The Wisdom of the Multitude: Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11 of Aristotle's Politics

Author(s): Jeremy Waldron

Source: Political Theory, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Nov., 1995), pp. 563-584
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 THE WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE
Some Reflections on Book 3, Chapter 11
of Aristotle's Politics

JEREMYWALDRON
Universityof California,Berkeley

1. INTRODUCTION

Thereis a passage in chapter 11, book 3 of the Politics thathas not been
given the attentionit deserves in moder discussionsof Aristotelianpolitical
philosophy.My aim in the presentarticleis to exaggerate the importanceof
a particularpassage'-to light it up in a way that may go far beyond the
intentions of its author-in order to benefit from its illurmnationof other
themes and passages whose importancefor the Aristotelianproject is, by
contrast,indisputable.
The passage I have in mind is Aristotle'sattemptto answerthe question
he poses aboutpolitical sovereigntyat the beginningof chapter10:

There is also a doubt as to what is to be the supreme power in the state:-Is it the
multitude?Or the wealthy?Or the good? Orthe one best man?Or a tyrant?Any of these
alternativesseems to involve unpleasantconsequences.2

After reviewing some of these consequences,Aristotlebegins chapter11 by

saying thattherermghtbe some truthin the principlethatthe people at large
ratherthan the few best ought to be in power in the polis. He says-and this
is the passage I want to focus on-the following:

AUTHOR'SNOTE: This essay has been improvedby discussion at philosophy department

seminars at the Universityof Californiaat Davis and the Universityof Otago in New Zealand.
I am grateful to David Coppand Alan Musgravefor these invitations.I am gratefulalso to Jill
Frankand David Gillfor some earlier discussionsof these themes,and to the editorand referees
of thisjournalfor their helpful commentsand suggestions.

POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 23 No. 4, November 1995 563-584

? 1995 Sage Publications,Inc.
563
564 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

Forthe many,of whom each individualis not a good man,when they meet togethermay
be betterthan the few good, if regardednot individuallybut collectively,just as a feast
to which many contributeis betterthana dinnerprovidedout of a single purse.Foreach
individualamong the many has a shareof excellence and practicalwisdom, and when
they meet together,just as they become in a mannerone man, who has many feet, and
hands,and senses, so too with regardto theircharacterandthought.Hence the manyare
betterjudges thana single man of music and poetry;for some understandone part,and
some another,and amongthem they understandthe whole.3

The claim thatis made (or at least entertained)here is sometimesreferredto

as "thesummationargument."4 For reasonsexplainedin section 3, I want to
avoidthatlabel.I shall call it by thegranderterm,the "doctnneof the wisdom
of the multitude"(DWM), which has the advantageof begging no questions
aboutthe basis of the collective superiorityof the many.
The thesis seems to be this. If we comparethe claim to sovereigntyof the
people at large (the generalbody of citizens) with the claim to sovereignty
of the individualwho happensto be the ablest,best, andwisest, we may want
to say that the people's claim prevails.Although,consideredindividualby
individual,each of the people is inferiorto the one best man, still, considered
as a body which is capableof collective deliberation,the people may make
better,wiser, and ablerdecisions. For they have the benefit of each person's
knowledge, experience,judgment,and insight-which they can synthesize
into collective knowledge, experience,judgment,and insight-whereas the
one best man can rely only on his own individualresources.Here,then, is an
initial formulationof the doctrne:

DWMi: The people actingas a bodyarecapableof makingbetterdecisions,by poolingtheir

knowledge,experience,andinsight,thanany individualmemberof the body,howeverexcellent,
is capableof makingon his own.

Actually,DWM1is a modest versionof the Anstotelianclaim. A stronger

version would make the case for the multitudenot only againstkingshipbut
also against aristocracy.That case is harderto make since an aristocratic
regime may itself benefit from the doctrine.In consideringthe rival claims
of democraticand aristocraticregimes, the appropriatecomparisonis not
between the people as a whole and individualaristocrats,but between the
people acting as a body,on one hand,and an aristocraticsubsetof them,also
actingas a body,on the otherhand.Justas thepeoplecanpool theirindividual
knowledge, experience, and judgment,so the members of the aristocratic
subset can pool theirs too. Thus a strongerversion of the doctrineoffers to
make the case for the people againstall such subsets.
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 565

DWM2:The people actingas a body arecapableof makingbetterdecisions,by pooling their

knowledge, experence, and insight, than any subset of them acting as a body and pooling the
knowledge, experience,and insight of the membersof the subset.

Of the two versions,DWM2is politicallythe moreimportant:the political

debates in Athens to which the Politics might be taken as a contribution
mainlyconcernedthe issue betweendemocracyandoligarchy,the rule of the
many and the rule of the few, not betweendemocracyand kingship.5For the
purposesof abstractdiscussion, however,I shall focus mainly on DWM,. A
numberof the points I wantto makeconcernhow we thinkaboutthe relation
betweenthe individualand the polis, andfor thatpurposethe weakerversion
of DWM is sufficientto bnng the importantissues into focus. In most of what
follows, I shall not be trying to argue that DWM is true in a way that is
practicallyimportantfor constitutionaldesign. Instead I shall consider its
theoreticalimportancefor our understandingof certainthemes in Aristotle's
political philosophy.

2. THEPLACEOF THEDOCTRINE
IN ARISTOTLE'S
ARGUMENT

The doctrineof the wisdom of the multitudeis, as I have said, introduced

with some hesitationin chapter 11. Aristotle is not sure that it clinches the
issue of sovereigntyin favor of the many:"Whetherthis prnciple can apply
to every democracy,and to all bodies of men, is not clear... But theremay
be bodies of men aboutwhom our statementis neverthelesstrue."6
He says that DWM is conditional on the people not being "debasedin
character";7 I shall returnto this at end of section 5. He also does not rule out
the possibility that there may be in a polis one man or a few men of such
outstandingvirtue that their ability outstripseven that of the others acting
collectively-an elite "so pre-eminentlysupenor in goodness that therecan
be no comparison between the goodness and political capacity which he
shows (or which several show, when there is more than one) and what is
shown by the rest."8I will discuss this possibility at the end of the article.
Despite these qualifications,Aristotle seems happyto apply the doctrine
throughouthis political theory.He applies it, for example,to judicial as well
legislative and executive functions.The initialquestion("[W]hatis to be the
supremepowerin the state?")arosein chapter10 afterAristotlehadconceded
that,althoughit is best if the laws rule and not men, still we have to ask who
is to make and who is to administerthe laws. Now, the logic of DWM seems
566 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

to apply most obviously to legislative assemblies (which is why we treatit

as the basis of an argumentfor democracy);butAnstotle appliesit also to the
laws' applicationand to the task of equitablejudgmentwhen thereare gaps
or silences in the law:

[W]henthe law cannotdeterminea pointat all, or not well, shouldthe one best man or
should all decide. Accordingto our presentpracticeassemblies meet, sit in judgement,
deliberate,and theirjudgementsall relateto individualcases. Now any memberof the
assembly,takenseparatelyis certainlyinferor to the wise man.But the state is madeup
of many individuals.And as a feast to which all the guests contributeis betterthan a
banquetfurrushedby a single man, so a multitudeis a betterjudge of many things than
any individual.9

He applies the principlealso to vindicatethe Athenianpractice of making

stateofficials accountableto thepopularassembly.Thoughhe feels the force
of the objection that those with the special capacityto take on magistracies
should be selected for that purpose only by their peers ("[a]s, then, the
physicianoughtto be called to accountby physicians")and thatthis election
andevaluationcan be properlymadeonly by those who have knowledge,he
goes on:

Yet possiblythese objectionsare met by ourold answer,thatif the people are not utterly
degraded,althoughindividuallythey may be worsejudges thanthose who have special
10
knowledge,as a body they are as good or better.

It is thus striking that what begins as a hesitant speculation quickly

becomes "ourold answer,"a recurringtheme, a constantreminderin Aris-
totle's discussion of institutions:

For the power does not reside in thejuryman,or counsellor,or memberof the assembly,
but in the court,andthe council, andthe assembly,of whichthe aforesaidindividuals-
counsellor,assemblyman,juryman-are only partsor members.And for this reasonthe
many may claim to have a higherauthoritythanthe few; for the people and the council,
andthe courtsconsist of manypersons,andtheirpropertycollectively is greaterthanthe
propertyof one or a few individualsholdinggreatoffices.1

Not only this, but DWM is used also as a basis for analyzingthe claims
of otherthinkers.Thus in book 4, Anstotle says thatin democracies,

the peoplebecomes a monarch,andis manyin one; andthe manyhave the powerin their
hand,not as individuals,but collectively. Homersays that "it is not good to have a rule
of many"[Iliad, II 204], but whetherhe means this corporaterule, or the rule of many
individuals,is uncertain.12
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 567

It seems, then, not inappropriateto toy with the possibility that DWM
occupies a centralratherthana perpheralplace in Aristotle'soverallconcep-
tion of politics.

3. ARISTOTLE'SGROUNDSFOR THEDOCTRINE

What groundsdoes Aristotle give us for thinkingthat DWM is true9At

times he seems to offer little more in its defense thana metaphor:as a "feast
to which all the guests contributeis betterthana banquetfurnishedby a single
man, so a multitudeis a betterjudge of many things than any individual."'3
The idea behind the culinarymetaphorseems to be that of variety-more
contributorswill producea morevared feast,andamore variedfeastis better.
We shall look at the first of these propositionsin section 8, when we discuss
the relationof this view to what I take to be Arstotle's pluralism.For the
moment, I want to concentrateon the second. As a purely culinarymatter,
one may contest whethera potluckdinneris betterthana carefullyplanned
and organized banquet.'4And even if it is, is there an appropriateanalogy
withthelkndof decisionmakinga democraticassemblywill haveto engagein?
One clue is provided by a second analogy that Aristotle uses: that of
aesthetic appreciation."The many are betterjudges than a single man of
music and poetry; for some understandone part, and some another,and
among them they understandthe whole."'5This seems to direct us to the
multifacetedcharacterof the issues that arise for decision in the assembly.
There may be many aspects to a given situation,and no one man, however
wise, can be trustedto notice them all. This is obvious enough in the case of
policy decisions. The assembly is debatingwhetherto mount an expedition
to Sicily- one citizen may be familiarwiththe Sicilian coastline;anotherwith
the militarycapacitiesof the Sicilians; a thirdwith the cost and difficulty of
naval expeditions;a fourthwith the bitternessof militaryfailure;a fifth with
the dangersto a democraticstate of successful militaryconquest;and so on.
Between them, pooling their knowledge, they can hope to gain the widest
possible acquaintancewith the pros and cons.
It is interesting, though, that Aristotle relates this point not only to
multifaceted policy decisions, but also to equity-basedjudgments about
individualcases:

[M]attersof detail about which men deliberatecannot be included in legislation. Nor

does anyone deny that the decision of such mattersmust be left to man, but it is argued
thatthereshould be manyjudges, andnot one only. Forevery rulerwho has been trained
568 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

by law judges well; and it would surelyseem strangethata personshouldsee betterwith

two eyes, or hearbetterwith two ears, or act betterwith two handsor feet, than many
with many.16

The idea here, if I understandit, is thatwhen legislationfails with regardto

certainhardcases, it is becausetheirmultifacetedcharacterdefies the simple
categorizationson which the rule of law depends.The cases where general
legal rules fail areprecisely the cases whereone wants a mode of judgment
that is sensitive to all aspects of the case, includingthose which legislation
might have overlooked.For thattask,one needs many eyes, notjust two.
The accountsjust given stressthe sensitivityof manyindividualsto many
factualaspectsof a situationaboutwhich a politicalor legal decision is to be
made. However, I think Aristotle's argumentis meant to apply to ethical
judgmentsor judgmentsof value as well.
One possible interpretation,which is not purely a matterof the accumu-
lation of factual knowledge, assimilatesAristotle's view of politics to the
utilitariancase for democracyput forwardby the earlierMill and the later
Bentham. Maybe what happens when the many come together to make a
decision is thatthey find out from each otherhow each person's well-being
may be affected by the matterunderconsideration.By this means, they put
themselves collectively in a betterposition to make a judgment of overall
social utility. A merchantmay not realize how much some measure he is
imtially inclined to supportmay prejudicethe situationof a farmeruntil he
hearsit from the farmer'sown mouth.
Or the process may even be cruderthan that. Never mind deliberation:
each citizen may simply vote his own self-interest,so thatit is the collective
decisionprocedure(presumablysome formof majorityrule)which is "wiser"
from the point of view of social utility than any individualmemberof the
collective. Indeed, this crude utilitarianconception of the wisdom of the
multitudehas the advantageof providinggroundsnot only for DWM, but
also DWM2.If the criterionof wisdom is social utility, if all groups make
their decisions by majority voting, and if all individuals vote their own
interests,then obviously the groupthatcompriseseveryone will be "wiser"
thanany subset.'7
Readerswill be relieved to learnthat I do not think this was Aristotle's
view. There are hints of utilitarianargument,for example, in Aristotle's
suggestion that politics is one of those arts whose products are properly
judged by the consumer,notjust the skilled artist:

[T]here are some arts whose productsare not judged of solely, or best, by the artists
themselves,namely those artswhose productsarerecogmzedeven by those who do not
 Waldron/ WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 569

possess the art;forexample,the knowledgeof the house is not limitedto the builderonly;
the user, or, in otherwords, the masterof the house will actuallybe a betterjudgethan
the builder,just as the pilot will judge betterof a rudderthanthe carpenter,andthe guest
will judge betterof a feast thanthe cook.18

There are two ways of reconciling this suggestion with the generally
nonutilitariancast of Anstotelian politics. It may reflect Aristotle'srealistic
and moderateview thatmen come togetherin society notjust in orderto live
well (i.e., in orderto live a life accordingto virtue),butalso to a certainextent
simply for the sake of life itself and of life-relatedinterests.Though"a state
exists for the sake of a good life, and not for the sake of life only,"19still it is
truethat "mankindmeet togetherand maintainthe political communityalso
for the sake of mere life (in which thereis possibly some noble element)."20
Preferrng the diners' judgment to the cook's is a way of respecting the
importance-partial thoughit is-of this aspect of political community.For
thatpurpose, the multitudeis a betterinstrument,because by definitionit is
more widely sensitive to the conditionsof life thanthe one good man.
The other possibility is that, even though Aristotle holds an objective
theory of the good life which is not hostage to purelyutilitarianor welfarist
calculations, neverthelessit is a theory which gives considerableweight to
subjective elements-to what it is like to live a life of a certainsort.Though
the agreeablelife is not necessarily the good life, Aristotle does suggest in
the Ethics thatthe good life is a pleasantand agreeablelife, albeit a pleasant
andagreeablelife of a certaincharacter.21 So, discoveringthatcertainpolitical
decisions make life disagreeablefor many people may be relevant to the
assessment of those decisions.
Having said all that,I think thatAristotle, in espousing DWM, is in fact
committinghimself to the propositionthatthe many actingcollectively may
be a betterjudge than the few best not only of mattersof fact, not only of
social utility, but also and most importantlyof mattersof ethics, value, and
the natureof the good life-issues which go beyond the mere accumulation
of individualexperiences.The termtraditionallyused for the doctrne-"the
summationargument"-suggests thatall thatis going on is the aggregation
of whateach personbringsto the argument.But thatmay be misleading-not
only in the way thatDavid Keyt says, becauseit suggests nothingmore than
a randomand unorderedcollection of experiences;22even the applicationof
a social welfarefunctionis morethanthat.It is misleadingbecauseit suggests
a merely mechanicalordering,whereasI thinkAristotle has in mind some-
thing more syntheticor even dialectical.His view is thatdeliberationamong
the many is a way of bringingeach citizen's ethical views andinsights-such
as they are-to bearon the views and insights of each of the others,so that
570 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

they cast light on each other,providinga basis for reciprocalquestioningand

criticism,and enablinga position to emergewhich is betterthan any of the
inputsand much more thanan aggregationor functionof those inputs.
This is whereit reallygets interesting.My hunchis thatthe kindof process
that groundsand generatesthe collective wisdom of the multitudefor the
purposesof the Politics is similarin characterto the process representedby
Aristotle'sown methodologyin ethics.Thinkof thepassageaboutthe endoxa
at the beginning of book 7 of the NichomacheanEthics. Introducinghis
discussionof self-restraintand akrasia,Aristotlesays,

Our propercourse with this subject as with others will be to presentthe vanous views
aboutit, and then, afterfirst reviewing the difficultiesthey involve, finally to establish
if possible all, or if not all, the greaterpart and the most importantof the opiions
generallyheld withrespectto these statesof mind;since if thediscrepanciescan be saved,
anda residuumof currentoplmonleft standing,the trueview will have been sufficiently
established.23

It is an assumptionof Aristotle's metaethics that it is better to begin by

examiningexisting views and opinions thanto proceedentirelya priori.By
takingthe endoxaseriously,even when they aremutuallycontradictory,one
can see whetherthey cast light on one anotherto indicatevariousaspects of
the truth.Thatthis proceduremay have (so to speak)a democraticdimension
to it-that it is not purely confined to the study of received philosophical
opinion-is indicatedin Aristotle'sremarksabout views of happiness (eu-
daemonla)in book 1 of the Ethics. For afterbriefly listing the oplmons, he
writes,

[S]ome of these views have been held by many men and men of old, others by a few
eminentpersons;and it is not probablethateither of these should be entirelymistaken,
butratherthattheyshouldbe rght in at leastsome one respect,oreven in most respects.24

The philosopher'sjob-Aristotle's own job in the Ethics-is to considerthe

common views and use them to cast light on each other, to bring out the
respectsin which each has somethingto contributeto the truth.In this way,
Aristotle'sown philosophicalmethod may be a model of what is supposed
to go on when the many act and deliberatecollectively.25
In a recent discussion of DWM, Mary Nichols has complained that
Aristotleoverlooksthe need for someone who would actuallydo the synthe-
sizing, someone who (on my account)would do for the variouscontributing
views what the authorof the NichomacheanEthics does for the endoxa:"A
work of music or poetry is more than the sum of its parts. Who is it who
judges or appreciatesthe whole?"26In fact, I think, she underestimatesthe
 Waldron/ WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 571

confidencewe may have in genuinedialectic(as opposedto the fakedialectic

of the single authorconslderng "severalviews" but always on his own terms
and in his own formulations).Think,by contrast,of J. S. Mill's suggestions
about the synthesis of diverse ideas in On Liberty.Some issues, he argued,
may not be amenableto being workedout in a dialectic tightly controlledby
a single thinker:

Truth,in the greatpracticalconcernsof life, is so much a questionof the reconcilingand

combiing of oppositesthatvery few have mindssufficientlycapaciousand impartialto
make the adjustmentwith an approachto correctness,andit has to be made by the rough
process of a strugglebetween combatantsfightingunderhostile banners.27

On this account, the absence of a master synthesizer may actually be an

advant ge. Of course, in the end, the view that emerges will end up being
held by someone (one hopes by all, or by most). Theremay neverthelessbe
something to the idea of a consensus "emerging"in open discussion rather
thanbeing actively engineered.ThoughMill's concernsare no doubt anach-
ronistic in this context, that is no reason to lose sight of the process Mill
describesas the kind of possibilityAristotleis contemplatingin his model of
nonaristocraticpolitics.
I want to move now to consider the wider significance DWM may have
for our understanding of certain central themes in Aristotle's political
philosophy.

4. DWMAND THENATUREOF MERIT

The firstthemeis therelationbetweenAristotle'sviews on politicalpower

and his meritocratictheoryof justice.
It is easy to forgetthatAristotle'sargumentin the middlechaptersof book
3 of the Politics is presentedas an applicationof the theory of distributive
justice expounded in book 5 of the Ethics: indeed it is just about the only
sustained applicationof the theory that we have in his work. In the Ethics,
we are told that "all men agree that what is just in distributionmust be
accordingto meritin some sense, thoughthey do not all specify the same sort
of merit."28 In book 3 of the Politics, Aristotleattemptsto apply thatdoctrine
to the distributionof one very importantspecies of good-namely "offices
of state,"which he says are "postsof honor."29
His discussion of what should count as merit for the purposes of the
distributionof this good is a fine anticipationof the moder moral doctrne
of relevantreasons. "[S]omepersonswill say thatoffices of stateought to be
572 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

unequallydistributedaccordingto superiorexcellence, in whateverrespect,"

includingexcellence of wealthandexcellence of birth;30 butAristotlehas no
troubledisposing of this view. It is, he argues,like saying thatplaces in an
orchestrashould be distributedon the basis of beautyandphysical courage,
whereasin fact they should be distributedonly on the basis of those excel-
lences that directly contributeto the purposes for which orchestras are
constituted-that is, excellence in playing. Similarly,"the rival claims of
candidatesfor office can only be basedon the possession of elements which
enterinto the compositionof a state."
A slightly differentproblemaboutthe meaningof meritconcerns,not its
elements or criteria,but the sort of conceptit is.31Is merit,like our moder
conceptdesert,an essentiallybackward-lookingconcept,proportionedto the
moral qualityof a person'spast acts? Is it like the concept of desertthat we
use, for example, in awarding prizes and honors, and in the retributive
apportionmentof pumshment?Or is meritrathera forward-lookingconcept
for Aristotle, indicatingability in regardto a task to be performedin the
future?
The backward-lookingview has some supportin the Ethics.In his discus-
sion of properpride,Aristotleobserves,

Desertis relativeto externalgoods; andthe greatestof these, we shouldsay, is thatwhich

we renderto the gods, and which people of positionmost aim at, and which is the prize
appointedforthe noblest deeds; and this is honour.32

Honor as "the prize appointed for the noblest deeds" certainly has a
backward-lookingflavor;and we should not forgetthatAristotleexplicates
the good of political participationas a matterof honor33
Even so, I think that it is the forward-lookingview that counts in the
Politics. Certainlythatis whatthe orchestraanalogysuggests:one distributes
places in the orchestrato people on the basis that they will be able to play
well, not on the basisof theirhavingbeenable to play well in thepast.Maybe
past performanceis evidence of prospective ability. But it is evidence of
merit,not merititself.
Now, if we take this forward-lookingview of merit and combine it with
DWM, we get a quitestrikingresult.Not only is meritnota backward-looking
concept, but it is also not necessarilyan individualizedconcept. The effect
of DWM, as David Keyt points out, is to allow the equationsof Anstotelian
justice to rangeover groups,notjust over individuals.3
Taketwo individuals,BrownandJones,the formera manof modestvirtue
andpedestrianjudgment,the lattera manof excellence so far as the political
 Waldron/ WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 573

virtues are concerned. Considered in terms of their respective individual

abilities, Jones merits higheroffice thanBrown;perhapsBrown considered
by himself does not mert any office at all. But if DWM appliesto a citizenry
that includes both of them, then their clams to office may be identical. A
groupincludingBrownalongwithJonesmaybe collectively wiserthanJones
himself or any group comprisingonly Jones and his peers. It will of course
almost certainly be true that a citizen body which included Jones but not
Brown (C,) would be collectively wiser than a citizen body that included
Brown but not Jones (CB). However,if C, is collectively inferor in wisdom
to a body that includes both of them (CJ&B), then the difference in merit
between Jones and Brown (which groundsthe differencein collective wis-
dom between Cj and CB)may be of limitedrelevanceso faras political office
is concerned.A person's meritis a matterof the collective political capacity
of a groupof which he might be a member.
Admittedly,this leaves open the questionof how Cj&Bmakesits decisions
and how far its proceduresmay be sensitive to the difference in individual
merit as between Jones and Brown.35It may be the case thatC,j&does better
by making decisions on the basis of the equal participationof its members
thanby any procedurethataccordsgreaterweight to the votes of people like
Jones.Thatneed not be the case of course.But the merefact of the superiority
of Jones to Brown, or of Cj to CB,is not incompatiblewith its being the case.
The dialectical dynamics of Cj&Bmay be such thatthe incrementalbenefits
of combimngBrown's limitedinsightswithJones'sextensive insights accrue
only in the light of a deliberativeprocedure that treats the two of them
formallyas equals.
I find this an intriguingpossibility,not least for the light it casts on modem
discussions aboutdiversityandmert in academichiring.Manyof us support
affirmativeaction because we think that a political science departmentor a
law school will be better able to dischargeits nmssionif it has a diverse
membership than if it consists of a pool of similar and similarly talented
individuals.On the accountI have given of Aristotle'sargument,affirmative
action can still be regardedas a distributionaccordingto merit-only now,
our startingpoint is the mert of the departmentor faculty as a whole. The
justice claims of particularindividualsto a place in the academy are then
derivedfrom the merit-basedjustice claims thatcan be madeon behalfof the
groups to which they might belong if appointed,ratherthan directly on the
basis of anything that can be regardedas "theirown" merit. Accordingly,
when we arechoosing betweentwo candidatesfor a position in a department,
we should decide by comparng the mert thatthe departmentwould have if
it included one of them with the merit that the departmentwould have if it
574 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

includedthe other.We may come up with a differentresulton thatbasis than

we would if we comparedtheirindividualmeritson the unspokenassumption
thateach of them would be actingon his or her own.

5. POLITICAL
RIGHTSAS PRIVATE
PROPERTYFOR COMMONUSE36

Though Aristotletalks of "themany"or "thepeople at large,"members

of thatclass are likely to thinkin termsof individualentitlementsto partici-
pate, based simply on each person'sstatus as a citizen. However,inasmuch
as the case for democracyis based on DWM, these individualparticipatory
entitlementsmustbe exercisedwith some responsibility.Thereis an interest-
ing analogy here with Aristotle'stheoryof property.
Aristotle'sdiscussionof propertypurportsto be somethingof a compro-
mise between a rejectionof Plato's communism and an attemptto secure
some of the social andethical advantagesthatresultfrom sharing:

Propertyshould be in a certainsense common,but, as a generalrule, private. And

yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, "friends,"as the proverbsays, "will
have all thingscommon."... For,althoughevery manhas his own property,some things
he will place at the disposal of his frends, while of others he shares the use with
them. It is clearly betterthatpropertyshould be prvate, but the use of it common;
andthe special businessof the legislatoris to createin men thisbenevolentdisposition.37

It is not clearwhatconcretearrangementsAristotleactuallyhas in mindwhen

he talks aboutprivatepropertyin commonuse. His examplesmainlyinvolve
the sharingof privatelargesse in a very close circle of friends, and that of
course happens in every system of private property. Apart from the
Lacedaemoniancustomof travelersappropratingprovisionsfromfields that
they pass by on theirjourney,38thereis nothingparticularlycommon in the
sense of polis-wlde in the examplesthatAristotlegives.
But if we turnto political property-that is, to the distributablegood that
consists of the rightto participatein politics-we can makeperfectsense of
the idea of common use. A man's rightto participateis in a sense his private
property.39 But the rationaleforthe distributionof this nght requiresthateach
use thatproperty,notjust for his own purposes,but in a way thatcontributes
to the excellence injudgmentof the groupor multitudeto which one belongs.
Though each has an individualnght, the properuse of thatrightinvolves an
essentially collective exercise. It is possible, of course, thatthe enfranchise-
ment of the many could be construedby each as purely an individualistic
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 575

opportunity "Now I can cast my vote. Now I can protect my interests.Let

everyone else look after themselves." But except on the assumption that
DWM is basedon purelyutilitariangrounds,thatattitudewill be inappropri-
ate. The individualmemberof the multitudeis requiredby the logic of his
(and their)enfranchisement,not only to use his vote responsibly,but to use
it in a way that interactsdeliberativelywith others, so that the final vote in
the assembly reflects a synthesis which is something more than a mere
aggregationof its constituentparts.
One way of readingthe qualificationaboutcorruption,which I mentioned
in section 2,40is that corruptionis the vicious inability to interactdelibera-
tively with others. A person under the influence of money, patronage,or
passion, for example, is likely to be someone who will cast his vote without
listening to others(except his patronor the one who has bribedhim), or who
will cast it on the basis of interestor impulse irrespectiveof what has been
said back and forth in the deliberativeprocess. His deafness, so to speak, in
deliberationis the markof hls using political propertyin a narrowlyselfish
way.41
Ideally,then,each will bringhis experienceandhis opinionaboutthe good
to the assembly in a form that can be communicatedto others, and he must
listen to others and reflect on what they say as they contributetheir insight
and expenence. Ronald Beiner in his book Political Judgmenttakes as a
motto an interestingcomment by Thucydides:"Onewho forms a judgment
on any point, but cannotexplain himself clearly to the people, might as well
have never thought at all on the subject."42The common use of political
propertyrequiresspecific virtues-skill in explainingone's own views, skill
In listenng to the views of others,skill in bringingthe two into relationwith
one another in a way that highlights their strengths and diminishes their
weaknesses, and skill once again in explainng the tentative synthesis that
one has arrivedat for the benefit of others(who are, of course, engaged in a
similarexercise). These are skills of empathy,but they are also, of course, as
Beiner remindsus, skills of rhetorc.43And they bringus to what is perhaps
the most importantconnectionI want to draw-between the doctrineof the
wisdom of the multitude and Aristotle's conception of reasoned speech-
logos-as the key to man's political nature.

6. POLITICSAND SPEECH

Thereis a suggestion in Rousseau'sSocial Contractthatthe generalwill

could be expected to emerge even (or perhapsespecially) if "thecitizens had
576 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

no commumcationone with another."44 ForAristotle,by contrast,the wisdom

of which the multitudeis capableemergesonly "whenthey meet together"-
a phrasehe repeatsseveraltimes.45The institutionof theirmeeting together
is the assembly(ecclesia) andthe mediumof theirmeetingtogetheris speech.
I have called my approachin this essay one of heurstic exaggeration.
Howeverit is, in my view, impossibleto overestimatethe importanceof the
connectionbetweenDWMandtheclaimmadeatthebeginningof thePolitics
thatthe markof man's political natureis his power of speech.

Now, that man is more of a political animalthan bees or other gregariousanmals is

evident. Nature,as we often say, makes nothingin vain, andman is the only animalwho
has the gift of speech. And whereasmere voice is but an indicationof pleasureor pain,
and is therefore found in other animals (for their natureattains to the perceptionof
pleasureand pain and the intimationof them to one another,and no further),the power
of speech is intendedto set forththe expedientandthe inexpedient,andthereforelikewise
the just andthe unjust.46

For one thing the passage immediately underminesany crude utilitarian

interpretationof DWM. If collective wisdom amountedonly to an aggrega-
tion of expressions of individualutility, the multitudecould be little more
thananimals,on this account.
But the connection I want to emphasizeworks in the other direction.If
politics were typically a matterof monarchy,a matterof rule by the one best
man, then this power of speech would be largely redundant,except as a
vehicle for the expressionof decision and command.Speech is the markof
man's political naturebecause speech is the mediumin which politics takes
place. And since politics takes place in the mediumof speech, it necessarily
takes place in a medium of plurality-a context in which there are many
speakers,each contributingto a collective decision somethingthat none of
the otherscould have got to by himself.
Thomas Hobbes, infamously, took the human power of speech to be
indicative of man's naturalunfitness for society. What distinguishedmen
fromcreatureslike bees andants(whichHobbesmistakenlythoughtAristotle
regardedas politicalammals)was, accordingto Hobbes,thatbees andants

want thatartof words,by which some men can representto others,that which is Good,
in the likenesse of Evill; and Evill, in the likenesse of Good; and augment,or diminish
the apparentgreatnesseof Good andEvill; discontentingmen, andtroublingtheirPeace
at theirpleasure.47

It is temptingto thinkthatthe Aristotelianposition, in oppositionto Hobbes,

must be that speech is a mediumin which we share a view about goodness
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 577

or justice. Hobbes thinksspeech is essentiallydivisive; Anstotle must think

thatspeech is the naturalmediumfor the expressionof the amicableunanim-
ity which is discussed in chapter6, book 9 of the Ethics.4 In fact, it would
be a mistaketo statethecontrastbetweenAristotleandHobbesin these terms.
Between divisiveness and unanirmtyis debateand complementarity:differ-
ent views coming togetherin deliberationto contributedynamicallyto a new
synthesis. Speech, for Aristotle, is not just the unanimouschanting of ac-
cepted truths about justice: it is a matter of conversation, debate in the
ecclesia, articulatediscussion, the sortof dialecticwhich (as I said) one finds
representedin Aristotle'sworks themselves.
In other words, politics, for Aristotle,is a matterof genuine interdepen-
dence. None of us can get by without the others in political life, which we
could do if speech were merelya matterof each giving voice to a preordained
unanimity.(It is perhapssignificantthatAristotle characterizesthe individ-
ual's dependenceon the polis in book 1 by asking us to consider what a foot
or a hand would be like if the whole body were destroyed49and that he
characterzes the wisdom of the multitudein book 3 with the analogy of a
body that has many feet, manyhands,and manysenses.)50
My suggestion then is thatDWM standsas a kind of model or paradigm
of our natureas speaking beings. Each can communicateto anotherexperi-
ences and insights that complementthose that the other alreadypossesses,
and when this happens in dense interactionthroughouta community, it
enables the group as a whole to attain a degree of wisdom and practical
knowledge thatsurpasseseven thatof the most excellent individualmember.
I don't want to push the exaggerationtoo far.I do not want to say that the
book 1 doctrineof speech as the markof man's political characterintimates
a direct essentialist argumentfor democracy.But the passage from book 1
does indicate the centrality of the logic of DWM to Aristotle's overall
argumentin the Politics: thatpeople do betterin theirpracticalthinkingwhen
they workin groupsratherthanwhentheyrely,one by one, on theirindividual
excellence. WhatDWM does, in the contextof book 3, chapter11, is pursue
that idea to an extreme.

7. PLURALISM

I said a moment ago thatif we connect DWM with the idea thatspeech is
the markof man'spolitical nature,we can see thatAnstotelianpolitics cannot
just be the unanimousrepetitionof sharedviews. Speech is a sign of diversity,
a sign thatwe have somethingdistinctiveto learnfrom one another.51 DWM
578 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

thuspoints us to Aristotle'scritiqueof Platoic unty in Politics, book 2, and

to his own insistenceon differenceand diversity."Thenatureof a state is to
be a plurality. [A] state is not made up only of so many men, but of
differentkinds of men; for similarsdo not constitutea state."52
Differencehere amountsto more thanthe fact thatwe etch have our own
lives to live, our own special needs to be takeninto accountin any plausible
conceptionof the commongood. We aretalkingherepartlyaboutsomething
amountingto a divisionof laborwithregardto knowledgeorunderstanding-
a point madeprominentin Aqulnas'sdevelopmentof these ideas:

Man has a naturalknowledgeof life's necessities only in a generalway. Being gifted

with reason, he must use it to pass from such unversal pnnciples to the knowledge of
what in particularconcernshis well-being. Reasomnng thus, however,no one man could
attainall necessaryknowledge.Instead,naturehas destinedhim to live in society,so that
dividing the labour with his fellows each may devote himself to some branchof the
sciences, one followingmedicine,anothersome otherscience, andso forth.Thisis further
evident from the fact that men alone have the power of speech which enables them to
convey the full contentof theirthoughtsto one another.53

In addition,we may also be talkingaboutdialecticaldifference,as opposed

to mere complementarty.My earliercomparisonbetween DWM and Aris-
totle's way with the endoxaindicatedthata multitudemay be moreinsightful
than one excellent man if its members contrive to spark off each other's
dissonant ethical views and sharpen their moral awareness dialectically.
Maybe there are some forms of conflict which are so extreme that the
proponentsof differentviews (or interests) are just talking at or past one
another,not listening particularly,not taking anything that is said by an
opponentinto account.This extreme of partisanconflict is perhapsitself a
formof the corrupt"deafness"I mentionedat the end of section 5. Still, there
is a large gap betweenthe moderationof conflict thatis necessaryto sustain
genuine deliberationandthe generaleliminationof diversityof ethical view.
There is thereforesome difficulty with AlasdairMaclntyre'sclaim that
Aristotelian political community is "informedby a shared vision of the
good."54If my hunchesbearout, we should expect the citizens in Aristotle's
polis to hold views aboutthe good at least as diverse as those canvased as
endoxa in the Ethics. Of course, that's what common sense tells us also.
Aristotle did not conjurethe conflicting endoxa up out of his own imagina-
tion. They were views commonly held, some among ordinarypeople, some
among philosophers,some among the elite. He gave no indicationthatone
would expect a good society to exhibit anything less than the diversity of
ethical view displayedin the pages of the Ethics-the diversity he used as
the startingpoint of his own dialectical wisdom and that I am suggesting
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 579

forms the basis also of the wisdom of the multitudeconcocted in political

deliberation.
Now Aristotledoes say early on in the Politics thatman alone among the
animals has a sense of good and evil, justice and injustice, and that it is the
sharing of a view about these things that constitutesa polis.55But the fact
that that passage immediately follows the discussion of man's power of
speech cuts at least both ways. I readit as indicatingthatour sharinga view
about the good or justice is to be understooddynamically,as perhaps the
upshot of our talking with one another,talk thatpresupposesthat we come
to the conversation from different startingpoints. So it is misleading for
Macintyreto couch his position in terms of a "formof social order whose
sharedmode of life alreadyexpresses the collective answeror answersof its
citizens to the question 'Whatis the best mode of life for humanbeings?' "56
It is wrong, too, for him to suggest thatif we ever actuallyreachnew ethical
conclusions throughdeliberation,it can only be because we started from
shared prermses.57Aristotle's own method in ethics intimates no such as-
sumption,and nor,I am arguing,does his politics.

8. A GODAMONGMEN

The final connectionI want to make stems fromAnstotle's discussion in

chapter13, book 3 of the Politics where he asks:Whatif, in a given society,
DWM is false? After all, "if the people are to be supreme,because they are
strongerthan the few, then if one man, or more thanone, but not a majorty,
is strongerthan the many, they ought to rule, and not the many."58That's
predictableenough: we know that Aristotle was preparedto countenance
aristocracyor monarchyin certaincircumstances.
The strikingthing, however, is his assertiona paragraphor two laterthat
the personwho providesthe counterexampleto DWM mayjustly or properly
be regardedas not a part of the polls:

If, however, therebe some one person,or more thanone, althoughnot enough to make
up the full complementof a state, whose excellence is so pre-eminentthatthe excellence
or the political capacityof the rest admitof no comparson with his or theirs,he or they
can no longer be regardedas partof a state; forjustice will not be done to the superior,
if he is reckonedonly as the equal of those who are so far inferor to him in excellence
and in politicalcapacity.Such a man may trulybe deemed a God among men.59

You will not be surprisedto hear that in my presentexcited state I cannot

resist malknga connectionbetweenthis passageandAristotle'sinsistence in
580 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

book 1, in a sentence immediatelypreceding the stuff about speech, that

anyone who can survive or flourish without the polis is either a beast or a
god: "[M]anis by naturea political animal.And he who by natureand not by
mere accidentis without a state, is eithera bad man or above humanity."60
The manwho is betterthanthe rest even whenthey act collectively-the man
who is as good without speech, without conversation,as the multitudeare
with it-has an excellent nature,butnot apolitical nature.He is a god among
men, for he has no need of the power of speech. Fromone point of view, he
is the ideal absolutemonarch;from anotherpoint of view, he is (as Hannah
Arendt recognizes) as much the antithesis of mundane politics as Billy
Budd.61
Aristotle does not leave the matterthere.Though he says in chapter 15
that "thebest man must legislate,"62the chapter13 passage continues,after
"aGod amongmen,"as follows:

Hence we see thatlegislationis necessarilyconcernedonly with those who are equal in

birthandcapacity;and thatfor men of pre-eminentexcellence thereis no law-they are
themselvesa law. Anyone would be ndiculous who attemptedto make laws for them.63

It is difficultto know whatto makeof this. Aristotle'spoint seems to be about

the rule of law- althoughthe "Godamongmen"shouldlegislate, perhapshe
should not be bound himself by the rules he makes.The images of diviilty
and bestiality that Aristotle associates with apolitical naturestake another
turnat this point-"he who bids the law rule may be deemedto bid God and
Reason alone rule, but he who bids man rule adds an element of the
beast"64-thatI have not been able to figureout.
Evenharderto figureout areAristotle'scommentson ostracism.In chapter
13, he toys with the idea that the ostracism of the truly excellent-thelr
expulsion from the polis over which they tower-"is based upon a kind of
politicaljustice."65They cannotbe subjectto law; they are, as Aristotleputs
it, a law untothemselves.Yetthatwill not do for all sortsof reasons,not least
thatthoughthey are betterthanthe multitude,they are "notenough to make
up the full complementof the state."66The one excellent man, or the few
excellent men, though morally self-sufficient, do not have the full self-
sufficiency associatedwithpoliticalcommunity'67 they needto live alongside
those with whom they cannotbenefitfromspealkng.And those othersin turn
would be fools to forgo the benefitof theirexcellence, even thoughthatmay
mean denying the efficacy of theirown political natures.
And so the discussion in book 3 ends with unsatisfactoryreassurances:
"Thebest must be that which is administeredby the best";68"The whole is
naturallysuperiorto the part, and he who has this pre-eminenceis in the
 Waldron/ WISDOMOF THE MULTITUDE 581

relation of a whole to a part";69"Surely it would not be right to kill, or

ostracize, or exile such a person, or requirethat he take his turn n being
governed."70
Surely?I am not so sure thatthe preferableconclusionis not the one from
chapter16 thatpersevereswith the power of speech and takes accountof the
logic of collectivity:

If, as I said before, the good man has a rght to rule because he is better,still two good
men are betterthanone: this is the old saying.
two going together,
and the prayerof Agamemnon,
would thatI had ten such counsellors!7

NOTES

1. My hermeneuticalhero is Michel Foucault, who made this response to someone who

quibbled about his interpretationof Nietzsche: "The only valid tribute to thought such as
Nietzsche's is preciselyto use it, to deformit, to make it groanandprotest.And if commentators
then say that I am being faithful or unfaithfulto Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest"
(Power/Knowledge:Selected Interviewsand Other Writings1972-1977 [New York:Pantheon,
1980]).
2. Arstotle, Politics (Jowett/Barnestrans.), ed. Stephen Everson (Cambridge:Umversity
Press, 1988), 65: book 3, chap. 10, 1281a1.
3. Ibid., 66: book 3, chap. 11, 1281a43-b9.
4. For example, David Keyt, "Arstotle's Theory of DistributiveJustice,"in A Companron
to Aristotle's Politics, ed. David Keyt and Fred D. Miller (Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1991), 270.
5. Eitherversionof the doctnne mightalso be used as the basis of an exclusionaryclaim. We
know that when Arstotle talked aboutthe people at large, he-like most Athenians-did not
have unversal suffragein mind. The claim made in DWM is made with regardto a body which
is itself a subset of all the inhabitantsof Athens: women, notoriously,were excluded, as were
children,as were those who were enslaved, as were residentaliens, and so on. DWM might be
used as a criterionfor such exclusion: a person is justifiably excluded from the citizen body if
better decisions can be made by pooling the knowledge, experience, and judgment of the
membersof a citizen body thatexcludes him, than by pooling the knowledge, experence, and
judgmentof the membersof a body thatincludes lum.
6. Aristotle,Politics, 66: 128 b 15.
7. Ibid., 126: 1282a.
8. Ibid., 71: book 3, chap. 13, 1284a.
9. Ibid., 76: book 3, chap. 15, 1286a27-31.
10. Ibid., 67: book 3, chap. 11, 1282a14.
11. Ibid., 68: 1282a34-41.
12. Ibid., 89: book 4, chap. 4, 1292a10-14.
582 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

13. Ibid., 76: book 3, chap. 15, 1286a29. Indeed, culinarymetaphorspervadethis partof
book 3. We aretold that"impurefood whenrmxedwith whatis puresometimesmakestheentire
mass more wholesome"(ibid., 67' chap. 11, 1281b36) and that"theguest will judge betterof a
feast thanthe cook" (ibid., 68: 1282a23).
14. CompareMaryP.Nichols, CitizensandStatesmen:A StudyofAristotle'sPolitics(Savage,
MD: Rowmanand Littlefield, 1992), 195, n. 20: "Inthe backgroundto Anstotle's referenceto
the feast to which many contributeis the meal describedat the end of Arstophanes'Assembly
of Women(1163-82), a meal made up of so manyrandomfoods thatthe mixtureis revolting."
15. Arstotle, Politics, 66: book 3, chap. 11, 1281a43-b9.
16. Ibid., 79: book 3, chap. 16, 1287b23-8.
17. Beanng in mindthat,accordingto Arstotle, "thewhole cannotbe happyunless most, or
all, or some of its partsenjoy happiness"(ibid., 29: book 2, chap. 5, 1264bl8).
18. Ibid.,67-8: book 3, chap. 11, 1282al8.
19. Ibid., 63: book 3, chap. 9, 1280a32.
20. Ibid., 60: book 3, chap. 6, 1278b25.
21. For example, Arstotle, NichomacheanEthics (hereafterEthics), trans.Sir David Ross
(London:Oxford University Press, 1954) 240-1: book 9, chap. 9, 1170a. (Unless otherwise
indicated,all referencesto the Ethics are to this translation.)
22. Keyt, "Aristotle'sTheoryof DistributiveJustice,"271.
23. Arstotle, Ethics: book 7, chap. 1, 1145bl. For this passage I have used the translation
by H. Rackham(London:Heinemann,1934), 377.
24. Arstotle, Ethics (Ross translation),15-6: book 1, chap. 8, 1098b.
25. I shouldaddthat Aristotleuses this methodto talkabout DWM itself-treating this too
as a common view that may "containsome difficultyand perhapseven truth."There is nothing
either tautologicalor vicious in this form of self-reference,providedof course that additional
groundsfor the doctnne are also available.
26. Nichols, Citizensand Statesmen,66.
27. J. S. Mill, On Liberty,ed. CarragheenV. Shields(Indianapolis,IN: Bobbs Merrill,1956),
58: chap. 2, paragraph36.
28. Arstotle, Ethics, 112: book 5, chap. 3, 1131a-1131b.
29. Arstotle, Politics, 65: book 3, chap. 10, 1281a30.
30. Ibid., 69: book 3, chap. 12, 1282b23.
31. I am gratefulto David Gill for several conversationson the topic discussed in this and
the following paragraphs.His view, however,is the oppositeof mine.
32. Arstotle, Ethics, 90: book 4, chap. 3, 1123b(my emphasis).
33. "Thenought the good to rule an have supremepower?But in that case everybodyelse,
being excluded from power, will be dishonoured.For the offices of state are posts of honour;
and if one set of men always hold them, the rest must be depnved of them"(Arstotle, Politics,
65: book 3, chap. 10, 1281a30).
34. Keyt, "Anstotle'sTheoryof DistributiveJustice,"270: "Thestrategyof the argumentis
to applythe pnnciple of distributivejustice to men takencollectively as well as individually.In
terms of our formulationof the pnnciple in modem functionalnotation,the strategyis to allow
the individualvarables 'x' and 'y' to reignnotonly over individualfree men butalso over groups
or bodies of free men."
35. I am gratefulto one of Political Theory'srefereesfor pressingthis point.
36. My argumentin this section owes a lot to manyconversationswith Jill Frank.
37. Arstotle, Politics, 26: book 2, chap. 5, 1263a25-35.
38. Ibid., 26: 1263a35.
 Waldron/ WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE 583

39. I know it seems odd to describe it this way, but that is what is implied by Aristotle's
treatmentof politicalrghts underthe auspices of distributivejustice.
40. Aristotle,Politics, 26: book 2, chap. 5, 1282a.
41. I am gratefulto one of Political Theory'sreferees for this point.
42. Thucydides,Historyof the PelopennesianWar:book 2, chap.6; quotedby RonaldBeiner,
Political Judgment(London:Methuen, 1983), 83.
43. Beiner,Political Judgment,83.
44. Jean-JacquesRousseau, The Social Contract:book 2, chap. 3, in The Social Contract
and Discourses, trans.G.D.H. Cole (London:J. M. Dent, 1973). But "communication" arguably
refers to the formationof factions.I am gratefulto Paul Thomas for this point.
45. Anstotle, Politics, 66: book 3, chap. 11, 1281bl and 1281b5.
46. Ibid., 3: book 1, chap. 2, 1253a8.
47. ThomasHobbes,Leviathan,ed. RichardTuck(Cambridge:CambrdgeUniversityPress,
1991), chap. 17, 119-20.
48. Anstotle, Ethics, 231: book 9, chap.6, 1167a.
49. Anstotle, Politics, 4: book 1, chap. 2, 1253a21.
50. Ibid., 66: book 3, chap. 11, 1281b6;see also 79: book 3, chap. 16, 1287b26.
51. As Mary Nichols writes, "It is precisely because the members of the multitudehave
differentcontributionsto make that they have a just claim to rule. Arstotle teaches democrats
the value of heterogeneityto a defense of their claim to political participation"(Citizens and
Statesmen,66).
52. Arstotle, Politics, 21: book 2, chap. 2, 1261a18-25.
53. St. Thomas Aquinas, On Princely Government:book 1, chap. 1, in Aquinas: Selected
Political Writings,ed. A. P. D'Entreves(Oxford:Basil Blackwell, 1959), 3.
54. AlasdairMacintyre,After Virtue:A Studyin Moral Theory(London:Duckworth,1981),
146.
55. Anstotle, Politics, 3: book 1, chap. 2, 1253a18.
56. Alasdair Macintyre, Whose Justice? WhichRationality? (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1988), 133.
57. Ibid., 134.
58. Anstotle, Politics, 71: book 3, chap. 13, 1283b23-26.
59. Ibid., 71: book 3, chap. 13, 1284a4-11.
60. Ibid., 3: book 1, chap. 2, 1253a2. See also Arstotle, Ethics, 238: book 9, chap. 9: "It
would be a strangethingto make the happyman a solitary:no one would choose to have all the
good things of the world in solitude:man is meantfor political association,and whose natureit
is to live with others."
61. See HannahArendt,On Revolution(Harmondsworth:Penguln, 1973), chap. 2.
62. Arstotle, Politics, 76: book 3, chap. 15, 1286a22.
63. Ibid., 71-2: book 3, chap. 13, 1284a4-14.
64. Ibid., 78: book 3, chap. 16, 1287a30.
65. Ibid., 73: book 3, chap. 13, 1284bl7. See also 72: 1284a19.
66. Ibid., 71: 1284a5.
67. For the self-sufficiency of the polis, see ibid., 3: book 1, chap. 2, 1252b30.
68. Ibid., 81: book 3, chap. 18, 1288a34.
69. Ibid., 80: book 3, chap. 17, 1288a26.
70. Ibld., 80: book 3, chap. 17, 1288a25.
71. Ibid., 79: book 3, chap. 16, 1287b12-15.The quotationsare from the Iliad, X 224 and II
372, respectively.
584 POLITICALTHEORY/ November 1995

JeremyWaldronIsprofessorof law and associate deanat theSchoolof Law(Boalt Hall),

Universityof California,Berkeley,and chair of Boalt'sJurisprudenceand Social Policy
Program.He is also a memberof Berkeley'sphilosophydepartment.He is the authorof
several books, includingThe Rightto Prvate Property(OxfordUniversityPress, 1988),
Nonsense upon Stilts:Bentham,BurkeandMarxof the Rightsof Man(Methuen,1989),
and LiberalRights:CollectedPapers 1981-91 (CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993). He
has publishednumerousarticles on rights,property,liberalism,and soctaljustice. His
present research interests center on the Idea of political decision making and, in
particular,legislationin large-scale diverse assemblies.