o f C 2

t h e art
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Version: 1.0 Date: July 2009

www.c2coe.org
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 Foreword

It is an honour for me to introduce

this new product of the C2CoE.
After having performed NNEC
Assessments of five NRF's the
C2CoE gathered a lot of
experience and knowledge which
is used to catalyse and support
commanders, staffs and units as
much as possible on the ability to
improve their Network Enabled
Capabilities.

In all our communication and in

all our products the C2CoE aims
to improve or stimulate the "art of
Command and Control". As the
main part of Command and
Control is not "a science" but "an Therefore we also need your
art" a traditional handbook does input, so please react on topics
not seem appropriate. Therefore I included and or suggest other
would like to focus on "Best and newer developments to share
practices". This publication is amongst each other. Improving
based on what we observed and the art of Command and Control
learned from the operators is in everybody‟s interest.
themselves. As practitioners you
I would like to thank everybody
are doing great things and it is the
who enabled the C2CoE to
aim of the C2CoE with this
execute this job. The NATO Bi-
publication to share these best
SC‟s for their initiative and
practices widely over our
support, Sponsoring Nations,
community of interest in order to
assessed NRFs and the friends
catalyse further developments.
and colleagues from the
So this is a publication which
supporting organisations.
includes "your best practices".

By the nature of the subject and Geerlof J. Kanis

r e al isi ng th at t h e NNE C Director C2CoE
assessments will continue , the Colonel RNLA
C2CoE will update this
publication on a regular basis.

3
4
Disclaimer

This handbook is a product of the Command and Control Centre of

Excellence (C2CoE). It is produced to disseminate the C2CoE findings
during NATO Response Force (NRF) assessments. It does not
represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide
an independent opinion.

Drawings by Wim Rietkerk

5
6
Table of content

Foreword …………………………………………………………………… 3

Table of content …………………………………………………………… 7

1. Background ……... ……………………………………………….. 9

2. Introduction ……………………………………………………….. 9

3. Network Enabled Capabilities ………………………………………. 10

4. NATO Network Enabled Capabilities …………..…………………… 10

5. NATO Response Force ……………………….……………………… 14

6. NATO NEC Maturity Model and Lines of Development ………. 14

7. Networks versus Domains ………………………..………………. 17

8. Limitations ………………………………………..…………………… 20

9. Observations ………………………………………………………….... 21

A. Doctrine ……………….……………………………………...……. 21

B. Organisation ………..………………………………………………… 26

C. Training ………………………………….………………………… 29

D. Materiel ………………….………………………………….…….. 31

E. Leadership ………………………………………………….... 34

F. Personnel ……………………………………………………...……. 37

G. Facilities …………………………………………………..……….. 39

I. Interoperability ……………………………………………….….. 39

10. Conclusion ………………………………………………………………… 42

11. Concluding Remarks ……………………………………………..……… 43

12. Acknowledgement ………………………………………………… …..…. 43

13. Acronyms List ………………………………………………………………. 44

7
 This handbook is a product of the C2CoE and based on practical experience gained
during NRF NNEC assessments. This handbook continues as an evolutionary
process to inform, share awareness and maintain cohesion across Allied Command
Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

During the preparation of the NRF 13 assessment, the Deployable Joint Task Force
(DJTF) requested a “Code of Best Practices” of NNEC. Consequently this
handbook has been developed to assist commanders and their staffs in thinking in
a NATO Network Enabled way and to offer insight into experiences gained in the
NRF 9, 10, 11 and 12 assessments, and assessments conducted at other
exercises. NNEC is sometimes perceived as a technological capability. However
NNEC is the capability to enable social, knowledge and technical networks to work
in synergy.

The quotes in the document are taken from personnel participating in exercises,
staff and commanders, unless otherwise indicated.

Excellent firms do not believe in excellence - only in constant improvement and

constant change
Tom Peters (Management Guru)

8
1. BACKGROUND
The C2CoE collects data on request of HQ SACT to expose the
problems and to improve “the way of doing business” in the field of
NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC). NNEC faces many
challenges. Not in the least because NNEC does not “live” at the
tactical and operational level. The NNEC approach is considered too
theoretical, too conceptual. Maybe because NNEC is currently seen
only as a high level concept.

The NNEC principles must be brought to the working (operational and

tactical) level and must be embedded in the daily business of NATO
including NATO exercises. Another important, but not unexpected
observation is that improvements of NATO Network Enabled Capability
in Headquarters (HQs) is a slow process.

Technology is an important NNEC enabler and though there are still

many shortcomings, it is developing fast. Nevertheless, in the near
future the technical interoperability between all levels of command in
NATO will not be ideal. Quick wins have to be made in other fields.
Organisations and people ensure that a challenging technical
environment does not cause mission failure and that a Command or
Headquarters can operate successfully. Leadership and staff must
accelerate the development of doctrine, tactics, training and procedures
for networked forces and establish which Line of Development (LoD)1
can be influenced to become better networked (or move to a higher
NNEC Maturity Level). We believe that this approach serves NNEC;
progress will ensure that people believe more in NNEC and provide a
new momentum towards NNEC.
2. INTRODUCTION
The C2CoE has participated in the NNEC assessments of NRF 4 and
5. The Centre conducted the assessment of NRF 9, 10, 11 and 12 on
behalf of Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT) located in
Norfolk, VA, USA. Based on not yet approved definitions, the Centre
has been requested to provide an insight in the level of NNEC maturity.
Besides questionnaires and observations, interviews with Commanders
or their senior staff are key input for the assessments. This handbook
will very briefly explain the principles of NNEC and then discuss the
findings of the assessments.
1
DOTMLPFI - Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Personnel, Leadership, Facilities, and In-
teroperability

9
3. NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITIES (NEC)

NATO considers the implementation of Network Enabled Capabilities

(NEC) or Network Centric Operations (NCO) a national responsibility. A
definition for NEC is ambiguous; when you google “NEC”, you will get
129.000.000 hits. In a more refined search you will at least find more
than 50 different definitions. We prefer the following definition2 as it pre-
sents the insight that NEC is applicable outside military organisations
as well.
NEC/NCO definition:
“A continuously evolving, complex community of people, devices, information
and services interconnected by a communications network to optimise resources
management and provide superior information on events and conditions needed
to empower decision makers”
(NCOIC)

The conclusion that can be drawn from this definition is that NEC/NCO
aims for information superiority which leads to decision superiority.

4. NATO NETWORK ENABLED CAPABILITIES (NATO NEC)

4.1 Recognising that in the Information Age military transformation is
essential, NATO pursues a course of transformation towards achieving
NNEC, which “encompasses the elements involved in linking collectors,
effectors, and decision makers together to enable the development of a
NATO, network enabled, and
effects-based, operational
capability”. In the NATO
Network Enabled Capability
resides a coherent approach
to the development of
technical and operational
interoperability standards and
targets for adoption and aims
to harmonize NATO and
national NEC and NCO
Picture 1: The ability to technically connect does not programmes.
always contributes to (N)NEC

2
NCOIC – Net Centric Operations Industry Consortium

10
 NNEC Definition:

“NATO Network Enabled Capability is the Alliance cognitive and technical ability to
federate the various components of the operational environment from the strategic level
down to the tactical level through a networking and information infrastructure”
(MCM-032-2006)

The NNEC definition3 provides some insights about NNEC. First of all
that it is not a concept but a capability, secondly that technical and
cognitive (i.e. social and knowledge) networks are equally important
and last but not least, that the capability entails the federation of all
networks from the strategic (NATO HQ) to the tactical level (in the field).

The Networking and Information Infrastructure (NIl) is the collection of

NATO and national information infrastructure and communications
infrastructure capabilities. The NIl implements standardised information
services including information transport, storage, security, management
and other enabling capabilities to technically support NNEC (MCM-032-
2006).

4.2 The NNEC Value Chain, as developed in the USA by OSD/OFT4,

(figure 1) depicts the increasing capabilities when a force becomes
more robustly networked. A robustly networked force (social, knowledge
and technical) increases its ability to share information and improves
the quality of information available to be shared. This in turn allows for
collaboration at all levels based on a shared situational awareness and,
more importantly, shared situational understanding.

This will result in the development and/or optimisation of the processes

and the ability for elements within the force to synchronize with other
elements. The end state of this continuum of improving capabilities
brought about through robust networking has greatly increased mission
effectiveness.

3
MCM-0032-2006, NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) Vision and Concept, dated 19 Apr
2006. This definition differs from MCM-0038-2005 as follows:
- "NNEC is the Alliance ability" was changed into "NNEC is the Alliance cognitive and technical abil-
ity"
- the word "integrate" is replaced by "federate" and
 the words "network of networks" are replaced with 'through a networking and information infra-
structure (NIl)".
4
Office of the Secretary of Defence / Office of Force Transformation
11
It is important to note that the main goal of achieving the NNEC is to im-
prove the effectiveness of our military forces.

Figure 1: NNEC Value Chain

4.3 So, what’s new? The idea is to start with a network with universal
services. This way one can obtain and exchange information with
people and systems from any location once plugged into the network.
The theory is that these capabilities can be formed of people,
information systems and resources, based on the mission
requirements.

The difference between the (old) hierarchical structure (figure 2) and

the NNEC structure (figure 3) is that the old one is joint at high level and
de-conflicted at low levels while the NNEC structure is joint at all levels.

In the hierarchical structure the coordination is carried out through

vertical lines, in an NNEC organisation the information is shared
horizontally at all levels. To enable this, there must be delegated
authority to act and to initiate joint solutions. 5

5
Human Dimensions in NEC. C2CoE-TNO Symposium 15 NOV 07. Dr. Peter Essens. TNO

12
 JFC JFC

ACC MCC LCC ACC MCC LCC

CAOC CTG Unit

CAOC CTG Unit

AOC/ AAWC Unit

CRC AOC/ AAWC Unit
CRC

Figure 2 Hierarchical Structured Organization Figure 3 Network Enabled Organization

4.4 A NNEC structure enhances the cross collaboration throughout

the organisation. As a result the organisation becomes more flexible
and adaptable (agile) to fast changing situations.

NNEC entails a new way of cooperation, organising and using available

capabilities. However, an agile, network enabled force requires special
competencies for people and organisations.

A well networked force has advantages, as all involved are in a position

to understand better each others‟ tactical situation and know what
capabilities are available to solve issues. However there are some
issues on the downside: e.g. how sure are we that there is common
situational understanding?
With the overwhelming amount of information that is available, people
become the limiting factor. There is only so much they can digest. This
explains why Information and Knowledge Management are so important
in Network Enabled Capabilities.

“Having a network is useful as long as it allows people to Share and to Link”

Gen (US AF )Elder

13
4.5 So (N)NEC is more about networking than about networks. It is
about the increased combat power that can be generated by a
networked enabled force. The power of (N)NEC is derived from the
effective linking or networking of knowledgeable entities that are
geographically or hierarchically dispersed. The networking of
knowledgeable entities enables them to share information and
collaborate to develop shared awareness, and also collaborate with one
another to achieve self-synchronization.6
5. THE NATO RESPONSE FORCE
5.1 The NRF is a coherent, high readiness,
joint, multinational force package, technologically
advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and
sustainable (approx 25.000 troops). The NRF is
tailored to the mission and comprised of rotating
national force contributions. The NRF Deployable
Joint Task Force (DJTF) is a NATO Joint Force
Command or Joint Headquarters; The Component
Commands are either a NATO or a National
Command.

5.2 The NRF/DJTF Commander normally has command for a period

of one year; the components are allocated for a period of one-half to
one year. After a national work up period, the components are nationally
certified, and then a NATO certification exercise, normally a CPX, is
conducted. On completion of this event the Supreme Allied Commander
Europe (SACEUR) will decide whether the NRF has reached the re-
quired Full Operational Capability.
5.3 Due to its nature (Joint and Combined and mixing NATO Com-
mand Structure (NCS) and NATO Force Structure (NFS) units) the NRF
is a very challenging environment from a NNEC point of view. This envi-
ronment can certainly provide more NNEC insights than others in
NATO.

6. NATO NEC MATURITY MODEL AND LINES OF DEVELOPMENT

6.1 Within NATO, eight variables, or Lines of Development (LoDs)
have been agreed upon to measure the progress in NNEC. Table 1
shows the LoD descriptions as used by the C2 CoE.

6
Alberts, Garstka and Stein (1999, 6-7)

14
6.2 The concept of maturity as applied to NATO Network Enabled
Capability (NNEC) has been introduced in the NNEC Feasibility Study
and is based on the Capability Maturity Model (CMM) developed by
Carnegie Mellon University.
A maturity model such as the CMM provides a framework to define or
measure the capabilities of an organization in particular areas. The
CMM approach uses a five-level definition of capabilities numbered
from 1 to 5 which define increasing levels of capabilities or maturity
(Table 2). This method provides a standardized way to assess the
capabilities of a complex organization by using common criteria.
Table 1: Working definitions of the Lines of Development.

Fundamental principles that guide the employment of military

Doctrine
forces in coordinated action toward a common goal.
A unit or element with various functions enabled by a structure
through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish a
Organisation
common mission and directly provide or support war fighting
capabilities.
Military training based on doctrine or tactics, techniques and
Training and procedures to prepare forces and / or staffs to respond to strategic
Education and operational requirements deemed necessary by the
commanders to execute their assigned mission.
All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support military
Material activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or
combat purposes.
The ability to influence, motivate and enable others to contribute
Leadership towards the success of the organisation and inspire to change in
order to improve effectiveness.
The human capital of a force serving as part of an organisation
Personnel
tasked to accomplish a mission.
A building, place or infrastructure which provides a specific kind of
Facilities operating assistance to naval, ground or air forces or a combination
thereof, thereby facilitating any action or operation.
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of an assigned
Interoperability
task.

6.3 The NNEC Maturity Levels (NML) that have been developed are
based on the CMM and refined to be applicable to a NATO force, in this
case the NATO Response Force (NRF). NML are a layered framework
providing a progression of measures of NNEC capability achievement
needed to engage in continuous transformational improvement. The
defined NMLs are shown in table 2. A NATO or coalition force operates
per definition in a condition open to external interactions and therefore
has per definition maturity level 2 or higher.
15
6.4 Superimposing the maturity levels on the LoDs creates the Matur-
ity Level Matrix. The NML-matrix can be used to define or measure the
progress of NNEC. It also provides information how to transition to the
next higher level of maturity. If the NML- matrix is applied, the strong
and weak points of the organization are identified, and one can start ini-
tiatives to improve.

Table 2: The 5 maturity levels, including a very brief description7

Closed to external interactions. Information is not shared, isolation is

Stand-alone the common word. Decision making is build up based on own
information.
Planning conducted to prevent interference but with a distinct lack of
harmonisation. Interoperability is preplanned and restrictive. CIS
does not support interaction across national and between NATO
security domains. Extensive use of swivel chair interfaces (human
De-conflict
interaction) is required. It is characterised by stand alone applications
and communication networks running with some “functional
stovepipes” in place. Little Shared Situational Awareness due to
limited interoperability.
Planning is coordinated horizontally and vertically but execution is
mainly by component. Interoperability is preplanned but not
restrictive. CIS supports interaction across national and NATO
Coordinate security domains. The implementation of interfaces and gateways
eliminates air gaps between separate systems. Some human
interaction is still required. This phase aims to break the information
barrier through “communication and information”.
Planning and execution are coordinated horizontally and vertically.
Interoperability is ad-hoc as needed. CIS is advanced semantic
integrated registry and discovery services and all user services are
accessible through generic portals or workspaces. Advanced
Collaborate semantic interoperability exists. By exploiting the Shared Situational
Awareness in a better way, decisions can be made towards better
actions in the field. “Advanced collaboration and planning
capabilities” are introduced. Improved data sharing allows full
collaboration.

One homogeneous force. Complete situational awareness is possible

through a proliferation of sensors and there is extensive information
Coherent sharing and continuous interaction between elements. Seamless and
effects transparent collaboration of all parties involved leads to
unprecedented mission effectiveness. Interoperability including
technical and operational is improved to the maximum extent.
7
Description developed by a team with representatives of HQ SACT (lead), NATO HQ, SHAPE,
NC3A, RTA, NCOIC and C2CoE

16
7. NETWORKS VERSUS DOMAINS

In the NNEC Value chain we differentiate between domains and net-

works.

7.1. NNEC DOMAIN.

A domain is the distinguished part or physical space where something

exists, is performed or is valid. On each domain one or more networks
can be active.

7.2. NNEC NETWORK.

A network is a group of interconnected entities, such as a network of
universities, a network of people, or a network of computers. What
makes a network is the existence of linked elements. Elements might
be routers and computers, persons or knowledge.

NNEC identifies three different networks:

 The technical network is the physical infrastructure that allows

the acquisition, generation, distribution, manipulation and
utilisation of information. Having a robust technical network is a
prerequisite to having a network enabled force.

 The social network is the extended group of people with similar

interests or concerns who interact and remain in formal and
informal contact for mutual assistance or support. The human
dimension of NNEC is a key enabler that at the end will contribute
through the personal skills and knowledge to use the information
in the right way to make the right and timely decisions.

 The knowledge network is the minds of the people and is where

perception, awareness, understanding, expertise, beliefs and
values reside and decisions are being made (e.g. Wikipedia is a
knowledge network).

17
7.3 Figure 4 shows the relationships between the LoDs and the net-
works. Though LoDs have influence in all networks, they are predomi-
nant in one of the three networks and the allocation shows the most ap-
propriate relationships. Per definition interoperability is not related to
any network and is positioned outside the networks. It is considered to
be the “grease” between all networks. In other words, Interoperability
makes networking possible.
7.4. The networks overlap one another emphasizing the vital linkage
among them and the fact that each is equally important. At the centre
point where all of the networks meet, the ultimate goal of networking is
achieved: more effectiveness, as this is qualitatively improved along
with each of the networks and lines of development.

Figure 4: (N)NEC networks

Interoperability is the ability of the networks to operate in synergy to

achieve certain mission9. Shortcomings in one network must be
compensated for by the others. This “compensation” process is not
optimised and quick wins can be achieved here. Interoperability
between social, knowledge and technical networks, and synergy
between the LoDs is required. Otherwise a higher level of NNEC
maturity cannot be achieved.

18
7.5 There is a close relationship between the LoDs. If for example
new technology is provided to a force, it should be expected that doc-
trine, organisation and training must change too. This example under-
pins that the introduction of tools to a force must be carefully managed.
7.6 In 2008 General (USMC)J.E. Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the
US Joint Chiefs of Staff9, identified culture as a critical and separate
field of interoperability. All people we work with have different cultures
(services, civilians, nationalities, background). The impact of this is un-
derestimated. An example is vocabulary. If there is no common vocabu-
lary, achieving shared situational understanding will remain difficult.
Therefore there is an urgent requirement for a common vocabulary as
this is (almost) non-existent.

© Wim Rietkerk

9
NCOIC KEY NOTE ADDRESS, WASHINGTON DC, 17 SEP 2008

19
8. LIMITATIONS
8.1 In accordance with the HQ SACT request, the C2CoE conducted
the NRF NNEC assessments only at DJTF and Component level. The
DJTF HQ is always a NATO HQ while the Component Command is ei-
ther a NATO Command or a National Command.
NATO is responsible to disseminate information from the Strategic level
down to the Operational (Component Command) level HQs and vice
versa. It is the Operational level commander‟s responsibility to ensure
that information is disseminated to the lower levels and vice versa; this
is mainly done through national Command and Control systems.

8.2 This is one of the main challenges in the development of technical

interoperability in the NRF. National systems are almost never interop-
erable with the NATO Bi-SC AIS (Automated Information System). This
puts constraints on HQs as commanders must consider how to organ-
ise to make sure that information and knowledge is distributed down to
the lowest level possible, and from the tactical up to the operational and
strategic level.

8.3 It is important to note that not all missions require the highest
level of NNEC maturity. But being able to work at a high level of ma-
turity environment has one major advantage:

An organisation with high NEC maturity is more agile and can

work with organisations operating at a lower level of NEC maturity.

20
9. OBSERVATIONS

9.1 These observations are based on four NRF assessments per-

formed by the C2CoE. For each assessment a classified report has
been forwarded to HQ SACT. The findings are declassified and bundled
in this document.

“A staff should work with their heads sometimes, not just with computers; it is
important to step out from behind the computers, take a walk and talk with each
other!”
Senior Mentor Gen. (DEU A) ret. Dr. Klaus Reinhardt

9.2 The general observation of Gen. Reinhardt makes it obvious that

the leadership has the task to pull their personnel from behind their
equipment and actively involve them in the action. It underlines the
importance of the social network. The social network must mature and
that is a challenge for the whole leadership, especially in multinational
(multi-culture) headquarters. More important, sharing of information in
HQs and between personnel of different HQs speeds up the decision
cycle.

A. DOCTRINE
“Fundamental principles that guide the employment of military
forces in coordinated action towards a common goal”.

 Review doctrine / concepts to support NNEC.

Using the definition above, doctrine entails all written documentation
that provides guidance to military forces, including concepts and poli-
cies. Doctrine is written from a desk in a safe environment and though
well thought out, it is often based on the last operation. Consequently it
is lacking behind. Therefore, doctrine should never become dogma; it
should be used as guidance for a commander and his staff. But some-
times commanders are put in a position where they cannot influence
doctrine, concepts and / or policy. The overarching NATO concepts and
policies are supposed to support NATO NEC, but not all of them do. Ul-
timately in NATO concepts NNEC principles must be emphasised.

21
 Incorporate NNEC principles in the internal doctrine.
In general terms we can state that NNEC is not well known; most of the
time it is misunderstood. Doctrine needs to be reviewed to incorporate
NNEC principles (networking at all levels); putting special emphasis in
clarifying that NNEC is much more than technology.

 The NATO Information Assurance Policies seriously hamper the

rapid exchange of information
In a NNEC environment information flow is extensive and fast. Conse-
quently the Information Assurance policy should support this principle
and manage risk, as opposed to avoiding risk, to allow a balance be-
tween security and operational capability.
Trained Information Assurance officers must be involved in the planning
from the earliest stage to prevent surprises in a later stage.
“Risk Management, as opposed to Risk Avoidance, allows a balance between security
and operational capability”.
HQ SACT Office of Security / INFOSEC Symposium 2006

 The “Need to Know” principle should change to the “Will to

Share”.
Mutual trust is the basis for information sharing between people and
organisations. Trust can only be achieved when it is actively worked by
all parties and the leadership in particular. Trust is important in support
of collaboration and decision making and should not be
underestimated. Trust must lead to accepting the “responsibility to
share” or even better, the “will to share” rather than “ the need to know”
principle.

Experiments have shown that sharing of information speeds up the

decision cycle. Therefore information sharing is critical in a networked
environment. However, information sharing is often hampered by
classification. We observed that the classification is often used as an
excuse for not sharing. A methodology must be found to improve the
process and work with releasability restrictions.

22
Over-classification occurs often and there are four main reasons for this
phenomenon:

1. It is a product of culture, wherein people think there is a

greater need to protect than to share information.
2. It is a result of people being unaware of classification criteria
and rather “be safe than sorry”.
3. It is a result of people being unaware of the consequences in-
cluding being unaware of who needs the information and the
fact that changes to the classification must be agreed by the
information owner (often the originator).
4. It is often due to labels being assigned more on process than
content (e.g. automatic assigning of classification to e-mails by
servers).

 Liaison Officers.
“The LNO is the Contact or Intercommunication between elements of
Military Forces or Other Agencies to Ensure Mutual Understanding and
Unit of Purpose and Action”
NRFs are different from national organizations. The components can be
national HQs with their national forces, only assigned to the NRF for a 6
month period. National HQs and the individuals do not simply replace
their national doctrine for NATO doctrine just because they are
temporarily part of the NRF. De-conflicting and sharing this doctrine with
other commands is one of the important tasks of the liaison officer
(LNO). The LNO fulfils a critical role.

“LNOs; If it does not hurt you to send the individual, you’re sending the wrong
person”

The LNO is the representative of the parent HQ Commander in the

hosting HQ and he is the grease between the commanders and staffs in
the different HQs. He or she has to explain clearly the limitations and
capabilities of his parent organization. While doing this, he or she must
support where necessary the hosting (supported) commander, keeping
the parent commander informed. It is clear that this is almost an impos-
sible task for one person, especially on a 24/7 basis.

23
Strong LNOs serve to strengthen communication nodes and clarify in-
formation necessary for the commander to make informed decisions.
They expand the knowledge network of a force. The LNOs role remains
key in the support of the commander‟s decision making process, provid-
ing direct and complete operational information and advice to the NRF.
We observed that the mandate (empowerment), rank and knowledge of
the LNO are very important to ensure that optimal use is made of this
person.

“The LNOs are worth their weight in gold, they know people at the other side so they
can get the things done much easier.”

Some commanders had daily teleconferences with LNOs sent to other

HQs and the hosted LNOs to ensure shared situational understanding
and discuss the way ahead in the operation. These were all well spent
VTC sessions as they allowed the personnel to leave the meetings
sharing common awareness.

 Information Management.

Information Management is about making available the right information to the

right person or system at the right time

The main goal of Information Management (IM) is to maximize the

efficiency and to allow exploitation of information to the fullest extent.
“Information Management (IM) is the discipline that directs and supports
the handling of information throughout its life-cycle, ensuring it becomes
the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy
the demands of an organisation.”12

Information is exchanged between HQs and personnel at high speed,

even with the existing technological shortcomings. Well executed
Information Management will boost the knowledge network to a higher
level and speed up the decision cycle. IM is key to information sharing
and to obtain shared situational understanding; it is an enabler which
enhances mission effectiveness.

Again mutual trust is the basis for information sharing between people
and between organisations.
Trust must lead to accepting the “responsibility to share” or “will to
share” rather than the “need to know” principle.
24
Leaders are crucial in building trust and convincing their subordinates to
share. The NATO Information Management Policy (NIMP), the Primary
Directive on Information Management (PDIM)11 and the Bi-Strategic
Command IKM Directive12 provide guidance and the US Joint War
Fighting Center (JWFC) and the UK Development, Concepts and
Doctrine Centre (DCDC) offer useful best practices how an IM
organization could be set up . 13 14
 IM Planning Coordination.
We observed that IM is something that can not be solved anymore at
the single HQ level. All HQs must work together to make one IM policy
for the whole force to ensure that information is not lost. Information
Management Officers must come together at an early stage to guaran-
tee that all the HQs IM Plans are aligned.
“IM SOPs should be all lined up with the DJTF”

 IM Education
The establishment of IM roles, rules and responsibilities does not re-
move every individual‟s responsibility to share and manage information
and to adhere to the IM plan and policy. The best plans are useless if
people do not stick to them. Therefore, all staff members require educa-
tion and training in this very important area. Only then they will be able
to post and retrieve information quickly to increase situational aware-
ness and reduce the decision time.
"It seems at times that there is an amazing amount of information available but the
information may not be where you think it is or is so buried within the software
applications that it is difficult to identify for actionable use”.

In a Network Enabled force much more information will become avail-

able to much more people. This information must be used effectively
and efficiently. As a result of NNEC, information availability will increase
at a lower level in the command structure (information at the edge).
This could result in an adapted organisational structure with more dele-
gation of responsibilities.

11
Primary Directive on Information Management, 8 Oct 2008
12
Bi-SC Information and Knowledge Management Directive, 15 Sep 2008
13
http://www.jko.cmil.org/
14
UK Joint Doctrine Note 4/06

25
 “You have to read it before you know you don't need it”.

 WISE structure.
WISE is the main generic portal for posting information by HQ‟s. The
best value of storing information in the WISE is that it is immediately
shared with everyone. This is the reason why WISE is commonly
accepted as the main and most used Share Situational Awareness
(SSA) tool. At present WISE pages all look different and some require
much bandwidth. It is advised that they should have the same structure
as this will reduce the searching time and increase the efficiency.
Though WISE is a pull system, it is important to notify others by another
means whenever something of importance is stored. Otherwise people
could miss the information posted.
“If I don‟t know that there is information, then I do not miss it. Important
information should be announced by any other mean”.

 Keep WISE up to date.

People are always more interested in storing the latest information
rather than removing whatever becomes obsolete. This fact, apart from
using storage capacity, creates confusion and delays the decision
making process. In WISE it is a responsibility of the owner of the
information to keep the information current.

B. ORGANISATION
“A unit or element with varied functions enabled by a structure
through which individuals cooperate systematically to accomplish
a common mission and directly provide or support war fighting ca-
pabilities”.

“It is not the strongest of the species that survives, nor the most intelligent,
but the one most responsive to change”.
Charles Darwin

The organization should be designed to facilitate the flow of information

and materials needed to carry out the tasks at hand. At the end, NNEC
should provide more agile C2.15

15
AC/322-WP(2207) 0001 Appendix 4 to Annex 1

26
Though there are still many shortcomings, technological innovation is
one of the main enablers for NNEC. Processes, organisations and ulti-
mately personnel in an organisation must absorb the technical short-
falls. We observed that it is in principle not relevant whether a staff is
organised in a functional cell structure or in the hierarchical “1 through
9” structure. What is important is that the staff has the flexibility and
agility to form pre-planned or ad-hoc working groups to solve emerging
issues. De-compartmentalising the staff allows the information and
knowledge to flow more freely.

© Wim Rietkerk

 Similar NATO organisations must have similar C2 structures.

Having different staff structures means different procedures, collabora-
tive tools and even systems; in the NRF concept where operational
commands can change in the different rotations, having similar C2
structures might reduce the need for training.

“Keeping the structure in peacetime and wartime is the only way to be ready
in five days notice”.

 “Collaborative planning is working together to incorporate all of

the stakeholders perspective’s to enhance the product.”
Collaboration requires an interactive and dynamic interface between the
Joint Force Command (JFC) and the Component Commands (CC).
However, the lack of collaborative planning tools causes that parallel
planning is to be conducted instead.

27
 Better integration between services leads to enhanced collaboration
and information sharing, which again leads to more effective C2.
“There is parallel planning, but not collaborative planning”.

HQs must ensure that the staffs maintain insight into how the peer
organisations have been organised. Collaboration between HQs is at
risk when this insight is lost. Organisational changes to HQs should be
done early, with clear lines of communication established and with C2
relationships understood by all relevant parties.

 IM Sections must be the right size and be located at the right

place.
We observed that often there was only one Information Management
Officer assigned in the staff, with no subordinates. The duties of the
Information Management Officer (IMO) entail more than a full time job.
A Senior Information Officer (e.g. the Chief of Staff (COS)) should be
responsible for Information Management. Day to day business,
including planning, can be delegated to an IMO with lower, but sufficient
rank. Much information is obtained through telephone calls, chat, e-
mail, etc. Disseminating this “informally” obtained information in the
formal network is a challenge. The IM organisation should be set up to
deal with this.

Disseminating sensitive information can be a problem. If that is done

incorrectly one will easily be excluded from the informal social network
and lose access to vital information.

“Being a captain (OF-2) is

difficult to act as IM, I can only
make suggestions”.

© Wim Rietkerk

28
C. TRAINING
“Military training based on doctrine or tactics, techniques and
procedures to prepare forces and / or staffs to respond to strategic
and operational requirements deemed necessary by the
commanders to execute their assigned mission”

The C2CoE observed that training and education must play a bigger
role in the preparations. A well trained HQ is able to overcome
challenges more easily; people trust each other and the commander
knows that he or she can rely on his staff. Training provides the HQ the
opportunity to get to know each other (social network), to get to know
the doctrine being used and to get acquainted with the equipment and
understand how other people think (cognitive network). It is important
that HQs are trained with all the augmentees, including LNOs from
other HQs present.

 Train the staff members on the available systems and tools.

All the staff must feel comfortable with the provided tools. On the job
training is not the preferred way of training, as staff members will not be
able to get the maximum out of the tool. The risk even exists that the
tool will not be used at all as it is considered “not user friendly”.
Sometimes the staff members have the feeling that there are too many
systems and tools, but they received only training on some tools and no
training at all on others. This lack of training is even more critical when
we talk about augmentees, as they then use the exercise as an
opportunity to train on tools instead of performing their duties.

 Train with the Augmentees.

Augmentees that are not present during training will have to get
comfortable with the equipment during the operation. In addition they
must get acquainted with the people in the HQ during the operation
(they have to build their social network). This puts extra stress on the
augmentee as he/she must work twice as hard.

Training is an enforcing factor to achieve a higher level of NNEC, not

necessarily for the development of the technical network, but certainly
for the development of the social and knowledge network by building
trust and understanding. This is crucial to enable HQs to overcome
challenges.

29
Some HQs prepared training packages for augmentees that were not a
part of the initial training, conducted frequent training of core staff with
integrated augmentees and always trained with the same people. This
paid of in the observed exercises.
„There is neither training nor requirement for the CJOC, everything is on job
learning. How do we know we are doing well?”

 Joint training is the best way to identify and solve gaps.

Many of the assessed HQs conducted some training, but the certifica-
tion exercise often was the first time that all HQs operated in a joint en-
vironment. Joint training will increase trust between the participating
forces and personnel, and improve the ability to overcome shortcom-
ings.
Better integration between services leads to enhanced collaboration
and information sharing, which again leads to more effective C2. Joint
and combined training will help reduce cultural issues between services
and between nations.

 IM and IKM training is essential.

Staff officers stated that it would be helpful to receive IM education as
this would help them in posting and retrieving information. Therefore we
are convinced that besides the IM manager, the whole staff must re-
ceive some IM training. Having a dedicated NATO training for Informa-
tion & Knowledge Management will improve the quality of this important
NNEC enabler.

“IM is improving, but not at the speed it should”.

 Exploit Joint Training Opportunities to the maximum extent.

An important observation is that most staff officers expressed the re-
quirement for more joint training during the preparation and the stand-
by period of the NRF.

“We are not meeting the exercise objectives of cross-training”.

30
We observed that internal training is adequate for certification exer-
cises, but there was a lack of joint (cross component) training. The sce-
nario mainly focuses on vertical relations between DJTF and CCs and
provided little opportunities for horizontal (CC to CC) interaction; in the
certification exercise Components are not forced to collaborate.
„Training should be designed for maximum learning value, this can be
achieved by having mentors who share lessons learned and are responsible
to expose people to them, to nurture the learning process”.

The scenario of an exercise must force the commanders and staffs to

work together to achieve the mission, otherwise HQ‟s tend to work in iso-
lation, not in collaboration. The Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE)
has a prime responsibility in this respect.

 Collaboration and information sharing result in a more effective

Command and Control.
Through procedures, personnel and leadership, a well trained force is
able to overcome shortcomings, like lack of technical interoperability or
differences in doctrines. Joint and combined training helps to reduce
cultural issues between services and between nations. This will in-
crease trust between the participating forces and improve the social
and knowledge network. Consequently this will lead to enhanced col-
laboration and information sharing and will result in more effective C2.

“Staffs need to be educated to operate at the operational level and not use
the hundred miles long screw driver”.

D. MATERIAL
All items necessary to equip, operate, maintain and support
military activities without distinction as to its application for
administrative or combat purposes.
In this context only applied IT is discussed.

If things seem under control, you are not moving fast enough
Mario Andretti

31
 Technology is an important enabler in NNEC and though there are is-
sues, the development of technology moves forward at high pace.
Commanders have no influence on the available technology and must
work within the limitations of the (NATO) INFOSEC policies. The non-
interoperability of National and NATO systems puts a heavy burden on
the social and knowledge network (especially organisation and train-
ing), as they have to overcome the technical shortcomings.

 Material and Micromanagement.

The modern technology provides the higher HQ the opportunity to act
as big brother and to use the miles long screwdriver. The operational
commander must operate at the operational level and not be lured into
the tactical level of operations.

“The improved exchange of

information should never lead
to micromanagement in the
chain of command”.

© Wim Rietkerk

 Train on Systems.
Introduction of new tools shortly without proper training should be
avoided. Proper documentation or introduction is required as there is
otherwise a great risk the introduction will fail. There is also a risk of re-
duced trust in technology. If this happens during an operation, the result
is that the (expensive) tool is not used.

32
A full test with a full set up of equipment (national and NATO), including
the software versions to be used, should be conducted prior to the
deployment and carefully observed by the participants to identify
potential issues.

“Generally, there are too many tools and we can not apply them practically.
The toolset is not very well integrated, operationally or technically. Before we
put out tools we should provide people a boundary within which to use the
tools. A CONOPS is needed on how to integrate the tools but only after a
decision on which tools are useful has been made”.

“Without proper instruction, the tool remains just another tool”.

 Use of JCOP
Although not yet fully operational, the Joint Common Operational
Picture (JOCP) starts to be a known SSA tool. It is designed to become
in the near future the main Joint Situational Awareness System. Our
observation is that at the component level the use of JCOP is hardly
encouraged, partly because people are not trained. HQs that used
JCOP recognised the value of the tool.

“For building up the SSA, JCOP is very important: all people get the same
picture at the same time. However one has to keep in mind that not everyone
needs to know the same”.

“It is not an option to restrict access to the data in the COP; rather you
should train people on their responsibilities”.

“Technological sophistication notwithstanding, in combat most information

about the enemy comes from the boots on the ground. There is only so much
that advanced CIS can do to resolve the fog of war”
NATO/RTO/TG 023

33
E. LEADERSHIP
The ability to influence, motivate and enable others to contribute
towards the success of the organisation and inspire to change in
order to improve effectiveness.
Leadership is not only applicable to the Force Commander. It applies to
the whole Command Group and also to whoever has leading responsi-
bilities (e.g. the Branch Chiefs). They are the enforcers and must moti-
vate people to change the way they do business.
In NATO, but also nationally, assessing Leadership is a sensitive issue.
However there are some thoughts (based on our observations) we want
to share . Also Command and Control insights provided by Gen (ret) G.
Luck and Col (ret) M. Findlay and the Netherlands Organisation for Ap-
plied Scientific Research TNO are used on this subject. Almost all of
their identified best practices are applicable in NNEC.

If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more and
become more, you are a leader
John Quincy Adams (6th US president)

It seems that the recognised importance of the social network is grow-

ing, and provides more „quick wins‟ than the technical network. The
strength of informal social networks should not be underestimated, but
they sometimes bypass the formal network and organisation. If a small
„inner and trusted circle‟ is doing most of the work, then this could result
into frustration and reluctance of personnel that are not part of that
„social network‟ and have to work in the formal structure and processes
of the staffs.

 Apply lessons learned from previous rotations

HQs insufficiently communicate with previous NRF rotations to obtain
observations, lessons identified and lessons learned. Leadership
should encourage the staff to contact HQs in a very early stage.

34
 Build up internal trust to overcome the language problems.
An important observation is that language proficiency and culture
continues to play an important role within the social domain. Building
trust and common understanding between nations by commanders of
different mother tongues is probably the best way to solve this.

 Benefit from the Cultural Differences.

It is not only the spoken language that is an issue; the interpretation of
what is said can be problematic. In NATO, cultural differences will
always be a factor. Although it is sometimes being looked at as a
weakness, leaders should try to live with it. A balanced mix of
nationalities and services means more expertise and better diversity,
and ultimately will lead to more collaboration. Leadership needs to
stimulate cultural awareness and proclaim the benefits of a diverse
workforce.
“Strong leadership is especially necessary in non-permanent HQs and when
joining people with different cultural backgrounds”.

 Balance “Chiefs and Indians”.

NATO command relationships are often related to rank rather than to
functions. This is a cultural issue that has to be taken into account and
the leadership has to recognize this. The leadership must actively work
it by extending the social network. Problems are not solved by bringing
more general / flag officers into a HQ. We observed that more general /
flag officers in a HQ slowes down decision making processes in that
HQ and consequently decreased the effectiveness. At an NCOIC
plenary meeting a senior officer made the following statement17:

The more senior an organization, the slower it moves; the information is

100% accurate but irrelevant
Gen (USMC) Cartwright, Vice Chairman JCS

A flat organisation improves the internal coordination and allows better

external interaction. Removing or re-arranging intermediate posts in the
organisation will improve the direct contact between the leaders and the
staff. Experiences have shown that this dramatically speeds up the de-
cision cycle.
17
NCOIC Plenary key note address, Washington DC, 17 Sep 2008
35
 Unity of Effort as much as Unity of Command.
As already stated several times, and re-emphasized by Gen Luck and
Col Findlay (JWFC), an important role of the leadership is to build trust
and confidence by establishing personal relationships. Building trust is
a conscious act; it is not something that just happens. Personal
relationships are essential in the joint, multinational and interagency
world. The leadership must build these relationships, and foster trust
and confidence with his partners to keep this a one team, one fight.

The leadership must ensure that his organisation is a learning

organisation before and during the fight, NOT only after the fight. The
leadership must focus on unity of effort, not only on the unity of
command. It is important to recognise the reality that partners have
different perspectives and goals. The leader must establish mission
approval processes that allow subordinates to retain agility and speed
of action. This likely entails decentralisation.18

 Use the Commanders Update Meetings to the maximum extent.

The best opportunities for leaders to convey intent are the internal
Commander‟s updates (Commanders Update Briefing (CUB), etc).
These are very important internal synchronisation tools and the best
opportunity to explain Commanders intent.
“One of the main staff challenges is to understand Commanders intent”.

 Encourage the use of systems and tools.

The leadership has a major role in encouraging the importance of
sharing information and therefore the use of sharing systems and tools.
Requesting to receive the Commander‟s updates over the network will
enforce the use of such systems and improve the quality of the
information.

 The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR).

Awareness is essential for the leaders to make the right decisions.
Therefore the staff needs to maintain the CCIR permanently updated
and ensure that the right information is always available. On the other
hand the leader must ensure that his requirements are known by the
staff; he must drive his CCIR.
28
Joint Operations Insights and Best Practices 2nd edition by Gen (ret) G. Luck and Col (ret) M. Findlay

36
 Build up “Esprit de Corps”.
During the NRF Assessments the importance of building up “Esprit de
Corps” was commonly agreed as a way to reach the right leadership.
This fact is especially challenging in the so called ad-hoc HQs due to
the lack of continuity and time.

F. PERSONNEL
The human capital of a nation or force serving as part of an or-
ganisation tasked to accomplish the mission.

Have you invested as much in your career as in your car?

Molly Sargent, OD consultant and trainer

Personnel is the most valuable asset of a commander and must be

treated as such. But personnel also have responsibilities. They must
ensure that they are trained and educated. Education is not only a
responsibility for the leadership self-education is an important method
to reach a higher level.

© Wim Rietkerk

37
The “on the job” trainers are busy with their own work and this method-
ology of educating will lead to the “slippery slope” of using only the lim-
ited capabilities of the equipment. If you do not know the system, you
do not realise the capabilities of the system. The good quality of people
is that they work around issues, they solve problems. This provides an
indication which urgent requirements must be fulfilled to enhance head-
quarters operations.

“It does not matter how technically perfect the system is, humans will always
break it up again”.

 Language skills at all levels.

Language proficiency and culture continues to play an important role
within the social domain. Issues can only be solved by building trust
and understanding between nations. Even between “native English
speakers” misunderstandings occur as a result of a missing common
vocabulary. NATO is and will remain an organisation with many nations.
Improving the language skills will result in a better communication and
trusting social network. It will also improve the work tempo.

“Language and Communication skills are not the same thing. Someone can
be proficient in a particular language and still not be able to share
information with another person”.

 (Informal) Social Networks help to build trust.

Early establishment of (informal) social networks throughout the whole
NRF is essential and provides greater synergy within the organisations.
Giving and receiving advice through the informal social network occurs
more often than through the formal social network and is better re-
ceived. This is one of the important reasons to build informal social net-
works. Social networks are more than about socialising. Commanders
and officers attach much importance to the social side of networking,
and the resulting quality of shared situational awareness and trust that
grow out of these. The paradox is that NNEC should make social
networking easier, but this does not seem to be the case, because the
level of networking is increasing fast too.

“Sometimes is more effective to walk over to the person than to send an

email”.

38
  Integrate the augmentees in the staff.
The quality of augmentees (specialisation, ability, capacity and
language skills) is important. The careful selection and early integration
of augmentees into the NRF training improves the staff effectiveness.

G. FACILITIES
A building, place or infrastructure which provides a specific kind
of operating assistance to naval, ground or air forces or a combi-
nation thereof, thereby facilitating any action or operation
In this context only the staff facilities are considered.

The way facilities are set up can be crucial to encourage human

interactions. We observed that limited interactions between staff
occurred when the cells
or the divisions had their
own cubical or tent into
which they could
withdraw. The other
extreme observed was
that leadership organised
their staff in one open
space, ensuring
interaction and enabling a
seamless exchange of
information. This requires
however much discipline
© Wim Rietkerk to keep the noise level
down.

H. INTEROPERABILITY
The ability to operate in synergy to achieve a certain mission
As a central component of NNEC, interoperability needs to be ad-
dressed in both the operational and technical dimensions. Technical
and Operational interoperability allows seamless exchange and exploi-
tation of information, aiming at achieving and exercising information and
decision superiority.

39
The definition implies that no technology is per se involved in
interoperability. If two people can achieve a goal because they speak
the same language and understand each other, they are interoperable.
A common vocabulary, respect for each other and trust are essential
elements. Interoperability is the grease that makes networking
possible.

Technical interoperability.
 Application of technical standards.
Technical interoperability starts by applying the same standards in
technology. Applying the same standards will however not make
equipment necessarily
interoperable. The number of
CIS, C2IS and C2 (including
national) support tools is
increasing. Due to
incompatibility and non-
interoperability of the tools,
swivel chair interfaces and /
or air-gaps are needed to
transfer information between
networks. This requires
organisational adaptation. We
observed that in some
occasions different
application software versions
had been installed.

This resulted in incompatible software versions, to a degree that the

necessary technical interoperability and information exchange could
not be achieved. Staffs have to ensure that identical or backward com-
patible (tested) versions are installed before the operation starts.
Technical interoperability allows you to communicate with almost
everybody, but what most systems do not provide is the opportunity to
do the face to face collaboration.

“Systems should be more user-friendly. There are just too many tools out
there”.

40
 The requirement to maintain more than one security domain
(NS, MS and National Secret) is an important technical
interoperability issue.
In most modern operations there is a requirement to maintain more
than one security domain, a NATO, a Mission and National Secret
domain.
Exchange of information between networks is often possible through
firewalls and mail-guards, as it is proven to work in operations.
However, to enable exchange of information conditions must be met,
e.g. naming conventions of documents (Information Management).
Reducing the size of the attachment can also be important. Staffs must
be aware of the limitations and possibilities.

Operational Interoperability.
 Language Interoperability.
The Combined Joint Operations Centre (CJOC) is one of the busiest
cells in the DJTF. One issue that increases the workload within the
CJOC cell is language proficiency. Language proficiency is still seen as
a major barrier to operations. Native speakers complain about the lack
of language proficiency of non-natives. And non-native speakers
complain about the speed, complexity and accent of native speakers.
This is, and probably forever will be, inherent to NATO. However, we
need to acknowledge that this is a mutual problem. Non-native
speakers are as capable and intelligent as native-speakers, however
because they have difficulties in expressing themselves this might be
seen differently. Unfortunately, sometimes, speed and accuracy of
communication and language is of critical importance. In these cases,
language proficiency and a common language (also semantically) are
most necessary.
“The language proficiency is a problem for the efficiency. Once the pace of
the operation picks up, the slow points in the system show up”.

 Cultural Interoperability.
As with language proficiency, cultural differences are inherent to NATO.
This is reflected in the way we conduct operations, approach people,
communicate horizontally and vertically, interpret situations and issues
etc. Everybody acknowledges the importance of cultural awareness, but
still it seems not to be addressed systematically.

41
Many pros and cons regarding cultural differences have been said and
observed during exercises. Still, the cons of cultural differences are
seen as more important than the pros. This hampers communication,
collaboration and the way people think of the capabilities of colleagues
from other nations or services.
Therefore, it is of great importance that the leadership and staff start
seeing the potential benefits of a diverse workforce. Cultural awareness
of other cultures, but maybe even more important, our own culture is
critical. High levels of cultural awareness can enable mutual
understanding and establish trust among staff. This will lead to better
communication, collaboration, information sharing and shared
understanding, and eventually to improved mission effectiveness. The
leadership is responsible to build the team to achieve the goal.

 Information sharing speeds up the decision process.

The Technical Interoperability continues to be a challenge in supporting
information sharing. Issues in the technical network are often
compensated by the knowledge and the social network. Leaders have
to build trust between people to ensure that information is shared as
information sharing speeds up the decision process
10. CONCLUSION
Network Enabled Capabilities is about networking, not about networks.
NEC empowers decision makers by providing information superiority.
In NATO this will be achieved by federating the various components of
the operational environment. To enable this, interoperability standards
are being developed.
When and if a higher level of Network Enabled Capability maturity is
achieved, Command and Control can also reach the next level. As a
result of NNEC leaders or commanders know what resources are
available to do the job most effectively. The leadership will be able to
share information more easily, to communicate across boundaries (in
and outside the military) and share resources. This will speed up the
decision cycle.
To achieve this, trust must be build between commands, commanders
and staff. That is an demanding effort but must be pursued actively.
Now a days it can hardly be expect that all the knowledge and skills
are present in one person. The solution is networking. This includes
providing the information to the person that is in the best position and
acknowledge that he or she has the best situational awareness.

42
11 . CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Command and Control Centre of Excellence is convinced that
improvements in the field of NATO Network Enabled Capabilities can be
achieved. It is important to note that many improvements can be made
in the “non-technical” field like the social and knowledge networks. The
human factor is a very important factor and often underestimated by
many. Social and knowledge skills are as important as technical
networks in contemporary Command and Control.
12. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
This document could not have been written without the coorperation of
the Commanders, Commands and Staffs who were willing to share their
experiences and views on NATO Network Enabled Capabilities.

43
13. ACRONYMS LIST

AAP.......... Allied Administrative Publication

AAWC...... Anti-Air Warfare Commander (Coordinator)
ACC......... Air Component Command
ACT......... Allied Command Transformation
ACO........ Allied Command Operations
AOC........ Air Operation Centre /Air Officer Commanding
Bi-SC....... Bi Strategic Commands
C2............ Command and Control
C2IS........ Command and Control and Information Systems
C3........... Command, Control and Comunications
C4I........... Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence
CAOC ...... Combined Air Operations Centre
CCIR........ Commander's Critical Information Requirements
CIS........... Communication and Information Systems
CJOC....... Combined and Joint Operations Centre
CJOS........ Combined and Joint Operations from the Sea CoE
CMM.......... Capability Maturity Model
CoE........... Centre of Excellence
COM......... Commander, Command
CONOPS.... Concept of Operations
CoS........... Chief of Staff
CRC........... Control (Combat) and Reporting Centre
CTG........... Commander (Carrier) Task Group
CUB........... Commander's Update Briefing
DJTF.......... Deployed and Joint Task Forces
DCDC ........ Development, Conceps and Doctrine Centre (UK)
DOTMLPFI.. Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel,
Facilities and Interoperability.
HQ............ Headquarters
HQ SACT.. Headquarter Supreme Allied Command Transformation
IKM...... Information Knowledge Management
IM............. Information Management
IMO.......... Information Management Officer
INFOSEC.. Information Security
IT.............. Information technology
JCOP....... Joint Common Operational Picture
JFC .......... Joint Forces Command
JWFC........ Joint Warfigthing Center (US)
LCC .......... Land Component Command
LNO.......... Liaison Officer
LoD........... Line of Development
MCC......... Maritime Component Command
MCM......... Military Commitee Manual

44
NATO........ North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NC3A......... NATO C3 Agency
NCO........... Network Centric Operations
NCOIC....... Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium
NCOP ......... NATO Common Operational Picture
NCS........... NATO Command Structure
NCW.......... Network Centric Warfare
NEC........... Network Enabled Capabilities
NFS........... NATO Force Structure
NGO.......... Non-Governmental Organization
NII............. Networking and Information Infrastructure
NIMP.......... NATO Information Management Policy
NML........... NATO Maturity Levels
NNEC ......... NATO Network Enabled Capabilities
NRF............ NATO Response Force
OFT............ Office of Force Transformation
OPR........... Office of Primary Responsibility
OPS........... Operations
OSD/OFT... Office of the Secretary of Defence / Office of Force Transformation
OSE............ Officer Scheduling the Exercise
PDIM.......... Primary Directive on Information Management
RTA............ Research and Technology Agencies
SA.............. Situational Awarenes
SACEUR.... Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACT......... Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
SHAPE...... Supreme Headquartes Allied Power in Europe
SSA.......... Shared Situational Awareness
TNO.......... Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientif Reasearch

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Disclaimer

This handbook is a product of the Command and Control Centre of

Excellence (C2CoE). It is produced to disseminate the C2CoE findings
during NATO Response Force (NRF) assessments. It does not
represent the opinions or policies of NATO and is designed to provide
an independent opinion.

This is a living document. Comments are most welcome to:

info@c2coe.org

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 Catalysing the art of C2

Command and Control Centre of Excellence

Elias Beeckman Kazerne

Mail address: Post box 9012 Visiting address: Nieuwe Kazernelaan 10

6710 HC Ede 6711 JC Ede
The Netherlands The Netherlands
Building 20, Room 7
Tel: +31 (0)318 681 580
Fax: +31 (0)318 683 105
jep.hendriks@c2coe.org

www.c2coe.org

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www.c2coe.org