Sarzotti 1

Cory Sarzotti
Philosophy Senior Project
Advisors Casey Haskins & Jennifer Uleman
2006-2007 Year

A Friend Once Asked Me…

A Discussion Of Free Will And The Responsibility It Gives Us

A friend once asked me, “Why did Socrates say the unexamined life is not worth living?”
“Because”, I answered, “if we do not examine our lives, our minds, our habituations, and our
programming, then we are not living a life we have chosen, but rather the default life that our
society, upbringing, and desires, unchecked, bring us. Such a life is not worth living because I
only wish to live a life I have consciously and rationally created based on wisdom and
virtue.”
“Whatever we choose, even if it is by lack of choice for the alternative, we are responsible for
that choice and its results. Life is not a random spin of a roulette wheel in Vegas, by a dealer
named God, where by our fate is the mere color and number the wheel arrives at, such as a
23-black car, and a 10-black job, or a 5-red romantic partner. Essentially we have, directly, or
indirectly, chosen and created all of our lives. We may have directly chosen, as in directly
choosing to marry a specific person, or indirectly by choosing not to look both ways before
crossing a street and thus getting hit by the car that we did not choose to look out for. If we
are miserable, it is because we have chosen, and continue to choose, that misery.”
The classical argument of free will is between two views. The deterministic view holds that
the universe is pre-determined, either by a deity or deities who are consciously controlling
things, or by the simple laws of physics, and that though we appear to be making choices,
those choices have themselves been pre-determined and in reality we are just living out some
grand universal script. The notion of fate or destiny falls into this side of the argument, and is
often used romanticized to give one some grand scheme or plan that the greatness of there is
guaranteed by. The other side of the argument, free will, states that there is no determinism,
everything is random, we are free to do what ever it is we want to do.
My goal in writing this work is to provide us, both you my reader, be you a seasoned
philosopher or an average layperson, and me, with new ways of understanding this ongoing
philosophical discussions of morality and free will so that we may be further empowered to
create happy, moral, and productive lives of our own choosing, no matter which side of the
debate you are on. I include myself in this because with every page I write I further develop
my own understanding of the subject and hence am just as enlightened by writing as I hope
you are by reading.
Using the work of modern and classical philosophical figures, as well as that of a clinical
psychologist, I will explain and ground my belief that our lives are of our choosing. Having
established that our life is of our choice I will then further discuss those figures and pass on
their advice on what makes a good and moral life.
Daniel Dennett is the modern philosopher I will be using. The book of his I will be
referencing, published in 2001, is Freedom Evolves. Though he stands in support of
determinism, Dennett claims that we still have room to make free decisions. He admits that
those decisions may themselves be pre-determined, but writes that we should keep trying to
make them anyway, and that we are still responsible for those choices.
While I remain undecided on the free will versus determinism argument, I agree with Dennett
in that we are responsible for our choices and further believe that it is that choice that gives us
the power to create our lives, even if that freedom is only illusory.
Emmanuel Kant wrote on what comprises moral behavior and a moral life. Kant’s categorical
imperatives tell one to choose only those maxims that are universally applicable. Kant also
believes that all rational beings are ends in themselves and insists that we act in accordance
with this. Dr. William Glasser, a modern psychologist, will be brought in at various times, via
his book, Choice Theory, to lend a modern psychological credibility and applicability to the
theories I am presenting.

Dennett shifts from the classical deterministic view by explaining that even though things are
determined, one still has free will. Dennett argues that it is because the universe is
deterministic, and thus predictable, that we have the ability to make choices and predict the
outcome of those choices. The obvious argument against this is “what if those choices are
themselves predetermined, what if we are predetermined, by DNA, or God, or whatever, to
make the choices that we make?” Dennett does not argue against this, and agrees that our
choices very well might be predetermined, but still argues that we can and should make them
any way.
Dennett revisits and revises the classical free will versus determinism argument. The
argument focuses around whether our choices are our free will choices or are predetermined
in advance. If there is free will then we are actively choosing our futures and present, and
therefore our choices are our own and we are responsible for them and for the results of them.
This gives one total responsibility for their life and thus requires constant vigilance in making
choices that produce the life one wants. This can be very uncomfortable, especially to
someone who is not happy with his or her current life circumstances. If such a person were to
have to admit that their life was their own creation, then they would have no one else to
blame but themselves for that life that they were unhappy with.
The deterministic point of view is very comforting to such a person because they are no
longer responsible. One who is experiencing a difficult life may even be able to feel good
about it under this system by thinking that ‘God needs them to suffer as part of his plan’. The
deterministic view relies upon an external force to create and dictate our lives and
predetermine our choices. As for what this thing is that is doing the predetermining it can be
the Christian God, a non-Christian God, the Zodiac, the laws of science, or any number of
other possibilities people have believed in through the ages. Regardless of the controlling
force however, the core belief is that we are not the ones in control. Under determinism,
every minute detail of the universe, including our personal lives and every thought we think,
is predetermined and thus out of our control. Every minute mental step of our most carefully
thought-out plans was also predetermined rendering what we believe to be our freedom of
choice completely illusory.
The confusion arises when one tries to maintain two perspectives on
the universe at once; the “God’s Eye” perspective that sees past and
future all laid out before it, and engaged perspective of an agent within
the universe. From the timeless God’s eye perspective nothing ever
changes – the whole history of the universe is laid out “at once” – and
even an indeterministic universe is just a static branching tree of
trajectories. From the engaged agent’s perspective, things change over
time, and agents change to meet those changes. (Dennett 93)
Dennett’s argument can be briefly summed as this; what is the world closer to, a Vegas
roulette wheel or a mathematical equation. Dennett would argue that it depends on
perspective. From the god’s perspective, the world is actually more like the mathematical
equation; totally pre-determined and with a fixed output based on input. If the universe is
determined, then one can easily predict, based upon the fixed systems of physics, chemistry,
probability, and so forth, what will happen as an effect from any given cause. In fact, the
more one learns about the sciences the more one is able to predict the future, and thus the
more one is able to have the god perspective.
Yet from the agent perspective the future is subjectively open. We make free decisions and
then have to live the outcome of those decisions. This gives us a certain amount of power and
control in our world. We thus know that if we do thing Y we will likely get effect X.
Therefore if we want X we can choose not to do thing Y, and vise versa. From the god
perspective both X and Y were predetermined, but that is not the perspective we are living
from. We are the acting agents. Even though the sciences allow us to come closer to the god
perspective, we are still living as rational acting agents. Even if the universe is
predetermined, we have to live as though it is not because, from our limited, relative, agent
perspective, we can do nothing else.
There is a controversial belief, which Dennett discusses, coming out of new neuro-biology
research with support from new age metaphysics and holistic medicine that says that the
human brain functions much like a computer with our brains acting as the central processing
chip, or CPU, the five senses taking in the input, our DNA functioning as the ‘operating
system’ determining the most basic levels of functioning, and our myriad other belief 1
systems, and educations functioning as our ‘programs’ that we run on a day to day basis.
The biological explanation behind this comparison is that instead of electric current running
along a printed circuit, our brains have sodium and potassium trading places causing nerve
impulses to pass along neurons. Instead of one part of a computer sending data to another part
of the computer via wires, neurons in the brain pass information from the end of one 2
neuron
to the receptor sites at the front of another neuron in the form of neurotransmitters . Just as a
computer takes in information As a computer The brain, and therefore the human
consciousness running as well, takes in input, the experiences we have in life through the five
senses, and calculate that input through the use of the programming that one is running, and
then give output in the form of the actions we do and the words we say.
Both sides of the classical argument can use this explanation to support their view. The
determinists can say that the brain is operating based on biochemical laws; that when two
chemicals meet in a certain ratio they will react in such and such way and that reacting gives
us the illusion of thinking. Therefore, though the brain is acting as a computer, it is running a
non-interactive program which started when we were born, and our parents when they were
born, and so on back to the dawn of man. The free will side can argue that once we know the
programs we are running we can and must change them to produce more favorable results.
Therapists and medications allow us to modify our thinking on both the outer thought level
and the chemical level, respectively. Yet the determinist can at this point still respond that all
of that therapy and medication is all predetermined as well.
What is complex about Dennett’s view is that while he mostly agrees with determinism, he
argues that we should still be responsible for our decisions. I say that Dennett mostly agrees
because he never comes right out and says directly that he agrees with determinism, but never
directly rules it out either. Instead he discusses humans in terms of mechanization and
programming. In his earlier book, Elbow Room, he compared us to the Sphex, a insect that
when studied in a laboratory experiment would re-check her nest 86 times before laying her
eggs simply because researchers had moved something near her nest. Dennett then argued
that we are much like the Sphex, but with much more elaborate programming. He posits this
as determinism in that we may be locked into this programming, but then he insists that we
still have elbow room in which to change that programming. He further posits that we should
try to change that programming, even if the freedom to make such changes is illusory.
What about improvement? Can there be not just improvement, but self-
generated improvement in a deterministic world? Can an agent in a
deterministic realistically hope to improve its lot? (Dennett 91)
Continuing with the computer analogy, we are born with certain programs built-in to our
minds. Our parents and teachers load some and others we create ourselves as we deal with
new situations and information. We may have a religion program, for example, that teaches
us such and such rules for living; that such and such is a sin or that such and such is good. We
may have a civic duty program that tells us to serve our community, or we may have a
hopeless-romantic-program that only accepts relationships that look like something out of a
romantic comedy movie.
The free will side says that we can always change any or all of these programs, regardless of
when or how they were loaded, while the determinist argues that sure we can try to change
them and we might succeed at doing so, but that all of those changes were themselves part of
the program. Dennett argues, and I concur, that we should indeed make every attempt at
‘improving our lot’ even if it is an illusion.
“Each of us is who he is, warts and all. I can’t be a champion golfer or
a concert pianist or a quantum physicist…I can try, it seems, but if I
never succeed, will it have been the case that I never could have
succeeded, not really? ...Aren’t we all automatically all that we can
be? Can any of us ever do anything other than what we end up doing?
If not, what’s the point of trying? Indeed, what’s the point of
anything?” (Dennett 7)
Dennett echoes here a common way in which determinism is used as an excuse to stop trying
at life, to stop trying to improve ourselves. A pre-determined world where we are what we
are, end-of-story, is comfortable. It is comfortable because we never have to accomplish
much, at least not on purpose, because everything is automatically what it is. One hears it all
the time from others, and perhaps themselves, when trying to excuse a behavior they wish
they did not exhibit. “It’s just the way I am I can’t help it.” One hears this from chronic
womanizers, for example. They claim that when they see a beautiful woman, no matter how
attractive their current mate is they are just compelled to go after this one too. Smokers feel
they just have to have a cigarette, and person abusers (to encompass all the variations –
spousal, etc) often claim that their victims ‘made them do it.’
In his earlier book, Elbow Room, Dennett discusses the concept of fairness and decision
making in relation to determinism in a chapter entitled ‘Acting Under the Idea of Freedom’.
He calls it pseudo random because as he showed in both books there really is no randomness,
just a series of causalities too complicated for an average person to ever fully understand.
Dennett uses the concept that all future events were pre-planned and we are not aware of this
plans details. It is this lack of knowledge that makes the world subjectively open. Even
though the future is determined and therefore closed, if I do not know the contents of that
future then to me it will appear open. If I do not know what decisions I am going to make
before I make them then determined as they may be they will feel like free choices in relation
to my subjective experience of the world.
 “…If our world is determined, all our lottery tickets were drawn at
once, eons ago, put in an envelope for us, and doled out as we needed
them through life. “But that isn’t fair!” some may say, “For some
people will have been dealt more winners than others.” But that will
be true even if the drawings are not held out before we are born…The
winner cannot properly claim it was his “destiny” to win, but whatever
advantages accrue to winning are his, destiny or not, and what could
be fairer then that. Fairness does not consist in everybody winning.”
(Elbow Room 121)
What Dennett is claiming is that determined as it may be, we are still responsible for, and, or,
entitled to, whatever happens to us because we are living in a subjectively open world which
is feeding us information to which we are responding. To us, the decision-making, rational
agent subjects, as we are without superhuman foresight, the future is still an unknown. Thus,
regardless of the true objective nature of reality, deterministic or not, we are experiencing an
open reality.
The natural sciences continue to prove and describe more and more of the universe as the god
perspective sees it. Gravity, for example, pre-determines that what goes up must come down.
Physics has codified the mathematics by which on can predict the movement of objects.
Chemistry knows what will happen when two or more specific substances combine, and
developmental psychology has mapped out many of the processes by which children’s minds
grow and develop into adult minds. New neuro-biology and genetic research has even traced
complex emotional experiences, such as fairness or spirituality, to specific DNA sequences.
Not much about life is random or unpredictable today and yet this predictability does not take
away our relative agent perspective, and nor does it prevent us from attempting to make the
best of our lives.
A rat in a laboratory maze did not create the maze, nor doe he have foreknowledge of its
layout, and yet it is still the rat’s experience to run the maze without foreknowledge and thus
to have to make choices and figure it out as it goes along. The way in which the rat goes
about solving the maze may itself be determined by the rat’s brain structure and neuro-
chemistry and yet again the rat is still experiencing the solving of the maze.
Even though its response, which way to turn in the maze, and the information the rat is
responding too, the layout of the maze, and the final outcome, may all be predetermined, the
rat is still able to respond, by making choices, to the information it perceives, and lead itself
to its final outcome, and thus is response-able. Responsibility does not mean that we are
necessarily blame-worthy if we make a mistake, or that we masterminded the entire thing; it
simply means that we are able to respond to what we are encountering. The illusion of choice
arises from the fact that when we respond we then get to experience the result of that choice.
Dennett sites the example of a game of chess to demonstrate how in an environment of
‘perfect information’ everything is determined and knowable and yet there is still suspense
and the need to exercise skill. A better player then the two he is watching play may be able to
see the entire game ahead of time because the entire game is predetermined by the skill levels
and idiosyncrasies of play of the two players, and yet to the players themselves the game yet
played appears uncertain and unknown and thus requires them to play the best they can
within their relative ignorance.
Chess is a game of “perfect information”… So both A and B
have common and total information about the state of the chess
game in progress and the possibilities that lie ahead… The
contest is to use the shared information to generate proprietary
 information on which to base one’s choice of move, and the
explanation of why A beats B (if it does, when it does) must
now be in terms of its superior capacity to generate, and use,
information about the uncertain, open future (from its
perspective). (Dennett 91)
The better player watching from above has the god perspective. He can see the entire game
ahead of time from the very first move. The players have the acting agent perspective. To
them the game is open and unknown and at every turn they are just doing their pest with what
the situation presents. The future is only open and uncertain to them because of limited
knowledge and experience.
What determines my success at chess is my ability at processing all of the information
presented to me in this total information environment and then seeing the future. The better I
process that information, the better I can predict my opponents moves and the better the
outcome will be for me. If I fail to accurately predict my opponent’s move, then I may suffer
because of it, and that would be experience of the acting agent perspective.
“We live in a world that is subjectively open. And we are designed by
evolution to be “informavores,” epistemically hungry seekers of
information, in an endless quest to improve our purchase on the world,
the better to make decisions about our subjectively open future.”
(Dennett 93)
So what if all of our efforts were preprogrammed? Even if they are, we still have a
subjectively open acting agent experience. Just because it may be programmed into us to start
smoking at certain age and then stop later does not make the entire experience any less rich,
nor does it make it any less the very meat of our life experience. Dennett and I agree that the
universe is determined, but to know that for absolute certain, and then to know the details and
the outcome is to have the god perspective and as acting agents it is not the perspective we
live from.
Let us posit it as immutable truth, for the sake of argument, that the universe is completely
predetermined. Let us also3
say that I am a raging alcoholic. Under this determined universe
all of my AA meetings , for example, and all other efforts to quit drinking are themselves
predetermined and I am just acting out the universal script for my life by making that effort.
But what if I don’t decide to get help and decide that I do not have a problem? I go to work,
get paid, then go drinking all night, and that works fine for me and I do not see any reason to
change it. So I live my entire life this way eventually dying of liver failure. The determinists
would again say that this course of action was determined, that my so-called mental decision
not to get help was hard coded into my DNA. In both versions the determinists stated that
what happened was as pre-determined and that my choices were illusory and that I was at no
point really effecting any true change. Yet in both versions I still had conscious awareness of
myself and was making choices. Though the decisions may have been predetermined, I still
experienced them as conscious decisions, which I still experienced the effects of.
Let us
4
say for a moment that this is the Star Trek universe, and we are all trapped in a hollow-
suite playing
5
a game which is pre-programmed and pre-set and which we only get out of by
finishing. Even though it is pre-programmed, we are still response-able for what choices we
make and what we do within that system even though the entire thing is rigged. I do not mean
that one is directly responsible for everything in one’s life in that one is consciously picking
every minute detail, for that can only happen if we are living from the god perspective. What
I am saying, and what Dennett is saying, is that one is responsible for what one makes of
one’s life, what ever those circumstances are.
“What about improvement? Can there be not just improvement, but self-generated
improvement in a deterministic world? Can an agent in a deterministic universe realistically
hope to improve its lot,” asks Dennett. This is an important question in the free will
argument. If the universe is deterministic can we really improve ourselves or will that
improvement still just be part of the program? The answer is that yes there is improvement,
but that improvement may be itself predetermined. Dennett does not necessarily see
improvement and determinism as apposing. Just because any improvement we make, or
attempt to make, is predetermined does not make that improvement any less valuable and nor
does it mean that we should stop trying to improve.
When one buys a new car, for example, the manufacturer predetermines a series of planned
maintenances that the car buyer must then make in order to keep their warrantee valid. Just
because these maintenances are predetermined does that make them any less important?
Should one now not get them done? Any car owner can see the fallacy here. Of course one
still gets them done. Of course they still matter. Just because I did not willing make a free
will choice for that maintenance to happen at that time does not mean that I should now not
get it done. Therefore, if the universe predetermines that one, at a certain age gives up being
an alcoholic, the fact that the universe predetermined it does not make it any less of a good
thing to do. Just call it a scheduled maintenance.
A friend argued me on this point, saying, “if the car is going to get that scheduled
maintenance anyway, then why do we have to do the work? If life is predetermined,” my
friend continued, “why get off the couch. Life is going to happen or not happen despite what
we do or do not do.” This is exactly the point of view that Dennett is trying to dispel. Even
though, in the end, life may be predetermined, every organism still has a “subjectively open”
future. Yes, in the end we may discover that everything was planned, but at this moment we
do not know this for a fact, and besides, one can easily see cause and effect in action. Every
choice I make leads to an effect.
At every moment one is making choices. These choices can be as grand as whether or not to
marry a person, or as tiny as which item to order at a restaurant. Some are conscious, such as
which flavor of ice cream, while some are unconscious, such as whether to anger at a person
we disagree with, or simply to let it go. For many of our daily situations we have stock
choices. That is, there are choices, which we are programmed, by parents, society, religion,
and other such sources of education in ones life, which then become automatic. One could
argue that stock choices are akin to predetermined choices in that we are pre-programmed to
make those decisions in the respective situations that those programmed choices relate to.
However, as one can, through therapy, meditation, or medication, change, or temporarily alter
or bypass those stock choices, they do not count as predetermined under traditional
determinism.
The question again arises here, “what is the point? If it is all predicted why bother?” One can
carry this question further. Why do we do anything? Why get out of bed in the morning when
one can just easily not? Why go out and get a good job and work and contribute to society
when one can just live off of welfare. If one believes that the universe was just one single
point of energy and then split off, like through a prism, and created the illusion of reality,
then one can ask why the universe did this. If one believes in a Christian-like concept of God,
one can ask why God created the earth in the first place?
Dennett’s answer is that determined or not we as rational beings are driven to gather
information and use it to better ourselves. If life is a chess game then what Dennett is saying
is that even though the game may be completely predetermined to us it is subjectively open.
Why continue to gather information and advance as a species? For the same reason my
friends practice to be better at video games or sports even though they are only games. For
the same reason why I practice the culinary arts even though one can just as easily put
everything into a big pot of boiling water. We do it because we feel, undeniably, that even
though it is illusory, it is still worth it. The human spirit longs to achieve things, to
accomplish things, to make something out of life, even though it is only an illusion.
The universe is subjectively open, and since we are the subjects, then as Dennett writes, our
world is ‘subjectively open’ and we have choices, illusory as they may be. The fact, or
possibility, that me writing this paper, and you reading this paper, and then you or I taking
something from it and changing our lives, may all be predetermined and part of some grand
universal hollow-deck program is in the end irrelevant. We are living this life, we have
choices that we are faced with every day, and we might as well do our best within that. It’s
not like we have anything better to do.
In the 1960’s Dr. William Glasser started his career as a medical doctor, during which time
he worked mostly at mental hospitals as a general care physician, treating the mental patients
for physical ailments. Doing this work he started to notice that looked like his patients were
choosing their illnesses, both mental and physical. He continued to research this hypothesis,
and eventually developed what is now called choice theory. Even if the universe is
determined, we still live as acting agents with subjectively open futures who are taking in
information and making choices. Choice theory explains the how and why of us making those
choices. 6
I will not include all his examples here for the sake of brevity , but what Glasser concluded7
is
that things never really happen to us, save a bullet to the head, getting hit by a train, etc , and
that everything that we call ‘people doing things to us’ is nothing more than them giving us
information, and that we then use that information, as we use the information in Dennett’s
chess game, to choose what our next move will be.
Choice theory explains that, for all practical purposes, we
choose everything we do, including the misery we feel. Other
people can neither make us miserable nor make us happy. All
we can get from them or give to them is information. (Glasser
3)
Within choice theory, Glasser explains that all humans have, genetically, four basic needs
that we are trying to fulfill at all times. These needs are; freedom, power, fun and learning.
Every choice we make, consciously, or unconsciously, is designed to help us fulfill one or
more of these needs. I will briefly describe them here.
Freedom: We all need to feel free to do what we want and to make choices. The need for
freedom can also be stated as the need to be able to exercise free will. When one does not feel
free, when one does not feel as though they are being allowed to make their own choices they
do not feel good about it, and then make choices to try to regain the feeling of having
freedom. Sometimes they fight or rebel, sometimes they look to see if they are mistaken
about not being free, as a philosopher may do, or they may simply depress.
To depress is to do nothing, to feel like it is hopeless, and generally includes such chosen
behaviors as drinking, smoking, blaming or moping around the house. The choice to depress
does not fix it per say, but at least functions as something to do about it, which is better than
nothing, and thus give the feeling of power.
Freedom and Power are connected needs in that we need to feel free to exercise power. If we
wish to exercise power but are not able to, then we feel that not only is our power need
frustrated, but our freedom need as well.
Power. We all need to feel powerful, that is, the ability to do something, to make something
happen, to bring about what ever it is we want to bring about. If another of our needs is not
being met, we choose an action to do that we believe will help us regain the need that we feel
is not being met. While the ability to choose an action is the need for freedom, exercising
freedom is our need for power.
Fun and learning. These are combined as one need because according to Glasser, “fun is the
genetic reward for learning.” (Glasser 41) This can be seen in young children who come
home beaming from ear to ear to show their parents what they have learned in school. In fact,
Glasser explains in his chapter on education how he helped problem students in inner city
schools by individually figuring out how to bring the fun back to learning for those students,
and thus giving them reason to bring learning and school back into their quality worlds.
Love, belonging and loving sex. We all need to feel loved by people and we all need to feel
like we belong to some sort of group, even a very small group. We are by nature social
creatures, and are generally not happy living our entire lives alone. People often exercise this
by joining or creating groups for themselves, be it based on interests, ethnicity, gender,
religion, or citizenship in a given municipality.
Glasser discusses loving sex as a sub-need of love and belonging because it is not a prevalent
need for everyone. There are many people, for example, that practice chastity, and there are
others that believe sex is jut for procreation. For some, it is a very strong psychological need.
These people tend to depress or frustrate when they do not have it in their lives. Others use it
to exercise their freedom or power needs, though Glasser does not consider such uses of sex
to be loving, and thus he discounts it as unhealthy. Glasser comments that if one is sacrificing
loving relationships for unloving sex that it is unhealthy because in looking to unloving sex,
one is in a sense giving up on healthy relationships and thus giving up on people. This is
counter to Glasser’s purpose in writing choice theory which is to enable us to keep the people
we need, and thus have our love and belonging need met, while still having our freedom,
power, and fun and belonging needs met.
It is not uncommon to sacrifice one of our needs for the other three. Some people, for
example, are what are termed ‘loners’ and appear to be happier alone, but I contend that these
people are not truly happy, have taken the need of love and belonging our of their quality
worlds because they do not know how to be with people and still satisfy other needs, such as
freedom.
Other people have what is termed ‘inferiority complexes.’ Such people may simply not know
how to satisfy their need for power while also satisfying love and belonging, that is, they do
not feel powerful when among other people, and so choose to let them selves be powerless
for the sake of love and belonging.
In order to understand how a person could do this, it is important to also understand Glasser’s
‘quality world’ theory. As Dennett’s information gatherers, we remember, from moment to
moment, what choices, people, and things, fulfilled our needs, and which frustrated them so
as to inform future choices as to which options would best satisfy future needs. We keep
these choices, people, and things in our minds in what Glasser calls the ‘Quality World.’
This small world, which each person starts to create in his or her
memory shortly after birth and continues to create and re-create
throughout life, is made up of a small group of specific pictures that
portray, more than anything else we know, the best ways to satisfy one
or more of our basic needs.
The quality world is learning. It is one’s mind remembering what choices worked in the past.
One is most likely to repeat a choice in the future if it worked in the past. This works as long
as the future remains constant in relation to the past. Changes in the future however, can
result in different choices being needed. That is, the choices that once worked no longer
work. This is where adaptability is required. One must be able to adapt to future situations.
Adaptation means recognizing that what worked in the past worked in the past because it was
based on those circumstances.
Glasser’s quality world allows our mind to classify experience in terms of what worked and
what didn’t. What worked we classify as what is termed good. What did not work we classify
as bad. Yet this was the past. Granted, such memory of action is useful as a hint to the present
decisions we have to make, but should not be held as the be all and end all of our deliberative
process.
Let’s take an example most people can relate to and put this in the context of a romantic
relationship. Let’s say your special-someone tells you she will call you when she gets home.
Let’s then also say that you know, because she told you, that she will be getting home at eight
o-clock, and so you rightly expect a phone call from her somewhere between eight o’clock
and half-past. Instead, however, the eight o’clock hour comes and goes, as does the nine, and
the ten, and your phone does not ring until sometime after eleven.
To further the stakes, lets assume you have an important philosophy mid-term exam the next
morning, and were planning on going to bed nine after having a sweet conversation with her
and allowing her soothing voice to ring in your ears when you fall asleep so you wake up the
next morning well rested and well relaxed for the exam. In case, by the way, you have not
already figured it out, this very thing happened to me, more than once, and I reacted in a less
than glasserian way. When she did call I was angry at her, and made a point to let her now.
I reproached her harshly for not calling when she said she was supposed to (pre-supposing
that she must always keep her exact word to me), blamed her for now not getting to bed on
time, and further more, blamed her for the fact that I was now going to bed angry before an
important exam. As this person was not one to let things go, she then reproached me for
reproaching her, and the argument that ensued lasted till nearly two in the morning.
At this point, many in my audience are probably thinking, “of course, how could she leave
you hanging like that, how inconsiderate, especially in the age of cell phones where no one is
ever truly unable to get a communication to someone.” Yet according to Choice Theory, and
the view I am here explaining, while she could have been courteous and called me, or at least
sent me a text message at eight, or even eight-forty-five, and told me she was held up
somewhere and would call me when she could, and that she still loved me, etc, I was wrong
for reproaching her, and more importantly, it was my choice to do so.
But many times in life, when we are miserable it is because we
continue to blame others for our misery or try to control others
when it is against our best interest to do so.
(Glasser 19)
I was not wrong because there I violated some sort of universal moral code, which states that
that was wrong but rather because it was not in my best interest to make that choice. The fact
that it was not in my best interest was then proven by the fact that I was miserable because of
it. If I had chosen a more patient approach I may have experienced more happiness in the
situation, and thus that would have been the ‘right’ choice.
Choice theory is extremely relativistic; it does not posit any specific morality or codes of
ethics. ‘Right’ and ‘wrong’ and ‘good’ and ‘bad’, in choice theory, only exist in relation to
one’s own best interest, and that ‘best interest’ is only in relation to one’s desires and goals.
According to Glasser, it is against our best interest to try to control or blame others because if
we do so we are not taking responsibility for our own actions. If we do not take responsibility
for our actions then we are not admitting that we have any choice in the matter. If we do not
admit that we have any choice in the matter then we will not think that we are able to choose
differently, and thus will not choose differently.
While it was natural to miss her, and natural to wonder where she was, and to wish she had
taken the courteous action, I made a conscious, or at least a habitualized, choice to react the
way I did. This is not in our best interest because it led to more misery than I was in before
she got home and called me, and thus did not serve my goal of having an enjoyable evening
talking to my girlfriend.
I could have just as easily answered the phone, told her in a sad-puppy voice that I missed her
and that I had worried about her, but that I understand sometimes life happens, and that all
that matters is that I’m talking to her now. This choice would probably have fetched me a
much better reaction, she probably would have said “aww, I’m sorry baby,” and, “how sweet
of you to worry”, and “I hope you won’t be too tired for your exam tomorrow.” Thus, to
choice theory, this would have been the ‘right’ choice because it got me what I wanted.
A major argument against choice theory is that it is not ‘fair’ because it says that one is
responsible for their happiness or their misery despite what other people do. Even though my
girlfriend in the example was the one who did not come home when she said she was going
to, if I wanted a nice night talking to her, then I had to choose to be understanding.
“But that isn’t fair!’ some may say, ‘For some people will have been dealt more winners than
others.” Dennett writes, echoing, and then responding to, the protests of his imagined
audience. “The [lottery] winner cannot properly claim it was his “destiny” to win, but
whatever advantages accrue to winning are his, destiny or not, and what could be fairer then
that.” (Elbow Room 121)
To choice theory, Dennett, and myself, fairness is irrelevant to responsibility. It may not have
been my fault that she did not call me when she said she was going to, just like it may not
have been the lottery winner’s fault that he won. Yet fault or no fault, we are still faced with a
situation in our subjectively open world that requires a response from us.
Whether we are preprogrammed or predetermined to be in that situation is irrelevant, and
makes it no less our experience or responsibility to respond to that situation. Neither does it
mean that our decisions in response to that situation will any less have ramifications for us
later, and neither will those later ramifications, again, be any less our response-ability to
respond to.
Dennett sites an example from the news that illustrates how even though something may not
have been expected by us, or of our choice, we still must deal with them, and are indeed
responsible for what we do in that situation. There was a story a few years back of a father
who was asked by his wife to take their daughter to day-care on his way to work. Somewhere
along the way he forgot that his child was in the back of his car and proceeded to drive to
work. At the end of the day he came back to his car to discover his daughter dead in the back
of his car still strapped to her car seat,
It is conceivable that he [the man who accidentally locked his daughter
in the car all day] is a callous and irresponsible human being, a villain
who deserves to be despised by us all. But it is also conceivable that
he’s basically a good person, a victim of cosmic bad luck. And, of
course, the better person he is, the greater his remorse must now be.
(Dennett 7)
I bring this up because counter arguments could be made here countering the man’s
responsibility by claiming that there could have been a number of things that could have
distracted him, and that it was an accident, or that it was predetermined that was going to
have to take his daughter to day care, or further predetermined that he was going to leave her
in the car, but all of this is irrelevant to the acting agent, the man, who’s experience it is, and
thus who’s responsibility it is.
Fair or not and predetermined or not, my girlfriend got home late, the lottery winner won the
lottery, and that man had to take his daughter to day care. Despite how fair it feels to us when
it happens, and despite how predetermined it looks from the god perspective, what happens in
ones lives is our acting agent perspective and the choices we make, as acting agents are our
responsibility.

In 2001, Richard Linklater wrote and directed a philosophical film called ‘Waking Life’ in
which he discusses the various philosophical views on life, death, causality, reality, and
responsibility, or lack thereof, for all of the above. He does this through the eyes of a
character who gets hit by a car and then continues on in this dream-like state in which he is
confronted by various people discussing various philosophical views.
In the first part of the film, the main character, who’s name is never mentioned, is offered a
ride by a quirky guy in a sailor’s outfit who is driving a combination boat-car, who has
already picked up another random rider, who incidentally is Linklater himself doing a cameo.
“Ahoy there, matey!” The sailor says as he pulls along side the hero, “You in for the long
haul? You need a little hitch in your get along, a little lift on down the line?” When the main
character accepts the offer with shrugged shoulders, the sailor replies “all right. Don’t miss
the boat.” (Linklater Ch. 2)
Linklater’s character gives the main character an address to go to, which is where the car hits
him. The implications of the director giving the main character his first ‘starting place’ from
which the entire story unfolds aside, during the ride the sailor guy gives a short dissertation
on sitting back and creating the best life picture one can for one’s self with whatever crayons
your given.
I feel like my transport should be an extension of my personality. Voila.
And this? [Pointing to the windshield] This is like my little window to
the world and every minute is a different show. Now, I may not
understand it, I may not even necessarily agree with it, but I’ll tell you
what; I accept it and just sort of glide along. You want to keep things
on an even keel I guess is what I’m saying. You wanna go with the
flow. The sea refuses no river…It’s like you come onto this planet with
a crayon box. Now you may have the 8 pack, you may have the 16
pack, but its all in what you do with the crayons, the colors, that you’re
given. Don’t worry about drawing within the lines or coloring outside
the lines, I say color off the lines, color right off the page. Don’t box
me in! We are in motion to the ocean. (Linklater Ch. 2)
The sailor’s crayons can be analogous to Dennett’s lottery drawings. One may come into life
with hundreds of dollars, or one may come into squalor. One may have all the breaks; one
may have none of the breaks. Yet what matters, what determines one’s success in the end, is
what one does with what one has. One can be born into wealth and squander it all in their
early twenties on partying. One can come into poverty but then through wise use of what
little they have they can become wealthy.
It is easier to stomach the belief that the universe itself is limiting us rather then to believe
that our choices are affecting things. Many people do not know how to take conscious control
of their lives without becoming anxious or ‘lying awake at night gnawing.’
 “If we are responsible…then we have a prerogative which some would
attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover
unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause certain events to happen, and
nothing – or no one – causes us to cause those to happen.” (Roderick
Chisholm quoted in Dennett, 100)
This is the freedom and responsibility of free will. One is free to do what ever they wish with
what ever they have. Even the worst criminal is at heart just a mis-guided opportunist
exercising free will. Not that I am commending or condoning crime, but I have more respect
for someone who meticulously plans and executes a bank heist then I do for someone who
sits at home all day complaining that they are poor. The former is seizing the moment and
putting in effort to achieve their goal while the later is just wallowing in self-pity.
We all take deliberation seriously…we plan for the future; we lie
awake nights gnawing at the bones of indecision, worrying about what
to do and why; we promise ourselves that we will be more circumspect
in the future…Is all this worry and work wasted? (Dennett 101)
Linklater’s sailor would say that it is not only a waste of one’s time, but would probably
respond that it is a spoiling of one’s time as well. “Just sort of glide along,” the sailor says.
This is not to say to dismiss one’s decisions in the moment, or be lazy when it comes time to
make choice, for I have already stated that one’s control in life is one’s choices, and a lack of
choice is a choice for the default. Rather it is like the sailor says; ‘keep things on an even
keel’.
Kant’s categorical imperative can lend one an idea of what to do with free will. That is, one
can implement Kant’s imperatives into their programming. Kant’s imperatives are just one in
a myriad of different points of view on morality. I present Kant here so as to present that
which I like best. I do not mean to present this as a be-all and end-all of morality, just one
possibility. Thus, here are the imperatives.
1. “…Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the
same time will that it become a universal law…”
2. “Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being
exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that
will at its discretions; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed
to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the
same time as an end [in himself]…”
3. “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a
means.”
(Kant 31-8)
The first imperative goes back to the golden rule and tells one to only do that which one
would will everyone to do. For example, I cannot will that my neighbor should steel from me
if I cannot also will that he steel from me. To go against the first imperative is commonly
known as hypocrisy, that is, doing one thing and then wishing other people to do differently.
This first imperative directs against hypocrisy because morality must be universal. It cannot
just be momentary encouragements or discouragements to this or that petty action, or apply to
this person, but not that person. Morality must be universal for all people so that what one
person is doing to other people is the same as other people are doing to one person. If one
were alone one in the world, one would not need morality because there would be no one else
to care what one did, nor would there be anyone else to effect with one’s actions. Yet we are
not alone in the world, and thus have to take into account the effects that our choices have not
only on ourselves, but on others as well, and at the same time take into account both the
effect that others actions have on us, and the effects that others actions have one further
others.
…Nothing other than the representation of the law in itself…can
constitute the preeminent good we call moral…but what kind of law
can that be…which must determine the will, even without regard for
the effect expected from it, in order for the will to be called good…
(Kant 14)
Kant’s universal law transcends the direct sense experiences people chase in life; feeling
good, looking good, being loved, being touched, etc, and instead is obeyed for its own sake.
The following of this law for its own sake Kant calls ‘duty’, and he believes that one should
follow one’s duty out of that same duty, and for no other reason. Kant proclaims a true
morality, a true ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ in the form of duty. Actions done from a sense of duty are
‘good’, and to do otherwise is ‘bad’. If the maxims behind the actions are in conformity with
duty, then the actions and choices themselves will automatically fall into line with duty as
well.
The second imperative classifies all rational beings as ends in themselves. This is important
to Kant because something that is an end in itself has no further purpose than its own
existence. What this does for the Free Will argument is take away the need to find a final
destination for man; a greater purpose. Humans, and indeed all rational beings, can exist
simply for the sake of existing.
The third imperative takes the second imperative and turns it into a directive, ordering that no
such rational being be ever treated as anything other than an end in itself. Essentially, this is
an imperative against exploitation. If one cannot treat a being as a means to another end, then
one cannot enslave another, one cannot objectify another, one cannot do anything to another
except allow that other to live their lives as they wish to, with the possible exception of
helping that other person if they so request; a.k.a., allowing them their Free Will.
I will return to the latter two imperatives later, but immediately I will be focusing my
discussion on the first one as it pertains most directly to choices and how we make them. The
maxims behind the actions of man survive the day-to-day influences and petty desires that
enter and leave one’s mind like people at an airport. Despite what one may, in a given
moment, wish to effect, if one’s maxims are to another end, those maxims will survive our
momentary will and have their way. This is why, to Kant, directing one’s Free Will by
momentary influence, even if the resulting actions happen to be in line with duty, are not
truly in conformity with duty.
A maxim is the thought or belief system one has behind their actions and choices. Even if
one’s volition, for example, is to be a good person just because to do so is according to one’s
religion (give to the poor, pray a lot, etc,) one will be acting more morally then one who does
so because they are a naturally good person, or because they ‘feel’ like acting in such a way.
Such is not moral to Kant because one’s innate tendency’s and ‘feelings’ can in an instant
change, and if such is the only driving force behind one’s choices, then once such a change
happens one might cease the afore mentioned good actions. In short, one must always act
from duty because duty is unchanging while momentary inclinations may shift. Kant believes
that one never truly wills something which one believes is bad; rather one momentarily
wishes to be allowed a single instance in which they get away with it.
“If we now attend to ourselves in any transgression of a duty, we find
that we do not really will that our maxim should become a universal
law, since that is impossible for us, but that the opposite of our maxim
 should instead remain a universal law, only we take the liberty of
making an exception to it for ourselves (or just for this once) to the
advantage of our inclination.” (Kant 34)
It is thus common to teach children the golden rule of ‘do unto others as you would wish
them to do unto you.’ This old adage, often taught to children from very early ages, is a
nursery version of Kant’s imperative, and delivers the same message to children that Kant’s
text delivers to studiers of philosophy. The core message in both is that others experience
things as one does, so if one does not like it when one does something to them, then to do the
same thing they do not like to another is to willingly inflict that same experience upon the
other as well. Further, if one does a certain thing to another, then one is willing as well that
that other do that thing to yet another one. If the sense of duty is not enough encouragement
to remember this, one can look at it from the understanding that eventually that thing that one
does will make its way back to us.
Though one may wish to make them selves a single exception, and do something once that
they wish no one else to do, but one is not alone in the world that is not actually possible.
Kant’s first imperative is not just a desire that one will one’s maxims to be universal, but a
also a reminder that one cannot will anything without any or all others also willing or doing
the same thing.
If despite my will that no one sleep with their neighbor’s wife I sleep with my neighbor’s
wife, then despite my best efforts at keeping secrets, there is a chance that my neighbor, and
or my wife, will find out and then do the same thing. Now, despite my will to keep my
cheating as something that just I have done just this once, Kant’s truth has proven true and
my action was a universal maxim.

“A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes,

because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of
its volition, that is…[it] is to be value incomparably higher than all
that could merely be brought about by it in favor of some inclination
and indeed, if you will, of the sum of all inclinations.” (Kant 8)
Kant takes away the usual influences, here called inclinations, from daily decision making
and instead directs all choices and actions to be done from universal law. That is, a law that is
good for no other reason than because it is law, and to follow such law is duty. This law is to
be the sole director of the Free Will of a rational being so that such a being would be acting
only out of such law. Such a directed being, and thus also only the actions of such a being,
chosen from such a maxim, are to be labeled good.
For example, what usually puzzles us when we do not agree with another person’s actions is
not that they did what they did, but why they did what they did, that is, what their maxim’s
were behind their actions. Traditionally, good has as many definitions as there are rational
beings in the universe, and everyone is always making choices based on their individual
definitions of good, and then labeling those choices as such.
Marcus Aurelius, in his Meditations, stated that one only has to “… revert to the teachings of
[one’s] creed, and to reverence for reason, and within8
a week those who now class [one] with
beasts and monkeys will be calling [one] a god.” This echoes Kant’s belief in reason alone
being able to guide our actions, and in the categorical imperative alone as the one true source
of moral guidance, or, as he states it, Universal Law.
“Understanding, wit, judgment, and the like, whatever such talents of
mind may be called, or courage, resolution, and perseverance in one’s
plans, as qualities of temperament, are undoubtedly good and
 desirable for many purposes, but they can also be extremely evil and
harmful if the will which is to make use of these gifts of nature, and
whose distinctive constitution is therefore called character, is not
good.” (Kant 7)
“…It is an analytic proposition that if I fully will the effect I also will
the action requisite to it; for, it is one in the same thing to represent
something as an effect possible by in a certain way and to represent
myself as acting in this way with respect to it.” (Kant 28)
To example Kant here, one cannot think, say of getting rich, without at the same time
thinking of some or another step or steps involved in getting rich. Any end which one wills
naturally includes in it the will to any and all intermediate steps. One’s will to take a vacation
in a far away place must necessarily include a will to pack one’s stuff, unless one wishes to
travel empty handed, to take the time off from work, purchase travel tickets, etc.
This is important to the concept of responsibility because it means that if one chooses a
certain end then one is also choosing the intermediate means that will lead to that end. As one
is responsible for choosing one’s ends, then one is also responsible for the intermediate
means. To the easy challenge to this, “but I didn’t know such and such were part of the
intermediate of such and such an end” I counter, even easier, with “ignorance is no excuse.”
It is no longer enough to will that the ends are good, and it is not enough to say, “the ends
justify the means”, or, “sometimes bad things just happen.” Now every step of every path is
put as the responsibility of the acting agent.
Thus the Kantian sense of duty takes on even greater import when one realizes one cannot
take a single step, or will a single thing into manifestation, without the possibility of results
occurring aside from the ones that one was initially aiming at. If one does not wish to
accidentally will bad things in the course of achieving the various ends that we think are
good, one needs a Universal Law, like the one Kant describes, that when universally applied
ensures that all our ends, and their intermediate steps, are in conformity with a equally
universal sense of good. In short, as long as one acts out of Duty, then the intermediate steps
as well as one’s ends will as well be in conformity with duty.
What one then needs is a way of testing one’s intentions, ones proposed ends, to see if they
are good moral intentions, and also a way of knowing what it means to be moral. In the world
of law there are logical constructs know as, ‘tests’. For example, in copyright law, one of the
tests to prove whether something is a instance of copyright infringement is to remove all the
non-copyrightable elements, such as standard fare of the given genre, from the infringing
work, and see if what is left is still and infringement. In this way, and all cases of copyright
infringement can be judged under a unified, and thus universal, system.
Kant’s imperatives are tests for morality. When one is attempting to judge a proposed choice
as to whether or not it is moral, one can run it through Kant’s logic and see if it passes. For
example, if one is deciding whether or not to rob a bank, one can pass this decision through
Kant’s imperative ‘test’ by asking one’s self if one would will any one to rob a bank. When
one then decides that no, one would not all anyone to rob a bank, then the Kantian test failed,
and one is returned with the result that they then cannot rob a bank either.
“Would it not therefore be more advisable in moral matters to leave
the judgment of common reason as it is and, at most, call in philosophy
only to present the system of morals all the more completely and
[apprehensively] and to present its rules in a form more convenient for
use.” (Kant 17)
Philosophy is thus presented by Kant as a ‘more convenient’ way of delivering and
employing the categorical imperative into daily life. Kant has laid down his imperatives as
necessary law precisely because Kant was aware of this power of the will and knew that it
must be tempered by reason.
The imperatives require only conformity to law, and yet promise to produce, in the one who
faithfully follows them, a good moral life. Conformity with the concept of treating all rational
beings as ends in themselves and doing only that which can be held universally, Kant says, is
morality.
“…Complete well being and satisfaction with one’s condition called
happiness, produce boldness and thereby often arrogance as well
unless a good will is present which corrects the influence of these on
the mind and, in so doing, also corrects the whole principle of action
and brings it into conformity with universal ends…” (Kant 7)
To Kant, the feeling of happiness is not necessarily bad, but is not to be the end that one’s
choices are aimed at. Just trying to be happy will not produce happiness, and will produce
unhappiness, “boldness and thereby often arrogance’, unless one has a sense of morality, that
comes from, and aims towards, conformity with duty, that can keep one’s baser desires in
check so that they do not control one, and overtake one’s reason, one’s conscience, and lead
one to the futile and miserable life that arises when one only seeks moment to moment
happiness for the sake of moment to moment happiness.
The question that arises from Kant’s imperatives, especially the second two imperatives,
however, is ‘what are rational beings, and what are not rational beings?’ From the text the
answer appears to be that a rational being is one who is capable of having maxims about his
own behavior; one that is able to think about what they are doing, and then make rational
choices. This includes any and all intelligent life forms from other planets we may encounter
in the future, but does not include however all the animals and insects in our world and other
worlds, which we do not believe are making choices.
This brings up another argument. ‘How do you know animals are not making choices? My
dog makes choices every day.’ This is true; many non-humans on this planet do display
intelligence, and do appear to be making choices. The easy answer to this is that such
creatures are merely following programming; living out a program that controls what they do
from birth to death and any apparent choices are just coincidental. Yet did not I already say
that humans are following programs too?
This is a difficult and ongoing argument because at any point when one asks about Free Will,
a scientist can come in and say that neurons and DNA have pre-programmed us to live a
certain way, and that we are no different from the dogs and cats except that language and
narrative-memory, the ability to remember the stories of our lives, has given us an illusion of
choice. The philosopher or new-age-spiritualist can then say, ‘but I am able to reflect on my
thoughts and my experiences and then choose to act differently.’ The scientist can then come
back and simply say ‘but all that thinking is just a more elaborate part of the DNA
programming.’

The first of Kant’s five Categorical Imperatives presents this as well, but from a different
angle. Instead of discussing one’s self in the present and one’s self in the past, Kant compares
one’s self in one’s present situation to any other person in one’s same present situation.
Kant, here, presents the view that what ever we base our decisions on must be universally
applicable. That is, they should be applicable to anyone in our situation. Anyone who is in the
same situation as we are should make the same decision we have made. Usually this is
exampled in relation to law. For example, if I believe I should be able to sleep with my
neighbor’s wife, then my neighbor should be able to sleep with mine.
Here it can be applied as; what one chooses to do in a situation, given all the variables of the
situation, as one perceives them, anyone else, in that situation, should choose to do. If I
cannot say that I believe that anyone should make the same choice, then I should not make
that choice either.
Yet this construct, as logical as it sounds, in the real world is irrelevant because no two
people will ever be in the same situation with exactly the same variables. The slightest
change in circumstances between what I face and what another faces can drastically change
which decision will produce the outcome that works for the one making the decision.
Going back to Glasser’s four needs, the level to which each individual’s needs must be met
for them to be happy tend to vary. Some of us need very little freedom, for example, while
others need a lot of freedom. Therefore, if a given choice in a given situation produces a
smaller amount of freedom than another choice, then for the individual who requires more
freedom, that choice would not be the right one.
Thus this variance of needs is itself a changed detail that can make a decision that worked for
one person not work for another person, even if they are in the exact same situation.
One can compare one’s self in the past to the other person in Kant’s imperative. Needs
change in ourselves from moment to moment the same way they do from person to person.
Therefore, a decision, in a given situation, that worked for us then may not work for us now.
The decision to leave a relationship when we are young may be the best choice when things
are not working out because at that time freedom is most important. Yet later in life when a
long time marriage is not working, we may choose to work it out because the love and
belonging of our family now switches priorities with our previous desire for freedom.
Not to say that Kant is wrong. I myself am writing theories in this paper that I believe apply
to all others as well as myself. It would not be right of me to say that all others are
responsible for the choices they make and the results those choices have on their lives, but
then say that I myself was not as thus responsible.
Thus the moral worth of an action does not lie in the effect expected
from it and so too does not lie in any principle of action that needs to
borrow its motive from this expected effect. (Kant 14)
Kant continues to explain what he means by universal law, which is to him that law which is
followed by the will for the sake of the law, and for no other sake such as happiness. Kant is
trying to find a good which stands outside of the definition of good I have stated above,
which is that which served to fulfill our Glasserian needs. I leave it up to the reader which
good they are trying to achieve, for the responsibility for one’s choices that I am discoursing
on here applies to either and thus I will not go into that discussion here.
To say that if determinism is true, your future is fixed, is to
say…nothing interesting. To say that if determinism is true, your
nature is fixed, is to say something false. Our natures aren’t fixed
because we have evolved to be entities designed to change their
natures in response to interactions with the rest of the world. It is
confusion between having a fixed nature and having a fixed future that
mis-motivates the anguish over determinism. (Dennett 93)
The argument against this is likely immediate in the average reader. “But everyday people do
things that make me angry, make me sad, and so forth, in fact you the writer are making me
want to put this down by suggesting that I am responsible for people making me feel and do
things.” What I am saying, as Glasser wrote, is that yes, you are responsible for the things
you do and the things you feel. A note on feelings, before I continue; according to Glasser,
you cannot control how you feel, but rather what you think and what you do, and so when I
say “make me feel angry”, what I mean is “make me act in anger when I feel angry.” From
this note, one can already see the point we (Glasser and myself) are making.
The next two examples will show how this plays out in daily life. I use the pronoun ‘you’ so
that the reader may learn from imagined experience. Let’s say your special-someone tells you
they will call you when she gets home. To further the stakes, lets assume you have an
important philosophy mid-term exam the next morning, and were planning on going to bed
nine after having a sweet conversation with them and allowing their soothing voice to ring in
your ears when you fall asleep so you wake up the next morning well rested for your exam.
Let’s then also say that you know, because they told you, that they will be getting home at
eight o-clock, and so you rightly expect a phone call from them somewhere between eight
o’clock and half-past. Instead, however, the eight o’clock hour comes and goes, as does the
nine, and the ten, and your phone does not ring until sometime after eleven. At this point, you
are angry with them, as you believe they have slighted you by their behavior, and you make a
point to let them now. You then reproached them harshly for not calling when they said they
were going to and you blame them for you now not getting to bed on time. You then further
blame them for the fact that you are now going to bed angry before an important exam, and
the argument that ensues lasts till nearly two in the morning.
…Many times in life, when we are miserable it is because we
continue to blame others for our misery or try to control others
when it is against our best interest to do so.
(Glasser 19)
While this may sound like an unavoidable fight, and a few readers may even commiserate
with the scenario, according to Choice Theory, and the view I am here explaining, you are
wrong for reproaching that person because it was your choice to do so. While it was natural
to miss them, and natural to wonder why they were not calling as they said they would, you
made a choice to react the way you did and could have just as easily chosen differently. The
fact that they could have made a choice to phone or text you at some point saying there were
delayed is immaterial as that was their choice, not yours, and we are talking about you.
Let us take another example; one that more people can relate to, or have at least witnessed.
Again, I put the reader in the driver’s seat and ask you to humor me with your imagination.
Let us say your driving down the road and a car cuts in front of you and you almost hit them.
You slam on your breaks and manage to screech to halt only inches from their rear bumper.
At this point you may honk furiously, maybe you even indicate you annoyance by extending
a certain digit out the window. You might even do the extreme anger version and get out of
you car so as to threaten them with you fist. You feel completely justified in your choice of
reaction because the outer world presented you with a situation that appeared out of your
control and you attempted to exercise control over it, even if that control is limited to
expressing anger.
Glasser, however, would argue that cutting you off was nothing more than information being
given to you, and that the decision you then made was entirely yours. As the decision was
entirely yours then the responsibility for make that decision, and therefore the responsibility
for the outcome, as it relates to your life, is yours. This is why it is important to remember
Glasser’s theory that people are doing nothing to us but presenting us with information rather
than making us do things. An example of this is a ringing phone.
When the information of the ringing phone hits our ears, we have a choice of whether or not
to answer it. Some people think about this choice, possibly consulting Caller I.D. to see if it is
a person they wish to choose to speak to. Others use the stock choice answer the phone. This
choice, to many who use it, is sub conscious. That is, they simply answer the phone every
time it rings without thinking about it. This may sound like a mundane example, but it is
important to understand choice theory in a simple example now, as it will get more complex
and subtle.
If we believe that people are doing things to us then we will always blame them and always
wait on them to act differently, which they may or may not do, instead of using the
information to adapt our programs and make them better. Such blaming is counter productive
and serves to keep us in our misery rather than allow us to adapt out of it. It is then an
exercise of Free Will and intellect to weed out the programs, which are no longer functioning
in one’s life. If one does not choose to live according to Free Will then one does not have to,
and one will not.
To choose not to accept the Free Will of changing our programs is akin to throwing away an
education; tearing up one’s hard earned diploma and claiming to have never made it beyond
high school when one may have a master’s degree. This is a foolish concept to anyone who is
working, or ever has worked, at earning a higher education degree, and yet many people
throw away the education their lives are presenting them at every moment by choosing to
blame rather than to learn.
Yet as so many people choose to ignore this education rather than learn from it, the question
arises why would such a behavior seem like a good idea. When life becomes more and more
laborious and a burden to deal with, surely one Glasser tells the story of a guy who threw
himself into a cactus garden in Arizona for no apparent reason.
Determinism is the system that allows us to be agents that make choices. The fact that we
make choices makes us responsible for those choices and thus the reactions and results of
those choices. Choosing to think thoughts that lead us to feel depression and self-loathing is
an action. If one chooses that action, and then feels the sorrowful depression that results from
such thoughts, then did one chose that depression by choosing those thoughts. Glasser
explains how these choices functions in the mind and why it is a choice even when it seems
that it is beyond our conscious control.
“You may argue: Sometimes I can’t seem to control what I am thinking
about; I cant get a repetitive thought out of my mind. I contend that
you keep choosing to think that you keep choosing to think that
repetitive thought, miserable as it may be, because it gives you better
control over some aspect of your life than any other thought you could
choose at the time.” (Glasser 74)
It is determined, that is, it is a known, pre-existing fact that thoughts are connected to feelings
and that thinking a thing brings about a mental state that feels a certain way. What one feels
is thus an indirect result of what one thinks. Though one may not choose all the thoughts that
pass through one’s conscious mind, one chooses which thoughts to focus on. A metaphoric
model for this is that while one does not choose the taxis that pass on a city street, one does
choose which, if any, of those taxis to hail for a ride.
How does one know if one is making a good choice if one cannot see into the future and see
the result of one’s actions? Yes the memory of past actions as they function in a Glasserian
quality world are useful if we can remember, but sometimes the situation we are in looks like
nothing we have seen before. Choosing virtue will never produce a result that does not work
for one in relation to their needs. This is the view of Aristotle’s Neimocean Ethics.

1 This comes a large part from numerous articles in the magazine ‘Scientific American Mind’
more of new age spirituality and metaphysics books then I can count, as well as my own
training and experience in holistic balancing.
2 This is personal knowledge I gained from an Intro-Psyche course
3 I want it to be known that this is just an example and that I am not actually an alcoholic.
4 A holographic virtual-reality system that perfectly imitates reality.
5 Which, incidentally, was the plot of at least one episode of each of the various Star Trek
shows.
6 Though I do suggest that everyone read Glasser’s book as it is one of those rare life-altering
reads that has the tendency to open its reader’s eyes, and thus greatly improve their lives, as it
did for me.
7 I will exclude here the new-age metaphysical belief in manifest-reality that states that even
these events happen to us by our choice.
8 Marcus Aurelius. Meditations. Translated by Maxwell Staniforth. 1964. Penguin Books.
London. (Page 66 – Book IV)