Conference Session’s Concepts

1. Session-I
First session of the Cold Start conference mainly focused on the definition aspect
of the Cold Start Doctrine, strategic stability and Deterrence. First session mainly
included a key note address the Chief Guest- Lt Gen (retd) Syed Athar Ali HI
(M). This session also highlighted the threat of Indian Cold Start doctrine and also
tinted implications for the defence and security policy of region, particularly
Pakistan.

2. Session-II- Plenary
Session-II focused on the Cold Start Concept, how it evolved over the past and
how it is going to impact on the strategic stability of South Asia. In this session
major emphasis was on Cold Start Conventional Doctrine and Evaluations-India-
Pakistan. This Session unveiled Indian military’s weakness in the
operationalisation of the CSD. India’s Cold Start Doctrine: Philosophy and
Dynamics were also discussed in this session, in which the evolution of Indian
military posture from defensive to offensive was highlighted. In Break out session
different war games were practiced in which audience actively played an
important role.

3. Session-III
Session-III of the conference focused on Cold Start Assumptions and its
implications on strategic stability in South Asia. Major emphasis was to highlight
the Indian assumption of fighting a limited war in a nuclear environment and keep
it below the nuclear threshold and that the Indians can unambiguously identify
Pakistan’s nuclear red lines. Other major which was discussed in this session was
structural context of the Cold Start Doctrine. In the critical analysis of Cold Start
ended this session. In this part it was emphasised that Cold Start Doctrine has
boosted the strategic optimism of the Indian strategic pundits. The supporter and
propagator of the doctrine have sketched interesting operational advantageous
scenarios. The Revolution in Military Affairs obviously restructures and
multiplies Indian Armed forces striking power. The increasing war-fighting
capability of Indian forces has been boosting Indian ruling elites’ strategic sense
of superiority, which could entail devastating misperception and miscalculation
about strategic competitor’s defensive capabilities.

4. Session-IV-Plenary
Session-IV discussed the military development and Implications for Arms Race.
Future Technologies, military capabilities and its implications for strategic
stability was also highlighted. Relationship between Nuclear Doctrines of India
and Pakistan and Cold Start Doctrine was also discussed in this session. Number
of rationales for India’s formulation of its aggressive Cold Start conventional
military doctrine were discussed in this session, Primarily Indian military’s
frustration with the failure of its military operation Parakram in 2002, wherein it
mobilized bulk of its armed forces against Pakistan immediately after an attack on
 the Indian Parliament in December 2001, provided the apparent rationale for
reformulation of the Indian military doctrine. Evolution and development of the
CSD was discussed in detail.

5. Session-V
Session-V mainly focused on strategic stability of South Asia and its implications
of Cold Start Doctrine for the regional stability. Strategic stability revolves
primarily around the development of a relation of mutual deterrence among the
adversaries. It can be broadly viewed as a result of effective deterrence. Its remit
goes beyond nuclear stability to include the wider issues of chemical, biological
weapons and conventional force balance. In this session Cold Start and nuclear
deterrence in South Asia was also discussed in detail. Fourth Generation Warfare
and Cold Start Doctrine were also discussed briefly. Threat of a fourth generation
warfare and its relevance with Cold Start doctrine was also highlighted. Further it
was highlighted in this session that, this paradigm of warfare revolves around a
symmetrical warfare to get a moral victory with minimum nation state
involvement. Moreover threat of nuclear use has also been highlighted in this
session.

6. Session-VI
Session-VI mainly highlighted the international response in case of any CSD based
operations. Pakistan-India Confrontation: role of US/UN

He outlined two basic parameters of this entire exercise in which we are engaged in
regarding the Indian Cold Start or as it is also known by them as their Proactive
Doctrine. On the one hand, it is important to draw international attention to an
essentially aggressive doctrine which is at variance by the pronouncement of the
Indian political leadership that India has no aggressive designs against Pakistan and
wishes to develop better relations and to live in peace with Pakistan.

10.2. Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Senior associate Fellow SASSI

Cold Start: Response from China and East Asia.
Ambassador Naqvi said perhaps the most important, and in all likelihood, the most
immediate response to a Cold Start offensive against Pakistan on the part of India
would be that of China. Important because it would be a determining factor in the
eventual outcome of the debacle, and immediate because of China’s proximity to
both Pakistan and India. While there does not seem to be any official Chinese
comment or position on Cold Start as such, it would be my endeavor to deduce the
contours of a likely Chinese response on the basis of a broad survey of Pakistan-
China relations followed by a surmise regarding the response in the context of the
present situation. I will then briefly look at the East Asian response.

10.3. Brig. Feroz Hassan Khan, Associate Fellow SASSI

Threat of two front war under CSD and role of NATO/EU
The security landscape in South Asia has changed dramatically over the last 12 years,
since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear weapons powers. In 2001 the
Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond to a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament building in New Delhi. After nine months of full mobilization, Indian forces
withdrew to the barracks.

10.2. Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Senior associate Fellow SASSI

Cold Start: Response from China and East Asia.
Ambassador Naqvi said perhaps the most important, and in all likelihood, the most
immediate response to a Cold Start offensive against Pakistan on the part of India would
be that of China. Important because it would be a determining factor in the eventual
outcome of the debacle, and immediate because of China’s proximity to both Pakistan
and India. While there does not seem to be any official Chinese comment or position on
Cold Start as such, it would be my endeavor to deduce the contours of a likely Chinese
response on the basis of a broad survey of Pakistan-China relations followed by a surmise
regarding the response in the context of the present situation. I will then briefly look at
the East Asian response.

This outcome of this coercive force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered debate
within the Indian Army to develop a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly
mobilize in response to a perceived proxy attack waged by Pakistan.

11. DAY-III
Session-VII- Plenary
National Response
11.1. Dr Tanveer Ahmed Khan, DG ISSI
Pakistan’s Response to Indian Cold Start Doctrine
The security landscape in South Asia has changed dramatically over the last 12 years,
since India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear weapons powers. In 2001 the
Indian Army was left flat-footed as to how to respond to a terrorist attack on the Indian
Parliament building in New Delhi.
Dr Tanveer Ahmed Khan, DG ISSI

After nine months of full mobilization, Indian forces withdrew to the barracks. This
outcome of this coercive force deployment was unsatisfying and triggered debate within
the Indian Army to develop a new doctrine, which would allow it to quickly mobilize in
response to a perceived proxy attack waged by Pakistan. Earlier, what was referred as
Sunderji doctrine envisaged deep strikes into Pakistan thorough three offensive corps
through salami-slicing tactics to destroy Pakistani armored forces in intense battleground
of Indian choosing (desert /semi deserts areas)

11.2. Dr Noman Sattar, Head of Deptt of Nuclear politics and Strategic Studies

Dr. Noman gave his views on the Cold start doctrine and national response. He
mentioned that the Pakistan’s national response will be at three levels; Doctrinal,
operational and political. He stated the three options that Pakistan could go for. These
are; Defuse conflict situation, engage/embroil and escalate—Fight. In addition, he said
that India must take into account Pakistan’s nuclear threshold and must not ignore the
response from China and US.

ne could conclude the discussion in the following points:

 Cold Start is a doctrine of prevention and punishment.

 It is a strategy for a High Intensity Limited Conflict.

 The doctrine is meant to avert the risk of a nuclear confrontation or escalation.

 The doctrine comes at the right time in the regional context, but at the wrong time
in the international context.

 As nuclear neighbors, it behooves India and Pakistan to act responsibly and

rationally, while Pakistan keeps the “first use option” open, and India mulls its
Cold Start doctrine.

 If the Pakistan army is prepared the fight a conventional war with India, it is ready
to face Cold Start.

Breakout Session VII: National Response

The breakout session for national response was through a war game, which was based on
an assumed scenario, portraying the implication of the Indian cold start doctrine against
Pakistan. The scenario was such that a massive terrorist attack had taken place in India in
the year 2015, and making it as the basis, India has attacked Pakistan at Kasur. Right in
accordance with the doctrine, India also opened a multiple thrust, surprise attack
throughout the Pakistani border. This causes a psychological paralysis for the military,
political leadership, Government and the masses of Pakistan. In addition, it has greatly
affected the decision making body of Pakistan. India also, apprehended that there is a
politico-military discord in Pakistan.

12. Session-VIII- Plenary

Pakistan Counter measures and nuclear doctrine

12.1. Maria Sultan-DG SASSI

Pakistan’s Nuclear Doctrine and Implications for Deterrence
and Strategic Stability: The theory of integrated strategic Equivalence

Dr. Maria Sultan said that the future war in South Asia can never remain conventional.
Presenting the new theory of Integrated Strategic Equivalence as Pakistan’s possible
counter measures to CSD, objective was to ensure that Pakistan no longer feared the
threat of pre-emption. War and the threat of war is a serious business which can
neither be left to conjecture, wishful thinking or mere imagination. Every move
made by the adversary requires inquiry and a thorough investigation; for any
miscalculation in the intent or response can be disastrous in the event of the outbreak
of war, especially in the nuclearised context. India and Pakistan have remained in a
state of rivalry for almost 60 years; more than the historic rivalry that existed
between the United States and the USSR; Furthermore the transformation in their
respective war doctrines have also remained locked in the historic tradition of
British war fighting, battle plans and strategic out comes. The force differentional
between the states being in the case of the army almost 31, 1.5mecahnised forces 4 to 1 in
artillery strength. The total number equalling to almost 1.3 million troops.

Lt. Gen. Tariq Waseem Ghazi, Former Secretary Defence

To Counter Cold Start Doctrine: Pakistan’s Possible Response
Lt. Gen. Tariq Waseem Ghazi said that Cold Start is an aggressive doctrine aimed at
Pakistan, such a doctrine against a nuclear weapon state will put the region into quagmire
of volatility and dismay. Threat of deterrence failure would increase if India
operationalised her CSD. The analyses of the level of funding allocated for the
modernization of Indian armed forces and its endeavor to overcome its deficiencies, show
that India may operationalise CSD in next five to ten years.

. Dr Parvez Iqbal Cheema, Dean Faculty of Contemporary studies

NDU- Chair.
Dr Cheema in his remarks said that India and Pakistan have fought many wars since
independence, including the 1999 Kargil conflict. Though relations at the strategic level
continue to be reasonably stable, instability persists in South Asia. The Cold Start
doctrine is a work-in-being. Its implementation would have major ramifications for
strategic stability in South Asia. He further said that no Pakistani could ever allow Indian
troops to enter Pakistan and occupy a strategic area in a so called limited war. The Cold
Start Strategy is a variation of India’s plan to take over Lahore in 1965. It did not work
then, and it will not work with a nuclear armed Pakistan.

Concluding Session-IX- Plenary

Implications for strategic stability

13.1. Concluding Remarks by Gen. Ehsan Ul Haq NI (M)

Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, Pakistan.
Gen (retired) Ehsan Ul Haq said Pakistan had been seeking peaceful resolution to
disputes and normalization of relations with India. Our Defence and security policy have
been entirely focused on deterring war, he said that restraint and responsible had been the
watchwords of our nuclear policy.

It is in pursuit of this policy that Pakistan has proposed the strategic restraint regime to
achieve stability and foster mutual confidence, he added. As long as destabilizing
concepts like CSD are being projected, Pakistan has to undertake all measures to
safeguard its territorial sovereignty.

. Concluding Session by Chaired by DG SASSI Maria Sultan

Lt. Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, Senator:

Excellencies, scholars, ladies and gentlemen,

The gravest danger in our times lies in the possibilities of war and conflict. This
is perpetuated by the military planning divorced of regional realities and the lack of
the ability to control the spiral of violence generated by the non state actors . This
reality becomes all the more relevant when we find ourselves at the cross roads of
extremism ; military adventurism and the probability of a nuclear war.

Lt. Gen Javed Ashraf Qazi, Former Interior Minister

Today, the unresolved conflicts around the world have unfortunately made all of us a
future witness to the probability of wars becoming a reality; a reality which may
become history of this region if the roots of misadventurism are not seriously
reconsidered by the politico- military elite of our neighbouring country India. For
the implications can be far reaching and offsetting for regional peace; if not re-
calibrated in the interest of peace.

Therefore, I welcome this scholarly and deliberate effort made by the intellectuals
/strategic community through this three day workshop on cold start and its
implications for the region to come up with policy recommendations and perhaps
solutions which may help to provide insights to ways and measures to bring about
strategic stability in the region . and it is in this context that I congratulate the South
Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI) for deliberating on this very important
Subject and its implications for regional and global security order. We in the
Defence Committee of the Senate will benefit from the recommendations that will
come through this august gathering of scholars, policy makers and the intelligencia
regarding the doctrinal implications for maintaining and managing the crisis through
effective and reliable crisis and deterrence stability.

Concluding Session – Session IX – Plenary

Colonel GS Hans Eberhart, PhD, Defence Attaché of Switzerland
Contribution to “International response”

Madam Chairperson DG Maria Sultan and General Ehsan ul Haq,

Distinguished Ladies and Gentlemen

1.) Preliminary remarks

I am honored and grateful for having been invited to constructively contributing to this
workshop. I approach the topic “International response” from a different perspective and
hope to add to its better understanding in the framework of this workshop.
My role here is an ad hoc one. I also speak on my personal capacity and do no present
any element of the position of the Swiss government.

Colonel GS Hans Eberhart, PhD, Defence Attaché of Switzerland

2.) Conclusions with concrete terms

- Firstly, in my view, as the workshop has shown, the component “International

response” needs further elaborations within the work to formulate an overall, coherent
and consistent response to the “Cold Start War Doctrine (CSWD)”. Let me concretize
this, namely with regard: To the aspect “International”. We must differentiate. Do we
expect responses/actions/support/disagreement

a.) at multilateral level, in/through international and/or regional organizations, etc.

b.) at unilateral level, from national actors ?.. to the aspect: “response”. We must clarify.

To what/which substance is the response related:

a.) to the doctrine itself,
b.) to the cause of triggering it and giving reason for a possible military escalation,
c.) to/in the phase of an armed struggle,
d.) in its aftermath (ceasefire, peace negotiations) ?.. to the aspect: “International
response” and its connection with the workshop title “and its Implications for Strategic
Stability in South Asia”. What can we assume as interest(s) of (the) external actors/third
parties for strategic stability in South Asia.