A2: Perm

Acting together on issues discourages Congress from developing their own ideological
interpretations and prevents congress from applying its own objective standards
Devins, prof law William & Mary, 2000
(Neal Devins, Goodrich Law Professor and Lecturer in Government, College of William and Mary, 2000, University
of Richmond Law Review, Summer, p. 363) [Dan Li]

Another way in which "judicial overhang distorts what legislators say about the
Constitution" is that legislative consideration of constitutional matters little more than
an attempt by lawmakers to fit their statutes into preexisting Supreme Court doctrine .
For example, tile House and Senate Judiciary Committees are understood to take
constitutional interpretation seriously because they are keenly interested in whether the
Court will uphold their actions, and are therefore willing to moderate the legislation
they produce. In other words, rather than develop their own distinctive interpretive
methodologies, lawmakers (when they talk about the Constitution) almost always mimic the
Supreme Court. And when Congress dots respond to Court decision-making, the cost of ensuring
compliance with judicial norms is significant.
 A2: Perm
Court action discourages the drafting of actual subsequent legislative action and
constitutional protection
Tushnet, prof law Georgetown, 98
(Mark Tushnet, Law Professor, Georgetown, 1998, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION A WAY FROM THE
COURTS, p.22) [Dan Li]

concern for the Constitution probably ranks relatively low in post

But, as a general matter,
politicians' calculations today. Recall, however the argument that this situation may have
arisen because of judicial review. Neither the people nor their representatives have to
take tile Constitution seriously because they know -or believe -that the courts will.
Political calculations might change if people knew they were responsible for the
Constitution.
 A2: Perm Doesn’t Link (Generic)
The permutation limits the ability of Congress to enact policies and puts added pressure on
the courts because otherwise it is seen as being Constitutionally shady, linking even harder
to the DA
Macey, prof law Cornell, 91
(Jonathan R. Macey, J. DuPratt White Professor of Law at the Cornell School of Law, 1991, Georgetown Law
Journal, “Separated Powers and Positive Political Control: The Tug of War Over Administrative Agencies,” pg.
671) [Dan Li]

Perhaps the most intriguing thing about the United States Constitution is the way that its basic principles
keep recreating themselves in a new an unexpected contexts. Quite recently, for example , the complex
matrix of check and balances under the constitutional separation of powers embodies in
the Articles I, II, and III has found new support in the work of scholars espousing positive
political theory (PPT). PPT shows why a robust system of checks and balances is
particularly important in the modern administrative state. On the one hand, modern
government could not function if congress were prohibited from delegating large
chunks of authority to administrative agencies. On the other hand, these delegations, coupled
with Congress’s remarkable sophistication at designing internal rules of organization to
control agency behavior, puts added pressure on the courts and the executive to fulfill
their roles in the constitutional scheme without undermining the ability of the state to
operate. PPT does not solve the venerable question of how the non legislative branches
can fulfill their obligation to check and balance Congress without intruding on the
constitutional authority of the legislature to make law. PPT does, however, real with
remarkable clarity how this problem has reconstituted itself in the modern administrative agencies
generate outcomes that are.
 A2: Perm Doesn’t Link (Perception)
Congress and the courts are empirically antagonistic, even if they act congruently in one
instance, the courts will always continue to oppose legislation means even in congruent
action, the courts are perceived as separate action – national labor law proves
Brudney, assoc prof law THE Ohio State University, 97
(James J. Brudney, Associate Professor at the Ohio State University School of Law, 1997, Connecticut Law Review,
“Of Labor Law and Dissonance,” 30:1530, pg. 1357, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?
q=info:Ldmetaeu4T4J:scholar.google.com/&output=viewport &pg=1&hl=en) [Dan Li]

What accounts for the dissonance between the meaning of our national labor law, as
decreed primarily by federal judges, and the social and economic realities of workplace
relationships addressed by the law? In his darkly eloquent commentary, Professor Getman
acknowledges that such dissonance is not unique to the law governing labor-management
relations. Yet the courts’ often mistrustful approaches toward employee rights under the
National Labor Relations Act (“NRLA” or “Act”) has had a special impact. The NLRA emerged at
a time of social turbulence, and was based on a recognized need to redress the fundamental inequality of
bargaining power between labor and management. While other factors help explain the
persistence of the inequality six decades later, decisions of the federal judiciary figure
prominently in the story. Professor Getman makes arresting use of the analogy between the British
army’s rules of military engagement of World War I and the other rules of engagement applied in federal
labor lab. One of his central contentions is that elites in each setting developed rules “to control
the conduct of people whose situation they did not understand and whose experience
they did not share.” I will explore two questions that this contention raises for me. First how should
we understand the role played in recent decades by and institutional elite.