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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M.

LA VIÑA
Preliminary notes areas. It involves decision-making by sub-national units. It is typically delegated
The exam would be 100 points + 10pt bonus. He asks essay questions just power, wherein a larger government chooses to delegate certain authority to more
for 5 points! Nevertheless, answer as comprehensively as you can to get local governments
the full points. Federalism: implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary systems may
He also said that he won’t ask you to memorize, BUT you should know also decentralize. The sub-units that have been authorized to act do not possess any
general concepts and issues. claim of rights against the central government.

TOPICS most likely to be included: Section 3: Congress ENACT LGC! (then outline more or less ng LGC)
*national-local powers Section 4: GENERAL SUPERVISION CLAUSE
*qualifications for elections President exercise general supervision over local governments
*disciplinary actions Provinces: component cities and municipalities
*CDMASAB (creation, division, merger, abolition and substantial alteration Cities and municipalities: component barangays
of boundaries) *ensure acts of their component units are w/n the scope of their prescribed powers
*corporate vs. governmental functions and functions
*General supervision powers – who exercises supervision over who?
*general welfare clause (police powers) questions GENERAL SUPERVISION: ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.
*federalism: test limits of local governance No control over acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his
*autonomy, decentralization and devolution own. Power of supervision means “overseeing or authority of an officer to see that
*recall elections as effective check the subordinate officers perform their duties.
*term-limits -includes power of the president to discipline elective officials. Also includes power
to investigate. (Joson v. Executive Secretary)
CONSTI PROVS on LG: ARTICLE X *see Section 25, LGC
Section 1: Territorial and Political Subdivisions (PCMBA):
1. provinces Section 5: ECON POWERS
2. cities Each LGU shall have power to:
3. municipalities 1. create own sources of revenues
4. barangays 2. levy TFC subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may
5. autonomous regions provide (power of taxation delegated by Congress to LGUs)
*Pimentel: list exclusive! …consistent with local autonomy
LGU Defined …TFC accrue exclusively to LGUs
Basco v. PAGCOR: Local Government has been described as a political *see Section 18, LGC
subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the government Section 6: IRA provision
under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign -just share in the national taxes
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local -automatically released to them
government in such a system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the *see Discussion on Section 18 of LGC
function of government.
Section 7: SHARE in Wealth of Nation
Section 2: territorial and political subdivisions enjoy LOCAL AUTONOMY -equitable share in the proceeds of the utilization and development of the national
Limbona v. Mangelin: wealth w/n their respective areas
• decentralization of administration - when the central government
-includes sharing the same with the inhabitants by way of direct benefits
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to Section 8: TERM OF LOCAL OFFICIALS
broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local GR (Local officials): 3 years, no more than 3 consecutive terms
governments "more responsive and accountable X: barangay officials, as determined by law
• decentralization of power - involves an abdication of political power in VOLUNTARY RESIGNATION: not considered an interruption in the continuity of service
the favor of local governments units declare to be autonomous . The – considered full term
autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its *see Section 43, LGC
future with minimum intervention from central authorities.
*Under LGC, only decentralization of administration! Section 9: Sectoral reps in Sanggunians
Section 10: Creation of LGUs
Decentralization vs Federalism -CDMASAB in accordance w/ LGC + approval of the majority of votes cast in a
Decentralization: decision by the central government authorizing its subordinates, plebiscite in the political units DIRECTLY AFFECTED
whether geographically or functionally defined, to exercise authority in certain *See section 10, LGC

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
Section 11: CREATION OF SPECIAL METROPOLITAN POLITICAL government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an
SUBDIVISIONS intra sovereign subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in
-by law imperio. Local government in such a system can only mean a measure of
-subject to plebiscite similar to Sec10 decentralization of the function of government.
-component cities and municipalities retain basic autonomy + entitled to
own executive and legislative assemblies Section 2: Declaration of Policy
-jurisdiction limited to basic services requiring coordination (a) genuine and meaningful local autonomy
MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association: MMDA has no police power, no (b) accountability of LGUs through recall, initiative, and referendum
legislative power, just coordinating powers and laying down policies for (c) periodic consultations w/ LGUs, NGOs and other sectors of
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services community

Section 12: CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES Genuine and meaningful local autonomy


HUC – determined by law -purpose of establishing local autonomy in the system of governance is to
ICC – prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials enable LGUs to become self-reliant communities and to make them more
Component cities – could vote for provincial elective officials effective partners in the attainment of national goals
ABELLA v. COMELEC: Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that
aside from highly urbanized cities, component cities whose charters prohibit their Accountable local officials
voters from voting for province elective officials are independent of their province. (a -people empowerment through checks on local officials
registered voter of an independent component city who is prohibited from voting *see sections 69-75 and 120-127
provincial officials cannot run as officials of the province!)
*see Section 451-453, LGC Consultations
-see Sec26-27
Section 13: LGUs may group themselves
For purposes of Section 3: Operative Principles of Decentralization
1. consolidation and coordination of efforts, services and resources (a) effective allocation among LGUs of respective powers, functions,
2. common benefit responsibilities, and resources
(b) organizational structure and operating mechanisms to meet
Section 14: REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS priority needs and services
-composition: (c) local officials, employees, subject to CS laws (merit and fitness),
a. LG offices paid maily from local funds
b. reps from NGOs (d) responsibility and accountability accompanied by provision for
-purpose: administrative decentralization, strengthen autonomy of units,
reasonably adequate resources (ArtX. Sec5,6,7)
accelerate the economic and social growth and development of units in the
region (e) general supervision (ArtX. Sec4)

Section 15 to 21: AUTONOMOUS REGIONS


(f) LGUs may group themselves (ArtX, Sec13)
(g) Enhance LGU’s capabilities to enable them to participate actively
Sec15: creation of Autonomous regions of Muslim Mindanao and
in implementation of national programs and projects
Cordilleras
(h) continuing mechanism to enhance local autonomy
Sec16: President exercise General supervision: ensure laws are faithfully
(i) LGUs and NG share in responsibility in the management and
executed
maintenance of ecological balance (Sec26)
Sec17: Powers, functions, responsibilities should be granted by law/consti
or else, NG (j) Effective mechanism for insuring accountability of LGUs (Secs 2(b),
Sec18: Organic Act for each Autonomous region 69-75, 120-127)
Sec19: first Congress enact organic acts (k) Improved coordination of NG policies and programs, extension of
Sec20: Legislative Powers of Autonomous regions adequate technical and material assistance (Sec 25)
Sec21: Preservation of peace and order w/n region – local police agencies
Defense and security – National Government (l) Participation of private sector in local governance encouraged
(ArtX, Sec9)
YeY! Locgov proper (m) NG ensure that decentralization contributes to continuing
development and performance of LGUs
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE: PRINCIPLES, POWERS AND RELATIONS GANZON v. CA: Local autonomy is not instantly self-executing. Although the broad
Section 1: LGC title principles on local autonomy are set out in the Constitution, they are not self-
Definition of LGU: Basco vs. Pagcor: Local Government has been described as a executing but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government
political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation
substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. In spite of
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general GR: based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to
supervision of the Executive. provide services
(a) INCOME: sufficient for all essential government functions and
Section 4: Scope of Application services, commensurate with population size
(b) POPULATION: total # of inhabitants w/n territorial jurisdiction
Section 5: Rules of Interpretation (c) LAND AREA: contiguous
a. power of LGU: liberal interpretation in favor of LGU X: comprises of 2+ islands
…separated by a LGU independent of others
…in case of doubt: in favor of devolution of powers, in favor of LGU
*properly identified by metes and bounds
b. tax ordinance: strictly against LGU, liberally in favor of taxpayer *sufficient to provide for basic services and facilities to meet
…Tax exemption: strictly against person claiming it requirements of populace
c. general welfare clause: interpret liberally to give more powers to HOW Income Plus Population Land Area (certified by
LGUs in accelerating economic dev’t and upgrading quality of life CREATED (certified LMB)*
for the people in the community by NSO) Not Territory as used before,
inspired by Tan v. COMELEC
d. rights and obligations existing before LGC and contracts involving Province Only by At least Eithe At least Contiguous Territory At least
LGUs: original terms an Act of 20M for r 250k 2k km2
e. when no legal provision/jurisprudence available: may resort to Congress the last inhabitant -creation shall not reduce
customs and traditions in the place where controversy takes place (therefor 2y s the land area, population or
* Where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for e LAW) immediat income of the original unit/s
interpretation. There is only room for application. (SUCALDITO V. MONTEJO) ely prior at the time of said creation
YAO KEE V. SY-GONZALES: cusoms: a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, to its to less than the minimum
uniformly observed or practiced as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory. A creation requirements
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. A local custom and a. territorial jurisdiction shall
as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is based be properly identified by
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact. upon metes and bounds
BADUA V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION: For decisions of tribal councils to 1991 X: composed of 1+ islands
be applicable, they should be w/n the scope of LGC (therefore, in this case, should constant b. need not be contiguous if
be under an autonomous region) prices as composed of 2+ islands
certified
Chapter 2 – General Powers and Attributes of LGUs by DOF
*refer to Section 10, CONSTI City Only by At least Eithe At least Contiguous Territory At least
Section 6: Authority to CDMASAB an Act of P100M r 150k 100 km2
-by law: by Congress: province, city, municipality, or any other political Congress for the inhabitant -creation shall not reduce
subdivision (therefor last 2 s the land area, population or
-by ordinance: by Sangguniang Panlalawigan/Panlungsod: barangay e LAW) consecuti income of the original unit/s
ve years at the time of said creation
LATASA v. COMELEC: the creation or conversion of a local government unit is done based on to less than the minimum
mainly to help assure its economic viability. 2000 requirements
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA: Administrative Regions are not constant a. territorial jurisdiction shall
territorial and political subdivisions but are primarily created to coordinate the prices as be properly identified by
planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered area.. CAR is certified metes and bounds
not a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It does not have a by DOF X: composed of 1+ islands
separate juridical personality unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it (amende b. need not be contiguous if
vested with the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of d by RA composed of 2+ islands
property, the power to create its own sources of revenues, etc. 9009)
PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL: President has no power to create municipalities. Municipality Only by Annual And At least Contiguous Territory At least
The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. law income: (all 3) 25k 50 km2
The statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a At least inhabitant -creation shall not reduce
negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of P2.5M for s the land area, population or
several barrios. the last 2 income of the original
consecuti municipality or
Section 7. Creation and Conversion ve years municipalities at the time of
based on said creation to less than

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
1991 the minimum requirements Tan v. COMELEC: in the creation of a new LGU, those to be included in such
constant a. territorial jurisdiction shall plebiscite would be the people living in the area of the proposed new province and
prices be properly identified by those living in the parent province.
metes and bounds Arguments that DIRECTLY AFFECTED means only those that would be included in the
X: composed of 1+ islands new LGU:
b. need not be contiguous if PAREDES v. EXEC SEC: In creating new municipalities from former barangays of
composed of 2+ islands other municipalities, should only include those which would be included under the
Barangay *by law None Can’t GR: At NONE new LGU because the residents of the parent municipalities would still be under the
*by Financial add least 2k a. land must be same LGU (Province) w/o diminution of any rights. (so consider same status, pero
ordinanc viability anyth inhabitant contiguous under pa rin supervision ng same entity…same benefits)
e of the ing! s b. land shall be LOPEZ v. COMELEC: Creation of MMC w/o plebiscite held as constitutional – but
created Except: properly identified now requires plebiscite: SEC11, ARTX, Consti requires plebiscite!
barangay w/n M.M. by metes and ABBAS v. COMELEC: Administrative regions ARE NOT TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL
becomes area bounds SUBDIVISIONS like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays so TO MERGE
the …other LGUs into an administrative region, NO PLEBISCITE REQUIRED.
obligation metropolit
of the an Section 11: Selection and Transfer of LG Sites, Offices and Facilities
LGU political Section 12: Government Centers
creating subdivisio Section 13. Naming of LGUs and Public Places, Streets and Structures
it ns w/c *basically:
may be WHO HAS POWER TO CHANGE NAMES:
created by (a) Sangguniang Panlalawigan
law (b) Sanggunian of HUCs and ICCs
…HUCs (c) Sanggunian of Component Cities and Municipalities
…dapat
P5k What can they change (in general): - in consultation with Philippine
inhabitant Historical Commission +
s 1. component units under them – w/ recommendation of Sanggunian
concerned + ratification in plebiscite
Tan v. COMELEC: Territory reflected only territory with reference to mass of land 2. roads, avenues, blvds, thoroughfares, and bridges
area and excluded the waters over which the political unit exercised control.
3. schools – Local School Boards
Section 8. Division and Merger. 4. hospital, health facilities – Local Health Boards
-same requirements as Creation and Conversion (INCOME, POPULATION, 5. any other public place/bldg owned by the LGU concerned
LAND AREA - IPL) *can’t use names of living persons, unless for justifiable reasons, not
-no reduction of IPL of LGUs concerned to less than min standards, and oftener than once every 10 years
w/re: INCOME, not below what was standard before *can’t change name with historical/cultural/ethnic significance unless
overturned by UNANIMOUS VOTE OF SANGUNIAN CONCERNED +
Section 9: ABOLITION of LGUs CONSULTATION WITH PHC
-there should be a law/ordinance *should notify: President, rep of legislative district concerned, Bureau of
-IPL irreversibly reduced to less than the minimum Posts
-the law/ordinance should include where the LGU would be
incorporated/merged Section 14: Beginning of Corporate Existence
PIMENTEL: Congress retained power to create brgys in Metropolitan Manila GR: upon election and qualification of its chief executive and majority of
so they can abolish it too. the members of its sanggunian
X: other time fixed by law/ordinance
SECTION 10: Plebiscite Requirement
-mandatory Section 15: Political and Corporate Nature of LGU (DUAL PERSONALITY)
-approval of majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the LGUs:
purpose -body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in
…in the political unit/units DIRECTLY AFFECTED conformity w/law
-conducted by COMELEC w/n 120d from effectivity of law/ordinance (unless -shall exercise powers as a
law/ordinance fix date) 1. political subdivision of the national gov’t
2. corporate entity representing inhabitants of its territory

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
(2) reasonable
CITY of MANILA v. IAC: re transfer of bones when lease contract w/ public …reasonable in a sense that it is not too overbroad! (there might be other ways to
cemetery not yet over so sued for damages (so refer to this later w/re achieve the lawful subject)
suability)
-Its powers are twofold in character-public, governmental or political on PARAYNO V. MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIO
the one hand, and corporate, private and proprietary on the other. - A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only
*Governmental powers: exercised in administering the powers of the state and when the following requisites are met:
promoting the public welfare and they include the legislative, judicial, public and (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
political class, require the interference of the State and
*Municipal powers: exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object
community and include those which are ministerial, private and corporate sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.
CITY OF NAGA V. CA: When transferring titles to property, needs The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the
RESOLUTION OF PROVINCIAL BOARD + APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT due process clause of the Constitution.

Section 16: GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE *TATEL V MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC


Powers exercised by LGUs: -For it to be valid however it
(1) expressly granted (1) must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
(2) necessarily implied from powers expressly granted must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law,
(3) necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective and
governance must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a
(4) those essential to the promotion of the general welfare (catch all) substantive nature
*Without the General Welfare clause, can LGUs still exercise police powers? NO. it is (2) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
delegated by Legislative: should be granted expressly (3) must not be unfair or oppressive
…PRESIDENT, based on residual powers, could also exercise Police Power (4) must not be partial or discriminatory
* “H” in the ff answers WON there was valid exercise of Police power (5) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(6) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
*RURAL BANK OF MAKATI v. MAKATI: (7) must not be unreasonable
-2 branches of general welfare clause:
(1) general legislative power: authorizes the municipal council to enact *BALACUIT V. CFI AGUSAN (MOVIE HOUSES TIX CASE)
ordinances and make regulations not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to -business may be regulated but regulation must be w/n the bounds of reason, that
carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon the municipal is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, and its provisions cannot be
council by law. oppressive amounting to arbitrary interference with the business or calling subject
(2) police power proper: authorizes the municipality to enact ordinances as may of regulation. A lawful business or calling may not, under the guise of regulation, be
be necessary and proper for the health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good unreasonably interfered with even by the exercise of police power
order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and its inhabitants and for the
protection of their property.
*VILLANUEVA V CASTANEDA (ON LEASE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY)
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V CA -Police power cannot be suspended/bargained away through a contract. Impairment
The State, through the legislature, has delegated the exercise of police power to clause is subject to and limited by the paramount police power.
LGUs, as agencies of the State, in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the
declared objects of their creation. This delegation of police power is embodied in the DACANAY V. ASSISTIO(ON LEASE CONTRACTS OF PUBLIC PROPERTY)
general welfare clause of the code. So exercise should be in accordance with law. -interest of a few should not prevail over good of the greater number in the
community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare the
*BINAY v. DOMINGO respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.
-Police powers vested in LGUs broad and not limited: AS LONG AS GREATEST
WELFARE TO ALL. Care for poor is public purpose. SANGALAN V. IAC
-duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort and -If act is in the concept of police power no need for just compensation.
convenience and consistently as may be with private rights.
Section 17: Basic Services and Facilities
PPL V FAJARDO Brgy powers in general:
-Should comply with standards of DUE PROCESS -Minimal compared to the other political subdivisions because Congress was of the
opinion that then, brgys do not yet possess either the structural capacity or the
*LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL V. JAC LINER administrative knowhow to handle the vast powers that are now devolved to other
-can regulate right to enjoy property, PROVIDED: LGUs
(1) for a lawful subject
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
Municipal Powers in general: ESTANISLAO V. COSTALES (ON TAXATION POWERS)
more extensive, four major services: -LGUs have the power to create their own sources of revenue, levy taxes, etc. BUT
(a) agricultural and aquacultural, encouraged through cooperatives subject to the guidelines and limitations set by Congress (IN ACCORDANCE W/SEC5,
(b) health services connected to primary health care and access to secondary ART X OF CONSTI)
and health care and access to secondary and tertiary health services
(c) social welfare services PIMENTEL V. AGUIRRE
(d) other services Automatic Release of IRA MANDATORY. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the
Provincial powers: more sweeping automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
(a) agriculture and aquaculture mandated by no less than the constitution (ArtX, Sec6). The LGC specifies further
(b) industrial development services that the release shall be made directly to the LGU concerned w/n 5d after every
(c) health services quarter of the year and shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
(d) social services imposed by the national government for whatever purpose.
(e) investment support services
(f) computerizing tax information and collection services Section 19: Eminent Domain
(g) intra-municipal telecom services Steps for expropriation of LGU
City powers; all services and facilities which the barangay, municipality and province 1. purpose: for public use/purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and
have been empowered to deliver (except Katarungang Pambarangay), plus:
landless – THERE SHOULD BE A NECESSITY FOR THE TAKING: MASIKIP V.
(a) adequate communication and transportation facilities
CITY OF PASIG
(b) support for education, police and fire services and facilities
2. WHO: chief executive acting through an ordinance
*devolution provision 3. ORDINANCE duly passed, AND NOT A RESOLUTION (BELUSO V. MUNICIPALITY
-LGUs can do everthing, subject to supervision of NG OF PANAY, MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V VM REALTY)
X: Environment – still subject to control of DENR 4. valid and definite offer previously made to owner (JIL v. Pasig)
(a) provides devolution of NG agencies services
5. offer not accepted
6. IMMEDIATE POSSESSION ONLY UPON: (a) filing of expropriation proceedings;
BRGY: LIMITED SERVICES
(b) make deposit with proper court of at least 15% of the FMV of the
…brgy is usually the governance unit:
property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
-involve constituents in decision-making
expropriated
-peace-making
-delivery of some services 7. payment of just compensation: to be determined by the court based on the
*for BRgys, the most important services involves Agricultural and Health services FMV AT THE TIME OF TAKING OF THE PROPERTY (EPZA v. DULAY)
*Env’t not devolved though need proximate care 8. property is private property (Chaves v. PEA – foreshore and underwater
Subsidiary: delegate all powers and decisions to level competent lands)
MUNICIPALITIES AND CITIES: BASIC UNIT W/C DELIVER SERVICES BELUSO V. MUNICIPALITY OF PANAY
*(2)(ii) supervision AND CONTROL OF DENR: DENR could substitute judgment to -Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
what municipality does property to particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the
WHY INSERTED? Congressmen wanted to prevent mayors and governors to be too legislature. While such power may be validly delegated to local government units,
powerful! other public entities and public utilities, the exercise of such power by the delegated
entities is not absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower
Provinces: Coordinator of services than that of the delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to
*no transfer of budget powers kasi konti rin lang naman ibubudget! expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress and subjects to its
? W/c power only 1 LGU can exercise: Katarungang Pambarangay powers! control and restraints imposed through the law conferring the power or in other
legislations. LGUs by themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. The
Section 18: Power to Generate and Apply Resources power of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but “inferior”
Under Section 18, LGUs can raise resources primarily through the ff: since it must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only
1. Taxes, fees, charges of a share in eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the
2. IRA: just share in national taxes automatically and directly released to them LGUs and the latter cannot go against the principal’s will or modify the same.
w/o need of any further action
3. share in proceeds from the utilization and development of the national wealth LAGCAO V. LABRA (LIMITATIONS): DUE PROCESS
and resources within their respective territorial jurisdictions
4. proprietary power: to acquire, develop, lease, encumber, alienate or REQUISITES: JIL SCHOOL FOUNDATION V. MUNICIPALITY OF PASIG
otherwise dispose of real or personal property held by them in their -The power of eminent domain is exercisable by all LGUs. The requisites for the valid
proprietary capacity exercise of that power:
cf: ArtX, Secs 5,6 & 7
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local The closure of city streets is w/n the powers of the city council while the closure of
chief executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of provincial roads is w/n powers of provincial board.
eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private
property. BAYAN V. ERMITA – ON FREEDOM PARKS
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or No prior permit may be required for the people’s exercise of their right to peaceably
for the benefit of the poor and the landless. assemble and petition in any public park or plaza of a city or municipality until that
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of city or municipality shall have complied with Sec;. 15 of BP 880 providing for
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws. FREEDOM PARKS in every LGU. Advance notices however should be given to LGUs to
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property ensure proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Section 22: Corporate Powers
MASIKIP V. CITY OF PASIG a. POWERS
-The right to take private property for public purposes necessarily originates from (1) continuous succession in its corporate name
"the necessity" and the taking must be limited to such necessity. The very (2) sue and be sued
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity (3) have and use a corporate seal
and that necessity must be of a public character. (4) acquire and convey real and personal property
-Morever, the ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not (5) enter into contracts
follow, the taking of the land. Necessity w/n the rule that the particular property to (6) exercise other corporate powers
be expropriated must be necessary, does not mean an absolute but only a b. continue using/modity/change corporate seals – register with DILG
reasonable or practical necessity, such as would combine the greatest benefit to c. NO CONTRACT CAN BE ENTERED BY LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN BEHALF
the public with the least inconvenience and expense to the condemning party and OF LGU W/O PRIOR AUTHORIZATION OF SANGGUNIAN CONCERNED
the property owner consistens with such benefit. d. full autonomy inexercise of proprietary functions and in the
management of economic enterprises
EPZA V. DULAY cf: authority to sue and be sued vs. entering into contracts power by local
-Just Compensation: the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means chief exec: can sue w/o authorization by sanggunian (CITY OF CALOOCAN V.
a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of CA) vs. cannot enter contracts in behalf of sanggunian w/o authorization by
the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be sanggunian (but cf: Ordonez v. Gustillo)
considered.
MUNICIPALITY OF ECHAGUE V. ABELLERA (FERRIES CASE)
*NO NEED FOR DAR AUTHORITY IF DOES NOT INVOLVE RECLASSIFICATION -Municipality has the power to acquire or establish municipal ferries. Admin Code
OF AGRICULTURAL LAND BY OWNER/BENEFICIARY TENANT: PROVINCE OF confers to LGUs the power to supervise public utilities and this was intended to
CAMARINES SUR V. CA provide additional sources of revenues to the LGUs for the maintenance of their
maintenance and operations
Section 20: Reclassification of lands
Section 21: Closure and Opening of Roads Section 23: Authority to Negotiate and Secure Grants
Permanent closure GR: local chief execs + authority given by sanggunian concerned can
*by ORDINANCE approved by at least 2/3 of the members of the negotiate and secure financial grants/donations
Sanggunian concerned …in support of basic services or facilities
*if necessary, an adequate substitute provided …from local and foreign assistance agencies
*there should be provisions for maintenance of public safety W/O CLEARANCE OR APPROVAL OF NATIONAL AGENCIES
If FREEDOM PARKS: cannot close permanently w/o provision for its transfer X: if w/ NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
or relocation to a new site
Temporary closure: Section 24: LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES
1. actual emergency …LGUs and local officials
2. fiesta celebrations …not exempt from liability if:
3. public rallies 1. death
4. agri and industrial fairs 2. injury
5. undertaking of public infrastructure works 3. damage to property
6. athletic/cultural/civic activities OFFICIALLY SPONSORED, RECOGNIZED *dapat daw with MALICE OR NEGLIGENCE
OR APPROVED BY LGU concerned *NOT AUTOMATIC LIABILITY, BUT MERE SUABILITY
7. THROUGH AN ORDINANCE: for bazaars, midnight sales, flea markets…
where commodities or articles of commerce may be sold and dispensed to MUNICIPALITY OF SAN FERNANDO V. FIRME (in exercise of governmental
the general public. function – CANNOT BE SUED)
IN GENERAL
CABRERA V. CA GR: State may not be sued w/o its consent:
Page 7 of 7 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
X: when there’s consent CARPIO V. EXEC SEC
Express Consent: embodied in a general law or a special law -“the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus and offices”
Implied Consent - recognizes the establishment of a single executive
>money claims involving liability arising from contracts - all elective and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
>when gov’t enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
other contracting party agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is
>when the State files a complaint required by the Constitution or law to act in person (or) the exigencies of the
FOR MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS: situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
Suable because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
in cases of TORTS, executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments,
GR: liable if in the discharge of a proprietary capacity performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless
X: not liable if committed in the discharge of governmental functions disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the
Chief Executive.
CITY OF MANILA V. IAC (in exercise of proprietary function) – can be sued
*DADOLE V. COA
GUILATCO V. CITY OF DAGUPAN: LGU would be liable under NCC for -here, recovnized that Congress exercises power of control over LGUs and
defective roads under its control and supervision in case of death or injury President exercises power of supervision over acts of LGUs
(prove it is under LGU’s control and supervision) -President may only interfere in the affairs and activities of a LGU if he/she
finds that the latter has acted contrary to law
PECHUECO SONS CO V PROVINCIAL BOARD OF ANTIQUE: cannot apply
doctrine of estoppel on the municipality to validate a contract RADIA V. REVIEW COMMITTEE
LG are not “attached” to the DILG in the same sense that bureaus and offices under
CITY OF MANILA V. TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORP - The rule is clear, and it is the DOJ. Provinces and Municipalities are instrumentalities or units of LG, vested
supposed by abundant authority, that a consent decree, in which the officials with their own legislative and executive powers under the LGC. So DILG does not
of a municipality assumed obligations not authorized by law, is null and have power to decide WON to remove LGU employee.
void. The fact that, by consent of the municipal officers, an agreement or stipulation
made by them has been put in the form of a judgment, in an effort to give it the *So summary: the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency recognizes that
force and effect of a judgment, does not cure a lack of power in the officers to make there is a single executive, the President, which exercises CONTROL over
it, and if such power is lacking, the judgment as well as the stipulation is void. An all executive departments, bureaus and offices. Since the president cannot
invalid contract is not validated by a judgment consented to by the municipality, perform all administrative functions of the a Chief Executive, all the
expressly stipulating that such a contract is valid and binding. adjuncts of the Executive Department are deemed as agents of the
President through which the President acts. The president, thus, could
Intergovernmental Relations exercise CONTROL over the acts of his/her agents.
Section 25: National supervision over LGUS HOWEVER, local government units, particularly the local chief executives,
a. PRESIDENT: are not covered by the DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY – the
*general supervision over LGUS President could only exercise general supervision over them. They are
…ensure that their acts are w/n the scope of their prescribed powers and territorial and political units vested with their own legislative and
functions (cf ArtX, Sec4) executive powers, unlike agencies attached to the Executive Department.
*supervisory authority
(1) DIRECTLY over: provinces, HUCs, ICCs DRILON V. LIM
(2) INDIRECTLY -the exercise of SOJ of reviewing the validity of tax ordinances is a mere
….through PROVINCE: component cities and municipalities exercise of supervision by the Executive through the SOJ, as in review, the
…through CITY AND MUNICIPALITY: brgys SOJ merely determines WON the officials concerned (the sanggunian)
b. national agencies and offices w/ project implementation functions: performed their functions in accordance with law
coordinate w/ LGUs, ensure participation of LGUs in planning and
implementation Section 26: Duty of National Government Agencies in the Maintenance of
c. President may direct appropriate national agencies to provide Ecological Balance
FINANCIAL/TECHNICAL/OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE to LGUs – upon -national agency/ GOCC
request, no extra cost …authorizing or involved in planning and implementation of any project or program
d. National Agencies (including GOCCs) should furnish monthly reports to (that may cause deterioration of the environment)
local chief executives concerned -should CONSULT with
>LGU
DOCTRINE OF QUALIFIED POLITICAL AGENCY – not applicable to local government >NGO
officials >PO
Community
Page 8 of 8 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
-what:
env’t and ecological balance Section 33: Cooperative undertakings among Local Government Units
measures that will be undertaken to minimize the adverse effects -through appropriate ordinances: group themselves, consolidate…for
purposes commonly beneficial to all
SECTION 27: PRIOR CONSULTATIONS REQUIRED -to contribute funds, real estate, equipments:
-project by gov’t authorities (no mention WON national or local project) >approval by Sanggunian concerned
1. consultation under >after a public hearing conducted for the purpose
SeC2©: continuing consultation >terms and conditions through a MOA
Sec26: consultation with LGUs, NGOs, Pos and the Community if it would involve
environmental impact on the community Relations with People’s and NGOs
2. PRIOR APPROVAL by Sanggunian concerned Section 34: Role of POs and NGOs
3. If it would involve eviction: SHOULD PROVIDE APPROPRIATE RELOCATION SITES -active partners in the pursuit of local autonomy
FIRST
MAGTAJAS V. PRYCE PRPERTIES CORP INC.
PROVINCE OF RIZAL V. EXEC SECRETARY Though PAGCOR had the legal authority to open and operate a casino in
Section 27, LGC requires that before a project by government is implemented, there CDO (and so the efforts of the civil society were useless in this case), it
should be: should re-examine and reevaluate its decision in the light of the vigorous
1. Consultation in accordance with Sections 2© and 26; and opposition of the people
2. Prior approval of the Sanggunian concerned
Section 35: Linkages w/ Pos and NGOs
Section 28: Power of the Local Chief Executives over the Units of the PNP -joint ventures
-operational supervision and control of local chief executives over -cooperative arrangements
>PNP -purpose:
>Fire protection units >delivery of basic services
>jail management personnel >capacity building
-governed by DILG Act of 1990 >livelihood projects
>develop local enterprises…
INTERLOCAL GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
SECTION 29. Provincial Relations with Component Cities and Municipalities Section 36: Assistance to Pos and NGOs
Province(gov): ensure that -through Local chief executives
…every component city or municipality w/n its territorial jurisdiction -concurrence of the sanggunian concerned
…acts w/n the scope of its prescribed powers and functions -provide financial assistance
*HUCs and ICCs: independent of Province (cf: Section 25)
Local Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee
Section 30: Review of Executive Orders -for the conduct of prequalification of contractors, bidding, evaluation of
Who reviews executive orders of subordinate local chief executives bids & recommendation of awards concerning local INFRASTRUCTURE
Gov (province): PROJECTS
- component city mayor -local chief executive = chair of the committee
- municipal mayor
(w/n jurisdiction) LOCAL TECHNICAL COMMITTEE: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
City/Municipal Mayor: Punong Brgy w/n his jurisdiction -composed:
*copies of orders fwdd to Gov or City/Municipal Mayor w/n 3 days from issuance *local engineer
…review WON ultra vires *local planning and development coordinator
…if fails to act w/n 30d: deemed consistent w/ law, presumed Valid *chair designated

CASINO V. CA Local Government Units


Review: reconsideration/reexamination for purposes of correction BARANGAY MUNICIPALIT CITY PROVINCE
…the power of review is exercised to determine WON it is necessary to correct the Y
acts of the subordinate and to see to it that he performs his duties in accordance Descripti “conduit for “general More Conduit for
with law. on ni sir democracy” purpose urbanized LGUs
government” and
Section 31: submission of Municipal Questions to the Provincial Legal – functional developed
Officer or Prosecutor unit of LGUs general
purpose
Section 32: City and Municipal Supervision over their respective Barangays
Page 9 of 9 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
government health officer *city administrator
ROLE Sec384: Sec 440: Sec 448: Dynamic *municipal administrator *provincial
a. basic general general mechanism civil registrar*city legal health officer
politic purpose purpose for **heads of officer *provincial
al unit government government development depts. *city vet social
b. primar for (same as al processes (subject to *city social welfare and
y coordination Municipality) and effective concurrence welfare and development
planni and delivery governance of the development officer
ng and of basic, of LGUs w/n majority of officer *provincial
imple regular and its territorial all *city general general
mentin direct jurisdiction sangguniang services services
g unit services and bayan officer officer
c. forum effective members + *heads of *provincial
governance subject to depts. agriculturist
of the civil service (subject to *provincial
inhabitants law, rules concurrence vet
w/n its and of the
territorial regulations) majority of (DISCRETION
jurisdiction (DISCRETION all ARY
MANNER See earlier table ARY sangguniang APPOINTIVE
OF APPOINTIVE bayan OFFICERS)
CREATION OFFICERS) members + *provincial
OFFICIAL Sec387: Section 443: Section 454: Section 463: *municipal subject to population
S IN *punong *municipal *city mayor *governor administrator civil service officer
GENERAL barangay mayor *vice mayor *vice gov *municipal law, rules *provincial
*7 *municipal *Sanggunian *members of legal officer and natural
sangguniang Vmayor g Panlungsod the *municipal regulations) resources
Barangay *Sanggunian members Sangguniang agriculturist (DISCRETION and
members g Bayan (MANDATORY Panlalawigan *municipal ARY environment
*SK chair members APPOINTIVE (MANDATORY environment APPOINTIVE officer
*brgy (MANDATORY OFFICERS) APPOINTIVE and natural OFFICERS) *provincial
secretary APPOINTIVE *secretary to OFFICERS) resources *city cooperative
*brgy OFFICERS) the *secretary to *municipal architect officer
treasurer *secretary to Sangguniang the architect *city *provincial
the Panlungsod Sangguniang *municipal information architect
Sangguniang *city Panlalawigan information officer *provincial
Bayan treasurer *provincial officer *city information
*municipal *city treasurer agriculturist officer
treasurer assessor *provincial *city
*municipal *city assessor population
assessor accountant *provincial officer
*municipal *city budget accountant City
accountant officer *provincial environment
*municipal *City engineer and natural
budget planning and *provincial resources
officer development budget officer
*municipal coordinator officer *city
planning and *city *provincial cooperative
development engineer/buil planning and officer
coordinator ding official development Chief TMTM
*Municipal *city health coordinator Executive
engineer/buil officer *provincial Powers
ding official *city civil legal officer!
*municipal registrar *provincial BARANGAY

Page 10 of 10 Cha Mendoza


LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
Sangguniang Kabataan OLIVARES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
423: Creation and Election Power to issue permits and licenses for holding activities for any
-Composition: charitable or welfare purpose expressly provided by LGC
1. SK Chair (elected)
2.. 7 members MUNEZ V. ARINO
3. secretary -mayors no longer allowed to issue warrants, determine probable cause
4. treasurer
-QUALIFICATIONS: 15 to 18 (on the day of election) ORDONEZ V. GUSTILLO
-as the Mayor represents the municipality in its business transactions,
Katipunan ng Kabataan signs on its behalf all contracts and official documents made in accordance
-all citizens of the Philippines w/ law/ordinance, directs the formulation of municipal dev’t plans and
…actually residing in the barangay for at least 6 months programs which upon approval by the Sangguniang Bayan, he will execute
…15 but less than 18y.o. ON THE DAY OF THE ELECTION and implement, there was no need for a new authority to sign it. (so may
…duly registered in the list of SK/in the official barangay list in the custody prior approval na, no need for another approval!) – cf Sec22
of the barangay secretary
LOPEZ V. CSC
REYES V. FERRER -if the City Charter designates the Sanggunian to appoint employees of the
-KB (former KK) still exists as an entity – as shown by MC 87-18 of Ministry City council (but it is generally vested with the MAYOR), special law
of Local Government prevails over general law so MAYOR DOES NOT HAVE POWER TO APPOINT
in this case
ALUNAN V. MIRASOL
-elections for SK officers are not subject to the supervision of COMELEC in STO DOMINGO V. ORDONEZ
the same way that contests involving SK officials do not fall w/n the -the local chief executive who appoints a local officer ALSO HAS THE
jurisdiction of COMELEC (SK elections not covered by OMNIBUS ELECTIONS POWER TO REMOVE SAID OFFICIAL in accordance with the disciplinary
CODE) jurisdiction of the Mayor

GARVIDA v. SALES LAGANAPAN V. ASEDILLO


-“Less than 18y.o.a” = not over 18, not beyond 18: 18 y x 365 d -the exercise of the power of discipline must be done in accordance with
law
MUNICIPALITY
Sec442: Requisites for Creation NESSIA V. FERMIN
(d) municipalities de jure -mayor may be held liable for damages for official inaction, which brings to
MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY V. CA standstill the administrative process and the public is left in the darkness
-subsequent gov’t acts point to state’s recognition of municipality created of uncertainty
under a void EO of its continued existence as municipality – De facto
municipal corp? ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY V. CA – business permit (not license)
-defect was cured by Section 442(d) of LGC: provides that if municipal -while a business may be regulated, such regulation must, however, be w/n
district… the bounds of reason
…organized pursuant to Presidential issuances/Eos
…have respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the Sangguniang Bayan: Powers, Duties – basically legislative powers of Congress
time of effectivity of this Code delegated to local legislative bodies
= considered REGULAR municipalities MUNICIPALITY OF MALOLOS V. LIBANGANG MALOLOS INC – no longer
controlling
Sec444: powers of Chief Executive It is the municipal mayor, w/ authorization of the Sangguniang Bayan that
(1) general supervision and control of all municipal programs, has primary power to issue licenses for operation of ordinary cockpits.
projects, services and activities (NOW, NO SUPERVISION ON THE PART OF THE PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL
(2) enforces all laws and ordinances, and implements all municipal COMMISSION)
programs, projects, services and activities
(3) initiates and maximizes the generation of resources and revenues LTO V. CITY OF BUTUAN
Powers of LTO and LFTRB unaffected by LGC. Under LGC, some functions of
and applies them to the priorities…
DOTC were transferred to LGUs
(4) ensures the delivery of basic services
-LGUs now have power to regulate operation of trike for hire
(5) exercises such powers and performs such duties as may be
…and to grant franchises for operation of tricycles
prescribed by law or ordinance
….SUBJECT TO THE GUIDELINES IMPOSED BY DOTC

Page 11 of 11 Cha Mendoza


LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JUAN V. CA F: 16 cities created, not complying with the income criteria for cities in the LGC
-Municipality is be liable for unclosed manholes made in connection with H: Black-letter law justification: The creation of local government units must follow
laying gas, water, sewer and other pipes w/n its territorial jurisdiction the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law.
-so STRICT LIABILITY UNDER NCC AUTOMATIC IF THE EXCAVATION W/C There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to
CAUSED THE INJURY IS RELATED TO THESE PIPELAYING ACTIVITES stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of
a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write
*~*~*~* such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. Therefore, Congress cannot
CITY v. MUNICIPALITY make cities which does not comply with the criteria in LGC!
-both general-purpose government -on EPC violation: There is no substantial difference between the “pending cities” of
-CITY: more urbanized and developed barangays vs. MUNICIPALITY: just barangay the 11th Congress and the other cities which were not yet pending
*but there are a few differences in services rendered(See Sec17) -why did the League opposed these cityhood bills: their share in the IRA would be
*IRA allocated differently for Cities and Municipalities diminished! (which is SO WRONG as the purpose of LGC is to make these LGUs
independent from the National Government!)
MUNICIPALITY/CITY v. BARANGAY -What should have the congress have done to make these municipalities as cities:
SIZE: Barangay smaller, CITY/MUNICIPALITY: composed of several barangays (at >amend the LGC first
least 2) >amend the IRA law: Review the incentives!
PURPOSE: Barangay is the conduit for democracy (primary planning and
implementing unit/forum); CITY/MUNICIPALITY: General purpose government Section 451: classification of cities
MUNICIPALITY/CITY v.PROVINCE CLASSIFICATION OF CITIES (3)
Province: Conduit for LGUs services Why classification? What’s the significance: if the city wants to become part of a
*Dynamic? – look at the big picture, long-term view province or not
WHY CITY/MUNICIPALITY charged with delivery of services? Why not make barangay
general purpose government? Why not PROVINCE? INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITIES:
1. size -component cities
2. scale -charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials
3. costs -independent of the province
*City and municipality general purpose government because it’s level wherein it is -ICC may be declared as such by Congress! Congress has a choice!
most cost-effective to deliver services
*Province/national level too large-scale; difficult to track work HIGHLY URBANIZED CITIES
e.g. Solid Waste Management -min population of 200k inhabitants AND
-latest annual income of at least P50M – amended so now P100M
*~*~*~*~* -also not entitled to vote for elective provincial officials
*has right to have a representative in congress? Minimum requirements for
THE CITY electorate?
On requisites for creation -automatically proclaimed a highly urbanized city once it vs. ICC (not automatically
Mariano, Jr. v. Comelec, 242 SCRA 211 (1995) proclaimed)
Mete and bound requirement MANDATORY BUT this is an exceptional case. Congress
has refrained from using the metes and bounds descriptions of land areas of other COMPONENT CITIES
LGU with unsettled boundary disputes (not an exemption!) -did not meet the requirements for highly urbanized cities
-allow their voters to participate in the election of provincial officials and whose
Plebiscite rule annual income or population does not qualify them to be highly urbanized

HOW IS CITY CREATED: By Act of Congress


+ plebiscite w/n120d by votes cast in by those directly affected Officials of city government
Mama, Jr. v. CA, 196 SCRA 489 (1991)
*can a city be made from 2 municipalities? YES, by act of congress -It is within the legal competence of the City Council of Ozamis, in the exercise of its
*IF municipality converted to an independent component city, should the whole sound discretion, to create such other offices as may be necessary to carry out the
province vote? YES. Whole province directly affected! purposes of the city government or consolidate the functions of any one of such
If city not an ICC: not necessary to include whole province offices with another in the interest of efficiency and economy.
-It may also create, consolidate, and reorganize city offices and positions wholly
REQUISITES: supported by local funds
*are these requirements absolute? Can congress make a city which does not follow -The City Council has no obligation to keep a useless office of a position that is
the requisites in LGC? neither needed nor in the public interest by reason of, as in this case, financial
losses and incapacity to render adequate public services
League of Cities v. COMELEC
Page 12 of 12 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
Powers of chief executives 12. Agriculturist
Social Justice Society (SJS), Cabigao and Tumbokon v. Atienza, 7 March 2007 13. Social Welfare and Development Officer
It is the duty of the Mayor to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city, pursuant to Sec 455 (b)(2) of LGC. It is a ministerial duty. Optional
Ordinance enacted pursuant to the police power delegated to LGUs, a principle Asst. Treasurer
described as the power inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional Legal Officer
limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of the Asst. Assessor
society. Sanggunian has power to reclassify lands within the jurisdiction of the city. Administrator
Agriculturist
Sir was included in this case: SJS wanted Mayor Atienza to enforce the Ordinance Social Welfare and Development Officer
In the Philippines, a lot of our oil are imported. Pandacan was set aside as the oil SENRO
base for Manila. But since we were not strict for land use (residential area first, but
converted to industrial area with the construction of the oil depot, then with the Who appoints generally: head of local government
ordinance, converted to commercial). 9-11 was an opportunity for LGU to have the Subject to confirmation:
oil depot to leave. Spot zoning – should not be allowed! (SIR) Zoning is the power of
the Sangguian. Now the oil depots are faced with the problem of relocation. This *first level civil service eligible? – highest or basic level?
case shows that land use is a powerful power which should be exercised rationally.
ROLE of CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION: Power to check if the appointees are qualified
SIR: Why should we change LGC when we have not yet maximized the potentials of for the positions – they cannot appoint or change the appointment
the LGUs -what if there is a violation of the Civil Service Law: then the CSC has the power to
remove the appointed official – disapprove the appointment
GORDON V. VERIDIANO
-the power to issue licenses includes the power to revoke it, but the latter Usual qualifications
is limited by the authority to grant license: can only revoke license if (1) he is a citizen of the Philippines
there’s a violation of the condition for granting of that license. If license (2) a resident of the local government unit concerned
granted by authority of another body (i.e. a national agency), then it may (3) of good moral character
only be revoked when there’s a violation of the guidelines of that other (4) a holder of a college degree preferably in (course concerned) from a
authority recognized college or university, and
(5) a first grade civil service eligible or its equivalent.
CITY OF CALOOCAN V. CA (6) He must have acquired experience (relevant field) for at least
-mayor has the authority to file suits “for recovery of funds and property …five (5) years in the case of the city or provincial appointive official, and
on behalf of the city, even w/o prior authorization from sanggunian …three (3) years in the case of the municipal appointive official

APPOINTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS COMMON TO ALL MUNICIPALITIES, CITIES AND *Treasurer and Asst. Treasurer: appointed by SOF
PROVINCES
Mandatory vs. Optional Basic job description
Mandatory: required: the LGU has the duty to appoint Assessor: real property values
Optional: it’s the choice of the appointing official to appoint it Accountant: internal auditor of the LGU
Treasuer: collection of local taxes
Pattern: Determine WON the function/duty performed is crucial to the delivery of Budget Officer: allocation of budget
the basic services or to the operation of the local government – ACCOUNTABILITY OF
LGUS Cases
On treasurer
Mandatory positions Macalincag v. Chang, 208 SCRA 413 (1992)
1. Sanggunian Secretary Municipal treasurer was under the DOF as provided in Section 3 of PD 477 (SABI NI
2. Treasurer PIMENTEL). SOF is proper disciplining authority to issue preventive suspension order.
3. Assessor Mayor/Gov may still exercise power to investigate erring local officials
4. Accountant pursuant to Sections 444(x), 455(x) and 456 (x) of LGC.
5. Budget Officer -HISTORY OF POWER TO APPOINT TREASURER: before (PD 477) Provincial Treasurers
6. Engineer and Assessors appoint municipal treasurers. Then power to appoint transferred to
7. Planning and Development Coordinator SOF (PD 921). Chang argues that the power to discipline him should be vested on
8. Health Officer the President who he alleges that under EO 392 had the power to appoint him.
9. Legal Officer, also optional However, under the Civil Service Law, the heads of the departments have the power
10. Civil Registrar to discipline and PD 477 provides that SOF has disciplinary supervision over
11. Administrator, also optional municipal treasurers.
Page 13 of 13 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
-as re: replacement required: Both the CIVIL SERVICE LAW and the then LGC does Pandi v. CA, 380 SCRA 436 (2002) * IPHO-APGH: Integrated Provincial
not require a replacement to be appointed first before the preventive suspension Health Officer-Amai Pakpak General Hospital
would be effective. OLD LGC even provides that in the case of temporary disability -Governor Mutilan of Lanao had no authority to appoint Saber as OIC IPHO-APGH
of the treasurer, the assistant treasurer would automatically take-over his position. since at the time he made the appointment, IPHO-APGH was still under national
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION EFFECTIVE UPON CHANG’S RECEIPT THEREOF government, officials paid from national funds entirely. Saber’s appointment VOID.
-Section 478, LGC: not a grant of powers to governors and mayors to appoint local
On Budget Officer health officers but simply a directive that those empowered to appoint local health
Lira v. CSC, Jaranilla, 144 SCRA 541 (1986) officers are mandated to do so (so DUTY, NOT POWER)
-PD 1375 transferred the local budget administration from the Ministry of Finance to -Designation made by Macacua after EO 133 valid.
the Ministry of Budget. Lira’s position as part of the Office of the Mayor is but a -After EO 133, the ARMM Local Code was passed. Under the ARMM Local Code, the
budget policy-determining arm of the local chief executive, otherwise it would be provincial health officer was converted from a regional government official to a
performing same functions as the Local Budget Staff of the City Treasurer’s Office. provincial official, and thus is under the general supervision and control of the
PD 1375 created the new position of City Budget Officer as a result of the transfer Provincial Governor and not of the Regional Secretary of Health. It is only after the
and since it’s a new position, it’s open to ALL QUALIFIED! ARMM Code that Governor Mutilan could have validly appointed Saber as OIC IPHO-
-QUALIFICATIONS: 3yr experience in treasury service or equivalent in budgeting or APGH.
in any related field + minimum qualification requirements, subject to Civil Service
Law and approval of Commissioner of Budget. Local Chief Executive’s discretion and On Legal Officer
prerogative in his choice of appointee to a new office is limited: should consider only Griňo v. CSC, 194 SCRA 458 (1991) – legal officer as a confidential officer
those who are qualified and eligible. Quoting Cadiente v. Santos, a city legal officer is one requiring that utmost
-Lira’s appointment was not done pursuant to Local Budget Circular No. 8 which confidence on the part of the mayor. The relationship existing between a lawyer and
requires that if a Local Budget Officer be appointed before June 19, 1980, the said his client, whether a private individual or a public officer, is one that depends on the
officer should be issued a new appointment to the position. Lira was not issued a highest degree of trust that the latter entertains for the counsel selected. Being a
new appointment, nor was her appointment approved by the Minister of Budget. “primarily confidential”, the Provincial Atty.’s services can be terminated based on
-Jaranilla has more experience: 6 years budgeting work vs. 2 years in Lira’s case. loss of confidence and trust.
Court, CSC found her more qualified than Lira -As regards the staff: legal work involved can be delegated. They do not occupy
primarily confidential positions, instead, they occupy positions that are remote from
On Engineer the appointing authority and are subject to the supervision and control of the legal
Genoblazo v. CA, 174 SCRA 124 (1989) officer, who can ensure that the judiciary duties inherent in the attorney-client
Manila City Engineer was authorized to issue a demolition order on his finding that relationship are observed. Accordingly, they enjoy security of tenure as mandated by
the disputed structures are dangerous and structures within the meaning of the the Civil Service Law.
National Building Code (dangerous or ruinous).
Ramos v. CA, 269 SCRA 34 (1997)
Patagoc v. CSC, 185 SCRA 411 (1990) GR: Only the provincial fiscal, provincial attorney and municipal attorney should
-CSC cannot disapprove the appointment made by the City Mayor when the represent a municipality in its lawsuits. Only accountable public officers may act for
appointed official is qualified. The power of appointment is essentially discretionary and in behalf of public entities and that public funds should not be expended to hire
and the Commission cannot substitute its judgment for that of the appointment private lawyers.
power. CSC under PD 807 may only approve or disapprove the appointment X: 1. when the municipality is an adverse party in a case involving the provincial
after determining WON the appointee possesses the appropriate civil government or another municipality or city within the province;
service eligibility or the required qualifications. It cannot order or direct the 2. if and when the provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court a particular
appointment of a successful protestant. municipality;
-Both Patagoc and the Incumbent Asst. City Engineer were qualified. 3. when the original jurisdiction of a case involving the municipality is vested in the
PIMENTEL: Requirement under OLD LGC that City Engineer must have been an Asst. Supreme Court
City Engineer or has engaged in the practice of his profession for at least 5 years NO 4. in a case involving the municipality, he or his wife, or child is pecuniary involved
LONGER CONTROLLING as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.

On Health Officer OTHER PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO LGUs


Alba v. Perez, 154 SCRA 225 (1987)
Dr. Perez is a national government employee, thus entitled to the salary increase. He Chapter 1– Settlement of Boundary Dispute
is included among the national officials performing municipal functions under the SECTION 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Dispute.
direct control of the Health Minister and not the city mayor. Provincial and city health GR: settle amicably
officers are all considered national government officials irrespective of source of X: if not able to settle amicably, refer for settlement to Sanggunian concerned
funds for their salary because preservation of health is a national service. (a) bet 2+ Brgys in the same city or municipality: Sangguniang Panlungsod/Bayan
PIMENTEL: Not controlling anymore. LGC makes Local Health Officers local officials. concerned
(b) bet 2+ municipalities w/n same province: Sangguniang Panlalawigan

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
(c) bet municipalities/component cities of DIFFERENT PROVINCES: jointly to (f) CERTIFICATION of number of obtained signatures: after lapse of periods
Sangguinang Panlalawigans
provided
(d) component city/municipality vs. HUC
…determine WON required signatures obtained
0r bet 2+ HUCs
…if failed to obtain the required number of signatures: wala na…
…jointly referred to the respective sanggunians
(e) if FAILED TO EFFECT AMICABLE SETTLEMENT W/N 60D FROM DATE DISPUTE WAS (g) If obtained: COMELEC set a date for the initiative (proposition shall
REFERRED: ISSUE CERTIFICATE be submitted to the registered voters of the LGU concerned for
…then formally tried by sanggunian concerned, decide w/n 60d from date of their approval)
certification *period: w/n ___days from date of CERTIFICATION
Section 119: Appeal -60d: provinces and cities
-elevate decision of Sanggunian to proper RTC -45d: municipalities
-jurisdiction determined by location of area in dispute -30d: brgys
-RTC decide w/n 1yr fr filing …results certified and proclaimed by COMELEC
*status quo maintained pending dispute Sec 123: Effectivity of Local Propositions
-approved by a MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST
Local Initiative & Referendum …take effect 15d after COMELEC Certification
Sec 120: Local Initiative Defined
-legal process whereby the registered voters of a LGU Sec 124: Limitations on local Initiatives
…may directly propose, enact or amend any ordinance (a) only 1x per year
*a form of DIRECT INITIATIVE: the voters themselves start the legislative (b) subject: those w/n legal powers of Sanggunians to enact
process for the enactment, amendment, or repeal of an ordinance or (c)if Sanggunian adopts the proposition before initiative held, local chief
resolution in the absence of positive action of the sanggunian exec approves the same: Initiative cancelled
INDIRECT INITIATIVE: voters want a piece of legislation or an ordinance or …but those against such action may still apply for initiative
resolution enacted, amended, or repealed but they do not do so directly;
they course their action through their elected representatives in the Sec125: Limits upon Sanggunians
national legislature -CANNOT repeal, modify or amend proposition/ordinance approved through
*may cover all sorts of measures as long as these are w/n the competence initiative w/n 6m from date of approval; can only do so 3y AFTER by a vote
of the sanggunian to enact of 3/4 of all members (18m for brgys)

Sec121: Who may Exercise Initiative and Referendum Sec126: Local Referendum Defined
-all registered voters of the PCMB -legal process whereby the registered voters of the LGU may approve,
amend, or reject any ordinance enacted by the Sanggunian
Sec122: Procedure in Local Initiative -held under CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF COMELEC w/n
(a) petition filed w/ Sanggunian proposing the adoption, enactment, *60d: Provinces and cities
repeal, or amendment of an ordinance by *45d: municipalities
…1k registered voters: Provinces and cities *30d: brgys
….100 registered voters: Brgys -COMELEC certifies and proclaims results
(b) no favorable action w/n 30d from presentation: proponents
Sec127: proposition approved pursuant to an initiative/referendum may be
(through duly authorized and registered reps) invoke power of
declared null and void by the proper courts
initiative – give notice to Sanggunian concerned
Grounds:
(c) proposition NUMBERED SERIALLY STARTING FROM ROMAN
1. violation of COnsti
NUMERAL I. COMELEC extend assistance
2. want of capacity of Sanggunian concerned to enact measure
(d) 2+ propositions may be submitted in an initiatie
(e) Collect number of signatures: Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. Comelec, 262 SCRA 492 (1996):
*period (counted from NOTICE to Sanggunian): In enacting the Initiative and Referendum Act, Congress differentiated one term from
-90d: provinces and cities the other, thus:
-60d: municipalities Initiative Referendum
-30d: Brgys -Power of the people to propose -power of the electorate to approve or
*may designate stations for collecting signatures: in a public place in amendments to the Constitution or to reject a legislation through an election
the LGU propose and enact legislations through an called for the purpose.
*whose presence required: election called for the purpose
-election registrar/rep -Indirect initiative: exercise of initiative by
-rep of proponent the people through a proposition sent to
-rep of Sanggunian concerned
Page 15 of 15 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
Congress or the local legislative body for …involving moral turpitude
action …punishable by 1 year or more of imprisonment
-3 systems of initiative: -2 classes: ….w/n 2yrs after serving sentence
1. Initiative on the Constitution: petition 1. Referendum on statutes: petition to MORENO V. COMELEC: if under probation, not serving sentence
proposing amendments to the Constitution approve or reject an act/law, or part anymore and restored to all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
2. Initiative on Statutes: petition proposing thereof, passed by Congress conviction
to enact a national legislation 2. Referendum on local law: petition b. removed from office as a result of an administrative case
3. Initiative on local legislation: petition to approve or reject a c. convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance of
proposing to enact a law/resolution/ordinance enacted by the Republic – a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act,
regional/provincial/city/municipal/barangay regional assemblies and local loyalty to 2+ states
law, resolution or ordinance legislative bodies MERCADO V. MANZANO: Dual citizenship vs. dual allegiance (see corresponding
-resorted to by the people directly either -the lawmaking body submits to the items for def)
because the lawmaking body fails or registered voters of its territorial
refuses to enact the jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, d. those w/dual citizenship* - w/ concurrent application of the different laws of
law/ordinance/resolution/act that they any ordinance or resolution which is 2 or more states, the person is simultaneously a national by the said states
desire or because they want to amend or duly enacted or approved by such *In Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (DUAL CITIZENSHIP
modify one already existing. lawmaking authority LAW), a natural-born citizen who lost Philippine Citizenship by naturalization of a
foreign country should: (1) take oath; (2) make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship; (3) should not be occupying a
public office abroad ; and/or (4) not in active service as commissioned/non-
PEOPLE AND STRUCTURES IN THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT commissioned officers

ELECTIVE OFFICIALS e. fugitives from justice: criminal/nonpolitical cases here/abroad: includes not
Qualifications and Election only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
Section 39. Qualifications who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. ESTABLISH INTENT TO
General Requirements EVADE (RODRIGUEZ V. COMELEC)
(a) citizen of the Philippines (regardless if natural born or naturalized – CO f. permanent residents of a foreign country
v ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE) …have acquired right to reside abroad + continue to avail the same right after
(b) registered voter in the LGU (if exec) or district (if Sanggunian) the effectivity of this Code
(c) resident therein for at least 1 yr immediately preceding the day of the g. insane or feebleminded
election GREGO V COMELEC: no provision for retroactive application
ABELLA V. COMELEC, SUPRA:difference between place of work vs. place of
domicile: domicile (where the person ultimately wants to reside, intent to return) vs. …is it a lifetime ban for local office the fact that you have been administratively
place of work; residence = domicile` - IMPORTANT UNG ANIMUS REVERTENDI removed you are disqualified? It seems so under Section 40 (b). – understood to be
DUMPIT-MICHELENA V. BOADO: to successfully effect a change of domicile, removal FOR CAUSE
there must be a clear and positive proof of concurrence of the ff: (1) an BRY SJ: seems unfair that one cannot run for being removed through an
actual removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of administrative case but those sentenced by final judgment for criminal conviction
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; (3) can run again if pardoned unconditionally…
acts which correspond w/ the purpose. Marge: under B, the lawmakers may have thought that these persons were already
(d) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect given the opportunity to work for the government but did not perform well
(e) AGE REQUIREMENT: at least
*23 y.o. on election day: GOV/VICE GOV/mem of Sangguniang Section 41: Manner of Election
Panlalawigan (PROVINCE) or MAYOR/Vmayor/member of Sangguniang (a) AT LARGE/THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICITON OF THE LGU
Panglungsod (HUC) CONCERNED
*21 y.o. on election day: MAYOR/VMAYOR of ICCs, Component cities and *Gov/vgov: entire province
municipalities *mayor/vmayor: entire city/municipality
*18y.o. on election day: mem of Sangguniang Panglungsod (ICC, *punong brgy: entire brgy
Component cities)/bayan (component municipality) (b) BY DISTRICT: regular mems of the various sanggunians
*18y.. on election day: Punong Barangay/mem of Sangguniang Barangay
*at least 15 y.o. but not more than 21 y.o.a. on election day: (c) BY BARANGAY: mems of Sangguniang Brgy
Sangguniang Kabataan (d) BY LEAGUE: presidents of the leagues…

Section 40. Disqualification (e) BY SECTOR: reps of


*women
a. sentenced by FINAL JUDGMENT for an offense *workers

Page 16 of 16 Cha Mendoza


LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
*other sectors as determined by the Sanggunian concerned Vacancies and Succession
*DE GUIA V COMELEC: why by district for Sangguian mems: to reduce the number of Section 44: Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor (local chief
positions to be voted for and ensure the efficiency of electoral processes execs)
PERMANENT VACANCY:
Section 42: Date of Elections …when an ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIAL
-every 3 yrs 1. fills a HIGHER VACANT OFFICE
-on 2nd Monday of May 2. refuses to assume office
3. fails to qualify
Section 43: Term of Office 4. dies
a. FOR ALL LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS: 3yrs 5. removed from office
b. NO SERVICE FOR MORE THAN 3 CONSECUTIVE TERMS in the same 6. voluntarily resigns/otherwise
7. permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office
position
IF PERMANENT VACANCY OCCURS IN THE OFFICE OF
…voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time: not
*Gov/Mayor: VICE gov/mayor becomes gov/mayor
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
*gov and vice gov/mayor and vice mayor: highest ranking sanggunian
term for the elective official concerned was elected
member/second highest ranking (in case of permanent inability)
c. BRGY OFFICIALS AND SK MEMS: 3 YEARS
…subsequent vacancies: filled automatically by other sanggunian mems
Cf: Art X, Sec8
ACCORDING TO RANKING
*PUNONG BRGY: highest ranking sanggunian barangay mem….
BORJA V. COMELEC: not enough that SERVED 3 consecutive terms; should
IN CASE OF TIE: draw lots!
also have been ELECTED to the same position for the same number of
Successors: serve only the unexpired terms of their predecessors
times (so if only succeeded the office, not applicable)
Ranking: determined on basis of proportion of votes obtained by each
*Sa president and VP, if VP continues the term for more than 2 years, then he cannot
winning candidate to the total number of voters in each district in the
run for President. 4 years and above considered a full term.
immediately preceding local election
ONG V ALLEGRE: for the 3-term limit for elective local officials to apply, 2
MENZON V. PETILLA:
conditions or requisites must concur:
VACANCY: when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and
(1) the official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms to
exercise at present the duties of the office
the same local government post
-in case of temporary vacancy in the VICE POSITION, and the code is silent,
(2) he has FULLY SERVED 3 consecutive terms.
THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH DILG SEC may appoint the temporary
-SERVICE NOT FULL when involuntary interruption/break in continuity of
replacement
service
*QUESTION: is this still applicable, when the code states that in case of
-BUT: considered full term if declared loser in a mayoralty electoral protest
vacancy in the VICE position, the highest ranking sanggunian mem would
become vice??? GOVS OF THE PHILIPPINES V. PIMENTEL: NOT APPLICABLE
OSMENA V. COMELEC: the legislature cannot extend the term of office by
ANYMORE. These cases were ruled during the time of AQUINO where there
providing that they shall hold over until their successors are elected and
was no CONSTI yet and the DILG sec may appoint officials who would
qualified
support the president…NOW, THERE IS AUTOMATIC SUCCESSION…
DIMAPORO V. MITRA: term vs. tenure
QUESTION: what if there’s a permanent vacancy in the sanggunian, as
TERM: may not be extended or shortened by the legislature
caused by the permanent vacancy in the local executives…eto na:
TENURE: period during w/c an officer holds the office – may be affected by
circumstances w/n or beyond the power of said officer
Section 45: Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian
* in this case, once a Congressman files for candidacy to another position
-applies when 44 does not apply (no more sanggunian member that could
when his TERM is not yet completed (so his tenure was just for the period
fill up the spot vacant)
w/n w/c he was a congressman), he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short
-permanent vacancy filled by APPOINTMENT of:
his tenure. His term may be continued by another person
a. PRESIDENT (THROUGH EXEC SEC – note: not DILG sec):
…Sangguniang Panlalawigan
*in practice, can run again after 3 consecutive terms after lapse of 1 year
….Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUCs
*policy wise, it’s a term limits are bad ideas:
… Sangguniang Panlungsod of ICCs
Reason: family dynasties discouraged, long-term totalitarian rule… BUT OPPOSITE
b. GOVERNOR:
HAPPENS!
….Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities
…if people wants their local government officials, let the official govern them
….Sangguniang Bayan
…long term planning difficult with term limits
c. CITY/MUNICIPAL MAYOR:
*if Vice mayor becomes a mayor when mayor dies, is that considered a term?
…sangguniang Brgy, upon recommendation of Sangguniang Brgy
Concerned
Page 17 of 17 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
ON RECOMMENDEES/NOMINEES c. Sanggunian mems: vice concerned
GR: nominated by the political party under w/c the sanggunian mem d. Component city/municipality mayor: gov
concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the next higher e. Punong brgys: city/municipal mayor
position created the last vacancy f. Sanggunian brgy mems: punong brgy
…TERM: serve the unexpired term …if application for LOA not acted upon w/n 5 working days from receipt:
…REQUISITES: deemed approved
(1) nomination
(2) certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of Local Legislation
the political party concerned SECTION 48. Local Legislative Power. - Local legislative power shall be exercised
X: by
1. sangguniang brgy vacancy: recommendation of Sangguniang Brgy the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the province;
concerned the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city;
2. if sanggunian member DOES NOT BELONG TO ANY POLITICAL the Sangguniang bayan for the municipality; and
the Sangguniang Barangay for the Barangay.
PARTY: recommendation of sanggunian concerned, Appointed by
LOCAL CHIEF EXECUTIVE (same as those above: FARINAS v. BARBA)
SECTION 49. Presiding Officer.
3. when vacancy in the REPS: automatically filled by the official nex
vice-governor: Sangguniang Panlalawigan;
in rank of the org concerned:
city vice-mayor: Sangguniang Panlungsod;
a. youth
municipal vice-mayor: Sangguniang bayan;
b. brgy rep to the sanggunian of a municipality, city or province Punong Barangay: Sangguniang Barangay.
…The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie.
Section 46: TEMPORARY VACANCY in the OFFICE OF THE LOCAL CHIEF EXEC *if absent: temporary presiding officer among themselves: if they constitute a
a. FOR GOV/CITY OR MUNICIPAL MAYOR/PUNONG BRGY: quorum + only among those present
-temporarily incapacitated to perform his duties for physical/legal
reasons: SECTION 50. Internal Rules of Procedure.
*LOA RULES of procedure
*travel abroad …adopted, update on 1st regular session w/n90d after
*suspension from office CONTENTS
…VICE or highest ranking Sangguniang Brgy mem in case of PUNONG 1. Organization, standing committees, jurisdiction of each committee, election of
BRGY shall AUTOMATICALLY EXERCISE chair
GR: POWERS AND PERFORM DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE LOCAL 2. order and calendar of business
CHIEF EXEC 3. legislative process
X: power to 4. conduct of members during sessions
*appoint 5. discipline of members
*suspend …for DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR
*dismiss employees ….ABSENCES W/O JUSTIFIABEL CAUSE FOR 4 CONSECUTIVE SESSIONS
…can only exercise 3 if temporary incapacity EXCEEDS 30d …CONVICTION by FINAL judgment to imprisonment of at least 1 yr: AUTOMATIC
TERMINATION OF TEMPORARY INCAPACITY EXPULSION
1. submission to appropriate sanggunian of a written
declaration by the local chief exec concerned that he has SECTION 51. Full Disclosure of Financial and Business Interests of
reported back to office Sanggunian Members.
2. LEGAL CAUSES: submission of necessary docs showing that
the legal cause no longer exist SECTION 52. Sessions.
…if absence caused by TRAVEL w/n country but OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL Min # of regular sessions:
JURISDICTION for less than or equal to 3d: designate in writing OIC 1/week: Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
OIC: anyone Bayan
-authorization should specify powers, duties, functions 2/month: Sangguniang Barangay
-if no authorization/designation given + if absent for MORE THAN 3 days: *special sessions:
vice gov/ city/municipal mayor/ highest ranking Sanggunian Barangay mem -called by local chief exec/majority of sanggunian
may assume powers of local chief exec .-when public interest demands
*sessions OPEN TO PUBLIC
Sec 47: LOAs X: closed-door session
By whom, who approves: …security
a. GOV/mayor of HUC/ mayor of ICC: president …decency
b. Vice gov/ vice mayor: local chief exec concerned ….morality
Page 18 of 18 Cha Mendoza
LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
*no 2 sessions in 1 day ITEM VETO: does not affect the item or items not objected to
…items vetoed should be overrided by Sanggunian or else the previous items
SECTION 53. Quorum concerning those vetoed would be deemed reenacted
MAJORITY of ALL mems elected and qualified LIMIT: ONLY VETO AN ORDINANCE ONCE: once approved by 2/3 of ALL mems of
If none: Sanggunian, cannot veto again!
-presiding officer may declare a recesss
-majority of mems may adjourn from day to day *why exercise similar powers of congress but don’t have contempt powers: NORECO
-majority of mems may compel immediate attendance if member absent case. Legislature’s power is inherent to them vs. local legislative bodies – it’s
w/o justifiable cause delegated!
…if wala pa rin: NO BIZ TRANSACTED, DECLARE SESSION ADJOURNED FOR But isn’t there separation of powers in the local levels as well? Contempt powers
LACK OF QUORUM inherent in the Judiciary. + powers of local governments should be explicitly
provided for.
SECTION 54. Approval of Ordinances. NEGROS ORIENTAL II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. SANGGUNIANG
-present to the local chief exec concerned, who may: PANLUNGSOD OF DUMAGUETE (1987)
a. approve it: affix signature on EACH AND EVERY PAGE There being no provision in the LGC explicitly granting local legislative bodies, the
b. veto and return w/ OBJECTIONS (should state reasons – Sec 55!): Sanggunian may power to issue compulsory process and the power to punish for contempt, the
reconsider it, override veto by 2/3 vote of ALL MEMS Sangguinang Panlungsod of Dumaguete is devoid of power to punish petitioners for
c. sit on it: deemed valid after lapse of period contempt!
…15d for province
….10d for municipality or city Review of Ordinances
-if Brgy Ordinance: approval of majority of all mems + approval of punong brgy
Section 56: Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances (and
*APPROVAL OF LOCAL CHIEF EXEC NOT A MINISTERIAL ACT (DE LOS REYES V. Resolutions)
SANDIGANBAYAN) -done by Sangguniang Panlalawigan/provincial attorney/prosecutor
-if no action w/n30d after submission: presumed consistent w/ law, valid
*Presumption of validity also applicable to ordinances. Police power also delegated
to LGUs. Should show clear violation of Consti or law. This is not delegated, it is MODAY V. CA: Sanggunian can only hold a resolution as invalid ON THE
constitutionally recognized. SOLE GROUND THAT IT IS BEYOND THE POWER OF THE SANGGUNIAN
*Proof required to contest the constitutionality of ordinance: substantive evidence CONCERNED, OR THE MAYOR TO ISSUE IT
only, not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lowest quantum of evidence required.
MUNICIPALITY OF PARANAQUE V. VM REALTY CORP: ORDINANCE V.
Lagcao v. Labra, supra. RESOLUTION
(1) For an Ordinance to be valid, USE TATEL STANDARDS! ORDINANCE RESOLUTION
• conditions 1-6 are generally applicable to all laws. The requirement that it law Merely a declaration of the
is within the corporate powers of the LGU is the special condition for LGUs. sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking
body on a specific matter
Tano v. Socrates, 278 SCRA154 (1997) – PRESUMPTION OF General and permanent temporary
CONSITUTIONALITY Needs 3rd reading Only needs 3rd reading if decided by
Ordinances enacted in the exercise of the powers under the Code (Gen Welfare a majority of all sanggunian mems
Clause) enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. In the light of the principles of
decentralization and devolution enshrined in the Code and of the powers granted Section 57: Review of Brgy Ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
therein to local government units which unquestionably involve the exercise of Bayan
police power, the validity of ordinances relative to the protection and preservation of
the environment, cannot be doubted. To overthrow this presumption, there must be Section 58: Enforcement of Disapproved Ordinances/Resolution
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or -sufficient ground for SUSPENSION/DISMISSAL OF THE OFFICIAL OR
argumentative contradiction. EMPLOYEE CONCERNED
*par 2, Sec 5, par8: enumerations presumed to be constitutionally valid, that’s why
SC has the power to review those enumerated. Section 59: Effectivity of Ordinances/Resolutions
GR: 10d after copy is posted in bulletin board + at least 2 other
SECTION 55. Veto Power of the Local Chief Executive conspicuous places
GROUND: X: ORDINANCE/RESOLUTION PROVIDES OTHERWISE
*it is ultra vires
*it is prejudicial to the public welfare Disciplinary Actions
…reasons stated in writing

Page 19 of 19 Cha Mendoza


LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
* Maraming Bar Exam Questions dito! Also in PubOff so the grounds will Section 62: Notice of Hearing
not be discussed really
* What applies to appointive local officials? Civil Service Law, Code of Anti- Section 53: Preventive Suspension
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act WHO IMPOSES on WHOM
*Elective officials usually rely on subordinates. Is it a ground for *President: elective official of a province/HUC/ICC
disciplinary action? [Arias v Sandiganbayan ] *Governor: elective official of a municipality or component city
*Mayor: elective official of a brgy
SECTION 60. Grounds for Disciplinary Actions. WHEN IMPOSED
- An elective local official may be disciplined, suspended, or removed (DSR) from -anytime when the issues are joined (answer already fi.led)
office on any of the following grounds: -when the evidence of guilt is strong
(a) Disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines; -given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the
(b) Culpable violation of the Constitution; continuance in office of the respondent could
(c) Dishonesty, ….influence the witness
…Oppression ….pose threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence
…misconduct in office *1 preventive suspension: MAX 60d
…gross negligence If several administrative cases filed: max 90d/yr on same ground/s existing
…dereliction of duty; and known at time of first suspension
(d) Commission of any offense involving moral turpitude or an offense REINSTATEMENT: expiration of preventive suspension
punishable by at least prision mayor (6Y,1D TO 12Y); Abuse of power of preventive suspension = abuse of authority
(e) Abuse of authority; *The OMBUDSMAN also has power to suspend local officials (example:
(f) Unauthorized absence for fifteen (15) consecutive working days, Merceditas Gutierrez suspended Mayor Pewee Trinidad of Pasay…un lang
EXCEPT: members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang wala daw basis ung suspension so ultra vires)
Panlungsod, Sangguniang bayan, and Sangguniang Barangay (not The President’s power of Preventive Suspension comes from the power of
regularly going to work everyday. Only required to be in sessions); general supervision (vs. Control: president cannot control the LG
(g) Application for, or acquisition of, foreign citizenship or residence or the executives, cannot substitute his decision)
status of an immigrant of another country; and
(h) Such other grounds as may be provided in this Code and other laws. YABUT V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
*REMOVAL: BY ORDER OF PROPER COURTAn elective local official may be removed A preventive suspension is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to
from office on the grounds enumerated above by order of the proper court. insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. A preventive suspension
may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official
*JURISDICTION: IMPT! concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure
Reliance on Good Faith – a valid defense (but it doesn’t mean you can be that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an
careless) investigation through the use of influence and authority.
ARIAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN. 180 SCRA 309 (1989): *In practice they do “credit” suspension prior to administrative decision
Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, reviewed procedures, and *In a way it is a penalty because you would lose your salary for those days you are
questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor of a fairly sized office could preventively suspended…that’s why usually it is credited.
personally do all these things for all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court
would be asking for the impossible. All heads of offices (mayors and governors CARPIO V. EXEC SEC
included) have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates an on the good -The President may preventively suspend only 3 categories of local elective officials:
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. (a) those of a province; (b) those of a highly urbanized city and (c) those of an
independent component city.
DELOSO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 217 SCRA 49 (1993) -Under the so-called doctrine of qualified political agency, the members of the
-ENTERING INTO AN ORAL CONTRACT (LATER REDUCED INTO WRITING BY Cabinet may act for and in behalf of the President in certain matters because the
SANGGUNIAN) IS NOT A GROUND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION President cannot be expected to exercise his control (and supervisory) powers
personally and all at the same time. He may, therefore, have to delegate some of his
Section 61: Form and Filing of Admin Complaints powers to his Cabinet members except when he is required by the Constitution or
-VERIFIED COMPLAINT law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he acts
-to whom: personally.
*against any elective official of a province/HUC/ICC/component city: Office of
President ESPIRITU V. MELGAR – BEFORE LGC
*against any elective official of a municipality: Sangguniang Panlalawigan, the Minister of Local Government to impose preventive suspension if the respondent
appealable to Office of the President is a provincial or city official (or) the provincial governor if the respondent is an
*against any elective brgy official: Sangguniang Panlungsod or Bayan, deci FINAL elective municipal official.
AND EXECUTORY *Now, the Secretary of DILG is not mentioned as one of those officials who have any
power to suspend any subordinate elective official. The only officials authorized by
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
the Code to impose preventive suspension under appropriate circumstances are the During pendency of appeal: considered placed under preventive
President, the governor and the mayor. suspension

GANZON V. CA Chapter 5 – Recall


-simultaneous service of the suspension orders *it is a special election, One is automatically a candidate
- allowing petitioner to serve simultaneously the overlapping third and fourth *recall can not be conducted when THERE IS NOT FUNDS
suspensions will favor him (and presumably the local constituency) and certainly *IS RECALL APPLICABLE TO CONGRESSMEN? TO senators? NO. LGC does not apply to
lessen if not offset the harsh effects of the respondent Secretary in issuing those them!
successive suspension orders.
*DILG Sec still suspends, by order of the President (para matanggal ung SECTION 69. By Whom Exercised
political taint ng suspension) …for loss of confidence (ONLY GROUND)
…by the registered voters of a local government unit to which the local
BUNYE V. ESCAREAL elective official subject to such recall belongs.
-SANDIGANBAYAN is mandated to preventively suspend a local official if a
criminal case is filed against him (but max of 90d only) GARCIA V. COMELEC, 227 SCRA 100 (1993) - HISTORY OF RECALL
H: Recall is a mode of removal of public officer by the people
Section 64: Salary of Respondent pending suspension …before the end of his term of office.
-during suspension: NONE …an incident of their sovereign power and in the absence of constitutional restraint,
-if exonerated and suspended: would be paid full salary including those the power is implied in all governmental operations.
during suspension … has been held to be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.
…frequently described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative
Section 65: Righst of Respondent democracy.
Full opportunity to appear and defend himself in person or by counsel maiden appearance: 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of Article XI: Batasang
To confront and cross-examine witness against him Pambansa shall enact a local government code…defining a more responsive and
To require attendance of witnesses and the production of documentary accountable local government structure with an effective system of recall…
evidence in his favor through subpoena ….The Batasang Pambansa then enacted BP 337 entitled ‘The Local Government
Code of 1983’. Section 54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating recall
Section 66: Form and Notice of Deci elections of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least 25% of the total
FORM: in writing number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned.
SUSPENSION: shall not exceed -Our legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as provided
…the unexpired term of the respondent by BP 337 was exercised by our people. In February 1986, however, our people more
…a period of 6m for every administrative offense than exercised their right of recall for they resorted to revolution and they booted of
-not a bar to the candidacy of the respondent as long as he meets the office the highest elective officials of the land.
qualifications required for office Section 3, Article X of 1987 Constitution reiterated the mandate for Congress to
(cf: Section 40: REMOVAL IS A BAR) enact a local government code which ‘shall provide for more responsive and
REMOVAL: considered bar to candidacy! accountable local government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum. In
Section 67: Administrative Appeal response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted LGC of 1991.
-w/n30d from receipt LGC of 1991 provided for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a
APPEALED TO WHOM FROM WHOM: preparatory recall assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all
*SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN: mayors, vice mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component
>Sangguniang Panlungsod of component cities cities.
>Sanggunian Bayan A reading of the legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea
*Office of the President: of empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
>Sangguniang Panlalawigan elective officials originated from the House of Representatives and not the Senate.
>Sangguniang Panlungsod of HUCs The legislative records reveal there were 2 principal reasons why this
> Sangguniang Panlungsod of ICCs alternative mode of initiating the recall process through an assembly was
*Deci of PRESIDENT FINAL AND EXECUTORY adopted, viz:
??? IF DECI SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN (a) diminish the difficulty of initiating recall through the direct action of the people;
CONCERNS ADMIN CASES VS. BRGY OFFICIALS, AND WHOSE DECISIONS and
ARE DEEMED FINAL AND EXECUTORY UNDER SECTION 61, WHY IS IT STILL (b) to cut down on its expense.
APPEALABLE? …Our lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism initiating
recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only one in the City of Angeles,
Section 68: decisions may be executed pending appeal Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor failed. Former
Congressman Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the
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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REVIEWER (for finals!) DR. ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA
people was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement. 4. acceptance of candidates: includes automatically the name of the official sought
Consequently, our legislators added in the second mode of initiating the recall of to be recalled
local officials that this second mode may cause instability in the local government
units due to its imagined ease. ANGUBUNG V. COMELEC
-petition must be filed NOT BY ONE PERSON ONLY but by the minimum required
EVARDONE V. COMELEC votes
“Loss of confidence” as a ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the
court, “WON the electorate of the Municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the SEC. 71. Election on Recall.
incumbent mayor is a political question. It belongs to the realm of politics where - Upon the filing of a valid petition for recall
only the people are the judge. …with the appropriate local office of the Comelec
Loss of confidence: a ground for recall: a formal withdrawal by an electorate of their COMELEC set the DATE OF THE ELECTION OR RECALL:
trust in a person’s ability to discharge his office previously bestowed on him by the not later than 30 days upon the completion: barangay, city or municipal officials,
same electorate. 45 days in the case of provincial officials.
The officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly
Section 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. - registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other
a. The Recall of any ELECTIVE PROVINCIAL, CITY, MUNICIPAL OR BARANGAY OFFICIAL candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.
…shall be commenced by:
>petition of a registered voter in the local government unit concerned Section 72: Effectivity of Recall
>supported by the registered voters in the local government unit -only upon election and proclamation of a successor: person receiving highest
concerned during the election in which the local official sought to be number of votes cast
recalled was elected subject to the following percentage requirements: -if official sought to be recalled won: continue office
1. At least 25%: voting population of not more 20,000;
2. At least 20%: voting population of at least 20,000 but not more than Section 73: Prohibition from Resignation
seventy-five thousand (75,000): -official sought to be recalled CANNOT RESIGN while the recall process is in progress
…Provided, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less than
5,000; Section 74: LIMITS ON RECALL
3. At least 15%: voting population of at least 75,000 but not more than 1. once during term of office for each local elective official
300,000: 2. no recall w/n
Provided, however, That in no case shall the required number of petitioners ….1yr from date of official’s assumption of office
be less than 15,000; and ….1 yr immediately preceding a regular local election (where the
4. At least 10%: a voting population of over 300,000 position of the official to be recalled is to be actually contested and
…Provided, however, That in no case shall the required petitioners be less filled by the electorate – ANGUBONG V. COMELEC)
than forty-five thousand (45,000).
b. PROCEDURE:
1. A written petition for recall duly signed by the representatives of the Section 75: Expenses of Recall Elections SHOULDERED BY COMELEC!
petitioners before the election registrar or his representative,
…shall be filed with the Comelec through its office in the local government unit ON IRA
concerned. Section 284 ALLOTMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE
2. CONTENTS: -share in the national internal revenue taxes
a. The names and addresses of the petitioners written in legible form and their -currently at 40%
signatures; Can be reduced to MAX 30% when:
b. The barangay, city or municipality, local legislative district and the province to -national government incurs an unmanageable public sector deficit
which the petitioners belong; -authorized by PRESIDENT
c. The name of the official sought to be recalled; and -upon recommendation of
d. A brief narration of the reasons and justifications therefore. *SOF
2. COMELEC certify sufficiency of number required *SILG
3. if sufficient in form: *SBM
…COMELEC provides official sought to be recalled a copy of the petition -subject to consultation w/
….publish it and post it *presiding officers of both houses of congress
*presidents of liga
Purpose: allow interested parties to examine and verify the validity of the petition
and the authenticity of the signatures contained therein. _automatically released!
3. COMELEC also proceed with independent verification and authentication of
signatures
-challenge/protest may be filed (w/n 20d)
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