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THE POLITICS OF PACIFIC
COOPERATION
Han Sung-joo
1281
1282 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983
alism.3 They argue that, in the post-World War II years, the dream of the
Atlanticists was stimulated and aided by America's historic drive for world
power and the anticipated leading role of the U.S. in consolidating the
Westernnations, the liberal economic principle of free trade, and the Cold
War.
Today, although an increasing number of Americans both in and out of
the government are beginning to recognize the inevitability of the United
States' Pacific ties, the "Pacificist"ideals do not seem to be as salient or
strong as those of the "Atlanticists"had been.4 Even when the importanceof
Asia and the Pacific to the United States is recognized, to many Americans
the Pacificregion is frequentlytaken to mean mainlyJapan.As a result, even
the newly recognized importance of the Pacific region shrinks under the
weight of the U.S.-Japanbilateralrelationship.
JapaneseInterests
In many ways,Japan'sinterestsin the Pacific cooperation concept are similar
to those of the United States. Through a cooperative organization,Japan
might be able to assume a leadership role that might not be possible on a
bilateralbasis without arousing resistancefrom countries with smallerecon-
omies. Also, such an organizational framework would have the positive
effect of creating a greater and more realistic awarenesswithinJapan of the
impact of its own domestic economic decisions on other countries.
There are many objectives Japan can seek through the creation of a
regional structure.Japanmay find it useful in (1) maintainingand consolidat-
ing a Pacific economy under its leadershipthat may or may not be shared
with the United States; (2) securing stable and geographically convenient
sources of naturalresources;(3) forming an internationalgrouping capable
of counterbalancingother groupings such as the EuropeanEconomic Com-
munity (EEC)and OPEC;(4) creating a mechanism through which conflict
with other countries such as the U.S. and the newly industrializingcountries
(NICs) can be collectively handled and resolved; (5) neutralizingproblems
and disadvantages arising from subregional or other regional integrative
arrangementssuch as ASEAN, the Andean Common Market, and the Latin
American Free Tariff Area; (6) facilitating coordination and cooperation
with other advanced countries of the area (i.e., the United States, Canada,
Australia,and New Zealand) in dealing with the developing countries and
the NICs in the area;and (7) establishinga mechanism by which rationaland
mutuallyadvantageousdecisions can be made with regardto regional indus-
trial specializationand division of labor.
In additionJapan's own "liberals"and internationalistsappearto be eager
HAN SUNG-JOO 1285
OtherAdvanced Countries
Australia,Canada,and New Zealand would play a crucial role in the realiza-
tion of an institutionalizedPacificcommunity. They are industrialcountries,
yet their efforts on behalf of the cooperative structurewould not arouse the
kind of suspicion or apprehensionthat would resultif the U.S. orJapan were
to take the initiative. Since these countries have expanding markets for
manufacturedgoods and are also suppliers of resources, they would help
ameliorateexisting and potential conflict between the advanced and devel-
oping countries.The Pacific community, when and if realized,would have a
unique composition in that it would be a regional organizationwith member
countries at many levels of development. Industrialand trade specialization
will be sought in vertical as well as in horizontal dimensions. The participa-
tion of the three advanced countries will be crucial for the industrial and
resourcediversitywithin the community.
For Australia,which now conducts a great majority of its trade with the
Asian and Pacific countries (almost 70%of exports and 60%of imports),the
proposed cooperative structuremay bring several benefits. LikeJapan, Aus-
traliaseeks avenues of closer cooperation and coordination with those coun-
tries belonging to the existing subregional groupings such as ASEAN and
ANCOM. The Australianadvocates of the regional cooperative organization
feel that Australia,like other countries in the region, has a strong interest in
the preservationand expansion of an open internationaleconomic system.
Furthermore,Australia sees its future more as a Western Pacific or- Asian
than as a Westernnation.7
More importantly, Australiansmay feel that bringing the U.S. into the
structurewould be an effective way to counterbalancethe economic role of
Japan upon which Australiais becoming increasingly dependent for trade
and investment capital. Similarly,Canada would wish to act as a "counter-
weight" to the U.S. by bringing Japan into the picture. As in the United
States and Japan, the "liberal traders"and internationalistsin all three of
these advanced countries-Australia, New Zealand, and Canada-will find
a cooperative organization useful for combating protectionist forces at
home and increasing the public's opportunities for a greater understanding
of and access to the outside world, particularlythe Western Pacific. Addi-
tionally, such a structurewould provide Australiaand New Zealand with an
opportunity to have their South Pacific neighbors (such as Papua New
HAN SUNG-JOO 1287
and the resulting diplomatic handicap, South Korea would hope to expand
its international involvement as much as possible by becoming an active
member of a regional organizations
South Korea recognizes the need to guard against the temptation to seek
more than just economic cooperation from the proposed organization. At
present, it probablyneitherwishes, nor is able, to establish new security ties
with any of the Pacific regional countries. However, it may expect indirect
political benefits from a Pacific community plan that could contribute to-
ward assuringa continued U.S. presence in Asia and broaden Seoul's overall
ties with other countries in the region.
Conclusion
From the above discussion of the various countries' interests and percep-
tions, it is possible to make certain observations concerning the shape and
feasibilityof a Pacific community organization.First,it seems that American
participationin the organizationis desired by most countries in the Western
Pacific. An active U.S. role is essential to allay the apprehensionshared by
many countries in the region that the organization might be dominated by
Japan. In some ways, this is analogous to the situation that pertained in
Europe when the admission of Great Britain to the European Economic
Community was being debated. While Francehad many reservationsabout
allowing Britain'sentry into the common market,the other countries, partic-
ularly the smaller ones, welcomed the opportunity to counterbalance the
predominantinfluence of Franceand to some extent that of West Germany
within the EEC.Americanparticipationin the proposed organizationis also
deemed useful for the security of the WesternPacific in an indirect way. It
could contribute to reversingwhat appearedto be a post-Vietnam WarU.S.
drift toward neo-isolationism and a Eurocentricsecurity policy.
A second observation is that, despite the security considerations that
might be present in the background of each country's attitude toward the
Pacificcommunity proposal, there is much resistanceto going beyond eco-
nomic cooperation and to making it a multipurposeorganization.Attempt-
ing to mix security needs with economic interests in connection with the
proposed organizationis considered to be self-defeating. Culturaland edu-
cational cooperation, which will both serve as a basis of economic coopera-
tion and be a product of it, can be pursued both within and outside of the
context of the proposed organization.Regardlessof the pace of progresson
the current effort to establish an economic cooperation structure,cultural
and personnelexchanges among the countries in the region will be pursued
HAN SUNG-JOO 1291
Notes
1. U.S. Senate (Committee on Foreign Relations), An Asian-Pacific Regional Economic
Organization.An ExploratoryConceptPaper, 96th Congress, 1st Session (Washington,
D.C., 1979).
2. Joan Edelman Spero, The Politics of InternationalEconomicRelations,2nd ed. (New York:
St. Martin'sPress, 1981), pp. 4-5.
3. David P Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, America and the WorldPolitical Economy.
Atlantic Dreamsand National Realities(Bloomington and London: Indiana University
Press, 1973), pp. 17-19.
4. Richard Nations, "Pax Pacifica:The Reagasone Prosperity Plan," Far EasternEconomic
Review,July 14, 1983, pp. 55-58.
5. Kiyoshi Kojima, 'An Organisation for Pacific Trade, Aid and Development: A Propos-
al," Paper published under the direction of the Australian Committee of the Australia-
Japan Economics Relations Research Project, mimeo., September 1976.
6. See reports on Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone's visit to ASEAN in Far Eastern
EconomicReview,May 26, 1983.
7. Peter Drysdale, 'Australia's Relations with Asia and the Pacific: Past Perspectives and
FutureProspects," mimeo. (Canberra,1978).
1292 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXIII, NO. 12, DECEMBER 1983
8. Noordin Sopiee, "ASEAN and the Pacific Basin Concept: Four Questions and Five
Imperatives,"in Day After Tomorrow in the PacificRegion,1981 (New York, 1981).
9. Han Sung-joo, "Thoughts on the Pacific Community Proposal: A Korean View, in The
PacificCommunityConcept.Viewsfrom Eight Nations (Tokyo:J.C.I.E., 1980), pp. 42-56.
10. Han Sung-joo, "South Korea's Policy Objectives in Southeast Asia," in Melvin Gurtov,
ed., SoutheastAsia in Transition(Seoul, 1977), pp. 214-219.
11. The first PECC (also known as PCC, Pacific Cooperation Conference) was held in
Canberrain 1980 under the auspices of the AustralianNational University. The second
meeting was held in Bangkok in 1982. The third and fourth meetings will be held in Bali,
Indonesia, in November 1983, and in Seoul, Korea, some time in late 1984, respectively.