developinga competitiveeconomy,which encourages
education improvements. Extemal links also can providegovemmentswith new political
allies (intemationaladvisors)and sourcesof advice and fundingthat may stimulatereform
initiatives.
15Otherpossible
examplesof dichotomousoutcomescorrelated
withdifferenttumoverratesindude
Romania-PolandandArgentina-Peru(seeAppendix1).
24
Part Two
KoreaandTaiwan(seeWorldBank1993;Intemational
LaborOrganization
1995).Singa-
poreis a goodexample.Tocompeteagainstcounterparts in intemational
markets,Singa-
porein the 1980senactedreformsintendedto producethe best-trained
laborforcein the
region.Thegovemmentstimulated
competition
amongpupilsby dividingthemaccording
to abilityand selectingthe mostacademically
giftedstudentsat theage of nine. It encour-
aged competitionamong schoolsby publishingacademicresultsand permittingtop
schoolsto raisetheir feesand becomesemi-independent.
The govemmenteven im-
poseda punitivetaxon foreignfirmswitha highproportion
of low-skilled
workers,thereby
boostingprivatesectordemandfor educatedworkers(Wooldridge1993). Similarly,an
explicitimpetusforThailand'snewlyenacted(1999)educabonreformswas adverseco m-
parisonswith the educationsystemsin neighboring
countriesand the threatof falling
competitiveness.
It alsomaynotbe coincidental
thatthe riseof educationreformon the politicalagendasof
LatinAmericain the 1990soccurredsimultaneously
with the region'sembraceof a more
outward-oriented
modelof economicdevelopment,
includingdeeptradeliberalization
(see
Morrow1998;Edwards1995).
Theprosandconsof involvingintemational
actorsin educationreformaresimilarto those
in debatesaboutthe meritsof globalization.
Forsome,extemaltiesaredesirableto com-
bat provincialism,
improvestandards,increaseaccountability
of stateofficials,and imbue
reformswith legitimacy,
politicalpowerand resources,etc. For others,theseties under-
minelocalinitiatives,
encourage politicians
to pursueforeignagendas,create"racesto the
bottom"andgeneratenationalist
backlashes.
16
25
The Politics of Education Reform
Hypothesis
3: Independent
pro-reformadvisorycouncilsbolsterthesupplyof
reform.
26
Part Two
for Educatfon
ResearchandDevelopment,
whichincludedrepresentatives
fromhigh-level
bureaucracies,
vocationaltrainingcorporations,
universitiesand think tanks as well as
economists
andeducatorswasestablished
to monitortheimplementation.
In Mexico,qualitycontrolin highereducation,
an importantfeatureof the 1990sreforms,
has beendelegatedto bodiesthat are eitherindependent
of ministerialappointments
or
7 or at leastrelativelyautonomous
funding,such as CENEVAL,1 (bothfrom the ministry
and unions),suchas the peerreviewcommittees.ThesebodieshaveinfusedMexico's
reformssince1988witha significantdegreeof continuity,
despitethe increasein political
turbulence
on the nationalsceneandhighministerial
tumoverin the 1990s(Kent1997).
Comparable
independent
bodieshavebeencreatedin Chile(theBrunnerCommission),
SouthKorea(the Committeeon EducationReformImplementation), Romania(theNa-
tionalCouncilfor Reformof Education)
andUruguay(theNationalAdministration
of Public
Education,
in chargeof primaryandsecondary
education).
Certaincommonalities
emergefrom these cases. To be effective,independent
advi-
sory/evaluative
bodiesshouldincludenotjustpoliticians,
butalsorepresentatives
fromcivil
society,respectedintellectual
leaders,opinion-makerssuchas joumalistsand think-tank
27
The Politicsof EducationReform
Independent advisory councils are not panaceas, but they can perform crucial political
tasks. First,the respectabilityof council members infusesthe reform effortwith credibility,
thus contributingto societalacceptance. Second, council members who are joumalists
and intellectualsestablishlinks betweenreformersand the opinion-makingsector,thus i n-
creasing the chance that local commentatorsbecome both stakeholders and frequent
writers on the topic. Third, and most important,councils counteract expected shortcom-
ings in the supplyof reforminitiatives. In some cases, for instance,heads of state instruct
their ministersof educationto follow the directivesof these independentcouncils. Setting
up a formally constitutedgroup with longer terms of office, nonevidentalternativecareer
plans and interestin the reform can act as an effective counterbalanceto the negative
side-effectof high ministerialtumover.
The recent swellingof societaldemand for quality education reform might still be insuffi-
cient. Left to themselves,quality reform beneficiaries(e.g., parents,employersand citi-
zens in general) are unlikelyto coalesceinto strong pressuregroups advocatingreforms.
A successful reform strategy requires mechanismsfor counteractingweaknesseson the
demandside.
28
Part Two
Hypothesis1:Infonnatfon
dissemination
strategiesbolsterthe demandforre-
form.
Caveats:First,a high-profile
approachis notalwaysappropnate. Duringthegestationpe-
riod (e.g.,whenstudiesaboutthe country'seducatonaldeficitsare beingconducted),a
low-profile
approachmightbewiser.At thisstage,the govemmentis ill equippedto win a
publicrelations
war,if one develops,particularly
sinceits findingsand recommendabons
maybe incomplete
or not agreedor both. Engagingthe entre publicin a policydebateat
a time when the reformersthemselvesare unsureabout their positonscan backfire.
29
The Politics of EducationReform
Second,information
dissemination
maybolsterdemand,but it maybe ineffective
in neu-
tralizingoppositionfrom cost-bearing
groups. Adverselyaffectedpartiesin the reform
processdo notalwaysacceptas valideventhe mosttransparent
information
providedto
them (Reimersand McGinn1997;seealsoHusen1994:18).For instance,in a referen-
dumamongteachersonthe needfor reform,78 percentof teachersin Polandvotedin fa-
vor of noreform,despitethegovemment's
all-outinformation
campaign(Sabbat-Swidlicka
1994).In Pakistan,a teamfromthe HIIDconductedextensiveresearchon the education
needsofthe country,onlyto discoverthateducation
officialswerecompletely
unmovedby
the findings(Relmersand McGinn1997:xiv).Mostlikely,the officialsun,derstood
the is-
suesat stake,but nonethelessrejectedthe informationbecausetheyhad concreterea-
sonsto feartheirimplications-thereformswouldcurtailthe powerof centralbureaucrats.
Argument: Becausebeneficiaries
facedistributed
benefitsas wellas variousexitoptions,
theydo notoftencoalesceintoeffectivepressuregroups.Incorporating potentialbenefici-
ariesin the reformprocessmightcounteractthis. The notionthat the inclusionof actors
enhancesreformacceptanceis paramountin theoriesof democratization and corpora-
tism. Inclusiongiveschangeteamsthe opportunity
to addressreservations
and,moreim-
portant,to convertopponents(seeReimers1997b).Inclusioncantum passivebenefici-
ariesintoactivestakeholders.Inclusionalsoallowsreformersto uncoverand respondto
opponents'
objections.Thus,'an expandingbodyof evidencesupportstheconvictionthat
includinglocalpersonnel,suchas teachers,in decisionsaboutimproving
schoolsfosters
moreeffectiveimplementation
of reforms"(Thomas1994:1855;
see also Navarroet al.
1998;Reimersand McGinn1997;Crouchand Healey1997:1-15
and 1-17;Fiske1996;
WorldBank1995:138-142;
Husen1994:8-9).
30
Part Two
31
The Politicsof EducationReform
In short, inclusionmay be an insufficientstep. It does not address the main reason that
veto groups opposereforms. It also failsto protect changeteams from the actions of veto
groups.
18 Forefficencygainsassociated
withlocalbudgetautonomy,seeSavedoff
(1998).
32
PartTwo
becamestrongalliesof reform-minded
officialsbecausetheyreceivedbothrightsandnew
responsibilites.In Argentinain 1991,at the timeof the decentralization
decision,prov-
incesreceiveda significantincreasein fundingto manageeducation,facilitating
the ap-
provalof the 1992FederalEducationLaw. Predictably,
whentheserevenuesbeganto
declinein 1995,tensionsbetweenthe centralgovemmentand the provincesresurfaced
(Garciade Fanelli1997:99-102).
Caveats:Theliterature
on the benefitsandshortcomings
of decentralization
is vast,sug-
gestingthat decentralization
is not a panacea.Leavingasidethe controversial
question
overwhetherdecentralization
producesbetterlearning,therearepolitcalrisksassociated
with decentralization.
Decentralization
mightreduce,ratherthan increase,the account-
abilityof the localelite. Decentralized
institutions
mightreflect,ratherthanresolve,regres-
sivesocialpractices.In Bijnor,Indiadecentralized
localschoolsincorporate
provincialdi s-
criminatory
practices,
discouraging
accessto schoolsby Hindugirlsand Muslimminorities
(Jefferyand Jeffery1998). Moreover,
grantingfiscalautonomyto localentitiesmaybe in-
sufficientto addressa largerpoliticalproblemwithdecentralization-equivocal,
insincere,
or mixedcommitmenton the part of centralauthorities, as discussedin Part1. These
problemswill persistevenafterlocalentitiesbecomestrongreformadvocates.Oncethe
originalfactorsthatmotivated
the stateto decentralize
subside(information
andfiscaldefi-
cits, legitimacyneeds,inter-tieror inter-bureaucratic
politicalconflicts),centralauthorities
maybetemptedto reversedecentralization.
Undercertainconditions,
govemments maybe powerlessto do this. Unioncooperation
maydependon institutional
factorsbeyondthe controlof reformers.Underothercondi-
tions,however,
governments
cansignificantly
affectthe propensity
of unionsto cooperate.
Thissectionexaminessomeof theseconditions.
33
The Politics of Education Reform
Examples:
In Polandin 1994,oncethe leadingteachers'uniondevelopedclosedlinks
with the mainoppositionparty,the Democratic
LeftAlliance,the reformprocessslowed
down. Similarly,
in Argentinabetween1983and1989,the govemmentsaKtempt to reform
the stateandstabilizethe economygeneratedenormoustensionbetweenthe rulingparty
(the UCR)and the mainoppositionparty(the Peronists).When,in 1986,the Peronist
Partytook leadership
of a teachers'union(CTERA)awayfromthe rulingparty,govern-
ment-teachers'
unionsrelationstumedincreasingly
hostile. In the 1990s,the govemment
hashadtroubleintroducing universityreformsin partbecauseof the stronglinksbetween
universitystudentassociations
andtheoppositionparties(Garciade Fanelli1997).
Caveats:Whileunionaffiliationwith oppositionpartiesmighthindergovemment-union
cooperation,
unionaffiliationwith the rulingparty is no guaranteeof unioncooperation.
Unionscanusetheirtiesto rulingpartyleaders,manyof whomoccupyinfluenbal positions
in government,
to advancetheir politicalpreferences.Thisis one reasonthateffortsto
decentralize
educationin Mexicoin the 1980sfailed. The SNTEopposednegotating
workingconditionsand other maKterswith 31 separategovemmentalentities(Fiske
1996:18).A seriesof unionstrikesfollowed.Checkmate
occurredwhenunionsbeganto
use their linkswith otheranti-reformrulingparty membersto blockthe reformsjointly.
Rulingpartyaffiliationthusfacilitatedthe riseof a formidableunion-bureaucrat
coalition
that forcedthe Mexicanexecutiveto retreat(McGinnand Street1986:486-488;
Lorey
1995;Perissinotto
1983).
34
Part Two
Corollary: Improvingexecutive-legislative
relations on the issue of education
reformcanmoderateunionopposition.
Ontheotherhand,externally
fragmented
unions,i.e.,thosein whichmultipleunionscom-
petewithone anotherfor teachermembership, will be lesseffectivein disruptingreform.
In this institutional
setfing,"eachunionis weaker,and all of themcan onlybargainafter
coordinating
theiractions."(Murillo1999:48).The collectiveactionproblemsassociated
withfragmentation
reducethecapacityof unionsto blockthereforms.
35
The Politics of Education Reform
Actors in processes of education reform can be classifiedinto two groups (Cerych and
Sabatier 1994). One group consists of affected players, or cost-bearers:those who di-
rectly bear the consequencesof reforms and play important roles in the implementation
process (e.g., teachers' unions, bureaucrats, school principals,politiciansin parliament
and universitystudentgroups). The second group consistsof outsider players:those who
do not bear the impact of the reforms directly, beneficialor otherwise (e.g., citizens-at-
large, employers,intellectualleaders,the media,the clergy, some students, some parent
groups and non-govemmentalorganizations). Although not direct stakeholders,outsider
playersare crucialin the politicsof educationreformbecausethey can be decisiveallies of
eitherpro-reformor anti-reformplayers.
36
Part Two
Scenaro1
Player r [ayer
Scenario2
Politicians,Teachers'Unions,Bureaucrats,
Principals, Civic Leaders,Employers,NGOs,Parents,
Universitystudentgroups,etc. Clergy,Media,etc.
If unions build coalitionswith either outsider players (Scenario1 in Chart 2) or with cost-
bearinggroups (Scenario2 in Chart 2), the reformsare injeopardy. If changeteams pre-
empt these coalitions,perhapseven counterbalancingthem by building coalitionsof their
own, they may reducethe powerof veto groups.
37
The Politics of EducationReform
38
Part Two
heads,policyconsultants
and researchers-wereincludedand,consequently,
the poten-
tial cost-bearer-union leaders,student activistsand sectors of academia-were
.pushed offto the sidelines"
(Kent1993).
39
Conclusion
The politicalimpediments
to educationreformarenottrivial,buttheyare not insurmount-
ableeither.Sincethe1980s,numerouscountries
fromvariousregionswith differentlevels
of developmenthavemanagedto approveand implementimpressivequality-oriented
educationreforms. The lessonfromthesecasesis that reformimplementation
is more
feasiblepolitically
whenthe followingconditions
are met:
1) Addressing
the cost-impact
of reforms
2) Bolstering
thesupplyof anddemandforreform
Boththe supply(govemment
initiative)and demand(organizedcitizenacclaim)for quality
reformsin educationare likelyto be weakor unreliable.Successfulreformadoptionre-
quiresaddressing
this. Weaknesses
in the supplyof reformscan be addressedby en-
suringlongertermsof officeforreformers(i.e.,lowerministerialtumover),maintaining
links
withthe globaleconomyand intemational
advisorsand,importantly,
settingup independ-
entVadvisory
councils. The latteroptionemergesas a promisinginstitutionalchannel
availableto almostanygovemment.Independent
councilshavethe potentialto galvanize
and sustainministerialcommitment
whilesimultaneously
forgingties betweenreformers
andsocietalgroups.
41
The Politics of EducationReform
42
Appendix
I
Changes in Ministers of Education and Ministers of Finance in Selected Cases of Education Reforrm
Year Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance
78 Catalan Martinez Canick Robirson Niemann de Castro Rivas Palacio Herrera Lopez Thayeb Wardhana Majaii Ad-Dabbas
84 AJconada Grinsptun Ryan Dawkins Aranguloz Caceres Escobar Rigoberto Notosusanto Prawiro AI-Saket Odeh
93 Rodriguez Arrate
43
- - - S1-1
- - ~ . - . .11111
Year Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance Education Finance
78 Hoff Phillips Solana Ibarra Gandar Muldoon Khan Hoti Kazi Tammur Holloway Elbsperu Saenz Kuberski Kisiel Gadea Dumitrescu
79 Blamo Wellington IshagKhan Guabloche Sava
80 Fahnbulleh Zulu Tulo Kaputin Teichma Sporic Niculescu
81 Alarco Ulloa Kruszewski Krzak
82 Boley Jones Benavides Faron Gigea
83 Reyes Silva . Holloway Bouraga Rodriguez Nieckarz Teoreanu
84 Afzal Paniagua Benaviles
85 Marshall Douglas Vacant Wingti Cardo Garrido-
Lecca
86 Gonga Gonzalez
86 Gonga
Gonzalez Aheer ~Khan Matiabe
~~~~~~
~~~ _
Chan
_
Pango
~~~~~~~~Wattoo
_ _ __ _ __ _ _ _ _ _
Alva
_ _ __
Michalows
ka
87 Bestman . Petricioli Davis Kwarara Samojilik Babe
88 Farhat Lange Haider Aoae Cabanillas Saberbein Bednarski Paraschiv
89 Bartltt Aspe Caygill Shah Bhutto Genia Pora Rivas Fisiak Wroblewsk Patan
91 Vacant Tarr Smith Richardson Imam Aziz Samana Punte Boloria Glebocki Gheorghe Dijmarescu
I I P~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~uent
92 Vacant Zedillo Ba=lilas Stelmacho
________ ________ ________ ________ ~~~~~ Vacant _
Golu
_
Danielescu
~ ~~~wski _ _
44
Appendix 1 (continued)
91 91 Hyong-Sup
gp Sawasdipanirc
Singhasaneh
~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ha
Sngasna
92 Marais Keys Wan-Kyu Yong-Nam Simasathien Posadas Augusto Rosas
93 Byung-Moon Jae-Hyung Perez
Byung-Moon
Perez
Jae-Hyug ThongsamakNrmanahae
Thongsamak minda Mercader
__________
de Cakderas Rafael
45
High. Educ.
Education (created Finance
_ ~~~19J8)
78 Walker Colvilile
79 ConiJeGibson Bulle
80 Mutumbuka Nkala
81
82 Chidzero
83
84
85 _
86
87
88 Chung Mutumbuka
89 Vacant
90 Ishemunyoro
91
92 _
93 Mangwende Mudenge
94
95 Lesabe Chombo Chambati
96 Garwe Murerwa
97 Machinga
98 _
Average
Tenure 2.63 2.2 3.5
(years)
Source:Eumpa WorldYearbook,variousyears.
Notes:The Yearbookdoesnot publishexacttenuresof a country'sministers.Instead,it providesthe nameof the ministeravailableto the editorsat the timeof publishing,usuallybetweenJanuaryand March. The
Yearbookwould not reflect two or more changes of ministers in one year. Thus,this listmay under-represent
the exactnumberof ministers.For instance,in Mexicotherewere two ministersof education
betweenSolana(1993)and ULmon(1994). Thus,for mostcountriesreported,theactualcoveragetenure in offioeis probablylowerthan indicatedby thesefigures. Vacancieswerecountedas a changein minister.
46
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ETHE WORLD BANK
The objective of this series is to provide client countries
with timely insight and analysis of large-scale education
reform efforts around the world. The series examines
how education reforms are successfully launched, imple-
mented and managed effectively in a given political
economy. This series is under the editorial supervision of
the Education Reform and Management Team (ERM), part
of the Human Development Network-Education at the
World Bank. The views expressed or implied in this se-
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World Bank. Electronic versions of this document are
available through the ERM Web site on the Bank's Educa-
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