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9 pp328-362]
Pramāṇasamuccaya (Dignāga)
Contents:
[2] This passage concludes with the word “sataimiram.” Eli Franco (op. cit.) argues, contra Masaaki
Hattori and Alex Wayman, for instance, that their interpretation of this word as indicating an additional
(fourth) kind of perceptual fallacy is mistaken, or at least that (following Lambert Schmithausen’s
suggestion) Dignāga changed his mind between the time of composing the kārikās and composing the
vṛtti.
113.1.4.Vaiśesika
(E49-58; T42-51) In the Vaiśeṣikasūtras perception is defined as follows: an
awareness produced from contact between a self, a sense-organ, the mind and an
object. Some Vaiśeṣikas say sense-object contact is the instrument since it is the
specific cause, but others of them say it is contact between the self and the
internal organ that is the instrument since that is the predominant (pradhāna)
cause. Now elsewhere the Vaiśeṣikasūtras remark that this definition explains
(the stages of) doubt and ascertainment (niścaya). But ascertainment is not the
same as awareness produced by the fourfold contact mentioned, since
ascertainment also requires conceptual construction, whereas perception lacks
that. The fourfold contact is the simple presentation of an object, not its
ascertainment.
Vaiśeṣika: But sense-object contact does not involve conceptual construction.
Answer: Then even doubt and inference must be perception, since [333] they
arise from sense-object contact.
Vaiśeṣika: But a sense-organ grasps the qualifiers that are actually in the thing
and thus ascertainment naturally follows.
Answer: Then no doubt could ever arise or be removed!
Now the Vaiśeṣikas say in various places that perception grasps its content as
depending on universals, individuators, and as substance, quality or motion, etc.
But if an awareness is produced merely from sense-object contact then there is
113.1.5.Sāṃkhya
(E64-85; T52-62) Kapila’s followers define perception as the functioning of the
auditory and other organs. But if so either there are an infinite number of sense-
organs, since there must be an infinite number of organs corresponding to the
infinitely diverse amounts of guṇas such as sounds, etc., or else one sense-organ
might grasped all objects, since all objects are composed of the three guṇas.
Sāṃkhya: Though all things are composed of configurations (saṃsthāna) of the
three guṇas they are not composed in the same way. Thus sounds differ from
shapes, etc., and each group is grasped by the appropriate organ.
Answer: But you admit that in least in the cease of visual and tactual sensations
the objects are grasped by both senses. Furthermore it is nonsense to speak of
the “configuration” of an auditory, gustatory or olfactory content. Then again,
things of the same configuration made of [335] different materials would be the
same, which is not the case, and in short we would not comprehend the
distinctive feature of things such as their productivity of satisfaction, etc., and in
fact be unable to tell the differences among many kinds of different things
except those that differ in configuration. To avoid this one would have to
assume the sense-organs were capable of conceptual construction.
113.1.6.Mīmāṃsā
(E89-109; T63-70) Mīmāṃsāsūtra I.1.4’s account of perception is that it is the
awareness that arises when the sense-organs are connected with something
existent. But if here “existent” (sat) excludes nonexistent (asat) things their
definition is wrong because the term “something existent” is redundant.
Mīmāṃsā: “Something existent” merely indicates the counterpositives
(pratiyogin) (of the relation of the senses etc. to their objects).
Answer: Then those objects should be named. Anyway, connection can only be
with what exists. A sense cannot be in contact with a mirage, which doesn’t
exist at all. If you mean that “something existent” designates just that kind of
object to which the sense-organ is related, that is still wrong, since atoms (which
are not perceptible) and ointments (which are not intended) are also related to
sense-organs, so it would follow that perception should arise from contact with
such entities.
Mīmāṃsā: Just as “go,” meaning what goes, is a term for cows even though
other things than cows go, so “exists” in our definition applies even if it applies
to other things as well.
Answer: “Go” is commonly accepted to mean cow, but “sat” is not commonly
accepted as a word for sense-objects only. And if the senses always came into
contact with their objects one could not experience things far away nor large in
size.
A commentator (vṛttikāra): Perception as the result of awareness is different
from the instrument; now since the result of perception is just the awareness that
arises when the sense-organs are connected with something existent the
definition is correct. In fact, the only instrument that could fill these
requirements is the joint contact of sense, object, [337] internal organ and self,
accompanied by a trace.
Answer: If so, what is the point of the words “the awareness that arises” in the
sūtra? And why should the word “pratyakṣa,” which emphasizes the sense’s
(akṣa) role, be singled out in the words used?
113.5 Apohaparīkṣā
Summary by Richard P. Hayes
References preceded by “H” are to numbers of paragraphs in Hattori’s (1982)
critical edition of the Tibetan translations of [350] Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti
Chapter Five by Kanakavarman and by Vasudhararakṣita, accompanied by
Jinendrabuddhi’s commentary translated into Tibetan by Blo Bros brtan pa, all
found in Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University No. 21 (Kyoto
1982). References preceded by “K” are to folio numbers in the Tibetan
translation by Kanakavarman (Text 5702 of the Peking Edition of the Tibetan
Tripiṭaka, Vol. 130). References preceded by “VP” are to folio numbers in the
Tibetan translation by Vasudhararakṣita (Text 5701 of the Peking Edition of the
Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Vol. 130); those by “VD” are to the Sde-dge (“Derge”)
edition (Text 4204) of this same translation: “T” refers to the translation by
Richard Hayes, Dignāga on the Interpretation of Signs. Studies of Classical
India 9 (Dordrecht 1988).
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