US Bank National Association, As : Court of Common Pleas

Trustee on Behalf of GSR Mortgage

Loan Trust 2005-AR4 : Civil Division
3476 Stateview Boulevard
Fort Mill, SC 29715 : No. 2010-16706
Plaintiff
vs. : Montgomery County

G. Linton Sheppard
Judith A. Sheppard
2256 Washington Lane
Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006-5826
Defendants

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Defendants respectfully request that the Court enter an Order for Reconsideration of the

above-captioned matter, grant pro se Defendants a reasonable time period for Discovery and

issue a stay of the in rem judgment that was entered in favor of Plaintiffs against Defendants in

the above-captioned matter by the Order dated the 30th day of November. In support thereof,

Defendants aver as follows:

CASE HISTORY AND FACTS

1. Plaintiff is US Bank National Association, as Trustee on Behalf of GSR Mortgage Loan

Trust 2005-AR4. Plaintiff’s address is 3476 Stateview Boulevard, Fort Mill, SC 19715.

2. Defendants’ are G. Linton Sheppard and Judith A. Sheppard. Defendants’ address is

2256 Washington Lane, Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006.

3. On June 18, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Complaint in Mortgage Foreclosure (hereafter

“Complaint”) to foreclose the residential real property owned and occupied by Defendants, G.

Linton Sheppard and Judith A. Sheppard.

4. Defendants response to Plaintiff’s Complaint filed July 16, 2010 challenged Plaintiff’s

statement of amounts due and, subsequently, of Plaintiff’s standing in the case and evidence of

ownership of the actual promissory note and mortgage instrument.

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 5. On September 2, 1020, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (hereafter

“Motion”). Attached to Plaintiff’s Motion were copies of the Mortgage and Note, the alleged

Assignment to Plaintiff, an Affidavit “confirming the default and the amount of the debt” and

various letters required in the foreclosure process.

6. On October 1, 2010, Defendants filed an Answer which substantially denied the

foreclosure allegations outlined in the Motion.

7. On October 15, 2010, Plaintiff filed a Brief in Support of its Motion in which Plaintiff

challenged only one of Defendants’ substantial allegations, one part of the issue of standing.

Plaintiff failed to address Defendants’ additional substantial allegations.

8. On November 15, 2010, Defendants filed a Brief in response to Plaintiff’s Brief, and

concurrently filed a Request for Production of the Note.

9. On December 2, 2010, the Honorable Judge Branca ordered an in rem judgment in favor

of Plaintiff against Defendants in the amount of $834,168.97 plus interest. The in rem judgment

was issued while the Request for Production of the Note was still outstanding. No explanation

for the in rem judgment was provided.

10. Defendants subsequently received a letter dated December 15, 2010 from Plaintiff’s

attorney requesting a 30-day extension to produce the original promissory note. To date,

Plaintiff has not produced the original promissory note.

PLAINTIFF’S ARGUMENTS AND SUPPORTING “EVIDENCE”

11. Plaintiff claims it is the “legal owner of the mortgage.” (Original Complaint §3) Plaintiff

subsequently produced an Assignment as “proof” it is the “legal owner of the mortgage.”

(Attached as Exhibit A2 to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment)

12. Plaintiff claims the amounts due on the mortgage are as follows: $787,500.00 principal;

$44,609.29 interest; $650.00 attorney’s fees; $754.68 cumulative late charges; $105.00 property

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inspections/property preservations; and $550.00 costs of suit and title search. (Original

Complaint §6) Plaintiff subsequently attached an Affidavit given by Herman John Kennerty in

his capacity as VP of Loan Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank, NA Successor by Merger to

Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc., in which he claimed he is “familiar with the account that

forms the basis of the instant foreclosure action and am authorized to give this Affidavit.”

(Exhibit B, Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment)

13. In support of its Motion, Plaintiff relied on a number of additional allegations and

supposed “proof” related to ownership and communications with Defendants: 1) statements that

Plaintiff sent the required foreclosure information to Defendants; and 2) statements that

Defendants’ did not take the necessary steps to rectify the debt as required in the information

“Plaintiff” sent to Defendants.

DEFENDANTS’ ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

14. Defendants denied that the mortgage instrument was properly assigned to Plaintiff (§4 rel

to Truth in Lending, §6 ¶1, §7 ¶4, §10 ¶2 rel to Truth in Lending, Defendants’ Brief §1) citing

violations of Truth in Lending and the fact that the Assignment filed after the original

Complaint. Defendants claimed lack of standing. Plaintiff subsequently disputed Defendants’

claim of lack of standing in their Brief in response to Defendants Response to Plaintiff’s Motion

for Summary Judgment.

15. Defendants denied that the promissory note was assigned by Wells Fargo to Plaintiff (§6

¶1, Defendants’ Request for Production of Original Promissory Note, Defendants’ Brief §4 ¶1).

16. Defendants denied that the Affidavit filed in support of Plaintiff’s claims was valid (§8)

and attached proof thereto. Defendants argued against Mr. Kennerty’s statements that Plaintiff

notified Defendants of their intent to foreclose when in fact it was Wells Fargo who notified

Defendants. Defendants argued against Mr. Kennerty’s statements that Defendants have not

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taken the necessary steps to cure the arrears or offer a reasonable solution to cure the arrears.

Defendants attached numerous communications to support their argument. Defendants also

disputed Mr. Kennerty’s statements related to the amount owed on the debt, however they did

not provide proof of their dispute. Plaintiff did not dispute the claims made by Defendants,

thereby admitting that Mr. Kennerty’s statements were false.

17. Defendants asserted that Plaintiff was in violation of Fair Debt Collection Practices

(Defendants’ Brief §3) stating that Plaintiff willfully and deceptively concealed their identity

from Defendants, thereby making it impossible for Defendants to come to a reasonable solution

in the instant matter. Plaintiff did not dispute this claim, thereby admitting they are in violation

of Fair Debt Collection Practices.

18. Defendants denied that Plaintiff’s paperwork has been executed in a legal fashion

(Defendants’ Brief §4) claiming fraud on the court due to the fact that an attorney from

Plaintiff’s representing law firm signed the Assignment in the capacity of VP of Loan

Documentation for Wells Fargo Bank, NA for the assignee while she was simultaneously acting

as Partner in the law firm representing the assignor.

APPLICABLE LAW

19. “Motions for reconsideration are discouraged unless the facts or law not previously

brought to the attention of the court are raised.” S.A. Arbittier et al., Philadelphia Court of

Common Pleas Civil Practice Manual, § 7-2.8 (10th ed. 2000). A court has inherent power to

reconsider its own rulings. Moore v. Moore, 535 Pa. 18, 25, 634 A.2d 163, 167 (1993);

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Hutchison v. Luddy, 417 Pa.Super. 93, 108, 611 A.2d 1280, 1288 (1992). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

5505.

20. As per Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1035.2, “any party may move for summary

judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law whenever there is no genuine issue of any

material fact as to a necessary element of the cause of action or defense which could be

established by additional discovery or expert report.” The record is to be viewed in the light

most favorable to the non-moving party, and all doubts as to the existence of material fact must

be resolved against the moving party. Albright v. Abington Memorial Hospital, 548 Pa. 268, 696

A.2d 1159 (1997). The moving party has the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of

material fact. Thompson Coal Company v. Pike Coal Company, 488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466

(1979). In response, the non-moving party may not rest upon pleadings alone, but must set forth

specific facts which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Phaff v. Gerner, 451 Pa. 146, 303

A.2d 826 (1973).

21. Rule 1035 permits the entering of a summary judgment only if the pleadings, depositions,

answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits, if any, “show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”

Summary judgment is granted only in the clearest of cases, where the right is clear and free from

doubt. Kotwasinski v. Rasner, 436 Pa. 32, 258 A.2d 865 (1969); Prince v. Pavoni, 225 Pa.Super.

S7e8265c9346011

286, 302 A.2d 452 (1973). The moving party has the burden of proving the

nonexistence of any genuine issue of fact. Kent v. Miller, 222 Pa.Super. 390, 294 A.2d 821

(1972); Moore v. Zimmerman, 221 Pa.Super. 359, 292 A.2d 458 (1972); Schacter v. Albert, 212

Pa.Super. 58, 239 A.2d 841 (1968). All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of a

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material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Ritmanich v. Jonnel Enterprises, Inc.,

219 Pa.Super. 198, 280 A.2d 570 (1971).

22. Under Rule 1035(d) there are strict requirements concerning affidavits which are used in

support of a motion for summary judgment. That Rule provides: ‘. . . Supporting and opposing

affidavits shall be made on Personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible

in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters

stated therein.’

23. Rule 1029(b) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provides that

“averments in a pleading to which a responsive pleading is required are admitted when not

denied specifically or by necessary implication.” One purpose in demanding a specific denial is

to enable the parties to focus upon the disputed facts and to assist the Court in defining the issues

for trial. Bogley, Harting & Reese v. Stuart, 11 D&C 3d 303, 310 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1979).

BASIS FOR RECONSIDERATION

24. Defendants contested the amount due as stated in Plaintiff’s Complaint. In addition,

Plaintiff used an Affidavit which was given by admitted robo-signor Herman John Kennerty, a

representative of Wells Fargo who has also admitted he doesn’t verify facts and amounts owed

when he signs Affidavits. Defendants submitted as proof that Herman John Kennerty is a robo-

signor his own deposition taken in the Geline case where he admits he robo-signs 50 to 150

Affidavits per day, and where he admits he only verifies the date on Affidavits, not the “facts”

contained therein.

In the Geline case, Mr. Kennerty was asked during his deposition, “Q: Can you tell me about

how many documents you sign a day? A: Anywhere from 50 to 150. (pg 8-9) On page 60 and

61, Kennerty admits he only verifies the date. “Q: [Y]ou’re only looking at the documents to

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make sure that the date is correct and consistent with the date you’re signing the document,

correct? A: Yes.” Kennerty goes on to admit that he does not verify that what is contained in

the affidavit he is signing is consistent with the actual amount owed. “Q: And you’re looking on

a computer screen at the foreclosure matrix that you described to me to make certain that the

name of the … beneficiary on the document that you’re signing matches with the matrix; is that

correct? A: No. That is not correct.” The attorney of record goes on, “Q: So you’re simply

signing the document that’s presented to you and you’re just making sure that the date is correct?

A: Correct.” (pg 62) In the instant case, as was true in Geline, Kennerty states in his Affidavit

that he has personal knowledge that the information contained in the Affidavit is true and correct.

On page 64 of the deposition in the Geline case, “Q: And so when you sign this beneficiary

declaration and any other beneficiary declaration, you don’t have any independent knowledge

about whether or not the information is truthful, you’re relying on the other people in the process

to make sure that the information is correct on the document that you’re signing? A: Yes.”

Kennerty goes on to admit (pg 64-65) that he does not know when signing affidavits whether the

entity referred to actually has the authority to enforce the obligation. “Q: And do you know the

difference between whether or not an entity … is the actual holder of the promissory note or the

requisite authority under RCW 62A.3-301 to enforce the obligation? A: No.”

Defendants believe this proves the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, thereby

calling into question whether the Court may enter a summary judgment in the instant case

“where the right is clear and free from doubt.”

It is also Defendants’ belief that Kennerty has committed fraud by claiming knowledge of a

financial matter of which he has no personal knowledge, and therefore, Plaintiff and potentially

Plaintiff’s counsel have also committed fraud on this Court.

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 25. Because Plaintiff did not dispute Defendants’ claims that Kennerty’s Affidavit was made

in bad faith, Plaintiff has thereby effectively admitted the same. Defendants believe this should

also constitute their position that there are issues of material fact in dispute.

26. Plaintiff also did not dispute Defendants’ claims that at no time where they informed by

Plaintiff of its intent to foreclose. Plaintiff also did not dispute the fact that at no time did

Plaintiff submit to Defendants the proper paperwork related to foreclosure, the required Acts and

notice of Defendants’ responsibility to meet with an approved credit counseling agency, despite

Plaintiff’s claims to the contrary. Defendants believe this not only calls into question Plaintiff

standing in this matter, but also believes this should constitute a genuine issue of material fact.

27. In Defendants’ response to Plaintiff’s Supplemental Brief in Support of Its Motion for

Summary Judgment, in addition to the inconsistencies and errors in Plaintiff’s documentation

mentioned above, Defendants raised more issues that they believe constitute genuine issues of

material fact. Defendants raised the following issues: 1) violations of the Fair Credit Extension

Uniformity Act, 2) violations of securities laws and potential fraud, including potential conflict

of interest in the Assignment, 3) violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, and 4)

violations of the Truth in Lending Act. Defendants are representing themselves pro se and as

such are not completely versed on the law, but it is their belief that the fact that because Plaintiff

did not contest these disputes, Plaintiff therefore avers them to be true. It is also Defendants’

belief that these issues should raise genuine issues of material fact, precluding this Court from

issuing a summary judgment not only on the basis that the Court cannot issue a summary

judgment when genuine issues of material fact are in dispute, but also because the disputed facts

call into question whether Plaintiff is actually entitled to a judgment in this case.

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 28. Defendants believe that the signing of the Assignment document by a partner in the law

firm representing Plaintiff as an officer of Wells Fargo, the servicing agent, is a significant

conflict of interest that the Court cannot ignore.

29. Defendants filed a Motion to Produce the Original Note, proving that Plaintiff has

standing in the instant case. Clearly Plaintiff felt this was a genuine issue of material fact based

on the request for an extension to produce the note that Defendants received after the Motion for

Summary Judgment was ordered in this case. If Plaintiff did not believe this to be a genuine

issue of material fact, why would Plaintiff have requested an extension to produce the original

note? Defendants therefore believe this calls into question the rendering of a judgment, and

therefore should be considered grounds for reconsideration.

NEW INFORMATION

30. It has come to Defendants’ attention that the Congressional Oversight Panel, pursuant to

Section 125(b)(1) of Title 1 of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.

110-343, issued their November Oversight Report dated November 16, 2010 entitled

“Examining the Consequences of Mortgage Irregularities for Financial Stability and Foreclosure

Mitigation.”

On page 13 – 14, they state that “the federal government should impose a nationwide

moratorium on foreclosures.” They go on to state that “on October 13, attorneys general from all

50 states announced a bipartisan effort to look into the possibility that documents or affidavits

were improperly submitted in their jurisdictions.”

On page 14 of the report, the panel discusses the Legal Consequences of Document

Irregularities. They state:

Effective transfers of real estate depend on parties’ being able to answer

seemingly straightforward questions: who owns the property? how did they come to

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 own it? can anyone make a competing claim to it? The irregularities have the
potential to make these seemingly simple questions complex. As a threshold matter,
a party seeking to enforce the rights associated with the mortgage must have standing
in court, meaning that a party must have an interest in the property sufficient that a
court will hear their claim and can provide them with relief. For a mortgage, “[a]
mortgage may be enforced only by, or in behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce
the obligation the mortgage secures.” Thus, the only party that may enforce the rights
associated with the mortgage, with standing to take action on a mortgage in a court,
must be legally able to act on the mortgage. Accordingly, standing is critical for a
successful foreclosure, because if the party bringing the foreclosure does not have
standing to enforce the rights attached to the mortgage and the note, that party may
not be able to take the property with clear title that can be passed on to another buyer.
Thus, if prior transfers of the mortgage were unsuccessful or improper, subsequent
transfers of the property, such as a foreclosure or even an ordinary sale, could be
affected. Further, failure to foreclose properly – whether because the foreclosing
party did not actually hold the mortgage and the note, or because robo-signing
affected the homeowner’s due process rights – means that the prior homeowner may
be able to assert claims against a subsequent owner of the property. In this way,
documentation irregularities can affect title to a property at a number of stages, as
further described below. (footnotes omitted)

It is Defendants’ belief that this Honorable Court cannot ignore not only the

inconsistencies present in the instant case, but the same inconsistencies that a Congressional

Oversight Panel is calling into question.

31. The Congressional Oversight Panel discusses the issue of title. They say on page 16:

The U.S. real property market depends on a seller’s ability to convey “clear title”:
an assurance that the purchaser owns the property free of encumbrances or competing
claims. Laws governing the transfer of real property in the United States were
designed to create a public, transparent recordation system that supplies reliable
information on ownership interests in property. Each of the 50 states has laws
governing title to land within its legal boundaries. Every county in the country
maintains records of who owns land there, of transfers of ownership, and of related
mortgages or deeds of trust. While each state’s laws have unique features, their basic
requirements are the same, consistent with the notion that the purpose of the
recording system is to establish certainty regarding property ownership. In order to
protect ownership interests, fully executed, original (commonly referred to as “wet
ink”) documents must be recorded in a grantor/grantee index at a county recording
office. In the case of a purchaser or transferee, a properly recorded deed describing
both the property and the parties to the transfer establishes property ownership.
(footnotes omitted)

As Defendants have previously discussed, there is question as to whether Plaintiff

actually has ownership interest, especially considering Plaintiff has failed to produce a “fully

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executed, original (commonly referred to as “wet ink”) document” proving its ownership

interest. Defendants similarly question conveyance of a clear title for the same reason. It is,

therefore, Defendants’ belief that genuine issues of material fact do exist in the instant matter,

necessitating this Court’s reconsideration.

32. In a footnote in the Congressional Oversight Panel report, effective transfer is discussed.

On pages 16 – 17, the report states:

There are two documents that need to be transferred as part of the securitization
process – a promissory note and the security instrument (the mortgage or deed of
trust). The promissory note embodies the debt obligation, while the security
instrument provides that if the debt is not repaid, the creditor may sell the designated
collateral (the house). Both the note and the mortgage need to be properly transferred.
Without the note, a mortgage is unenforceable, while without the mortgage, a note is
simply an unsecured debt obligation, no different from credit card debt. See FBR
Foreclosure Mania Conference Call, supra note 3. The rules for these transfers are
generally governed by the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), although one author
states that the application of the UCC to the transfer of the note is not certain. See
Dale A. Whitman, How Negotiability Has Fouled Up the Secondary Mortgage
Market, and What to Do About It, Pepperdine Law Review, Vol. 37, at 758-759
(2010).

States adopt articles of and revisions to the UCC individually, and so there can be
variation among states in the application of the UCC. This report does not attempt to
identify all of the possible iterations. Rather, it describes general and common
applications of the UCC to such transactions.

There are two methods by which a promissory note may be transferred. First, it
may be transferred by “negotiation,” the signing over of individual promissory notes
through indorsement, in the same way that a check can be transferred via
indorsement. See UCC §§ 3-201, 3-203. The pooling and servicing agreements
(PSAs) for securitized loans generally contemplate transfer through negotiation.
Typical language in PSAs requires the delivery to the securitization trust of the notes
and the mortgages, indorsed in blank. Alternatively, a promissory note may be
transferred by a sale contract, also governed by whether a state has adopted particular
revisions to the UCC. In many states, in order for a transfer to take place under the
relevant portion of the UCC, there are only three requirements: the buyer of the
promissory note must give value, there must be an authenticated document of sale
that describes the promissory note, and the seller must have rights in the promissory
note being sold. UCC § 9-203(a)-(b).

The first two requirements should be easily met in most securitizations; the
transfer of the mortgage loans at each stage of the securitization involves the buyer
giving the seller value and a document of sale (a mortgage purchase and sale

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 agreement or a PSA) that should include a schedule identifying the promissory notes
involved. The third requirement, however, that the seller must have rights in the
promissory note being sold, is more complicated, as it requires an unbroken chain of
title back to the loan’s originator. While the loan sale documents plus their schedules
are evidence of such a chain of title, they cannot establish that the loan was not
previously sold to another party.

Further, this discussion only addresses the validity of transfers between sellers
and buyers of mortgage loans. It does not address the enforceability of those loans
against homeowners, which requires physical possession of the original note. Thus,
for both securitized and non-securitized loans, it is necessary for a party to show that
it is entitled to enforce the promissory note (and therefore generally that it is a holder
of the physical original note) in order to complete a foreclosure successfully.

Perhaps more critically, parties are free to contract around the UCC. UCC § 1-
302. This raises the question of whether PSAs for MBS provide for a variance from
the UCC by agreement of the parties. The PSA is the document that provides for the
transfer of the mortgage and notes from the securitization sponsor to the depositor
and thence to the trust. The PSA is also the document that creates the trust. The
transfer from the originator to the sponsor is typically governed by a separate
document, although sections of it may be incorporated by reference in the PSA.

If a PSA is considered a variation by agreement from the UCC, then there is a

question of what the PSA itself requires to transfer the mortgage loans and whether
those requirements have been met. In some cases, PSAs appear to require a complete
chain of indorsements on the notes from originator up to the depositor, with a final
indorsement in blank to the trust. A complete chain of indorsements, rather than a
single indorsement in blank with the notes transferred thereafter as bearer paper, is
important for establishing the “bankruptcy remoteness” of the trust assets. A critical
part of securitization is to establish that the trust’s assets are bankruptcy remote,
meaning that they could not be claimed by the bankruptcy estate of an upstream
transferor of the assets. Without a complete chain of indorsements, it is difficult, if
not impossible, to establish that the loans were in fact transferred from originator to
sponsor to depositor to trust, rather than directly from originator or sponsor to the
trust. If the transfer were directly from the originator or sponsor to the trust, the loans
could possibly be claimed as part of the originator’s or sponsor’s bankruptcy estate.
The questions about what the transfers required, therefore, involve both the question
as to whether the required transfers actually happened, as well as whether, if they
happened, they were legally sufficient.

Defendants’, acting in their pro se capacity, were unfamiliar with, and inexperienced in,

the process relating to the production of documents. The ownership of the Note is very

important as is the issue of transfer of ownership, and therefore should be granted

reconsideration to allow sufficient time for further discovery.

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 33. Defendants also question whether the securitization of their mortgage has been preserved.

The Congressional Oversight Panel discusses the process on pages 18-19 of their report.

Securitizations of mortgages require multiple transfers, and, accordingly, multiple

assignments. Mortgages that were securitized were originated through banks and
mortgage brokers – mortgage originators. Next they were securitized by investment
banks – the sponsors – through the use of special purpose vehicles, trusts that qualify
for Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit (REMIC) status. These trusts are
bankruptcy-remote, tax-exempt vehicles that pooled the mortgages transferred to
them and sold interests in the income from those mortgages to investors in the form
of shares. The pools were collateralized by the underlying real property, because a
mortgage represents a first-lien security interest on an asset in the pool – a house. A
governing document for securitizations called a pooling and servicing agreement
(PSA) includes various representations and warranties for the underlying mortgages.
It also describes the responsibilities of the trustee, who is responsible for holding the
recorded mortgage documents, and of the servicer, who plays an administrative role,
collecting and disbursing mortgage and related payments on behalf of the investors in
the MBS.

As described above, in order to convey good title into the trust and provide the
trust with both good title to the collateral and the income from the mortgages, each
transfer in this process required particular steps. Most PSAs are governed by New
York law and create trusts governed by New York law. New York trust law requires
strict compliance with the trust documents; any transaction by the trust that is in
contravention of the trust documents is void, meaning that the transfer cannot actually
take place as a matter of law. Therefore, if the transfer for the notes and mortgages
did not comply with the PSA, the transfer would be void, and the assets would not
have been transferred to the trust. Moreover, in many cases the assets could not now
be transferred to the trust. PSAs generally require that the loans transferred to the
trust not be in default, which would prevent the transfer of any non-performing loans
to the trust now. Furthermore, PSAs frequently have timeliness requirements
regarding the transfer in order to ensure that the trusts qualify for favored tax
treatment. (footnotes omitted)

As Defendants and this Honorable Court have received an Assignment that does not

indicate an actual date of transfer (but rather simply a date of record for the Assignment), this

Honorable Court nor Defendants can ensure that a non-performing loan has been transferred into

the trust. Similarly, this Honorable Court nor Defendants can ensure that title has been passed in

accordance with the trust documents, and therefore cannot ensure that the transfer is not void.

Without this crucial evidence, this Honorable Court cannot determine that 1) Plaintiff is the legal

owner of the mortgage in question and 2) Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

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 34. Given the numerous questions raised above, if Plaintiff is in violation of any of the

foregoing processes, a put-back could result. In the case of a put-back, the investors in the trust

would be protected and the originator of the loan would have to take the loan back. In that case,

as Defendants suspect could be the case in the instant matter, Plaintiff would have no standing to

foreclose on Defendants’ property. Furthermore, if the securitization process was deficient or

illegal, then the mortgage may not have been transmitted to the trust at all. This calls into

question who owns the mortgage, thereby requiring the process to be halted until ownership can

be clearly established.

35. It has also come to Defendants’ attention that there are questions related to false

signatures on documents and cases where officials claiming to have personal knowledge as to

who owns the debt and how much debt is actually owed have used numerous job titles, calling

into question the legitimacy of their claims in a court of law, things which could also affect

ownership and clean transfer of title.

36. It is Defendants belief that the judicial system, whose function is to enforce the law and

provide justice to those who need it, has abdicated its responsibilities and ignored Defendants’

fundamental rights to be protected from foreclosure fraud.

WHEREFORE, Defendants respectfully request that this Honorable Court reconsider the

facts presented herein, grant Defendants the opportunity to present Oral Arguments to the Court

in support of its facts and, until such time as this Honorable Court has heard the Oral Arguments,

reconsidered the matter and issued its Order as a result of its reconsideration of the facts, that this

Honorable Court grant a stay of any Sheriff’s Sale that may be scheduled as a result of the Order

dated the 30th day of November.

Respectfully submitted,

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