Safety & Risk Management Services

Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOP)

Germanischer Lloyd – Service/Product Description

Germanischer Lloyd – Service/Product Description

Hazard Operability Studies Contents

(HAZOP)
Service Title: Safety & Risk Management Services Page 3 Service Description and Values Generated

Lead Practice: GL Safety & Risk (UK) Pages 4 - 6 Detailed Method Statement

The detailed method statements explain how the

work is conducted, which inputs are required and
which outputs and results can be expected.

Page 7 Case Studies and Examples

a: Natural Gas Cavern Storage

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 SERVICE DESCRIPTION

Service Description and presented in the form of the HAZOP Report. The necessity of
additional safeguards/recommendations can either be evaluated by
and Values Generated: the team on a qualitative basis or by means of a risk matrix.

HAZOP studies may be held at any time during the design and
Motivation
operation of a plant. Most effectively they are conducted during the
The hazard and operability study (HAZOP) is a creative technique for
conceptual design phase where recommendations affecting the
identifying hazards and operating problems in a process plant.
general design may be made.
Nowadays it is widely used in industry and is offered by Germanischer
Lloyd (GL) for new and existing facilities.
The analysis serves the operator as a proof to operate his installations
such that hazards for employees, third parties, the environment and
Increasing demand by governments and public bodies for improved
the surroundings can largely be excluded. The operator’s
safety in addition to a strong awareness within the industry that safe
management gets an up-to-date picture of the present hazards, their
operation can also be highly efficient and profitable, support the need
possible effects and ways to solve these issues.
for plant safety and effective safety management. Advances in tech-
nology and trends to highly complex and integrated plant designs
have sensitised people for systematic and sustainable methods to
Frequency of Reviews
identify hazards of which the HAZOP study is generally recognised as
HAZOP analyses are usually to be revised when considerable
the foremost solution being able to cover standard and also new
modifications, upgrades or re-design of existing facilities are carried
complex technology.
out or if events like accidents, critical situations or near misses call for
this. In this context a change, upgrade or re-design is to be considered
The operator of a technical installation by which health and safety,
as essential if process modifications associated with consequences for
the environment, assets and the operator’s reputation could be
safety or safety related equipment is involved. This also applies for
affected is obliged e.g. by European legislation to:
utilities including buildings, machinery, equipment et al. that do not
necessarily contribute to the operating objective directly but that are
 have an up-to-date knowledge about all safety relevant
associated with the process facilities in terms of layout or operational-
aspects of their operations,
wise and that are safety relevant. Those being in charge of operations
and those working in the facilities are obliged to indicate all identified
 prevent accidents or to limit their impacts/escalations
possible changes. In principle operators are expected to repeat the
(acc. to Seveso II Directive),
analyses at least every 5 years in order to maintain the residual risk as
low as reasonable practical.
 control hazards reliably and to minimise risks by
identifying installations with risk potential regarding
health and safety as well as the environment, evaluating
Offered Service
their inherent risks and specifying risk mitigation
The success of the HAZOP technique strongly depends on the skills
measures (which is part of the risk management process),
and experience of the facilitator in preparing and running the study.
A sufficient depth to derive all the potential hazards and safety related
 design, start up, operate and maintain workplaces in such
operability problems and on the other hand the avoidance of a time
a manner that the workforce can conduct work without
consuming design review which is out of scope for a HAZOP are
putting their own safety and health or that of others at
essential for the effectiveness and quality of the sessions. The service
risk (§2 Abs.l Allg. Bundesbergverordnung ABBergV, §3
offered in this matter is the provision of an experienced facilitator
ArbSchG)
/chairman that leads through the HAZOP sessions supported by an
experienced minute taker/scribe who notes down the relevant results
into the prepared HAZOP spreadsheet. Depending on clients’ needs
Objectives
in house spreadsheets or a special HAZOP software tool will be used
The primary objective of a HAZOP study is to identify potential hazards
by the HAZOP management team. Subsequently upon completion of
and operating problems on e.g. a process plant. Performed by a
the sessions a report will be prepared by the HAZOP chairman and
multi-disciplinary team which applies the HAZOP structured
submitted to the client.
brainstorming technique all possible deviations from normal
operating conditions are examined in detail and their reasons and
consequences are assessed. The detailed insight into the plant is
Potential Clients
supported by dividing the plant into manageable sections, so called
'nodes'. Specific 'parameters' and 'guidewords' are used to focus the
a. Operators in the oil, gas and (petro-, bio-) chemical
team towards likely design issues in each section of the plant. Once
business carrying out green-field and brown-field
identified, potential 'deviations' from the standard operating or design
projects. The service can be rendered beginning in the
conditions may then be discussed and assessed by the team with
FEED stage of a project.
respect to their effect on safety. Subsequently the implemented
safeguards are identified and where considered necessary
b. Investors, insurers of above named enterprises
recommendations for action or further consideration are recorded

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DETAILED METHOD STATEMENT

The success of the HAZOP study depends upon an effective system Depending on the item, the following deviations may be considered.
for working through the items of the study. Germanischer Lloyd
provides this effective system through the experience gained from
several HAZOP studies and the theoretical and practical departmental
expertise.

As a first step, the definition of scope is considered with respect to the

special requirements of the client before the required data are
collected by the HAZOP team and/or HAZOP facilitator. The plant or
process under investigation is divided into a number of suitable units,
the HAZOP nodes. Each node is the topic of a HAZOP session,
conducted under the supervision of a GL team leader/facilitator who
is an expert in the HAZOP technique. GL will also provide an
experienced minute taker/scribe to assist the facilitator by entering
the team’s brain-storming outcomes into the spreadsheets/software
during the ongoing discussions. Each HAZOP session takes 1 ½ … 3
hours, depending on the scope of the item under discussion and on
the plant or process itself – new or existing. A HAZOP on a large
project may consist of a large number of nodes and respectively
require several weeks to be performed.

HAZOP technique assumes that the plant management is competent

and that the plant or process under investigation will be operated
and maintained as intended by the design team and in accordance
with good management and engineering practice.
The HAZOP study starts with a systematic examination of the plant or
process with a depth depending on the level of detail required.
A list of guide words is applied to each part of the plant or process,
thereby generating deviations from normal operating conditions with
respect to all conceivable eventualities. Apart from normal operations
the following are considered and listed for all guidewords of each
HAZOP: foreseeable changes to start-up and shut-down procedures,
maintenance, etc. Each deviation is checked for possible causes and
consequences; potential problems are identified and noted, and the
need for action is decided by taking into account both the significance
of the consequence(s) and the probability of the event occurring.
The item under investigation, e.g. a flow, is examined by applying the
guide words, e.g. MORE OF. As a first step, possible causes for "more
flow" (deviation from normal forward flow) are considered. If "more
flow" is not possible, the team leader/HAZOP team moves on to the
next deviation. If "more flow" is possible, but does not prevent
efficient operation (and is considered not to affect safety), other
causes of "more flow" are to be considered. If a possible cause can
lead to hazardous situation(s), further consequences (detection of the
deviation, change in plant or method to prevent "more flow", etc.) are
discussed and action(s) required are noted and/or suggested to the
client. Protection against the consequences can be achieved by
changing the plant design and/or operation method.

If necessary, a team member explains the function of the item under

investigation, including normal process conditions and specifications
if available, to ensure that all team members have the background
knowledge of the item examined.

In general to search for possible deviations each HAZOP item is

examined by applying the guide words

 NONE
 REVERSE
 MORE OF
 LESS OF
 PART OF
 MORE THAN
 OTHER THAN

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 DETAILED METHOD STATEMENT

By defining appropriate nodes, each system or equipment is divided The method consists of a systematic study of all process and utility
into sub-systems by consensus of the review team. The selected lines and equipment included in the project. The study will primarily
system is identified by a study node number and for easy reference a be performed based on the piping and instrumentation diagrams
colour code can also be applied on the related P&IDs prior to the (P&IDs) developed for the project. The study will be confined within
review and worksheet during the review. the new and modified facilities only, along with tie-ins with the
existing.
The HAZOP process should proceed as follows:
Each line will be studied as a whole from battery limit to battery limit
1. Select the appropriate node or to the equipment connected to the end of the line, whichever
2. Apply the first or next parameter applicable.
3. Apply the first or next guideword, which in combination
with the parameter gives the deviation For each line, the study will look at the appropriate process
4. Determine deviation parameters and the key word as listed on the following table:
5. Identify all potential causes of the deviation
6. Appraise the consequences of the deviation
7. Appraise the safeguards preventing or mitigating the
deviation and its consequences
8. Agree a recommendation for action or further
consideration of the problem where required
9. Once all causes and consequences for a given deviation
have been identified and the requirement for action
discussed, the procedure returns to step 3. This process
iterates until all guidewords have been combined with a
selected parameter.
10.Once all guidewords have been considered the next the
next parameter will be selected (step 2) and the process
will be repeated until all parameters have been applied
11.Then the discussion moves to the next node and the
process will be repeated until all nodes are applied.

As mentioned above the HAZOP also includes the division of the plant
into sections/nodes.

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DETAILED METHOD STATEMENT
For each key word, the HAZOP team will list the possible causes and
the consequences regarding the operating procedures and the safety
aspects from both personnel and material point of view. If the
consequences are considered as being out of the normal operating
range, the HAZOP team will investigate the installed safeguards:
a) The detection devices, to ensure that the operator will be
aware that something abnormal is happening.
b) The safety devices installed, to limit the consequences of
the process upset. If the P&ID shows devices which are
considered adequate for the considered risk, the next key
word will be reviewed, then the next parameter, then the
next process lines or equipment.
Key aspects may include:
a) A detailed systematic study of the design and outline
operating and maintenance philosophy to identify the
consequences from design intent.
b) Consideration of transient operating conditions during
start-up, shut-down, plant upsets and emergencies.
c) Consideration of potential exposure of employees to
chemicals during routine operations including
maintenance, de-contamination, etc. If the protection by
so called safeguards indicated on the P&IDs are
considered unsafe, the HAZOP team may make
recommendations that are numbered and propose
alternative designs elaborated to satisfy all the operation
and safety requirements. These requirements will be
recorded and classified in the HAZOP Report (see below).
Final report
When the HAZOP study is completed, a final report will be prepared.
The minimum requirements for the report are as follows:
 Description of applied procedures and HAZOP technique
 Summary and description of approved HAZOP
recommendations
 Summary of operational recommendations and
limitations
 List and description of drawings and related documents
studies
 Finalised HAZOP study work sheets together with reports
from each study session including a list of participants
 Annotated copies of drawings together with supporting
documentation which were used during the examination
6
 Recommended revisions of drawings and documents (or
part thereof if more convenient) which show
modifications, identified as necessary as a result of the
HAZOP study
 Changes proposed by the HAZOP team, but not accepted,
and the reasons why the proposed changes were rejected
Team composition
The HAZOP study team shall neither be over-nor undersized. Ideally
the study is carried out by a team of 4 to 6 people plus a facilitator
and scribe. The team should be composed of the following
participants:
 the design engineer in charge for the respective facility
 the project manager (for new installations)
 the plant engineer in charge
 the maintenance engineer
 the HSE representative
 the foreman/ technician
 the facilitator and scribe
Execution of the HAZOP sessions
HAZOP Session Preparation
Prior to the HAZOP session itself the facility in question will be divided
into manageable, logical sections (nodes). Section limits can be
identified for example where there is a significant change in the
process conditions, a change in location or in material phase and
composition. Sections will preferably be identified in a way that one
section contains either gas or liquid, not both at the same time.
Reasonable divisions of a complex facility can be processing units, less
comprehensive facilities could also be sub-divided into functional
groups. The identified sections will be written in the GL section
division document. This preparatory sectioning work including the
compilation of the work sheets for each defined unit as well as the
HAZOP section division document is generally carried out by the
facilitator. Subsequent to completion the prepared documents are
subject to discussion with the operator’s representative.
 CASE STUDIES

a. Natural Gas Storage Facility - Underground Cavern

Date: 2008
Customer: Medium Size German Oil and Gas Producer
Savings: Savings not directly quantifiable

Issue:

A medium size German oil and gas producer and supplier, owned by
a major European gas exploring and producing company, requested
a process hazard analysis for its gas cavern storage facility expansion
project. GL offered the independent leadership of a HAZOP study in
order to support the company in their effort to get an early as possible
first appraisal of the integrity of the planned facilities.

Methodology & Results:

The existing and newly planned facilities were sectioned into logical
units and scrutinised in consideration of potential hazards originating
from or affecting the unit in question. Amongst the total number of
identified scenarios the majority of scenarios were classified as
non-critical. However, a significant number of recommendations
representing safety and operability issues were established.

Savings:

Savings due to this assessment can not be comprehended monetarily.

But the identification of hazards and operability issues at an early
stage of the project enabled the designer to account for this in the
consecutive planning. The obvious benefit is the reduction of the
possibility of increased expenses for potentially required corrective
measures in the course of the proceeding project.

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Safety & Risk Management Services

Safety Case and Compliance Consultancy

Hazard Identification Studies (HAZID)

 Hazard Operability Studies (HAZOP)

SIL Studies (Safety Integrity Level)

Consequence Evaluation (Fire, Release,

Germanischer Lloyd
Explosion, Dispersion), Including CFD
Industrial Services GmbH
EER Analysis (Escape, Evacuation,
Rescue) (GL-Aeneas)
Oil and Gas
Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) Steinhöft 9
20459 Hamburg, Germany
Decision Support (Risk Based Layout Studies)
Phone +49 40 36149-7700
Performance Standards Fax +49 40 36149-1781
glis@gl-group.com
Large Scale Hazards Testing (Spadeadam)

Incident Investigation www.gl-group.com/glis

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up-to-date nature, accuracy, completeness or quality of the information provided.
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unless such loss or damage is caused by the proven wilful misconduct or grossly
negligent conduct of Germanischer Lloyd.
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reserves the right without notice to change, supplement or delete parts of the pages
or the entire offer or to stop the publication temporarily or definitively.

Issue no.001 15.05.2008