'With a Little Bit of Luck...

' Coping with Adjustment in Urban Ghana, 1975-90

Author(s): Lynne Brydon
Source: Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, Vol. 69, No. 3 (1999), pp. 366-
385
Published by: Edinburgh University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1161213
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Africa69 (3), 1999

'WITH A LITTLE BIT OF LUCK...'

COPING WITH ADJUSTMENT IN URBAN GHANA,
1975-90

Lynne Brydon

Since the late 1970s the majorityof the countriesof the so-called 'South'
have adopted,with varyingdegrees of desperation,enthusiasmor success,
the policy prescriptionsof the InternationalMonetaryFundand the World
Bankin returnfor FundandBankloans and,moregenerally,internationally
recognisedcreditworthiness. The policy prescriptionshave usuallyincluded,
among other things, strictfiscal measuresto restorebalancesof payments
(the regularisationand liberalisationof public sectorenterprises)as well as
effortsto liberalisebusiness,to encourageexportsand to attractinvestment
from overseas. Such prescriptionsconstitute'stabilisation'and 'structural
adjustmentpolicies' (SAPs).Throughthe 1980s andinto the 1990s boththe
IMFandthe WorldBankcontinuedto lend to ThirdWorldstateson stricter
or more lenient terms, over shorteror longer periods, dependingon a
country's performance in adhering to the imposed policies' terms.
Departuresfrom predicted trajectoriesof developmentor improvement
were glossed as 'slippage'(Mosley et al., 1992) and attemptswere madeto
accountfor problemsin performancein termsof economicfactors.'
But in addition,from 1987, and after pressurefrom UNICEFand non-
governmentalorganisations,the World Bank accepted that social factors
mightalso have some bearingon problemsin the failureto achieveexpected
performancetargets and subsequentlymade some allowances for such
factorsin its assessmentsand evaluationsof countries'performances.The
World Bank also created a 'Social Dimensions of Adjustment'unit to
investigatethe ramificationsof the effects of its macro-economicpolicies on
identified 'vulnerable'groups.But the late 1980s also saw pressurefrom
donor countries(the effective paymastersof the IMF and World Bank)
throughthe IMFandWorldBankfor ThirdWorldstatesto achievewhatthe
donors could recognise as 'good governance'.What this meant was that
different and political, just as much as economic, conditionshad to be
satisfiedbeforea beneficiarystatewas regardedas creditworthy: statesin the
ThirdWorldhad to be seen to have (andrecognisedby the Northto have)
democraticallyelected civilian governmentswhichimplementedthe Bank's
and the Fund'spolicies.2
While there is a dominantperceptionin World Bank, IMF and other
agency reportson developing countries'performancethat economic and
social factors in additionto political legitimacy (as judged by the donor

1
Mosley et al. (1992) is perhapsboth the most detailedand accessible accountof the
processes involved.
2
The freedomand fairnessof severalelections in Africa has been questioned.(See, for
example, Nugent, 1995, and Jeffries and Thomas, 1993, for an accountof Ghana's 1992
elections.)
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 367

states)can be accountedfor, measuredor evaluated,the actualperformance

of many Third World states in terms of adherenceto the conditions of
stabilisationand SAPs has been erratic.Many predictionshave not been
fulfilled and slippage has persistedin the 1990s, in spite of taking into
accountmitigatingsocial or politicalfactors.
In late 1993, however, the World Bank's pundits came up with yet
another,and seeminglyimportant,set of factorswhich they urgedmightbe
takeninto accountin evaluationsof performanceand which would finally
explain deviations in countries' expected growth rates. The Guardian
newspaper(UK),towardsthe end of thatyear,carrieda reportthatthe World
Bank economists had produceda documentsuggesting that it was very
difficultfor prescribedbitterfiscal medicineto workwithouta considerable
element of 'luck'. On the subject of recovery in adjustingcountries,the
articlecites the Bank's representativesas stating:'Thereis a surprisingly
large volatile element ... thathas a significanteffect on growthrates ....
This volatile element . . . can be described simply as luck' (30 December
1993).
Whatfollows is aboutthe spaceoccupiedby 'luck' in the economicworld
views of some Ghanaiansratherthana disquisitionaboutthe economicsof
adjustment.It is not really about 'economics' in the formal sense of its
versionsas a Westernacademicdiscipline,or the bodyof theoriesunderlying
policy prescriptionsin the West, at all. Ratherit is aboutGhanaians'coping
with the vagariesof 'economic',definedmorebroadly,circumstancesfrom
the late 1960sonwards.It beginswith a generaldiscussionof Ghana's(often
held up as an exemplarof the successfulworkingout of stabilisationand
adjustmentpolicies) economic fate over the past thirty years. The article
traces,usinglargelyanecdotalevidencefrommy field notes,Ghana'sformal
economicdeclinethroughthe 1970s.Perceptionsof strivingfor bothsurvival
and success are sketchedout duringthis overwhelminglypessimisticperiod
in Ghana'shistory.They are followed by a descriptionof people's views
aboutsurvivaland 'the state of play' in Ghana'seconomicprogressin the
late 1980s and early 1990s. These discursivecommentsare followed by
some simplequantitativematerialaboutwork,the availabilityof jobs andthe
structureof the labourmarketat the time.Whatbecomesobvious,given that
Ghanaiansare actuallycontinuingtheirlives muchas they have in the past,
is thatthe IMF'sandWorldBank'spolicyprescriptionsandstrategiesfor the
developmentof manufacturingindustry,for attractingthe 'world market
factories'of the multinationals,are not being achieved.Instead,Ghanaians
have focused (as they have done since long beforethe impositionof SAPs)
on strategiesfor networkingand gettinga break:strikingit 'lucky', in fact.
The relatively newly discovered volatile element in the World Bank's
calculationshas long been a, if not the, core factorin the developmentplans
of manysmall Ghanaianenterprises.In the meantimeGhanaianwomenand
men are trying-hoping for some 'luck'-to surviveand even prosperinto
the next millennium.

ECONOMICSAND POLITICSIN AN ERA OF DECLINE, 1970-83

Ghanafirst adoptedstabilisationand SAPs in 1983. Whereasmany Latin
368 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

Americanstateswereforcedinto the clutchesof the IMFandWorldBankby

inabilityto meet their massive debt commitmentswith the decline in the
supply of petro-dollars,Ghana'scase (similarto, but more markedthan,
othersin sub-Saharan Africa)is different.Forat least fifteenyearsbeforethe
governmentsought IMF/World Bankfinancing,the economyhadbeengoing
steadily downhill.3Between 1970 and 1982 it became apparentjust how
severethe problemswere.The ratioof exportsto GDPfell from21 per cent
to 4 per cent, the ratioof investmentto GDP fell from 14 per cent to 2 per
cent, the real value of exportearningshad fallen by half, real wages fell by
80 per cent and income per head fell by 30 per cent (WorldBank, cited in
Rimmer,1994).
Whatthis meantin everydaytermswas thatthe realvalueof the currency,
the cedi, fell. Industrialproductiondwindledas adverseexchangeratesmade
importsof both raw materialsand machineryand sparepartsprohibitively
expensive.Imports(in relativelysmall quantities,limitedby the amountof
legitimate foreign exchange available)4were controlledby licences, and
these tendedto be given out on a corruptbasis. Even if people had cash
throughthe 1970s, there was progressivelyless and less to buy: initially
consumergoods and importedfood, later sparepartsand medicines.There
were no importsof spare partsfor industrialequipmentand vehicles and
there was virtuallyno infrastructural investment.Because of the growing
disparity between the official and real values of the cedi what tendedto be
importedwere goods that could be sold easily and at an enormousprofit
(clothing,musicproducts),ratherthanindustrialgoods.Thiswas also the era
whenthe basis for giving out governmentcontractswas at its most blatantly
corrupt.It was widely rumouredand believed that in order to secure a
contractfor worka bribehadto be given andoftenthe cost of the bribewas
such that the contract could not be fulfilled. Infrastructure(roads and
bridges,for example)and public servicescrumbledduringthe 1970s.
While Ghana had a succession of more or less autocraticmilitary
governmentsfor muchof the 1970s, the attemptto returnto electedcivilian
government between 1979 and 1981 saw no increase in domestic
accountability or any increase in the country's creditworthinessin
internationalterms. Minimal creditworthiness,however, meant minimal
borrowing,and so, when JerryRawlingsseized powerin a militarycoup in
December 1981, not only did he inheritan almost bankruptstate, he also
inheritedminimaldebts.
While Ghanahad relativelyfew debts then, it had virtuallyno capitalor
revenueeither.Forthe countryto 'work',in the sense of function,it needed
money and skills. Consonantwith the initial expressed ideology of the
PNDC5regime,Ghanafirstlookedfor help to the Easternbloc, China,Cuba
andLibya.But this was the time at which socialiststateswere beginningto

3 See, for example, Chazan (1983), Frimpong-Ansah (1991), Loxley (1988), Rimmer
(1992).
4Legitimate foreign exchange, as distinct from foreign exchange in circulation in the black
market, the kalabule economy.
5 Provisional National Defence Council.
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 369

focus on their own troubles and little help was forthcoming(see, for
example, Ray, 1986; Frimpong-Ansah,1991; Rimmer, 1992). Rawlings,
however, proved to be a pragmatistand so, in spite of seemingly overt
politicalcontradictions,the PNDCwentto the IMFandWorldBankin 1982.
In April 1983 the first budget reflecting the stabilisationand adjustment
policies of the BrettonWoodsinstitutionswas announcedas partof Ghana's
first EconomicRecoveryProgramme.
Ghana'spackageof stabilisationand adjustmentmeasureswas similarto
others recommended around the world. However, Ghana's economic
problems were so severe that its programmecame to be regardedas
something of a test of the IMF and World Bank policies, providing a
'baseline'case. In line with IMF and WorldBankprescriptions,steps were
takento regularisecurrencyandimport/export transactionsto stifle the black
marketandto rationalisethe enormouspublicsector.Significantnumbersof
employeeswere dismissed,in the hope, ultimately,of privatisingthe newly
'efficient' enterprises. Steps were also taken to increase government
revenue,in particularfrom cocoa, Ghana'smain export crop, the bulk of
which had been smuggledout of the countryin the late 1970s and early
1980s for more profitablesale in Togo and C6te d'Ivoire (Nugent, 1991).
Afterthe budget,effectivelythe official announcementthatGhanawas now
in the IMF/WorldBankclub, the civil servicewas detailedto drawup a list
of requirementsto be presentedto a meetingof the ParisClubin November
1983. The list includedsuch basic items as light bulbs, screws and nails.6
Not only had many years of the effects of corruptionand decline taken
theirtoll on the economyandinfrastructure but also, in early 1983, Ghana's
poor condition was exacerbatedby both natural and man-madedisasters.
There was a prolongedand very severe dry season and majorbush fires
ravaged the south of the country. The resulting food shortages were
exacerbatedby the returnto Ghanaof more than a million of its citizens
(approximatelyone-twelfthof its then population),expelledor fleeing from
Nigeria after the Nigerian government'sdecree of late January(Brydon,
1985). Internationalaid to help with the returneesdid not begin to enterthe
countryuntil May at the earliest (ibid.). By July the main Accra markets,
usuallyburstingwith the new maizeharvestandotherfoodstuffsat thattime
of year, were practicallyemptyof freshfood and customershad to wait for
food to arrivebeforequeuingto buy it. In the villageswomenbeganto speak
about makingand using palm oil lamps (as their grandmothershad done)
when the supply and distributionof kerosenewere severely disrupted.For
the first time since I had been workingin southernGhana(more than ten
years),people spoke openly aboutbeing hungryand therewerejokes about

6
Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning official, personal communication. In July
1983 the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning in Accra was surrounded by a sea of
vehicles, all bearing its logo. None of them had any tyres, all were up on blocks. For further
information here see Brydon (n.d.).
370 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

'Rawlingschains':necklacesof prominentcollarbones whichbecamemore

visible as people lost weight.7
This section has outlined in a very broad way Ghana's political and
economic characteristicsthroughthe 1970s and into the 1980s. We have
seen how economiccorruptionand mismanagement,togetherwith eventual
politicalineffectualness,broughtthe countryto the brinkof bankruptcyand
how the consequencesof economicandpoliticalfeeblenesswere intensified
by Nigeria'sexpulsionof Ghanaianmigrantworkersandthe seriousdrought
andbushfires of early 1983. The next sectionlooks at evidencedrawnfrom
my fieldworkin Ghanaover the years since the mid-1970s to show the
effects of decline on Ghanaiansand, to some extent, how they coped. As
declineandcopingwere not the mainfocus of my workat the time, muchof
the materialis anecdotaland drawnfrom incidentalremarksin field notes,
but some draws on interviews with Accra residentsin the late 1970s. I
suggestthat 1983 can be seen as the nadirof Ghana'sdeclineandalso as the
end of one era (of corruptionand recession)and the beginningof another
(the impositionof differenteconomic and, ultimately,political conditions
which were to impingeon people's lives in differentways).

DECLINEAND URBAN SURVIVALIN THE 1970S

The devaluationof the currencywas so spectacularduringthe 1970s thatin
orderto convey any sense of it and what it has meantwe have to look at
purchasingpower. In terms of numbers,the exchangeablerate of the cedi
droppedfromtwo to the poundin 1971 to about200 to the poundin 1979on
the blackmarket.These dataare not official, ratherthey aredrawnfromthe
convertiblevalue of the money I lived on in Ghanaat the relevanttimes. In
1983 puttingany exchangeable'value' on the cedi was difficult:I did not
attemptto change money. Any goods wantedby people I knew in Ghana
were availableonly in one or two designatedand government-controlled
'hardcurrency'shops.I used sterlingto buy whatmy friendswantedin the
hard-currency shopsfor themandthey gave me cedis at no particularrateof
exchange to cover day-to-dayexpenses,for exampletaxi fares, streetfood.
Therewere plenty of cedis in circulation,but therewas little to buy in the
local shops.By the early 1980s,too, the cedi's subdivision,the pesewa,had
ceased to exist for any practicalpurpose.My field notes record(1976: I, 4)
thatbetweenAugust1974 andOctober1976 pricesin the village marketsin
the mid-VoltaRegionrose fourfold.In anecdotalterms,at the beginningof
the 1970s a bottleof beercost abouttwo-thirdsof the minimumdaily wage;
between 1979 and 1983 a bottle of beer cost more than four times the
minimumdaily wage, if you could find the beer. While a primaryschool
teachercouldaffordto buy half a piece of cloth (six yards,enoughto makea
completeoutfitfor a woman)as well as food for the monthin 1971, in 1979

7
Observations here are taken from field notes made during a short visit to Ghana in June
and July 1983.
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 371

half a piece of cloth was about 10 times the monthly salary of the same
teacher, that is, if she could find cloth to buy.
In inland urban markets in the Volta Region in late July 1979 the only
regularly available fish (the usual protein staple) was the fermented mononie,
usually used primarily as flavouring, and this in a region bordered on the
southern side by the sea and on the west by the Volta river and lake. In Ho
(the regional capital) the market had no yams or bread, both foods which
were formerly in regular supply irrespective of season. Flour for bread has to
be imported, and what little flour was imported into Ghana at the time tended
to be distributed to bakers, who could afford inflated prices to pay the
distributors the bribes necessary in order to get hold of an import licence.
Baking thus seemed to be confined largely to Accra, where there were some
larger-scale bakery businesses and where consumers could afford to pay high
prices. After Rawlings's 4 June coup, however, small bakers were
encouraged to form co-operatives and the system of flour distribution was
reorganised. By early August small-scale bakers in Ho were beginning to
bake again (Field notes: I). The problem with ensuring the supply of yams
and other locally produced foodstuffs was essentially one of transport and
distribution. While fuel oil supplies had been erratic from the early 1970s
onwards, after the 4 June coup, Nigeria, Ghana's major supplier, cut off
supplies and credit. Only Libya of the world's oil suppliers was willing to
allow Rawlings's untried government credit. What it meant was that there
were vast queues-several hundred metres long and beginning to form
perhaps three or four days before petrol arrived at a petrol station-for petrol
in the capital, and there was virtually no petrol or kerosene (paraffin for
lamps and cooking) outside of the capital. In any case, because of the
previous decade's shortages and mismanagement, both vehicles and roads
were in an appalling state of repair.
Shortages were also apparent in Accra. The range of goods for sale in
markets and stores narrowed drastically with the decline of the cedi. The
government subsidised the prices of a small range of 'essential commod-
ities', including tinned milk, tinned fish, soap and detergent, ostensibly to
provide a cushion for low-income urban dwellers. But those with access to
wholesale supplies bought up the major part of these special imports at
government-controlled (low) prices and either sold them internally on the
black market for a significant profit or smuggled them to neighbouring states
where prices were higher and the currency was negotiable internationally.8A
junior civil servant in the Immigration Office in Accra said in June 1979:
You spend200 cedis at market... yoursalaryis not big ... so you knowsomeone
and go and get one carton[of tins of] milk and sell it one-one [by the individual
tin], whichis more,so you get a little more.You need it in orderto survive.[Field
notes, 1979; I, 27 June]

8
The CFA franc,at thattime pegged to the Frenchfranc.
372 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

The same civil servantpointedto profiteeringandrent-seekingas the cause

of the country'sproblems.
The prices of the few goods availablein Ghanaianstores and markets,
apartfromlocally producedfoodstuffs,werehigh. By the end of the 1970sit
was obvious that workersin any field, not only the fixed-salarypublic
servants,neededmorethanone sourceof incometo survive.The wife of an
electricianworkingfor the state-ownedElectricityCorporation saidthatthey
could not have survived without her husband's private jobs, and in
interviewsin Accra in 1976-77 and 1979 over and over againI foundthat
employed artisansalso worked on their own account, while white-collar
workersin the publicsectorlookedfor private-sectoropportunities(minimal
at thattime) or diversifiedinto tradingas the civil servantin the Immigration
Office had done. In spite of low monthly salaries,the public sector still
attractedmany workers:it providedbasic rights (remuneratedleave, sick
pay, pensionrightsandaccess to regularamountsof government-designated
'essential commodities'at controlledprices) to all its workersand more
significantperks(subsidisedhousing,low-interestor interest-freecar loans)
to higher-levelworkers.But by the end of the 1970s in additionformallyto
holdingthesejobs workershad to have othersourcesof income in orderto
survive.
A final optionwas migrationoverseasandthe late 1970s andearly 1980s
arethe periodduringwhichGhanaiansbeganto be foundeverywhere:in the
'South' therewere Ghanaiansstaffinghospitalsin SaudiArabia,Ghanaian
teachersin SouthAfrica's 'Bantustans',artisansin Nigeria;in the 'North'
Ghanaianmigrationto Europe (Britain,Germanyand Holland) and the
United Statesincreased.
Rawlings'sfirst governmenthandedover power to the civilian govern-
ment of Dr Hilla Limannin September1979 and Ghanaiansexpectedthe
new regimeto bringprosperityandinternationalinvestment.Therewas also
the overtlyexpressedhope, stifledduringthe yearsof militaryrule,thatthey
might protest efficaciously and without fear of reprisalsif things went
wrong. Two years later the governmentwas in such a state of hopeless
disarray,with a weak leadershippulled in several directionsby various
factions, that there was, effectively, no one to protestto (Chazan,1983,
1991). There had been no internationalinvestment, and rent-seeking
behaviourhad continued unabated.These events form the backdropto
Rawlings's second coup and ultimately the announcementof the first
EconomicRecoveryProgramme(ERPI) in 1983. Ghana,as exemplifiedby
its state apparatus,had a weak and probably corruptgovernmentand
petrified public services with no resources-for example, a health care
systemwithno medicinesandan educationsystem,once an exemplarfor the
region,if not the continent,whose teachersspenttheirtime absentfromthe
classroomeitherfarming(in ruralareas)or selling (in urbanareas)in order
to survive.In any case, therewere no books, paperor pens.
Even before the adoption of an Economic Recovery Programme,
therefore,life for ordinarypeople was difficult and 'abnormal'.By 1983,
for example, workersin the NationalArchives arrivedat work using the
remnantsof a crippled(by lack of sparepartsand fuel shortages)transport
system.They came,perhaps,to work,butmainly,so they said,becausethey
 ADJUSTMENT
IN URBANGHANA 373

weregiven a chit for a free meal in the neighbouringYMCAcanteen.Trying

to work in the archivesafter 3.00 pm was useless, as workershad already
begun leaving to try to get home before dark.Restaurantsstill functioned
with skeleton menus, but beer was almost unobtainable,as the breweries
were workingat about20 per cent of capacity.People might have cedis in
theirpocketsbuttherewerefew goods to buy. Since local factoriesandother
enterprises(such as the breweries)were working at a fraction of their
capacity,whatit meantwas thattherewas locally producedfood to buy and
very little else. Seamstressescomplainednot only of lack of clothbut also of
lackof thread:children'sschooluniformsweresewnwithwhatevercoloured
threada seamstresshad, regardlessof the colourof the uniform.Packaging
andwrappinggoods boughtwas also a problem.Leaveswerein commonuse
as wrappingin Accra markets9and there was a living to be made from
dealingin second-handnewspapers,magazinesor any kind of paperwhich
could be sold on to shopkeepersand traders:it was not uncommon,in the
late 1970s and early 1980s to buy streetfood wrappedin what looked like
official documents:pages fromreceiptbooks, companyreports,even pages
from the archives.

IN GHANA
RECOVERY
ECONOMIC
Nineteen eighty-foursaw plentiful rain and a recovery of the country's
subsistencebase. In addition,however,the injectionof aid flows in the wake
of the 1983 budget and the NovemberParis Club meeting meantthat the
governmentand industrycould begin to work again.
Ghana'seconomicrecoverypackage,as was the case withothercountries,
involvedmeasuresto strengthenthe balanceof paymentsand to emphasise
and encouragethe productionof goods whichcould be tradedabroadrather
thangoods for the home market(the productionof 'tradables').Policies to
curbthe operationof parallelcurrencymarketswere also broughtinto play,
largelyin termsof lettingthe cedi float on the markets,thusfindinga more
realisticinternationalvalue.In addition,a seriesof majorreformsof public-
sectorenterpriseswas begun,with the aim of rationalisingthemandmaking
themmore efficient.The whole of the public sector-education, electricity,
transport,public works, construction,purchasing, among others-was
subjectto theseinfluences,resultingin majorprogrammesof 'redeployment'
(redundancy).The redeploymentprogrammewas aimed at achieving not
only labour,capital and resource-efficiententerprisesin the public sector
(whichmight subsequentlybe attractiveto private-sectorinvestors)but also
at makinga skilled labourforce availableto new enterprises.Financefor
these new enterpriseswas to come fromindigenouscapitalandfromoutside

9 Litterand the clogging of drainsand gutterswith non-biodegradable

wastes were not a
problemat thattime.
374 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

the country,attractedby reducedinflationandthe maintenanceof economic

and politicalstability.'
At the sametime as attemptswerebeingmadeto makethesepublicbodies
more efficient and cost-effective,measureswere put in place to remove
subsidiesand also to improvethe efficacy with which taxes, both local and
national,werecollected.Thusnot only didthe pricesof water,electricityand
fuel (petrol,diesel andkerosene)rise, butalso therewas a strongprobability,
ratherthana vaguepossibility,thatlocal waterratesandelectricityaccounts
would be collected.Defaulterswere likely to have theirsupplycut off and
those who had tappedinto waterand electricitysuppliesillegally would be
disconnectedand charged for their previous use. However, while these
measuresprovidedsome revenuefor local and nationalcoffers, the major
sums neededto rehabilitateGhana'sindustryand infrastructure came from
aid andloans. Commercialinvestmentin the manufacturing sectorhas been
minimal and the generationof income (for living and for taxes) is still
largelydependenton small-scaleagricultureandwhatcan loosely be termed
'informal-sector enterprises'.Eventhougha reasonablyskilledandeducated
labourforcewas 'available'becauseof redeploymentin the 1980s,it has not
been mopped up by new industrialenterprises,whether externally or
internallyfinanced.
Thus, while official statistics11indicatethat GNP has risen in real terms
over the yearssince 1983,thatinflationhas declined,thatexportshaverisen
and thatindustriesare workingto a greatercapacity,they also indicatethat
real incomesarejust aboutequivalentto those of the late 1960s, beforethe
onsetof majordecline.Ghanastill has a long way to go beforeit can boastof
externalconfidencein its economyandreal growthin internalincomesover
the long term.

URBAN SURVIVALIN THE 1990s

As with the above section on decline, the evidence in this section is
anecdotaland focused on inflation and purchasingpower. When I began
fieldworkin mid-1990the exchangeratebetweenthe cedi and sterlingwas
about750 cedis to the pound.WhenI left, in the springof 1991, it had gone
up to over 800 cedis to the pound.On subsequentvisits the exchangerate
was:
February1995 1,700 cedis = ?1
July 1996 2,500 cedis = ?1
July 1997 3,000 cedis = ?1
February 1998 3,400 cedis = ?1

10 For discussion of
the problems of small business trying to start up and flourish at that
time, whether using redundancy payments from state-owned enterprises to start up or whether
trying to get access to loan money coming into the country, see Brydon and Legge (1996),
especiallychapters3 and4.
1 Forformalandmacro-economic detailsof Ghana'seconomicprogresssince 1983 see, for
example,Armstrong(1996), Oti Boatenget al. (1990).
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 375

The purchasingpowerof the cedi is obviouslydeclining,and althoughthere

have been salaryrises for those in work,andrises in the minimumwage, the
purchasingpower of the currencyand what a salary buys has declined.
Althoughthe cedi buys less, however,there are goods availableto buy, a
significantdifferencefrom both 1979 and 1983. In more accessibleterms,
using the example of cloth quoted above, while a primaryschool teacher
couldnot affordto buy a half piece of clothin 1979, even if she couldfind it
to buy,in 1991the sameteachermightbe ableto affordthe cloth(once again
readilyavailablein marketsas well as in stores)if she had a farmon which
to growfood for herselfandher family,andschool fees were not due. Local
textile factories (Akosombo,Juapong,Tema) which rarely operated(and
then at very low capacity)in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had begun to
workregularlyandto muchgreater,if not full, capacityagainafterseven or
eight years of adjustment.And, with the liberalisationof trade,wax prints
from Hollandand Britainhave begun to be importedagain, but they are
much more expensive. An innovationis that significantamountsof cloth
from COted'Ivoireand from Nigeria are also to be foundin the markets.
Perhapswe can summarisethese trends in terms of relationsbetween
meansandends.Whileends andmeanshada definiterelationto one another
in the early 1970s,by the end of thatdecade,andin the early 1980s,endsand
meanswere completelyout of kilter.In the early 1990s,however,aftereight
years of adjustment,means were beginningto bear some relationto ends
again, even if the relativeproportionsand factorshad changed.

EMPIRICALDATA/REALFACTS
The data on which this section is based are drawnfrom empiricalwork
carriedout in 1990 and 1991 in Nima, a low-incomeareain Accra.Untilthe
1960s Nima was a majorfocus of immigrationfor both internalmigrants
(mainly from the north of the country and from the Volta Region) and
externalmigrants,mainly from the SouthernTogo. Althougha significant
proportionof Nima's inhabitantsoriginatefromthe statesof the Sahel,their
migrationstendto have occurredwell beforethe 1960s. Sahelianinhabitants
of Nima tend to be thirdand even fourth-generation Accraresidents.More
recentlyimmigrationto Nima seems to have wanedand newly settledsub-
and peri-urbanareas such as Madina,Achimotaand Dansomanare now
attractingmigrants.The data include basic demographicand quantitative
informationas well as qualitativeinformationaboutpeople's perceptionsof
theirlives. Interviewswerecarriedout in fifty-onehouseholds12
butthe basis
of sampling was not random,as there was no adequatesamplingframe
available.Introductionsto key people in the various ethnic communities
within Nima were followed by furtherintroductions,and thus a range of

12
A householdwas regardedas a cookingunit for the most part.However,where,as was
the case with some Muslimmen, marriageswere polygynous,the householdwas taken,from
the male perspective,to be the residentialunit. The household 'head' was the person
acknowledgedto be in chargeby othermembersof the household.
376 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

people were interviewed,fanningout from severaloriginalpointsof entry.

The resultsof the interviewsreveal both differencesfrom and continuities
with the kinds of experiencepeople were havingin 1979 and 1983, before
the adventof stabilisationand adjustment.First,what kinds of work were
people doing in the early 1990s?
Informationon occupationsdrawnfromall those (over 18) in the sample
households (128 men and 146 women) shows that 'manufacturing'and
'factory'work, relativelylarge-scaleproductionin formalenterprises,just
does not featureas an occupationalcategory.'Factoryworker',in fact, was
not includedin the final coding scheme,althoughprovisionwas madefor it
in the earlystagesof dataanalysis.13The men interviewedin Nimatendedto
rely on small artisanand other less well-defined'business'enterprisesfor
their income, in additionto rent for those who owned their own houses.
While most of the artisanalenterprisescan be unequivocallylocated in an
'informal'sector, however we define it, what the other less well defined
'businesses',headedby self-styled 'entrepreneurs',entailedshiftedthrough
formal operations to informal wheeling-and-dealing.These businesses
tended to be in the areas of trading,buying and selling ratherthan in
productionfor export.It was not possibleto drawany definiteline between
kinds of business enterprisesand, in any case, a particularentrepreneur's
deals might vary in their 'formality':some might undergo accountants'
scrutiny and thus be classifiable as 'formal', while others might not.
Women'ssourcesof income andwhatthey said they did for a living tended
to be moreeasily categorisedas 'informal':in the mainthe Nima women's
income came from trading(and then largely in cooked food and/ordrink)
and secondarily from remittances from absentee children.14 Those
categorisedas professional,technicalor clerical were in the service sector
as secretariesor teachers,for example,ratherthanin industry.
In 1990-91, as in the late 1970s, coping throughdiversifyingsourcesof
incomewas crucial.Seventy-fiveper cent of male andalmost80 percent of
female respondents(twenty-oneout of twenty-eightand sixteen out of
twenty-one) said they had more than one source of income.15What is
potentially problematic here, in terms of the World Bank's policy
prescriptionsand Ghana'slong-termplans for economic development,is
that these sources of income, whetherregardedas primaryor secondary,
were not drawn,in the main, from anythingthat could be glossed as a
'formal sector', that is, from industriesand enterprisesestablishedand
expanding as investment opportunitiesin post-adjustmentGhana. This

13 In
1976-77, whenI firstworkedin the areaof workandlabourmarkets,out of a sample
of over 300 interviewed,only one worker,a man,workedin a factory-which, at the time,was
workingat a tiny fractionof its capacity.The significanceof manufacturing productionin the
economydoes not seem to have increasedsince then.
14 Detailsof the figuresreferredto herecanbe foundin BrydonandLegge (1996), appendix
II.
15I suspectthatthesefiguresmay under-represent the proportionshavingdiversesourcesof
income:in some cases whatpeopleclaimedas theirmainoccupationdifferedfromtheirmain
income source.
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 377

hardlyfits with policy outlines.The plansfor Ghana'seconomicrecoveryin

the mediumto long term('recoverywith growth',in the terminologyof the
World Bank) hinge upon the establishmentof formally accountingand
accountableenterprisesproducing'tradables'which can be sold abroadfor
hardcurrency.16
The Nima respondents'actualoccupationsand sourcesof income, with
theirfocus on informal-sectorenterprises,both artisanaland trade-oriented,
is echoed by the range of jobs people felt were appropriateto men and
women: what jobs were available and, more important,profitable. In
responseto the question'Whatwork can women do?', 52 per cent of men
and39 percent17of womensaidthatwomencouldbe traders.Onlyabout20
per cent of men and 25 per cent of women suggestedthatwomen mightbe
involvedin clericalwork,white-collarjobs or the professions.Responsesto
the question 'What work can men do?' showed a similar 'informal'
emphasis.Men couldbe artisans(accordingto 55 percent of men and81 per
cent of women), farmers(38 per cent men and 24 per cent women) and
'entrepreneurs' (48 per cent men and 19 per cent women). (See below for
discussionof 'entrepreneur'.)
Only two women (out of twenty-one)and no men at all (out of twenty-
nine) mentionedfactoryworkin theirinterviews,whetherin relationto men
or women.Neithermanufacturing or assemblingin 'modernm'18 settings,on
the one hand,nor productionfor the exportmarket,on the other,featuresin
these Nima people's perceptionsof the labourmarketas it is or as it might
be.
As we saw above, while the massive retrenchmentof the public sector
from the mid-1980s onwards was meant to stimulate diversity in the
economyandto providea pool of skilledlabourfor new enterprises(as well
as to promoteefficiency and accountabilityin the state-ownedenterprises),
the resultant'pool of labour'has not been moppedup by locally grounded
manufacturing or by foreign-ownedenterprises.In orderto makeredundancy
payments stretch or last in a still inflationaryclimate, and without any
expansionin employmentopportunities,those laid off from the mid-1980s
onwardshave investedin theirown small-scaleenterprises:eitherin buying
and selling or, if they had access to capital (eitherphysical or human,in
terms of educatedchildren),have retreatedinto the rentingor remittance
economy.This is whatmen andwomenin the samplesfromNimahave done
and have deemed it appropriateto do. Men buy and sell a wide range of
goods while womentend to deal in raw or cookedfood and drink.Those in
the Nima surveyneitherworkedin formal-sectorjobs nor had any ambition
to find formal-sectorwork. This finding is not in accordwith government
policy, whichemphasisesinvestmentin large-scaleproductiveenterprises:a

16 Recentworkis to the scope and evaluationof 'informal'

giving seriousreconsideration
sectorworkin Africa;see, for example,Meagher(1995).
17 =
N 29 and 21, respectively,for these and the succeedingfigures.
18
'Modem' in this contextis used loosely to refer to enterprisesusing motorisedand/or
electricallydriventools andmachineryandemployingformallyqualifiedas well as unskilled
personnelon termsin accordancewith prevailinglabourlegislationand on a regularbasis.
378 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

key strategyin Ghana'sstructuraladjustmentpolicies is to promotewhat

may be called 'systematicbusinessdevelopment'and,in particular,to try to
attractinvestmentinto firms from both the domesticand overseasmarkets.
Thereis no successfulexportprocessingzone,19no mushroomingof world
marketfactoriesin Ghana.
What new industrialdevelopmentthere has been since adjustmenthas
been confinedto the rehabilitationof older extractiveindustries(gold and
timber in particular).For whatever reasons, major investors, local and
overseas,are fightingshy of puttingtheircapitalinto Ghana,andthe result,
since there is such limited domestic capital, is that people turn to the
informalsector,to whichthey can haveaccess withverylittle capitalor even
on a creditbasis.The informalsectorin turnhas becomeovercrowded,profit
marginsare falling/havefallen andpeople have less income.Withtradeand
currency liberalisation,too, some previously profitable informal-sector
activitieshave become redundant.One womanin the Nima surveysample
had madewhatshe said was a significantcontributionto her incomeduring
the 1970sand 1980sby tradingin usednewspapers,magazinesandanyother
paper, which she sold to traders to wrap their goods. Now, with
liberalisation,polythenewrappersand bags are importedand ubiquitous,
and papertends not to be used.

PERCEPTIONSOF ADJUSTMENT
A generalquestionaskedin the interviewsin 1990-91 was whatpeople felt
the differenceswere betweenthen and 1983 (1983 being etchedon people's
memoriesas such a bad year),but also before the beginningof adjustment
andthe pathto 'EconomicRecovery'.A commonthemein the repliesto this
question was the shortage of cash in the early 1990s. While this was
mentionedover and over again by both male and female respondentsas a
problem,it was a situationwhich, on the whole, comparedfavourablywith
thatin 1983:in 1983 people may have had money but therewas nothingto
buy-no local foodstuffs,let alone importedfood or othergoods, as we saw
above. Typicalresponseswere the following:
That time hard,hungercame, but people try and tightenbelt. Farmerstry, now
everythingis free ... borkor... [MaleAlhajiin his 60s, prominentmemberof his
communityand house owner]

'Tightening belts' was a common metaphor for coping, often used by

government spokespeople, in the 1980s. Borkor is an Akan word in common
use, meaning 'peaceful', 'calm', 'cool'.

19 An EPZ was
inaugurated in early 1996 but as yet it has not succeeded in attracting any
large overseas investors in productive enterprises. There are tertiary enterprises (bottling,
finishing, etc., for sale on the Ghanaian market), but there is no production for re-export or
profit-making. Ghana continues to rely on the production and export of primary products (gold,
timber, cocoa) for the bulk of its foreign earnings.
 IN URBANGHANA
ADJUSTMENT 379

'Eighty-three,get money, not food. This time food there [but] no money.
Governmentis trying,butthosewho follow themarespoilingit... [Maleitinerant
cobblerin his 30s, rentingand living in one room]

And from a 52-year-oldwomanwho tradesin maize and owns a small bar:

Now thingshaverisenup:changeshave madeit so thatif today[somethingcosts]
fifty cedis, tomorrow,100 cedis. Pricesarerisingandthereareno sales. Drinking
is now scarce:[people]don't drinkas before.

Typically, those in a position of authority and responsibility in the

communitytendedto favourthe government.People, they said, could now
speak their mind freely, with the implicationthat under formerregimes
freedomof speechwas curtailed.20 However,one local chief (of a Burkinabe
communitywithinNima),a painteranddecoratorby trade,who hadrecently
been redeployed,said:

Everybodyfinds everythingdifficultbut the governmentdoesn'twantto say that.

The moneyyou taketo marketwon't reach.They don'twantus to talkthatthings
aredifficult.[There's]no worknow ... they arestoppingpeopleto work.Thieves
don't mindbeing caughtbecausethey are hungry.

In general,these resultsreflectthe fact thatpeople'sperceptionsof the state

of play in 1990-92 seem to dependon theirstatusandpersonalexperiences:
the male communityleader's response was positive (the first comment),
while the cobbler,perhapsa moretypicalNimaresident,saw thattherewere
problemsbut was unwilling-in public,anyway-to blamethe government.
But the experienceof redeployment(the last comment) outweighedthis
reluctanceto criticise. On the other hand, an employee of the National
Commission on Democracy gave a broader overview, but ended by
personalisinghis answer, saying that the work of the NCD was vital to
'conscientise'peoplebeforethe elections.Women'scommentstendedto be
morepersonaland,while stressingthe availabilityof food and goods in the
1990s, consistentlyhighlightedshortagesof cash, trade and jobs. As the
informalsectorbecomesmore crowded,so makinga living throughtrading
becomes more difficult. While male tradersmay have ambitionsto be
'entrepreneurial'andmetamorphoseinto 'businessmen',choices for women
aremoreconstrained.Not only arewomenperceivedlargelyas 'traders'but
they arealso perceivedas tradersin a fairlyrestrictedrangeof goods (rawor
cooked food and drink).Choices and opportunitiesfor women to expand
theirenterprisesare more restrictedthanthose of men (Brydonand Legge,
1996).

20
It was only once the decisionto returnto civilianrule hadbeen madein the early 1990s
that controlof the news mediawas loosenedand a plethoraof, usuallycritical,independent
newspapersappearedon the streets.These empiricaldatawere collectedbeforethe returnto
civilianrule in 1992.
380 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

TABLE1. Percentage (n = 34) of people owning consumer durables

Commodity
Refrigerator Television Radio

Men
Have 47 (16) 68 (23) 91 (31)
Have not 38 (13) 27 (9) 6 (2)
Used to have 15 (5) 6 (2) 3 (1)
Women
Have 44 (7) 44 (7) 69 (11)
Have not 50 (8) 56 (9) 19 (3)
Used to have 6 (1) 0 (0) 13 (2)

THE 'EFFECTS'OF ADJUSTMENT

But these stated perceptions of differences in life and living between the late
1970s/early 1980s and the early 1990s are only part of the picture. Although
the Nima survey data indicate that male-headed households tend, overall, to
be relatively wealthier than female-headed households,21 there is some
evidence that those in both male and female-headed households have been
adversely affected by adjustment,if we can take the incidence of those who
used to possess consumer goods such as refrigerators,televisions and radios
but who now do not as an indication of 'economic decline' (Table 1).
Although the figures are small, the stories explaining the 'decline' do
indicate hardship. One man had sold his deep-freezer and refrigeratorto pay
for his children's education. Possession of refrigeratorsis interesting, since
they seem to be the one consumer commodity that women possess in similar
proportions to men. Elsewhere (Brydon and Legge, 1996) we have argued
that this is probably because of the practical usefulness of refrigerators to
women in their businesses (most often selling, or preparingand selling, food
or drink). Three people, (two men and a woman) had once had a car but had
sold it to pay off debts when they ran into financial trouble. Five male
respondents still had functioning, but ageing, cars or commercial vehicles,
and two had broken-down cars but could not afford to pay for repairs. No
women respondents currently owned a car.

21
If we takepossessionof a rangeof utilitiesandconsumergoodsas an indicatorof wealth.
Basic utilitiesare more widespreadin Accra now, but membersof male-headedhouseholds
havegreateraccessto themthanthoseof female-headedhouseholds.However,the majorityof
bothmaleandfemale-headedhouseholdsin the samplehadelectricity(only 3 percentof male
and 13 per cent of female-headedhouseholdsdid not), but only one personin the sample,a
man,hadtapsin thehouse.Fifty-twopercentof menand48 percentof womenhadstandpipes
in theircompounds,but 52 per cent of womenandonly 33 per cent of men had to buy water
eitherfromtankersor frompublicstandpipes.Concomitantwith this lack of watersuppliesto
people's houses,only 21 per cent of men and 10 per cent of womenhad access to a working
w.c.: 57 percentof womenand31 percentof menusedpublic(pit)latrines,andthe remainder
used bucketlatrines.
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 381

The constraintsof the WorldBankhave also meantthat social sectorsin

particularhave felt the effects of adjustment,in thatcost recoverymeasures
have been imposed in the health and educationsectors. With respect to
health,otherauthorshave noted the decline in the use of medicalfacilities
with the introductionof user charges for consultationsand medicines
(Waddingtonand Enyimayew, 1989). Respondentsin Nima in 1990-91
pointedout thatmedicineswere no longerfree andthathealthserviceswere
now expensive.But on the otherhandthey also pointedout thatbothservices
and medicines were now availableif they had the cash to pay for them.
While in theoryhealthchargeswere absentor minimalin the late 1970s and
early 1980s, therewere neithermedicinesnor dressingswith which to treat
patients.Respondentsin Nima were asked about recent illnesses among
themselvesor amongmembersof theirhouseholds,andtherewererelatively
few responsesof 'No treatment'.Initiallywe assumedthatthis was because
of the expense,but furtherquestioningrevealedthatit was becauseof self-
medicationor an ailmentthatclearedup on its own account,ratherthanthe
expenserulingout treatment.
What was more frequentlycomplainedaboutin Nima was the way that
hospitalsfunctioned,the 'culture'of hospitalcare.While peopleexpectedto
have to tip ('dash')hospitalstaff for betterstandardsof care-this has long,
beforeadjustment,been a way in whichhospitalworkerssupplementedtheir
incomes-they complainedthat now they had to dash everyone, from
receptionists,portersandcleanersto nursesanddoctors,for any careat all.22
Nevertheless, wealthier and poorer members of the sample alike had
managedto have hospitalcare,one relativelywell-off womanby payingfor
herself (with her husband),and another,poorer,woman throughhaving a
wealthierbrotherto pay for her. The ethos of extendedfamily supportis
strong and forms a continuitywith the past. It is common to note that
historically, in West African contexts, 'wealth' was not necessarily a
function of ownership of material goods, since differentiation and
stratificationwere generally limited, but was dependenton control over
people. The 'rich' were able to utilise the labourand services of a large
kinship,affinalandclientagenetwork.The converse,the notionthatabsolute
povertyis tantamountto being withoutkin and withoutpatronage,meant,
transposedto those in the sample,that, althoughpeople might be poor in
terms of cash and materialgoods, if they had a wide networkof kin they
would somehowsurvive.23

22
This creative income earning does not cease with the care of the living. Mortuary
attendants make a steady living by charging relatives for adequate refrigeration of corpses.
Funerals are culturally extremely significant in southern Ghana, and bodies tend to be stored in
mortuaries until a suitably lavish funeral can be arranged. Occasionally, apparently, what is
eventually buried bears little relation to the formerly living person if dashes to mortuary staff
are deemed inadequate.
23 This reliance on kin differentiates
sharply the material we collected from Nima (and
elsewhere in Ghana) from the extremely detailed material on surviving adjustment from
Ecuador presented by Moser (1992), for example.
382 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA

CONCLUSIONS:SURVIVINGAND WINNING ... WITH ONLY A LITTLEBIT OF LUCK!

There is no doubt that people in Accra (Nima) are surviving adjustmentand
have developed or are developing strategies to cope with adjustment's
effects. Survival through the 1970s and into the 1980s provided a salient
practice ground, although the terms were different, for the economic shocks
of adjustmentfrom 1983 onwards. But whether the stage is being set for the
future development of the economy along lines reminiscent of an Asian tiger
economy in its heyday is a moot point.24 While people are somehow
juxtaposing means and ends in order to live amid the array of changing
circumstances adjustment has brought, a concerted strategy of developing
the production of primary (agriculturally based) 'tradables' and a 'formal'
manufacturing sector-key features in the World Bank's and the govern-
ment's vision-is not apparent in Nima people's world views. People are
still opting for business and trading,buying and selling on their own account,
as a tried and tested way of making their fortune. And striking it lucky as an
ideal is still much in evidence: getting the break; clinching the deal.
The dominant rhetoric from the purse-string holders of adjustment is
phrased in strict econometric terms and has, as we have seen, made little
impact at the grass-roots level. Nima visions, on the other hand, accord better
with the emphasis on 'luck' singled out in the 1993 World Bank report cited
earlier. Urban Ghanaians are hedging their bets, hoping for a break; going
after economic success in ways that have been known to work in the past.
And some voices in the World Bank seem to agree that this is more realistic.
At any rate, it may be just as likely to promote economic growth as strictly
econometric ploys.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Fieldworkin Ghanaover the yearssince 1973 has been fundedby a seriesof generousgrants
from the following bodies:the Wyse Fund(Universityof Cambridge),the SSRC (UK), the
NuffieldFoundation,the BritishAcademy,the Universityof Liverpooland,mostrecently,the
ESRC(grantNo. R00023/1089).I am extremelygratefulto all these bodies.

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 INURBAN
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ABSTRACT

Using largelyanecdotalevidencefromfield notes, the articletracesGhana'sformal

economicdeclinethroughthe 1970s.Perceptionsof strivingfor survivalandsuccess
are sketchedout duringthis overwhelminglypessimisticperiod. There follows a
descriptionof people's views about survival and 'the state of play' in Ghana's
economicprogressin the late 1980sandearly 1990s.Thesediscursivecommentsare
followed by some simple quantitativematerialaboutwork,the availabilityof jobs
andthe structureof the labourmarketat the time.Whatbecomesobvious,given that
Ghanaiansare actuallycontinuingtheirlives much as they have in the past, is that
the IMF'sandWorldBank'spolicy prescriptionsandstrategiesfor the development
of manufacturingindustry, for attractingthe 'world market factories' of the
multinationals,are not being achieved.Instead,Ghanaianshave focused (as they
alwayshave) on strategiesfor networkingandgettinga break:strikingit 'lucky',in
fact. The relatively newly discovered volatile element in the World Bank's
calculationshas long been a (if not the) core factor in the plans of many small
enterprises.MeanwhileGhanaiansaretrying,hopingfor some 'luck',to surviveand
even prosperinto the next millennium.

RI8SUMt
Cet article,qui s'appuieprincipalement surdes observationsanecdotiquesrecueillies
surle terrain,retracele declineconomiquedu Ghanadansles annees70. Il decritles
perceptionsde lutte pour la survieet le succes durantcette periodeexcessivement
pessimiste.II poursuiten decrivantle pointde vue de certainssurla notionde survie
et l'etat du progreseconomiquedu Ghanavers la fin des annees80 et le debutdes
annees 90. Ces commentairesdiscursifs font ensuite place a des donnees
quantitativessimples relativesau travail,a l'acces a l'emploi et a la structuredu
marchedu travaila cette epoque.II en ressort,comptetenudu fait que les Ghaneens
continuenta vivre comme dans le passe, que les recommandations et les strategies
politiques du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale en faveur du developpementde
 ADJUSTMENTIN URBAN GHANA 385

l'industriemanufacturiere,visant a encouragerles multinationalesa s'implanter,

n'ont pas produitles resultatsescompt6s.Au lieu de cela, les Ghaneensont favorise
(comme ils l'ont toujoursfait) des strategiesbasees sur les contactset la bonne
fortune : miser sur la chance en somme. L'element volatile d6couvert assez
recemmentdans les calculs de la BanqueMondialeest depuis longtempsun des
facteursfondamentaux(voire le seul) au sein des projetsde nombreusespetites
entreprises.Pendantce temps,les Ghaneenss'efforcentde survivrevoire meme de
prosperera 1'aubedu nouveaumillenaire,en esperantque la chanceva leur sourire.