Professional Documents
Culture Documents
LAW
Based on the outline of Prof. Rodrigo Quimbo
_______________
Public Utility
Public Service
• The term public service includes every person that now or hereafter
may operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or
compensation, with general or limited clientele, whether permanent,
occasional or accidental, and done for general business purposes, any
common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, sub-way
motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both with or without
fixed route and whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier
service or any class, express service, steamboat, or steamship line,
pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in the transportation of
passengers and freight or both, shipyard, marine repairshop,
[warehouse], wharf or dock, ice plant, ice refrigeration plant, canal,
irrigation system, gas, electric light, heat and power, water supply and
power, petroleum, sewerage system, wire or wireless communications
system, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and other similar public
services: Provided, however, that a person engaged in agriculture, not
otherwise a public service, who owns a motor vehicle and uses it
personally and/or enters into a special contract whereby said motor
vehicle is offered for hire or compensation to a third party or third
parties engaged in agriculture, not itself or themselves a public
service, for operation by the latter for a limited time and for a specific
purpose directly connected with the cultivation of his or their farm, the
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME LAW
Transportation
Nature of certificate
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TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME LAW
4. priority of operation
• to carry out the purpose and intent for which the PSC was created the
law contemplates that the first licensee will be protected in his
investment and will not be subjected to a ruinous competition. It is
not therefore the policy of the law for the PSC to issue a CPC to a
second operator to cover the same field and in competition with a first
operator who is rendering sufficient, adequate and satisfactory service,
and who in all things and respects is complying with the rules and
regulations of the PSC. Accordingly, a CPC or CPCN ought not to be
granted where there is no complaint as to existing rates and the co. in
the field is rendering adequate services.
Shipper
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Carrier or Conductor
To accomplish its mandate, the Dept. shall have the ff. powers and functions:
(a) formulate and recommend national policies and guidelines for the
preparation and implementation of integrated and comprehensive
transportation and communications systems at the national, regional
and local levels;
(c) assess, review and provide direction to xxx research and devt.
programs of the govt xxx;
(d) administer and enforce all laws xxx in the field of transportation and
communication;
(e) coordinate with the DPWH in the design, location, devt, rehabilitation,
improvement, etc. of all infrastructure projects and facilities of the
Dept. xxx
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(g) issue certificates of public convenience for the operation of public land
and rail transportation utilities and services;
(j) establish and prescribe rules xxx for the establishment, operation and
maintenance of such telecommunication facilities in areas not
adequately served by the private sector xxx;
(l) establish and prescribe rules xxx issuance of CPCs for public land
transportation utilities, such as motor vehicles, trimobiles, and
railways;
(m) establish and prescribe rules xxx inspection and registration of air and
land transportation facilities, such as motor vehicles, trimobiles, and
aircrafts;
(p) determine, fix and/or prescribe charges and/or rates pertinent to the
operation of public air and land transportation utility facilities and
services xxx;
(r) administer and operate the Civil Aviation Training Center xxx;
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RA 776, as amended
7. prescribe the forms of any and all accounts, records, and memoranda
of the movement of traffic, as well as of the receipt and expenditures
of money and the length of time such accounts, records, and
memoranda shall be preserved
8. require each officer and director of any air carrier to transmit a report
describing the shares of stock or other interest held by such air carrier
with any person engaged in any phase of aeronautics, and the holding
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TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME LAW
of the stock in, and control of, other persons engaged in any phase of
aeronautics.
(b) Land
e. punish for contempt of the Board, both direct and indirect xxx;
j. fix, impose, and collect, and periodically review and adjust reasonable
fees and other related charges for services rendered;
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l. coordinate and cooperate with other govt. agencies and entities xxx;
(c) Water
• The Maritime Industry Authority is hereby retained and shall have the
ff. functions:
a. develop and formulate plans, policies, projects xxx geared toward the
promotion and devt. of the maritime industry, the growth and effective
regulation of shipping enterprises, and for the national security
objectives of the country;
c. issue CPCs for the operation of domestic and overseas water carriers;
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COMMON CARRIERS
Common Carriers
Transportation defined
Classification :
1. As to object
(1) things;
(2) persons;
(3) news
2. As to place of travel:
(1) land;
(2) water;
(3) air
Shipper or Consignor.
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Carrier or Conductor.
Consignee.
Freight defined
• The hire paid for the carriage of goods on land from place to place, or
on inland streams or lakes.
Carriers defined
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the common carrier holds himself out the private carrier agrees in some
in common, that is, to all persons special case with some private
who choose to employ him, as ready individual to carry for hire
to carry for hire; no one can be a
common carrier unless he has held
himself out to the public as a carrier
in such a manner as to render him
liable to an action if he should
refuse to carry for anyone who
wished to employ him
a common carrier is bound to carry a private carrier is not bound to carry
all who offer such goods as it is for any reason, unless it enter into a
accustomed to carry and tender special agreement to do so
reasonable compensation for carrying
them
a common carrier is a public service a private carrier does not hold itself
and is therefore subject to regulation out as engaged in the business for
the public, and is therefore not
subject to regulation as a common
carrier
• The true test is whether the given undertaking is a part of the business
engaged in by the carrier which he has held out to the general public
as his occupation rather than the quantity or extent of the business
actually transacted, or the number and character of the conveyances
used in the employment (the test is therefore the character of the
business actually carried on by the carrier.)
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• The law requires common carriers to carry for all persons, either
passengers or property, for exactly the same charge for a like or
contemporaneous service in the transportation of like kind of traffic
under substantially similar circumstances or conditions. The law
prohibits common carriers (CC) from subjecting any person, etc. or
locality, or any kind of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or discrimination whatsoever.
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o Merchandise of like quantity may not be considered alike - the quantity, kind
and quality may be exactly the same, and yet not be alike, so far as the cost
of transportation is concerned.
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• Such regulations must not have the effect of depriving an owner of his
property without due process of law, nor of confiscating, or
appropriating private property without just compensation, nor of
limiting or prescribing irrevocably vested rights or privileges lawfully
acquired under a charter or franchise [just compensation, due process
of law]
• Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to the circumstances of each case.
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• The laws applicable to COMMON CARRIER are rigorous and should not
be extended to a person who has neither expressly assumed that
character, nor by his conduct and from the nature of his business
justified the belief on the part of the public that he intended to assume
it.
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Kabit system
• The law does not relieve the registered owner directly of the
responsibility that the law fixes and places upon him as an incident or
consequence of registration -- where a registered owner allowed to
evade responsibility by proving who the supposed transferee or owner
is, it would be easy for him by collusion with others or otherwise, to
escape said responsibility and transfer the same to an indefinite
person or to one who possesses no property with which to respond
financially for the damage or injury done; in case of an accident, the
registered owner should not be allowed to disprove his ownership to
the prejudice of the person injured or to be relieved from responsibility
When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for the
benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to wilful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant
recovery.
The law requires the approval of the PSC, in order that a franchise, or any
privilege pertaining thereto, may be sold or leased without infringing the
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(1) the liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its
obligation; there is breach if it fails to exert extra-ordinary diligence
accdg. to all the circumstances of each case
(2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence of
a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances
A transfer made without the requisite approval of the PSC is not effective and
binding in so far as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in
relation to the public is concerned. The law was designed primarily for the
protection of the public interest.
Under the law, the presumption is that common carriers acted negligently
but not maliciously. The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the
sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and negligence (as mere
carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored. A carrier's bad
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faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was
breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
The principle of last clear chance would call for application in a suit between
the owners and drivers of two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a
passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its contractual
obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the
jeepney and its owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise
guilty of negligence.
On the presumption that the drivers who bump the rear of another
vehicle are guilty and the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other
evidence, the SC held that the jeep made a sudden U-turn which was so
abrupt that the other driver did not anticipate the sudden U-turn.
In culpa contractual, the carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently, and this disputable presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that he had observed extra-ordinary diligence or that
the death or injury of the passenger was due to a fortuitous event.
The driver cannot be held jointly liable with the owners of the jeep in
case of breach of the contract of carriage. The contract of carriage is
between the carrier and the passenger, and in the event of contractual
liability, the carrier is exclusively responsible therefore to the passenger,
even if such breach be due to the negligence of the driver. To make the
driver jointly liable would make the carrier's liability personal instead of
merely vicarious and consequently, the victim is entitled to recover only the
share which corresponds to the driver.
Laws applicable
• In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights and obligations of
common carriers shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by
special laws. (Art. 1766)
• The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or
deterioration. (Art. 1753, NCC)
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B. Common Carriers
• The common carrier can terminate the services of its drivers, pilots
and employees for serious misconduct and drunkenness because of its
duty of extra-ordinary diligence. Whenever a passenger dies or is
injured the presumption is that the common carrier is at fault
notwithstanding the fact that it has exercised due diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Thus, extra-ordinary measures and diligence should be exercised by it
for the safety of its passengers and their belongings. A common
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• A vessel should not accept cargo unless it can be given the type of
storage that its character requires, for placing of conditions in a bill of
lading does not relieve the vessels of obligation to take appropriate
care of the cargo.
Presumption of negligence
• Under Art. 1735, if the goods are proved to have been lost, destroyed
or deteriorated, common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they have
observed the extra-ordinary diligence required by law.
• The plaintiff needs only to prove that the goods he transported have
been lost, destroyed or deteriorated
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1. Art. 1734
2. Art. 1735 (exercise of extra-ordinary diligence required by law)
3. Natural disaster: The CC is exempt from liability if he proves that
the loss or destruction of the merchandise was due to accident and force
majeure and not to fraud, fault or negligence on the part of the EEs and
owners of the CC.
CC cannot interpose the defense that it exercised due diligence in the
selection and supervision of EEs. The liability of the CC arises from breach of
the contract of carriage and not from culpa aquiliana. It is however the duty
of CC to teach their drivers not to overload vehicles, not to exceed safe and
legal speed limits, and other safety precautions.
• Common carriers are not required to exercise all the care, skill and
diligence of which the human mind can conceive nor such as will free
the transportation of passengers from all possible perils. A common
carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers and is not
absolutely and at all events to carry them safely and without injury.
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Natural disaster
Act of public enemy
Act or omission of shipper
Character of goods
Order of competent authority
Natural disaster
1. Art. 1739 -- natural disaster must have been the proximate and only
cause of the loss
3. Art. 1740 -- the common carrier must not be in delay. If the common
carrier incurs in delay, a natural disaster shall not free it from
responsibility. Under Art. 1165 par. 3, if the obligor incurs delay, he
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Loss of a ship and of its cargo, in a wreck due to accident or force majeure
must, as a general rule, fall upon their respective owners, except in cases
where the wrecking or stranding of the vessel occurred through malice,
carelessness or lack of skill on the part of the captain or because the vessel
put to sea is insufficiently repaired and prepared. (Art. 841, Code of
Commerce)
• The carrier is responsible for safe and proper storage of the cargo, and
there is no doubt that by the general maritime law he is bound to
secure the cargo safely under deck. If he carries the goods on deck
without the consent of the shipper and the goods are damaged or lost
in consequence of being exposed, the carrier cannot protect himself by
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TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME LAW
showing that they were damaged or lost by the dangers of the sea.
When the shipper consents to his goods being carried on deck, he
takes the risk upon himself.
• If goods shipped are found to have been damaged, the burden of proof
is on the carrier to show that the damage was due to fortuitous events.
But, even if the damage is caused by one of the excepted causes, the
carrier is still responsible if the injury might have been avoided by the
exercise of reasonable skill and attention on their part. However, in
this case, where the shipper consented to the conditions of carriage,
the burden of proof is shifted to the shipper.
1. the act of the public enemy must have been the proximate and
only cause; and
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• The act or omission of the shipper must be the proximate cause of the
loss, destruction or deterioration of the goods. If the shipper merely
contributed to the loss, etc. and the proximate cause is still the
negligence of the common carrier, the common carrier shall still be
liable for damages although the damages shall be equitably reduced.
Character of goods
• Claims for damages must be made at the time the goods are delivered
unless the indications of the damage cannot be ascertained from the
exterior of the package, in which case such written claims must be
made within 24 hours from delivery.
• As long as the damage to the goods was due purely to the inherent
nature or defect of the goods or of the containers thereof, the common
carrier cannot be held responsible. However, under 1742, the common
carrier must exercise due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss for it
to completely escape liability.
The common carrier is not responsible for the loss, etc. of the goods if the
public authority had power to issue the order. Where the officer acts without
legal process, the common carrier will be held liable.
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Constructive delivery
• Notice by the common carrier that the cargo had already arrived,
placing them at the disposal of the shipper or consignee releases the
common carrier from extra-ordinary responsibility. From such moment
the consignee or shipper should exercise over the cargo the ordinary
control pertinent to ownership (should unload cargo from the common
carrier).
• The temporary unloading or storage of the goods during the time that
they are being transported does not interrupt the extra-ordinary
responsibility of the common carrier. (Art. 1737)
Stoppage in transitu.
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• The act by which the unpaid vendor of goods stops their progress and
resumes possession of them, while they are in the course of transit
from him to the purchaser, and not yet actually delivered to the latter.
This is exercised when the buyer is or becomes insolvent.
• The test as to whether the relation of shipper and carrier had been
established is: Had the control and possession of the goods been
completely surrendered by the shipper to the common carrier.
Whenever the control and possession of goods passes to the carrier
and nothing remains to be done by the shipper, then it can be said
with certainty that the relation of shipper and carrier has been
established.
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carrier and not after it has lost control of them. While the goods are in
its possession, it is but fair that it exercise extra-ordinary diligence in
protecting them from damage and if loss occurs, the law presumes
that it was due to its fault or negligence.
As to diligence required
(3) Reasonable, just and not contrary to public policy. (Art. 1744)
(1) That the goods are transported at the risk of the owner or
shipper;
(2) That the common carrier will not be liable for any loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods;
(3) That the common carrier need not observe any diligence in the
custody of the goods;
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(5) That the common carrier shall not be responsible for the acts or
omissions of his or its employees;
(7) That the common carrier is not responsible for the loss,
destruction, or deterioration of goods on account of the
defective condition of the car, vehicle, ship, airplane or other
equipment used in the contract of carriage. (Art. 1745)
• The fact that the common carrier has no competitor along the line or
route, or a part thereof, to which the contract refers shall be taken into
consideration of the question of whether or not a stipulation limiting
the common carrier's liability is reasonable, just and in accordance
with public policy. (Art. 1751)
As to amount liability
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o First, one exempting the carrier from any and all liability for loss or damage
occasioned by its own negligence.
o Third, one limiting the liability of the carrier to an agreed valuation unless
the shipper declares a higher value and pays a higher rate of freight.
• The fact that the conditions are printed at the back of the ticket stub in
letters so small that they are hard to read would not warrant the
presumption that plaintiff was aware of those conditions such that he
had "fairly and freely agreed" to those conditions. PAL has admitted
that passengers do not sign the ticket. Also the carrier cannot limit his
liability for injury or loss of goods shipped when such injury or loss was
caused by its own negligence. (Arts. 1734, 1735)
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• Considering that petitioner had failed to declare a higher value for his
baggage, he cannot be permitted a recovery in excess of P 100.00.
Besides, passengers are advised not to place valuable items inside
their baggage. Also, there is nothing in the evidence to show the
actual value of the goods allegedly lost by petitioner.
• Pan Am cited Ong Yiu vs CA. Such case is squarely applicable in this
case. The ruling in Shewaram vs PAL is inapplicable since it was
premised on the fact that the conditions printed at the back of the
ticket were so small and hard to read.
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• The shipper or owner and the CC may stipulate to limit the liability of
the CC for the loss, destruction or deterioration of goods to a degree
less than extra-ordinary diligence :
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• This applies only when the CC is acting as such but not when it acts as
a private carrier [in Home Insurance vs American Steamship Co., the
SC held that the Civil Code provisions on CC should not be applied
where the common carrier is not acting as such but as a private
carrier; such policy has no force where the public at large is not
involved]
The common carrier cannot avail of the contract limiting his liability in these
cases:
(2) where the common carrier changes the stipulated or usual route
[in both cases, the delay or change of route must be without just
cause] (Art. 1747)
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• The law of the country to which the goods are to be transported shall
govern the liability of the common carrier for their loss, destruction or
deterioration. (Art. 1753)
• The Civil Code governs the liability of the common carrier in case of
loss, damage or deterioration. Under 1766, in all matters not
regulated by the Civil Code, the rights and obligations of the common
carier shall be governed by the Code of Commerce and by special laws
which are suppletory to the provisions of the Civil Code.
• The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the common carrier is not
deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of arms or
through irresistible force.
• The common carrier is not liable for compensation if the loss is due to
the acts of the passenger, or if the loss arises from the character of the
things brought into the common carrier.
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(2) baggage not in such custody but in that of the common carrier.
(2) the passengers take the precautions which said CCs advised
relative to the care and vigilance of their baggage.
• The act of a thief or robber, who has entered the common carrier's
vehicle is not deemed force majeure, unless it is done with the use of
arms or through irresistible force.
• The common carrier is not liable if the loss of the baggage in the
personal custody of the passenger is due to the acts of the
passengers, his family, servants or visitors, OR if the loss arises from
the character of the baggage.
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• Art. 1755 shows clearly the high degree of care and extraordinary
diligence required of a common carrier with respect to its passengers.
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• The conduct of plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly underway was not characterized by imprudence and that he
was not guilty of contributory negligence.
• It is not negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving
train.
• MRR failed to exercise due care in not providing for safe exit of its
passengers. It also failed to provide adequate lighting for its station.
• The foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which
plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of that contract
by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its
performance. Its liability is direct and immediate (culpa contractual),
differing essentially, from that presumptive responsibility for the
negligence of its servants, which can be rebutted by proof of the
exercise of due care in the selection and supervision of employees
(culpa aquiliana).
• The liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or
omissions of their servants or agents, when such act or omissions
cause damage which amount to the breach of a contract, is not based
upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection
or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost diligence and care in
this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of
his contract. When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking
by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff
has failed or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for
plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the contract
is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or
of his servants or agents. Proof of the contract and of its
nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to warrant recovery.
• The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by
implication, the duty to carry him in safety and to provide safe means
of entering and leaving its trains. That duty, being contractual, was
direct and immediate, and its nonperformance could not be excused
by proof that the fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
• A carrier is not liable for defects of ignition cables used on his plane,
nor of the installation thereof, which cables were purchased from a
competent and reputable manufacturer in the absence of a showing
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that it knew those defects or that such kind of ignition cable is not
ordinarily used on the airplane operated by it.
(1) The liability of a carrier is contractual and arises upon breach of its
obligation; there is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary diligence accdg. to
all the circumstances of each case
(2) A carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with the utmost diligence
of a very cautious person, having due regard for all the circumstances
(3) A carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently in case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its duty to
prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence
(4) The carrier is not an insurer against all risks of travel
Held : In Lasam vs Smith, the court held that accidents caused by defects in
the automobile are not caso fortuito. The rationale is that the passenger has
neither the choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and use of the
equipment and appliances in use by the carrier.
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Held : The facts show that the cage was not about to fall. Plaintiff was
probably dizzy or sleepy that he fell from the truck.
It is true that defendant being a CC is bound to transport its
passengers from the point of origin to the place of destination, but the duty
does not encompass all the risks attendant to a passenger in transit, for then
the co. would be a good source of stipend for a family who would like to end
it all by simply boarding, paying the fare and intentionally falling off. It is
enough for the CC's EEs to see to it that the passenger places himself safely
inside the vehicle, that it is operated carefully and that its mechanism is
perfectly alright to prevent mishaps. It would be unreasonable to exact upon
operators to determine beforehand whether a passenger is likely to fall dizzy
or sleepy on the way, for that is the lookout of the passenger himself. A
passenger must see to it that he seats himself in a safe portion of the
vehicle.
Held : While the carrier is not an insurer of the safety of the passengers, it
should nevertheless be held answerable for the flaws of its equipment if such
flaws were discoverable. The liability of the CC rests upon negligence or his
failure to exercise the utmost degree of diligence that the law requires. The
rationale of CC's liability for manufacturing defects is the fact that the
passenger has neither choice nor control over the carrier in the selection and
use of the eqpt. and appliances in use by the carrier. Having no privity
whatever with the manufacturer or vendor of the defective eqpt, the
passenger has no remedy against him. In this case, the defect could have
been detected with the exercise of utmost diligence by the CC.
2. Duration of responsibility
4 Agbayani:
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Held: Whether or not the relation between carrier and passenger does not
cease at the moment the passenger alights from the carrier's premises is to
be determined from the circumstances.
In this case, there was no utmost diligence. The driver stopped the
bus but did not turn off the engine. He started to run the bus even before
the conductor gave him the signal. The presence of passengers near the bus
was not unreasonable and the duration of the responsibility still exists.
Held: The proximate cause of the death was the overturning of the vehicle
which was followed by the negligence of the driver and the conductor who
were on the road walking back and forth. They should have known that with
the position of the bus, leakage was possible aside from the fact that gas
when spilled can be smelled from a distance. The failure of the driver and
conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to warn rescuers not to bring a
lighted torch too near the bus constitutes negligence on the part of the
agents of the carrier.
Held: Aboitiz is still liable for his death under the contract of carriage. The
relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock. Once
created the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has
safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had reasonable opportunity
to leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a
reasonable time after leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers
and what is reasonable time is to be determined from all circumstances and
includes a reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his
departure. The CC-passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the
fact that the person transported has been carried to his destination if the
person remains in the premises to claim his baggage.
The test is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
presence of the passenger near the vessel.
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3. Presumption of negligence
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4 Agbayani:
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4. Force Majeure
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running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had
already fallen off the bus; the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law. It is therefore clear that the petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law
governing CCs.
The CC's argument that it is not an insurer of its passengers deserves
no merit in view of the failure of the CC to prove that the deaths of the 2
passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of
the CC to observe extra-ordinary diligence in transporting safely the
passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.
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4 Agbayani:
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The CC cannot escape liability by interposing the defense that its EEs have
acted without any authority or against the orders of the CC
The passenger is entitled to protection from personal violence by the
CC or its agents or EEs since the contract of transportation obligates the CC
to transport a passenger safely to his destination and a CC is responsible for
the misconduct of its EEs
Reason for making the CC liable for the misconduct of its EEs in
their own interest.-- The servant is clothed with delegated authority and
charged with the duty by the CC, to execute his undertaking to carry the
passenger safely; when the EE mistreats the passenger, he violates the
contractual obligation of the CC for which he represents the CC
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Held : There was a breach of the contract of carriage and negligence on the
part of the agent of the CC, the driver. At the time of the blowout of the
tires, the bus was speeding. The proximate cause of the death was the
overturning of the vehicle which was followed by the negligence of the driver
and the conductor who were on the road walking back and forth. They
should have known that with the position of the bus, leakage was possible
aside from the fact that gas when spilled can be smelled from a distance.
The failure of the driver and conductor to have cautioned or taken steps to
warn rescuers not to bring a lighted torch too near the bus constitutes
negligence on the part of the agents of the carrier.
Held: The NCC unlike the OCC makes the CC absolutely liable for intentional
assaults committed by its EEs upon its passengers (Art. 1754). The CC's
liability is based on either (1) respondeat superior or (2) the CC's implied
duty to transport the passenger safely. Under respondeat superior (w/c is the
minority view), the CC is liable only when the act of the EE is within the
scope of his authority and duty. Under the second view, the CC is liable as
long as the assault occurs within the course of the performance of the EE's
duty. It is no defense that the act was done in excess of authority or in
disobedience of the CC's orders. The CC's liability is absolute in the sense
that it practically secures the passengers from assaults committed by its own
EEs. Three cogent reasons underlie this rule : (1) the special undertaking of
the CC requires that it furnish the passengers the full measure of protection
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afforded by the exercise of the high degree of care prescribed in the law,
from violence and insults in the hands of strangers, other passengers, and
from its own servants charged with the passenger's safety; (2) liability is
based on the CC's confiding in the servant's hands the performance of his
contract to safely transport the passenger, delegating therewith the duty of
protecting the passenger with utmost care prescribed by law; (3) as between
the CC and the passenger, the CC must bear the risk of wrongful acts or
negligence of the CC's EEs against passengers since it has the power to
select and remove them.
It is the CC's obligation to select its drivers with due regard not only to
their technical competence and physical ability but also to their total
personality, including patterns of behavior, moral fiber, and social attitude.
4 Agbayani:
Held: The law does not make the CC an insurer of the absolute safety of its
passengers. Art. 1755 qualifies the duty of the CC in exercising vigilance to
only such as human care and foresight can provide. The presumption
created by law against the CC is rebuttable by proof that the CC had
exercised extraordinary diligence in the performance of its obligations and
that the injuries suffered were caused by fortuitous events. The liability of
the CC necessarily rests upon its negligence, or its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence required by law. Under Art. 1763, the diligence required,
with regards to its liability in cases when intervening acts of strangers
directly caused the injury, is the diligence only of a good father of a family
and not the extraordinary diligence generally required. The rule is not so
exacting as to require one charged with its exercise to take doubtful or
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Held: The CC raised the defense of caso fortuito. The running amuck of the
passenger was the proximate cause of the incident and is within the context
of force majeure. However, in order that a CC may be absolved from liability
in case of force majeure, it is not enough that the accident was caused by
force majeure. The CC must still prove that it was not negligent in causing
the injuries resulting from such accident. It must prove that there was no
negligence or lack of care and diligence on the part of the CC.
The TC and the CA had conflicting findings of fact. The SC upheld the
findings of the CA-- the driver did not immediately stop the bus at the height
of the commotion; the bus was speeding from a full stop; the victims fell
from the bus door when it was opened or gave way while the bus was still
running; the conductor panicked and blew his whistle after people had
already fallen off the bus; the bus was not properly equipped with doors in
accordance with law. It is therefore clear that the petitioners have failed to
overcome the presumption of fault and negligence found in the law
governing CCs.
The CC's argument that it is not an insurer of its passengers deserves
no merit in view of the failure of the CC to prove that the deaths of the 2
passengers were exclusively due to force majeure and not to the failure of
the CC to observe extraordinary diligence in transporting safely the
passengers to their destinations as warranted by law.
Law does not protect negligence of passenger.-- Law does not protect
negligence of passenger to the extent of doing harm or damage upon a
public utility
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Held: The conduct of plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet
slightly underway was not characterized by imprudence and that he was not
guilty of contributory negligence.
The circumstances show that it was no means so risky for him to get off
while the train was yet moving. It is not negligence per se for a traveler to
alight from a slowly moving train.
Isaac vs A. L. Ammen
Held: By placing his left arm on the window, the passenger is guilty of
contributory negligence, and although contributory negligence cannot relieve
the carrier but can only reduce his liability (Art. 1762), this is a circumstance
which militates against plaintiff's position. It is negligence per se for
passengers to protrude any part of his body and that no recovery can be had
for an injury.
In this case, the bus driver had done what a prudent man could have
done to avoid the collision. The injury was due to passenger's fault.
Liability of air carrier under the Warsaw Convention (Oct. 12, 1929)
Art. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damages sustained in the
event of death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily injury
suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so
sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the
operations of embarking or disembarking.
Art. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked baggage
or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the transportation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding
paragraph shall comprise the period during which the baggage or goods
are in the charge of the carrier, whether in an airport or on board an
aircraft, or, in case of a landing outside an airport, in any place
whatsoever.
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(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any
transportation by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If
however, such transportation takes place in the performance of a contract
for transportation by air, for the purpose of loading, delivery, or
transshipment, any damage is presumed, subject to proof to the contrary,
to have been the result of an event which took place during the
transportation by air.
Art. 19. The carrier shall be liable for damages occasioned by delay
in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage or goods
SC has held that these provisions merely declare the carrier liable for
damages in the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are
present. Neither said provisions nor others in the Convention regulate or
exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier.
1. In general
2. Actual or compensatory
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Held: The train driver was not negligent. He sounded the train's whistle four
times before the intersection, which were heard even by the bus passengers.
The bus did not slow down but instead the bus driver tried to pass the
intersection before the train. In addition, another LTBC bus which arrived
ahead of the bus in this case, at the crossing heeded the train whistle by
stopping and allowing the train to pass. Clearly, the bus driver was negligent
in totally disregarding the warning. On the other hand, MRR cannot be held
to be contributorily negligent because LTBC was not able to discharge its
burden of proof when it alleged that MRR violated its charter by failing to ring
the locomotive bell.
The evidence shows that Ed C. had been rendered physically and
mentally invalid by the accident. He suffered head injuries specifically a
fractured right forehead necessitating the removal of all the right frontal lobe
of his brain, which reduced his intelligence by 50% so that he can no longer
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finish his medical course. In addition, he has to lead a quiet and retired life
because if the tantalum plate which replaced a portion of his skull is pressed
in or dented, it would cause his death.
LTBC admitted that under Art. 2201, it is liable for damages that are
the natural and probable consequences of the breach and which the parties
had foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation
was constituted. It however claims that the said provision contemplates only
the medical, hospital, and other expenses in the total sum of P 17,719.75.
The SC ruled that the income which Ed could earn if he should finish the
medical course, and pass the corresponding board exams must be deemed
included because they could have reasonably been foreseen by the parties at
the time he boarded the bus.
While his scholastic record may not be first rate, it is sufficient to
justify the assumption that he could have finished his course and would have
passed the board exams in due time. As regards the income that he could
possibly earn as a doctor, P 300 (accdg. to LTBC witness, Dr. Doria) could
easily be expected as minimum monthly income of Ed C. had he finished his
studies. Compensatory damages should be increased to P 25,000.
The claim for moral damages could not be granted because Art. 2219
enumerates the instances when moral damages may be recovered and the
present case does not fall under any of them, even par. (2) thereof because
this case is not one of quasi-delict and could not be considered as such
because of a pre-existing contractual relation between Ed C. and LTBC.
Neither could LTBC be liable under Art. 2220 because it did not act
fraudulently or in bad faith. Attorney's fees could also not be granted
because this case does not fall under Art. 2208.
The claim by the parents for actual and compensatory damages is also
without merit because the present action is based upon a breach of contract
of carriage and the parents were not a party thereto, and were not
themselves injured as a result of the collision.
Held: On the basis of stipulations printed at the back of the ticket, Pan Am
contends that its liability for the lost baggage of Pangan is limited to $
600.00 ($20 x 30 kilos) as the latter did not declare a higher value for his
baggage and pay the corresponding charges.
The SC applied the ruling in Mendoza vs PAL: Before defendant could
be held to special damages, such as alleged loss of profits on account of
delay or failure of delivery, it must have appeared that he had notice at the
time of delivery to him of the particular circumstances attending the
shipment, and which probably would lead to such special loss if he defaulted.
In order to impose on the defaulting party further liability than for damages
naturally and directly, i.e. in the ordinary course of things, arising from a
breach of contract, such unusual or extraordinary damages must have been
brought within the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of the
breach at the time of or prior to contracting. In the absence of proof that
Pan Am's attention was called to the special circumstances requiring prompt
delivery of Pangan's luggages, petitioner cannot be held liable for the
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Held: Under Arts. 1764 and Article 2206 (1), the award of damages for death
is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased and not of
the beneficiary. In this case, the lower courts determined the deceased
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3. Moral
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Held: Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured
passenger does not die, moral damages are not recoverable unless it is
proved that the CC was guilty of malice or bad faith. In the case at bar, there
is no other evidence of such malice to support an award of moral damages.
To award moral damages for breach of contract, without proof of bad faith or
malice on the part of the CC, as required by Art. 2220, would be to violate
the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted legislation. A
CC's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the
contract was breached through negligence of the CC's EEs. The exception is a
mishap resulting to the death of a passenger in which case Art. 1764 makes
the CC subject to Art. 2206 (award of moral damages).
Held: Air France contended that the issuance of the first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but such would depend upon
the availability of first class seats. The SC ruled that it could not understand
how a reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out
tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount
in payment of first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the
mercy of its EEs. Plaintiff was indeed confirmed for first class all the way to
Rome.
There was contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage. Said
contract was breached when the CC failed to furnish the first class
transportation at Bangkok. Third, there was bad faith when petitioner's EE
compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation after he was
already seated and to take a seat in the tourist class by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliation, thereby causing
him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings, and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that the complaint did not
use the term Bad Faith. But the interference of BF is there. The manager
not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat;
worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat,
made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment -- just to give way to another passenger whose right thereto
has not been established. This is certainly BF. For the willful malevolent act
of CC's manager, the CC-ER must answer. Moral damages are recoverable.
CC's contract with Carrascoso is attended with public duty. The
expulsion of Carrascoso is a violation of a public duty by the CC -- a case of
quasi-delict. Damages are proper. The manner of ejectment of Carrascoso
fits into the legal precept for awarding exemplary damages in addition to
moral damages.
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Held: It is the opinion of the SC that moral damages should be raised from P
100,000 to P 150,000 and exemplary damages be increased from P 30,000 to
P 100,000. It is our considered view that when it comes to contracts of
common carriage, inattention and lack of care on the part of the CC resulting
in the failure of the passenger to be accommodated in the class contracted
for amounts to bad faith or fraud which entitles the passenger to an award of
moral damages in accordance with Art. 2220. In this case, the breach
appears to be of graver nature, since the preference given to the Belgian
passenger over plaintiff was done willfully and in wanton disregard of
plaintiff's rights and his dignity as a human being and as a Filipino, who may
not be discriminated against with impunity. Since both Alitalia and Lufthansa
are members of IATA and are agents of each other, they are bound by the
mistakes committed by a member such as the mistake of the Alitalia EE to
inform Ortigas that he could travel first class instead of only being waitlisted.
The award of higher damages is justified by the aggravation of the situation
when the Lufthansa EE at Rome falsely noted on Ortigas' ticket that he was
traveling economy from Rome to HK and which was repeated four times.
Also taken into consideration was the heart condition of Ortigas which gave
him added apprehension about traveling economy against the advice of the
doctor.
4. Exemplary
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Held: Before going into the issue, the SC ruled that the action which was
based on quasi-delict should be appropriately regarded as grounded on
contract, and indulged in the presumption of negligence on the part of the
CC although its EEs may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or
even in violation of its instructions. Its liability would include moral damages
(Art. 1764) and exemplary damages if the defendants acted recklessly or
with gross negligence (Art. 2332).
There is no question that the defendants are negligent. As found by
the CFI, DJ steered to the right while TC continued its course to the left.
There can be no excuse for them not to realize that with such maneuvers,
they will collide. They executed maneuvers inadequately and too late, to
avoid collision. The question is WON the defendants were recklessly or
grossly negligent. The SC ruled in the affirmative.
As for the captain, he was playing mahjong before and up to the time
of the collision. WON he was then off-duty is immaterial; there is, both
realistically speaking and in contemplation of law, no such thing as off-duty
hours for the master of a vessel at sea that is a CC upon whom the law
imposes the duty of extraordinary diligence. When the collision occurred, the
captain failed to supervise his crew in the process of abandoning the ship
and he failed to avail of measures to prevent the too rapid sinking of his
vessel, thus aggravating the casualties.
As for Negros Aviation, in permitting, or in failing to discover and
correct the regularity of the captain's mahjong sessions while DJ was at sea,
it must be deemed grossly negligent. It also sailed with an overload (1,004
passengers and crewmembers).
As for the failure of TC to follow R18 by turning right instead of left, the
SC ruled that it is not applicable and will not relieve DJ from responsibility if
the collision could have been avoided by proper care and skill on her part or
even by a departure from the rules. DJ is still at fault when, upon seeing TC
turn to its left, it still turned to its right resulting in the collision.
The SC awarded moral damages of P 307,000 and exemplary damages
of P 307,000 and attorney's fees of P 15,000 together with actual and
compensatory damages for wrongful death of P 126,000 and P 60,000 for a
total of P 815,000. Although the petitioners only asked for P 400,000 award
of damages granted by the CFI, the SC increased it to P 800,000 following the
doctrine that the SC must consider and resolve all issues which must be
decided in order to render substantial justice to the parties, including issues
not explicitly raised by the parties affected.
In discussing the rule of exemplary damages in law, the SC looks to it
as an instrument to serve the ends of law and public policy by reshaping
socially deleterious behaviors, specifically, in the case, to compel CC to
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control their EEs, to tame their reckless instincts, and to force them to take
adequate care of human beings and their property.
Held: Under the Warsaw Convention, an air carrier is made liable for
damages for: (1) The death, wounding or other bodily injury of a passenger if
the accident causing it took place on board the aircraft or in the course of its
operations of embarking or disembarking; (2)
The destruction, or loss of damage to, any registered luggage or goods, if the
occurrence causing it took place during the carriage by air; and (3) Delay in
the transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods. The Convention
also limits the liability of the carriers for each passenger to 250,000 francs
and for registered baggage and cargo to 250 francs per kg unless the
passenger has declared a higher rate and has paid additional charges. The
Warsaw Convention, however, denies to the carrier availment of the
provisions which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his
wilful misconduct or by such default on his part as is considered to be
equivalent to wilful misconduct or if the damage is similarly caused by any
agent of the carrier acting within the scope of his employment. The
Convention does not thus operate as an exclusive enumeration of the
instances of an airline's liability, or as an absolute limit of the extent of that
liability. Such proposition is not borne out by the language of the
Convention. The Convention should be deemed a liability only in those cases
where the cause of the death or injury to person, or destruction, loss or
damage to property or delay in its transport is not attributable to or attended
by any wilful misconduct, bad faith, recklessness, or otherwise improper
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conduct. The Convention does not regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier. Otherwise, an air carrier would be
exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute refusal, in
bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage. The Warsaw Convention has
invariably been held inapplicable, or as not restrictive of the carrier's liability,
where there was satisfactory evidence of malice or bad faith attributable to
its officers and employees.
In the case at bar, no bad faith or otherwise improper conduct may be
ascribed to the EEs of Alitalia. Dr. Pablo's luggage was eventually returned
belatedly, but without appreciable damage. The fact is, nevertheless, that
some special species of injury was caused to her because Alitalia misplaced
her baggage and failed to deliver it to her at the time appointed -- a breach
of its contract of carriage -- with the result that she was unable to read her
paper that she had painstakingly labored over. The opportunity to claim
honor or distinction for herself, for UP and for the country, was irretrievably
lost to her. She also underwent profound distress and anxiety, which
gradually turned into panic and despair, when she learned that her suitcases
were missing.
The compensation for the injury suffered by Dr. Pablo cannot under the
circumstances be restricted to that prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for
delay in the transport of baggage. She is not entitled to be compensated for
loss or damage to her luggage since they were ultimately delivered to her.
She is however entitled to nominal damages, which is adjudicated in order
that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered.
As to the argument that she failed to include a specific claim for
nominal damages in her complaint, it suffices that her general prayer
includes "such other and further just and equitable relief in the premises."
Also absent any claim for actual or compensatory damages (she asked for
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees), and with proof of Dr.
Pablo's right being violated, the issue of nominal damages is raised.
The award of P 5,000 for attorney's fees is reasonable. The law
authorizes recovery of attorney's fees where the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third person or to incur expenses
to protect his interest, or where the court deems it just and equitable.
Held: (1) Petitioners allege that private respondents received the casketed
remains of petitioner's mother on Oct. 26, 1976 as evidenced by the issuance
of the PAL Airway Bill. From said date, private respondents were charged
with the responsibility to exercise extraordinary diligence so much so that for
the alleged switching of the caskets on Oct. 27, 1976, or one day after
private respondents received the cargo, the latter must necessarily be liable.
Petitioners relied on the doctrine that the issuance of the bill of lading carries
the presumption that the goods were delivered to the carrier issuing the bill,
for immediate shipment, and it is nowhere questioned that a bill of lading is
prima facie evidence of the receipt of the goods by the carrier. A bill of
lading is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of the goods and an
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(2) Petitioners allege that even assuming CMAS was at fault, PAL would still
be liable because whoever brought the cargo to the airport or loaded it on
the plane did so as agent of PAL.
SC: This contention is without merit. When the cargo was received
from CMAS, Air Care Intl, PAL's agent and TWA had no way of determining its
actual contents, since the casket was hermetically sealed by the Philippine
Vice-Consul. They had to rely on the information given by CMAS. No amount
of inspection by the airlines could have guarded against the switching that
had taken place. They had no authority to unseal and open the casket. It is
the right of the carrier to require good faith on the part of those persons who
deliver goods to be carried by it. In the absence of more definite information,
the carrier has the right to accept shipper's marks as to the contents of the
package offered for transportation and is not bound to inquire particularly
about them. It can safely be said that a CC is entitled to fair representation
of the nature and value of the goods to be carried, with the concomitant right
to rely thereon, and that a carrier has no obligation to inquire into the
correctness or sufficiency of such information. The consequent duty to
conduct an inspection arises in the event that there should be reason to
doubt the veracity of such representations.
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(4) Petitioners alleged that private respondents are liable for tort on account
of humiliating, arrogant and indifferent acts of their officers and personnel.
They contended that there was no reason for the personnel to disclaim
knowledge of the arrival or whereabouts of the body other than their sheer
arrogance, indifference and extreme insensitivity to their feelings.
SC: It affirmed the CA's findings that TWA EEs did not deal with
petitioners in a grossly humiliating, arrogant or indifferent manner as to
amount to BF or malice. It must be pointed out that the lamentable
actuations of TWA's EEs leave much to be desired, particularly so given the
grief of petitioners, their tension and anxiety wrought by the confusion and
the fear about where their mother's remains were. Airline companies are
sternly admonished to strictly require their personnel to be more
accommodating to passengers and the general public.
Petitioners agonized for 5 hours unattended to and without any
assurance from the EEs of TWA. Common sense should have dictated that
they exert a little extra effort in making more extensive inquiry, by
themselves or through their superiors, rather than just shrug off the
promblem with a callous and uncaring remark that they had no knowledge
about it.
The foregoing observations do not appear to be applicable to PAl and
its EEs.
(5) In the absence of strong and positive evidence of fraud, malice or bad
faith, moral damages cannot be awarded. Neither can exemplary damages
nor attorney's fees, in the absence of proof that defendants acted with
malice, fraud or BF. The censurable conduct of TWA's EEs cannot be said to
have approximated the dimensions of fraud, malice or BF. Nonetheless, the
facts show that petitioners' right to be treated with due courtesy in
accordance with the degree of diligence required by law to be exercised by
every common carrier was violated by TWA and this entitles them, at least,
to nominal damages from TWA alone. Arts. 2221 and 2222 of the Civil Code
makes it clear that nominal damages are not intended for indemnification of
loss suffered but for the vindication or recognition of a right violated or
invaded. They are recoverable where some injury has been done but the
amount of which the evidence fails to show, the assessment of damages
being left to the discretion of the court accdg. to the circumstances of the
case. Nominal damages of P 40,000 to be paid by TWA was awarded in favor
of petitioners as a reasonable amount in the circumstances.
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4 Agbayani:
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damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and (6) interest.
Indemnity arising from the fact of death is fixed whereas the others are still
subject to the determination of the court based on evidence presented;
indemnity for death is distinct and separate from the other forms of
indemnity
Held: A passenger is entitled to courteous treatment from the carrier and its
EEs and failure of the CC to comply with this obligation will entitle the
passenger to damages.
The relation between CC and passenger involves special and peculiar
obligations and duties, differing in kind and degree, from those of almost
every legal or contractual relation. On account of the peculiar situation of
the parties, the law implies a promise and imposes upon the CC the
corresponding duty of protection and courteous treatment. Therefore, the CC
is under the absolute duty of protecting his passengers from assault or insult
by himself or his servants.
A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree
from any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which
an air carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the
traveling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it
offers. The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended
with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the CC's employees naturally
could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a
right to be treated by the CC's EEs with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees.
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So it is, that any rude or discourteous conduct on the part of EEs towards a
passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the CC.
Common carrier is liable only for damages that are natural and
probable consequence of breach of contract.-- Where the CC is guilty
of a breach of contract, but acted in GF, it is liable only for the natural and
probable consequences of the breach and which the parties had foreseen or
could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted
(includes medical, hospital expenses)
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xxx
CC is subsidiarily liable for moral damages in actions ex delicto or
where the action is based upon its liability arising from a crime
xxx
CC is not ordinarily liable for exemplary or corrective damages based
upon the wrongful act of its EE or driver where it did not have anything to do
with the wrongful act or had not previously authorized or subsequently
ratified such act (Art. 2332) This cannot be presumed but must be proven by
evidence; exemplary damages cannot be recovered as a matter of right
[PAL vs CA, 106 SCRA 391] The duty to exercise the utmost diligence on the
part of the CC is for the safety of passengers as well as for the members of
the crew or the complement operating the carrier. Any omission, lapse or
neglect thereof will certainly result to the damage, prejudice, injuries and
even death to all aboard the plane, passengers, and crew members alike.
xxx
[KLM vs CA] A provision in passage ticket that carriage by successive air
carriers is to be regarded as a single operation makes the ticket-issuing
carrier liable for tortious conduct of other carriers
xxx
Exemplary damages may be awarded where the vehicle involved in
the accident operated under the kabit system, which is a pernicious system
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in violation of law and which is in fraud of the traveling public which has a
right to expect that the holder of the certificate of convenience be the one to
actually operate his transport line.
xxx
CC is liable for nominal damages for its failure to bring passengers to
their destination which is in violatin of their right as passengers.
xxx
The CC is liable for the negligence of his driver in case of breach of
contract and cannot avail of the defense that he exercised due diligence in
the employment of his driver. The action for breach of contract imposes on
the CC a presumption of liability upon mere proof of injury to the passenger.
xxx
An action for damages against CC for breach of contract is primary and
independent and does not depend upon the previous conviction of the driver
or EE. Indemnification in a criminal prosecution is distinct from that
awarded as damages in a civil action.
Other Principles :
The offended party has the option between an action for enforcement
of civil liability based on culpa criminal and an action for recovery of
damages based on culpa aquiliana. Responsibility for negligence under the
Civil Code is entirely separate from negligence under the Penal Code.
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B. Nature of Contract
Art. 1766. In all matters not regulated by this Code, the rights
and obligations of common carriers shall be governed by the Code
of Commerce and by special laws. (New Civil Code.)
D. Contract of Carriage
1. Bill of Lading
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Nature : (1) each bill is a contract in itself and the parties are bound by its
terms
(2) a bill of lading is also a receipt
(3) it is also a symbol of the goods covered by it
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Many of the items required in a bill of lading may be omitted with much
advantage to commerce, which aims to have the greatest number of
transactions in the last possible time especially in cases where there are
tariffs or regulations issued by the carrier company. In this case, the
circumstances relative to price, term and conditions of carriage may be
omitted and simple reference be made to the tariff and regulations under
which the transportation is to be made. (Art. 351)
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the goods has not yet reached the port where the goods are held for
shipment
10. port B/L - issued by the CC to whom the goods have been delivered
and the steamer indicated in the B/L by which the goods are to be shipped is
already in the port where the goods are held for shipment
Rights acquired:
1. such title to the goods as the person negotiating the bill had or had
ability to convey to a buyer in good faith for value
2. direct obligation of the CC issuing the bill to hold possession of the
goods for him according to the terms of the B/L as fully as if such CC
contracted directly with him
Rights acquired:
1. as against the transferor, title to the goods subject to the terms of
any agreement with the transferor
2. right to notify the CC who issued the bill and thereby acquire the
direct obligations of such CC to hold possession of the goods for him accdg to
the terms of the document; prior to notification of the CC, the title of the
transferee may be defeated by levy upon the goods or a subsequent
purchaser from the transferor of a subsequent sale of the goods by a
transferor
(c) Function
Art. 353. The legal basis of the contract between the shipper
and the carrier shall be the bills of lading, by the contents of which
all disputes which may arise with regard to their execution and
fulfillment shall be decided, no exceptions being admissible other
than forgery or material errors in the drafting thereof.
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading
shall be returned to the carrier who may have issued it, and by
virtue of the exchange of this title for the article transported, the
respective obligations and actions shall be considered canceled,
unless the same act the claims which the contracting parties desire
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B/L constitutes the legal evidence of the contract of transportation --> all
disputes between the parties regarding the execution and performance of the
contract shall be decided by the contents of the B/L issued by the CC --> the
law admits no exceptions other than falsity and material error in the drafting
of the B/L
2. Refusal to Transport
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4. No bill of lading
Bill not essential to contract : While under 350, the shipper and the CC may
mutually demand that a B/L is made, it is not obligatory. The fact that a B/L
is not issued does not preclude the existence of a contract of transpo.
Provided there is a meeting of the minds and from such meeting arise rights
and obligations, there should be no limitations as to form.
The B/L is not essential to the contract, although it may become
obligatory by reason of the regulations of companies or as a condition
imposed in the contract by agreement of the parties themselves
Where no B/L is issued, the disputes between the parties shall be
decided accdg. to the rules laid down in Art. 354
1. When it commences
Art. 355. The liability of the carrier shall begin from the
moment he receives the merchandise, in person or through a person
entrusted therewith in the place indicated for their reception.
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2. Route
Where there is an agreed route, the CC shall be liable for losses due not only
to the change of route but also to other causes, together with the indemnity
agreed upon --> the CC may not avail of the contract limiting his liability in
case of unjustified change of route
Where there is no agreed route, the carrier must select one which may
be the shortest, least expensive and practically passable
3. Care of Goods
When goods are delivered on board a ship in good order and condition, and
the shipper-owner delivers them to the shipper in bad order and condition, it
then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the goods
were damaged by reason of some fact which legally exempts him from
liability
The shipper will suffer losses and deteriorations arising from fortuitous
event, force majeure, or inherent nature and defects of the goods (at the risk
and venture of the shipper)
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It does not mean that the CC is free from liability for losses and
deterioration arising from his negligence or fault, which is presumed
Relate this with Art. 1734 and 1735 of the Civil Code
Art. 362. The carrier, however, shall be liable for the losses
and damages arising from the causes mentioned in the foregoing
article if it is proved that they occurred on account of his
negligence or because he did not take the precautions usually
adopted by careful persons, unless the shipper committed fraud in
the bill of lading, making him believe that the goods were of a class
or quality different from what they really were.
Burden of proof : the CC has the burden of proving that the injury was
occasioned by one of the excepted causes
The shipper then has the burden to prove that although the injury may
have been occasioned by one of the excepted causes, yet still the CC is
responsible if the injury might have been avoided by the exercise of
reasonable skill and attention on his part
Art. 362 is in consonance with Art. 1735, NCC --> except that under
1732, proof of extra-o diligence is required and not just ordinary diligence as
implied under 362
Where goods run risk of loss due to their nature, Art. 362 provides for
the remedy of sale by the CC of the goods, placing them for the purpose at
the disposal of the judicial authority or of the officials designated by special
provisions
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4. Delivery
Duty to deliver goods : duty to deliver the goods in the same condition in
which accdg. to the B/L they were found at the time they were received,
without damage or impairment --> otherwise, the CC is liable for damages
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Where all the goods are delivered but damage is to such an extent
that their value is diminished, the obligation of the CC shall be reduced to the
payment of the amount which, in the judgment of experts, constitute such
difference in value --> subject of course to other damages under the NCC
Where damage renders the goods useless for sale and consumption for the
purposes for which they are properly destined:
1. if the damage affects all goods, the consignee may abandon all the
goods to the CC who shall pay the corresponding damages
2. if the damage affects only some of the goods, the consignee may
abandon only the damaged goods --> but if the consignee can prove that it is
impossible to conveniently use the undamaged goods in that form, without
the damaged goods, the law authorizes the consignee to abandon all the
goods
In case of damaged goods, the damage may either be (1) ascertainable only
by opening of the packages, or (2) ascertainable from the outside part of the
package
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In Case 1, the claim against the CC for damages must be made within
24 hours following the receipt of the merchandise
In Case 2, the claim must be made at the time of receipt
The claim must be made before the payment of transportation charges
** otherwise, no action for damages may be maintained against the CC
When period begins to run : period begins to run when the consignee
received possession of the goods such that he may exercise over it the
ordinary control pertinent to ownership
There must be delivery of the merchandise by the CC to the consignee
at the place of destination --> Art. 366 applies only to cases of claims for
damage to goods actually turned over by the CC and received by the
consignee
The conditions under Art. 366 are not limitation of action but are
conditions precedent to a cause of action --> if the shipper or consignee fails
to allege and prove the conditions under 366, he shall have no right of action
against the CC
The CC may require in the B/L that the goods be examined at the time
of delivery thereof --> the CC may likewise waive such right
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If doubts and disputes should arise between the consignee and the CC with
respect to the condition of the goods transported at the time of the delivery,
Art. 367 shall govern --> expert opinion on the matter is not conclusive on
the parties
Where the B/L is issued to the order of the shipper, the CC is under a duty
not to deliver the merchandise except upon presentation of the B/L duly
indorsed by the shipper, and where the CC delivered the goods to another
person who did not present the B/L, such CC is liable for misdelivery --> duty
to transport the goods safely and to deliver them to the person indicated in
the B/L
Misdelivery: Delivery to a person different from that indicated in the B/L -->
different from non-delivery
In case of conflicting orders of the shipper and the consignee (where
one orders the return and the other orders the delivery of the goods), there is
no other recourse than to determine at what moment the right of the shipper
to countermand the shipment terminates --> this moment can be no other
than the time when the consignee or legitimate holder of the B/L appears
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with such B/L before the CC and makes himself a party to the contract (prior
to that time, he is a stranger to the contract)
Article 370. If a period has been fixed for the delivery of the
goods, it must be made within the same, otherwise the carrier shall
pay the indemnity agreed upon in the bill of lading, neither the
shipper nor consignee being entitled to anything else.
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Where period fixed for delivery : the CC must deliver the goods within the
time fixed --> for failure to do so, the CC shall pay indemnity stipulated in
the B/L, neither the shipper nor the consignee being entitled to anything else
--> however, under the CC, damages shall be paid if the carrier refuses to
pay the stipulated indemnity or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of his
obligation (Art. 1126,NCC)
If no indemnity has been stipulated and the delay exceeds the time
fixed in the B/L, the CC shall be liable for the damages that the delay may
have caused, e.g. the difference between the MV of the goods at the time
when they should have been delivered, and the price at the time when they
were delivered to which may be added reasonable expenses caused by delay
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The time for delivery when no period fixed : the CC shall be bound to
forward them in the first shipment of the same or similar goods which he
makes to the point where he must deliver them --> should he not do so, the
damages caused by the delay shall be for his account
Art. 358 is not violated when though the goods were not shipped on
the train agreed upon, they were shipped on another train which arrived
earlier than the one agreed upon
The carrier making the delivery shall also assume all the
actions and rights of those who may have preceded him in the
transportation.
Successive carriers shall assume the obligations of previous carriers but have
a right of action against previous carriers is the latter are directly responsible
for the fault giving rise to the claim of the shipper
Art. 377. The carrier shall be liable for all the consequences
arising from noncompliance on his part with the formalities
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1. Right to Damages
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Art. 353. The legal basis of the contract between the shipper
and the carrier shall be the bills of lading, by the contents of which
all disputes which may arise with regard to their execution and
fulfillment shall be decided, no exceptions being admissible other
than forgery or material errors in the drafting thereof.
After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading
shall be returned to the carrier who may have issued it, and by
virtue of the exchange of this title for the article transported, the
respective obligations and actions shall be considered canceled,
unless the same act the claims which the contracting parties desire
to reserve are reduced to writing, exception being made of the
provisions of Article 366.
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot
return the bill of lading subscribed by the carrier, due to its loss or
for any other cause, he shall give said carrier a receipt for the goods
delivered, this receipt producing the same effect as the return of
the bill of lading.
Art. 372. The value of the goods which the carrier must pay in
case of their being lost or mislaid shall be fixed in accordance with
what is stated in the bill of lading, no proofs being allowed on the
part of the shipper that there were among the goods declared
therein articles of greater value, and money.
The value of the goods stated in the B/L is conclusive between the parties
and the shipper is not allowed to prove a higher value
It is only when the CC's fault is so gross as to amount to actual fraud,
that the actual amount of the losses and damages suffered may be proved
by the shipper against the carrier
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Par. 2 especially binds the horses, vehicles, vessels and eqpt. and all other
principal and accessory means of the CC in favor of the shipper --> this lien
is a security for the payment of the value of the goods which the CC must
pay in case of loss or misplacement
Art. 1744, NCC. A stipulation between the CC and the shipper
or owner limiting the liability of the former for the loss, destruction
or deterioration of the goods to a degree less than extra-o diligence
shall be valid, provided it be:
(1) in writing, signed by the shipper or owner;
(2) supported by a valuable consideration other than the
service rendered by the CC; and
(3) reasonable, just, and not contrary to public policy. (New
Civil Code.)
2. Right to abandon
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Damages for abandonment : Art. 371 (2) --> subject to Civil Code
Art. 360. The shipper may, without changing the place where
the delivery is to be made, change the consignment of the goods
delivered to the carrier, and the latter shall comply with his orders,
provided that at the time of making the change of the consignee the
bill of lading subscribed by the carrier, if one were issued, be
returned to him, exchanging it for another containing the novation
of the contract.
The expenses arising from the change of consignment shall be
defrayed by the shipper.
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Art. 360. The shipper may, without changing the place where
the delivery is to be made, change the consignment of the goods
delivered to the carrier, and the latter shall comply with his orders,
provided that at the time of making the change of the consignee the
bill of lading subscribed by the carrier, if one were issued, be
returned to him, exchanging it for another containing the novation
of the contract.
The expenses arising from the change of consignment shall be
defrayed by the shipper.
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Art. 372(par. 2); time limit rests on the necessity which the consignee must
have for alienation of the goods, by which the CC is given a period relatively
urgent pertaining to the said goods transported --> after the time has
prescribed, his preference prescribes and his only remedy is by ordinary
action
The mere fact that the goods remain in the possession of the CC
because they have not been removed by the consignee, and the right of the
CC to demand the sale of the goods to satisfy the cost of transportation and
other expenses, do not deprive the CC of its right to demand in a proper
action the amounts owing to it by reason of the contract of transpo
The bankruptcy of the consignee shall not cut off the preference of the
CC, provided that the claim is made w/in 30 days from date of delivery (NCC)
Art. 353. The legal basis of the contract between the shipper
and the carrier shall be the bills of lading, by the contents of which
all disputes which may arise with regard to their execution and
fulfillment shall be decided, no exceptions being admissible other
than forgery or material errors in the drafting thereof.
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After the contract has been complied with, the bill of lading
shall be returned to the carrier who may have issued it, and by
virtue of the exchange of this title for the article transported, the
respective obligations and actions shall be considered canceled,
unless the same act the claims which the contracting parties desire
to reserve are reduced to writing, exception being made of the
provisions of Article 366.
In case the consignee, upon receiving the goods, cannot
return the bill of lading subscribed by the carrier, due to its loss or
for any other cause, he shall give said carrier a receipt for the goods
delivered, this receipt producing the same effect as the return of
the bill of lading.
Under par. 2, Art. 353, after the contract of transpo has been complied with,
the B/L shall be returned to the issuing CC in exchange for the goods
transported which are delivered to the shipper or consignee
Where the consignee upon receiving the goods cannot return the B/L
to the CC by reason of its loss or any other cause, par. 3, Art. 353 provides
that he must give the CC a receipt of the goods delivered
G. Applicability of Provisions
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Held : It is clear from the complaint that IH is being held liable only on the
assumption that the goods had been lost in transit or before being
discharged at the pier. The liability of IH is predicated on the contract of
carriage by sea between IH and Yaras & Co. as evidenced by the B/L,
independently of the liability of the Manila Terminal Co. as operator of an
arrastre service.
Admiralty has jurisdiction over all maritime contracts, in whatever
form, wherever they were executed or are to be performed, but not over non-
maritime contracts. Whether or not a contract is maritime depends not on
the place where the contract is made and is to be executed, making the
locality the test, but on the subject matter of the contract, making the true
criterion a maritime service or a maritime transaction. Specifically, admiralty
has jurisdiction of a proceeding in rem or in personam for the breach of a
contract of affreightment, whether evidenced by a B/L or a charter party.
And typical of a controversy over contracts of affreightment is a suit of one
party against the other for loss or damage to the cargo. This is the very case
before us, because the respondent Yaras & Co. seeks to recover from the
petitioner IH the value of certain lost cargo.
The contention of Yaras that the admiralty jurisdiction is not involved
because the contract in question was made upon land and to be terminated
upon land, merely reflects the English rule which had long been rejected in
the US. It is now well-settled in the latter country that the jurisdiction of
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admiralty in matters of contract depends upon the subject matter, i.e., the
nature and character of the contract and that the English rule which
conceded jurisdiction only to contracts made upon and to be performed upon
navigable waters, is inadmissible, the true criterion being that the contract
has reference to maritime service or maritime transaction. Under the law,
the CFI has jurisdiction over admiralty cases.
B. Vessels
1. Meaning
Held : Assuming that article 835 of the Code of Commerce states a condition
precedent to the maintenance of an action in a case requiring protest, such
as protest is nevertheless not necessary in the case at bar. The article is
found in the section dealing with collisions and the context shows the
collisions intended are collisions of sea-going vessels. Said article cannot be
applied to small boats engaged in river and bay traffic. The vessels intended
in the Third Book of the Code of Commerce which deals with maritime
commerce and in which Art. 865 is found was evidently intended to define
the law relative to merchant vessels and marine shipping, and the vessels
intended in that Book are such as are run by masters having special training
with the elaborate apparatus of crew and equipment indicated in the Code.
The word "vessel" used in the section was not intended to include all ships,
craft, or floating structures of every kind without limitation, and the provision
of that section should not be held to include minor craft engaged only in river
or bay traffic. Vessels of minor nature, such as river boats and those carrying
passengers from ship to shore are governed as to their liability in
passengers, by the Civil Code.
The word ship and vessel, in their grammatical sense are applied to
designate every kind of craft, large or small, merchant or war, a signification
which does not differ essentially from its juridical meaning according to
which vessels for the purpose of the Code of Commerce, are considered not
only those engaged in navigation whether coastwise or high seas, but also
floating docks, pontoons,dredges, scows, and other floating apparatus for the
service of the industry or maritime commerce.
Yet notwithstanding these principles from which it would seem that
any floating apparatus which serves directly for the transportation of things
or persons or which indirectly is related to this industry, ought to be
subjected to the principles of the Code with reference to ownership, transfer,
rights, registrations, etc. they are not applicable to small craft which are only
subject to administrative regulations in the matter of port service and in the
fishing industry.
But even if The Code Of Commerce was applicable, a protest still need
not be made since under Art. 836, want of protest cannot prejudice a person
not in a condition to make known his wishes. A person who has suffered
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The business of constructing and repairing vessels or parts thereof shall not
be considered a public utility and no CPC shall be required thereof
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Subjects of Registration:
1) All vessels used in Phil. waters, not being transients of
foreign registry, shall be registered with the MARINA. To this end, it
shall be the duty of the master, owner and agent of every such
vessel to make application to the proper MARINA district office for
registration thereof within 15 days after the vessel becomes subject
to such registration.
2) A vessel of 3 tons gross or less shall not be registered
unless the owner shall so desire, nor shall documents licenses of
any kind be required for such vessel, but the proper fee shall be
charged for measurement when measurement is necessary, except
when the same is engaged in towing or carrying of articles and
passengers for hire.
3) All undocumented vessels shall be numbered in such form
as may be prescribed by the Administrator.
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The Phil. Coast Guard is vested with exclusive authority over the registration
and documentation of Phil. vessels, as well as the issuance of all certificates,
licenses, or other documents necessary or incident to such registration
The registration shall be effected at its home port or at the nearest
Coast Guard district or station when the home port does not have such
HELD : Sec. 1171 of AC has modified the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage
Law, particularly Sec. 4 thereof. It is now not necessary for a chattel
mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the register of deeds. But it is essential
that a record of documents affecting the title of a vessel be entered in the
office of the collector of customs at a port of entry. This is designed to
protect persons who deal with a vessel on the strength of the record title.
Mortgages on vessels., although not recorded, are good as between the
parties. But as against creditors of the mortgagor, an unrecorded mortgage
is valid.
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Art. 586. The owner of a vessel and ship agent shall be civilly
liable for the acts of the captain and for the obligations contracted
by the latter to repair, equip, and provision the vessel, provided the
creditors proves that the amount claimed was invested therein.
By agent is understood the person entrusted with the
provisioning of a vessel, or who represents her in the port in which
she happens to be.
Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the
indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct
of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but
he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all
her equipments and the freightage he may have earned during the
voyage.
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Art. 588. Neither the owner of the vessel nor the agent shall
be liable for the obligations contracted by the captain if the latter
exceeds his powers and privileges inherent in his position or those
which may have been conferred upon him by the former.
However, if the amounts claimed were made use of for the
benefit of the vessel, the owner or agent shall be liable.
Under 588, the shipowner and the shipagent are not liable for the obligations
contracted by the captain if he exceeds his authority, unless the amounts
claimed were invested for the benefit of the vessel --> however under Art.
1759, NCC, the ship owner is liable for the death of or injuries to the
passengers which are caused by the negligence or wilful acts of his EEs
although such EEs may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the shipowner
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Art. 594. The part owners shall elect the manager who is to
represent them in the capacity of agent.
The appointment of director or agent shall be revocable at the
will of the partners.
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Art. 596. The agent may discharge the duties of captain of the
vessel, subject, in every case, to the provisions contained in Article
609.
If two or more co-owners request the position of captain, the
disagreement shall be decided by a vote of the members; and if the
vote should result in a tie, the position shall be given to the part
owner having the larger interest in the vessel.
If the interest of the petitioners should be the same, and there
should be a tie, the matter shall be decided by lot.
Art. 597. The agent shall select and enter into an agreement
with the captain, and shall contract in the name of the owners, who
shall be bound in all that refers to repairs, details of equipment,
armament, provisions, fuel, and freight of the vessel, and, in
general, in all that relates to the requirements of navigation.
Art. 598. The agent cannot order a new voyage, nor make
contracts for a new charter, nor insure the vessel, without the
authority of her owner or by virtue of a resolution of the majority of
the co-owners, unless these powers were granted him in the
certificate of his appointment.
If he should insure the vessel without authority therefor he
shall be subsidiarily liable for the solvency of the underwriter.
Art. 600. After the account of the managing agent has been
approved by a relative majority, the co-owners shall satisfy the
expenses in proportion to their interest, without prejudice to the
civil or criminal actions which the minority may deem fit to institute
afterwards.
In order to enforce the payment, the managing agents shall be
entitled to an executory action, which shall be instituted by virtue of
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Art. 602. The agent shall indemnify the captain for all the
expenses he may have made from his own funds or from those of
other persons, for the benefit of the vessel.
Art. 603. Before a vessel goes out to sea the agent may at his
discretion, discharge the captain and members of the crew whose
contract did not state a definite period nor a definite voyage, paying
them the salaries earned according to their contracts, and without
any indemnity whatsoever, unless there is an expressed and specific
agreement in respect thereto.
Art. 604. If the captain or any other member of the crew should be
discharged during the voyage, they shall receive their salary until their return
to the place where the contract was made, unless there are good reasons for
the discharge, all in accordance with Art. 636 et seq. of this Code.
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Art. 618. The captain shall be civilly liable to the ship agent
and the latter to the third persons who may have made contracts
with the former -
1. For all the damages suffered by the vessel and its cargo by
reason of want of skill or negligence on his part. If a misdemeanor
or crime has been committed he shall be liable in accordance with
the Penal Code.
2. For all the thefts and robberies committed by the crew,
reserving his right of action against the guilty parties.
3. For the losses, fines, and confiscations imposed on account
of violation of the laws and regulations of customs, police, health,
and navigation.
4. For the losses and damages caused by mutinies on board
the vessel, or by reason of faults committed by the crew in the
service and defense of the same, if he does not prove that he made
full use of his authority to prevent or avoid them.
5. For those arising by reason of a misuse of powers and
nonfulfillment of the duties which pertain to him in accordance with
Articles 610 and 612.
6. For those arising by reason of his going out of his course or
taking a course which, in the opinion of the officers of the vessel, at
a meeting attended by the shippers or supercargoes who may be on
board, he should not have taken without sufficient cause.
No exception whatsoever shall exempt him from his obliga-
tion.
7. For those arising by reason of his voluntarily entering a
port other than his destination, with the exception of the cases or
without the formalities referred to in Article 612. 8. For those
arising by reason of the nonobservance of the provisions contained
in the regulations for lights and maneuvers for the purpose of
preventing collisions.
Art. 618 provides for the direct responsibility of the shipowner and shipagent
to third persons; the captain shall be civilly liable to the ship agent and the
latter is the one liable to third persons This article applies to breaches
of contract and tortious negligence of the captain
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But where the vessel is totally chartered for use of a single party, the
shipowner and that party may validly stipulate that the latter shall be exempt
from liability for the negligence of the captain and crew
Held : Ordinarily, the loss of cargo carried on deck shall not be considered as
general average loss, as expressed in the York- Antwerp Rules. This rule,
first made during the days of sailing vessels has changed and it is now
generally held that jettisoned goods carried on deck, according to the
customs of trade, by steam vessels navigating coastwise and inland waters,
are entitled to contribution as general average loss. The reason for this, in
coastwise trade, is that boats are small and voyages are short, with the
result that the coasting vessel can use more circumspection about the
condition of the weather at departure time. It is evident therefore, that the
loss of the petroleum is a general average with the result that plaintiff is
entitled to recover an amount bearing such proportion to its total loss as the
value of both ship and cargo bears to the value of ship and entire cargo
before jettison was effected.
It is universally recognized that the captain is the representative of the
owner and both under Art. 586 of the Code of Commerce, are civilly liable for
the acts of the master. When jettison of cargo occurs, it is the duty of the
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Held : Ipil and Solamo, as carriers and depositories of the money were liable
under the Civil Code, the theft not being a fortuitous event or of force
majeure and they being manifestly negligent and at fault.
As to the liability of Lauron, the SC proceeded by first defining the
banca "Maria" as within the meaning of the term "vessel." Thus, according to
the foregoing definitions (by the Mercantile Code, by Reus in Commentaries
on the Code of Commerce, and by Blanco) we hold that the banca "Maria"
chartered by Yu Con from Lauron, was a "vessel" under Mercantile Law and
the Code of Commerce. Ipil, the master of the banca, was also held to be the
captain (masters are to small vessels as captains are to big ones). Under
Arts. 587 and 618, the shipowner shall be civilly liable to third persons when
the captain of the vessel causes the damage or loss to goods entrusted to
him by said third persons under a contract to carry said goods. Thus, it is
well and god that the shipowner be not held criminally liable for such crimes
or quasi crimes but he cannot be excused from liability for the damage and
harm which in consequence of those acts may be suffered by the third
parties who contracted with the captain in his double capacity of agent and
subordinate of the shipowner himself. In maritime commerce, the shippers
and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through the
confidence they have in the shipowner who appointed him.
The owner of a minor craft who has equipped and victualed it for the
purpose of using it in the transportation of merchandise from one port to
another is under the law a shipowner and the master of the craft is to be
considered as its captain in the legal acceptation of this word, and the former
must be held civilly liable for indemnities in favor of third parties to which the
conduct of the master/captain may give rise in the custody of the effects
laden on the craft, and for all losses which, through his fault or negligence,
may occur to the merchandise or effects delivered to him for their
transportation as well as for the damages suffered by those who contracted
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Held : (1) While it is true that plaintiff's action against petitioner is based on a
tort or quasi-delict, the tort in question is not a civil tort under the Civil Code
but is a maritime tort resulting in a collision at sea, governed by Arts. 826-
939 of the Code of Commerce, while the owners of both colliding vessels are
solidarily liable for damages caused. This direct responsibility is recognized
in Art. 618 of the Code of Commerce, under which the captain shall be civilly
liable to the ship agent, and the latter is the one liable to third persons.
In fact it is a general principle well established in the maritime law and
custom, that shipowners and shipagents are civilly liable for the acts of the
captain (Art. 586) and for the indemnities due to the third persons (Art. 587).
This direct liability moderated and limited by the owner's right of
abandonment of the vessel and earned freight (Art. 587) has been declared
to exist not only in the case of breached contracts but also in cases of
tortious negligence.
It is easy to see that to admit the defense of the diligence of a bonus
pater familias in the selection and vigilance of the officers and crew as
exempting the shipowner from any liability for their faults, would render
nugatory the solidary liability in Art. 827 for the greater protection of injured
parties.
(2) It is to be noted that Macrohon was not duly licensed as a
shipmaster and Lim knew of this fact when it hired the former, thus
deliberately increasing the risk to which the unknowing passengers would be
subjected. The liability of Lim, cannot, therefore be identical to that of a
shipowner who bears in mind the safety of the passengers by employing duly
licensed officers. To hold, as the CA had done, that Lim may limit his liability
to the value of his vessels, is to erase all differences between compliance
with law and the deliberate disregard thereof.
The international rule is to the effect that the right of abandonment of
vessels, as a legal limitation of a shipowner's liability, does not apply to
cases where the injury of the average is due to shipowner's own fault.
* Doctrine of limited liability is provided for in Arts. 587, 590 and 837
Art. 587. The ship agent shall also be civilly liable for the
indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from the conduct
of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but
he may exempt himself therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all
her equipments and the freightage he may have earned during the
voyage.
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BUT the ship agent may exempt himself from liability by abandoning the
vessel with all her equipment and the freight it may have earned during the
voyage --> the effect of abandonment is to extinguish the liability of the
shipagent
The ship agent's liability is confined to that which he is entitled as a
matter of right to abandon : the vessel with all her eqpt. and the freight it
may have earned during the voyage and to the insurance thereof
Limited liability is not applicable when no abandonment of vessel is
made
Thre (3) cases where the loss of the vessel extinguishes the
liability of the shipowner:
(1) under 587, liability arising from the conduct of the captain in the
vigilance of the goods and for the safety of the passengers and for any
liability arising from the negligent or illicit acts of the captain for which the
shipowner or ship agent may be held liable
(2) under 643, liability for the wages of the captain and the crew and
for advances made by the shipagent if the vessel is lost by shipwreck or
capture
(3) under 837, liability for collision
Exceptions:
(1) Doctrine does not apply where shipowner is at fault : the doctrine is
premised on the condition that the death or injury to the passenger occurred
by reason of the fault or negligence of the captain only
(2) Doctrine does not apply in cases of Workmen's Compensation --> such
compensation has nothing to do with maritime commerce; it is an item in the
cost of production which must be included in the budget of any well-
managed industry
(3) Total destruction of the vessel does not affect the liability of the owner for
repairs on the vessel completed before its loss --> owners of a vessel are
liable for necessary repairs; its liability for repairs remains unaffected by the
loss of the thing
Reason for limited liability: This doctrine had its origin when maritime
trade and sea voyage was attended by innumerable hazards and perils --> to
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Issue : How is the doctrine of limited liability applied in this case with M/V
Consuelo?
Held : Art. 587 accords a shipowner or agent the right of abandonment; and
by necessary implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled
as of right to abandon -- the vessel with all her equipments and the freight it
may have earned during the voyage. In other words, such liability is limited
to the value of the vessel and other things appertaining thereto such that a
total loss thereof results in its extinction. Although the article appears to
deal only with the limited liability of shipowners or agents for damages
arising from the misconduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the
vessel carries, this is a mere deficiency of language and in no way indicates
the true extent of such liability, to wit, the benefit of limited liability applies
in all cases (as regards both goods and passengers of the vessel) wherein the
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shipowner or agent may properly be held for the negligent or illicit acts of the
captain.
The reason for the limited liability is the real and hypothecary nature
of maritime law as distinguished from civil law and mercantile law in general.
As evidence of this real nature, we have (1) the limitation of the liability of
the agents to the actual value of the vessel and the freight money and (2)
the right of the maritime creditor to retain the cargo, and the embargo and
detention of the vessel in cases where the ordinary civil law would not allow
more than a personal action against the debtor or person liable. Thus, even
assuming that Yangco is liable for breach of contract because his relationship
to the passengers rests on a contract of carriage, the exclusively real and
hypothecary nature of maritime law still operates to limit his liability to the
value of the vessel or to the insurance thereon, if any. In this case, the
vessel was not insured. Whether the abandonment of the vessel sought by
the petitioner in instant case was in accordance with law or not, is
immaterial. The vessel having totally perished, any act of abandonment
would be an idle ceremony. Petitioner is absolved from all complaints.
Held : The real and hypothecary nature of the liability of the shipowner or
agent embodied in the provisions of the Maritime Law, had its origin in the
prevailing conditions of the maritime trade and sea voyages during the
medieval ages, attended by innumerable hazards and perils. To offset
against these adverse conditions and to encourage shipbuilding and maritime
commerce, it was deemed necessary to confine the liability of the owner or
agent arising from the operation of a ship to the vessel, equipment, and
freight, or insurance, if any, so that if the shipowner or agent abandoned the
ship, equipment, and freight, his liability was extinguished.
The provisions of the Code of Commerce regarding maritime
commerce have no room in the application of the Workmen's Compensation
Act which seeks to improve, and aims at the amelioration of, the condition of
laborers and EEs. Said Act creates a liability to compensate EEs and laborers
in cases of injury received by or inflicted upon them, while engaged in the
performance of their work or employment, or the heirs and dependents of
such laborers and EEs in the event of death caused by their employment.
The officers of motor ships engaged in fishing are industrial EEs and
are entitled to the benefits of the Workmen's Compensation Act. If an
accident is compensable under the WCA, it must be compensated even when
the workman's right is not recognized by or is in conflict with other provisions
of the Civil Code or Code of Commerce. The reason is that the WCA was
enacted in abrogation of existing laws.
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While the captain was negligent for overloading the ship, Maritima
shares equally in his negligence. M/V Mindoro was cleared for departure at 2
PM by the Bureau of Customs and the Coast Guard but its departure was
delayed for 4 hours. Maritima could not account for the delay because it
neither checked from the captain the reasons behind the delay. It was due to
this interim that there is great probability that unmanifested cargo and
passengers were loaded.
Maritima presented evidence of the seaworthy condition of the ship
prior to its departure, including the installation of life saving equipment and
other navigational instruments. But it could not present evidence that it
specifically installed a radar which could have allowed the vessel to navigate
safely for shelter during the storm. An important device such as the radar
could have enabled the ship to pass through the river and to safety.
Maritima's lack of EO diligence coupled with the negligence of the
captain were the proximate causes of the sinking of M/V Mindoro. Maritima is
liable for the deaths and injury of the victims. It was ordered to pay death
indemnities to the heirs of the victims, moral damages, actual damages and
attorney's fees.
Art. 575. Part owners of vessels shall enjoy the right of pre-
emption and redemption in the sales made to strangers; but they
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can only exercise it within the nine days following the record of the
sale in the registry and by delivering the price at once.
Art. 594. The part owners shall elect the manager who is to
represent them in the capacity of agent.
Art. 596. The agent may discharge the duties of captain of the
vessel, subject, in every case, to the provisions contained in Article
609.
Art. 601. Should there be any profits, the co- owners may
demand of the managing agent the amount due them, by means of an
executory action without further requisite than the acknowledgment
of the signatures in the instrument approving the account.
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RA 5173
notes:
- Captain - one who governs vessels that navigate the high seas or ships of
large dimensions and importance, although they may be engaged in coastwise
trade
- Master - one who commands smaller ships engaged exclusively in coastwise
trade
- captain and master have the same meaning for maritime commerce
- patron - bancas
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notes: The first three powers cannot be renounced as they relate to public
order and are vested in the captain as a delegation of public authority
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In the first book, which shall be called "log book," he shall enter
every day the condition of the atmosphere, the prevailing winds, the
course sailed, the rigging carried, the horsepower of the engines, the
distance covered, the maneuvers executed, and other incidents of
navigation. He shall also enter the damage suffered by the vessel in
her hull engines, rigging, and tackle, no matter what is its cause, as
well as the imperfections and averages of the cargo, and the effects
and consequence of the jettison, should there be any; and in cases of
grave resolutions which require the advice or a meeting of the
officers of the vessel, or even of the passengers and crew, he shall
record the decision adopted. For the informations indicated he shall
make use of the binnacle book, and of the steam or engine book kept
by the engineer.
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shall not spend the night away from the vessel except for serious
causes or by reason of official business.
Notes: Although the duties in Art. 612 are inherent in the captain, the civil
liability arising from the non-fulfillment thereof is not limited to the captain,
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since while the captain is liable to the shipagent, the shipagent is liable to
third persons (Art. 618).
The captain shall proceed in the same manner if, the vessel
having been wrecked, he is saved alone or with part of his crew, in
which case he shall appear before the nearest authority, and make a
sworn statement of the facts.
The authority or the consul abroad shall verify the said facts,
receiving sworn statements of the members of the crew and
passengers who may have been saved, and taking such other steps
as may help in arriving at the facts, he shall make a statement of the
result of the proceedings in the log book and in that of the sailing
mate, and shall deliver the original records of the proceedings to the
captain, stamped and folioed, with a memorandum of the folios,
which he must rubricate, for their presentation to the judge or court
of the port of destination.
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Notes: Under 619, the delivery of the cargo at the port of discharge
terminates the captain's responsibility as to the cargo
HELD: Yes.
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Art. 615. Without the consent of the ship agent, the captain
may not have himself substituted by another person; and should he
do so, besides being liable for all the acts of the substitute and
bound to pay the indemnities mentioned in the foregoing article, the
substitute as well as the captain may be discharged by the ship
agent.
Notes: The duties of a captain are essentially personal due to the confidence
given to him arising from the fact that he possesses the required technical
ability and that he is a man worthy of trust of the shipowner
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Art. 583. If the ship being on a voyage the captain should find
it necessary to contract one or more of the obligations mentioned in
Nos. 8 and 9 of Article 580, he shall apply to the judge or court if he
is in Philippine territory, and otherwise to the Filipino consul, should
there be one, and in his absence to the judge or court or to the
proper local authority, presenting the certificate of the registry of
the vessel treated of in Article 612, and the instruments proving the
obligation contracted.
The judge or court, the consul or the local authority as the case
may be in view of the result of the proceedings instituted, shall make
a temporary memorandum in the certificate of their result, in order
that it may be recorded in the registry when the vessel returns to the
port of her registry, or so that it can be admitted as a legal and
preferred obligation in case of sale before the return, by reason of
the sale of the vessel by virtue of a declaration of unseaworthiness.
The lack of this formality shall make the captain personally
liable to the creditors who may be prejudiced through his fault.
Notes: Obligations covered by this article : (1) price which has not been paid
to the last vendor; (2) for materials and labor in the construction of the vessel;
(3) for the repair, equipment and provisioning with the victuals and fuel; (4)
loan on bottomry before departure of the vessel; (5) insurance premiums
under Art. 580 pars. 8 and 9.
notes:
Art. 626 - 631 : sailing mate or second in command
Art. 632 - 633 : second mate or third in command
Complement of a vessel or crew - all the persons on board, from the captain to
the cabin boy, necessary for the management, maneuvers, and service;
includes the sailing mates, engineers, stokers, and other employees.
Art. 634. The captain may make up his crew with the number
he may consider advisable, and in the absence of Filipino sailors he
may ship foreigners residing in the country, the number thereof not
to exceed one-fifth of the total crew. If in foreign ports the captain
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Notes: The contract with a seaman has the nature of a lease of service, in
virtue of which one person binds himself to perform or to do the services or
works for which he has signed himself in the vessel in consideration of the
compensation stipulated
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(c) Rights
Art. 636. Should there be no fixed period for which a sailor has
been contracted, he cannot be discharged until the end of the return
voyage to the port where he enlisted.
Art. 637. Neither may the captain discharge a sailor during the
time of his contract except for just cause, the following being
considered as such:
1. The perpetration of a crime which disturbs order on the
vessel.
2. Repeated insubordination, want of discipline, or non-
fulfillment of the service.
3. Incapacity and repeated negligence in the fulfillment of the
service which he should render.
4. Habitual drunkenness.
5. Any occurrence which incapacitates the sailor to perform the
work entrusted to him, with the exception of that provided in Article
644.
Art. 644. A seaman who falls sick shall not lose his right
to wages during the voyage, unless the sickness is the result
of his own fault. At any rate, the costs of the attendance and
cure shall be defrayed from the common funds, in the form of
a loan.
6. Desertion.
The captain may, however, before setting out on a voyage and without
giving any reason whatsoever, refuse to permit a sailor whom he may have
engaged to go on board, and may leave him on land, in which case his wages
have to be paid as if he had rendered services.
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The indemnity shall be paid from the funds of the vessel if the captain
should have acted for reasons of prudence and in the interest of the safety
and good service of the vessel. Should this not be the case, it shall be paid by
the captain personally.
After the voyage has begun, and during the same and until the
conclusion thereof, the captain may not abandon any member of his crew on
land or on the sea, unless, as the accused of a crime, his imprisonment and
delivery to the competent authority in the first port touched should be proper,
which shall be obligatory to the captain.
Art. 638. If, after the crew has been engaged, the voyage is
revoked by the will of the ship agent or of the charterers, before or
after the vessel has put to sea, or if the vessel is for the same reason
given a different destination from that fixed in the agreement with
the crew, the latter shall be indemnified on account of the rescission
of the contract, according to the following cases:
1. If the revocation of the voyage should be decided before
departure of the vessel from the port, each sailor engaged shall be
given one month's salary, besides what may be due him, in
accordance with his contract, for the services rendered to the vessel
up to the date of the revocation.
2. If the agreement should have been for a fixed amount for
the whole voyage, what may be due for said month and days shall be
determined in proportion to the approximate duration of the voyage,
in the judgment of the experts, in the manner established by the law
of civil procedure; and if the proposed voyage should be of such
short duration that it is calculated at approximately one month, the
indemnity shall be fixed at fifteen days, discounting in all cases the
sums advanced.
3. If the revocation should take place after the vessel has put
to sea, the sailors engaged for a fixed amount for the voyage shall
receive the entire salary which may have been offered them if the
voyage had terminated; and those engaged by the month shall
receive the amount corresponding to the time they might have been
on board and to the time they may require to arrive at the port of
destination, the captain being obliged, furthermore, to pay said
sailors in both cases the passage to the said port or to the port of
sailing of the vessel, as may be convenient for them.
4. If the ship agent or the charterers of the vessel should give
it a destination different from that fixed in the agreement, and the
members of the crew should not agree thereto, they shall be given by
way of indemnity half the amount fixed in the first case, in addition
to what may be due them for the part of the monthly wages
corresponding to the days which may have elapsed from the date of
their agreements.
If they accept the change, and the voyage, on account of
greater distance or of other reasons, should give rise to an increase
of wages, the latter shall be adjusted privately, or through friendly
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Art. 639. Should the revocation of the voyage arise from a just
cause independent of the will of the ship agent and the charterers,
and the vessel should not have left the port, the members of the
crew shall no other right than to collect the wages earned up to the
day the revocation was made.
Art. 640. The following shall be just causes for the revocation
of the voyage:
1. A declaration of war or interdiction of commerce with the
power to whose territory the vessel was bound.
2. The blockade of the port of its destination or the breaking
out of an epidemic after the agreement.
3. The prohibition to receive in said port the goods which make
up the cargo of the vessel.
4. The detention or embargo of the same by order of the
government, or for any other reason independent of the will of the
agent.
5. The inability of the vessel to navigate.
Art. 641. If, after a voyage has been begun, and any of the first
three causes mentioned in the foregoing article should occur, the
sailors shall be paid at the port which the captain may deem
advisable to make for the benefit of the vessel and cargo, according
to the time they may have served thereon; but if the vessel is to
continue its voyage, the captain and the crew may mutually demand
the enforcement of the contract.
In case of the occurrence of the fourth cause, the crew shall
continue to be paid half wages, if the agreement is by month; but if
the detention should exceed three months, the contract shall be
rescinded and the crew shall be paid what they should have earned
according to the contact, as if the voyage had been made. And if the
agreement should be for a fixed sum for the voyage, the contract
must be complied with in the terms agreed upon.
In the fifth case, the crew shall have no other right than to
collect the wages earned; but if the disability of the vessel should
have been caused by the negligence or lack of skill of the captain,
engineer, or sailing mate, they shall indemnify the crew for the
damages suffered, always without prejudice to the criminal liability
which may be proper.
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Art. 642. If the crew has been engaged on shares it shall not be
entitled, by reason of the revocation, delay, or greater extension of
the voyage, to anything but the proportionate part of the indemnity
which may be paid to the common funds by the persons responsible
for said occurrences.
Art. 643. If the vessel and her cargo should be totally lost by
reason of capture or shipwreck, all rights shall be extinguished, both
as regards the right of the crew to demand any wages and as regards
the right of the ship agent to recover the advances made.
If a portion of the vessel or of the cargo, or of both, should be
saved, the crew engaged on wages, including the captain, shall retain
their rights on the salvage, as far as possible, on the remainder of
the vessel as well as on the value of the freightage or the cargo
saved; but sailors who are engaged on shares shall have no right on
the salvage of the hull, but only on the portion of the freightage
saved. (If they should have worked to recover the remainder of the
shipwrecked vessel, they shall be given from the amount of the
salvage an award in proportion to the efforts made and to the risks
encountered in order to accomplish the salvage.)
Art. 644. A sailor who falls sick shall not lose his right to wages
during the voyage, unless his sickness is the result of his own fault.
At any rate, the costs of medical attendance and treatment shall be
defrayed from the common funds, in the form of a loan.
If the sickness should be caused by an injury received in the
service or defense of the vessel, the sailor shall be attended and
treated at the expense of the common funds, deducting, before
anything else, from the proceeds of the freightage, the cost of the
attendance and treatment.
Art. 645. If a sailor should die during the voyage, his heirs shall
be given the wages earned and not received, according to his
contract and the cause of his death, namely ---
If he died a natural death and was engaged on wages, that
which may have been earned up to the date of his death shall be
paid.
If the contract was for a fixed sum for the whole voyage, half
the amount earned shall be paid if the sailor died on the voyage out,
and the whole amount if he died on the return voyage.
And if the contract was on shares and the death occurred after
the voyage was begun, the heirs shall be paid the entire portion due
the sailor; but if the latter died before the departure of the vessel
from the port, the heirs shall not be entitled to claim anything.
If death occurred in the defense of the vessel, the sailor shall
be considered as living, and his heirs shall be paid, at the end of the
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voyage, the full amount of wages or the entire part of the profits
which may be due him as others of his class.
The sailor shall likewise be considered as present if he was
captured while defending the vessel, in order to enjoy the benefits
as the rest; but should he have been captured on account of
carelessness or other accident not related to the service, he shall
only receive the wages due up to the day of his capture.
Art. 646. The vessel with her engines, rigging, equipment, and
freightage shall be liable for the wages earned by the crew engaged
per month or for the trip, the liquidation and payment to take place
between one voyage and the other. // After a new voyage has been
undertaken, credits of such kind pertaining to the preceding voyage
shall lose the preference.
Art. 647. The officers and the crew of the vessel shall be
exempted from all obligations contracted, if they deem if proper, in
the following cases;
1. If, before the beginning of the voyage, the captain attempts
to change it, or there occurs a naval war with the power to which the
vessel was destined.
2. If a disease should break out and be officially declared
epidemic in the port of destination.
3. If the vessel should change owner or captain.
4. Supercargoes
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1. Averages
Art. 806. For the purposes of this Code the following shall be
considered averages:
1. All extraordinary or accidental expenses which may be
incurred during the voyage for the preservation of the vessel or
cargo, or both.
2. All damages or deterioration which the vessel may suffer
from the time it puts to sea at the port of departure until it casts
anchor at the port of destination, and those suffered by the
merchandise from the time they are loaded in the port of shipment
until they are unloaded in the port of their consignment.
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(a) Defined
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(b) Effects
Art. 810. The owner of the goods which gave rise to the
expense or suffered the damage shall bear the simple or particular
averages.
(a) Defined
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1. there must be a common danger --> the ship and cargo are subject
to the same danger and that the danger arises from accidents of the sea,
dispositions of the authorities or faults of men, provided that the
circumstances producing the peril should be ascertained and imminent
2. for the common safety, part of the vessel or the cargo or both is
sacrificed deliberately
3. from the expenses or damages caused follows the successful saving
of the vessel and cargo
4. the expenses or damages should have been incurred or inflicted
after taking legal steps and authority
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The goods that were not sacrificed shall not be liable for the indemnification
of those sacrificed - One of the requisites of general average is lacking,
that is, success in saving the vessel and remaining cargo
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Held: It is clear that the cargo in question is not liable to a general average.
It is not claimed that said cargo was contraband of war and being neutral
goods, they were not liable to forfeiture in the event of capture by the
enemies of the ship's flag. It follows that when the master of the vessel
decided to take refuge in Manila, he acted exclusively with a view to the
vessel's protection. There was no common danger to the ship and cargo;
and, therefore, it was not a case for a general average.
The outbreak of the war between Germany and Russia absolved the
defendant from conveying the cargo to Russia, and no damage could be
recovered by the plaintiff from the defendant for the latter's failure to convey
the cargo to the port of destination on that ship. But by the terms of the
contract of affreightment, the defendant was bound to forward the cargo to
Vladivostok at its expense, not necessarily by a streamer of defendant. It
does not by any means follow that it is not liable for the expenses incurred
by the plaintiff in completing the unfinished portion of the voyage in another
ship. Defendant is, therefore, liable for the cost of forwarding the cargo by
another line, the full freight having been received by the ship at the
commencement of the voyage.
Judgment affirmed.
Held: The danger from which the master of the vessel fled was a real and
not merely an imaginary one. Seizure at the hands of the enemy, though not
inevitable, was a possible outcome of a failure to leave the port of Saigon;
and it cannot be said that under the conditions existing at the time when the
master elected to flee from that port, there were no grounds for a reasonable
apprehension of danger from seizure by French authorities, and therefore no
necessity for flight. The deviation of the vessel therefore, from the route
prescribed in her charter party, and the subsequent abandonment by the
master of the voyage contemplated in the contract of affreightment, must be
held to have been justified by the necessity under which the master was
placed to elect that course which would remove and preserve the vessel from
danger of seizure by the public enemy of the flag which the vessel sailed;
and that neither the vessel nor her owners are liable for the resultant
damages suffered by the owner of the cargo.
The claim for general average by the shipowner, however, cannot be
sustained under the provisions of the York-Antwerp Rules. An examination of
the entire body of these rules discloses that general average is never allowed
thereunder unless the loss or damage sought to be made good as general
average has been incurred for the `common safety'. It is very clear that in
fleeing from the port of Saigon and taking refuge in Manila, the master of the
vessel was not acting for the common safety of the vessel and her cargo.
The French cargo was absolutely secure from danger of seizure or
confiscation so long as it remained in the port of Saigon, and there can be no
question that the flight of the vessel was a measure of precaution adopted
solely and exclusively for the preservation of the vessel from danger of
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seizure or capture. Delivery of the net proceeds of the sale to plaintiff should
be affirmed, but recovery of damages by plaintiff should be reversed.
Defendant cannot claim for general average.
Judgment modified.
(c) Effects
(d) Jettison
Art. 815. The captain shall direct the jettison, and shall order
the goods cast overboard in the following order:
1. Those which are on deck, beginning with those which
embarrass the maneuver or damage the vessel, preferring, if
possible, the heaviest ones with the least utility and value.
2. Those which are below the upper deck, always beginning
with those of the greatest weight and smallest value, to the amount
and number absolutely indispensable.
(1) Modes
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the port where the repairs are made, or where the merchandise is
discharged, sold, or utilized.
For this purpose the captains shall be obliged to demand of
the expert appraisers and of the contractors making the repairs, as
well as of those appraising and taking part in the unloading, repair,
sale, or utilization of the merchandise, that in their appraisements
or estimates and accounts they set down separately and accurately
the expenses and damages pertaining to each average, and in those
of each average those corresponding to the vessel and to the cargo,
also stating separately whether or not there are damages
proceeding from inherent defect of the thing and not from accident
of the sea; and in case there should be expenses common to the
different averages and to the vessel and its cargo, the amount
corresponding to each must be estimated and stated distinctly.
Art. 852. If the captain does not comply with the provisions of
the preceding article, the ship agent or the shippers shall demand
the liquidation, without prejudice to the action they may bring to
demand indemnity from him.
Under Art. 851, the captain is required to initiate the proceedings for the
adjustment, liquidation and distribution of any gross average; it is his duty to
take the proper steps to protect any shipper whose goods may have been
jettisoned for the general safety ==> if the captain does not comply with his
duty under 851, the shipowner or shipper has the right to maintain an action
against the captain for indemnification for the loss --> this does not involve
the suppression of the right of action of the shipper against the shipowner
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(a) Causes
Art. 819. If during the voyage the captain should believe that
the vessel cannot continue the trip to the port of destination on
account of the lack of provisions, well-founded fear of seizure,
privateers, or pirates, or by reason of any accident of the sea
disabling it to navigate, he shall assemble the officers and shall
summon the persons interested in the cargo who may be present,
and who may attend the meeting without the right to vote; and if,
after examining the circumstances of the case, the reason should be
considered well-founded, the arrival at the nearest and most
convenient port shall be agreed upon, drafting and entering the
proper minutes, which shall be signed by all, in the log book.
The captain shall have the deciding vote, and the persons
interested in the cargo may make the objections and protests they
may deem proper, which shall be entered in the minutes in order
that they may make use thereof in the manner they may consider
advisable.
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the port of destination due to : (1) lack of provisions, (2) well-founded fear of
seizure, privateers, or pirates, (3) by reason of any accident of the sea
disabling it to navigate
(b) Formalities
Art. 819. If during the voyage the captain should believe that
the vessel cannot continue the trip to the port of destination on
account of the lack of provisions, well-founded fear of seizure,
privateers, or pirates, or by reason of any accident of the sea
disabling it to navigate, he shall assemble the officers and shall
summon the persons interested in the cargo who may be present,
and who may attend the meeting without the right to vote; and if,
after examining the circumstances of the case, the reason should be
considered well-founded, the arrival at the nearest and most
convenient port shall be agreed upon, drafting and entering the
proper minutes, which shall be signed by all, in the log book.
The captain shall have the deciding vote, and the persons
interested in the cargo may make the objections and protests they
may deem proper, which shall be entered in the minutes in order
that they may make use thereof in the manner they may consider
advisable.
(c) Expenses
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Requisites for the captain to unload the cargo arriving under stress:
1. the unloading must be necessary to make repairs or there must be danger
that the cargo may suffer damage
2. the captain must be authorized by either a competent court or the Phil.
consul, depending on the port of arrival
Art. 823. The custody and preservation of the cargo which has
been unloaded shall be entrusted to the captain, who shall be
responsible for the same, except in cases of force majeure.
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The captain has the duty to continue the voyage without delay after the
cause of the arrival under stress has ceased--> otherwise, he shall be liable
for damages caused by the delay
3. Collisions
Cases of collision :
1. due to the fault, negligence or lack of skill of the captain, sailing mate or
the complement of the vessel --> under 826, the shipowner shall be liable for
the losses and damages
2. due to the fault of both vessels --> under 827, each vessel shall suffer its
own losses, but as regards the owners of the cargoes, both vessels shall be
jointly and severally liable
3. where it cannot be determined which of the 2 vessels is at fault --> under
828, each vessel shall suffer its own losses, and both shall also be solidarily
responsible for the losses and damages caused to their cargoes
4. collision due to fortuitous event or force majeure --> under 830, each
vessel shall bear its own damages
5. where two vessels collide with each other without their fault but by reason
of the fault of a third vessel --> under 831, the owner of the third vessel
causing the collision shall be liable for the losses and damages 6. a vessel
which is properly anchored and moored may collide with those nearby by
reason of a storm or other cause of force majeure --> under 832, the vessel
run into shall suffer its own damages and expenses
1. When 2 vessels are about to enter a port, the farther one must allow
the nearer to enter first; if they collide, the fault is presumed to be imputable
to the one who arrived later, unless it can be proved that there was no fault
on its part.
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2. When 2 vessels meet, the smaller should give the right of way to
the larger one.
3. A vessel leaving port should leave the way clear for another which
may be entering the same port.
6. The presumption also works against the vessel with spread sails
which collides with another which is at anchor, and cannot move, even when
the crew of the latter has received word to lift anchor, when there was not
sufficient time to do so or there was fear of a greater damage or other
legitimate reason.
7. The vessel which is not properly moored or does not observe the
proper distances, has the presumption against itself.
8. The vessel which is moored at a place not used for the purpose, or
which is improperly moored or does not have sufficient cables, or which has
been left without watch, has also against itself the presumption.
9. The same rule applies to those vessels which do not have buoys to
indicate the location of its anchors to prevent damage to these vessels which
may approach it.
1. all the time up to the moment when the risk of collision may have
said to have begun
--> within this zone, no rule is applicable because none is necessary.
Each vessel is free to direct its course as it deems best with reference to the
movements of the other vessel.
2. the time between the moment when the risk of collission begins and
the moment when it has become a practical necessity.
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wrong, cannot create responsibility on the part of said vessel with the right of
way. Thus, it has been held that fault on the part of the sailing vessel at the
moment preceding a collission, that is, during the third division of time, does
not absolve the steamship which has suffered herself and a sailing vessel to
get into such dangerous proximity as to cause inevitable harm and confusion,
and a collision results as a consequence. The steamer having a far greater
fault in allowing such proximity to be brought about is chargeable with all the
damages resulting from the collission; and the act of the sailing vessel
having been done in extremis and even wrong, is not responsible for the
result.
(1) Fortuitous
(2) Culpable
Where the obligation arises from tortious act and not from contract, both the
owner and the shipagent should be declared liable
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Under Arts. 827 and 828, in case of collision between two vessels at
sea, both are solidarily liable for the loss of cargo carried by either to the full
extent of the value thereof, not only in the cse where both vessels may be
shown to be actually blameworthy but also in the case where it is shown that
only one ws at fault but the proof does not show it --> it makes no difference
that the negligence imputable to the two vessels may have differed
somewhat in character and degree and that the negligence of the sunken
ship was somewhat more marked than that of the ther
The doctrine of last clear chance cannot be raised --> under the
express provisions of Art. 827, under which the evidence disclosing that both
vessels are blameworthy, the owners of neither can successfully maintain an
action against the other for the loss or injury to his vessel
(c) Liabilities
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Art. 838. When the value of the vessel and her appurtenances
should not be sufficient to cover all the liabilities, the indemnity due
by reason of the death or injury of persons shall have preference.
Limited liability : limited to the value of the vessel and the freight earned
during the voyage [provided for in Arts. 587, 590 and 837]
Damages may be recovered to the extent of what may be salvaged or
of the freightage received or of the value of the insurance recoverable
Art. 829. In the cases above mentioned the civil action of the
owner against the person causing the injury as well as the criminal
liabilities, which may be proper, are reserved.
Art. 834. If the vessels colliding with each other should have
pilots on board discharging their duties at the time of the collision,
their presence shall not exempt the captains from the liabilities they
incur, but the latter shall have the right to be indemnified by the
pilots, without prejudice to the criminal liability which the latter
may incur.
Art. 835. The action for the recovery of losses and damages
arising from collisions cannot be admitted if a protest or declaration
is not presented within twenty-four hours before the competent
authority of the point where the collision took place, or that of the
first port of arrival of the vessel, if in Philippine territory and to the
consul of the Philippines, if it occurred in a foreign country.
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Art. 835 establishes a condition precedent before any action for the recovery
of damages arising from collisions may be admitted --> presentation of a
protest or declaration within 24 hours before the proper authorities
[competent authority at the point where the collision took place or of the first
port of arrival of the vessel or to the consul of the Philippines if it occurred in
a foreign country]
4. Shipwrecks
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Under 841, in case the wreck or stranding is due to the (1) malice,
negligence, or lack of skill of the captain, or (2) because the vessel put to sea
was insufficiently repaired and equipped, the captain shall be liable
Art. 842. The goods saved from the wreck shall be specially
bound for the payment of the expenses of the respective salvage,
and the amount thereof must be paid by the owners of the former
before they are delivered to them, and with preference over any
other obligation if the merchandise should be sold.
Where a ship and its cargo are saved together, the salvage allowance should
be charged against the ship and cargo in proportion of their respective
values, the same as in general averages and neither is liable for the salvage
due from the other
Where a personal action is brought by the salvor against the owner of
the ship, the liability of the latter is limited to such part of the salvage
compensation due for the entire service as is proportionate to the value of
the ship
Art. 843. If several vessels sail under convoy, and any of them
should be wrecked, the cargos saved shall be distributed among the
rest in proportion to the amount which each one is able to take.
If any captain should refuse, without sufficient cause, to
receive what may correspond to him, the captain of the wrecked
vessels shall enter a protest against him, before two sea officials, of
the losses and damages resulting therefrom, ratifying the protest
within twenty-four hours after arrival at the first port, and including
it in the proceedings he must institute in accordance with the
provisions contained in Article 612.
If it is not possible to transfer to the other vessels the entire
cargo of the vessel wrecked, the goods of the highest value and
smallest volume shall be saved first, the designation thereof to be
made by the captain with the concurrence of the officers of his
vessel.
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1. a marine peril
2. service voluntarily rendered when not required as an existing duty
or from special contract
3. success, in whole or in part, or that the services rendered
contributed to such success
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nature, the crew of the salvaging ship is entitled to salvage, and can look to
the salvaged vessel for its share
Captain towing vessel cannot invoke equity in quasi-contract of towage
--> there is an express provision of law (Art. 2142, NCC) applicable to the
relationship of quasi-contract of towage, where the crew is not entitled to
compensation separate from that of the vessel
Salvor has an interest in the property; this is called a lien, but it is not a debt
due by the owner to the salvor for services rendered but upon the principle
that the service creates a property in the thing saved --> he is, to all intents
and purposes, a joint owner and if, the property is lost he must bear his
share like other joint owners.
Payment of compensation where vessel and cargo salvage : where a ship and
its cargo are saved together, the salvage allowance should be charged
against the ship and cargo in the proportion of their respective values, as in
the case of general average
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The amount should be liberal enough to cover the expenses and to give an
extra sum as a reward for the services rendered; should be liberal enough to
offer an inducement to others to render like services in similar emergencies
in the future; BUT should not be so high as to cause vessels in need of
assistance to hesitate because of ruinous cost
Section 11. From the proceeds of the sale of the things saved
shall be deducted, first, the expenses of their custody, conversation,
advertisement, and auction, as well as whatever taxes or duties they
should pay for their entrance; then there shall be deducted the
expenses of salvage; and from the net amount remaining shall be
taken the reward for the salvage or assistance which shall not exceed
50% of such amount remaining.
No other person has the right to interfere with the salvage of a vessel or cargo
if the salvor is able to effect the salvage with fidelity and vigor --> if their
means are inadequate, they are bound to accept additional assistance if
offered
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Section 14. This Act shall take effect on its passage. Enacted
2/4/16.
Issues : Is the plaintiff entitled to recover renumeration for saving the cargo as
well as for saving the ship? What is the reasonable compensation which should
be allowed?
Held : There is no question as to the liability of defendant for the service
rendered by plaintiff. Nor is there any dispute over the fact that the service
rendered was a salvage service and renumerable as such. Where a ship and
its cargo are saved together, as a result of services carried on with a view to
saving both, the salvage allowance should be apportioned between the ship
and cargo in the proportion of their respective values, the same as in a case of
general average; and neither is liable for the salvage due from the other. If
one who have salved both ship and cargo brings before the court in his
salvage action only the ship, or only the cargo, he will get judgment only for
such amount of reward as the court finds to be due in respect of the value of
that property which is before the court. Not only is the salvage charge a
separate and divisible burden as between ship and cargo, but also as between
portions of the cargo belonging to different owners. There is no common
liability for the amounts due from the ship or other portions of the cargo when
the ship and cargo, or either, are brought into the custody of the court as a
result of a proceeding in rem. The rule of liability must be the same where a
personal action is instituted against the owners of the one or the other. The
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personal liability of each must be limited to the portion of the salvage charge
which should be borne by his own property.
If it had been alleged and proved that the ship was unseaworthy when
she put to sea or that the necessity for the salvage service was due to the
negligence of the master, or of the ship's owner, the latter might have been
liable, at least between himself and the shipper, for the entire cost of the
service. But when the claim is put upon the basis of salvage, the fixing of the
compensation goes beyond the limits of a quantum meruit for the work and
labor done and involves the assessment of a bounty. The amount to be
allowed is in part determined upon considerations of equity and public policy;
and it is not proper to make the ship or the ship's owner liable for the whole
amount. But where the owner of the cargo has not been made a party to the
action, no recovery can be had in this action in regard to the service rendered
to the cargo.
In fixing the compensation, the ff. circumstances are taken into
consideration: (1) the labor expended by the salvors in rendering the salvage
service; (2) the promptitude, skill and energy displayed in rendering the
service and saving the property; (3) the value of the property employed by the
salvors, and the danger to which such property was exposed; (4) the risk
incurred by the salvors in rescuing the property from the impending peril; (5)
the value of the property salved; and (6) the degree of danger from which the
property was rescued.
In applying these criteria to this case, the ff. circumstances are
pertinent : the Hondagua was delayed in her voyage about nine hours. This
delay caused her to enter Iloilo, the port of destination, in the early hours of
the morning instead of the late afternoon of the previous day; but the
unloading of her cargo was not thereby retarded. Under the charter party
contract under which she was operating, the Hondagua was earning about P
300/day, which was considered reasonable compensation for her use,
including the services of officers and crew. The service rendered did not
involve any further expenditure of labor on the part of the salvors, no unusual
display of skill and energy and the condition of the sea was not such as to
involve any special risk either to Hondagua or her crew. Finally, the danger
from which the Seward was rescued was real since the ship was confronted
by a serious peril. In determining the amount of the award, the aim should be
to hold out to seafaring men a fair inducement to the performance of salvage
service without fixing a scale of compensation so high as to cause vessels in
need of such services to hesitate and decline to receive them because of the
ruinous cost. That the salvor is entitled, as of bounty, to something more than
mere renumeration for his own work and the risk incurred by him is conceded;
but the interests of commerce should also be considered. Towage is not
considered a salvage service of high order of merit and where the risk is
inconsiderable and other conditions favorable, the compensation to be allowed
should be modest in its amount.
In this case, the sum of P 1,000 is adequate for the service rendered.
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1. Charter Parties
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b. Kinds
(3) as to freightage
(a) for a fixed amount for the whole cargo
(b) for a fixed rate per ton
(c) for so much per month
This case involves a voyage charter.In the present case, the charterer
was responsible for loading, stowage and discharging at the ports visited,
while the owner was responsible for the care of the cargo. Par. 2 of the
Uniform General Charter provided that the owner shall be responsible for loss
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If the cargo is received without a charter party, the B/L shall be considered
the contract of the parties
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Lay days.-- Days allowed to charter parties for loading and unloading the
cargo
Art. 656. If in the charter party the time in which the loading
and unloading are to take place is not stated, the usages of the port
where these acts take place shall be observed. After the stipulated
or customary period has passed, and should there not be in the
freight contract an express provision fixing the indemnification for
the delay, the captain shall be entitled to demand demurrage for
the lay days and extra lay days which may have elapsed in loading
and unloading.
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Articles 659 to 664 : Some of the goods being transported may : (1) be sold
by the captain to pay for necessary repairs; (2) be jettisoned for the common
safety; (3) be lost by reason of shipwreck or stranding; (4) be seized by
pirates or enemies; (5) suffer deteriorations or dimunitions; or (6) increase by
natural cause in weight or size
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Art. 673. The person from whom the vessel is chartered shall
be liable for all the losses caused the charterer by reason of the
voluntary delay of the captain in putting to sea, according to the
rules prescribed, provided he has been requested to put to sea at
the proper time through a notary or judicially.
Art. 675. If the vessel has been chartered to receive the cargo
in another port, the captain shall appear before the consignee
designated in the charter party, and should the latter not deliver
the cargo to him, he shall inform the charterer and await his
instructions, the lay days agreed upon, or those allowed by custom
in the port, beginning to run in the meantime, unless there is an
express agreement to the contrary.
Should the captain not receive an answer within the time
necessary therefore, he shall make efforts to find cargo; and should
he not find any after the lay days and extra lay days have elapsed,
he shall make a protest and return to the port where the charter
was made.
The charterer shall pay the freightage in full, discounting that
which may have been earned on the merchandise which may have
been carried on the voyage out or on the return trip, if carried for
the account of third persons.
The same shall be done if a vessel, having been chartered for
the round trip, should not be given any cargo for her return.
Art. 676. The captain shall lose the freightage and shall
indemnify the charterers if the latter should prove, even against the
certificate of inspection, if one has been made at the port of
departure, that the vessel was not in a condition to navigate at the
time of receiving the cargo.
Art. 677. The charter party shall subsist if the captain should
not have any instructions from the charterer, and a declaration of
war or a blockade should take place during the voyage.
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In such case the captain must proceed to the nearest safe and
neutral port, requesting and awaiting orders from the shipper; and
the expenses and salaries accruing during the detention shall be
paid as general average.
If, by orders of the shipper, the cargo should be discharged at
the port of arrival, the freightage for the voyage out shall be paid in
full.
Obligations of shipowner:
1. Art. 669 - to observe in the charter parties, the capacity of the vessel, and
to indemnify the shippers whose contracts are not fulfilled for the losses they
may have suffered by the failure of the shipowner to observe the capacity of
the vessel
2. Art. 670 - to undertake a voyage at the time agreed upon or within 15
days from loading if no time is stipulated, even if the shipowner should not
find cargo sufficient to make up at least 3/5 of the amount which the vessel
may hold, where he fails to exercise his right to change vessel
3. Art. 670 - where the shipowner should not find cargo sufficient to make up
at least 3/5 of the amount which the vessel may hold, to accept other cargo
procured by the owner of the freight already loaded under the same price
and conditions
4. Art. 671- not to change the vessel after 3/5 of the vessel has been loaded,
without the consent of the charterers or shippers
5. Art. 672 - if the vessel has been chartered in whole, not to accept cargo
from any other person without the consent of the charterer
6. Art. 673 - to answer for losses arising from delay in putting to sea
7. Art. 676 - to have the vessel in a condition to navigate at the time of
receiving the cargo
8. Art. 677 - in case of declaration of war or blockade during the voyage,
where the captain has not received any instructions from the charterer, for
the captain to proceed to the nearest safe and neutral port, requesting and
awaiting orders from the shippers
Rights of Shipowner:
1. Art. 670 - where the cargo is not sufficient to make up at least 3/5 of the
amount which the vessel may hold, he may substitute anohter vessel
inspected and declared suitable for the voyage --> expenses of transfer and
increase in price of the charter shall be paid by him
2. Art. 674 - to collect the freight in accordance with the price stipulated for
cargo in excess of that agreed upon is such excess can be properly stowed 3.
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Art. 674 - to refuse and unload at the expense of the owner excess cargo that
cannot be properly stowed
4. Art. 674 - to unload merchandise clandestinely placed on board, or to
transport them if he can do so, demanding the highest freightage
5. Art. 675- to find freight to take place of freight not received, if the vessel
has been chartered to receive cargo in another port, after he receives no
cargo from the consignee and after he receives no answer from the charterer
6. Art. 675 - to receive freight in full, discounting that which may have been
earned on the merchandise carried as substitute
7. Art. 677 - to have the charter party subsist notwithstanding the declaration
of war or a blockade during the voyage, and to receive in such cases, the
freightage in full where the shipper orders that the cargo should be
discharged at the port of arrival
e. Obligations of charterers
Art. 680. A charterer who does not complete the full cargo he
bound himself to ship shall pay the freightage of the amount he fails
to load, if the captain does not take other freight to complete the
load of the vessel, in which case he shall pay the first charterer the
difference should there be any.
Art. 682. If the merchandise should have been shipped for the
purpose of illicit commerce, and was taken on board with the
knowledge of the person from whom the vessel was chartered or of
the captain, the latter, jointly with the owner of the merchandise,
shall be liable for all the losses which may be caused to other
shippers, and even though it may have been agreed, they cannot
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Art. 686. After the vessel has been unloaded and the cargo
placed at the disposal of the consignee, the latter must immediately
pay the captain the freightage due and the other expenses for which
the cargo may be liable.
The primage must be paid in the same proportion and at the
same time as the freightage, all the changes and modifications to
which the latter should be subject also governing the former.
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1. Art. 680 - to pay the freight in full even if the charterer does not complete
the full cargo he bound himself to ship
2. Art. 681- to answer with the value of his shipment and other property for
the losses suffered by the shipowner, captain or other shippers arising from
confiscation, embargo, detention, or other causes, where the charterer loads
goods different from those stated at the time of the execution of the charter
party
3. Art. 682 - to be jointly liable with the captain for losses which may be
caused to the other shippers where the charterer ships goods for illicit
commerce with the knowledge of the shipowner or captain
4. Art. 682 - in case of making a port to repair the hull, machinery or
equipment of the vessel, to wait until the vessel is repaired or to pay for the
expenses of unloading should the charterer choose to unload
5. Art. 684 - where the charterer unloads goods before arriving at port of
destination without any force majeure occurring, to pay (1) expenses of
arrival, (2) full freight and (3) for the damages and losses caused to other
shippers, if any
6. Art. 685 - where the charterer unloads before the beginning of the voyage,
(1) to pay 1/2 of the freight, (2) to pay for the expenses of stowing and
restowing the cargo, (3) to pay any other damage which he may have caused
other shippers
7. Art. 686 - to pay for freight, other expenses and the primage after the
vessel has been unloaded and the cargo placed at the disposal of the
consignee
8. Art. 687 - not to abandon merchandise damaged on account of
inherent defect or fortuitous event, for the payment of the freight and other
expenses
f. Rescission
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Art. 689. At the request of the person from whom the vessel
is chartered the charter party may be rescinded:
1. If the charterer at the termination of the extra lay days
does not place the cargo alongside the vessel.
In such case the charterer must pay half of the freightage
stipulated besides the demurrage due for the lay days and extra lay
days.
2. If the person from whom the vessel was chartered should
sell it before the charterer has begun to load it and the purchaser
should load it for his own account.
In such case the vendor shall indemnify the charterer for the
losses he may suffer.
If the new owner of the vessel should not load it for his own
account the charter party shall be respected, and the vendor shall
indemnify the purchaser if the former did not inform him of the
charter pending at the time of making the sale.
Art. 690. The charter party shall be rescinded and all action
arising therefrom shall be extinguished if, before the vessel puts to
sea from the port of departure, any of the following cases should
occur:
1. A declaration of war or interdiction of commerce with the
power to whose ports the vessel was to make its voyage.
2. A condition of blockage of the port of destination of said
vessel, or the breaking out of an epidemic after the contract was
executed.
3. The prohibition to receive at the said port the merchandise
constituting the cargo of the vessel.
4. An indefinite detention, by reason of an embargo of the
vessel by order of the government, or for any other reason inde-
pendent of the will of the ship agent.
5. The inability of the vessel to navigate, without fault of the
captain or ship agent.
The unloading shall be made for the account of the charterer.
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One made on the goods laden on board the ship, and which are to be
sold or exchanged in the course of the voyage, the borrower's personal
responsibility being deemed the principal security for the performance of the
contract, which is therefore called respondentia. The lender must be paid
his principal and interest, thought the ship perishes, provided that the goods
are saved.
c. Character of Loan
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The borrower is in effect indemnified for his loss, at least, to the extent of the
loan --> in case of loss of the thing given as security, the borrower is under
no obligation to pay the loan
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Effect of registration:
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1. the loan shall have, with regard to other credits, the preference which,
according to its nature, it should have (Art. 580 - 8th in the order of
preference)
2. effective against third persons from the time of execution/registration
e. On What Constituted
f. Amount
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g. By whom
Art. 728. The loan which the captain takes at the point of
residence of the owners of the vessel shall only affect that part
thereof which belongs to the captain, if the other owners or their
agents should not have given their express authorization therefor or
should not have taken part in the transaction.
If one or more of the owners should be requested to furnish
the amount necessary to repair or provision the vessel, and they
should not do so within twenty-four hours, the interest which the
parties in default may have in the vessel shall be liable for the loan
in the proper proportion.
Outside of the residence of the owners, the captain may
contract loans in accordance with the provisions of Articles 583 and
611.
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Art. 583. If the ship being on a voyage the captain should find
it necessary to contract one or more of the obligations mentioned in
Nos. 8 and 9 of Article 580, he shall apply to the judge or court if he
is in Philippine territory, and otherwise to the Filipino consul, should
there be one, and in his absence to the judge or court or to the
proper local authority, presenting the certificate of the registry of
the vessel treated of in Article 612, and the instruments proving the
obligation contracted.
The judge or court, the consul or the local authority as the
case may be in view of the result of the proceedings instituted, shall
make a temporary memorandum in the certificate of their result, in
order that it may be recorded in the registry when the vessel
returns to the port of her registry, or so that it can be admitted as a
legal and preferred obligation in case of sale before the return, by
reason of the sale of the vessel by virtue of a declaration of
unseaworthiness.
The lack of this formality shall make the captain personally
liable to the creditors who may be prejudiced through his fault.
h. Effects of Contract
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Art. 730. Loans made during the voyage shall have preference
over those made before the clearing of the vessel, and they shall be
graduated in the inverse order of their dates.
The loans for the last voyage shall have preference over prior
ones.
Should several loans have been made at the same port of
arrival under stress and for the same purpose, all of them shall be
paid pro rata.
F. BILL OF LADING
B/L operates both as a receipt and as a contract; it is a receipt for the goods
shipped and a contract to transport and deliver the same as stipulated
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1. Contents
Art. 706. The captain and the shipper shall have the
obligation of drawing up the bill of lading, in which shall be stated:
1. The name, registry, and tonnage of the vessel.
2. The name of the captain and his domicile.
3. The port of loading and that of unloading.
4. The name of the shipper.
5. The name of the consignee, if the bill of lading is issued in
the name of a specified person.
6. The quantity, quality, number of packages, and marks of
the merchandise.
7. The freightage and the primage stipulated.
The bill of lading may be issued to bearer, to order, or in the
name of a specified person, and must be signed within twenty- four
hours after the cargo has been received on board, the shipper being
entitled to demand the unloading at the expense of the captain
should the latter not sign it, and, in any case, the losses and
damages suffered thereby.
Art. 714. If before the vessel puts to sea the captain should
die or should cease to hold his position through any cause, the
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shipper shall have the right to demand of the new captain the
ratification of the first bills of lading, and the latter must do so,
provided that all the copies previously issued be presented or
returned to him, and it should appear from an examination of the
cargo that they are correct.
The expenses arising from the examination of the cargo shall
be for the account of the ship agent, without prejudice to his right
of action against the first captain, if he ceased to be such through
his own fault. Should said examination not be made, it shall be
understood that the new captain accepts the cargo as it appears
from the bills of lading.
2. Probative Value
1. Nature of Contract
2. Obligations of Passengers
Art. 693. If the passage price has not been agreed upon, the
judge or court shall summarily fix it, after a statement of experts.
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3. Rights of Passengers
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the fare; and if it is due exclusively to the captain or ship agent they
may furthermore demand indemnity for losses and damages.
A vessel exclusively destined to the transportation of pas-
sengers must take them directly to the port or ports of destination,
no matter what the number of passengers may be, making all the
stops indicated in its itinerary.
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them to their destination at its expense or refunded the value of the tickets
purchased, perhaps this controversy would not have arisen.
Furthermore, the conditions relied upon by petitioner cannot prevail
over Arts. 614 and 698 of the Code of Commerce.
The voyage to Catbalogan was interrupted by the captain upon
instruction of management. The interruption was not due to fortuitous event
or force majeure nor to disability of the vessel. Having been caused by the
captain upon instructions of management, the passengers' right to indemnity
is evident. The owner of a vessel and the ship agent shall be civilly liable for
the acts of the captain under Art. 586 of the Code of Commerce.
4. Responsibilities of Captain
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entered into with the crew; the list of passengers; the health
certificate; the certificate of the registry proving the ownership of
the vessel; and all the obligations which encumber the same up to
that date; the charters or authenticated copies thereof; the invoices
or manifest of the cargo, and the instrument of the expert visit or
inspection, should it have been made at the port of departure.
2. To have a copy of this Code on board.
3. To have three folioed and stamped books, placing at the
beginning of each one a note of the number of folios it contains,
signed by the marine official, and in his absence by the competent
authority.
In the first book, which shall be called "log book," he shall
enter every day the condition of the atmosphere, the prevailing
winds, the course sailed, the rigging carried, the horsepower of the
engines, the distance covered, the maneuvers executed, and other
incidents of navigation. He shall also enter the damage suffered by
the vessel in her hull engines, rigging, and tackle, no matter what is
its cause, as well as the imperfections and averages of the cargo,
and the effects and consequence of the jettison, should there be
any; and in cases of grave resolutions which require the advice or a
meeting of the officers of the vessel, or even of the passengers and
crew, he shall record the decision adopted. For the informations
indicated he shall make use of the binnacle book, and of the steam
or engine book kept by the engineer.
In the second book, called the "accounting book", he shall
enter all the amounts collected and paid for the account of the
vessel, entering specifically article by article, the sources of the
collection, and the amounts invested in provisions, repairs,
acquisition of rigging or goods, fuel, outfits, wages, and all other
expenses. He shall furthermore enter therein a list of all the
members of the crew, stating their domiciles, their wages and
salaries, and the amounts they may have received on accounts,
either directly or by delivery to their families.
In the third book, called "freight book," he shall record the
entry and exit of all the goods, stating their marks and packages,
names of the shippers and of the consignees, ports of loading and
unloading, and the freight earned. In the same book he shall record
the names and places of sailing of the passengers and the number
of packages of which their baggage consists, and the price of the
passage.
4. To make, before receiving the freight, with the officers of
the crew, and the two experts, if required by the shippers and
passengers, an examination of the vessel, in order to ascertain
whether she is watertight, and whether the rigging and engines are
in good condition; and if she has the equipment required for good
navigation, preserving a certificate of the memorandum of this
inspection, signed by all the persons who may have taken part
therein, under their liability.
The experts shall be appointed one by the captain of the
vessel and the other one by the persons who request the examina-
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J. Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (Commonwealth Act. No. 65, Public Act No.
521, 74the US Congress)
Sec. 1. That the provisions of Public Act No. 521 of the 74th
Congress of the United States, approved on April 16, 1936, be
accepted, as it is hereby accepted to be made applicable to all
contracts for the carriage of goods by sea to and from Philippine
ports in foreign trade: Provided, that nothing in this Act shall be
construed as repealing any existing provision of the Code of
Commerce which is not in force, or as limiting its application.
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c. From the Phils. to a foreign country: apply laws of such foreign country
(Art. 1753)
- with respect to vessels destined for foreign ports, the COGSA doesn't apply
unless parties make it applicable.
Sec. 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. (Approved
October 22, 1936).
TITLE I
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RISKS
(2) The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow,
carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried.
(3) After receiving the goods into his charge the carrier, or
the master or agent of the carrier, shall, on demand of the shipper,
issue to the shipper a bill of lading showing among other things-
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The notice in writing need not be given if the state of the goods
has at the time of their receipt been the subject of joint survey or
inspection.
In any event the carrier and the ship shall be discharged from
all liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is brought within
one year after delivery of the goods or the date when the goods
should have been delivered: Provided, that, if a notice of loss or
damage, either apparent or concealed, is not given as provided for in
this section, that fact shall not affect or prejudice the right of the
shipper to bring suit within one year after the deliver of the goods or
the date when the goods should have been delivered.
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(7) After the goods are loaded the bill of lading to be issued by
the carrier, master, or agent of the carrier to the shipper shall if the
shipper so demands, be a "shipped" bill of lading: Provided, that if
the shipper shall have previously taken up any document of title to
such goods, he shall surrender the same as against the issue of the
"shipped" bill of lading, but at the option of the carrier such
document of title may be noted at the port of shipment by the
carrier, master, or agent with the name or names of the ship or ships
upon which the goods have been shipped and the date or dates of
shipment, and when so noted the same shall for the purpose of this
section be deemed to constitute a "shipped" bill of lading.
Notes: Prescriptive period under Section 3(6). - the carrier and the agent
shall be discharged form liability in respect of loss or damage unless suit is
brought within 1 year from:
(1) in case of damaged goods: from the time delivery of the goods was
made
(2) in case of non-delivery (i.e., lost goods): from the date the goods
should have been delivered
Loss contemplates only where no delivery at all was made by the carrier of the
goods because the same had perished, gone out of commerce, or disappeared
in such a way that their existence is unknown or they cannot be recovered
Shipper, consignee or legal holder of B/L may invoke the prescriptive period
and have the right to file suit within one year after delivery of the goods or
failure to deliver.
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Mere proposal for arbitration or fact that there have been initial negotiations
does not suspend the running of the period for prescription
NOTE: Prof. Quimbo does not agree with this SC ruling. If there is a
misdelivery or conversion, there is a case of loss from the point of view of the
consignee or shipper.
Q: Is the prescriptive period under the COGSA interrupted from the time of
the making of extra-judicial demand or filing of judicial action as provided in
Art. 1155, NCC?
A: No. 1 year period is a special prescriptive period, uniform worldwide
Rationale behind the 3-day notice and relatively short prescriptive period:
- to provide carrier an opportunity to look for the lost goods
- to discover who was at fault
- in case of transshipment, to determine, when and where damage
occurred
But prescriptive period does not apply to the action by an insurer as subrogee
of the consignee.
Stipulation in bill limiting carrier's liability contrary to sec. 3(8) is void; e.g.
provision in the bill excepting th owner form liability for loss or damage of
cargo unless written notice is thereof was given to the carrier within 30 days;
such a provision is contrary to a provision of the COGSA since Sec. 3 provides
that even if a notice of loss or damage is not given as required, that fact shall
not prejudice the right of the shipper to bring suit within 1 year after delivery
of the goods.
Notice requirements:
COGSA: Sec. 3(6)
If loss or damage is apparent - protest as soon as receipt of goods
If not apparent -> within 3 days of delivery
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failure to comply with the 3-days notice requirement under COGSA does not
affect the right of the shipper to bring action provided he brings the same
within 1 year
Sec. 4. (1) Neither the carrier not the ship shall be liable for
loss or damage arising or resulting from unseaworthiness unless
caused by want of due diligence on the part of the carrier to make
the ship seaworthy and to secure that the ship is properly manned,
equipped, and supplied, and to make the holds, refrigerating and
cooling chambers, and all other parts of the ship in which goods are
carried fit and safe for their reception, carriage, and preservation, in
accordance with the provisions of paragraph (1) of Section (3).
Whenever loss or damage has resulted from unseaworthiness, the
burden of proving the exercise of due diligence shall be on the carrier
or other person claiming exemption under this section.
(2) Neither the carrier not the ship shall be responsible for loss
or damage arising or resulting from-
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(5) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall in any event be or
become liable for any loss or damage to or in connection with the
transportation of goods in an amount exceeding $500 per package of
lawful money of the United States, or in case of goods not shipped in
packages, per customary freight unit, or the equivalent of that sum
in other currency, unless the nature and value of such goods have
been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill
of lading. This declaration, if embodied in the bill of lading, shall be
prima facie evidence, but shall not be conclusive on the carrier.
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The plaintiff cannot dispute said limitation on the ground that it was not freely
and fairly agreed upon or that it is against public policy, since the LAW ITSELF
PROVIDES FOR SAID LIMITATION; THE SAME IS DEEMED READ INTO THEIR
CONTRACT
Parties may agree to amount of liability less than $500 under Sec. 4(5). By
providing that $500 is the maximum liability, the law does not disallow an
agreement for liability at a lesser amount. Moreover, Art. 1749 of the NCC
expressly allows th limitation of the carrier's liability. (Eastern v. Great Ameri-
can)
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
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Sec. 8. The provisions of this Act shall not affect the rights and
obligations of the carrier under the provisions of the Shipping Act,
1916, or under the provisions of Section 4281 to 4292, inclusive, of
the Revised Statutes of the United States, or of any amendments
thereto, or under the provisions of any other enactment for the time
being in force relating to the limitation of the liability of the owners
of seagoing vessels.
TITLE II
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Sec. 11. When under the custom of any trade the weight of any
bulk cargo inserted in the bill of lading is a weight ascertained or
accepted by a third party other than the carrier or the shipper and
the fact that the weight as ascertained or accepted is stated in the
bill of lading, then notwithstanding anything in this Act, the bill of
lading shall not be deemed to be prima facie evidence against the
carrier of the receipt of goods of the weight so inserted in the bill of
lading, and the accuracy thereof at the time of shipment shall not be
deemed to have been guaranteed by the shipper.
Sec. 13. This act shall apply to all contracts for carriage of
goods by sea to or from ports of the United States in foreign trade.
As used in this Act the term "United States" includes its districts,
territories, and possessions: Provided, however, that the Philippine
Legislature may by law exclude its application to transportation to or
from ports of the Philippine Islands. The term "foreign trade" means
the transportation of goods between the ports of the United States
and ports of foreign countries. Nothing in this Act shall be held to
apply to contracts for carriage of goods by sea between any port of
the United States or its possession: Provided, however, that any bill
of lading or similar document of the title which is evidence of a
contract for the carriage of goods by sea between such ports,
containing an express statement that it shall be subject to the
provisions of this Act, shall be subjected hereto as fully as if subject
hereto by the express provisions of this Act: Provided, further, that
every bill of lading or similar document of title which is evidence of a
contract for the carriage of goods by sea from ports of the United
States in foreign trade, shall contain a statement that it shall have
effect subject to the provisions of this Act.
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Sec. 15, COGSA. This Act shall take effect ninety days after the date
of its approval; but nothing in this Act shall apply during a period not
to exceed one year following its approval to any contract for the
carriage of goods by sea, made before the date on which this Act is
approved nor to any bill of lading or similar document of title issued,
whether before or after such date of approval in pursuance of any
such contract as aforesaid.
Sec. 16, COGSA. This Act may be cited as the "Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act."
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Notes: If common carrier, Civil Code first applies, then Warsaw Convention.
B. Constitutionality
HELD: No. Art. 28 (1) of Warsaw Con. is constitutional. Although the case can
be decided on other grounds without resolving the constitutional question, the
Warsaw Convention is a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the
Philippine Government and as such, has the force and effect of law. The
presumption is that this joint legislative-executive act was first carefully
studied and determined to be constitutional before it was adopted. Petitioner's
allegation have not overcome this presumption. Moreover, the treaty since
1950 has not been rejected by the Philippine Government.
HELD: No. The circumstance that the airline industry was still in infancy when
the Convention was made, alone, is not sufficient justification for the rejection
of the treaty at this time. The changes recited by petitioner were not entirely
unforeseen although they were expected in a general sense only. (Check
Art.41).
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HELD: Jurisdiction
(1) The wording of Art. 32, which indicates the places where the action for
damages "must" be brought, underscores the mandatory nature of Art. 28 (1).
(2) This characterization is consistent with one of the objectives of the
convention, which is to regulate in a uniform manner the conditions of
international transportation by air.
HELD: No. Art. 28 (1) provides that an action for damage must be brought at
the option of the plaintiff: (a) before the court of the domicile of the carrier;
(b) the court of its principal place of business;
(c) the court where it has a place of business thru w/c the contract had been
made;
(d) the court of the place of destination.
In this case, the ff. were not followed, and hence the Philippines, not
being one of the courts mentioned in Art.28 (1), does not have jurisdiction
over the case.
(1) court of domicile is Minnesota, U.S.A;
(2) principal place of business of carrier is also U.S.A;
(3) place of business where contract was made was in San Francisco;
(4) place of destination is also San Francisco, Santos having purchased a
round trip-ticket from SFO-TYO-MNL, then back to TYO- SFO. The "ultimate
destination" being San Francisco.
Note however, that the limitations of liability in the Convention favors the
carrier.
C. When Applicable
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Art. 17. The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the
event of the death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the
damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course
of any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.
Art. 18. (1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in
the event of the destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any checked
baggage, or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage
so sustained took place during the transportation by air.
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ISSUE: W/NOT CUENCA HAS A CAUSE OF ACTION THOUGH NOT AMONG THOSE
MENTIONED IN THE WC?
HELD: Yes. The said articles merely declare the carrier liable for damages in
the enumerated cases, if the conditions therein specified are present. Neither
the provisions of said articles nor others regulate or exclude liability for other
breaches of contract by the carrier. Under petitioner's theory, an air carrier
would be exempt from any liability for damages in the event of its absolute
refusal, in bad faith, to comply with a contract of carriage, which is absurd.
HELD: No. The WC does not operate as an absolute limit of the extent of an
airline's liability. It does not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of
contract by the carrier.
Under the WC, an air carrier is made liable for damages for delay in the
transportation by air of passengers, luggage or goods. The WC also limits
the liability of the carrier to 250 francs per kilo of the total weight of the
package. The WC denies to the carrier availment of the provisions which
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exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his willful misconduct
or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court
seized of the case, is considered as willful misconduct, or if the damage is
caused by any agent of the carrier acting w/in the scope of his employment.
2. The WC does not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract
by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees or for some
particular or exceptional damage. The WC has been held inapplicable where
there was proof of malice or bad faith attributable to its officers and
employees. Here, however, there was no bad faith on the part of the
employees.
Nominal damages however, was awarded because of the presence of some
special species of injury caused to Dr. Pablo.
E. Limitations on Liability
RE: PASSENGERS
RE: BAGGAGE/GOODS
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Art. 24. (1) In the cases covered by Arts.18 & 19 any action for
damages, HOWEVER FOUNDED, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limit set out in this convention.
(2) In the case covered by Art.17, the provisions of the preced-
ing paragraph shall also apply,w/o prejudice to the question as to
who are the persons who have the right to bring suit and what are
their respective rights.
NOTES: Even if you base your claim on quasi-delict, you can still sue under
Warsaw, invoking Art.24 (1).
ISSUE: WON Pangan is bound by such Warsaw provisions & hence is entitled
only to $600 ($20 standard X 30 kilos) ---- YES.
Such provisions have been held to be a part of the contract of carriage,
& is valid & binding upon the passenger regardless of the latter's lack of
knowledge or assent to the regulation.
A contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation does not offend
against the policy of the law forbidding one from contracting against his own
negligence. Inasmuch as Pangan failed to declare any higher value for his
luggage & to pay add'l charges, PanAm's liability is limited to $600, as
stipulated at the back of the ticket.
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A: YES. It just can't avail of the limitation on liability. Thus it can still
invoke the provisions on NOTICE or PRESCRIPTION/LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION.
e.g. If damage wasn't one of the enumerations in the WC, & case was filed
beyond the 2 year requirement. The carrier can invoke prescription. But if suit
is brought w/in 2 years, carrier may be liable for a higher amount than the
limitation.
The only time when WC isn't applicable is when it's not intl. air
transport. There is nothing in Art.25 w/c says that the WC doesn't apply
entirely.
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F: Vinluan, ACCRA lawyer, was downgraded from 1st class to economy & was
issued refund
application, in his MNL-Europe-NYK- SFO-MNL flight. (His NYK-SFO flight particularly)
He also noticed that white Caucasian passengers who checked in later than him were
given preference in 1st class seats, w/c became available due to "no show"
passengers. He sued in CFI for breach of contract & bad faith.
ISSUE: WON Warsaw Con. limit on liability can be availed of --- NO.
There was obvious discrimination & humiliation to w/c Vinluan was
subjected. Such inattention & lack of care for interest of its passengers
amount to bad faith w/c entitles passenger to moral damages.
NOTES: His entire trip, even though he availed of the services of other
airlines, is equal to one transport.
E.g. MNL-SFO via PAL } one continuing
SFO-NYK via United } ticket
Hence, if injury appears in SFO-NYK, Warsaw can be applied.
F. Conditions of Liability
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Art. 27. In the case of death of the person liable, an action for
damages lies in accordance w/ th terms of this convention against
those legally representing his estate.
Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option
of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties,
either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his
principal place of business , or where he has a place of business
through w/c the contract has been made, or before the court at the
place of destination.
(2) Questions of procedure shall be governed by the law of the
court to w/c the case is submitted.
xxx
In this case, the ff. were not followed, and hence the Phils., not being
one of the courts mentioned in Art.28 (1), does not have jurisdiction over the
case.
(1) court of domicile is U.S., Minnesota;
(2) principal place of business of carrier is also US;
(3) place of business where contract was made was in San Francisco;
(4) place of destination is also San Francisco, Santos having purchased a
round trip-ticket from SFO-TYO-MNL, then back to TYO- SFO. The "ultimate
destination" being San Francisco.
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