Cases to Know

Marbury v. Madison (1803)

Baker v. Carr (1962)-Political Question Doctrine/ Separation of Power

Facts

As a result of the Court’s decision in Colegrove v. Green (1946), states that had not reapportioned since
1900 were under no federal constitutional mandate to do so, and disparities between the voting power of
urban and rural citizens continued to grow. Rural vote for the Tennessee legislature counted nearly four
times as much as an urban vote. In Marbury v. Madison, The Great Chief Justice Marshall made it clear
that, “Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the constitution and laws, submitted to the
executive, can never be made in this court.” As such, the Court determined that political questions,
although could be constitutional in nature, fall outside of the Court’s jurisdiction because it is better
solved by other branches of government. In Luther v. Borden (1849), the court dealt on the issue of what
constitutes a political question. Writing for the majority in Luther, Chief Justice Taney held that although
Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 of the US Constitution states that, “The United States shall guarantee to
every state in this Union a Republican form of government,” the Supreme Court should avoid deciding
any question arising out of the guarantee clause because such questions are inherently political. The
opinion is based on the belief that Article IV and the guarantee clause address the relationship between
the state and the federal government, not governments and court. Because of the omission of the Court in
the Guarantee Clause, Justice Taney believed that the clause should be enforced only by the president or
Congress. Arising from Luther v. Borden was the standard that questions arising from the Guarantee
Clause are nonjusticiable.

Calls for the Court to take rethink its position on the Guarantee Clause resurfaced in 1940 under the issue
of reapportionment. According to Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the US Constitution, each state is
apportioned with a certain number of representatives based on its population, which is determined every
10 years. Once that number is determined, it is up to the states to draw congressional districts. However,
there is no constitutional guideline as to how states map their districts. Most states redrew their
congressional districts as populations shift, but few states refused to reapportioned their seats despite
population shifts. Malapportionment was at the center of Colegrove v. Green (1946), in which inner city
voters from Illinois sued. They argued that the failure to reapportion legislative districts deprived some
voters of their right to a republican form of government. Writing for the Court, Justice Frankfurter held
that the Court has no power to interfere the manner in which state apportion their congressional seats.
Citing both Luther v. Borden and Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the US Constitution, which states that,
“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the Legislature,” Justice Frankfurter held that the Guarantee Clause is
inherently a political question that falls outside of the Court’s jurisdiction.

Knowing that the Court will not hear any argument for reapportionment based on the Guarantee Clause of
Article IV, inner city voters in Tennessee sued on the ground that the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal
protection clause, which say, no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.” From this clause, they made the argument that the failure to reapportion led to unequal
treatment of voters. The Middle District Court of Tennessee was the last highest court to hear this case.

Issues:
Whether the issue of congressional district apportionment consists of a political question and if so,
whether it is justiciable by the Court?

Holding:

Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan held that, “the claim pleaded here neither rests upon nor implicates
the Guaranty Clause and that its justiciability is therefore not foreclosed by our decisions of cases
involving that clause.” The claims made by the appellant here are justiciable because, “judicial standards
under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and familiar, and it has been open to courts since
the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment to determine, if on the particular facts they must, that
discrimination reflects no policy, but simply arbitrary and capricious action.” Reverse and remanded.

Significance:

1) It extended the US Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to apportionment cases.

2) It established criteria for determination whether a dispute presented a political question: first, the court
will look to the Constitution to see if there is a “textually demonstrable commitment” to another branch of
government. The justices also consider whether particular questions should be left to another branch of
government as a matter of prudence.

McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)-Legislative Power: Unenumerated Powers: Necessary and Proper

Clause (The Elastic Clause)/ Constitutional Interpretations: strict constructionist v. broad
interpretation

Facts:

Article I, Section 8, Clause 18: “The Congress shall have Power - To make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.”

The Elastic Clause was subjected to heated debate during the

Issues:

Whether Congress had the power to charter a national bank and whether state exceeded its power by
seeking to tax a federal entity?

Opinion:

Justice Marshall: although “we do not find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. There is
no phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied
powers.”

“A Constitution to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions and of all the means by which they ay
be carried into execution could never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires that only
its great outlines should be marked.”

The Necessary and Proper Clause “is placed among the power of Congress, not among the limitations on
those powers, and its terms purport to enlarge, not to diminish the powers vested in the government.”

The Bank of the United States is necessary is the functioning of the federal government. For this reason, it
is constitutional since the Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the power to make all laws that is
necessary and proper for the functioning of the country.

In order for the “Constitution to endure for the ages to come,” a broad interpretation of the Constitution is
needed.

Significance:

1) Not only does Congress have powers enumerated in the Constitution, but it bow also has powers not
named in the Constitution-unenumerated powers that are necessary and proper to carry out of the laws of
the land and for the functioning of the US.

2) By holding that Congress has powers beyond those enumerated, that it has implied powers, Marshall
set into law a largely Hamiltonian version of congressional authority.

Bush v. Gore (2000)-political question doctrine

Korematsu v. United States (1944)-strict scrutiny

Immigration and Neutralization Service v. Chadha (1983)-legislative veto violated separation of

powers

Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952)

Significance:

Limited the power of the President of the United States to seize private property in the absence of either
specifically enumerated authority under Article Two of the United States Constitution or statutory
authority conferred on him by Congress.

Katzenbach v. McClung (1964)-Congressional Power: Commerce Clause: Segregation/ Civil Rights

Act of 1964
Facts:

Title II of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in hotels, motels, restaurants, theaters,
and all other public accommodations engaged in interstate commerce. McClung (P) owned Ollie’s
Barbecue in Birmingham, Alabama, which provided take out service to black customers but allowed only
white customers to dine on the premises. While the clientele was local, a substantial portion of the food
served by the restaurant moved in interstate commerce.

McClung and other plaintiffs brought this lawsuit to enjoin United States Attorney General Nicholas
Katzenbach from enforcing Title II of the Act against his restaurant on the grounds that the law
overextended the Commerce Clause to small, private business and is thus unconstitutional.

Issues:

Whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to regulate local business activity if any
part of it affects interstate commerce, if the aggregate of activity of that industry has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce?

Opinion:

Justice Clark, in his unanimous opinion for the Court, held that Because some food served in Ollie's
Barbecue originated out of state, the U.S. Supreme Court held that Congress had the power, under the
Commerce Clause, to ban racial segregation in the restaurant.

Yes. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to regulate local business activity if any part of it
affects interstate commerce, if the aggregate of activity of that industry has a substantial effect on
interstate commerce.

Congress acted within its power to protect interstate commerce in extending coverage of Title II of the
Civil Rights Act to restaurants serving food moving in interstate commerce. Congress had had ample
basis to conclude that discrimination based on race by such restaurants burdens interstate trade.

In Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, the Supreme Court found that the Act was a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce in prohibiting hotels from discriminating against
customer based on race.

The commerce power is broad and it gives Congress the authority to regulate activity with only a minor
impact on interstate commerce. Both Houses of Congress conducted prolonged hearings on the Act and
the record is replete with testimony of the burdens placed on interstate commerce by racial discrimination
in restaurants. A comparison of per capita spending by black patrons in restaurants, theaters, and other
establishments indicated less spending in areas where discrimination is widely practiced. While
McClung’s impact on interstate commerce may be insignificant when viewed in isolation, the aggregate
effect has a significant impact and is subject to regulation.

Significance:

1) Broad interpretation of the Commerce Clause.

2) Now Congress has the power to commerce even if it only has a minor impact on Commerce because
the aggregate of those small businesses has a significant impact on interstate commerce.

3) Upheld Article II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and allowed the Commerce Clause to be used for the
purpose of desegregation.

Ex parte Milligan (1866)

Facts:

City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey (1978)

Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee (1816)

Facts:

The state of Virginia enacted legislation during the Revolutionary War that gave the State the power to
confiscate the property of British Loyalists. Hunter was given a grant of land by the State. Denny Martin
held the land under devise from Lord Thomas Fairfax.

In an action in ejectment, the trial court found in favor of Martin and the court of appeals (the highest
Virginia state court) reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in favor of Martin,
holding that the treaty with England superseded the state statute, and remanded the case to the Virginia
court of appeals to enter judgment for Martin. The Virginia court refused, asserting that the appellate
power of the U.S. Supreme Court did not extend to judgments from the Virginia court of appeals.

Issues:

Whether the US Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal
laws?

Holding:

The federal power was given directly by the people and not by the States. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2
of the U.S. Constitution states that “in all other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction”.

The Federal jurisdiction is designed to expand. “It cannot expand by original jurisdiction if that was
already rightfully and exclusively attached in the state courts; it must, therefore, extend by appellate
jurisdiction, or not at all.
Appellate jurisdiction over the states is important and necessary due to the need for uniformity of law and
decisions through the whole United States. (Epstein 79)

Significance:

1) Article Three of the U.S. Constitution grants the U.S. Supreme Court jurisdiction and authority over
state courts on matters involving federal law.

2) Confirming the Supremacy Clause of Federal over state power.

US v. Lopez (1995)

Cooley v. Board of Wardens (1852)-The Commerce Clause

Facts:

In 1803 Pennsylvania passed a port regulation law requiring that all vessels hire a local pilot to guide
ships in and out of the Port of Philadelphia. Aaron Cooley owned a vessel that sailed into Philadelphia
without hiring a local pilot. The port’s Board of Wardens took legal action against him, and Cooley was
fined. He responded by claiming that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional; only Congress, he
asserted, could regulate the port because the harbor was an integral part of interstate and foreign
commerce, and the states had no constitutional authority to set regulations for such commerce.

Issue:

Whether Commerce Power extends to laws related to pilotage and if, whether State laws related to
commerce powers can be valid so long as Congress is silent on the matter?

Holding:

Justice Curtis, in his opinion for the Court, held that the Commerce Clause and the “existence of this
power in Congress, like the power of taxation, is compatible with the existence of a similar power in the
States, then it would be in conformity with the contemporary exposition of the Constitution.”

The mere grant of the power to regulate interstate commerce did no imply a prohibition on the States to
exercise the same power.

Significance:

1) The states retain the power to regulate purely interstate commerce

2) Congress has the power to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. When it exercises this power, any
contrary state laws are preempted.

3) the power of Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce is exclusive over those elements of
commercial activity that are national in scope or require uniform regulation.

4) Those elements of interstate and foreign commerce that are not national in scope or do not require
uniformity, and which have not been regulated by Congress, may be subject to state authority including
the state’s police powers.

5) Established the selected exclusiveness doctrine, which designates certain aspects of interstate and
foreign commerce over which the powers of Congress are exclusive, allowing no state action. This
exclusiveness, however, is not complete; in the absence of federal legislation, states may reglate some
business activity affecting interstate commerce.

Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States (1964)-The Commerce Clause

Facts:

Article II of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited places of “public accommodation” from
discrimination based on customers' race, sex, color, religion, or national origin. The Heart of Atlanta
Motel challenged the constitutionality of this provision and, after losing before a three-judge federal
court, appealed to the Supreme Court.

The Heart of Atlanta Motel was a 216-room facility in Atlanta, Georgia. It was located near the
commercial center of the city; it had easy access to two interstate highways and two major state roads.
Both the government and the motel agreed that the facility met the act’s definition of a public
accommodation in interstate commerce.

Issues:

Whether Congress unconstitutionally exceed its powers under the Commerce Clause by enacting Title II
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, which prohibited racial discrimination in public accommodations?

Opinion:

Justice Clark, in his majority opinion for the Court, held that due to the burdensome and crippling effect
arise from discrimination on interstate commerce, it is thus within Congress’ power to regulate it.

Due to the hardship of finding lodging, “there was evidence that this uncertainty stemming from racial
discrimination had the effect of discouraging travel on the part of a substantial portion of the Negro
community”-resulting in burdens placed upon interstate commerce.
Justice Clark held that the federal government has the power to regulate commerce as long as it passes the
Commerce Clause test: 1) the activity sought to be regulated involves more than one state and, 2) has a
real and substantial relation to the national interest.

“Commerce among the States consists of intercourse and traffic between their citizens, and includes the
transportation of persons and property…Nor does it make any difference whether the transportation is
commercial in character.”

(Champion v. Ames)

Significance:

1) Congress has power to regulate local commercial activities as long as it has a substantial and harmful
effect on interstate commerce.

2) The Court’s opinion in HAM gives Congress broad powers to use the commerce clause as authority to
regulate moral wrongs that occur in interstate commerce.

3) The Court’s interpretation of the commerce clause turned that provision into one of the most powerful
weapons in the federal government’s regulatory arsenal.

Gibbons v. Ogden (1824)-Legislative Power: Enumerated Powers: Commerce Clause: The power to
regulate interstate commerce

Facts:

Aaron Ogden had purchased the right to operate in NY waters (including NY Harbor and the Hudson
river) from the Livingston-Foulton monopoly. Gibbons had a federal permit issued under the 1793
Coastal Licensing Act to operate steamships along the coast. The two’s interests came to conflict when
they both wanted to operate the steamboat business on the waters between NY and NJ.

Issues:

Whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce extend to regulations of navigation among
states and whether the licensing contract granted to Ogden by the state of NY came in conflict with
government laws and regulations of interstate commerce?

Opinion:

Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion for the Court held that Commerce means a commercial intercourse
and in order for the Federal government to regulate this intercourse among states, it must inlucde the
power to regulate navigation. CJ Marshall believes that the power to regulate Commerce with foreign
powers and among sates is one of the primary objectives for the adoption of the Constitution.
If the Federal government is given the power to regulate every aspect of commerce between the US and
foreign nations, than the same should and must be true when it comes to regulating interstate commerce,
since the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 enumerates that Congress has the power to
regulate commerce with foreign nations and among states.

On the issue of whether NY’s licensing of steamboats conflicted with National laws, the Chief Justice
held that “States may sometimes enact laws, the validity of which depends on their interfering with and
being contrary to, an act of Congress passed in pursuance of the constitution.” If such conflict is found to
exist, then the state law must yield to federal law. For the Constitution is the Supreme Clause.

Significance:

1) A broad interpretation of Constitutional powers is used to determine the scope of Congressional

powers and the Commerce Clause.

2) From such standard of constitutional interpretation, it is determined that commerce involves more than
buying and selling. It includes the commercial intercourse between nations and states, and therefore
transportation and navigation clearly fall within the definition of commerce.

3) Commerce that occurs within a state may be part of a larger interstate process. As such, once an act is
considered part of interstate commerce, Congress may regulate it, in accordance to the Constitution.

4) Because the text of the commerce clause limits congressional power to regulate commerce among the
states, the power to regulate commerce that occurs completely within the boundaries of a single, and does
not extend to or affect other states, belongs to the states.

5) Gibbons v. Ogden was a substantial victor for national power. It broadly construed the definitions of
both commerce and interstate commerce.

6) It is determined that Congress has completely power to regulate interstate commerce and that
federal regulations are superior to any state laws.

National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp (1937)

Ex parte McCardle (1869)-Appellate Jurisdiction, Article III, Section II

Facts:

After the Civil War, Congress imposed military government on many former Confederate States by
authority of the Civil War Reconstruction Acts. McCardle (D) was a Mississippi newspaper editor held in
military custody on charges of publishing libelous and inflammatory articles.

McCardle filed a habeas corpus writ claiming that Congress lacked authority under the Constitution to
establish a system of military government. The Act authorized federal courts to grant habeas corpus to
persons held in violation of their constitutional rights and granted the Supreme Court the authority to hear
appeals.

The circuit court denied McCardle’s habeas corpus writ but the Supreme Court sustained jurisdiction to
hear an appeal on the merits. After arguments were heard however, Congress passed an act on March 27,
1868, repealing the portion of the 1867 Act that allowed an appeal to the Supreme Court and the exercise
by the Supreme Court of jurisdiction on any such appeals, past or present.

Issues:

Whether Congress has the power to make exceptions to the Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in
cases in which it has already granted jurisdiction and whether must the Court always first determine if it
is has jurisdiction to review a case?

Holding:

1) The Constitution gives the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, but it gives Congress the express
power to make exceptions to that appellate jurisdiction.

2)The Court must always determine first if it is has jurisdiction to review a case.

3) Congress withheld the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to review habeas corpus cases. As such, the Court
does not have jurisdiction to hear this case.

Significance:

1) Congress has the authority to remove the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, as it seems necessary. This sets
the boundary and limit/ constraint on the Court’s power (which arrives from Article III, Section 2)