8/31/2010 Liaison Vol.4 No.

Sea Power and Domestic Disaster

Response: Exploring the Role of
Naval Vessels during Hurricane Katrina
By Captain Tim Jackson

Photo by PH3 Ja y C . Pugh

The purpose of this article is to explore the utilization and role of large
United States Navy vessels for domestic disaster response. Although
responding to domestic disasters is considered a nontraditional role for
the U.S. Navy, the capabilities found on aircraft carriers, amphibious
vessels, and other vessels are unparalleled in terms of operational
mobility and providing critical capabilities during a coastal disaster. In
the devastating aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, U.S. leaders,
both civil and military, called for a reassessment of plans to better
support future disaster response efforts. This article attempts to
answer that call by informing leaders, policy makers, and professionals
involved in disaster management as to why and how sea power may be
effectively leveraged as a nontraditional response to a future domestic

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disaster.1 In an attempt to prevent future underutilization of
nontraditional assets, this article provides a general framework
regarding how the Department of Defense (DoD) mobilized and
employed sea power during the nation’s most devastating recent
domestic disaster, examines the capabilities and constraints found
aboard selected Navy vessels, and concludes with an assessment
regarding how information and coordination through the capacities
found on naval vessels may be best applied in future domestic disasters
on or near coastal regions. The intended audience for this research
includes civilian disaster planners, policy makers in the U.S. legislative
branch, and military leaders, such as National Guard Adjutants General
in coastal states. The methodology for this research employed a case
study focusing on specific vessels and personnel involved in response to
Hurricane Katrina.

During the first few days after Hurricane Katrina made landfall in
2005, the USS Bataan sat offshore and remained largely underutilized
as a crisis quickly developed in New Orleans.2 While federal, state, and
local officials attempted to direct response efforts in an increasingly
chaotic urban environment where power and communications were
inoperable, it quickly became apparent that the systems and networks
to control and mitigate disaster response were incapable of
accomplishing such tasks. In the aftermath of the failures that occurred
in New Orleans, a consensus among policy makers formed with respect
to the slow delivery of resources and inadequate preparations made by
the majority of responsible parties. The underutilization of
nontraditional assets, such as those found on the USS Bataan, seem to
have arisen primarily from two issues: insufficient awareness of such
capabilities, and the procedural or legal hurdles that precluded usage of
said capabilities.

As many of the institutional lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina

have sought to address federal agency coordination and communication
between the various layers of the U.S. bureaucracy, there will likely be
improvement in future processes as federal stakeholders involved in
disaster response adapt their practices to respond better in future
disasters.3 However, there still remains a knowledge gap for civil
authorities and disaster managers regarding how and where they may
successfully leverage support from the military.

A Massive Undertaking during a Muddled Response

On August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the
United States after having battered communities across Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Alabama for nearly a week. While the full impact of this
Category 3 storm bypassed the city of New Orleans, the attention of
the nation was fixed on the events that unfolded as local, state, and
federal agencies attempted to marshal sufficient personnel, supplies
and equipment to alleviate the issues that evolved in the storm’s
aftermath. The activation of the Louisiana’s National Guard by
Governor Kathleen Blanco, the movement of emergency resources and
equipment in the region, the evacuation efforts in the city managed by
Mayor Ray Nagin, and the direction of Under Secretary Mike Brown,
director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), all
indicated that efforts were underway to effectively respond to the
storm. However, the lack of situational awareness regarding the impact
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of levee failures and insufficient resources in the city to assist stranded
citizens were both clearly evident in the chaotic response that occurred
after Katrina’s landfall.

The delayed announcement that identified the storm as an Incident of

National Significance and the muddled request for support from
Louisiana’s leaders required that military units would assume an active
role in domestic disaster response without full preparation and analysis
of the mission they would be tasked to accomplish.4 The lack of
preparedness and readiness for this crisis was further compounded
because the planned response by the U.S. Department of Defense
(DoD) Operation Plan #25014,5 had not been updated to provide
effective guidance, designate responsibilities, or share relevant
information regarding how DoD would be required to work with the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)6 and local civilian authorities
during a domestic disaster.7 Furthermore, the lack of communication
between civil leaders, volunteers, and numerous organizations already
working in the impacted areas of the Gulf Coast determined that
creating a centralized, coordinated effort must precede any coherent
response to improve search and rescue efforts, as well as the
evacuation of stranded citizens who were unable or unwillingly to leave
prior to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall.8

Sea Power during Hurricane Katrina

Without situational awareness regarding both the needs and capabilities

on-ground following Hurricane Katrina, the DoD developed a rapid and
massive response that occurred through two major components, U.S.
military’s Northern Command (NORTHCOM)9 and the National
Guard.10 While the National Guard deployed the majority of the
personnel from state activations during the initial response period (see
Figure 1), NORTHCOM spearheaded federal efforts under its Joint
Task Force Katrina (JTFK).11 Major General Russell Honore, a
Louisiana native, was appointed to lead the task force as the
commander, and he directed operations for all components of the
federal military units that participated, including the Air Force, Navy,
Marines and Army. In order to support what would normally be a
humanitarian assistance mission in a foreign country, a large number of
Navy assets were deployed across the Gulf Coast in a nontraditional
grouping that emphasized the enormous impact that Katrina had
made.12 In total, seventy-seven aircraft, eighteen vessels, and over ten
thousand Navy personnel were sent to support JTF-Katrina’s
operations. 13

The nontraditional role for sea power exhibited during Hurricane

Katrina is best understood in the role reversal which transpired in
order for response efforts to occur. Traditional operations for the U.S.
Navy utilize the organization of a Carrier Strike Group,14 where
helicopters and jets are launched from the deck of an aircraft carrier
and supported by numerous other vessels and personnel. During
Hurricane Katrina, many of the vessels normally utilized for support
assumed the leading role. Moreover, the composition of the Naval Task
Force responding to Hurricane Katrina involved a much larger force
that focused on bringing logistical, medical, and amphibious assets to
remedy the issues that had developed in the aftermath of the storm
(see Figure 2). Some of these vessels were located near the disaster
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area and simply steamed in to lend assistance, such as the USS Bataan.
Other vessels, including the USS Truman, USS Iwo Jima, and USNS
Comfort, were rapidly uploaded and embarked from other regions
along the U.S. eastern seaboard (see Figure 3).

The Impact of Sea Power

The subsequent push of military personnel, materials, and equipment

did not have the immediate impact that many had envisioned. A post-
disaster review from independent Congressional committees cited the
lack of situational awareness, inadequate materials, and poor
communication with other organizations as negatively impacting the
responsiveness of DoD units and personnel.15 However, such criticisms
were not directed specifically at naval forces, as sea power had a
significant impact that unequivocally resulted in positive effects, which
are summarized below:16

Navy units conducted over 8,500 evacuations across the region

in both urban and rural settings after the disaster
Navy physicians and corpsman provided medical aid to over
10,000 disaster victims
Navy logistics provided over 2.2 millionpounds (997,900 kg) of
emergency food and water
Navy vessels provided over 14,000 berths to displaced
individuals, and shelter to residents and responders who came
to their aid in the immediate emergency phase
Navy leaders and communication networks assisted in
reestablishing control of the airspace, area logistics sites, and
rapid clean-up of the seaports in Louisiana and Mississippi

While this information provides some insight as to how sea power

performed, the question unanswered is why were they so successful?
Although not all-inclusive, the following factors may be of some
assistance in understanding the utility that sea power brings to
domestic disaster response that occurs around coastal areas. First, sea
power provided the appropriate assets to respond after the crises.
While other organizations, such as the Coast Guard and FEMA, have
significant responsibilities for the security and management of U.S.
ports and coastal communities following a disaster, they do not have
any equipment or systems comparable to the vessels examined in this
paper. Moreover, the human capital, rapid surge capabilities and self-
sufficient communication and computer networks found on these Navy
vessels are not financially replicable for other federal organizations with
smaller budgets. Nor are such expensive vessels possible for state and
local communities to maintain with their limited revenue and yearly
balanced budget requirements.

Accessibility is a second factor that enabled sea power to have critical

impact during Hurricane Katrina. Unlike other land-based components
of the federal government that responded, such as the National Guard
and Army units (that were blocked by damaged roads and
infrastructure), Navy vessels had unrestricted movement across much
of the impact area following the storm. Thus, the dual logistical bases
established in Pensacola (Florida) and New Orleans (Louisiana) were
capable of rapidly transporting personnel, supplies and equipment to
regions such as Biloxi, a coastal city in Mississippi, while continuing to
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support broader response efforts occurring throughout the Gulf
Coast.17 Furthermore, the mix of aircraft and sea vessels that the Navy
provided created two avenues of response that could address issues.
With teams of engineers aboard vessels reopening and dredging sea
lanes to improve accessibility, while helicopter pilots, mechanics, and air
traffic controllers coordinated air support from onboard vessels, sea
power provided task-specific teams by both air and sea.

Finally, adaptability is a third factor that enabled naval vessels to

succeed in providing support in the wake of the storm. After FEMA
became overextended and relinquished many responsibilities to the
DoD, Navy vessels and logistics proved to be flexible and versatile in
delivering goods and services into the region while also providing the lift
capabilities to conduct evacuations. This flexibility was possible in part
because vessels were operating on seaways unhindered by traffic and
pushing forward assets, even when sea lanes had not been completely
cleared. Additionally, as command and control was largely delegated to
vessel commanders and leaders working directly with the communities
that needed support, rapid responsiveness in services was possible.18
While not the only success story in a time of troubles, Naval sea power
assisted in responding to civil authorities by modifying internal
networks and operations to support first-hand information, and
bypassing the cumbersome task organization and reporting
requirements that were found in the National Response Plan (NRP).

In summary, the impact of sea power during Hurricane Katrina was

overwhelmingly positive, and the Navy provided several important
assets to local leaders and emergency managers who sought to remedy
needs such as food, shelter, medical assistance, and electrical power.
The ability to interface directly with military decision makers who can
provide materials, information, and communication to the outside world
will allow civil authorities and disaster planners to maximize the full
effect of sea power. The following section will provide some insight into
what they can expect to see and receive by reviewing four types of
vessels, which were employed in response to Hurricane Katrina.

Examining Some Alternatives to Traditional Response

The purpose of this section is to profile four unique Navy vessels that
participated in Hurricane Katrina, and play a significant role in naval
operations both now and in the future. While Navy vessels have always
maintained pivotal roles in national security and foreign policy, their
usage has often been overlooked as an asset for communities and state
governments to rely upon. This is due to the provisions found in the
federal government of the United States preventing them from doing so
without a clear request from those local governments. This section
attempts to briefly highlight the roles that these vessels played and
better enable professionals from a wide variety of backgrounds to gain
more insight into their capabilities and limitations.

Amphibious Assault Vessels (USS Iwo Jima)

Amphibious assault vessels appear to be smaller versions of aircraft

carriers on first glance, though their purpose and capabilities are vastly
different. The primary warfare role of an aircraft carrier is to launch
aircraft from at sea to impact targets far removed from the aircraft
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carriers position. On the other hand, the primary warfare role of the
amphibious assault vessel is to transport, rapidly deploy, and direct
large numbers of Marines, vehicles, and equipment to shore on smaller
landing craft and helicopters that are all stored on-board. While the
United States Ship (USS) Bataan was the first vessel to respond during
Hurricane Katrina,19 the USS Iwo Jima proved to be an excellent
example of what an amphibious assault vessel can provide during
disaster response.

After briefly stopping in Biloxi, Mississippi to provide supplies and

equipment, the USS Iwo Jima steamed to New Orleans and became the
center for relief operations upon arrival on September 5, 2005. The
Iwo Jima served as the flagship for multiple senior officials, including
presidential visits, and provided facilities and equipment to enable staff
coordination, information dissemination, and public affairs briefings on a
daily basis. The Iwo Jima also had many other unique roles during
response efforts to include: being the only functioning dental clinic in
New Orleans; acting as the proxy air traffic control agency (in lieu of
the Federal Aviation Agency); providing approximately 3,000 extra
meals per day for first-responders and National Guardsmen; and
producing 120,000 gallons (454,200 liters) of water and 6,200
kilowatts (6.2 megawatts) of electrical power to support the numerous
ongoing relief activities while working pier-side in New Orleans.20

Amphibious assault vessels will clearly be a resilient and

multidimensional asset during a coastal domestic disaster, as they are
staffed with a good mix of medical, technical and specialized personnel
capable of supporting and directing disaster response efforts across
lines of operation. These include: air evacuation, sea-based logistics,
medical support, and command and control functions. Amphibious
assault vessels have the capacity to provide ship-to-shore linkage by
working pier-side. They can also send out smaller launching craft while
simultaneously having robust rotary-wing air support (i.e. helicopter)
features. Therefore, amphibious assault vessels, such as the USS Iwo
Jima are ideal platforms to manage a coastal disaster in an urban region
that has a seaway able to support the depth of this rather large vessel.

Hospital Ships (USNS Comfort)

Hospital ships are easily identified by their distinctive white color and
bright red crosses, which are visible from both the sides of the ship and
from overhead. Hospital ships are converted San Clemente-class super
tankers, which were built to provide transcontinental delivery of oil.
Unlike the other vessels examined in the article, hospital ships are not
fully manned and operated at all times. Rather, they are maintained in
a “reduced operating status” in which they are docked and maintained
by a small crew of civilian mariners, and a small number of full-time
medical and support personnel. In response to Hurricane Katrina, the
United States Naval Ship (USNS) Comfort mobilized and steamed
around Florida to the Gulf Coast in less than three days.

During Hurricane Katrina, the medical support provided by USNS

Comfort personnel enabled over 1,528 patients to be treated aboard
ship in Mississippi. A further 7,000 patients received treatment at
clinics and hospitals staffed by naval medical corpsman and doctors who
deployed from the USNS Comfort. The utility of this vessel during
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Hurricane Katrina was further proven in the deployment of medical
personnel, normally tasked to provide advanced critical care during
wartime at sea, but focused instead on giving outpatient and advanced
care to residents in land-based facilities. Noteworthy constraints for
hospital ships derive from the fact that there is limited support for air
operations, little room for additional non-patient personnel as the
majority of the space is allocated for the 1,000 patient berths, and lack
of cargo space to carry food and water for deployment and delivery.
Hospital ships are not likely to provide immediate response efforts
following a disaster, unless they coincidentally reside close to an impact
area. However, these vessels will still continue to play a definitive role
in meeting the needs of survivors who require patient care on a more
routine and sustained basis, such as would occur in the weeks and
months following a disaster along a coastal region. It is noteworthy to
recognize that the USNS Mercy, the USNS Comfort’s sister ship, also
provided post-disaster relief for 40 days following the 2004 tsunami
disaster in Banda Aceh, Indonesia. Furthermore, the USNS Mercy also
provided relief following the March 2005 earthquake that struck near
Nias Island, Indonesia and in response to the World Trade Center
attacks in New York City in September 2001.

High Speed Vessels (HSV-2 Swift)

The high-speed catamaran, HSV-2 Swift, appears on first glance to be

an unlikely vessel on which to rest the future of sea-based logistics.
With two keels, a relatively low profile, and a helicopter platform, this
vessel appears to be something out of the modern day cinema, rather
than a powerful vessel that has been built to infuse next-generation
technologies into the world of transportation. With its unusual shape,
the vessel can sustain rapid speeds that have exceeded 60 knots-per-
hour in test scenarios and have enabled the vessel to complete
transoceanic crossings without being replenished with fuel. Another
noteworthy feature includes the vessel’s extendable ramp that can
enable large diesel trucks to drive directly onto the vessel while it
docks, significantly cutting down on on-loading and off-loading. There is
little room to expand services, such as medical facilities and command
suites, to facilitate large groups unless the cargo space is converted
from storage to berthing quarters.

During Hurricane Katrina, the HSV-2 Swift completed only three

round-trip logistic runs from Pensacola to the Gulf Coast. However, the
rapid pace and delivery of over 800 tons of water, materials and
supplies demonstrate that HSV-2 Swift fulfilled a relatively simple, but
absolutely essential role: to move people and equipment as fast as
possible.21 In terms of future coastal disaster response efforts, sea-
based logistical networks can rely on HSVs as a nontraditional “work-
horse” that will rapidly support various non-combat missions across
numerous environments.

Aircraft Carriers (USS Harry S. Truman)

As the single most expensive asset in the U.S. military’s inventory,

valued at over $4.5 billion per vessel, aircraft carriers traditionally
provide comprehensive support for air combat and serve as the
centerpiece for all sea-based operations. In terms of national security,
the aircraft carrier is the ultimate example of U.S. security interests
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across the world.

During the week leading up to Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, the USS

Harry S. Truman remained docked at Norfolk, Virginia for scheduled
repairs and re-supply of ship stores. Upon notification of activation
from Naval Command and after the levees broke in New Orleans, mass
loading of food and water from nearby warehouses rapidly occurred
while the vessel’s crew was recalled for immediate deployment. As the
vessel steamed around Florida and headed to the Gulf Coast, numerous
helicopters were received on the flight deck, significantly altering the
traditional mix of aircraft on-board the vessel traditionally set aside for
fighter jets, such as the F-16, and reconnaissance aircraft. First
assigned to be Joint Task Force Katrina’s flagship, the USS Truman
later served as the “lily pad and fuel station” that directed and
supported air operations to reach victims, and provide logistical support
over extended distances to numerous vessels spread across the Gulf
Coast region.22 Such rapid, nontraditional mobilizations are in line with
previous exploratory research conducted by the RAND Corporation,
which has the power and versatility of the vessel to respond.23

Aircraft carriers are large, powerful platforms that may accomplish

numerous tasks over vast distances. As the primary focus of a carrier is
to manage, support and direct long-range air operations, the
capabilities aboard the vessel must be significantly modified to
accommodate close-in disaster response. While this transition quickly
developed in response to Hurricane Katrina, guarantees that such an
opportunity will exist in the future are difficult to foresee. Clearly, there
are both space and abundant resources aboard these vessels to
accommodate numerous needs during disaster response. However, the
lack of inherent ship-to-shore assets on the carrier may preclude it
from supporting the logistical delivery of heavy equipment and supplies
[e.g. a 1000k (1 MW) generator] when air operations cannot occur due
to adverse weather conditions. This constraint, coupled with the
strategic role maintained by carriers for upholding U.S. strategic
security interests abroad, determine that carriers will likely play a
supporting role in future domestic disasters, only when the situation
allows them to and if modifications can be conducted rapidly enough
when the vessel is at sea.

Conclusion

The purpose of this research was to examine the role of sea power
during a domestic disaster, and provide policy-makers and disaster
planners with more insight as to how Navy vessels were employed.
Based on the data and in view of the impact of the profiled vessels
during Hurricane Katrina, “big deck” amphibious assault vessels, such
as the USS Iwo Jima mentioned above, appear to provide the most
diverse set of capabilities to conduct rapid, close-in disaster response
efforts. While the other vessels are clearly not one-dimensional,
significant tradeoffs are required for them to operate in a disaster
assistance role. Specifically, the lack of adaptability and air support
onboard hospital ships, the limited berthing and medical capabilities
aboard the HSVs, and the lack of large-bodied sea transport vessels and
influential national security role maintained by aircraft carriers, rule
these vessels out as the optimal prospect for nontraditional and
consistent sea-based domestic disaster response.
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While the nontraditional employment of Navy vessels will continue to

be controlled by federal agencies and national decision makers,
maximizing the use of the assets discussed here requires that those
who make the request for assistance and receive the support are well-
informed and prepared to leverage the opportunities that sea power
can bring. Leaders and disaster managers at the state and local levels
must be fully engaged to utilize sea-based support for the best results.
Policy changes must also be made to implement U.S. sea power assets
into domestic disaster relief planning. Without such changes, the
employment of U.S. sea power will continue to remain a matter of
reaction rather than an integrated, powerful component for response
efforts to enable and direct disaster response in coastal regions.

Ultimately, sea power will be insufficient to remedy disasters in the

long-term, as land-based operations provide greater space and
proximity to those in need. However, in the short term, sea-based
logistic networks may be a faster and more effective method to deliver
supplies and equipment to coastal areas. The independent
communication networks, medical facilities, refueling and re-supply
capabilities, and command and control opportunities found onboard
Navy vessels can provide unparalleled support for state and local
leaders. Future research regarding sea power and disaster response
might focus on the numerous international humanitarian assistance
missions that the Navy is engaging across both the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, as the nontraditional and non-kinetic usage of sea power is
leveraged to achieve U.S. strategic goals.

Captain Tim Jackson is currently completing his

second combat tour in Iraq as the Executive Officer for
Task Force 1 34, Multi-National Forces-Iraq. He has
completed overseas tours in Southeast Asia, Europe,
and Southw est Asia, and held various leadership and
staff positions in eight years of military service. He
w as aw arded a Master’s Degree in Public Policy
A nalysis at George Mason University in 2007 , and has
completed graduate studies abroad at Oxford
University in the United Kingdom and Tsinghua
University in the People’s Republic of China. He
received his Bachelor’s of Art Degree in Psychology w ith honors from Wheaton
College in 2000. He may be reached for comments and questions at
timothy.a.jackson@us.army.mil.

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