Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Fall 2010
• Alperovitz, Gar. The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American
Myth. New York: Knopf, 1995.
Dr. Gar Alperovitz is the Lionel R. Bauman Professor of Political Economy at the
University of Maryland. Like his previous writings, Alperovitz is a staunch critic of the Truman
administration and, as the title suggests, its decision to use the atomic bomb. This particular
topic has remained a divisive counterpoint in Cold War historiography. Writing in the post Cold
War world, Alperovitz reintroduces his argument debunking the commonly held belief that the
nuclear bombs dropped on Japan were for an easy conclusion to the war. He asserts that the war
was over before the decision was made, and Truman knew it. This single assumption is what the
rest of his monograph carries out with. Alperovitz, however, is unable to prove that the Japanese
were united in their desire for a peaceful conclusion to war, and thus, the single assumption is at
best speculation.
Alperovitz began writing this 1995 publication on the tail end of the Enola Gay exhibition
at the Smithsonian Institute. The controversy over the morality of extolling or even displaying
this infamous plane sparked a renewed interest in the origins of the Cold War, and in particular,
in the atomic bombs. Alperovitz uses many sources of key decision makers to make his case that
the decision to drop the bombs were immoral and more political than commonly asserted. The
generalized narrative of the consensus school is that the decision was purely militaristic.
Revisionists do not agree. Alperovitz set off to prove that Truman had other alternatives to the
atomic bombs, and to this end he succeeds. However, he does not adequately convince the
reader that all reasons for the eventual drop were non militaristic. The majority of his
monograph deals with the aftermath of the bomb and how a large effort was made in Washington
to sell the bomb, again, as a military-centric decision. He does have evidence from shocking
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Andrew S. Terrell - HIST 6393: Empire, War & Revolution! Fall 2010
speeches of Pentagon and State officials that look back at the atomic bombs as poor decision.
However, he does not delve into how much of these speeches could have been influenced by the
What other historians often times concede to in argument, is the presence of a certain
morally ambiguous situation; we know now that Truman had reason to believe that certain
factions within Japan were willing to negotiate for peace granted their emperor remain in power,
and we also know the military were correct in assuming using the bombs would most certainly
end the war with expedience. What most historians do not concede is that the decision could
have been based on all known factors described and presented by Alperovitz and many others:
the Soviet threat and the question over shaping the post-war world, the desire to conclude the
manhattan project with the unprecedented killing of over 200,000 civilians. Alperovitz,
however, does make a convincing case if you agree to his notion that the Truman administration
could have assumed a united front from the people of Japan over peace talks or an eventual
surrender. Additionally, Alperovitz misrepresents key Japanese documents that have been
translated. He uses them to defend his presumptions of a united Japanese front when the
telegrams in truth only mention a shared interest of the cabinet to seek peace but not surrender.
Furthermore, the same sources cited by Alperovitz in 1995 reveal that of the proposals by the
Japanese for peace, none of them could have come to fruition without Truman committing
political suicide.1
For all its misgivings, however, Alperovitz does reiterate with strength the revisionist
approach to the origins of the Cold War. Though lacking in Japanese sources, the monograph is
1Diplomatic Message translations amongst Japanese in 1943-1945 are found in boxes 286-516 of the
National Security Agencyʼs RG 457 collection at the National Archives.
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Andrew S. Terrell - HIST 6393: Empire, War & Revolution! Fall 2010
filled with evidence to defend many of his smaller arguments. If one was to accept his core
assumption over the decision, all arguments afterwards are more than adequately researched and
defended. Historical interpretations and debates are essential in keeping early Cold War history
present in the minds of successive generations, and to this end, Alperovitz does not disappoint.
What 21st century Cold War historians need to focus on now, is finding ways of incorporating a
in hopes of finding a common ground in the narrative over the peace talks that took place after
the bombs of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the air raids that destroyed almost a hundred towns
and cities before the atomic decision. Instead of approaching the issue from the decision front,
we need to start at the conclusion and work our way back. This, one believes, will reveal much