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The petitioners: Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of
candidacy for said position. Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar.
Alfredo Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
(Dumlao’s contention will be skipped as his situation was not discussed in the discussion on taxpayer’s
suits)
Sec. 4. ...
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices
covered by this Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein.
Ratio Decidendi:
1. "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury “. In the case of petitioners Igot and
Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, that Igot is said to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it
cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty, nor disqualified
from being candidates. Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial interest at
stake. They can claim no locus standi.
2. It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the
rule has been relaxed, thus:
“... there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of
taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public
funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public
funds, by an officer of the State for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at
the request of a taxpayer.”
3. However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, do not directly involve the disbursement of
public funds.
While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their
Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific
constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power", or that there is a misapplication of such
funds by respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose. Neither
do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid
or unconstitutional law.
4. Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this
Court in Tan vs. Macapagal, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a taxpayer's suit
should be entertained.
Holding: Petition denied.
Dumlao v. COMELEC
Facts: Petitioners Patricio Dumlao (former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya), Romeo Igot (taxpayer, voter and member of the
Bar) and Alfredo Salapantan, Jr. (taxpayer and voter) seek the enjoinment of COMELEC to from implementing certain
provisions of BP 51, 52 and 53 for being unconstitutional.
Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of BP 52, which provides: “Any retired elective provincial city or
municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits…and who shall have been 65 years of
age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for
the same elective local office from which he has retired.” He asserts that the same is insidiously directed against
him, supports class legislation, and is contrary to the Constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail Section 4 of BP 51, Section 1 and 6 of BP 52, and question that the accreditation
of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, pursuant to BP 53.
Issue: Are the assailed provisions contrary to the Constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process? – NO
Do petitioners have locus standi in the instant case? – NO
Ratio: From a procedural aspect, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence,
traditionally unacceptable for judicial resolution. The petitioners in this case contest completely different statutory
provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate. The action of petitioners Igot
and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit.
To reiterate, in the exercise of judicial review, there must be a) an actual case/controversy, b) raised by a proper party, c)
at the earliest possible opportunity, and d) the unavoidability of the constitutional question. In the instant case, only the
3rd requisite was complied with.
From a substantive viewpoint, Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him
personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based
on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC, overthrowing Dumlao’s contention of intentional
or purposeful discrimination.
Neither is the assertion that Section 4 of BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of equal protection well taken. Equal
protection of laws is subject to rational classification, as long as the same are based on reasonable and real
differentiations. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal
office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office from which he had retired, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same
government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again. It is for this very reason that
inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection neither does it permit of such denial.
It bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a
classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable
classification based upon substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all chosen belonging to the same class.
Ruling: Paragraph 1, Section 4 of BP 52 is declared valid. Paragraph 2 providing that "... the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie
evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused. PETITION DENIED.
Ateneo de Manila University v. Capulong
Facts: As a result of the initiation rights held by the Aquila Legis Fraternity on February 8-10, 1991, Leonardo “Lennie”
Villa died of serious physical injuries at the Chinese General Hospital. A Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Committee
was tasked to investigate the circumstances resulting in Villa’s death within 72 hours. Respondent students Mendoza,
Abas, et al, were also required to submit written statements within 24 hours from receipt. Said respondents failed to give
a reply, while being placed on preventive suspension. On February 14, 1991, after receiving the written statements and
testimonies of several witnesses, the Committee found prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule
3 of the Law School Catalogue (Discipline). The students were required to file answers on or before February 18,
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defense. On February 20, Dean del Castillo
created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against said respondent students. On the same day, the students were
informed of their violation, giving them until the 22nd of February to respond. After several postponements and a letter
from petitioner Bernas, a resolution dated March 9 found respondents guilty of violation of Rule 3 of the Ateneo Law
School Rules of Discipline, for having participated in the initiation as auxiliaries, heightened by the fact that they made no
effect to prevent the infliction of further injury. The board, however, left the imposition of the penalty to the
Administration. Petitioner Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. On March 10, respondent
students filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition and TRO with preliminary injunction, alleging lack of due
process. After the issuance of a TRO on April 7, a special civil action for certiorari was filed with the SC.
Held: Contrary to respondent’s argument of denial of procedural due process, the Court finds no indication that such
right has been violated. Petitioners have meticulously respected respondent’s rights in a school disciplinary proceeding,
as stated in Guzman vs. NU, Alcuaz vs. PSBA-QC, etc. Further, the Guzman case, and not the ANG TIBAY case asserted by
respondents, provides the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary actions in academic
institutions:
1. Students must be informed in writing of the nature or cause of the accusations against them.
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel.
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them.
4. They shall have the right to address evidence in their own behalf
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by school authorities to
hear and decide the case.
The requisites as stated have been met adequately. Respondents cannot hide behind the argument that they were not
accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written statements which became the basis of the February 14 order.
Granting without admitting that they were denied such, disciplinary cases involving students do not necessarily need or
include the right to cross examination. It may be summary in nature.