-Sample of previous work II-

Ioannis Kyriakantonakis

Aspects of Developmental History and the rationalization schema in the analysis of Max
Weber (UCL History Graduate Course Weber for Historians, March 2004)

I. The rationalization theme is one of Weber’s major analytical tools. This idea and the
relevant analysis penetrates, as a cohesive element, into his work as a whole, but
particularly into his approaches to religion, bureaucracy, routinization of charisma, and
sociology of law. It constitutes a developmental schema, an ideal-type of historic
evolution, perhaps even an explanatory principle of universal significance (but not of
catholic authority)1. Two components of this schema could at this early point be traced.
The first one refers to religion and the elimination of metaphysics from its sphere, the
demagification of the world, -its disenchantment2. Religion itself did not of course cease
to exist, but, as Weber explained, was turned to a rational system of ethical norms and
beliefs, into which salvation was not the result of the irrational absolute liberty of the
Father, but a rational necessity (a necessity arising from rational data and a logical
process). The second characteristic of this schema refers to bureaucratization through the
routinization of charisma, the emergence of complicated administrative needs and the
demise of traditional structures. Both phenomena require the development of a
methodology of abstractions and deductions, of a rational system of law characterized by
typical consistency and calculability in terms of the relationship between ends and means,
as well as, the connection between the specific behavior and the production of (legal)
consequences3.
Now there are two important ways to view these schemas, both in weberian work and
sociohistoric enquiry in general. We could conceive them as ideal-types, according to the
1
Guenther Roth, “Rationalization in Max Weber’s Developmental History”, in Scott Lash, Sam Whimster
(eds), Max Weber, Rationality and Modernity, Allen & Unwin, London, 1987, 81.
2
Translation of Entzauberung. Max Weber cited by Ralph Schroeder, Max Weber and the Sociology of
Culture, Sage, London, 1992, 73.
3
Charles Taylor, “Rationality”, in M. Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds), Rationality and Relativism, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984, 87, 88, Max Weber, Economy and Society, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1978, 956, 975.

1
relevant abstract reasoning and method, which always refers to a possible explanation,
-understanding of historical reality. Weber seems to follow this method at the first
volume of Economy and Society, wherein he refers to the pure types of authority, as pure
types of legitimate domination (legal-rational, traditional, and charismatic)4. This
classification is made on the basis of the kind of claim to legitimacy typically made by
authority. However, we could also regard this process of rationalization as the
characteristic of historic development of a particular civilization, that of the West. In
doing so, western history would be approached as a process of rationalization and the
West itself as rationality, at least on the level of generality and abstraction5. This
approach is linked to Weber’s question in the Author’s Introduction: Why the West, and,
as he repeatedly mentions, the West only? Why the West in science, in law, in
architecture, in the state and administration, in capitalism, in modernity. All these
categories are related to the rationalization process, a phenomenon that occurred in the
West in a unique way and degree (Weber speaks of the peculiar rationalism of western
culture6), although rationality is not something unknown to other cultures as well.
This particular aspect of Weber’s developmental history is manifested in the Protestant
Ethic, where rationalization is not only a basis for explanation, but, as Wolgang
Schluchter has argued, also a question to be analyzed. It would not be accurate, however,
to trace a distinction between the two above mentioned works in relation to this matter as
Weber’s interest in the West also appears in Economy and Society, for example in his
analyses of the unique evolution of Roman Law, or of the relation between Jewish
rationalism and Puritan Asceticism, or even of the Standestaat and the transition from
feudalism to bureaucracy.
Before entering to the more specific part of this essay, it could be mentioned in advance
that Weber’s analysis regarding rationalization is not in essence similar to other –liberal-
theories that identify the rise of rationality with liberalism and the republican state. It is
rather the relationship between means and ends, methodical consistency in pursuing ends
and calculability, which determine rationalization. The instrumental nature of the

4
Economy and Society, 215, 216.
5
Wolfgang Schluchter, The Rise of Western Rationalism. Max Weber’s Developmental History, University
of California Press, Berkeley, 1981, 9-12.
6
“Author’s Introduction”, in Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin,
London, 1965, 24, 25.

2
resulting rationality implies that it can be equally cultivated within a communist society
(as the experience of the historical bureaucracy in these regimes has shown), within the
organism of the church, or in the benefit of the bourgeois state with the same level of
success and effectiveness7. Moreover, in this same respect, the distinction between
public and private sphere is irrelevant. Both the enterprise and agency share the
bureaucratic element, which is accompanied by high level of regulation by law and
calculation, as well as separation of the household from either the business or the office 8.
Further reference to these characteristics will be made below, but at this point we have
stressed the perhaps obvious idea that the sociological presuppositions for the
development of rational methodism of bureaucracy should only with attention be related
to the ideological nature of the authority that it sustains.

II. Bearing in mind the above reservation, we should point out that in Weber’s work
rationalization is indeed related to some cultural characteristics, or to a pattern of cultural
development. This originates from his view of social reality itself as essentially cultural
and it is a way to move from the ideal-typical level of analysis to the more empirical-
historic one. We believe that the birth of ideology could be viewed as one critical cultural
element within the weberian rationalization process. Weber does not refer to ideology but
to the process of disenchantment, which took place first within Judaism and later on
within Protestantism9. In our view this transformation of religion to ideology adequately
describes this weberian notion. It also refers directly to rationalization, if we regard
ideology as a consistent system of belief that in the case of salvation was rationally
ordained in order to ensure this goal. Religion itself (before disenchantment) could serve
salvation only through metaphysics, through a magical mediation and an unsystematic
intuition. But after disenchantment the certituto salutis was about to be inscribed in a
rational pathway, a methodology of salvation based on the strict performance of legal and
moralistic duties10. The notions of discipline, of obligation, and debt founded a purely
legalistic code, which constituted piety.

7
Economy and Society, 221, 225.
8
Economy and Society, 217-9, 956.
9
The Protestant Ethic…, 105.
10
Idem, 104, 126, Schroeder, op.cit., 98.

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It is a temptation to approach Judaism and Puritanism as very similar and consistent to
each other religious systems, perhaps by ignoring the different social consequences that
they may have created11. But this can be attempted in relation to their role in
disenchantment and consequently rationalization process, in the way Weber analyses it.
Disenchantment presupposed an absolute dualism, that is a division between the
transcendental God and the imperfect creaturely world. This dualism resulted to the
abolition of salvation through the Church and its sacraments. There could be no magical
mediation within a system that had transformed the relativeness of the personal God-
Father to a completely set apart from the world being12. However, to contest the will of
this God and his existence was of course unconceivable, in spite of Milton’s brave and
early romantic reaction13. His power determined everything, the whole world history in
Judaism, as well as each individual’s predestination in Calvinism. But each individual
had to follow the pathway to his destiny alone, given that “no one could help him”. No
priest, no sacraments, no Church, no God: metaphysics were abandoned and replaced by
individual perception, the practical religious belief, which took the form of the Puritan
rational- methodical plan of conduct in order to secure certainty for salvation and of the
Jewish moralistic legalism and intellectualism14.
In Calvinism the answer to the question “which the evidence of grace?” is essentially
determined by the above transformation, the abolition of the Church and the emergence
of religion as conviction (sola fide) and fulfillment of ethical orders and norms according
to a legalistic system of practical nature and presupposition. This legalism has, as Weber
explains, a rationalistic, or rationalizing consequence, in the sense of the typical
consistency and accuracy. In that respect every individual good work would be
meaningless, unless it was inscribed within a system, a methodology of self-control
“which at every moment stands before the inexorable alternative, chosen or damned” 15.
This method of moral behavior, determinant of conduct as a whole (methodism) was

11
Economy and Society, 622-3.
12
The Protestant Ethic, 117, Schroeder, op.cit., 75.
13
The Protestant Ethic…, 101: “Though I may be sent to Hell for it, such a God will never command my
respect”. (Milton’s reaction to the Westminster Confession). It was the beginning of another process, a
revolutionary one, which lead to atheism, as Albert Camus has showed in L’ Homme en Revolte.
14
Idem, 104, 110-2, John Love, “Max Weber’s Ancient Judaism”, in Stephen Turner (ed), The Cambridge
Companion to Weber, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 208-9.
15
The Protestant Ethic…, 115.

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rational and consistent. “It was this rationalization which gave the Reformed faith its
peculiar ascetic tendency”16. For Weber, asceticism exactly refers to the systematization
of ethical conduct. Of course, he acknowledges that this tendency was not unknown to
Catholicism, especially to Western monasticism (but also even to Augustine). But with
Reformation, it became a secular phenomenon, given that the Church had been abolished
and in its place remained only the authority of the text (sola scriptura). Secularization
contributed to the diffusion of asceticism to the whole social life, a fact that, according to
Weber’s argument in the Protestant Ethic, influenced the conduct of professions and
business in a critical way.
Having rejected the Sacred Tradition, this methodism derived its stable norms from the
Bible17. The objectification of infallibility in a concrete text and the latter’s absolute
authority (bibliocracy), even towards the Church that gave birth to it by recording there
its experience, is a central trait of the European historic experience with obvious
reference to Weber’s rationalization theme. (It could be stressed that the Occident
became a text-oriented civilization. Thus, ideas could not be conceived, unless –
rationally- articulated in a text, which would function as an auctoritas)18. As a social
phenomenon, it is comparable to the codification of Roman Law, which, in combination
with the required rational expertise in order to meet technical needs arisen from the
complexity of legal cases, shaped its peculiarly rationalistic form. The concentration of
norms to a legal corpus is closely linked to formalism and routinization, which also
constitute weberian concepts relevant to rationalization. The Old Testament was a
suitable text for such a concentration, given its “small bourgeois” rationalism and its
previous contribution to the suppression of the mystic element19.
Although Weber argues that it was the puritan spirit that culminated the process that had
started with the Jews, by stressing their “perfectly unemotional wisdom”, while rejecting
their traditionalistic aspect, time and again he underlines the affinity of Jewish legalism
and moralism to the methodical character of Puritan ethics consisting in a systematic and
rationalized conduct, the acknowledgement of authoritative rules and the absolute
determinism –and transcendency of God. Articulate knowledge of the law was the basic
16
In contradiction to the realism of the Church. Idem, 117, 118.
17
Idem, 123.
18
For the relationship of articulation with rationality see Charles Taylor, op.cit., 90.
19
Idem.

5
quality of the Jewish wise man, not any metaphysical role of mediation. For Weber this
intellectualism was defied by Christ20, but had already survived in the Greeks (although
the linkage between Jews and Greeks is not analyzed and consequently remains on the
basis of only a typical similarity regarding the use of reason, but within distinct
sociohistorical contexts) and after the first Christian centuries it would re-emerge in
Europe. At this point we could add Scholasticism to this chain and the shaping of
theology as a sacra scientia under its influence.
The Protestant ethic argument proposed that the universal systematization of life
determined the economic realm and led to a methodical, rationalized division of labor.
“Not leisure and enjoyment, but only activity serves to increase the Glory of God”, and
“the active performance of His will in a calling” is pleasing to God. But not activity, or
work were the crucial prerequisites, but work in order, rational -specialized labor in a
calling21. The most relevant model of conduct, which was about to be ethically
appreciated was that of the sober, middle-class, self-made man, as Jewish piety had
previously been oriented to the urban dweller and had for his sake formed its laws
according to his status22. It was this moralistic sobriety that was mostly suitable for the
puritan formalism, the emphasis on common type and the rejection of anything that had
no practical utility, of “all designations of an irrational attitude without objective purpose,
thus not ascetic”23. Weber refers to the conceptions of idle talk, of superfluities and of
vain ostentation, which, we believe, would be enough to describe the atmosphere, the
ascetic education that surpassed the mere influence of Puritanism as a religious
movement and survived its demise.
It is interesting to note that Weber viewed the culmination of this ascetic ethos in the
modern division of labor in a rather depressing way. His concept of the iron cage maybe
departs from the realm of objective enquiry, and hence it uncovers some of his inner
agonies regarding the evolutionary historic schema of rationalization, for regarding the
last stage of this cultural development, he argues that it might well be said: “specialists
20
Economy and Society, 617. For Weber, Jesus was primarily a magician, someone endowed with
charismatic powers. He has referred to His indifference to the world on the basis of reliance to God’s will, a
fact that nevertheless bridged the gap between the divine ruler and humanity, given that early Christianity
was dominated by elements of salvation through faith, magic and ritual.
21
The Protestant Ethic…, 161-2.
22
Economy and Society, 618.
23
The Protestant Ethic…, 169.

6
without spirit, sensualists without heart; this nullity imagines that it has attained a level of
civilization never before achieved”24. This possibly nietzschean extract concludes the
Protestant Ethic and leaves the reader with a kind of nostalgia for previous stages in
history that were perhaps less methodical, but also with a more personal side of the
German sociologist, who exhibits a hint of pathos at the conclusion of his essay on the
elimination of pathos from life by a rational control of every kind of conduct 25. But that
does not of course undermine the theoretic significance of his argument, which is
moreover expressed in Economy and Society, perhaps in a more pure-typical way, but
always in accordance with the spirit that we have above tried to indicate.

III. Was “this nullity” the modern bureaucrat? As we have already mentioned, Weber’s
schema of developmental history applies to the transformation of types of legitimate
domination; and rational -scientific consistency characterizing bureaucracy can be
analyzed mutatis mutandis of the above comments, as the possible culmination of a
rationalizing process. He also exhibited a sense of nostalgia for the authentic charismatic
leader and he pointed out that history develops out of a struggle between charisma and
routinization. Charisma strives for revolutionary change due to the belief in its
extraordinary power (it revolutionizes the world), while bureaucracy is by nature
conservative and perhaps originates from the will to preserve an established order and the
privileges that derived from it26. It appears that nothing can be more efficient in this latter
conformist trend than standardized norms and procedures, a methodical system of dealing
with practical necessities and perpetuating authority.
What happens to charisma? Its fate is determined by the extra-ordinary element that is
inherent to it. That is why charismatic authority, according to Weber, exist only in statu
nascendi, at least in its pure form27. “It cannot remain stable, but becomes either
traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both”. The motives behind this
transformation (routinization of charisma) consist in the continuation, stability and
reassurance of the community and the primitive organization of the disciples, whose

24
Idem, 181-2.
25
Alan Sica, “Rationalization and culture” in Stephen Turner (ed), The Cambridge Companion to Weber,
op.cit., 57, 58.
26
Economy and Society, 1115-7, 244, 246, 251.
27
Idem, 246, 1148.

7
interests and position need to be put on “a stable everyday basis”. The community of
disciples, which was endowed with a mission resulting from the revolutionary nature of
charisma, becomes an administrative staff, which will seek “the creation and
appropriation of individual positions and the corresponding economic advantages for its
members”28. But even the mission itself can more adequately be promoted, providing that
the administration is efficient. If this process is pursued by rational legislation, we are
able to refer to rationalization, according to the above analysis. Now bureaucracy is a
possible result of the transformation of the charismatic mission into an office, which
historically is linked to the modern Western world and Antiquity, whereas “elsewhere it
is exceptional”29. Thus, out of Christ’s charisma emerged the bureaucracy of the Catholic
Church, whose hierarchy and canon law preceded the modern state and its analogous
phenomena. Weber’s analysis of routinization of charisma is somehow deterministic, in
the sense of the inevitability of this process due to the forces of everyday routine
(everyday needs and conditions of carrying on administration) which appear as soon as
domination is established and “above all as soon as control over large masses of people
exists”30. This element (the fate of charisma) is particularly evident in the analysis of
discipline, as a consistently rationalized, methodically prepared and exact execution of
the received order. Discipline becomes a type-method of domination, under which
obedience, or devotion, is uniform, impersonal, and rationally calculated31. In that
respect, Weber’s reference to the puritan sense of duty and conscientiousness, in order to
stress discipline’s impersonal character and “matter-of-factness” is enlightening, (not
only in regard to discipline, but also to the puritan ethos), although he does not confine
his analysis to the sober disciple of Cromwell.
From this schema, what is important for the present essay is obviously the rationalization
element and the emergence of bureaucracy (the most rational “offspring of discipline”).
A bureaucratic system of administration and an impersonal legal order are the
components of the type of legitimate domination that is based on legal authority 32. The
legal order is comprised by abstract rules that are consistently (according to rational

28
Idem, 250.
29
Idem, 251.
30
Idem, 252, 1148.
31
Idem, 1149-50.
32
Idem, 217, 220.

8
induction) applied to particular cases. Weber seems to follow a rather positivist approach
in his sociology of law. Although we would like to keep some reservations about this
position, it is true that legal positivism was dominant in his time and basically
reminiscent of Weber’s concepts of rationality of the legal order and of the value of the
norm per se within a system of enforcement. Of course Weber is not primarily a
philosopher of law and, in that sense, his sociological approach can be regarded as value-
free in relation to critical questions of (ethical-political) legitimacy of authority and
implementation of rules. The important element in his analysis is the methodical function
of a system, of a corpus of laws, and not its ethical evaluation (although his relevant
political positions are well known and although he has conceptually distinguished
substantial justice from the methodical and consistent application of rules33).
Bureaucracy functions on the basis of legal competence, which is designated and
restricted by law (principle of official jurisdictional areas)34. This means that it is
methodical, formalistic and systematic. As a result, the official has to meet some
standards, which are relevant to the performance of his duties. More specifically, it is
required of him to exhibit technical qualification and specialized knowledge. This is
specific historical appearance of the spirit of legalism and intellectualism; because
technical expertise refers to the knowledge of rules, and training refers to a field of
specialization in the realm -and science of law35. What is achieved by this legalism is “the
optimum possibility for carrying through the principle of specializing administrative
functions according to purely objective considerations”. This objectivity introduces the
idea of calculated behavior, or we could argue that the notion of calculability is inherent
in the impersonal (objective) nature of the law and constitute the most important element
for modern bureaucracy36. It also introduces the impersonal character of the office. As
Weber says bureaucracy in its fullest development comes under the principle of sine ira
et studio, which would be unconceivable without the separation of officials from the
means of administration. The office holder, who ruled by virtue of status privileges and
the appropriation of the powers of administration, was eliminated and replaced by the
principle of hierarchy and the appointment of officials whose professional and personal
33
Economy and Society, 980.
34
Idem, 956.
35
Idem, 958.
36
Idem, 975.

9
legal status are distinguished37. This produced the rather impersonal character of
administration in its modern (ideal)type38. Again Weber cites another process, namely
dehumanization39, which means that no purely personal, irrational and emotional element,
which escape calculation, could be determinant of the administrative process and its
outcome.
We have mentioned that dehumanization process takes place due to the routinization of
charisma and the need to legitimize authority on the basis of an objective order rather
than a person’s exceptional power. Moreover, the interests of modern capitalism
demanded precision, unambiguity, continuity and speed in the performance of public
administration40. Weber has linked modern capitalism and bureaucracy (in its highest
stage of rationalization) both conceptually and historically. The common elements in the
systems of the enterprise and the office are stressed in Economy and Society, maybe with
some exaggeration, as his comment on the European idea of the intrinsically different
character of the bureau activities from the management of private offices indicates. The
summation of those similarities is rationality, or the rational- methodical functioning of a
system. In that respect the nominal differences are irrelevant. It does not matter whether
the enterprise functions in the pursuit of profit, “and forever renewed profit”, whereas the
state takes into account its own raison d’ etat41; because they are both characterized by
methodical consistency, that is by a specific means-goals ratio. Consequently, their inner
logic is identical, which indicates that they are simultaneous aspects of a particular
(pure)stage of historic development.
IV. Is this historical development identified with the emergence of a distinct cultural
entity, that of the Occidental civilization? Was, as we have already posed the question,
the Occident, and the Occident only? Admittedly, revolutionization through reason42

37
Idem, 226.
38
Because Weber has acknowledged that in reality several elements of previous types of legitimate
authority can survive in modern bureaucracy. Thus, the separation of the official from the means of
administration does not absolutely guarantee his formalistic impartiality, as obviously the case of many
administrative systems indicates. Corruption and bribery are not absent from modern bureaucracy, although
overt disregard of the formal-typical procedure would be a rare case. Consequently and moreover, the
persistence of many traditionalistic structures within rationalized modernity, would be a subject of a
separate analysis that cannot be attempted here.
39
“Bureaucracy develops the more perfectly, the more it is dehumanized”, Economy and Society, 975.
40
Economy and society, 974.
41
Author’ s Introduction, 17, Economy and Society, 978.
42
Economy and Society, 1002.

10
(rationalization) would first and foremost refer to the western world, as Weber argues in
several parts of his work, but particularly in the Author’s Introduction. The trained
official is thereby characterized as the pillar of the Modern State and of the economic life
of the West. “He forms a type of which there have heretofore only been suggestions”
because “no country and no age has ever experienced, in the same sense as the modern
Occident, the absolute and complete dependence of its existence (…) on a specially
trained organization of officials”43. And most of Weber’s empirical references to
bureaucracies in Economy and Society are western, as well as his exemplification
regarding the transition from feudalism to bureaucracy44. We will try to add here some
relevant thoughts, which nevertheless we wish to distinguish from a potential dualist
schema, because it is possible to deduce from this developmental history of
rationalization some valid references to the West, without having to reject its possible
significance in relation to other historic contexts as well. This not reductive interpretation
refers to the way we have understood the function of the ideal type.

In Weber, the analysis on bureaucracy, capitalism and, as we pointed out above,

demagification contributes to a possible understanding of rationality, as a specific
outcome of a rationalization process, which, although partially (not everywhere in his
work) described in an ideal-typical manner, is nevertheless historical. This approach is
perhaps similar to the idea of Wolfgang Schluchter that –for example- the theme of
bourgeois capitalism (which refers to the whole configuration of a specific cultural
manifestation) was, in Weber’s analysis transformed into that of rationalism 45. Now vice
versa, from his rationalization scheme (demagification, routinization, and
bureaucratization) and due to its historicity some concrete historic phenomena arise, the
understanding of which can be enhanced in its light. The codification of Roman law,
Jewish moralism and legalism, Reformation and Secularization, the modern State, they
all refer to the coherent historic problem of the emergence of the Occident. But it is
perhaps the subjective interest of the theorist that imposed this question regarding
empirical reality and not another, which could possibly refer to a different cultural

43
Author’s Introduction, 16, 17.
44
Economy and Society, 1086-7.
45
Schluchter, op.cit., 9.

11
context. In that respect, Schluchter, although admitting that Weber acknowledges the
existence of rationalization (and rationalism) in all cultures, denies that Weber’s end was
the construction of a systematic typology and sociology of rationalization. He argues that
“it is true that he wants [Weber] to contribute to such a sociology but only insofar as it is
related to the solution of his historical problem”, which was the distinctiveness of
Western rationalism and the explanation of its historical origins46. According to this view
Weber was a cultural historian and less a systematic universal sociologist, or a world
historian. The (ideal)type was for him a means and not an end in his research.
He focused on cultural values and the subjective meaning of reality. We could possibly
contribute to this debate, if we examined the subjective significance of the rationalization
process. What is meant here is that in the Occident rationalization acquired a concrete
-and unique character, at least in the subjective level. It became and constituted the basic,
determinant of a whole civilization. Elements of rationalization may be found elsewhere.
But only the Occident universally tended to be self-defined as rationality, in a scale of
ideology. Apart from ideological questions we believe that the schema of rationalization
is particularly important for the western cultural experience and is constructed for its
understanding. It does not merely refer to the structure of the state and the market but is
also significant (as Weber partially showed in the Protestant Ethic) for most of the inner
situations of the western man, the history of ideas and mentalities, the disenchantments in
religion, in politics and social relationships. That was therefore the reason for writing this
essay.

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46
Idem, 10-12.

12
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