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Airworthiness Directives Procedures Manual
10. Examples of Airworthiness Directives

10.1 Sample Draft ADs for Internal Discussion
Approved by Executive Manager, Aviation Safety Standards Version 2.0: August 2004

10.1.1 AD/B767/102
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY AUTHORITY
SCHEDULE OF AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVE
For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the following
AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being
action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or
aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section;
and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the
compliance section.
Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes
AD/B767/102 Fuel Pump Conduit Sleeving 8/98

TX
Applicability: All Boeing Model 767 aircraft line positions 001 to 689 inclusive and 691
Requirement: 1. Perform a one-time visual inspection to confirm installation of Teflon sleeves over the electrical
wires to the boost pumps installed inside conduits in the main and centre wing tanks in accordance
with Boeing Message M-7200-98-01080, dated 18 March 1998.
2. If any Teflon sleeve is found to be missing during the inspection required by Requirement 1 of
this AD, inspect to detect damage to the wires, in accordance with Boeing Message M-7200-98-
01080, dated 18 March 1998.
a. If no damage is found, install a Teflon sleeve in accordance with Boeing Message

M-7200-98-01080, dated 18 March 1998.
3. If any damage is found, inspect to detect damage to the conduits in accordance with Boeing
Message M-7200-98-01080, dated 18 March 1998.
a. If no damage is found, replace any damaged wire and install a Teflon sleeve in
accordance with Boeing Message M-7200-98-01080, dated 18 March 1998.
b. If any damage is found, replace any damaged wire and conduit and install a Teflon
sleeve, in accordance with Boeing Message M-7200-98-01080, dated 18 March 1998.
4. Operators are to report all instances of missing sleeving, sleeving that required rework, and any
instances of damaged wiring to Boeing. The report should include the following:
a. the aircraft model number;

b. the aircraft line position
c. the total number of hours time-in-service accumulated on the airplane;
d. the total number of flight cycles accumulated on the airplane;
e. a description of the area of the wiring where the sleeving was missing; and
f. a description of the damage found.
Note 1: FAA AD 98-10-10 Amdt 39-10522 dated 12 May 1998
Page 1 of 2
10-1

AD/B767/102 (Continued)
Compliance: 1. For requirement 1; within 60 days of the effective date of this AD
2. For requirements 2 and 3; before next flight, following the requirement 1 inspection.
3. For requirement 4; within 10 days of accomplishing the required inspections and rectifications.
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 May 1998.
Background: This AD requires a one-time inspection to confirm the installation of Teflon sleeves over certain
electrical wires inside conduits installed in the fuel tanks and corrective actions if found necessary.
This action is prompted by a report of missing Teflon sleeves which protect the wiring insulation
from chafing. The actions specified in this AD are intended to prevent such chafing which could
eventually expose the electrical conductor creating the potential for arcing from the wire to the
conduit and consequent fuel tank fire/explosion.
Justification:
Country of Origin AD. Aircraft operating in Australia are affected by the same safety issue.
Effect on
10 aircraft affected. It is estimated that labour costs will be extensive however no actual costs
Operators
have been quoted in the FAA AD.
Electronic signature block)
R Smith
Delegate of Civil Aviation Safety Authority
15 November 1999
Page 2 of 2
10-2
10.1.2 AD/LYC/101 Amdt 1

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes airworthiness
directive AD/LYC/101 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the
action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition)
be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances
mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c)
at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Lycoming Piston Engines

AD/LYC/101 Superior Cylinders 3/97
Amdt 1
Applicability: All Lycoming TIO/LTIO-540-A2C, -J2B, -F2BD, -J2BD, -N2BD, -R2AD, -S1AD and IO-540-
M1B5D engines fitted with Superior Air Parts Inc. cylinders part number (P/N) SL54000-A1,
SL54000-A2, SL54000-A2P, SL54000-A20P and SL54000-A21P with serials numbers 001
through 650.
Requirement: 1: To prevent the possible loss of a cylinder head, the subsequent loss of engine power and a
possible engine fire, carry out:
a. A visual inspection of applicable cylinder assemblies for evidence of combustion leaks

and/or cracking in the area adjacent to the location of the inlet valve seat as detailed in
Figure 1, and
b. An 80psi pressure “wet” leak check of the cylinder assemblies paying particular attention
to the area detailed in Figure 1.
c. Remove from service before further flight, any cylinder showing either combustion gas
leakage or cracks.
2. Remove applicable cylinders from service
Note 1: FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-01-04 Amdt 39-10522 refers

Note 2: For the purpose of Requirement 1.(B), a wet leak check may be carried out by using soapy
water or a commercial leak detector product such as “Sherlock Leak Detector”.
Page 1 of 3
10-3

AD/LYC/101 Amdt 1 (Continued)
Compliance: 1. For requirement 1,

a Cylinders with a time in service greater than 250 hours; within 5 hours time in service
from the effective date of this directive and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25
hours time in service.
b Cylinders with a time in service less than 250 hours; prior to exceeding 250 hours time
in service and thereafter at intervals not to exceed 25 hours time in service.
2. For requirement 2, prior to exceeding 300 hours cylinder time in service.
This Amendment becomes effective on 27 February 1997.
Background: This directive was originally issued to require the inspection of certain cylinder assemblies. The
requirement follows the CASA investigation of a PA31-350 cylinder head failure in service. This
amendment reflects the issue of an FAA airworthiness directive based on the results on the
CASA investigation and the subsequent revision to the cylinder manufacturer’s published
requirements.
FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-01-04 increases the engine models applicable, reduces the
compliance threshold and adds a terminating action by replacement of affected cylinders.
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 27 November 1996.
Justification: This directive was originally issued in response to the investigation of the 6 October 1996 Airlines of
Tasmania Piper PA31-350 engine failure event. In that event, the top of a cylinder head separated from the cylinder
during take-off from King Island Airport. The head separation resulted in an significant loss of power and created a
potential for an in-flight engine fire. A leak check of the 5 other cylinders on the subject engine revealed head leaks
in 2 cylinders. The failed cylinders had only achieved 495 hours TIS.
Page 2 of 3
10-4

AD/LYC/101 Amdt 1 (Continued)
The failed cylinder and the 2 leaking cylinders were obtained for examination at the CASA Airworthiness Branch
Failure Analysis Group facility in Canberra. An examination of the fractured cylinder identified the failure cause to
be a fatigue crack initiating in the area between the cooling fins and the inlet valve seat insert. Of concern, the crack
progressed rapidly from the initiation to catastrophic failure. One of the leaking cylinders was cut open to reveal a
fatigue crack initiating from the bottom of the cooling fins and progressing to the inlet valve insert flange. The
results of the investigation, including a copy of the original issue of AD/LYC/101, were forwarded to the FAA and
Superior Air Parts.
This amendment reflects the issue of an FAA AD on the is subject. FAA AD 97-01-04 requires compliance with
Superior Air Parts SB 96-002 Rev. A. Unfortunately, the requirements of SB 96-002 Rev. A still include
requirements detailed in the original issue which were considered by CASA to be inappropriate for the purpose of
identifying a defective cylinder.
The primary inspection requirement detailed in SB 96-002 Rev.A is to carry out a dye penetrant inspection of the
cylinder head at the bottom of the cooling fins. A dye penetrant inspection of the cylinder head at the bottom of
cylinder head cooling fins, especially when the material surface is granular, is considered by CASA to be of limited
value.
The designated area of the cylinder head to be inspected, as detailed in a diagram in the service bulletin, is also of
concern. The cylinder cut open and examined by the Failure Analysis Group had a fatigue crack initiating outside
the service bulletin circle area. An inspection in accordance with the service bulletin would not have detected the
crack in that cylinder. These concerns with the original issue of SB 96-002 were advised to the FAA and Superior
prior to the issue of the FAA AD and the revision to the SB.
Accordingly; this amendment maintains the visual and wet leak check requirements detailed in the original issue of
this directive. The amendment also continues the expanded area of concern as detailed in Figure 1 of the directive.
The amendment does however, extend the engine models applicable and provides a terminating action, as detailed in
the FAA AD. A copy of this amendment has been forwarded to the FAA and Superior Air Parts for advice and
comments as appropriate.
Effect on Operators: Superior Brisbane has advised; Whilst all of the original cylinders of concern (L/TIO-J2BD
350 hp engines) have now been withdrawn from service, based on the extended number of engine models now
applicable, there are a further 9, possibly 15 applicable cylinders in service in Australia. The operators affected have
been advised and a recall program initiated. Again, Superior is covering the cost of the recall program.
(Electronic signature block)
R Smith
15 November 1999
Page 3 of 3
10-5
10.1.3 AD/DHC-8/54 Amdt 1

directive AD/DHC-8/54 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the
action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition)
be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances
mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c)
at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Bombardier (Boeing Canada/de Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes

AD/DHC-8/54 Fuselage Cable Trough 13/98
Amdt 1
Applicability: DHC-8 aeroplanes Models 102, 103, 106, 201, 202, 301, 311, 314 and 315 with serial numbers 3
through 540 inclusive, excluding serial number 462.
Requirement: Incorporate de Havilland modification 8/2705 in accordance with Bombardier Inc. De Havilland
Service Bulletin 8-53-66 dated 27 March 1998.
Note: Transport Canada AD CF-98-08 R1 refers
Compliance: The compliance remains unchanged as ‘At the next ‘C’ check, but no later than 36 months after
18 June 1998 (the effective date of the original issue of this directive)’.
This Amendment becomes effective on 3 December 1998.
Background: A DHC-8 aeroplane experienced an uncommanded engine shut-down in flight due to a short
circuit between adjacent wires located in the left underfloor cable trough. The short circuit
resulted in a 28 volt signal being applied to the fuel shut-off valve. An investigation revealed
that the short circuit was caused by chafing of wires on sharp edges on the cherrymax rivets in
the cable trough.
The directive requires the installation of new cable tie-mounts in the cable trough and sealing
rivets to prevent chafing of wires.
This amendment increases the serial number range of the affected aeroplanes.
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 18 June 1998.
Justification: Country of origin AD. Aircraft operating in Australia are affected by the same safety issue.
Effect on Operators: Some inconvenience, this directive increases the serial number range by 21 aircraft.
Bombardier estimates that 70 to 100 man-hours will be required to incorporate the
modification, depending on aircraft model.

R Smith
15 November 1999
Page 1 of 1
10-6
10.1.4 AD/BELL 47/66 Amdt 4

directive AD/BELL47/66 Amdt3 and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires
that the action set out in the requirement section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe
condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the
circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement
section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Bell 47 (All Variants) Series Helicopters
AD/BELL 47/66 STABILISER BAR TUBES 10/86

Amdt 4 AND ASSEMBLY
Applicability: All models of the Bell 47 and all variants.
Requirement: Inspect the stabiliser bar tubes and assembly as detailed in Bell Service Bulletin (SB) No 50-
(04-20)-73-1, Revision A dated 3 March 1975 or Kawasaki Bell SB KSB- Bell 338 dated 15
March 1975 as appropriate.
Compliance: Inspect before the first flight of each day after 31 October 1986
If the inspection is carried out by the pilot in command, the pilot in command must enter the
precise AD reference in a certification made on the maintenance release.
This Amendment becomes effective on 31 October 1986
Background: This amendment has been issued to include Kawasaki- Bell helicopters and the applicable
Kawasaki Bell Service Bulletin.
Amendment 3 called up the latest revision of the Service Bulletin, which excluded the use of
particular stabiliser tubes.
Amendment 2 clarified how daily inspection certification may be made by the pilot in
command.
The initial amendment was introduced to detect cracked stabiliser bar tubes and/or tie rods that
are in tension.
Amendment 3 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 7 April 1975
Amendment 2 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 28 February 1974
Initial issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 7 October 1970

Page 1 of 2
10-7
Bell 47 (All Variants) Series Helicopters

AD/BELL 47/66 Amdt 4 (Continued)
Justification: A number of aircraft have found to be cracked. This type of cracking is considered a
safety of flight issue and remedial action is required.
Effect on Operators: Minor. Inspection takes approximately 10 minutes. 71 aircraft affected.
R Smith
Delegate of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority
15 November 1999
Page 2 of 2
10-8
10.2 Sample ADs
10.2 Sample ADs
10.2.1 AD/B727/162

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below issues the
following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement
section (being action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the
aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the
requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the requirement section; and (c) at the time
mentioned in the compliance section.
AD/B727/162 Vertical Beam Web and Forward Flange of 13/99

the Aft Pressure Bulkhead
Applicability: All Model 727 aircraft
Requirement: Action in accordance with the technical requirements of FAA AD 99-18-05 Amdt 39-11271.
Note: Boeing Service Bulletins 727-53-0210 and 727-53-0055 refer.
Compliance: As specified in the Requirement document for the initial and repetitive inspections, with a revised
effective date of 30 December 1999
This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 30 December 1999.
Background: The FAA received reports of fatigue cracks found in the vertical beam web and forward flange of
the aft pressure bulkhead. Such fatigue cracking could result in the inability of subject vertical
beam to withstand the fail-safe loads, and consequent loss of cabin pressurisation
R Smith
15 November 1999
Page 1 of 1
10-9
10.2 Sample ADs
10.2.2 AD/A320/101 Amdt 1

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes airworthiness directive AD/A320/101
and issues the following AD under subregulation 39.1 (1) of CAR 1998. The AD requires that the action set out in the requirement section (being
action that the delegate considers necessary to correct the unsafe condition) be taken in relation to the aircraft or aeronautical product mentioned in the
applicability section: (a) in the circumstances mentioned in the requirement section; and (b) in accordance with the instructions set out in the
requirement section; and (c) at the time mentioned in the compliance section.
Airbus Industrie A319/A320/A321 Series Aeroplanes
AD/A320/101 Main Landing Gear Sliding Tube 13/99

Amdt 1
Applicability: All Model A319, A320, and A321 aircraft, all serial numbers up to and including 0875; without
having fully accomplished Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin A320-32-1189.
Requirement: 1. Perform a detailed visual inspection of both main landing gear (MLG) sliding tubes in
accordance with Airbus Industrie Service Bulletin (SB) A320-32-1189.
a. If cracks are detected around the area between the jacking dome bush and the hole for the HP
inflation valve or the hole for the lower electrical harness assembly, before further flight,
replace the sliding tube.
b. If other cracks are detected, contact the manufacturer.
Compliance: 1. Within 500 hours time in service after 12 August 1999. Thereafter, repeat at intervals not to
exceed 500 hours time in service.
The Compliance 1 initial inspection time remains unchanged by this issue.
This Amendment becomes effective on 30 December 1999.
The original issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 12 August 1999.
Background: During a maintenance inspection/overhaul process on the MLG sliding tubes, a wrongly performed
NDT inspection could have led to local heating, which as a consequence, could initiate cracks.
Such cracking could lead to landing gear collapse.
Amendment 1 is issued in response to a new DGAC AD which introduces on-going repetitive
inspections for the main landing gear sliding tubes.
R Smith
15 November 1999
Page 1 of 1
10-10
10.2 Sample ADs
10.2.3 AD/PC-12/21

For the reasons set out in the background section, the CASA delegate whose signature appears below revokes airworthiness directive AD/PC-12/21.
Pilatus PC-12 Series Aeroplanes

AD/PC-12/21 Trailing Edge Flap Inboard Attachment Fitting 12/99
Requirement: CANCELLED.
Background: The requirements of this Directive are contained in AD/PC-12/19.
R Smith
15 November 1999
Page 1 of 1
10-11

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Airworthiness Directives Procedures Manual

10. Examples of Airworthiness Directives

10. Examples of Airworthiness Directives

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B767/102 Fuel Pump Conduit Sleeving 8/98

a. If no damage is found, install a Teflon sleeve in accordance with Boeing Message

a. the aircraft model number;

Boeing 767 Series Aeroplanes

Compliance: 1. For requirement 1; within 60 days of the effective date of this AD

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 27 May 1998.

Electronic signature block)

10.1.2 AD/LYC/101 Amdt 1

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-106

Lycoming Piston Engines

a. A visual inspection of applicable cylinder assemblies for evidence of combustion leaks

2. Remove applicable cylinders from service

Note 1: FAA Airworthiness Directive 97-01-04 Amdt 39-10522 refers

Lycoming Piston Engines

Compliance: 1. For requirement 1,

2. For requirement 2, prior to exceeding 300 hours cylinder time in service.

This Amendment becomes effective on 27 February 1997.

Lycoming Piston Engines

(Electronic signature block)

10.1.3 AD/DHC-8/54 Amdt 1

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Bombardier (Boeing Canada/de Havilland) DHC-8 Series Aeroplanes

(Electronic signature block)

10.1.4 AD/BELL 47/66 Amdt 4

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Bell 47 (All Variants) Series Helicopters

AD/BELL 47/66 STABILISER BAR TUBES 10/86

Applicability: All models of the Bell 47 and all variants.

This Amendment becomes effective on 31 October 1986

Amendment 3 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 7 April 1975

Amendment 2 of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 28 February 1974

Initial issue of this Airworthiness Directive became effective on 7 October 1970

Bell 47 (All Variants) Series Helicopters

Effect on Operators: Minor. Inspection takes approximately 10 minutes. 71 aircraft affected.

(Electronic signature block)

10.2 Sample ADs

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Boeing 727 Series Aeroplanes

AD/B727/162 Vertical Beam Web and Forward Flange of 13/99

Applicability: All Model 727 aircraft

Note: Boeing Service Bulletins 727-53-0210 and 727-53-0055 refer.

This Airworthiness Directive becomes effective on 30 December 1999.

10.2.2 AD/A320/101 Amdt 1

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Airbus Industrie A319/A320/A321 Series Aeroplanes

AD/A320/101 Main Landing Gear Sliding Tube 13/99

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA (Civil Aviation Regulations 1998) PART 39-105

Pilatus PC-12 Series Aeroplanes

Background: The requirements of this Directive are contained in AD/PC-12/19.

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