14

Terrorismin the Contextof

Academic Research
MichelWieuiorka

issue, a topic that

For many years, terorism was an "untouchable'
from the field of scholarly
despite its practical impact was isolated
research.Books ;"d by self-appointedexperts on this subject
"di.les usuallywritten by journal-
werefar from lriffi"nt. Thebesi *toai.t i"tt superficialandideologi-
ists, not by socialsri.ntirtr. Mostanalyses-were
issue hal becomea worthy
cal. Today tfris iormerly l'gntoo.ttrlt""
major shif in the definition
subject for inquirSl--"t tuia.nced by a
of terrorism. notionof terorism' They
scholarsusedto feel uncomfortablewith the
facedthe probl;;;t*ry of distinguishingterrorism from other forms
of viorencebut ,il-;i,"i[i"s arr"-[tr.o".ttar boundsarorurdtheir field
 Conclusion

of inquiry. Did Buonarotti or Babeuf,the Carbonari,or the Anarchists

andBolsheviksin Russiabetween1905and 1907act like terrorists?How
are temorists different from guerrillas?Most conferences,books,md
papers about this issue seemedto answer all such questionswith a
commonplace that now belongsto the prehistory of researchon terror-
ism. Platitudinously,they concludedthat no definitioneouldbe given of
terorism for the simplereasonthat one side'sterrorist is the othet's
freedom fighter. firis implied that the idea of terrorism was not a
scientifie category but a commorurense obseryationfrom the general
public or, at best,,from the personsactively involved in or directly
concernedby the phcnomenon.Therefore,the first obstacleto opening
the field to researehby socialor politicalscientists,historians,or psychol-
ogistswas getting arounda popular,ffid generallyconfusing,dbfinition
of tenorism soa$tto reacha scientifieone.Couldthe ideaof tenorism be
deconstmctedandthen reconstnucted with a precise,practicalmeaning?
firis obstacleto researchhasbeendealtwith in two mainways.
Finst, the notionof terrorism canbe seenasa socialproduet:animage,
psychologicalrepresentation,or social coneeption.Aceordingly,it is
necessaryto exarrinethe processes wherebya society(or certainintellec-
tual or political circles,for example)forms suchah image.Studiesare
madeof the social,cultural, political,economic,religious,andintellectual
factorsrelated to andthe actorsresortingto violenee.It is assumedthat
these factors and actors ereate the conditionsfor applying the tem
'terrorist," regatrdless of the gravity of the violenceor seriousness of the
threat. Thescholarswhohaveadoptedthis viewpointtry to discoverwhy
policymahersor the rnassmediause'terrorism" insteadof other words-.
A secondway of viewing this problemis to examinethe actionsor
actorsthat are calledterorist (regardlessof who callsthem so), in the
lope that as researchproceeds,it wiu be possibleto refine the deserip
tion by adding other attributes. firus, scholars andyze what violent
actors lay ?nd do, the ways violencearisesand esealates,or the pro-
cesses that leadpople to becomeinvolved.In my view,trhisstrffcisgcalli
for the introductionof conceptualcategoriesother than terrorism. The
word doesnot disappearfrom the scholadsvocabulary,but its salienee
in!!r. field of inquiry forcesus to focuson definingit morepreeisely.
firese two viewpointsare different but not necessarilyineompatible.
The effeetsof terrorism are "pelerse" andunforeseeable becausbof the
distancesepa,rating the soeialperception,image,or representationof the
threat from its sociologiealreality.Both viewpointsare usefulfor study-
ing temorish, ffi well asother socialor politicalissues(suchasmcismor
delinquency).Althoughwe agreethat the commonsense notionof temor-
ism has to be deconstmcted,we do not have to begin researchby
 Tenorism in the Contextof AcademicResearch

redefiningit. Instead, its definitionshouldbe the outcomerather than

lf,. strrtiltg point of our analyses,the conclusionrather than a postulate.
There,"i ut least two dimensionsto terroristic activities:there is the
frght againstan enemy,but it is carried out in the nameof a people,
.&i* .i"g, nation, oireligious community.Ethnmentric or ideological
lfina."r sfuoUanotkeep us from seeingboth aspects.In effect,temorist
do not just intend to threaten a certain category o{ qeo.deor
".to"r the ,,ot-herside."They alsotry to deliver a messageto their own
menace
side, to potentialallies, or to the governmenlsthat might suPPo{reven
rpotiro", ttteir actions.in this respect,soTesituationsaresocomplicated
tirat it is usefulto distinguishbetweenprimary andsecondaryaudiences
or to rceognizean intricate set of interrelations amongvarious actors
with severil targets and audiences.Furthermore,we shouldnot forget
that the nrles oithe gamemay change,old alliancesfall apart, andnew
onesform. Thesetwo-facetsofterrorist operations+gainst enemiesbut
alsoto win friends,-shouldnot be set at odds.It would be excessiveto
concludethat there are two distinct kinds of terrorismnfor example,a
;solipsistic" one (whiehIan Lustick considersto be directedtoward its
own'groups beliefsandpractices)versusan otherdirected one(whichis
direcied p.tto not belongingto the terrorists'reference goup)' A
terrorist "totirtizatioo may bemoreor lesssolipsistic'more_orlessother-
directed;
- nlt it is usuallyboth at once,or at leastover the longterm'
'lrrre temorism"in whichends
Of specialinterest are extremecasesof
and meansare mixed up, -is violencehas no limits, and the referenceto a
peopte,class,or nation factitious.In suchcases,oneseesan intensifi-
irti,^o"of the subjectivity of an actor who unrealisticallyidentifieswith
abstractionssu.[ as the Froletariat, Revolution, Nation, or llistory.
This subjectivity coincideswith a "desubjectification-" of the enemy'
whomthe terrorist treats as lessthan human.Evidenceof this twofold
pt*.s can be found in intenriews with certain Italian terrorists. fite
actor defineshis or her personalidentity as the subject of history, but
the enemyis an evil thing-a devil, savage,or beast.Both processes are
at work io varying degreeswithin the terrorist personalit-y.pefore
undergoingbotli hypersubjectivity(9f one'sself-identity)and infra- or
*.ir"iUj"itinotion (of thsenemy),the ?ctormayhaveexperiencedlong
years of stmggle that started with "solipsistic"violence.Furthennore,
!u.n if one Jf-th"se two processesseemsto be primarily at work, we
tnry n. wearingethnocentrieblindersif we seeonlythe violeneedirected
,d;t others,-andwe may be showingtoo muchideologicalcomprehen-
sionif we talk only aboutthe solipsisticaspect'
io study temorism, it may be useful to make a clear analytical
distinction betweentwo different sorts of problems.On the one hand,
 Conclusion

terrorists, through their actions,involve other aetors:the government,

of course,but alsopoliticalparties,churches,trade unions,intellectuals,
social movements,and the mass media. These actions are part of a
systemof interactions,part of a gameof politieator militaryitrategy.
Actors react to one anotherrsdecisions,or evenanticipatethem. ThG,
terrorism fits into a set of relations that should be subjectedto a
synnlwonic,or stmctural, analysis.Onthe other hand,terrorism follows
a cycle of birth, growth, and decline.This life cycle may be simple or
intricate, long or short. It may, thoughnot necessarily,start with low-
intensity violencethat escalatesbeyondall limits. Thus, tenorism as a
procels of changeshouldalso be subjectedto a d,inclwowi,c analysisof
how it has evolvedin specifichistorical circumstances.I would like to
emphasizeseveral points relevant to this diachronic, or historical,
analysis.
{irst, nearly all instancesof terrorism are markedby both mptures
andcontinuities:continuitiesinsofarasthe ideologyor religiontha[ Iends
meaningto suchactionsusuallyhas a tradition ifuor,ism-Leninism for
far left temorism, or Islamicismfor certain radical Muslim groups);
rupturgsinsofarasthis ideologyor religion asreinterpretedby tirrofut
actors is removed.fromnormal or classicalinterpretations,which are
rejected, transformed,or distorted aceordingto specificpolitical eondi-
tions.
A secondpoint has to do with the patterns of growth and declinein
temorist organizations,specificallywith the waysin which new activists
are recmited and old militants leaveor "exit." The peopleentering the
orgarnzatton may or may not comefrom diversesocialorigins, andiheir
originsmay affect the outcomeof violence.Oryailzationaldoctrinemay
shift in order to aiftaet reenrits from new backgrounds,thus creating
ideological"mptures." An inability to recruit maybe the mostimportant
cauneof decline.
Third, we must disputethe widespreadidea that the turning point in
a temorist's careeris the first time he or she usesa gun or diposits a
bomb. In fact, we now know that other momentsare more important
from the individual'sviewpoint. As Donatelladella Porta demonstrates
in the Italian case,a decisivestep occurswhe4 the pensonacceptsthe
commitmentto becomea professionalor semiprofessional t"rohlion ry
or when she or he agreesto participatein undergroundoperationsthat
oftenleadto becominga full-fledgedtenorist. Thus,the group'sdecision
to go undergroundis a key markerin the evolutionof terrorism.
A fourth observationis that even though terrorism is a historical
processfor tl-resoup, movement,or organizationpracticingit, it may
also be a major or minor phasein a broader historical process.tn ttre
 Terrorismin the Contextof AcademicResea'rch 60r

case of the Armenian Secret Army for the- Liberation of Armenia'

tenorism seerrurto lie at the very center of the-group's_life-history.
iffi;;, ior the Palestinianmovlment or the Algeri?T FLN, not all
can be reduced to a question of terrorist violence, because
".tiott*
temorismwas sometimesof secbnda,ry impgrtTce. Terorism can be a
;bdd; i* *r" or revolution,but it canalsobe on9Phase,-ortheater,
ilfu or r.uolution. The fact that it is onepart of a complexpolitical
ot g"oporitiealprocessforcesscholarsto analyzeterrorism in its context
," fift"tft, Crenshawhasexplainedin the first chapterin this volume'
Thesefou" ,.mart s i*piy a fifth: the idea of process,of historical
idea of
cf,ang. or.volutior\ is aifierent from and incompatiblewith the
il;. T*., in some caseswe do obsente a cyclical repetition of
iloorirti. violence(for instance,within the modelof action-repression-
government
,.iion, whichpredicisthat eachviolent actionwill makethe
t"o"riritrgiy reliant on force, which will in turn provoke even more
;ffit aid effeetive actions until the state cavesin). rlowever, we
cannotadopt .y.ti.* theorryb,asedon a sort of mechanistichistorical
The
law when *. "."irot actually show that deternrinismis at work.
,lsuccess" or eventhe repetitionof terrorism is not inevitable.
Most scholars,in.ioaiitg thosewho havewritten for this book, distin-
gqishtwo sorts of proble-ms,.ortwo kinds of temorism' They colnpare
ifi.it.a hrrorism"io'terrorism without boundaries,]'or "te:rorism" to
,1ure-tenorism." charles Townshendhas donethis by orplaining.that
dolenceis less extremewhen the temorist actor foeuseson the street
.;;;;rather ttran watctringonly the state. Somescholarsdifferentiate
betweenfor:msoi*riol"n.e t[at are effectiveandthosethat become"self-
uaia"ting, or, (CharlesTownshend),between terror "as a
**p""'fita ";;"ototelic" or classicallybetween
end p9r se" (Philip Pomp-er),.
ter-
instrunrentarand expreriiu" terrorisms, or limited and unlimited
rorism.
firese distinctionspoint to a seriousproblem.we cannotequate-acts
'"'
of uiof"* performei Uv thosewho pursuea specificpur?oseTg
to abandonterrorisir in a new potiticatcontextwith actsof violence
nv trtr* who neither foreseenor expegt an -endto tenorism. some
"Lr"
when it no longer appears
;"rp; *. able to hatt the use of terrbrism inner
ir"iiil rot their prr"por6; othersseemto be satisfyingan in9{iable
practicaltenns as the
;;d. This disd;ih oo t. reformulatedin more
as a
differencebetweenterrorism as a m,etlndof o'ction'and temorism
logic of aetinn. . ! I -, - _ rr :- - r.^^r .
"Ar a method,termrismis a common fornrof violence.It is a toolto be
po.litical
emfloyed, *"*. ofreachinga gopl,fo-tp*{ {itrerent!W.t of
" actors'behavior.ri fd deducedfrom their strategies;it
actors.The
 Conclusion

can be reducedto caleulationsand tactics. In my opinion,temorism

always a method, but under somecircumstanees,in somegroups
movements,it is somethingelse:the actor not only usesterror as a t,
but acceptstemor as an endin itself. fite meansbeeomean end. In su
easesof pure, extreme violence, tenorism is a logic of action tl
Iiterally dictatesthe actoy'sattitudes and behaviors.He eanno long
dootherwise.
Let me glve a brief, simplifiedexample.Regardlessof what onethin
of Yasser Arafat, it is clear that on various occasionshe has us
terrorism asa method,but eventhoughonesuspectshim of beinga lir
it is also clear that since 1988he can say that he has finished w
tenorism and that he is turning to political and diplomaticactivitir
Although he has been responsiblefor someterrorism since the ea
1970s, Araflat is not locked inside the logie of violence as such.
contrzst,it is hard to imagineAbu Nidal existingwithout his terroris
operations.For him, temorismseemsto be a logic of action. He wot
not survive asa politiealactorwereterorism to be abandoned.
IVhen the distinctionsare reformulatedin this way, we are led
questionhow somegroupsstart by using limited violenceas a tool"b
then become"pure" terrorists. In other words, how doesthe meth
becomea logic of aetion?A simpleansweris that this shift is genera
the outcomeof both an ideologicalprocess,wherebyactorsbreak witt
doctrine, religion, or conceptionof history, and a social or politir
"distancing"phenomenon that occurswhen actorslosecontactwith t
class, nation, or community in whosenamethey claim to speah.T
aetntno longerrepresentsa eauseor referencegroup.
Even if the referenceto a causeis fictitious, tenorist aetorsalwa
act in the nameof a peopleor for the sakeof a historicalproject.As sor
casesanalyzedin this bookshow,theseactorsmust dealwith morethi
oneframeof reference.Ttreyact for the salreof two or three maincaus
andspeahin the nameof morethan onereferencegroup.Very commonl
the temorist organizationhasto try to makeits violenceassumemea
ings related to the image of a divided communityand also meaniq
associatedwith the unity of the same community.For exarnple,i
oryanizationmay haveto speakin the nameof a dominatedor exploitr
socialgroup(the working class,peasantry or proletariat)andact for tl
sake of the whole community(nation, religion, or ethnic group). I
Austrian Mar:ristsrealizedat the beginningof this centur5r,it is alwa;
difficult to representboth the wholecommunityandonepart of it again
another.It is thus simplerto resort to tefforism whenonehasonly or
aim, to divide one's community from the larger community and '
Y

Terrorismin the Contextof AcademicResearch

enhanceits solidaritywhile driving the "enem/'communityinto hostility

andviolence.
It is noteworthythat violent actorsthemselvesconfrontthis incompat-
ibility although someappearobliviousto the dilemma.Orsini, for in-
stance,spokein the nameof the Italian nation andalsocalledfor social
change;lie intendedto kill NapoleonIII for the saheof both Italy ?nd "
Europeanrevolution. The Russianpopulistsacted on behalf of the
peasantrybut alsoin terms of a certain conceptionof nationaldevelop-
ment. The Basqueswhobelongto ETA are nationalistsbut alsoMar:cist-
Leninistswho claimto be the vanguardnot only of the working classbut
also of new soeial movements(such as the feminist and antinuclear
movements).The Algerian FLN wantedboth to separateAlgeria from
Franceandto win the supportof metropolitanpublicopinion.
At this point, we can formulate a tentative hypothgsis.Might not
terrorism,lspeciallypure temorism,sometimesbe the ideologicalout-
comeof the actot's needor will to combine,incorporate,and incarnate
severalcontradictorymeaningsin a single stmggle?The stronger the
determinationto expressvariousmeanings,ild the strongerthe incom-
patibility betweenthesemeanings,the mgre extremeviolencewill be-
come.In other words, temorismfreduently mixesup so manydifferent
meanings,issues,and causesthat the mixture is necessarilyexplosive.
That is, terrorism that results from strategiccontradictionsis likely to
be mostdangerous.
In concludingthis overview I would like to offer three observations
concerningresearchon oppositionaltemorism. First, we should,burya
numberof stereotypes.The morewe know aboutterrorism, the lesswe
shouldrely on commonplace assumptions.We are right' for example,to
distinguishbetweenanarchistand Mar:rist-Leninistterrorism, but sueh
a differencecannotalwaysbe discernedin left-wing terrorist groups.
Many organrzations build on a Marxist-Leninistfoundationbut endwith
a thorou[h$ anarchisticor libertariantype of ideology.t!ri9 happenedin
Italy and alsoin Francewith Direct Action. Another clich6sometimes
taken to be a tnrism is that when terorism ends, we should credit
effrcientcountertemoristoperations.This premiseis, of course' never
absolutelyfalse.Nevertheless, there arecaseswherethe success of law-
enforcem-ent actionswasfoundedon the failure of the terrorist ideology.
For example,activists may feel that it is time to lay 4oyn th-.{ guns
becauseviblencehasno meaningandleadsto a deadend.This definitely
happenedin Italy, wherefarleft temorismwaswaning(a phased1tn1g
increased)while the
*tiictt violencedid not decreasebut to the eontra,qy
Carabinieriled by Dalla Chiesagrew more and more effective.A third'
muchmore platitudinousidea shouldalsobe laid to rest, namely'that
 Conclusion

terrorism can be explainedin terms of a crisis. This easiestof explana-

tions has usually been inspired by a functionalistquest to locate the
causesof tenorism in the crisis of the state, political system,economy,
culturenor society.Themorewe examineinstaneesof terrorism, the less
we canbe satisfiedwith the notion of a crisis. Most authorshere, while
they do not denythe occasional importanceof a crisis, pwh the analysis
deeper.Yet anotherideahasbeensohackneyedby journalistsandpublie
opinionthat seriousscholars,particularly socialand political scientists,
are wary of usingit lest they revive skeletonsthat previousscholarship
hadrelegatedto the closetonly with the greatestdiffrculty.Accordingto
this assumption,terrorism is a plot, a conspiracyof secret services,
police, governments,terrorist states, or other centert of power who
manipulatedim-witted actors. This book showsthat manipulationdoes
sometimesoccur,policeandtemorists do sometimeshavedealingswith
eachother, ffid psychologicaltactics are a tool of intelligenceservices.
Azev'srole in the BussianSocialistRevolutionaryParty arrdthe blauite
in the Algerian FLN are instaneesof this phenomenon. Although it is
naiveto reducetemorismto the mpnipulationof violent actorsby foreign
powers or secret serviees,it would also be shortsightedto refuse to
investigatethis sort of hlryothesiswhen there is plsusibleevidenceof
externalinvolvementin terrorism.
A secondset of unsolvedproblemsconcernsthe theoreticalquestions
anddebatesraisedby recentstudiesof terrorism, includingthosein this
book. A centml questionis that of the appropriatelevels of analysis-
whether social, orgarnr,ational,political, international, or individual-
where determinantsof causesandeffectswill be located.Distinguishing
suchlevelsimpliesthat there may be a hierarchyarnongthem. If there
is, it has to be given a theoreticalfoundation.For example,a reason
must be given for assigningcausationat the level of the individual, not
society.If variablesare not m,nked-and this is possiblewhentenorism
is perceivedas the result of a multitude of causesor factors.-then our
descriptive treatment of determinantsmust be as comprehensiveas
possible.I call this last perspectivehistorical,in order to distinguishit
from a sociologicalperspectivethat ranks levels of analysis.Whatever
perspectiveis adopted,what is said about every level has to be con-
nected.Is there,for instanee,a connection betweenNechaedspersonal-
ity and the organizationhe created?How are personalor psychologicat
problemsrelated to political tensionsor crises within a group? Is it
contradictoryto suggestthat tenorism is the result of an organization's
strategicchoicesandsimultaneously to maintainthat, at anotherlevel, a
preexistingideologyor a surroundingpoliticalcultureshapesthe political
life of the organization?
 Terrorismin the Contextof AcademicResearch

The problemof levelsof analysishasfurther implications.Most sehol-

ars hesitatebetweentwo mainpolesof explanation:the state or govern-
ment to which terrorists are opposed,and the social movementor
communityfor whosesakethey are supposedlyacting. Both polesare
productiveof explanations,but if onereasonsin terms of a hierarchyof
ievels, a choicehas to be made.Is the referenceto a nation, religious
community,or socialmovementa more important explanatoryvariable
than the nature of the state to be fought?Shouldanalysisproceedfrom
this referenceand work its way up to the state, or shouldit proceedin
the oppositedirection?The answeris not obvious.
A third unansweredquestionconcernsthe history of terrorism. Is
there a historicalcontinuityin this phenomenon sincethe FrenchRevolu-
tion and the secret societiesof the nineteentheentury?Tbo extreme
points of view eharaetettze answersto this question.The fust insists on
itre unity of terrorism throughoutthe ages.The secondconsiderseach
instanceof terrorism unique,so absolutelydifferent from othersthat it
calls for detaited sociological,historical, and political analysis of the
specificsituation without any referenceto previousexperiencgs.firis
dfuparityof viewpointsis not specificto the study of terrorism: It crops
up-in most general debatesbetween, for example,evolutionismand
historicismin history or universalismand relativism in anthropologT.
The debateis sofar inconclusive.
To conclude,I would like to commenton what may be the principal
problemfor scholarsresearchingtenorism, a problemthey usuallylvoid
discussingin public:the relationbetweenthe researcherandthe subject
of study. Until recently this problemwastnot salientbecausethosewho
studiedterrorism were lesslikely to be scholarsthanjournalists,former
military offrcers,witnesses,or other personsinvolvedin terrorist experi-
ences.As often as not they did not pretendto be objective.As sociologi-
cal, political,psychologieal,andevenhistoricalresearchhasdeveloped,
it hasbecomeneeessaryto locatereliablesources,to makecontactwith
the actors, and-why not?-to define and control the conditionsfor a
scientificstudy of terrorism andtemorists.Theauthorsof thesechapters
havesometimesfoundnew sourcesof information(literature, poetry, or
court records,for example).Someof them know personallythat temor-
ism is a researchsubjectfraught with dangerson all sides.However,the
problemI stress is not merely this physicaldanger.It concernsmoral
obligations.How shouldthe scholarbehavein the presenc€of actors
belongingto a systemof violence,whetherthey be terrorists, polcet
secreiservices,or the military?Whatis the appropriateattitudeto take?
What contradictionshave to be tolerated in order to obtain accessto
sourcesand thus create the conditionsfor scholarly knowledgeable
606 Conclusion

inquiry? What professionalstandardsshouldguidework on this contro.

versial topic? Surprisingly, discussionsabout these questionsoccur
amongjournalists more often than amongsoeialor political scientists.
Thetime hascomefor us, too, to consideranddefineour owr professional
standardsand our intellectual relation to this dangeroussubject, ter-
rorism.
 rism
m
Context
Editedby
Martha Crenshaw

T h e P e n n s y l v a n i aS t a t e U n i v e - r s i t y P r e s s
University Park, PennsYlvania
\qq5