When Is an Arms Rivalry a Prisoner's Dilemma?

Richardson's Models and 2× 2 Games

Author(s): Mark Irving Lichbach
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 34, No. 1 (Mar., 1990), pp. 29-56
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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When Is an Arms Rivalry a
Prisoner's Dilemma?
RICHARDSON'S MODELS AND 2 x 2 GAMES

MARK IRVINGLICHBACH
Universityof Illinois at Chicago

This articleuses the utility functionsfrom Richardsonarmsrivalry(R-AR) models to help

determinethe equilibriumoutcomesof 2 x 2 game-theoryarmsrivalry(GT-AR)models. Three
differentformulationsof a R-AR, one general and two specific, are employed. Four different
formulationsof a GT-AR,a PD armsrivalry(PD-AR), a Chickenarmsrivalry(Chicken-AR),a
Deadlock armsrivalry(Deadlock-AR),and a Stag Huntarmsrivalry(Stag Hunt-AR),are also
used. I first establishthe most generalpossible restrictionson Richardson-typeutility functions
thatdeterminethe four common2 x 2 armsrivalrygames. I then establishtwo counterintuitive
results:One of the specific formulationsof a R-AR may help imply the equilibriumoutcomes
of a PD- or Deadlock-ARbut is inconsistentwith the equilibriumoutcomes of a Chicken-or
Stag Hunt-AR;it is impossible for either specific formulationof a R-AR to ever yield the
equilibriumoutcomeof a Stag Hunt-AR.

There arethreepossible outcomes to an armsrivalrybetween two nations.

One is an "armsrace,"where both nationsspend much on arms.Anotheris
"armscontrol,"where both nations spend little on arms. A final possible
outcome is "armsdomination,"where one nationspends much on armsand
the other nation spends little. Given a particulararms rivalrybetween two
nations, how can we explain and predictwhich of the three outcomes will
occur?

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I wish to thankMichael D. McGinnisand JohnT. Williams for their

very helpfulcommentson earlierdraftsof this article.

JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION,Vol. 34 No. 1, March1990 29-56

? 1990 Sage Publications,Inc.

29
30 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

GAME-THEORY MODELS OF ARMS RIVALRIES

One importantapproachto answeringthe questionof the outcome of an

armsrivalryis to focus on the equilibriumoutcomeof the 2 x 2 armsrivalry
game thatthe nationsmight be thoughtof as playing. A 2 x 2 game-theory
armsrivalry(GT-AR)model- for example,one of Brams'(1985) formula-
tions that used the Prisoner'sDilemma (PD) -is a model of two or more
nations'weapons acquisitionprocesses in which there is an interdependent
choice of the levels of militaryexpendituresby the two nations.'
Considerany two levels of armsexpendituresof nationX, such as X1 and
X2, andof nationY. such as Y1 andY2. If X1 < X2 andY1 < Y2, then we may
refer to X1 and Y1 as "cooperation"in low armamentexpendituresand X2
andY2 as "defection"to high armamentexpenditures.The payoffs to X and
Y from the fourpossible outcomes may be representedin the following 2 x
2 matrix(Exhibit1) thatrepresentsa GT-ARmodel:
Exhibit 1: A GT-ARModel

y
Y1(C) Y2(D)

Xi (C) P. (C,C), Py (C,C) Px (C,D), Py (C,D)

X2 (D) |Px (D,C) , Py (D,C) | Px (D,D) , Py (D9D)|

NOTE: X, and Y1 representcooperation (C) or "low" armamentexpenditures;X2 and Y2

representdefection(D) or "high"armamentexpenditures;andpayoffs aredenoted,for example,
as Px (CD) [Py (D,D) ], the payoff to nationX[Y] from X's choice of C and Y's choice of D.

The GT-ARapproachproducesan answeraboutthe equilibriumoutcome

of an armsrivalry:The outcomeis a resultof the game thatnationsplay. For
example,if an armsrivalryleads to a PD, then the equilibriumoutcome will
be an "armsrace";if an armsrivalryleads to Stag Hunt,then an equilbirium
outcomewill be "armscontrol";andif an armsrivalryleads to Chicken,then
an equilibriumoutcome will be "armsdomination."
This answerto the questionof the outcome of an armsrivalryis by itself
incompletebecause it simply raises anotherquestion:If armsoutcomes are
1. There have been three types of game-theoreticmodels of arms rivalries. One uses
continuousarmsrivalriesin the staticcase and emphasizesvarioustypes of reactioncurves (see
Boulding, 1962; Case, 1979, p. 22; Friedman,1986, p. 180; Intriligator,1964). Anotheruses
continuousarmsrivalriesin the dynamiccase andemphasizesdifferentialgames (see the review
in Isardand Anderton,1985). The focus of this articleis the thirdtype, which uses 2x2 games.
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 31

the result of arms games, then which 2 x 2 game best representsan arms
rivalry? Knowing which game characterizesa particulararms rivalry is
crucialto the GT-ARapproach.Unfortunately,the answerto this questionis
in dispute. Arms rivalries take place in many different decision-making
environments.The payoff structure,the extent of mutual and conflicting
preferences,and the types of interactionsor "games"thatlead nations into
an arms rivalry are thus open questions. There are, moreover, various
game-theoreticmodels for the two actor-two choice case. Rapoportand
Guyer (1966) showed that if preferencesare strictly ordered,there are 78
conceptuallydifferent2 x 2 games. If preferencesareweakly ordered(ties
in preferencesover outcomes arepermitted),therearemorethan500 differ-
ent types of games.
Using the basic formulationof Exhibit1, analystshave thuscharacterized
armsrivalriesby manyof the 78 different2 x 2 games structures.Most have
arguedthatparticipantsin an armsrivalryareinvolvedin a PD game (Brams,
1985, chap. 3; Rapoport,1960; Russett, 1983a; Schelling, 1960; Snyder,
1971; and Snyderand Diesing, 1977). But many have suggested that other
games may representan armsrivalry:Chicken,Deadlock,andStag Huntare
commonly used. More generally,analystshave arguedthat it is possible to
representan armsrivalryby several different2 x 2 games. Schelling (1984:
244-247) analyzed16 different2 x 2 armsgames thathe consideredthe most
likely to occur. Downs et al. (1985) offered 12 different2 x 2 games that
potentiallygeneratearms rivalriesand even arguedthat "undersufficiently
unluckycircumstancesalmost any game can resultin an arms race" (p. 133,
emphasisin original).Hardin(1983) suggested seven different2 x 2 games
thatmay generatethe nucleararmsrivalrybetweenthe UnitedStatesandthe
Soviet Union. Evidently,as Downs andRocke (1987: 302) put it, "no single
game characterizesall armsraces."
One consequence of this uncertaintyis that the connection between an
arms rivalry and a PD has been nebulous and confused. Questions, for
example, have been raisedaboutthe conditionsunderwhich an armsrivalry
is really a PD. Many contend that a particulararms rivalrydoes not fit the
PD payoff structure,or that a particularPD arms rivalry has changed its
payoff structureand hence is no longer a PD. No one, however,has offered
precise guidelines for determiningthese conditions;only informalspecula-
tions or suggestionshave been made aboutthe relevanceof internalfactors
(for example, bureaucraticpolitics or the military-industrialcomplex, as in
Russett, 1983b) or the technology of war (for example, its offensive or
defensive nature,as in Jervis, 1978). Althougheveryonerecognizesthatnot
all arms rivalries fit the PD model, no one has outlined an approachthat
indicates which ones do. Gowa (1986: 172), for example, has pointed out
32 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

that Axelrod arguedthatthe PD fits armsrivalries(as well as otherinterna-

tional phenomena)but "does not offer any clues to his rationalefor distin-
guishingbetween problemsin internationalpolitics thatareonly 'related'to
(p. 4) PD games andthosethat'takethe form'(p. 190) of PD games."Another
consequenceof the uncertaintyis thatthe connectionbetweenan armsrivalry
and Chicken has also been nebulous and confused. While some (Hardin,
1983) have modeledan armsrivalryusing Chicken,Downs et al. (1985: 121)
arguedthat"Chickenis highly unstable,however, and not a realisticmodel
for an arms race as continual defection."
The linkage between arms rivalries and GT-AR models has also been
confusedbecause the same games, such as PD, Chicken,Deadlock andStag
Hunt,that have been used to representan armsrivalryhave also been used
to representseveral other phenomena in internationalrelations:war, (nu-
clear) deterrence,bargaining,crises, alliance formation,tradewars, and the
general problemof internationalcooperationunderanarchy.Dacey (1987:
165) thus refersto the "armsrace/deterrencegame,"whereasSnyder(1971)
arguesthatdeterrenceis best modeledas Chickenandan armsrivalryas PD.
Such confusion has not gone unnoticed. Gowa (1986: 172) pointed out
that "there is a growing literaturefocused precisely on the issue of the
applicability of PDs and other game theoretic concepts to the study of
internationalrelations."We evidently need a close examinationof the appli-
cability of the game-theoryframeworkto armsrivalries.

RICHARDSON MODELS OF ARMS RIVALRIES

The disputeover themost appropriateGT-ARmodelhasoccurredbecause

GT-AR modelers have not inquiredinto the process that generatesprefer-
ences over outcomes.No one has asked,Whatmechanismsin armsrivalries
generate the particular2 x 2 arms rivalry games that, in turn, produce
equilibriumarmsoutcomes?For example,what producesa PD armsrivalry
ratherthan a Deadlock arms rivalry?The typical procedurein the GT-AR
literaturewas shown above:Posit nations'utilitiesforpossible outcomesand
label payoffs by single parametersrepresentingordinalpreferenceorderings
(Brams,1985, p. 90; Dacey, 1987, p. 165; Downs et al., 1985, p. 121; Russett,
1983a, p. 101). No one, however, has inquired into the origins of these
rankingsin an armsrivalry.2This gap severely limits game-theoreticmodels
2. 1 now speak of the 2 x 2 game formulationsof arms rivalries,not of the dynamicgame
formulationsas in Isardand Anderton(1985). The "graduated"game models of Snidal (1981,
1985) and McGinnis(1988) come closest to examininghow continuousRichardson-typeutility
functionsyield 2x2 games.
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYANDPRISONER'SDILEMMA 33

of arms rivalriesbecause such models are more realistic if the process by

which payoffsor utilitiesaregeneratedis specified.As Morrow(1986: 1131)
argued, "rationalchoice models are most compelling when the actor's
utilities for outcomes can be tied to primitivequantities."Simply assuming
the existence of particularpreferenceorderingsis inherentlyunsatisfying.
The classic statementof the process behindan armsrivalrywas made by
Richardson(1960). A Richardsonarmsrivalry(R-AR) model is one of two
or morenations'militaryexpenditureprocessesin which each nation'schoice
of the level of its militaryexpendituresis partiallydependentupon what the
other nation(s) does.3All such models assume that the change in a nation's
arms expenditures is a function of the external threat created by the
opponent's arms and the internalfatigue createdby one's own arms. The
variationsin the models come in how one's own and one's opponentsarms
entera nation'sexpenditurefunction.
The R-AR approachalso producesan answerto the equilibriumoutcome
of an arms rivalry:The outcome is a resultof the grievances nationshave,
the fatiguecomingfrom a nation'sown expenditureson arms,andthe threats
coming from the other nation'sexpenditureson arms. Richardsonshowed,
for example, that given low grievances, low threats,and high fatigue, an
equilibriumoutcome may exist and be stable at a low level of armaments
(Zinnes, 1976: 339-354).
Because the process behind armsrivalriesare exploredin R-AR models
but not GT-ARmodels, perhapsthe conditionsthatproducea particular2 x
2 armsrivalrygame may be sought in Richardson'sapproachto explaining
the equilibriumoutcomes of armsrivalries.This articletries to accountfor
the equilibriumoutcomes of armsrivalriesin a more satisfactoryway than
do existing GT-ARmodels by using R-AR models to help formulateGT-AR
models. In other words, I do more than simply posit that both nations in a
GT-ARreceivepayoffs.I relatea nation'spayoffor utilityfunctionin a 2 x 2
game to a Richardson-typearms-acquisitionprocess.
Hence the specific questionthatguides this article:Whatare the condi-
tions, if any, under which the utilityfunctions of a particular R-ARmodel
help determinethe equilibriumoutcomes of a particular GT-ARmodel? I
investigate this question by using Richardson-typeassumptions about a
nation'sutilityfunctionto constructparticular2 x 2 armsrivalrygames, ones
with particularpreferenceorderingsover armsrivalryoutcomes and partic-
ularequilibriumoutcomes.This articlefills an importantgap.Althoughthere
is muchinformalspeculationaboutthe sourcesof various2 x 2 armsrivalry
3. For an overview of the literatureon Richardson-typearmsrivalries,see Zinnes (1976),
Intriligator(1982), Anderton(1985a, b), Isard and Anderton(1985), and Leidy and Staiger
(1985).
34 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

games, there are no formal demonstrationsof the conditions(if any) under

which an armsrivalrymodeledby Richardson-typeutility functionsimplies,
for example, the preferenceorderingand equilibriumoutcome of a PD.
My results are highly general.I first establish the most generalpossible
restrictionson Richardson-typeutilityfunctionsthatdeterminefourcommon
2 x 2 arms rivalrygames: a PD Arms Rivalry (PD-AR), a Deadlock arms
rivalry (Deadlock-AR), a Chicken arms rivalry (Chicken-AR),and a Stag
Huntarmsrivalry(Stag Hunt-AR).I thenestablishthe games thatmay occur
undertwo commonly used but more specific Richardson-typeutility func-
tions. Two counterintuitiveresultsemerge:(1) It is impossiblefor one of the
commonlyused Richardson-typeutilityfunctionsto ever lead to a Chicken-
or Stag Hunt-AR;and (2) it is impossible for eitherof the commonly used
Richardson-typeutility functionsever to lead to a Stag Hunt-AR.

THE ASSUMPTIONS

There are three sets of assumptionsmade in the models developed here:

general assumptionsaboutAR models, assumptionsaboutthe utility func-
tions of R-AR models, and assumptionsabout the preferenceorderingsof
GT-ARmodels.

GENERALARASSUMPTIONS

I begin with six assumptionsaboutthe natureof the armsrivalrythatwill

be explored.Due to space constraints,I can offer no justificationshere (see
Lichbach,1989).

ASSUMPTIONAl: Two nations,X and Y, areinvolved in the armsrivalry.

ASSUMPTIONA2: The only strategiesavailable to nations X and Y are

levels of defense expenditures.

ASSUMPTIONA3: Each nationis a unitaryactor.

ASSUMPTIONA4: Each nationis a utility maximizer.

ASSUMPTIONA5: The nations play a noncooperativegame of complete

information.4

4. These rulesof the game lead me to analyzeNash pure-strategyequilibria.I do notconsider

mixed-strategyequilibriabecause it appearsfarfetchedto conceptualizenations as "spinning
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 35

ASSUMPTIONA6: Nations make a one-shot binarychoice of armaments

from among a continuumof possible armamentlevels.5

R-AR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT UTILITY FUNCTIONS

What are the sources of a state's preferences about the possession of

armaments?What are its intentionsand goals that are affectedby its arma-
ment procurement?As indicatedpreviously,Richardsondeveloped several
variationsof his basic model while subsequentanalystsproposedadditional
ones. In this section, I propose three differentvariantsof Richardson-type
utility functions.I first considerthe most general possible Richardson-type
utility functionthatdeterminesfourcommon2 x 2 armsrivalrygames.I then
examine two commonly used, but more specific, Richardson-typeutility
functions.

A General R-AR Model

The most general assumptionabout a R-AR utility function is that each
nation'sutility is a functionof its own armsand the othernation's arms:

ASSUMPTIONSB1: The two nationshave the following utility functions:

UX= UX(X,Y) [2.1]

UY= Uy (X,Y) [2.2]

Where

Ux andUy aretheutilitylevelsof X andY;and

X andY arethearmsexpenditures of X andY.

spinnersor rollingdice" (Ordeshook,1986: 181) to choose armamentlevels, andbecausemixed

strategiesproduceparadoxesin interpretation (AumannandMaschler,1972). Hence, theconcept
of mixed strategies"does not offer a useful model of choice" (Ordeshook,1986: 137) in the
contextof armsrivalries.Foran attempttojustify mixed-strategyequilibria,see Harsanyi(1973).
5. The first five assumptionsare commonto both modeling traditions.The final assumption
is not, for while GT-AR models adopt this assumption,R-AR models typically assume that
players choose from among a continuumof armamentlevels over time. How do the two arms
expendituresat one time in the 2x2 models correspondto the continuumof armsexpenditures
over time in the Richardsonmodel? One possibilityis thatif the Richardsonmodel hadmultiple
equilibria,the 2x2 game moves would correspondto choosing amongthose stable levels. But I
do not wish to push this equivalencetoo far:Binaryone-shot choices are clearly differentthan
continuous choices made over time. I need not establish the exact equivalence between the
approachesbecausethe purposeof thisarticleis notto comparetheconclusionsaboutequilibrium
from the two models-it is to explore how the assumptionsaboutthe utility functions behind
R-AR models help determineGT-ARmodels.
36 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

If one assumesthatnationsmay choose from amonga continuumof possible

armamentlevels, then one may use resultsfrom Friedman(1986: 29-46) to
impose restrictionson (2.1) and (2.2) to establishthe existence andunique-
ness of an equilibriumpoint in the continuousarmsrivalrybetween nations
X and Y I am concernedwith the equilibriumoutcomes of the 2 x 2 arms
games often discussed in the literature.Hence, I assume (A6) that nations
make binarychoices and impose restrictionson (2.1) and (2.2) to establish
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibriumoutcome of the 2 x 2 AR
game the nationsmay be thoughtof as playing.
To produce restrictions on the preference orderings and equilibrium
outcomesof the 2 x 2 games consideredhere,it turnsoutthatonly the mildest
of restrictionson (2.1) and (2.2) are required.Two sets of restrictionsare on
the first-orderpartialderivatives, or how X and Y separatelyaffect each
nation'sutility.A thirdset of restrictionsis on the total differentials,or how
X and Y togetheraffect each nation'sutility.
The first set of possible assumptionsrelateto how increasesin a nation's
own arms affect the nation's utility. One assumptionis that increases in a
nation'sown armsalways increasethe nation'sutility:

ASSUMPTIONB1.1: Over the intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, aUX/aX> 0

and aluyiY > 0.

Two other assumptionsare that, dependingupon the level of the other

nation's armaments,increases in a nation's own arms sometimes increase
and sometimes decreasethe nation'sutility:

ASSUMPTIONB1.1': Overthe intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, aUx/aX > 0

if YsY1 and aUx/aX< 0 if Y > Y1;and aUY/aY> 0 if X 5 X1 and auy / aY <
OifX>X1.
ASSUMPTIONB1.1": Over the intervalsX1 to X2 and Y1 to Y2, aui aX <
0 if Y 5 Y1 and alu /X > 0 if Y > Y1; and auy/aY < 0 if X 5 X1 and aUy/aY
>OifX>X1.
The second set of possible assumptionsrelateto how increasesin the other
nation's armsaffect a nation'sutility.The only assumptionrequiredhere is
thatincreasesin the othernation'sarmsalways decreasethe nation'sutility:

ASSUMPTIONB1.2: Overthe intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, aUxlaY < 0

and aUy/aX < 0.
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYANDPRISONER'SDILEMMA 37

The thirdset of possible assumptionscombinethe firsttwo and statehow

increases in a nation's own and the other nation's arms affect the nation's
utility. One assumptionis that the positive impactof increasesin a nation's
own arms on its utility (in B1.1, B1.1', or B1.1 ") is outweighed by the
negative impactof increasesin the othernation's armson its utility (131.2);
thus, the total impactof increasesin the armsof both nationsis to decrease
the nation'sutility:

ASSUMPTIONB1.3: Over the intervalsX1 to X2 and Y1 to Y2,

dUx = (aUx/3X) dX + (aUx/aY) dY < 0

dUy = (3Uy/IY) dY + (aUy/aX) dX < 0

The alternativeassumption is that the positive impact of increases in a

nation's own arms on its utility (B1.1) outweighs the negative impact of
increases in the other nation's arms on its utility (B1.2), and thus the total
impactof increasesin the armsof bothnationsis to increasethenation'sutility:6

ASSUMPTIONB1.3': Over the intervalsXjto X2 and Y1 to Y2,

dUx = (aUx/aX) dX + (aUx/aY) dY > 0

dUy = (3Uy/3Y) dY + (aUy/aX) dY > 0

A Specific R-AR Model

A more specific R-AR assumptionaboututility functions, employed by
Downs and Rocke (1987: 309) and Friedman(1986: 180), is the following:

ASSUMPTIONB2: The two nationshave the following utility functions:

Ux = kx (X-Y) - jX X2 [2.3]

Uy = ky (Y-X) - lyy2 [2.4]

Where

kx andky are the threatparametersof X and Y; and

1x and 1 are the fatigueparametersof X and Y.

6. Note that because dX, dY > 0, the following are true:assumptionB1.1, B1.1', or BL1"
can be combinedwith assumptionB1.2 to produceassumptionB1.3; assumptionB1.1 can be
combined with assumptionB1.2 to produce assumptionB1.3'; however, neither assumption
B1.1' nor B1.1" can be combinedwith assumptionB1.2 to produceassumptionB1.3'.
38 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

Assume, in other words, that a nation's utility function is affected by the

threatposed by the other state's weapons, how these threatsare offset by
one's own weapons, and by the burdenthat one's weapons place on one's
own economy.
Importantpropertiesof this R-AR utility function are revealedby taking
derivatives.Considerthe partialderivativesof U,, with respectto Y.:
a Ux(- [2.5]

a2Ux [2.6]
ay2

Note thatthe partialderivativeof Ux with respectto Y, as shown in (2.5), is

alwaysnegative.Moreover,as shownin (2.6), as its rival'smilitarycapability
increases, a state always loses utility at a constantrate. The threatfrom Y
thereforedoes not varywith levels of Y. One mightargue,however,thatvery
highlevels of Y's armamentexpenditureswill usuallybe morethreateningto X.
A similarissue may be raisedwith respectto the partialderivativesof Us;
with respectto X:

auX= kx- 21xX [2.7]

ax

a Ux= [2.8]
ax2

Note that the marginalutility of Ux with respect to X, as shown in (2.7),

increasesto some maximumandthendecreases.Moreover,as shownin (2.8),
it increasesat a decreasingrateand thendecreasesat an increasingrate.This
representsthe fatigue due to opportunitycosts as X approachesthe state's
budget constraint.But note again that this partialderivativeis independent
of Y. Hence, if aUx/aX > 0 for some value of Y, then it is positive for all
values of Y. This will be shown to have dramaticconsequencesfor the type
of GT-ARmodel allowed.

Another Specific R-AR Model

It appearsthat an additionalR-AR formulation,one that is more flexible
in its linkage to certainGT-ARs,is needed. Considerthe following assump-
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYANDPRISONER'SDILEMMA 39

tion adopted by Gillespie et al. (1977), McGuire (1982), and McGinnis

(1985):
ASSUMPTIONB3: The two nationshave the following utility functions:

U = kx,(X_py)2 X
1xX2 [2.9]

UY= ky (Y- qX)2- lyY2 [2.10]

Wherep(q) is the minimumsecuritylevel of Y's (X's) armamentsacceptable

toX(Y),p,q>0.
Importantpropertiesof this R-AR model are also revealed by taking
derivatives.Considerthe partialderivativesof Ux with respectto Y:

ay = 2pkx(pY- X) [2.11]

a2Ux 2 [2.12]
2= 2p kx

Note thatthe partialderivativeof Ux with respectto Y, as shown in (2.11), is

negative when X > pY and positive when X < pY Moreover,as shown in
(2.12), as its rival's militaryexpendituresincrease,a state loses utility at a
decreasingrate or gains utility at an increasingrate.Hence, Y's threatto X
now varies with levels of Y: When X > pY, very high levels of Y are
marginallyless threateningto X.
Now considerthe partialderivativesof Ux with respectto X:
au, = 2kx 2.3
ax (X - pY) - 1xX [2.13]

ax2 = 2 (kx - 1) [2.14]

Note that the marginalutility of Ux with respect to X, as shown in (2.13),

given thatX > pY, is positive if the first termon the RHS of (2.13) exceeds
the second term.Equation(2.14) indicatesthatthis marginalutilityincreases
(decreases) at an increasingrate if kx > 1, and increases (decreases) at a
decreasingrateif kx < l, This representsthe fatiguedue to opportunitycosts
as X approachesthe state'sbudgetconstraint.Note thatthis fatiguefactoris
dependenton Y. As Y increases, X's gain from more X always decreases.
This propertywill also be shown to have dramaticconsequencesfor the type
of GT-ARallowed.
40 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

GT-AR ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT PREFERENCE ORDERINGS

Given ordinalpreferences,78 different2 x 2 games may be constructed

(Rapoportand Guyer,1966). I focus here on four 2 x 2 armsrivalrygames,
all with symmetricalpayoffs, that have been most often mentionedin the
literatureas possible representationsof armsrivalries:PD, Chicken,Dead-
lock, and Stag Hunt.7A comparisonof the payoffs from all four games is
given in Exhibit2.
Exhibit2: Four2 x 2 Arms RivalryGames

PD Chicken Deadlock Stag Hunt

C D C D C D C D

C 3,3 1,4 3,3 2,4* 2,2 1,4 4,4* 1,3

D 4,1 2,2 *+ 4,2* 1,1 4,1 3,3 *+ 3,1 2,2

NOTE: Cell numbersreferto ordinallyrankedpreferences;4 = best, 1 = worst. The first entry

is the payoff to nation X, the second to nation Y. * = Nash noncooperativeequilibrium,+ =
dominantstrategyequilibrium.

The preferenceorderingsof these symmetricalGT-ARmodels for nation

X may be summarizedas follows:

ASSUMPTIONCl: Px (D,C) > Px (C,C) > Px (D,D) > Px (C,D) (PD).

ASSUMPTIONC2: Px (D,C) > Px (C,C) > Px (C,D) > Px (D,D) (Chicken).
ASSUMPTIONC3: Px (D,C) > Px (D,D) > Px (C,C) > Px (C,D) (Deadlock).
ASSUMPTIONC4: Px (C,C) > Px (D,C) > Px (D,D) > Px (C,D) (Stag Hunt).

Note that, again for brevity,I referto a GT-ARwhere assumptionC1 holds

as a Cl-arms rivalry (Cl-AR), or as a Prisoner's Dilemma arms rivalry
(PD-AR). A similarreferencingprocedureholds for assumptionsC2-C4.
Note how the assumptionsbehindthe utility functionsintroducedearlier
relateto the assumptionsbehindthepreferenceorderingsof these fourgames.
The first set of utility function assumptions,how X's utility is affected by
changesin its own arms,relatesto verticalmoves in the game,or moves from
mutualcooperationto X's unilateraldefection and Y's unilateraldefection
to mutual defection. Such moves are always beneficial to X in PD and
Deadlock, but are harmfulto X when Y defects in Chickenand cooperates
7. For a review of the "stories"behindthese games, see Oye (1985: 7-8).
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYANDPRISONER'SDILEMMA 41

in Stag Hunt. Hence, in these four games, nations do not always prefer to
spendmoreon arms.The second set of utilityfunctionassumptions,how X's
utility is affected by changes in its opponent's arms, relates to horizontal
moves in the game, or moves from mutual cooperationto Y's unilateral
defection and from X's unilateralcooperation to mutual defection. Such
moves are harmfulto X in all four games, and hence in these games nations
always preferthattheiropponentsspendless on arms.The thirdset of utility
function assumptions,how X's utility is affected by changes in its own and
its opponent'sarms,relates to diagonal moves in the game, or moves from
mutualcooperationto mutualdefection.Such moves areharmfulto X in PD,
Chicken, and Stag Hunt, but beneficial to X in Deadlock. In these games,
nationsmaypreferanarmsraceto armscontrol,or armscontrolto anarmsrace.

THE GENERAL R-AR MODEL

Using assumptionsA1-A6, the B1-AR may be representedas the follow-

ing game (Exhibit3):

Exhibit3: The Bl-AR Game

y
Y. (C) Y2(D)

X1 ( U, (Xi, Y0) UY (X1, Y1) Uy (X1, Y2), UY (X1, Y2)

X .

X2 (D) Ux NX, Y1), UY (X2, Y1) U, (X2, YA) UY NX, Y2)

Threehighly generalsets of restrictionson Ux andUYwere suggestedearlier.

Which arethe sufficientconditionsthatallow this most generalRichardson-
type armsrivalryto producea PD, Chicken,Deadlock, or Stag Huntgame?
This section assesses the ability of the highly general restrictionson the
B 1-AR modelto yield the equilibriumoutcomesof C1-AR to C4-ARmodels.

PD

The following propositionestablishesthe restrictionson utility functions

(2.1) and (2.2) that are sufficientfor a Bl-AR to be a Cl-AR (PD).
42 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

PROPOSITION3.1: Given A1-A6, if B1.1 andB1.3 hold, then an armsrace

is the Nash equilibriumoutcomeof Exhibit3.
PROOF:B1.1 implies Px (D,C) > Px (C,C) and Px (D,D) > Px (C,D). B1.3
implies Px (C,C) > Px (D,D). Combiningyields a preferenceorderingas in
PD. A similarresultholds for Y, andthus mutualnoncooperationis the Nash
equilibrium.QED

Hence, the resultsproducea classic summaryof a PD-AR in Richardsonian

terms:If, over the intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, X's (Y's) gains from X's
(Y's) armsare always positive (B1.1), but X's (Y's) gains from X's and Y's
armsare always negative (B1i.3),then both nationsare in a PD.

CHICKEN

The following propositionestablishesthe restrictionson utility functions

(2.1) and (2.2) that are sufficientfor a B1-AR to be a C2-AR (Chicken).

PROPOSITION3.2: Given A1-A6, if B1.1' and B1.2 hold, then the arms
dominationoutcomes are the Nash equilibriaof Exhibit3.
PROOF: B1.1' implies Px(D,C) > Px(C,C) and PX(C,D)> PX(D,D).B1.2
implies Px(C,C)> Px(CD) [as well as Px(D,C) > PX(D,D),which is redun-
dant].Combiningyields a preferenceorderingas in Chicken.A similarresult
holds for Y. and thus the unilateraldefections are the Nash equilibria.QED

Hence, the results produce a classic summary of a Chicken-AR in

Richardsonianterms:If, over the intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, X's (Y's)
gains from X's (Y's) armsare positive at a low Y (X) but negative at a high
Y (X) (B 1.1'), andX's (Y's) gains fromX's andY's armsarealwaysnegative
(B1.2), thenboth nationsare in a Chickengame.

DEADLOCK

The following propositionestablishesthe restrictionson utility functions

(2.1) and (2.2) that are sufficientfor a B1-AR to be a C3-AR (Deadlock).

PROPOSITION3.3: GivenA1-A6, if B1.2 andB1.3' hold, then an armsrace

is the Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit3.
PROOF: B1.2 implies Px(CC) > Px(CD) and Px(DC) > PX(DD). B1.3'
implies Px (D,D) > Px(CC). Combiningyields a preferenceorderingas in
Deadlock.A similarresultholds for Y. andthusmutualnoncooperationis the
Nash equilibrium.QED
 PRISONER'SDILEMMA 43
Lichbach/ARMS RIVALRYAND

Hence, the results produce a classic summary of a Deadlock-AR in

Richardsonianterms:If, over the intervalsX1 to X2 andY1 to Y2, X's (Y's)
gains from Y's (X's) arms are always negative (B11.2)but X's (Y's) gains
from X's and Y's armsare always positive (B1.3'), then both nationsare in
a Deadlock game.

STAG HUNT

The following propositionestablishesthe restrictionson utility functions

(2.1) and (2.2) that are sufficientfor a B1-AR to be a C4-AR (Stag Hunt).

PROPOSITION3.4: GivenA1-A6, if B1.1" andB1.2 hold,thenarmscontrol

is a Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit3.
PROOF:B1.1" implies Px (C,C) > PX(DC) and Px (D,D) > Px (C,D). B1.2
implies PX(D,C)> Px (D,D) [as well as Px(C,C) > Px (C,D), which is
redundant].Combining yields a preference ordering as in Stag Hunt. A
similarresultholds for Y, andthusmutualcooperationis a Nash equilibrium.
QED

Hence, the results produce a classic summary of a Stag Hunt-AR in

Richardsonianterms:If, over the intervalsXI to X2 and Y, to Y2, X's (Y's)
gains from X's (Y's) armsare negative at a low Y (X) but positive at a high
Y (X) (B1.1"), and X's (Y's) gains from Y's (X's) armsare always negative
(B1.2), then both nationsare in a Stag Huntgame.
In Summary,PD, Chicken,Deadlock, and Stag Hunt arms rivalriesmay
exist from a Richardsonianperspective.Quite general restrictionson Rich-
ardson-typeutilityfunctionsmay producethe preferenceorderingsandNash
equilibriaof the four most commonly discussed 2 x 2 arms rivalrygames.
Given thatthe restrictionsareall individuallyreasonabledescriptionsof real
world armsrivalries,such realworld armsrivalriesmay indeed approximate
certain2 x 2 games. These results aboutthe use of Richardson-typeutility
functions in 2 x 2 GT-ARmodels are gratifyingfor two reasons:We now
know, in one importantsense, thatthe two traditionsare consistentand that
2 x 2 GT-ARmodels are realistic.
But just because highly general Richardson-typeutility functions can
producecertain2 x 2 armsrivalrygames does not meanthatall conceivable
Richardson-typeutility functionscan produceall conceivable 2 x 2 games.
Specific Richardson-typeutility functionsembody specific restrictionsthat
may make certain 2 x 2 arms rivalry games impossible. This potential
situationis investigatedin the next two sections.
44 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

THE FIRST SPECIFIC R-AR MODEL

Using assumptionsA1-A6, the B2-AR maybe representedas the game in

Exhibit4.
Exhibit4: The B2-AR Game

Y
Y1 (C) Y2 (D)

X1 (C) k. (XI-YI) - 1X12, ky (Y1- X1) - 1y Y12 k. (X1-Y2) - 1X12, ky (Y2- X1) - ly Y2
x
X2 (D) k. (X2-Yl) - 1xX2, k (Y1- X2) - Y
l2 k. (X2-Y2) - 1,X22, ky Xy2
2- - ly Y2

Note thatthe armsrivalryoriginsof armsrivalrypayoffs is specified more

exactly in Exhibit4 thanwas possible in Exhibits1-3. But arethe restrictions
involved in utility functions (2.3) and (2.4) sufficient to produce a PD,
Chicken,Deadlock, or Stag Huntgame? This section assesses the ability of
the highly specific restrictionson the B2-AR model to yield the equilibrium
outcomes of Cl-AR to C4-AR models.

THE PD-AR

The following proposition shows what inequality is needed for this

B2-AR to be a PD.

PROPOSITIONS4.1: Given assumptionsA1-A6, if

-
(X1 + X2) + lx(X j) > (X1 + X2) [4.1]
lxX2 -X1) 'l l x

then an armsrace is the Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit4.

PROOF:Cl lists three conditions,found in the appendix,for a PD to exist
given utility functions (2.3) and (2.4). First, Px(DC) > Px(C,C). Second,
Px(D,D) > PX(CD). Note that these two conditions are equivalent.Third,
Px(CC) > PX(D,D).Combiningand rearrangingthese conditionsyields the
generalconditionon preferenceorderingsfor B2-AR to be a PD-AR in (4.1).
Hence, if (4.1) holds, Exhibit 4 is a PD, and mutualnoncooperationis the
Nash equilibrium.QED
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 45

Anotherconditionsometimes imposedon the PD is

2R>T+S [4.2]

This eliminatesthe possibilityof an alternatingsolution:X receives T andY

receives S on one round,then X receives S andY receives T on the next. B2
implies this PD conditionif
+ [kx(Xi-Y2)-1jXi2] [4.3]
> [kx(X2-Y1)-1XX22]
2[kx(Xi-Yi)-1XXI2I
This reduces to the simplification of Px(CC) > PX(DD) shown in the
appendix,and addsnothingnew to (4.1).
What does Proposition4.1 say? First, consider what each of the three
componentssay. Px(DC) > Px(CC) implies thatthe gains to X from being
the exploiterexceed its gains frommutualcooperation.The simplificationof
this expression, listed in the appendix,says that (a) if the "threat/fatigue"
ratio(kx/1x)is high, then the armsrace is a PD; but (b) if the sum of the two
possible levels of militaryexpenditures(X1+X2)is high, then the armsrace
is not a PD. In otherwords, at high levels of militaryexpenditures,fatigue
overwhelmsthreatandthe stateno longerprefersto spendmore on its arms.
Px(D,D) > PX(C,D)implies thatthe gains to X frommutualdefection exceed
its gains frombeing exploited. Given thatthe same analysisholds here as in
PX(D,C)> PX(C,C),if the threat/fatigueratio is low or the total level of
militaryexpendituresis high, C will alwaysbe preferredto D andthe B2-AR
game becomes a simple game of coordination.PX(C,C)> PX(D,D)implies
thatX's gains frommutualcooperationexceed its gains from mutualdefec-
tion. The simplificationof this expression,listed in the appendix,says that
in orderfor X to prefermutualcooperationto mutualdefection the threat/
fatigue ratio,kx/lx, must be less thanthe sum of the two possible armament
levels, X1 + X2, plus the threat/fatigueratiotimes the ratioof the increasein
Y's armamentsto the increase in X's armaments,kx(Y2-Y1)/1X(X2-X1).
Note thatfor Px(D,C)> Px(C,C)to hold, kx/1x> (X1+X2).The first termon
the RUS of the Px(CC) > PX(D,D)condition,X1 + X2, is, by itself, less than
kx/1x.Thus the last termon the RUS, kx(Y2-Y1)/1x(X2-X1),must be large
enough to offset the difference.This is less likely if the changes in Y are
smallerthanthe changesin X. Forsymmetricgames,the ratiobecomes 1 and
the conditionalways holds. The termgets at the relativesize of the changes
in armamentlevels: The changes in Y must be as threateningas those in X
are attractive.
Now, put all three componentstogetheras in (4.1). Proposition4.1 thus
says thatfor a PD to exist, X's losses frommutualdefectionmustexceed X's
46 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

gains from its unilateraldefection, which must exceed X's costs from its
unilateraldefection. The dilemmais as follows: The inducementto cooper-
ation, (X1+X2) + kx(Y2-Y1) / lx(X2-Xl) > kx/lx, and the inticement to
defection, kx/1x> (X1+X2),are linked together.That is, the condition for a
PD arms rivalry is that the rewardsfrom mutual cooperationexceed the
rewardsfromone's own unilateralnoncooperation(thus,cooperate),but the
rewardsfrom one's own unilateralnoncooperationexceed the cost of one's
own unilateralcooperation(thus, defect).
What do these results imply about the equilibriumof the PD-AR? The
conditionin the appendixfor PX(D,D)> PX(C,D)must hold for both players
in orderfor (D,D) to be a Nash equilibrium.Thus, a Nash equilibriumat
(D,D) occursin the B2-AR if, foreach nation,its threat/fatigueratiois greater
thanthe sum of its two possible levels of militaryexpenditures.

CHICKEN

The next proposition shows that while a B2-AR may, under certain
conditions,become a PD game, thereare no conditionsunderwhich it may
become a Chickengame.

PROPOSITION4.2: Given assumptionsA1-A6, B2 andC2 areinconsistent.

PROOF:C2 lists the requirementsfor a Chickengame to exist, Px(DC) >
Px(CC) > PX(C,D)> PX(D,D).Hence, Px(DC) > Px(CC) and Px(CD) >
Px(D,D).The appendixshows that,except in thetrivialcase whereall payoffs
are the same, these two requirementsare inconsistent.QED

DEADLOCK

The following propositionshows what inequalityis needed for a B2-AR

to be a Deadlockgame.

PROPOSITION4.3: Given assumptionsA1-A6, if

- Y) [4.4]
(+X)+kx(Y2 >kx
+x(X2 -x1) 1x

then an armsrace is the Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit4.

PROOF:C3 lists three conditions, found in the appendix,for a Deadlock
game to exist given utilityfunctions(2.3) and(2.4). First,Px(DC) > PX(DD).
Second, Px(C,C)> PX(CD).These conditionsare always fulfilled because it
is assumedthatY2 > Y1. Third,PX(DD) > Px(CC), or (4.4). Hence, if (4.4)
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 47

holds, Exhibit 4 is a Deadlock game, and mutual noncooperation is the Nash

equilibrium. QED

STAG HUNT

The next proposition shows that while a B2-AR may, under certain
conditions, become a PD or Deadlock game, there are no conditions under
which it may become a Stag Hunt game.

PROPOSITION 4.4: Given assumptions A1-A6, B2 and C4 are inconsistent.

PROOF: C4 lists the requirements for a Stag Hunt game to exist, Px(CC) >
Px(DC) > Px(DD) > Px(CD). Hence, Px(CC) > PX(DC) and Px(DD) >
PX(CD). The appendix shows that, except in the trivial case where all payoffs
are the same, these two requirement are inconsistent. QED

In sum, commonly used Richardson-type utility functions (2.3 and 2.4)

may, under certain conditions, be a PD or Deadlock game, but there are no
conditions under which there may be a Chicken or Stag Hunt game. If one
believes that utility functions (2.3) and (2.4) are a realistic representation of
an arms rivalry, then one must also believe that a Chicken-AR and a Stag
Hunt-AR are unrealistic representations of that arms rivalry.

THE SECOND SPECIFIC R-AR MODEL

Using assumptions A1-A6, the B3-AR may be represented as the game in

Exhibit 5.

Exhibit 5: The B3-AR Game

y
Y. Y2

|X1 kx (Xl-pY1) - 1,Xx2 Iy (Y1- qX) -l_ Y12 kX (Xl-pY2)2 - lXX12, ky (Y2- qX)2 - ly Y2
XI

X2 kx (X2-pYl)2 - 1XX2, ky (Yj- qX2) - ly Y1 kx (X2-pYj)2 - 1XX22, ky (Y2- qX2)2 - ly y22

PD

The following proposition shows what inequality is needed for this B3-AR
to be a PD.
48 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

PROPOSITION5.1: Given AssumptionsA1-A6, if

[ kx] [X2 ]>X2 [5.1]

- kx(XlpYl)2
1X(X22-Xi2)>kx(X2-py2)2 [5.2]

then an armsrace is the Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit5.

PROOF:Cl lists three conditions,found in the appendix,for a PD to exist
given utility functions (2.9) and (2.10). First, Px(D,C) > Px(C,C). Second,
Px(D,D) > Px(C,D).Note thatthese two conditionsareno longer equivalent.
However,Y2 > Y1, andthe LHS of both expressionsarethe same. Only (5.1)
holds as a PD requirementhere. Third,Px(C,C)> PX(D,D),or (5.2). Hence,
if (5.1) and (5.2) hold, Exhibit5 is a PD, and mutualnoncooperationis the
Nash equilibrium.QED

The crucialdifferencebetweenthe two specific R-AR models discussedhere

is that two of the conditions for a PD, Px(D,C) > Px(C,C)and Px(D,D) >
PX(C,D), are equivalent for a B2-AR and different for a B3-AR. This
difference does not affect the possibility of the two specific R-AR models
becoming PD-ARs, but will have crucialimplicationsfor the R-AR models
becoming Chicken-ARs.

CHICKEN

The following propositionshows what inequalityis needed for a B3-AR

to be a Chickengame.

PROPOSITION5.2: Given AssumptionsA1-A6, if

PY2 > [k X ][ +X2 ] PY1 [5.3]

then the two arms-dominationoutcomes are the Nash equilibria of Ex-

hibit 5.
PROOF:C2 lists threeconditions,foundin the appendix,for a Chickengame
to exist. First, PX(D,C)> Px (C,C). Second, Px(C,D) > Px(D,D). These two
conditionsmay be combinedinto (5.3). Third,Px(C,C)> PX(C,D),which is
always fulfilled because it is assumed that Y2 > Y1. Hence, if (5.3) holds,
Exhibit 5 is a Chicken game and the unilateral defections are the Nash
equilibria.QED
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 49

In sum, a B3-AR may, undercertainconditions,become a Chicken-AR,

but a B2-AR may never,underany conditions,become a Chicken-AR.It is
importantto realize how the utility functionsdefined in B2 and B3 produce
these differentresults. Equation(2.7) shows that values of Y do not affect
X's gains from greatermilitary expendituresin a B2-AR. Thus, if a state
derives increasedbenefit from increasedexpenditures(it prefersD to C or
X2 to X1), then it does so for all possible values of Y. It thereforecannotbe,
as in Chicken, that D is preferredto C for low Y and C preferredto D for
high Y. On the otherhand,(2.13) shows thatvalues of Y do affect X's gains
from greatermilitaryexpendituresin a B3-AR. High levels of Y hurt X's
gains from more X. Hence, it can be, as in Chicken,thatat low Y, X prefers
D to C [Px(DC) > Px(C,C)],while at high Y, X prefersC to D [Px(C, D) >
Px(DD].

DEADLOCK

The following propositionshows what inequalityis needed for a B3-AR

to be a Deadlock game.

PROPOSITION5.3: Given assumptionsA1-A6, if

kx(X2_py2)2- kx(Xl-pyl)2 > x(X22-X1 [5.4]

then an armsrace is the Nash equilibriumoutcome of Exhibit5.

PROOF:C3 lists three conditions, found in the appendix,for a Deadlock
game to exist given utility functions (2.9) and (2.10). First, Px(DC) >
PX(D,D). Second, Px(CC) > Px(CD). These two conditions are always
fulfilled because it is assumed that Y2 > Y,. Third,PX(DD) > Px(CC) or
(5.4). Hence, if (5.4) holds, Exhibit 5 is a Deadlock game, and mutual
noncooperationis the Nash equilibrium.QED

STAG HUNT

The next proposition shows that while a B3-AR may, under certain
conditions,become a PD, Chicken,or Deadlock game, there are no condi-
tions underwhich it may become a Stag Huntgame.

PROPOSITION5.4: Given assumptionsA1-A6, B3 andC4 areinconsistent.

PROOF:C4 lists three conditions, found in the appendix,for a Stag Hunt
game to exist. First,Px(CC) > Px(DC). Second, PX(D,D)> Px(C,D).These
two conditionsmay be combinedinto
50 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

pY, > [1 lx Xl+X

2 > py 2>

But (5.5) cannothold because Y2 > Y1, and hence pY1 < PY2. QED

In sum, neithera B2-AR nor a B3-AR may ever, under any conditions,
become a Stag Hunt-AR.The informalanalyses of GT-ARshas again gone
awry. It is importantto realize how the utility functionsdefined in B2 and
B3 producethese similar results.Equation(2.7) shows that values of Y do
not affect X's gains from greatermilitaryexpendituresin a B2-AR. Thus, if
a statederivesincreasedbenefit fromincreasedexpenditures(it prefersD to
C or X2 to X1), then it does so for all possible values of Y. It thereforecannot
be, as in Stag Hunt,that C is preferredto D for low Y and D preferredto C
for high Y. On the other hand, (2.13) shows that values of Y do affect X's
gains from greatermilitaryexpendituresin a B3-AR. But high levels of Y
hurtX's gains from moreX. Hence, it cannotbe, as in Stag Hunt,thatat low
Y, X prefersC to D [Px(C,C)>Px(D,C)]and yet at high Y, X prefersD to C
[Px(DD)>PX(C,D)].The patterncan only be as in Chicken,whereY's greater
expendituresforces X to prefermore armamentexpendituresat low Y, and
less armamentexpendituresat high Y

SOME CONCLUSIONS ABOUT GT-AR MODELS

PD

Examplesof PD-ARs abound.Downs and Rocke (1987: 302) cited "the

Anglo-Germannaval race in its later stages, the French-Germanrace just
before the outbreakof WorldWarI, the Japanese,U.S. andBritishnavalrace
that was temporarilyhalted by the WashingtonTreaty of 1923, and the
U.S.-Soviet racepriorto SALTI."As a consequence,the analystscited earlier
considered the PD as a reasonablerepresentationof an arms rivalry.My
resultsshow thatall threeR-AR models will generatePD-AR models when
(a) the marginalutility of increases in one's own arms are positive, (b) the
marginalutility of increases in one's opponentsarms are negative, and (c)
the total differential of the increases of both are negative, or when (b)
overwhelms (a). All three assumptionsare quite reasonable.The conven-
tional wisdom aboutthe usefulness of the PD as a model of an armsrivalry
is confirmed.
 LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND
PRISONER'SDILEMMA 51

DEADLOCK

Examplesof Deadlock-ARsalso abound.Downs andRocke (1987: 302)

cited several examples of participantsin arms rivalries that appearto be
motivatedby Deadlock:Germanyduringthe 1930s, the Soviet Union during
the 1950s, Chinaduringthe 1960s, Iranduringthe 1980s, Britainduringthe
1870s, and the United Statesduringthe Reaganyears.Previousresearchhas
consideredDeadlock as a reasonablerepresentationof an armsrivalry.My
resultsshow thatall threeR-AR models will generateDeadlock-ARmodels
when (a) the marginalutility of increasesin one's own armare positive, (b)
the marginalutility of increases in one's opponentsarms are negative, and
(c) the total differentialof the increases of both are positive, or when (a)
overwhelms (b). All three assumptionsare quite reasonable.The conven-
tional wisdom aboutthe usefulness of Deadlock as a model of armsrivalry
is also confirmed.

CHICKEN

Many have speculatedaboutthe possibility of a Chicken-AR.The exam-

ple usuallygiven is a nucleararmsrivalryin which it is reasonableto expect
that the marginalutility of increasesin X's armamentsshouldbe positive at
low levels of Y's armaments(becausesome deterrencepreventsnuclearwar)
but negative at high levels (because too much deterrenceis destabilizing).
Although,my most generalR-ARmodel,the B1-AR, shows thatit is possible
to make this assumption, the fairly common B2-AR does not have this
property.A Chicken-ARis more unusualthanexpectedby the conventional
wisdom.

STAG HUNT

And finally, many have speculatedaboutthe possibility of a Stag Hunt-

AR. Jervis (1978) was first. Hardin(1983: 247) referredto a Stag Hunt-AR
as a CoordinationGame, and Stein (1982: 303) as an AssuranceGame. One
scenario offered for this model is that a state may not be very competitive
and not very interestedin "beatingits rival" throughunilateraldefection.
Thus, a Stag Huntarmsrace "describes,for example,the classic situationin
which a state acquiresa weapon it would not have built on its own initiative
because it believes that the rival is building it" (Downs et al., 1985: 135).
Another scenario offered for this model is that the costs of unilaterally
building some armamentmightbe very high. A Stag Hunt-ARis consistent
52 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

with "generalresults of the early Richardsonmodeling literature. .. that a

stable equilibriumwill exist whenever the economic constraintsassociated
with largemissile stocks- capturedby the fatigueterm- outweighthedesire
to acquirenew missiles in response to growing adversarymissile stocks"
(Leidy and Staiger, 1985: 515). Such reasons are not compelling because
they do not explain why the marginalutility of increasesin X's armaments
shouldbe negativeat low levels of Y's armamentsbutpositive at high levels.
Although the most general R-AR models, the Bl-AR, shows that this is
possible, neitherof the specific R-AR models, the B2-AR or B3-AR, have
this property.The Stag-HuntAR is more unusual than expected by the
conventionalwisdom.

CONCLUSIONS ABOUT THE

COMPATIBILITYOF R-AR AND GT-AR MODELS

Is thereany relationshipbetweenthe two explanationsof the equilibrium

outcome of an arms rivalry? Given the considerableoverlap, it is quite
reasonable to attempt to link the two formal traditions of arms-rivalry
modeling.The lack of overlapwas, in fact, one of the early criticismsmade
by game theorists(Rapoport,1957; Harsanyi,1962) of Richardson'smodels
of arms rivalries;critics focused on Richardson's(1960: 12) "whatpeople
would do if they did not stop to think"assumptionand urged more game-
theoreticassumptions.A set of questionsarises:Arethereformalconnections
between the two traditionsfor modeling armsrivalries?When is borrowing
appropriate?May one be used to provide insight and understandingabout
the other?
This articleaddresseda specific version of these questions:Given partic-
ularR-AR assumptions,which GT-ARequilibriumoutcomes can exist? To
answerthis question,it was necessaryto formallyspecify the set of assump-
tions behind a particularR-AR model, and then determineif and when it is
possible for these assumptionsto generatethe set of assumptionsbehind a
particularGT-ARmodel.I showed,for example,if andwhen certainassump-
tions behind the R-AR model in (2.1) and (2.2) formally imply the set of
assumptionsbehind a PD game in Exhibit 1.
What sorts of assumptionswere involved? R-AR models make assump-
tions abouta nation'sutility functiondefined over its goals. GT-ARmodels
make assumptionsabout a nation's preferenceorderingsdefined over the
possible outcomes.The abilityof Richardson'sassumptionsto determinethe
equilibriumoutcomesof 2 x 2 games boils down to the compatibilityof the
R-AR model's assumptionsaboututilityover goals with the GT-ARmodel's
 PRISONER'SDILEMMA 53
LichbachIARMSRIVALRYAND

assumptions about preference over outcomes. Finding the compatibility

between the two different sets of assumptionsis the same as discovering
whether a particularRichardson-typeutility functioncan producethe pref-
erence orderings(and the Nash equilibria)of a particular2 x 2 game. The
debate over the propergame representationof an arms rivalry is really a
debate over the proper utility functions and preference orderings of the
nationsinvolved. Nations have many differentmotives, andthereforeutility
and preferences,for the possession and nonpossession of arms. Different
utility functionsproducedifferentgames thathave differentimplicationsfor
the outcomes of armsrivalries.
Two types of resultsoccurred.First,one set of R-AR assumptionsimplied
anotherset of GT-ARassumptions.It was possible, for example, to derive a
PD preferenceordering(and hence an equilibriumoutcome that is an arms
race) from a particularRichardsonmodel. In this case, I developedproposi-
tions of the form:Given assumptionsA and conditionsB, if R-AR model C
holds, then GT-AR model D holds. The R-AR model, in other words, is
sufficient for the GT-ARmodel, and the GT-ARmodel is necessaryfor the
R-AR model. Second, a relationshipbetweenthe two modelingtraditionsdid
not hold:The two sets of assumptionswere inconsistent.If a particularR-AR
representationof an armsrivalryis not consistentwith a particularGT-AR
representation,then making one set of R-AR assumptionswill preclude
anotherset of GT-ARassumptions.In this case, I developedpropositionsof
the form:GivenAssumptionsA, if R-AR model C holds, thenGT-ARmodel
D cannothold.
The utilityfunctionof a particularR-AR model mightbe inconsistentwith
the preference orderingsof a particularGT-AR model. For example, the
requirementsfor a particularR-AR may,undercertainconditions,imply the
requirementsfor a GT-ARto be a PD game, but be inconsistentwith the
requirementsfor a GT-ARto be a Chickengame. A R-AR model may imply
one GT-ARmodel andbe inconsistentwith anotherbecause the set of utility
functionsfor a R-AR may not be able to yield both a single equilibrium,as
in PD, and two equilibria,as in Chicken.Similarly,a set of Richardson-type
utility functions may not be able to yield both a pareto-dominatedequilib-
rium, as in PD, and a pareto-optimalequilibrium,as in Stag Hunt.
This analysis has revealed the importanceof explicating the precise
Richardson-typeutility functions in a GT-AR,ratherthan simply positing
preference orderings. Several informal conjecturesabout the relationship
betweenarmsrivalriesand2 x 2 gameswere shownto be incorrect.The more
exactinganalysisadoptedherehighlightedthesubstantivemeaningof GT-ARs.
As a result of the analyses, externalthreatand internalfatigue, previously
considered only in R-AR formulations,are now also examined in GT-AR
54 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION

formulations(Lichbach,1989). These resultsare more precise and relevant

to the arms outcome question than those offered by the previous informal
treatmentsof the connectionbetweenarmsrivalriesandPDs. Showingif and
when a R-AR becomes a GT-ARgreatlyenhancesthe substantiveinterpre-
tation and theoreticalrelevance of the latter.Unless we explore the utility
functionsbehind the payoff functionsof the nations involved in a GT-AR,
these issues are hidden.

APPENDIX

The following R-ARrequirementsfor GT-ARconditionsto hold areused in proofs

of the propositions in the sections discussing the two specific R-AR models and
conclusions aboutGT-ARmodels.

R-AR
GT-AR B2-AR B3-AR

Px (D,C) > Px (CC) -> (X1 + X2) |1l| [ X1+ X2] PY

kx kXY2Y1 222

Px (C,C) > Px (D,D) - > (X1 + X2) +

( ) 1X(X2 - X1 ) > kX(X2 - PY2)- kX(Xl - pYj)
ix iX(X2- Xi)

Px (D,D) > Px (C,D) > (X1 + X2) [its] [X1 +X2} [ 2

Px (C,C) > Px (C,D) Y2 > Y1 Y2 > Y1

Px (D,C) > Px (D,D) Y2 > Y1 Y2 > Y1

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