Social Sciences Research Journal, Volume VI, no. 1& 2, March-July 1981, pp.

62-98

COMMUNIST CHINA’S VIEW OF THE ASIAN

NON-ALIGNED TILL 1960
Mohd. Khalid

The People’s Republic of China emerged as an important actor in world politics

in 1949. Since then it has played a significant role among the developing countries of
South and Southeast Asia. Claiming for itself the status of what came to be known as a
“Third World” country—in its later description by Mao in his “Three World” theory 1—
China undertook some major shifts in its policy towards one of the most significant
phenomena in the world, namely, non- alignment. Swinging from total hostility to
appreciative support and then back again to selective hostility, China’s policy seems
clearly to be less than consistent particularly in this regard.
The shifts in the’ Chinese ideological position vis-a-vis nonalignment in the
period under consideration have to be understood in the perspective of China’s natural
urge of acquiring power and influence in the world commensurate with its size and
history on the one hand, and the realities of the world situation obtaining at that time, on
the other. In such a difficult and deterring perspective had China to define its interest and
pursue it.
China’s prominence in the region of Southeast Asia had been an acknowledged
fact since times immemorial. It, therefore, wanted to regain its earlier prominence in the
region, and in the world at large. The Chinese regarded their culture superior vis-a-vis the
rest of the world, and their country as the centre of the world.2 Traditionally, the Chinese
view of the world was centered around the notion of ‘Middle Kingdom’.3 China did not
have much contact with the rest of the world, except with its immediate neighbours; it
perhaps did not have much knowledge oi or interest in the other parts of the world. Its
geography —viz., its size and location—helped in this view. Geography had kept the
country separate from South Asia and the West, and made it the most distinctive of all
areas which in Chinese terms could be called as Sino-centric.4 The superiority which
China had in the region, was used to influence the bordering, states in Asia to establish
peace on its boundaries.
The idea of Middle Kingdom could work only until China was an isolated and elf-
contained world. After the tenth century the country became weak and defensive, was
defeated by Mongols and then Manchus, who finally conquered it in 1644. This dealt a
body blow to the Chinese belief of itself as superior and those in the rest of the world as
inferiors and barbarians, and this attitude began to crumble. It is doubtful if any other
people have had quite such an image of themselves and for such an unbroken length of
time.5
By the time the Western colonial powers arrived in China in the 19th century, it
had already lost all its power and prestige. This prestige was later vigorously pushed
down and finally submerged under the semi-colonial status for China. The
technologically advanced countries of Europe, especially Great Britain, riding the crest of
imperialist wave, forcibly disturbed the age old Chinese isolation and exclusivity. The
Opium Wars of 1840 and 1857 inflicting humiliating defeat on the Chinese proved that
its rulers, the Manchus, were incapable of defending their land. Thus, the Europeans
succeeded in. imposing many unequal treaties, on China, and got trading concessions
there. Many trading posts on the Chinese soil were set up by Great Britain and other
European nations, and China was steadily reduced to an ill-governed, weak and shaky
kingdom.6
Movements against foreign influence, and the weak dynasty held to be
responsible for Chinese weakness and humiliation arose in the country. The Taiping
Rebellion of 1848, and later the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, were such major uprisings
against the Manchus, and the Western encroachments in China.7 These movements aimed
at democratic set-up in China and freeing the country of all foreign influence. They
intensified gradually, led to the fall of Manchus in 1911, and were followed by institution
of a republicari government under Dr. Sun Yat-Sen.
Sun Yat-Sen, leading the struggle against the Manchus, became the President of
the Republic. In 1916, he named his party as Kuomintang, with declared principles of
nationalism, democracy, and people’s livelihood.8 However, he could do little to improve
the situation. His efforts to reunify China were hampered by regional militarism—the
‘War Lords’—and the situation in the country deteriorated further.
The Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917 had great impact on China. Spread of
Marxism-Leninism reached China and in 1921 the Communist Party of China was
formed. Those who joined the new party, which later became the bulwark of the
Communist revolution, F were the ones disgruntled and dissatisfied with Kuomintang
performance. The republican China’s importance to cope with domestic problems and
external pressures led them to think that Marxism- Leninism was the key to create a new
apparatus and bring fundamental changes in agrarian China. The Kuomintang Party too
was influenced by the Soviet revolution, and the two parties, Kuomintang and
Communists, worked together under Soviet guidance. After the death of Sun Yat-Sen in
March 1925, Chiang Kai-Shek succeeded as president of the party and the republic. He
disliked communists, and a confrontation between the two followed in which thousands
of Communist Party workers were killed.9
This was a very crucial period in the recent Chinese history. Kuomintang
government remained occupied with domestic problems. The war lords asserted to
maintain their regional autonomy, and in time the confrontation with communists touched
new heights. In 1931, Japan occupied Manchuria and planned further aggression.10
Chiang Kai-Shek, through a policy of appeasement of the Japanese, tried to postpone
war, but failed. He was also unwilling to fight the Japanese in collaboration with the
Communists. This led to his detention by his own troops in 1937 until he agreed to form a
United Front with the Communists, to fight Japan.11 The Sino-Japanese war, which
started in 1937, continued with Japanese successes and came to an end on 14 August
1945 only with the Japanese surrender to the Allies at the end of second World War.
After the war, Chiang Kai-Shek was recognised by United States and the West as
the ruler of China. The country was accorded independent status and permanent
membership in the Security Council.12 This arrangement was not acceptable to the
Communists, who—backed by the Soviet Union— had emerged as a powerful force with
substantial land area under their control. Soviet help to build Red Army, under the
leadership of Mao Tse-tung, was extended in the hope that a Communist China, with its
vast land and resources, would serve the Soviet security as well as political interests
better. 13
In 1946, attempts to form a coalition between Chiang and the Communists failed,
and the country was plunged in a civil war, in which the Communists emerged victorious
in 1949. Chiang Kai-Shek fled alongwith his forces, to Taiwan and established a
government-in- exile there. Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) on 1 October 1949.14
Emergence of Communist China was a big boost to the socialist bloc ‘in the
world, and a particular jolt to US policy in East Asia. Peking now perceived the world as
full of hostile forces peopled by numerous enemies of China, on the prowl and waiting to
pounce upon it at the first available opportunity.15 Therefore, the immediate and pressing
problem that the Chinese leadership perceived was that relating to its security. United
States’ take over and commitment to the Japanese security after the second world war,
and its consequent and formidable military presence in the Far East to shield Taiwan,
made China think seriously of its security. Moreover, China, for a variety of reasons, did
not expect much co-operation with the newly independent states, who had opted out of
the U.S. and Soviet bloc rivalry. These countries had decided to remain ut of the military
alliances and pacts formed after the World War II. The only option left for China at this
stage was to join hands with Soviet Union to meet its security needs.16
In early 1950s and onward, the foreign policy of China was more or less guided
by the Soviet Union, and the country remained strictly confined to the socialist bloc for
its diplomatic relations. In 1950, Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual
Assistance was signed, which bound the two countries militarily, politically, culturally
and economically.17 On the other hand, United States recognised the Chiang Kai-Shek
regime in Taiwan as true representative of China. US armed forces under the auspices of
United Nations went in support of South Korea in 1950 and as allied support to Vietnam
in 1953. All these developments were enough to whip up the tension between China and
the USA the more.
Keeping to the Marxist-Leninist ideology, Mao declared that “in the present
international state system the contradiction is between the imperialism and the people of
the world”.18 The oppressed nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America are faced with the
urgent task of fighting imperialism and its lackeys. He appealed to the proletarian parties
to hold high the mission of struggle against imperialism and a new colonialism. At this
stage, the PRC seemed busy in consolidating its revolution and Marxist-Leninist
ideology. Chinese criticized every non-communist phenomenon and rejected the idea of
neutrality, Mao said
The forty years’ experience of Sun Yat-Sen and the twenty eight years’ experience of the CCP
have taught us to believe that in order to win and to consolidate the victory we must lean to one
side. The experiences…. show that without exception the Chinese people either lean to the side of
imperialism or to the side of socialism. To sit on the fence is impossible; a third road does not
exist. We oppose the Chiang Kai-Shek reactionary clique who lean to the side of imperialism; we
also oppose the illusion of a third road. Not only in China but also in the world, without exception,
one either learns to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is mere
camouflage and a third road does not exist. 19

Development of Non-Alignment
The immediate post-World War II years were characterised and convulsed by the
triumph of nationalism and corresponding dissolution of empires in Afro-Asia. India’s
independence in August 1947 set the course in this direction so that Burma, Sri Lanka,
Indonesia came out of the colonial yoke as independent nations one after the other. As
constituents of empires these countries and their men and materials had fed the political
and military ambitions of their imperial masters who exploited them thoroughly for the
promotion of imperial interests rather than those of these countries themselves. As
subject peoples they had no place or position in international intercourse and world
affairs.
After independence, these newly emerged countries will have nothing to do with
power politics played by the colonial powers. At the same time, they were determined to
play an active and their due role in the affairs of the world, especially when peace and
freedom were at issue.
Non-alignment—the concept, posture and policy—was the result of these urges,
and Jawaharlal Nehru was the first to articulate it.
In his very first broadcast to the nation (7 September 1946) Nehru said:
“…. We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation with our own policy and
not merely as a satellite of another nation. We hope to develop close and direct contacts with other
nations and to cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and freedom.
We propose as far as possible, to keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against
one another, which have led in the past to world wars and which may again lead to disasters on an
even vaster scale. We believe that peace and freedom are indivisible and the denial of freedom
 anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to conflict and war. We are particularly
interested in the emancipation of colonial and dependent countries and peoples, and in the
recognition in theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races.... We seek no domination
over others and we claim no privileged position over other peoples”.20

A few months later he declared,

“We have proclaimed during this past year that we will not attach ourselves to any particular
group. That has nothing to do with neutrality or passivity or anything else. If there is a big war,
there is no particular reason why we should jump into it…..21
Again,
“We have no designs against anybody; ours is the great design of promoting peace and progress
all over the world. Far too long have we of Asia been petitioners in Western courts and
chancellories. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to
cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us. We do not intend to be the
playthings of others”. 22

Historical, geographical, economic and political factors had moved Nehru, and
India, to opt for non-alignment as the basis of India’s foreign policy as early as 1946.23
Non-alignment, as Nehru conceived it, meant non-entry into and opposition to military
alliances and power blocs—Western led by the USA, and Eastern or Communist led by
USSR Secondly, non-alignment stood for acting according to the best judgment of
individual country, an independent approach to the foreign policy and not being tied
down to any preconceived or externally dictated line of action or policy. As Nehru
explained (9 December 1958) in the Lok Sabha:
“... When we say our policy is one of non-alignment, obviously, it means non, alignment with
military blocs. You cannot have a negative policy. The policy is a positive one, a definite one, and
I hope, a dynamic one, but in so far as the military blocs today and the Cold War are concerned,
we do not align ourselves with either bloc. That in itself is not a policy; it is only part of a
policy.... one has to lay stress on the fact that we are not parties to the Cold War and we are not
members of, or attached to, any military bloc.

The policy itself can ‘only be a policy of acting according to our best judgment, and furthering the
principal objective and ideals that we have…..”24

At a stage when both the super powers —USA and USSR— were competing each
other by making military alliances the world over, and the Cold War was on, the
countries of Asia and Africa refrained from entering the bloc politics. Nehru had
frequently spoken of Afro-Asian solidarity, and after a deep analysis of the exploitation
of Afro-Asian states, had favoured the idea of a federation of Asian states.25 Under
Nehru’s inspiration the Indian Council of World Affairs undertook to organize a
conference on Asian problems. The conference, attended by 26 countries which opened
in Delhi on 23 March 1947, was characterised by Nehru as .a unique occasion in history
and a landmark which divided the past from the future. He stressed on equality of nations
and said: “In this conference... there are no leaders and no followers. All countries of
Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting
that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development...”. 26
So,’ the idea of non-alignment was an assertion of the desire of the newly
independent countries to stay outside the military contest. Its purpose was to reduce
international tension and to make a positive contribution to world peace.

People’s Republic of China and Non-Alignment

Chiang Kai-Shek’s misrule over China (1925-49), the two civil wars, and US help
to Taiwan and Japan, thus, became the major determinants of China’s foreign policy.
China’s major concern at that time was its security. Being primarily an Asian state, China
had to seek security and its interests in Asia,, which was overwhelmingly nonaligned. So,
an interaction between China and non-aligned states was natural and inevitable.
Chinese leaders were “remarkably unequipped” with first hand knowledge of the
outside world, 27 and they depended on Soviet Union for PRC’s foreign relations. The
PRC gave unqualified support to every Soviet stand in cold war. To be in tune with the
Soviet Union—which looked at non-alignment with suspicion— China opposed the states
who opted out of military alliances. Nehru’s attempts to polarize non-alignment and
Afro-Asian unity was obstructed by China, probably due to the orthodox Communist
belief, held till about 1952, that the newly-independent Asian states were all puppets of
the West.28 They doubted the independence of Asian states and regarded them a Western
lackeys —having no independent foreign policies. However, being an Asian country,
China also tried to define its national interest in Asian terms.
In a long range perspective China saw Asia not in terms of ruling it, but as a
community of socialist states where China would be the centre —the great within— as it
had been in the illustrious days of the ancient empire.29 The leaders in Peking sought to
restore China to its past position of grandeur and influence. 30 The newly independent
nations were suspect and 1the PRC was not sure of the kind of relationship it should
develop with them, and remained hostile to them. The leadership of these states was
labeled by Peking as well as Moscow as “running dogs” and hirelings of the imperialists.
 In the early fifties, however, certain international events brought home to the
Chinese, the significance of non-alignment and this led to a favourable shift in its policy.
On 25 June 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea and in its resolution of 27 June 1950
the United Nations• appealed to all countries to assist South Korea to repel the
aggression. The United States dispatched its forces in response to the resolution and
ordered its 7th fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait. General MacArthur was deputed as
Commander of UN—essentially U.S.— forces which drove the North Korean army back
over the border and on 1 October 1950 crossed the 38th Parallel (border between the
North and South Korea) heading towards the Yalu river. Considering it a direct threat the
Chinese People’s Army entered the Korean War.31 Apparently, the Chinese entry into the
war was motivated largely by its concern for its own security and only secondarily by
concern for North Korean survival. 32
During the Korean War most of the non-aligned states refused to brand China as an
aggressor. Nehru, the spokesman for nonalignment, urged peaceful settlement of the
dispute.33 He also urged that a representative of the People’s Republic of China should
also be allowed to sit in the Security Council and there should be direct dealing among
China, Soviet Union and USA to solve The Korean crisis.34 Also, India abstained from
voting in UN, on the resolution for embargo measures against the People’s Republic of
China.35 This policy of nonaligned nations for mediation and firm resolve for peaceful
settlement of the crisis, made China think of the usefulness of non-alignment vis-a-vis
China’s national interest. They also saw how powerful the voice of these states was to
mould the world public opinion.36

Developments in Tibet
Similarly in the case of Tibet, China began the “liberation” of Tibet in October
1950. The move was to reassert its authority there. India offered to assist the Chinese in,
reaching a peaceful settlement with the Tibetan government before their army entered
Tibet. But negotiations could not make any headway and India after initial annoyance and
despair accepted the Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as agreed upon between the British
Indian government and China at Simla Convention of l913. 37 Nehru, on this issue decided
to avoid any confrontation with China and conceded to the Chinese position. In 1951
Sino-Indian treaty over Tibet was signed as a gesture of goodwill to new China and as an
earnest of the cordiality which he wished should pervade the relations between the two
countries. 38
These developments helped in’ removing the Chinese misgivings about non-
alignment. In 1952 the Chinese policy towards most of the Asian countires regardless of
their ideological orientation gradually started changing. In October that year, at the Asian
and Pacific peace conference held in Peking, the Chinese proclaimed their new line of
peaceful co-existence. They now took a stand that nations with different ideologies and
social systems could co-exist So the policy underwent a change between 1951 and 1953’
The intention behind this change seems to have been covered by the Chinese desire to
befriend the non-aligned states for its security and also to propagate its ideology of world
revolution and present PRC as a model for the developing countries of Asia.
The boundary question between India and China remained unsettled and China’s
control of Tibet upset India’s traditional relations with Tibet. But Indian leadership
earnestly tried to open dialogue with China to improve the relations, without touching the
boundary question.
Nehru canvassed for five principles of peaceful co-existence —Panchsheel—
which, eventually, came to be enshrined in the Sino-Indian Treaty, 24 April 1954; these
are (i) Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) Mutual non-aggression;
(iii) Mutual noninterference in each other’s internal affairs; (iv) Equality and mutual
benefits; and (v) Peaceful co-exstence.40
China establishsd relations with non-communist nations on the basis of these
principles, and made these the symbol of the new relationship between the non-aligned
states and a communist power.41
An era of harmonious relations began with emphasis to reduce international
tensions and non-interference in the affairs of other states. Describing the agreement iP
Parliament, Nehru pointed to the significance of the preamble of the agreement. Pleading
for the acceptance of the vows of peaceful co-existence, “not only with respect to India
and China but also the other countries of Asia” he claimed, “this atmosphere of fear
which is haunting us will gradually go away... We have done no better thing than this
since we became independent”.42
 The Colombo Conference, held on 28 April 1954, and attended by India, Burma,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, corroborating the sentiment, also appealed for mutual
cooperation and preservation of world peace.

Bandung Conference, April 1955

China canvassed for working together against Western imperialism and took a
common stand with the Asian states. The US sponsored treaty (SEATO) had been signed
at Manila on 8 September 1954 from which most of the Southeast Asian states had stayed
away, and alongwith China, criticised the alliance.
A meeting of the Prime Ministers of Burma, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Indonesia and
India, had in December 1954 decided at Bogor to convene a conference under the joint
sponsorship of the five Prime Ministers. The conference aimed to (i) promote goodwill
and cooperation; (ii) consider social, economic, cultural problems and the problems of
special interest to Asian and African peoples, and (iii) view the position of Asia and
Africa in the world and the contribution they could m4e to the promotion of world peace
and cooperation.43 The conference so planned came to be known as the Afro-Asian
Solidarity Conference which was held at Bandung (Indonesia) in April 1955, and to
which at India’s—in fact Nehru’s —suggestion the People’s Republic of China was also
invited. The prime minsters further agreed that the conference should be composed of all
the independent and near-independent nations of Asia and Africa. The invitations thus
extended were on geographical and not on idological or racial basis.44
The Bandung Conference which opened on 18 April that year was the first in
which the PRC and other newly independent Afro-Asian states presented a common view
point. Chou En-lai, the Chinese Prime Minister in charge of Foreign Affairs, tried to
make the most of his diplomatic skill. He tried to befriend the Asian states and declared
that China had no aggressive designs against any other country and that it wanted to live
in peace and harmony. He stated that the People’s Republic of China had come to seek
unity and not to quarrel. The Chinese delegation was there to seek common ground rather
than to creating any divergence.45 This conference was the climax of the soft attitude of
China towards the non-aligned states.
 A great success, in so far as for the first time Asian nations came in direct contact
the PRC, the Conference is considered to be a landmark in international relations. Nehru
regarded it as a historic event which represented the emergence of a new Asia and Africa.
At the conference, Chou En-lai got a chance to explain the Chinese stand vis-a-vis other
Afro-Asian states. He offered political settlement of disputes —which were mainly
territorial— and offered economic help. The spirit of goodwill, created at Bandung
proved very helpful to bring China closer to Afro-Asia. It was admitted in China that
“since the Bandung Conference a major trend has come to the fore. The peoples of Asia
and Africa are playing an increasingly important role in shaping the future of
humanity”.46
Soon after the Bandung conference, however, it became apparent that the
Panchsheel and the Bandung declaration were mere slogans for PRC camouflaging its
real expansionist designs. China seemed to have re-discovered the Great Han foreign
policy of expansionism. The Bandung phase was thus the necessary time-gaining device
to prepare for a major conflict especially with India. In 1956, Chinese domestic policy
underwent a change and it strongly affected its foreign policy too. Mao asserted that
China should emerge as the most powerful country in the world. In his talk on the ‘Ten
Major Relationships’, he declared that:
National defence is indispensable. Our defence capabilities have attained a certain level. As a
result of the war to resist U.S. aggression and aid Korea and of several years of training and
consolidation, our armed forces have grown more powerful and are now stronger than was the
Soviet Red Army before the Second World War; also there have been improvements in
armaments. Our defence industry is being built up.... We have never been able to make planes and
cars, and now we are beginning to make them.

We do not have the atom bomb yet. But neither did we have planes and artillery in the past. We
defeated the Japanese imperialists and Chiang Kai-Shek with millet plus rifles. We are stronger
than before and will be stronger still in the future. We will have not only more planes and artillery
but atom bomb too. If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the
bomb…..47

Mao also talked about bridging the gap between China and the Western countries
and initiated in 1958 the policy of “Great Leap Forward” to catch up with Great Britain
and Soviet Union within a few years. The programme was called the “going all out,
aiming high and achieving greater, quicker, better, and more economical results in
building socialism”. At the international meeting of communists and workers in Moscow,
Mao declared (18 November 1957) that the east wind prevails over the West wind; that
is, the strength of socialism exceeds the strength of imperialism48 and that the Socialist
bloc was more powerful than the West and would remain so. This slogan was seen to
indicate that the centre of the world revolutionary movement had shifted to Peking. 49
In 1957 and later, the PRC spoke of itself as more involved at international level
and tended to evaluate its foreign policy in terms of its contribution to the overall
advancement of world communism. The Chinese pleaded that they had identical interests
with nonaligned states, and both could work together in collaboration with each other.
Most of the newly independent stales in Asia, it said, were ripe for a 5ocialireV0u0n on
the Chinese pattern. The nonaligned states in its view were a peace area for resolving
world tension and providing a buffer zone contributing to the security of China against a
military attack.50 Looking beyond the immediate future, the Chinese leadership also hoped
that in the long run internal revolutions, in most Asian countries, will bring communist
regimes to power.
This shift in Chinese policy was criticized by Marshal Tito—a prominent leader
of the non-aligned —who argued that the newly born countries should come together to
make a third force in international affairs. He asserted that they should primarily concern
themselves with their economic development, and that their interests were different from
those of the communist world.50 The PRC was critical of the “Tito Clique” and accused
him of being a revisionist and anti-socialist.
In its editorial, the “Remin Ribao”, a daily newspaper of the PRC, wrote (18
March 1958) that. Tito had “put out a programme of modern revisionism designed to split
communist movement. Under the signboard of ‘active coexistence’ Tito and his group
‘toured’ the Man and African countries, showing discord among them in an attempt to
turn these countries away from the road of peace and neutrality, to weaken and
undermine the national independence movements in the Asian-Africa region and assist us
imperialism in its aggression and expansion against the Asian and African nationalist
countries”. 52 It further observed:
The policy of peace and neutrality of the Asian and African nationalist countries based on their
anti-colonialist stand cannot but take on the character of solidarity with the socialist countries in
opposition to imperialism. The Asian and African nationalist countries of course do not belong to
the camp of socialism, but they share with the socialist countries common interests in the struggle
against imperialist aggression and in defence of world peace.53
 The PRC viewed at this stage that the Asian countries could achieve national
liberation through United Fronts opposed to the United States, and with the collaboration
of local Communist parties.54 It further asserted that socialist and ‘neutralist’ countries had
the same view regarding imperialism and colonialism. So, Peking devised a strategy to
encourage armed struggles against the West and build a mighty united front of all the
countries struggling for independence, with collaboration of non-aligned states of Asia.
The non-aligned countries of Asia on their part refused to fall in with the Chinese
calculations, which were suspect and the relevance or utility of which to the socialist
camp was in question. China then branded the nonaligned as getting closer to the
imperialist camp.55
Consequently, sometime after April 1959, a full dress propaganda campaign was
mounted against India on the Tibet question —where Tibetans had revolted against the
stepped up activities at Sinification of Tibet by Peking—accusing India of .‘expansionist’
plots and adoption of the “heritage of colonialism”.56 In 1959, Chinese hostility increased
further, and it proclaimed that the existing regimes of the non-aligned were unpopular,
and that the native communist parties alone spoke for the people’s interests there. By the
end of 1959, china’s relations with almost all the Asian countries, especially those on its
borders, had soured.
By this time Chinese differences with Soviet Union on various issues like co-
existence with the West, nature of freedom struggles in Asia and the Soviet aid for
China’s economic development also surfaced.
The Soviet Union, keeping in view the Chinese attitude toward the non-aligned
and itself, tried to woo the non-aligned and consolidate its position in Asia. In fact, the
Soviet Union viewed nona1ignment and the states subscribing to it, as potentially helpful
in the international class struggle between socialism and capita1ism and regarded
nonalignment as a transient form of external behaviour of the erstwhile colonial and
semi-colonial societies; it felt that the socialist countries alone could help and sustain
nonalignment. In February 1960 Khrushchev visited Afghanistan, Burma, India and
Indonesia to promote peace and friendship. He assured that the socialist camp was the
best friend of the newly independent Asian nations, and would help and support them; he
declared that “a neutral, active and independent policy of non-participation in military
alliances made a positive contribution to the cause of easing international tension and
maintaining world peace”.57 He also promised economic aid for development to South
and Southeast Asian countries.
The Chinese leadership too, now felt the need to reconcile with the non-aligned
states. Speaking at the second session of the second National People’s Congress on 10
April 1960, Prime Minister Chou Enlai said:
In the past year there has been a further development of friendly relations and economic and
cultural exchanges between China and Asian, African and Latin American countries on the basis
of Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence... China and these countries have gone through
common historical trials, share common aspirations for defending world peace and opposing
imperialism and colonialism and have common wishes for developing the national economy and
culture. This constitutes a reliable basis for the establishment and development of friendly co-
operation between China and these countries. 58

Further,
With regard to the nationalist countries of Asia.... We firmly believe that no matter what complex
questions may have been left over from history between China and those countries, reasonable
solutions can be found for them all, so long as friendly consultations are conducted in accordance
with the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. 59

The Chinese, thus, once again pretended to endorse the cause of the newly
independent countries and the need to promote friendly relations with Asian states in
Bandung spirit.60 China singed a border agreement with Burma and Nepal in 1961. The
criticism of India softened, though border dispute remained unresolved. Sino-Indonesian
double nationality treaty was implemented, and peaceful coexistence and peaceful
competition as the watchwords again articulated.
Evidently then, the Chinese attitude towards the non-aligned states kept shifting
right from 1949 to 1960. Whenever these states seemed useful to the Chinese national
interest, they were friends and, if not, they were enemies.

INDIA
Being the most ancient and proud neighbouring cultures of Asia, both India and
China have interacted with each other since times immemorial. In the words of Nehru:
The past two thousand years stand witness to our mutual relations. We have been neighbours
during the long stretch of years and we have been vital countries throwing out our thought and
culture to each other and to other neighbouring countries. Our people have come into contact in
many lands, more especially in South-East Asia; yet there is no record of war between us. This
long period is of the peaceful commerce of ideas, of religion and of art and culture.
 Both China and India have their particular and individual backgrounds. Each has her own cultural
inheritance. In many ways they are different, and they have grown according to their own genius.
Yet in spite of these differences, we have been good neighbours and friends and have not come
into conflict with each other during the millennia of history. 61

After 1949, China and India were, thus, bound to interact for more than one
reason. They ate not only geographically contiguous they are also indebted to one another
through culture, religion and history. Having a long —though haphazard— border India
was perceived as very important by the Chinese leadership. When the communists took
over in China, Indian government adopted a friendly attitude towards the new regime and
became the second non-communist country (after Burma) to recognise it. Indian leaders
viewed the communist revolution in China primarily as part of a general Asian revolt
against colonialism and backwardness rather than as a part of expansionist world-wide
revolutionary movement. 62
However, due te its alliance with socialist bloc and in consonance with the Soviet
policy China’s communist leadership disliked the concept of 0nalignment and showed an
open hostility towards the noncommh1t leaders of India, who were among the leading
spokesmen for 0igflhlent4n fact, its progenit01 founders and promoters. Nehru and his
policies were discredited. He was accused of being a rebel against movements for
national independence, blackguard who undermu1d the progress of people’s liberation
movements, a loyal slave of imperialism.60
In 1950, China seemed determined to use force to “liberate” Tibet --declaring it as
an integral part of China-- and warned any outside power against interference in Tibetan
affairs. Nehru avoided confrontation and accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet.
Throughout 1949-50 the Indian leadership tried to improve relations with China through
trade, diplomacy and cultural ties. India was at that time perhaps the one and only
country to advocate admission of the People’s Republic of China to its legitimate seat in
the UN. India, moreover, repeatedly acted as a voluntary advocate of Peking’s interests,
and attempted to mediate between Peking and the West. But China ignored all these
gestures by India, and labeled Nehru as “running dog of imperialism” to be overthrown
by the Indian communists as soon as possible.
Indian refusal to brand the PRC as aggressor during the Korean war, opposition to
US interference in Taiwan affairs and endorsement of Peking’s claim over Taiwan,
however, softened China’s attitude. In 1951, India and PRC, both signed a trade
agreement and exchanged several visits. In 1953, settlement of prisoners of Korean war
started with Indian mediation. India repeated its advocacy of the Chinese entry into the
United Nations which had been halted by United States and its allies, on the pretext that
Taiwan regime of Chiang Kai-Shek was the true representative of the Chinese people.
The PRC realised that India was an important country in this part of Asia and
could be useful to China’s, interests. A more friendly relationship began with the Sino-
India agreement over Tibet –the Sino-Indian Treaty on Tibet- signed by Chou En-lai and
Nehru in April 1954, and both the countries declared Panchsheel to be the basis of this
relationship. Nehru paid a return visit to Peking the same year. India backed Peking on
Taiwan and China supported India over Goa. Both condemned the SEATO, Baghdad
Pact and other U.S.-supported military alliances. Chinese propaganda of ‘two thousand
years of Sino-Indian friendship’ reached a new pitch, and Chou En-lai regularly made
warm references to “our great neighbour India”. Nehru’s concerted efforts brought Chou
En-lai to the Bandung Conference the next year.
This euphoria could not last long, and in subsequent years China’s foreign policy
took a dramatic turn. Growing Indo-Soviet relations, the Tibet question, the disputed
MacMahon line as the boundary with India, and growing Sino-Soviet differences, all
contributed to this somersault.

Souring of Sino-India relations

Joseph Stalin died on 5 March 1953 at the age of 73. Soon thereafter, the Indo-
Soviet relations got a new fillip. Nehru visited the Soviet Union in 1955, and in
December the same year Khrushchev and Bulganin paid a state visit to India. The Soviets
endorsed Indian position on Kashmir, appreciated India’s vociferous opposition to
American military aid to Pakistan as well as to US-inspired military pacts like CENTO
etc; and committed substantial economic aid for India’s economic development. Such
express Soviet support of India boosted India’s image and position in South Asia as
power of some influence in the world; it also caused considerable consternation in the
Chinese mind.64 China’s attitude towards India started changing from then on.
 Evidence of this change surfaced when in 1955, China displayed some maps
showing Kashmir and other Indian areas as part of China, against which India protested.
When Chou En-lai visited India in November 1956, to the surprise of Indian leaders, he
professed total ignorance of any McMahon line.65 He said that he had never heard of it,
and whatever it was it had never been ratified by the People’s Republic of China.
Rejecting the delimitation of the Sino-Indian border by such a line, he suggested its re-
demarcation by a high power border commission. Chon En-lai tried thus to enhance his
country’s claim across its presumed boundaries, and in the process tarnish the growing
Indian image in the sub-continent.
With this turning point in Sino-Indian equation, some armed skirmishes on the
border occurred signifying change in the Chinese attitude. In 1956 Dalai Lama visited
India to take part in 2500th anniversary of the birth of Lord Buddha. He had almost made
up his mind already to stay back in India until China moderated its Tibetan policy; but
Nehru advised him to go back.
The years 1957-58 saw many developments in China: repression of the
intellectuals in the wake of “Hundred Flowers” campaign and the commencement of the
“Great Leap Forward”, and the establishment of “People’s Communes”. Mao proclaimed
too that the “East wind blows over the west wind”. These developments coincided with
the hardening of the Chinese policy towards India. Chinese intrusions into the
northeastern corner of the Ladakh province of Kashmir were discovered: China had
constructed, without India’s knowledge or consent, a motor road --popularly known as
the road in Aksai-Chin-- as part of its Sinkiang-Tibet highway. India duly conveyed it
concern and protest at these instrusions to China:
“The Government of India are concerned at the report of violation of the Indian frontier. They
would not like to believe that unilateral action has been taken by the Government of the People’s
Republic of China with whom their relations are of the friendliest, to enforce alleged territorial
claims in the region”.66

The white papers of the Government of India issued from time to time after 1954
speak of increasing Chinese violations of the Indian territory at various places along the
border. But the Chinese propaganda l this while refers to Nehru as a friend and talk of
safeguarding world peace and the Panchsheel. As it eventually turned out, the Chinese
propaganda successfully camouflaged their real intent which started becoming evident by
1958 or so.
Nehru had promised the Dalai Lama to visit him in Lhasa. The Chinese
government cancelled the visit in July 1958.67 Uprisings against Peking erupted in Tibet
in March 1959 which were severely put down by the Chinese troops. India was accused
of instigating and encouraging the rebellion and fanning trouble in Tibet in connivance
with the Chiang Kai-Shek clique.68
Most of the Asian non-aligned criticized the Chinese policy in Tibet Nehru, while
emphasizing the necessity of friendly relations between India and China, was very critical
of China’s militant behaviour in Tibet. Fearing further repression Dalai Lama fled to
India (in March- April1959), with 13,000 Tibetan refugees who were duly given asylum
in India. This marked sharp deterioration in Sino-Indian relations. The incidence of
military clashes on the Sino-Indian border mounted throughout 1959.
In yet another surprising move, Chou En-lai wrote on 8 September 1959 to Prime
Minister Nehru that the Sino-Indian border question was a complicated one left over by
history. He categorically rejected that the so-called McMahon line as boundary between
India and China. He further said that this line was a “product of the British policy of
aggression against Tibet Region of China and has never been recognised by any Chinese
Central Government and is therefore decidedly illegal”.69
The earlier claims of 12,000 sq. miles of the Indian territory in Ladakh region and
30,000 sq. miles in the eastern region, and rejecting the McMahon Line as the va1d
border between the two countries were reiterated in a note by the Chinese government on
26 December the same year.70 From now Nehru too came to be regarded by the Chinese
as a “bourgeois reactionary” of the underdeveloped world, a loyal representative of the
big bourgeoisie and big landlords of India, and the stooge of China’s international
enemies.71
China, apparently aimed at building its influence in the predominantly non-
aligned south and Southeast Asia. India, deeply involved in its own ambitious
development projects, on the other hand, was keen to avoid any confrontation or conflict
with China. The policy goals of the two big neighbour were thus so obviously contrary,
though not necessarily incompatible or antagonistic.
 During the years under consideration in this essay, 1949-1960, the Chinese
attitude and policy towards India is thus characterised by three distinct phases. The first
phase up to 1952 is marked by suspicion and condemnation of India and its non-
alignment India’s role in the Korean War assuages the Chinese distrust and paves the way
for some warmth and cordiality in Sino-Indian relations. The second phase, up to mid-
1955, is that of utmost friendliness between the two—the phase of “Hindi Chini-Bhai
Bhai” (Indians, Chinese are brothers)— the phase of India’s role in bringing the PRC to
international negotiations at the Geneva Peace Conference on Indo-China, and of
Panchsheel and Bandung. And from about the last few months of 1955 starts the third
phase, that of Chinese hostility and militancy and bitterness, which finally resulted in the
Sino-Indian military clash in October-November 1962, auguring the years of stalemated
anger and unmitigated antagonism between the two.
Let us now have a look at the Chinese posture and policy vis-a-vis other Asian
non-aligned countries.

BURMA
Burma, having a common border with the People’s Republic of China, never
formally declared itself to be non-aligned, but, at the same time, showed no inclination to
join any ideological or military bloc either. An important producer of rice, Burma offers
the best route of access to the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean, although a difficult
one.72 The Chinese communists showed little interest in Burma, possibly because of the
forbidding terrain and easy inaccessibility of the border region between the two countries.
Communism came relatively late to Burma, never struck roots among the masses, and
was additionally weakened by factionalism within the communist groups.73
Since its independence on 4 January 1949, Burma tried to maintain friendly
relations with China and was the first non-communist country to accord recognition to
the Communist regime of China immediately after its establishment on 1 October 1949.
China’s large size, immediate proximity and formidable ‘potential and actual military
capability injected an element of fear on the part of Burma in its relations with the PRC.
Burmese leaders had every reason to apprehend the influence which their powerful
neighbour might try to bring upon their country as had happened in history before.74 This
realistic view of the situation, and the obvious, tremendous power imbalance between the
two made Burma avoid all provocations to China.
Thus, without formally proclaiming its non-alignment, Burma went to the extent
of refusing all Western and Soviet aid or association, while at the same time, also did not
keep visible company with the leaders of the non-aligned.
Chinese maps of 1951 showed some Burmese areas as parts of China, and a few
incursion by the Chinese into these areas were also reported. The Chinese leadership
conveyed to the Burmese Prime Minister of having no territorial ambitions in Burma.
Since there had not been time to draw new maps, old ones showing un-demarcated border
region had been produced. China assured that there will be no difficulty in working out
an amicable settlement in this regard. Burma too announced that complete understanding
existed between the two neighbours regarding the future of the northern border areas. 75
No major border clash occurred, and for’ a variety of reasons—the main being Peking’s
sole preoccupations with Taiwan and Korea. Moreover, the access on both sides of the
Sino-Burmese border was anything but easy. And then, a steady decline in the Burmese
communist movement to the point of rendering it completely ineffective was also a factor
that gained some significance in Sino-Burmese relations.76
Burma refused to join SEATO and clung to the policy of noninvolvement in the
Cold War. Chou En-lai visited Rangoon in July 1954, and both the countries endorsed
Panchsheel, the policy of peaceful co-existence, and also signed trade agreements. Burma
assured that it would never allow its territory to be used for military operations or
espionage against China by any one. Prime Minister U Nu returned the visit to Peking in
December 1954; he offered to mediate between China and the United States, whose
mutual hostility was perceived as the greatest threat to peace in eastern Asia.
Nevertheless, there were few problems which worried the Burmese leadership and
irritated the Chinese. One of them was the question of ten to twelve thousand
Kuomintang troops under General Li Mi who infiltrated Burma while escaping from the
PRC forces in January 195O.77 These troops sometimes plundered Burmese villages and
occasionally forayed into Chinese territory. 78 The Burmese were thus afraid that China
might use the presence of these nationalist troops as a pretext for direct intervention.
Chinese support to the Burmese communists and a large scale illegal immigration to
Burma also created some problems. These immigrants settled along the Burma- China
border, created autonomous minority areas that defied Rangoon. Finally, the Chinese
suppression of Tibetan revolt (1959) and the border clashes with India again revived
Burmese apprehension of the possible Chinese intervention or attack, especially when the
issue of the border between the two countries had remained unresolved till then.
The border problem, however, was finally resolved when in January 1960 General
Ne Win, Prime Minister of Burma, visited China. Both governments signed the “Sino-
Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression” and the “Sino-Burmese
Agreement on the Question of the Boundary”.79 In his return visit to Rangoon on 15 April
1960, Chou En-lai enthusiastically hailed the Sino-Burmese friendship, and the efforts to
bring peace on the border. He said:
… China has common boundaries with many South Asian countries, among which its boundary
with Burma is comparatively long—running two thousand several hundred kilometers. . And for
various reasons, historical, national and economic, the relations between the border people of the
two countries are very close. Prior to the independence of Burma and liberation of China, the
imperialists, by trickery and robbery, brought about many unreasonable conditions on the border
between the two countries to remain unsettled for a long period of time. Confronted with such a
complicated question, the Governments of both our countries, holding the fundamental interests of
their people and Asian peace, adopted the correct attitude of taking into consideration both the
historical background and present actualities and conducting friendly consultations in accordance
with the Five Principles, and ultimately they found the avenue to a reasonable settlement.80

Curiously, the PRC conceded the Burmese position in this regard, and agreed to
that demarcation of the border which was none other than the much maligned McMahon
line, and declared it to be the “traditional customary line”.
In short, then, the Burmese policy towards China remained non- provocative and
committed to a hands-off policy whatever the Chinese action might be,81 as suits a small,
weak country dwarfed by the giant of a neighbour. China condescended to accept that
policy.

NEPAL
Nepal’s entire northern border is shared with Tibet, with which the Hindu
Kingdom has had trade and cultural relations and interaction for centuries. 82 Tibetan salt
and wool were traded for Nepalese cotton and grain. Probably these exchanges off and on
got linked to life on the mainland -China, but hard and direct evidence of this has not
surfaced yet.
 Following the communist takeover at Peking in 1949, Mao aimed at extending the
Chinese influence on to Nepal. Wedged as Nepal is between two immensely large
countries, its land-locked location obliged the country to adopt and observe strict
impartiality and neutrality in the Sino-Indian interaction, if it wanted to retain its own
identity Evidently, Nepal could not afford to please one at the expense of the other, or
cause offence to either.
The Chinese occupation of Tibet in 1950, therefore, at once posed for Nepal the
problem of infiltration or Chinese political spill-over. However, it managed to keep its
relations with PRC normal. The Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet (1954) brought Nepal in
direct Contact with China for first time ever in recent times. Soon after, Yuang Shang-
Kim, the Chief of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party declared that
flow the two peoples —the Chinese and the Nepalese Would be united for the sake of
defending Asia and preserving world peace. 83
This kind of thinking and suggestion naturally alarmed the Nepalese, for, the
Chinese historical claims included not merely Tibet, but also Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and
even Ladakh and NEFA.84 But, Nepal kept its cool and persisted in its reiteration of non-
alignment. It Was only after the Bandung Conference, that diplomatic relations between
the PRC and Nepal were established, on - I August 1955, and both the Countries declared
adherence to Panchsheel.85 King Mahendra on state visit to Peking in May 1956 reiterated
the Same, and urged for further improvement in Sino-Nepalese relations. China gave 60
million Indian rupee aid to Nepal, that year.
China now (in 1956) talked of making Tibet an autonomous region like Inner
Mongolia within the People’s Republic of China and pleaded for the establishment of a
confederation of autonomous Himalayan States.86
In 1959, crises in Tibet, and the deteriorating Sino-Indian equation over the
border question did not leave Nepal untouched. The Chinese now started claiming chunks
of Nepalese territory also as belonging to the PRC. They claimed Mount Everest —Sagar
Matha as the Nepalese call it— as part of China.87 However the situation was diffused
when B.P. Koirala, the then Prime Minister of Nepal, visited Peking in March 1960,
signed a bound agreement and got economic aid of Rs. 100 million. The Chinese
accepted the traditional border with slight changes which was also to the satisfaction of
Nepalese leadership. Commenting on the boundary, the People’s Daily in its editorial of
25 March 1960, maintained that the entire boundary between the two countries had not
been scientifically delineated and formally demarcated, as a result of which certain
discrepancies had arisen. But China and Nepal have always respected the existing
traditional, customary line and lived in amity. So, with the 1960 agreement “both parties
decided to determine concretely the boundary line between (them) and erect boundary
markers on the basis of the existing traditional customary line...”88 Chou En-lai paid a
visit to Katmandu in April 1960, signed a treaty of peace and friendship with Nepal, and
accepted the Nepalese ownership of Mount Everest.89
With this no irritant remained between China and Nepal to dispute about, and
their bilateral relations were put on an even keel.

INDONESIA

Of all the China’s Southeast Asian neighbours, it is Indonesia whose geography

played a key role in shaping the Sino-Indonesian equation.
The fifth most populous country in the world and fourth biggest in the Indian
Ocean region, Indonesia is the biggest archipelago in the world, and, in terms of total
area, the largest state in Southeast Asia. Fringed along the equator, with a land area of 1,
919,443 sq. km. the country extends 5,271 km. from east to west and 2,210 km. from
north to south.
The country is a vast conglomerate of about 13,667 islands, more than 7,600 of
which are unnamed and almost 12,700 of which are uninhabited.90 The islands were never
a composite political or economic unit throughout the archipelago’s written history which
goes back to about 3,000 years.
Having suffered the Dutch colonial rule since about 1630, the Indonesian
archipelago fell to the Japanese in World War II (March 1942, to be precise). After the
defeat and subsequent surrender of the Japanese on 17 August 1945 to the Allies, the
Indonesians —under the leadership of Sukarno—declared the country’s independence.
The Dutch refused to accept or honour this declaration, and tried militarily to re-establish
their control over Indonesia in face of a determined resistance by the Indonesians. The
protracted conflict eventually came to an end with the recognition of Indonesian
independence on 27 December 1949.91
In the attainment of Indonesian independence, India had played a significant role.
In December 1948, India denied permission for the Dutch troops to fly over its territory,
nor did it allow the Dutch planes carrying these troops any landing/fueling facilities at
Indian airports.92 Then in January 1949, Nehru convened a conference on Indonesia
Which, attended by 18 Afro-Asian countries adopted a resolution condemning the Dutch
military action and called for transfer of all Power to Indonesia UN Security Council
echoed and endorsed this demand.
Indonesia recognised communist China in April 1950 (though the diplomatic
relations between the two countries were established only in 1953); supported the
Chinese claim on Taiwan; and criticized almost every aspect of US policy towards the
People’s Republic of China.94 But the Sino-Indonesian relations did not grow, largely
because of the Suspicion of the Chinese effort to manipulate the large overseas Chinese
community in Indonesia and elsewhere, and to exert influence on the Communist Party of
Indonesia (inspired and supported by MOSCOW more than Peking) which until about
1953 was on very bad terms with the (Indonesian) government.95
The sizable and prosperous Chinese minority in Indonesia which monopolised
certain section of industry and displayed extra-territorial loyalties constituted a constant
and continuing cause of coldness in the bilateral Sino-Indonesian relations. Indonesia was
willing to grant citizenship only to those of its Chinese who were born in Indonesia, and
who would repudiate their relations/citizenship with China. Chinese of doubtful or dual
political loyalties in Indonesian view did not qualify for citizenship of Indonesia.
At the time of the Bandung Conference the two countries signed a treaty on 22
April, which provided that the Chinese having dual nationality will opt for one nationality
—Chinese or Indonesian.96 The treaty was ratified by Indonesia and China in December
1957, but PRC showed no sign of implementing the treaty. A few months later, in May
1958, however, a military revolt broke out in Indonesia, which was put down firmly by
President Sukarno. Suspecting the PRC’s hand in the rebellion, the Indonesian
government took steps against the Chinese population, and deported some of their
leaders. A little later, in 1959, trade in rural areas by the Chinese was banned and they
were forbidden living in West Java. The government accused them of indulging in anti-
national activities. These measures compelled the Chinese government to take due steps
towards implementation of the ‘double nationality’ treaty it had ratified in December
1957.97
But the sincerity of the PRC remained suspect in Indonesian eyes as the events of
1960s were to bear out subsequently. The Indonesian Communist Party’s attempt to
capture power in mid-1960s, presumably with PRC’s support, and the latter’s
machinations to use the Indonesian Chinese minority whenever possible lend support to
the Indonesian attitude towards China.
Beholden as Indonesian leadership was to India for active support in the
Indonesian struggle for independence, the leadership subscribed naturally to the
international policy (of non-alignment) India had evolved and was canvassing. Indeed, as
it came to pass, President Sukarno, along with Nehru, Nasser and Tito, became in 1950s,
a pillar of support and strength for non-alignment. Even after his eventual fail from
power in 1960s Indonesia stuck to its non-alignment.

SRI LANKA
Sri Lanka seemed to have a rather low priority in the political calculations of the
People’s Republic of China in the years under discussion in this essay.
At the time of the PRC’s emergence and for a few years thereafter, Sri Lanka —
Ceylon, as it was known then— was quite active in promoting the Afro-Asian sentiment
and solidarity.
It accorded recognition to the PRC immediately, within moths of the latter’s
establishment. Sri Lanka had traditionally been a supplier of rubber to China in exchange
for Chinese rice. This arrangement was not interrupted even during the Korean crisis
when the UN Genera] Assembly voted for sanctions against the PRC and Sri Lanka was
not even a member of the world Organisation. The two countries formalised their trade
relations (regarding rubber-rice transactions) in November 1952.
There was no territorial or political dispute between the two countries. But from
1952.98 the PRC did try to promote Marxism-Leninism in Sri Lanka and stepped up its
propaganda and efforts in this regard when the leftist S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike came to
power as the prime minister.
With S.W.R.D’s rise to power, Sri Lanka’s entire orientation and role in
international affairs changed. Till then, the country’s essentially conservative leadership
of Sir Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotalawala had been willy-nilly somewhat pro-
Western. Prime Minister Bandaranaike turned about that orientation. He demanded, and
eventually obtained within a year in office, the winding up of the British naval and air
bases at Trincomalee. Diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were established; and
the Rubber-Rice agreement of 1952 with PRC was renewed.
Prime Minister Chou En-lai paid a visit to Colombo in 1957 and extended
economic aid and credits to Sri Lanka, which continued during the first term as Prime
Minister of Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike, 1960-1965.
On the whole, thus the Sino-.Sri Lankan relations were formal and correct: neither
too warm nor too cold. The geographic distance between the two countries, as also the
rather limited Chinese air and naval capability at this stage, seem to preclude Sri Lanka
ever rising high in the PRC’s strategic or political priorities. And then, Sri Lanka too was
not very active or articulate about non-alignment to draw the PRC’s critical attention or
ire.

Conclusion
Clearly, the PRC at this stage had its hands full at home to consolidate the
revolution internally. Even it caught international attention and comment over its
participation in the Korean crises or over its actions in Tibet it was more to acquire and
assert it territorial integrity than precipitate an international event. Even its move in
regard to boundary questions can be seen as steps to ensure the new republic’s territorial
integrity.
In the framework of ideological prescriptions, and the context of the cold war
colouring the perceptions of the dominant power of the day —the two superpowers—
non-alignment made little or no sense to the PRC. And she found support of this in the
position that its ally, the Stalinist Soviet Union took.
 But, the circumstances of the Soviet Union —domestic and external— and the
inherent Sino-Soviet incompatibility (that eventually erupted in the 1960s), along with
the unfolding potential and picture of Afro-Asia obliged the PRC to take a closer look at
non-alignment, especially at the originator and propagator of the new doctrine —India.
The promoter of the creed of non-alignment was also a formidable rival —in terms of its
size, history, political-economic system, leadership and possible aspirations— in Afro-
Asia. The PRC thus shifted gears in coping with the challenge of non-alignment; small
subscribers of the creed did not matter, but its big advocate had to be honoured or cut
down to size as the opportunity arose, or as the situation at the home permitted or
demanded.
Broadly, 1949-53 constitutes a phases in the PRC’s attitude to non-alignment
where the latter’s similarity to that of Soviet Union is in evidence. India’s role in Korea,
and her successful moves to ensure PRC’s very first participation in international
confabulations (at the Geneva Peace Talks in 1954) on peace in Indo-China, persuades
the PRC to put on its friendly face and smile towards India. This short- lived phase of
Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai 1954-1957, comes at a time when the PRC is relatively
comfortable at home and wants international exposure and attention. But then the
situation changes at home: the PRC’s “Great Leap Forward” policy proves to be adisaster
with the result that good old iron-hand policies must be brought back to deal with
domestic situation gone sour.
From 1957 onwards, then, there is no place in the Chinese calculations either for
the Bhai-Bhai (brother) spirit or for any compromises in the Marxist-Leninist ideological
system. This is the phase then which eventually erupts in armed conflict between the two
contenders for Afro-Asian leadership.

References

1. Chinese communist leadership, after the liberation, divided the world into three general groupings
of nations: the Communist bloc headed by Soviet Union; the Western bloc comprising the United
States and Western Europe; and the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America,
or the non-aligned countries

China claimed its place in the communist bloc. After its differences with Soviet Union flared up in
late 1960s and early ‘70s, China in its -einterpretation of the three world theory, claimed ha place
along the developing “‘l’hird World” countries. See, Barnett, AD.: COMMUNIST CHINA AND
 ASIA, Challenge to American Policy (London, OUP) 1960, p. 105, and Gudoshnikov LM. and
others CHINA, Cultural Revolution and After (New Delhi, Sterling) 1978.

2. Fitzgerald, C.P: CHINESE VIEW OF THEIR PLACE IN THE WORLD (OUP) 1966: G.P.
Deshpande, “Maoist World View”, in Misra KP. And Beal, Richard Smith (eds);
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY, Western and Non-Western Perspectives (New
Delhi, Vikas) 1981, pp. 201-14.
3 During the period 722-481 BC, known as the Ch’un Ch’iu period, the lands inhabited by peoples
of Chinese culture were divided between fifteen major feudal states and a large number of smaller
fiefs. These fifteen states themselves were classed in two categories, those which were truly
members of the Chinese confederacy, Chung Kuo “the Middle Kingdom”, and those which were
regarded as more or less barbarous. Thus, from the earliest times it was the acceptance of Chinese
culture rather than racial ties which determined whether a people were to be regarded as Chinese
or Barbarous. For details see, Fitzgerald, C.P.: CHINA A. short Cultural History (London, The
Cresset Press) 1950, pp. 56-57.

4 Fairbank, John K (ed): CHINESE WORLD ORDER (Harvard University Press) .1968, p. 2.

5 Lien-Sheng Yang, “Historical Notes on Chinese World Order”, in Ibid., p. 20.

6 For details of decline of Manchu dynasty, see, Latourette, Kenneth Scott: THE CHINESE, Their
History and Culture (London, MacMillan) 1972, pp. 247-289.

7. For details of various movements in China against the ailing Manchu dynasty, see, Li Chien-Nung
THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF CHINA 1840-1928. (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand) 1956, pp. 47-94 &
164-187.
8. Karki, Dcv Singh: CHINA AND NON-ALIGNMENT (New Delhi, Sopan) 1980, p. 2.
9. Ibid., p. 3
10. Latourette, op. cit., pp. 345-350.
11. Snow, Edgar RED STAR OVER CHINA (London, Gollancz) 1968, pp. 380-90.
12. Karki, op. cit p.3.
13. Hinton, H.C: COMMUNIST CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS (London, MacMillan) 1966, pp. 9-12.
14. Meisner, Maurice: MAO’S CHINA, A History of the People’s Republic (New York, The Free Press)
1977, pp. 31-51.
15. Dutt V.P: CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY 1958-62 (Bombay, Asia Publishing House) 1964. p. 21.
16. Hinton, op.cit., p. 25.
17. Schurnann, Franz and Schell, Orville (cds): COMMUNIST CHINA (Penguin) 1968, p. 256.
18. Mao Tse-Tung: SELECTED WORKS (Peking, Foreign Languages Press) vol. I, 1975, p. 334.
19. Mao Tse-Tung: ON THE PEOPLE’S DEMOCRATIC DICTATORSHIP (Peking, New China News
Agency) 1949, pp. 6-8.
20. Nehru, Jawaharlal: INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY (New Delhi, Publications Division) 1971, p. 2.
21. From Nehru’s speech in the Constituent Assembly (Legislative), 4 December 1947, cited in ibid., p. 24.
22. From Nehru’s inaugural address at the Asian Relations Conference, New Delhi, 23 March 1947, Cited
in Ibid., p. 251
23. A. Appadorai, “Non-Alignment: Some Important Issues” in International Studies, vol. 20, no. l-
2,January-june 1981, p. 3.
24. JAWAHARLAL NEHRU’S SPEECHES, September 1957-April 1963 (Delhi, Publications Division),
vol. 4, 1964, p. 381.
25. Karki, op. cit., p. 52.
26. Nehru, INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, op. cit., p. 250.
27. Kapur, Harish: CHINA IN WORLD POLITICS (New Delhi, Publications Division, India International
Centre) 1975 p. 2.
28. For details see, Jensen, G. H.: AFRO-ASIA AND NON, ALIGNMENT (London,! Faber and Faber)
1966, pp. 71-73.
29. Buss; Claüd A: THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (New York, D. Van Nostrand) 1962, p. 72.
30. Schurmann and Schell, op. cit., p. 374.
31. Whitting, Mien S: CHINA CROSSES THE YALU, The Decision to Enter the Korean War (New York,
Macmillan) 1960, pp. 20-23, & 64-65
32. Hinton, op. cit., p. 26.
33. Panikkar, K M: IN TWO CHINAS (London, George Mien & Unwin) 1955, pp. 104-110
34. Though India had initially supported the UN resolution on Korea, it later changed its position.
Subsequently it took a middle position, leaning sharply away from Western stand and manifesting its
political neutrality. Part of the reason for adopting that position lay in India’s concern for its good relations
with China. See for details, Heimsath, Charles H, and Mansingh, Surjit: A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF
MODERN INDIA (Bombay, Allied) 1971, p. 69.
35. United Nations, GAOR 330th Plenary Meeting, New York, 1951, p. 378.
36. For India’s role in Korean conflict see, Heimsath & Mansingh, op. cit., pp. 66-74.
37. Ibid., pp. 184-191.
38. For details see, Murti, B. S. N: NEHRU’S FOREIGN POLICY (New Delhi, Beacon Publications)
1953.
39. Dutt, op. cit, p. 148.
40. Nehru, INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, op. cit., pp. 303-04.
41. Dutt, op. cit., p. 148.
42. “Indian View of Sino-Indian Relations”, Indian Press Digest Monograph Series, (Berkeley, University
of California, Institute of International Studies) 1956, p. xix.
43. Nehru, INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, op. cit., p. 273.
44. Van Eekelen, W. F: INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BORDER DISPUTE WITH CHINA
(The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff) 1967. pp. 51-52.
45. Ho Cheng, ‘The Great Asian-African Conference”, People’s China, no. 10, 16 May 1955, p. 6.
46. Tung Feng, “TheBandung Spirit Thrives”, Peking Review, vol. 1 no. 9, 29 April 1958, p. 6.
47. “On Ten Major Relationships” in Mao Tse-tung SELECTED WORKS (Peking, Foreign Languages
Press) vol. V, 1977, p. 288;
48. Cited in, Barnett, op. cit., pp. 106-07.
49. Kaulhik, Devendra: CHINA AND THE THIRD WORLD (New Delhi, Sterling) 1975, p. 17.
50. AM. Halprin, “Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism”, China Quarterly, No.26, April-June 1966, p.
92.
51. Ibid.,
52. “Tito’s Asian-African Tour”, Peking Review, no. 12,24 March 1959, pp. 9-10.
53. Ibid.,
54. Kaushik, op. cit., p. 17.
55. See, Dutt, op. cit., p. 153.
56 Halprin, op. cit., p. 103: also see, “The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru’s Philosophy”, Peking Review,
no, 19, 12 May 1959, p.6.
57. Joint Soviet-Indonesian Statement on 28 February 1960, Translated by TAAS.
58. Peking Review, no. 15, April 12, 1960, p.8
59. Ibid.,
60. Halprin, op. cit., p. 108.
61. From the Speech of Jawhar1al Nehru, at a banquet held in honour of Chou En-lai, Prime Minister of
China, New Delhi, 26 June 1954. See, Nehru, INDIA’S FOREIGN POLICY, op. cit., p. 306.
62. Barnett, op. cit., p. 307.
63. For details see, Jain, Giri Lal: PANCHSHEEL AND AFFER (Bombay, Asia Publishing House) 1960,
pp.8-9.
64. Hinton, op. cit., pp. 445-449.
65. Woodman, Dorothy: HIMALAYAN FRONTIERS (London, Barry & Rockliff) 1969, p. 299: The
genesis of the “McMahon Line”, India’s Assam boundary, was Great Britain’s efforts to limit Chinese
authority in Tibet and to commit the Chinese to accept the Himalayan crest —India’s vital rampart of
defense—rather than the Himalayan southern base as the northeast boundary between India and Tibet The
drawing of this line represents a vital phase in- China-India relations. The line is called after the name of
Sir Henry McMahon —the then Secretary to the Government of India— who played the role of mediator at
Simla Conference - of India, China and Tibet held in October 1913. The line was drawn at this conference.
For details see, Rowland, John: A HISTORY OF SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS, Hostile Co-Existence
(Princeton, D. Van Nostrand) 1967, pp. 41-50.
66.Note by the India’s Ministry of External Affairs to the Chinese Counsellor in India, 2 July 1958. For
details see, WHITE PAPER 1954-1959 (New Delhi, Govt of India, pp. 22 and 26-27.
67. George N. Patterson, “China and Tibet: Background to the Revolt”, China Quarterly, no. I, Jan-March
1960, p. 98.
68. For details see, “The Tibet Question can be settled only in China” Peking Review, no. 18, 5 May 1959,
Pp. 12-18; also see, Note given by the Counseller of China in India to the Ministry of External Affairs,
New De1hi, WHITE PAPER, op. cit. no. I, p. 70, no.111, p. 109.
69. For full text of the letter see WHITE PAPER no. II, op. cit., pp. 27-33.
70. The note contained exhaustive details of Chinese position on Sino-Indian border. See WHITE PAPER
no. Ill, op. cit, pp. 58-79.
71. Maxwell, Naville: INDIA’S CHINA WAR (Bombay, Asia Publishing House) 1971, p. 270.
72. Hinton, op. cit., p. 416.
73. Levi, Werner: MODERN CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY (OUP) 1953, pp. 345-46.
74. Interview on 30 March 1956 by U Kyaw Nyein, one of the leading political figures in Burma. Cited in,
Frank W. Trager, “Burma’s Foreign Policy, 1948-56”, The Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 16, Nov. 1956, p.
93.
75. New York Times, I and 26 February, and 9 March 1951, cited in Hinton, op. cit., pp. 347-43.
76. Ibid., p. 416.
77. Hall, D G E: BURMA (London, Hitchinsons) 1956, pp. 179-80.
78. Hinton, op. cit., p. 48.
79. Peking Review, no. 5, 2 February 1960, p. 13
80. Ibid., 19 April l96O, pp. 15-16.
81. Dutt, op. cit., p. 171.
82. For details see, Huang Sheng-Chang, “China and Nepal”, People’s China, 1 May 1956, pp. 8-10.
83. Mukherjee, Amitava and Banerjee, Sudhir: CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS ASIA (New
Delhi, Sterling) 1975, p. 44.
84 In 1939, Mao had drawn a list of those tributary states and those parts of its own territory which had
been detached from China’, by the imperialists. The list included both Bhutan and Nepal; see for details,
Schyam, Strout R: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF MAO TSE-TUNG (New York. New Praeger) 1963,
p. 257.
85. People’s China, 1 May 1956, P. 10 and 1 November, 1956, PP. 14-15.
86. George N. Patterson, “Recent Chinese Politics in Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States”,
China Quarterly, no. 12, Oct-Dec. 1962, p. 193.
87. Dutt, op. cit., p. 178.
88. Cited in Peking Review, no. 13, 29 March 1960, p.6.
89. Documents on NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FRIENDLY RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA AND
NEPAL.(Peking, Foreign Languages Press) 1960.
90. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, vol.9, p. 457.
91. See, Palmier, Leslie: INDONESIA (London) 1965, pp. 93-112.
92. The Communiqué released by Press Information Bureau on 23 December 1948 said that in view of the
military action taken by the Dutch Government against the Republic of Indonesia, the Government of India
have decide to suspend the rights of operation of KLM in or in transit across India... No fuel will be issued
to KLM aircraft at Indian airports with effect from 1 a.m. (1ST), 24 December 1948. Cited in, Poplai, S.L:
INDIA 1947-50, External Affairs (OUP) 1959, p. 10.
93. For details see, Arora, B.D: INDIAN-INDONESIAN RELATIONS 19614980 (New Delhi, Asian
Educational Services) 1981, pp. 16-18.
94. Barnett, op. cit., p. 323.
95. Hinton, op. cit., pp. 429-33.
96. For the full text of the treaty see, People’s China, no. 10, 16 May 1955, pp. 2-4.
97. Hinton, op. cit., pp. 429-33.
98. Ibid., 462-63.