Public-Key Certificates: INFS 766

INFS 766 PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES
Internet Security Protocols

reliabledistribution of public-keys
Lecture 6 public-key encryption
Digital Certificates ¾ sender needs public key of receiver
public-key digital signatures
¾ receiver needs public key of sender
Prof. Ravi Sandhu public-key key agreement
¾ both need each other’s public keys
© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 2
THE CERTIFICATE
TRIANGLE X.509 CERTIFICATE
user VERSION
SERIAL NUMBER
X.509 X.509
attribute identity SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
certificate certificate ISSUER
VALIDITY
SUBJECT
attribute public-key
SPKI SUBJECT PUBLIC KEY INFO
certificate SIGNATURE
© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 3 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 4
X.509 CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATE TRUST
0 how to acquire public key of the

1234567891011121314 issuer to verify signature
RSA+MD5, 512 whether or not to trust certificates
C=US, S=VA, O=GMU, OU=ISE signed by the issuer for this subject
9/9/99-1/1/1
C=US, S=VA, O=GMU, OU=ISSE, CN=Ravi Sandhu
RSA, 1024, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
SIGNATURE
PEM CERTIFICATION GRAPH CRL FORMAT
Internet Policy
IPRA Registration Authority SIGNATURE ALGORITHM
Policy Certification
Authorities (PCAs) ISSUER
HIGH MID-LEVEL LAST UPDATE

RESIDENTIAL PERSONA
ASSURANCE ASSURANCE
NEXT UPDATE
REVOKED CERTIFICATES
MITRE Certification Virginia Anonymous
GMU SIGNATURE
Authorities
(CAs)
Abrams ISSE Fairfax LEO

SERIAL NUMBER
Subjects REVOCATION DATE
© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 Sandhu Sandhu 7 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 8
PGP BOTTOM UP
TRUST MODEL X.509 CERTIFICATES
How does Alice get Bob’s public key X.509v1

¾ directlyfrom Bob through some secure ¾ very basic
channel (e.g., post, phone, floppy) X.509v2
¾ from Chuck, who is known to both Alice ¾ adds unique identifiers to prevent
and Bob and introduces Bob to Alice against reuse of X.500 names
¾ from a trusted certifying authority X.509v3
¾ adds many extensions
PGP has mechanisms to support
¾ can be further extended
these, and related, alternatives
SEPARATE KEYS FOR

SEPARATE PURPOSES SIGNATURE KEYS
RSA is the only known public-key private key: must be private for entire life,
cryptosystem in which the same may never leave smart card
public-private key pair can be used for ¾ needs to be securely destroyed after lifetime
¾ digital
signatures ¾ no need for backup or archiving (would
conflict with above)
¾ encryption
¾ no need to weaken or escrow due to law
perceived as a major advantage public key: must be archive possibly for a
long time

ENCRYPTION KEY X.509 INNOVATIONS
private key: backup or archive required for distinguish various certificates

recovery ¾ signature, encryption, key-agreement
¾ should not be destroyed after lifetime identification info in addition to X.500 name
¾ may be weakened/escrowed due to law name other than X.500 name
¾ email address
public key:
issuer can state policy and usage
¾ no need to backup RSA or other encryption ¾ good enough for casual email but not good enough for
keys signing checks
¾ need to backup Diffie-Hellman key agreement limits on use of signature keys for further
keys certification
X.509v3 EXTENSIONS
X.509v3 EXTENSIONS CRITICALITY
X.509v3 same as X.509v2 but adds non-critical: extension can be

extensions ignored by certificate user
provides a general extension ¾ alternate name can be non-critical
mechanism critical : extension should not be
¾ extension type: registered just like an ignored by certificate user
algorithm is registered ¾ limit on use of signatures for further
¾ standard extension types: needed for certification
interoperability
X.509v3 EXTENSIONS
CRITICALITY X.509v3 NAMES
criticality is flagged by certificate issuer internet email address

¾ certificate user may consider non-critical internet domain name
extensions more important than critical ones
web uri (url's are subset of uri)
¾ certificate user may refuse to use certificate if
some extensions are missing IP address
critical extensions should be few and X.400 email address
should be standard X.500 directory name
registered identifier
other name
X.509v3 STANDARD KEY AND POLICY
EXTENSIONS INFORMATION
key usage
Key and policy information ¾ critical: intended only for that purpose, limits liability of CA
Subject and issuer attributes ¾ non-critical: advisory to help find the correct key, no liability
implication
Certification path constraints private-key usage period
Extensions related to CRLs ¾ certificate valid for 2 years for verifying signature
¾ key valid only for one year for signing
¾ will be discussed with CRLs
certificate policies
¾ for CAs
SUBJECT AND ISSUER CERTIFICATION PATH

ATTRIBUTES CONSTRAINTS
Subject alternative names Basic Constraints

¾ can or cannot act as CA
Issuer alternative names
¾ if can act as CA limit on certification path
Subject directory attributes • limit=1 means cannot certify other CAs
¾ whatever you like Name Constraints
¾ position, phone, address etc. ¾ limits names of subjects that this CA can issue
certificates for
Policy Constraints
¾ concerned with CA policies
CERTIFICATE REVOCATION CERTIFICATE REVOCATION

LISTS LISTS
CRLs issued periodically as per CA CRL distribution

policy ¾ pull method
¾ off-cycle
CRLs may also be needed ¾ push method
¾ blank CRLs can be issued DMS example
¾ pull method with push for compromised
key list (CKL) which is broadcast via
secure email, single CKL for entire
system

CERTIFICATE REVOCATION
LISTS REVOCATION TIME-LINE
Issue Of Revocation Issue Of
immediate or real-time revocation CRL 1 Request CRL 2
¾ needsquery to CA on every certificate
use
¾ maybe ok for small closed communities
Compromise Revocation
Event Time
OCSP SHORT-LIVED
ON-LINE CERTIFICATE STATUS PROTOCOL CERTIFICATES
consult authoritative server Authorization certificates can be

the server in turn can look up CRLs short lived
¾ minutes, hours, days instead of
¾ months, years
X.509 CRL EXTENSIONS GENERAL EXTENSIONS
General Extensions Reason Code

¾ Key Compromise
CRL distribution points
¾ CA Compromise
Delta-CRLs ¾ Affiliation changed
Indirect-CRLs ¾ Superseded
¾ Cessation of operation
Certificate Suspension
¾ Remove from CRL: defer till Delta-CRL
¾ Certificate hold: defer
Invalidity Date
CRL DISTRIBUTION POINTS CRL DISTRIBUTION POINTS
CRLs can get very big certificateextension field, says

¾ version 1 CRL (1988, 1993) where to look
• each CA has two CRLs: one for end users, one for CAs
• end user CRL can still be very big CRL extension field
¾ version 2 CRL ¾ distributionpoint for this CRL and limits
• can partition certificates, each partition associated on scope and reason of revocation
with one CRL
• distribution point ¾ protects against substitution of a CRL
• also can have different distribution points for different from one distribution point to another
revocation reasons
DELTA-CRLs INDIRECT-CRL
Delta CRL indicator CRL can be issued by different CA

¾ only carries changes from previous CRL than issuer of certificate
Remove from CRL reason code ¾ allows all compromise revocations to be
causes purge from base CRL (stored one list
at certificate user) ¾ allows all CA revocations to be on one
list (simplify certificate chasing)
removal due to expiry of validity
period or restoration of suspension
GENERAL HIERARCHICAL
CERTIFICATE SUSPENSION STRUCTURE
Z
Certificate
hold reason code in CRL
Supporting CRL entry extension X Y
¾ Instruction code: instructions on what
to do with held certificate
Q R S T
• call CA, repossess token
A C E G I K M O
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p
GENERAL HIERARCHICAL TOP-DOWN HIERARCHICAL
STRUCTURE WITH ADDED LINKS STRUCTURE
Z Z
X Y X Y
Q R S T Q R S T
A C E G I K M O A C E G I K M O
a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p
PEM CERTIFICATION GRAPH SET CA HIERARCHY

Internet Policy
IPRA Registration Authority Root
Policy Certification
Authorities (PCAs)
HIGH MID-LEVEL Brand Brand Brand

RESIDENTIAL PERSONA
ASSURANCE ASSURANCE
Geo-Political
MITRE Certification Virginia Anonymous
GMU
Authorities
(CAs)
Bank Acquirer
Abrams ISSE Fairfax LEO
Subjects Customer Merchant

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 Sandhu Sandhu 39 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 40
FOREST OF HIERARCHIES
© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 41

Public-Key Certificates: INFS 766

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INFS 766 PUBLIC-KEY CERTIFICATES

Internet Security Protocols

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 2

X.509 CERTIFICATE CERTIFICATE TRUST

0  how to acquire public key of the

HIGH MID-LEVEL LAST UPDATE

Abrams ISSE Fairfax LEO

 How does Alice get Bob’s public key  X.509v1

SEPARATE KEYS FOR

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 11 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 12

 private key: backup or archive required for  distinguish various certificates

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 13 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 14

 X.509v3 same as X.509v2 but adds  non-critical: extension can be

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 15 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 16

 criticality is flagged by certificate issuer  internet email address

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 19 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 20

SUBJECT AND ISSUER CERTIFICATION PATH

 Subject alternative names  Basic Constraints

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 21 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 22

CERTIFICATE REVOCATION CERTIFICATE REVOCATION

 CRLs issued periodically as per CA  CRL distribution

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 23 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 24

 consult authoritative server  Authorization certificates can be

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 27 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 28

X.509 CRL EXTENSIONS GENERAL EXTENSIONS

 General Extensions  Reason Code

 CRLs can get very big  certificateextension field, says

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 31 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 32

 Delta CRL indicator  CRL can be issued by different CA

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 33 © Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 34

PEM CERTIFICATION GRAPH SET CA HIERARCHY

HIGH MID-LEVEL Brand Brand Brand

Subjects Customer Merchant

© Ravi Sandhu 2000-2004 41

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0 how to acquire public key of the

How does Alice get Bob’s public key X.509v1

private key: backup or archive required for distinguish various certificates

X.509v3 same as X.509v2 but adds non-critical: extension can be

criticality is flagged by certificate issuer internet email address

Subject alternative names Basic Constraints

CRLs issued periodically as per CA CRL distribution

consult authoritative server Authorization certificates can be

General Extensions Reason Code

CRLs can get very big certificateextension field, says

Delta CRL indicator CRL can be issued by different CA