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Abstract
Federally supplied aircraft has been and can be an effective means of supplementing
surface transportation modes for moving people who need assistance in evacuation
prior to a disaster. It is easily integrated into a multi-modal mass evacuation
transportation system. Planning and execution of air evacuations in Louisiana and
Texas will be reviewed as well as future concepts for catastrophic disasters such as a
New Madrid earthquake. Key components and processes essential to successful
implantation of an air evacuation plan will be identified and discussed.
Author Notes: This paper does not necessarily represent the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), any state or other government agency’s position or
stance. This paper is expressed solely as the opinion of IEM based on experience
over a variety of projects and disasters.
Recommended Citation:
Robertson, Stephen; Donald Griffith (2010) “Air Evacuation Operations,” Risk,
Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy: Vol. 1: Iss. 2, Article 6.
DOI: 10.2202/1944-4079.1024
Available at: http://www.psocommons.org/rhcpp/vol1/iss2/art6
Introduction
Although the use of aircraft to move large numbers of people began to
flourish during the “Golden Age” of aviation—the years between World
War I and II—the use of aircraft to support mass evacuations prior to or
following a disaster did not assume significant proportions until 1944. Since
that time aircraft have been and continue to be an effective means of
supplementing surface transportation modes, with examples ranging from
small evacuations conducted by general aviation aircraft to large-scale
evacuations using commercial and military aircraft in an integrated multi-
modal system.
This paper will review current planning efforts and recent execution
of air evacuations in Louisiana and Texas as well as future concepts for
catastrophic disasters such as a Midwestern earthquake along the New
Madrid fault. The key components and processes essential to successful
implementation of an air evacuation plan will be highlighted.
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DOI: 10.2202/1944-4079.1024
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Robertson and Griffith: Air Evacuation
Hurricane Katrina was one of the strongest storms to impact the United
States with sustained winds during landfall of 125 mph.1 Although not well
known, there was a post-landfall air evacuation of New Orleans area
residents. The Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport was
significantly damaged during Katrina, requiring 24 hours to open one
runway and 48 hours to open the second runway. The Federal Aviation
Administration worked with Air Force personnel to install temporary
runway, taxiway, and ramp lighting.2
The New Orleans airport worked closely with the local and state
authorities, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), the Transportation Security Administration,
the Department of Defense, and commercial air carriers to restore air
transportation needed to support the post-landfall evacuation of the New
Orleans area.
By working together, almost full air traffic control and navigational
aid capability was restored to the New Orleans airport in less than one week.
During that first week, an estimated 400 civilian and military flights safely
evacuated more than 24,000 Katrina victims.
Of the 24,000-plus Katrina victims that were air evacuated from the
New Orleans area, more than 13,000 were evacuated under Operation Air
Care.3 At least 15 commercial air carriers volunteered for the program,
operating more than 130 flights.4
1
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climate of 2005: Summary of
Hurricane Katrina, http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html.
2
Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Response to Hurricane Katrina,” September
15, 2005, http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6286.
3
Operation Air Care was the largest airlift in U.S. history. The purpose of Operation Air
Care was to air evacuate Katrina victims out of New Orleans. Both commercial (U.S.
and foreign) and military aircraft were involved in the round-the-clock airlift from Louis
Armstrong New Orleans International Airport, bringing in supplies and taking people
out.
(http://www.disastercenter.com/Department%20of%20Transportation%20Hurricane%20
Katrina%20Efforts.html).
4
Air Transport Association, “ATA Statement: Operation Air Care Evacuates 13,000+,”
September 13, 2005, http://www.airlines.org/news/releases/2005/statement_9-13-05.htm.
Hurricane Rita followed less than a month after Hurricane Katrina and
devastated large parts of the central Gulf Coast region. Like Katrina, Rita
also reached Category 5 strength in the Gulf of Mexico (the first time two
hurricanes achieved this rating in the Gulf of Mexico during the same
season).5 Before Hurricane Rita made landfall, the FEMA mission assigned
the Department of Defense to air evacuate an estimated 4,000 residents
(including medical patients). These FEMA-tasked evacuation flights flew
evacuees to other cities in Texas and Fort Smith, Arkansas, during a two-day
period.6 Rita’s air evacuation was conducted pre-landfall unlike the air
evacuation conducted for Katrina.
The federal, state, and local authorities were well prepared for
Hurricane Rita. The Department of Defense evacuated nearly 2,000 Texas
and Louisiana residents from the path of Hurricane Rita on September 22,
2005. The Department of Defense prepositioned aircraft, personnel, and
equipment to further assist with the relief effort.7
In a 24-hour period, Air National Guardsmen, Air Force reservists,
and active-duty Airmen conducted aeromedical evacuations of nearly 1,240
special needs individuals threatened by Hurricane Rita. Officials estimate
that more than 1.5 million people fled the Gulf region because of Hurricane
Rita.8
For nearly three years, the southern coast of Louisiana was unthreatened by
a major storm (i.e., a Category 3 or higher hurricane). During those three
years, federal, state, and local authorities worked together to apply the
lessons learned about mass evacuations following the 2005 hurricane season.
Under the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006,
5
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Climate of 2005: Summary of
Hurricane Rita, September 22, 2005,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/rita.html.
6
Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Response to Hurricane Rita,” September 25,
2005, http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6290.
7
United States Department of Defense, Air Force Evacuates Thousands; Crews, Aircraft
Standing By, September 24, 2005,
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17224.
8
Department of Defense, “Air Force Evacuates Thousands; Crews, Aircraft Standing
By,” September 24, 2005, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17224.
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Robertson and Griffith: Air Evacuation
12
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, “State of the Climate: Hurricanes
& Tropical Storms September 2008,” September 2008,
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/?report=tropical-
cyclones&year=2008&month=9&submitted=Get+Report.
13
Special needs evacuees (SNE) are Texas-specific residents that lack the means to self-
evacuate. The federal government and Department of Defense call to SNEs in the
generic as general population.
14
U.S. Air Force Website, “AMC Aircraft, Airmen Supporting Hurricane Ike
Evacuations,” September 11, 2008, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123114798.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Office of the Governor Rick Perry, “Gov. Perry Suspends Hotel Motel Tax for Victims
of Hurricane Ike,” September 12, 2008, http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-
release/11131/
18
Ibid.
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Robertson and Griffith: Air Evacuation
players handling aviation requests and tasking in one room face-to-face, the
Aviation Coordination Group crosses functional lines to prevent
“stovepiping” or single-source “missioning.”
The Aviation Coordination Group does not command or control;
operational control and administrative control remain with the
owner/operator of the aircraft. Keeping within Incident Command System
principles, the size of an Aviation Coordination Group is dependent on the
size of the response. The Aviation Coordination Group only addresses air
issues and synchronizes agreeable solutions across local, state, federal,
military, and civilian air partners toward a common goal. As the Aviation
Coordination Group is a coordination entity, communication and
information flow to and from the Aviation Coordination Group is
paramount. Command and control decisions and mission assignments
remain with the State Emergency Operations Center and the agencies
controlling the aircraft. The Aviation Coordination Group serves to take
those mission requirements and assign them to the best aviation resource
available to accomplish the mission. This results in deconflicting multiple
aviation resources being assigned the same mission; sharing of the results of
missions across agencies; and deconflicting multiple aviation resources in
the impacted airspace. Requests for aviation resources will come through the
State Emergency Operations Center to the appropriate state agency or to the
Joint Field Office for federally supplied resources. The mission request and
assignment processes remain the same. The State Emergency Operations
Center will consult with the Aviation Coordination Group for a
recommendation on the most appropriate aviation resource to request and
whether or not the requested mission is already being accomplished by other
aviation resources. All aviation resources operating in the impacted airspace
coordinate activities through the Aviation Coordination Group. All agencies
providing significant aviation resources or conducting significant missions
should provide a liaison officer to the Aviation Coordination Group for
coordination.
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands present unique challenges in
population evacuation in the face of a hurricane (or earthquake) and the
movement of response personnel and supplies after an incident occurs.
Another unique challenge that aviation planning may address is the limited
housing available for response personnel. Those responders may be housed
on an island not impacted by an incident and shuttled by air to the impacted
island.
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Robertson and Griffith: Air Evacuation
Federal Air Regulations Part 121.693 requires that each part 121
(Commercial Air Carrier) operator must have a load manifest that lists each
passenger and crew member by name unless they are maintained by some
other means. This includes all crew members, all revenue passengers, all
non-revenue passengers, children being held in the lap of an adult, and
persons occupying cabin or cockpit jumpseats. By contrast, Federal Air
Regulations Part 135.63 requires that each part 135 (Charter or On Demand)
operator only manifest the total number of passengers and the identification
of the required crew members.
Air traffic flow management is the metering of air traffic in order to avoid
exceeding airport capacity in handling traffic and to ensure that available
capacity is used efficiently. Since only one commercial aircraft can land or
take off from a runway at a time, and those aircraft must also be separated by
time, every airport has a finite capacity; in other words, each airport can only
safely handle so many aircraft per hour. This capacity also depends on other
factors such as the number of runways available, the layout of taxiways, the
amount of ramp space available for parking, and the availability of ground
support services and material handling equipment. Air traffic control can
also be limiting as there are only so many aircraft an air traffic control tower
can safely handle.
In pre-incident evacuation planning, it is assumed that the airport
will be operating at its maximum capacity for normal ticketed passenger
service. This will most likely be achieved by filling all seats in existing
scheduled flights but can also be achieved by adding flights to the schedule.
Disruptions, such as equipment breakdown, weather, or lack of ground
support services, will cause delays in service.
Safety is the paramount concern in all aviation operations, and few elements
affect operations as much as weather. Recent pre-incident air evacuations
have all been in advance of hurricanes impacting coastal areas. Wind speed
and direction and thunderstorms influence aviation operations. Aircraft have
a not-to-exceed safety factor known as the crosswind component. Crosswind
is the wind blowing across the landing or departing runway, and each
aircraft has a published wind speed across the runway that it cannot exceed.
Post-incident evacuations may occur in situations other than
hurricanes and could involve any type of weather or incident (e.g.,
catastrophic earthquakes). While wind and thunderstorms will continue to be
primary safety considerations for aviation operations, additional factors such
as ceiling, visibility, functioning air traffic control services and aids to air
navigation will also have a great impact on whether or not operations are
even feasible.
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Robertson and Griffith: Air Evacuation
that goes into planning the departure end of an air evacuation go into the
arrival of those evacuees to a host airport and city. If evacuees are being
moved from one state to one or more host states, coordination needs to start
between those states. The host city’s human service agencies are a critical
part of the planning component to determine where evacuees may be housed
and fed, how they may be moved from the arrival airport to various housing
locations, how they may receive medical and pharmaceutical services, and
how they may be kept informed of what may happen in terms of return
movement. These will likely all be short-term operations, and if the disaster
causing the evacuation is such that a return movement is unlikely or may be
long delayed, immediate consideration for long-term housing and integration
into the host city must begin.
While the return movement of evacuees need not be at the emergent
pace of the evacuation, it requires no less detail in its planning. To start with,
a decision should be made as to the mode of return transportation. Socio-
political considerations may dictate that evacuees are returned in the same
manner as they were moved out; in other words, if they were evacuated by
air they would be returned by air.
Aeromedical Evacuations
Conclusion
Aviation has proven to be a valuable and extremely flexible component of
pre- and post-incident mass evacuations and aeromedical evacuations. To
successfully use aviation as a standalone asset or as part of an integrated
multi-modal transportation system requires specialized knowledge and
experience for those who plan and carry out evacuation operations. Our past
experience and current efforts in the area of aviation-supported operations
shows a strong need for a regional and national approach to air operations
for large-scale disasters.
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References
Air Transport Association. 2005. “ATA Statement: Operation Air Care
Evacuates 13,000+.” September 13.
http://www.airlines.org/news/releases/2005/statement_9-13-05.htm.
Barron, J., D. Cave, K. Fahim, and A. Nossiter. 2008. “Spared a Direct Hit,
New Orleans Exhales.” New York Times. September 2.
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/02/us/02gustav.html.
Department of Defense. 2005. “Air Force Evacuates Thousands; Crews,
Aircraft Standing By.” September 24.
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=17224.
Department of Homeland Security. 2008. “FEMA’s Preparedness for the
Next Catastrophic Disaster.” March.
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_08-34_Mar08.pdf.
Department of Homeland Security. 2008. “Hurricane Gustav: What the
Government is Doing.” September 14.
http://www.dhs.gov/files/gc_1221144856738.shtm.
Federal Aviation Administration. 2005. “FAA Response to Hurricane
Katrina.” September 15.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6286.
Federal Aviation Administration. 2005. “FAA Response to Hurricane Rita.”
September 25.
http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=6290.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2005. Climate of 2005:
Summary of Hurricane Katrina.
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/katrina.html.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2005. Climate of 2005:
Summary of Hurricane Rita. September 22.
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/2005/rita.html.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2008. “State of the
Climate: Hurricanes & Tropical Storms August 2008.” August.
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/?report=tropical-cyclones&year=200
8&month=8&submitted=Get+Report.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 2008. “State of the
Climate: Hurricanes & Tropical Storms September 2008.”
September. http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/?report=tropical-
cyclones&year=2008&month=9&submitted=Get+Report.
Office of the Governor Rick Perry. 2008. “Gov. Perry Suspends Hotel Motel
Tax For Victims Of Hurricane Ike.” September 12.
http://governor.state.tx.us/news/press-release/11131/.
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