Wesleyan University

Max Weber on China

Author(s): Otto B. Van Der Sprenkel
Source: History and Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1964), pp. 348-370
Published by: Blackwell Publishing for Wesleyan University
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2504237
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 MAX WEBER ON CHINA *

OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

That Max Weber made a fundamental contribution to Sinology, and in par-

ticular to the study of Chinese society and social institutions, is indisputable.
The paradox is that he was able to do this despite a serious methodological
flaw in his approach to the subject; despite having to work with a severely
limited range of sources, available to him only in translation and often in
versions that were faulty and sometimes even grossly misleading; i and despite
the fact that his writings on China abound in errors of detail, while some of
his generalizations are as dogmatically wrong-headed as they are sweeping.
This is a discouraging catalogue, but there is more. The determined reader
still has to face the difficulties of Weber's style and the disorganized presen-
tation he gave to his ideas. As his wife wrote of him: "He attached no im-
portance whatever to the form in which his wealth of ideas was presented.
So many things came flooding out of the storehouse of his mind... that
time and again he found it impossible to force them into a lucid sentence
structure."2
What Weber wrote about China is to be found partly in his long essay
Konfuzianismus und Taoismus (KuT); and, for the rest, in short passages
and fragmentary utterances scattered through a number of his other works.3
* Attention is drawn to Gabriel Kolko, "Max Weber on America", History and
Theory I, 3 (1961), 243-260.
1 Weber was well aware of these problems. He wrote: "The non-expert is sadly
handicapped by the fact that only the tiniest fraction of the documentary sources and
inscriptions have been translated. Unfortunately, no sinologist was at my side to check
the translations. It was therefore only after much painful reflection and with the
greatest reservations that I decided to allow this part of my work to be printed." KuT,
278n.
2 Marianne Weber, Max Weber,Ein Lebensbild (TUbingen,1926; reprintedHeidelberg,
1950), 350.
3 KuT, begun just half a century ago in 1913, was published in 1915 in vol. 41 of the
Archiv far Sozialforschung;and re-issued as part of vol. 1 of the Gesammelte Aufsdtze
zur Religionssoziologie (Tibingen, 1920), 276-536. In judging the work in detail it must
be remembered that fifty years, during which research monographs and authoritative
translations of Chinese sources have appeared in ever increasing numbers, have elapsed
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 349
It is necessarily a difficult task, both for the general sociologist (who is
moreover as a rule unable to control the evidence behind Weber's statements)
and for the sinologist, to disentangle and bring together the guiding ideas
that underlie his "construct" of Chinese society.4 But the effort is rewarding:
even Weber's mistakes are apt to be more stimulating, and to open up more
fertile lines of inquiry, than most other people's target-centered truths.
However, before going on to consider Weber's analysis of Chinese society,
a brief comment is needed on what I have already referred to as the "serious
methodological flaw" in his approach: I mean his use of historical materials
taken from widely different periods of Chinese history, ranging from the
Shang-Yin and Chou kingdoms of the second and first millennia B.C. to the
early decades of the twentieth century when he himself was writing, with
utter disregard for the chronological sequence of events. Bendix has sought
to defend and excuse Weber's procedure, though he succeeds only in
bringing out the nature of the offense and in making explicit the unstated
assumption on which its commission rests. He writes: "Weber confined him-
self by and large to the early period of Chinese history .., the emphasis on
the early period was not exclusive, however. Weber freely cited data up to

since Weber wrote. A not altogether satisfactory English translation by Hans H. Gerth
was published by the Free Press, Glencoe in 1951 under the title The Religion of China.
See the present writer's review-article "Chinese Religion" in The British Journal of
Sociology, 5 (1954), 272-75. This is Weber's only work devoted exclusively to China,
but there are many passages concerned with Chinese society and institutions in his
monumental Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft (WuG), first published (Tiibingen, 1922) as the
third volume of the Grundrissder Sozialikonomik sponsored by the publishing house of
Mohr (Siebeck). The most important of the longer references to China is on pages
707-12. Substantial portions of WuG have been translated into English (not including
this passage) and a useful list is given in the excellent book by R. Bendix, Max Weber,
An Intellectual Portrait (London, 1960), 11-12. Perspicuous remarks on the Chinese
city will be found in sections 1 and 2 of Die Stadt, an essay that first appeared in vol.
47 of the Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik in 1921 and was later in-
corporated as ch. 8 of Part II in WuG, 513-600. An English translation, The City, by
Martindaleand Neuwirth, was published in Glencoe (1958) and London (1960).
4 Sinologists, with one or two notable exceptions, have profited little from Weber's
insights into their own domain. The labor of refining sinological metal from Weber's
massive seams of low-bearing ore has proved too onerous. The "Bibliographyon Max
Weber" prepared by Hans and H. I. Gerth (Social Research, 16 [1949], 70-89) lists 466
books and articles provoked by his writings, of which only one (by von Rosthorn) is
directly concerned with his work on China. Additional minor, though real, irritations
that bear particularly on the sinologist are the inconsistent and often outlandish
romanizations of Chinese names, titles, and phrases, which Weber takes as they stand
from the older literature in different European languages (without, it seems, always
knowing to whom or to what they refer), and the very inadequate references he gives
to the sources from which he quotes (e.g., "the Annals"). The understanding,and hence
the use that should properly be made, of Weber's work, particularly in some of the
highly specialized fields into which he entered, would be greatly facilitated by critical
annotated editions (or translations) in which these obstacles to comprehension were
tidied away, and some guidance given to the results of more recent scholarship. Max
Rheinstein's Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, 1954) is a model of how this should be done.
350 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

the beginningof the twentiethcenturyand in so doing ignored chronology.

Whilethis aspectof his work has often been criticized,it is sufficientfor our
purposeto point out that it had a rationale.Certainaspects of the Chinese
social structure had remained relatively unchanged - at any rate up to the
fall of the Manchudynastyin 1911 - and the variouspossibilitiesinherent
in that structurethereforecould be elucidatedby referenceto events from
differentperiods."5 What this line of reasoningassumesis the old myth of
an "unchangingChina".Unconsciousacceptanceof this myth by a German
scholar who received his formativetrainingin the last quarterof the nine-
teenth centuryis explainablein terms of the ruling German historicaltra-
dition of that time, which, when it took note of the existence of the Asian
civilizationsat all, did so only to dismiss them as "static",as making no
contributionto the movementof world history, and thereforeof no interest
to the historian. Dynamism in history was the exclusive attributeof the
West.6
It should be counted as a merit to Weber that in his inquiry into the
sociology of religionshe concernedhimself also with the "Wirtschaftsethik"
of the religionsof East and SouthAsia. In so doing he widenedthe horizon
of socio-economicand institutionalinvestigationbeyond what had hitherto
been its customarylimits in Westernscholarship.7As regardsChina,it would
have been asking too much to expect a developmentaltreatment.Not only
had Westernhistoricalwritingon China (whichWeberhad perforceto con-
sult) reached its nadir in the late nineteenthcentury,but Weber'sway of
approachinghis subject inhibited him from looking in the first place for
change and the causes of change. His preferredanalyticaltool is the ideal-
type. This is not a descriptionof reality but a normativeand classificatory
constructbuilt up by aggregatingconcreteindividualphenomenawhich may
or may not be present,or may be presentin greateror lesser degree,in any
5 R. Bendix, Max Weber, 117. The italicized phrases "hedge"the argument somewhat,
and so weaken it. My point could hardly be better expressed than in the following
comment by Alvin W. Gouldner, "On Weber's Analysis of BureaucraticRules", in R. K.
Merton, ed., Reader in Bureaucracy (Glencoe, 1952), namely, that Weber's theories are
"relativelyinnocent of spatio-temporalcautions" (48).
6 Compare Leopold von Ranke's description of the Asian peoples as "Vliker des
ewigen Stillstandes". Japan's self-modernization and her defeat of Russia struck the
first blow at this idea; and the revolution of 1911 should have done as much for China.
But historiography,of its nature, must lag behind the event. In any case, the real point
was not that Japan and China were capable of change in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries (and under the impact of the West at that) but that there had been "develop-
ment" in the histories of both countries from the beginning. The latter view, as regards
China at least, began to win acceptance only with the publication of Otto Franke's
Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, the first volume of which appeared as recently as
1930. See the present writer's article, "Franke'sGeschichte", in Bulletin of the School
of Oriental and African Studies, 18 (1956), 3 12-32.
7 This is not to overlook or detract from the worth of E. T. C. Werner's (Spencerian)
Descriptive Sociology: Chinese (London, 1910), a pioneer compilation that deserves to,
be better known.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 351
given example of historical reality. Weber's ideal-types, as Bendix well puts
it, are "artifacts of the researcher based on historical materials",8 and,
although no ideal-type ever exactly mirrors an historical situation as it ac-
tually existed or exists, nevertheless -it "must be at least in the realm of
probability and not merely possible; that is, there must be found somewhere
at least a close empirical approximation. Thus, the construction of an ideal-
type can also be regarded as a working hypothesis".9
Weber seeks to attain clarity in the analysis of actual institutions and
social behavior patterns by collecting as much observational data as possible
and then classifying the picture so obtained in accordance with its degree of
deviation from, or approximation to, one or more of the thematically relevant
ideal-types he has set up. His method, in other words, is one of "positioning"
the various situations he is examining on a sort of spectroscope whose bands
are demarcated by ideal-types. Adoption of this technique no doubt accounts
for Weber's predilection for the comparative method, which indeed he uses
with great effect. On the other hand, he is not overly concerned with tran-
sitions from one type to another. The only developmental process which he
discusses in any detail is the one he calls "the routinization of charisma";
and in general there is little emphasis in Weber's work on the dynamics of
change.
This judgment may appear to need modification in the light of certain
passages in KuT, especially earlier in the second chapter, "The Feudal and
Prebendal State", which both describe and suggest reasons for the transition
from Chou feudalism to what Weber calls the "patrimonial" empire of the
Ch'in-Han.10He refers to the Chou Ritual which, as he says, "already por-
trays a highly schematized form of state organization, with irrigation works,
specialized crop cultivation (e.g., sericulture), call-up registers for the army,
statistics, and grain stores, all supervised by a rationalized bureaucracy. That
such a system really existed," he adds, "is very problematical, since, according
to the historical records, rational state administrations first appeared as a
product of the competitive struggles of the Warring States." He continues
with these perceptive sentences: "There are grounds for believing that a
patriarchal epoch," similar to that of the 'Old Kingdom' in Egypt, preceded
8 Bendix, Max Weber, 281. Cf. also Karl Jaspers, Max Weber, Politiker, Forscher,
Philosoph (Munich, 1958), 53.
9 Max Weber, Basic Concepts in Sociology, transl. with an introductionby H. P. Secher
(New York, 1962), 14. For a different view see G. Kolko, "Max Weber on America", in
History and Theory, I, 3 (1961), 243.
10 See 318-29 of the German text; 37-45 of Gerth's translation. The applicability of
the term "patrimonial"is discussed below.
11 Weber is referring here not to "Sultanism"(a system of personal despotism backed
in the last instance by military force) but to a patriarchalism resting on hereditary
charisma inhering in the sib of the priest-king. In earliest times, so the legends of the
canonical books would suggest, charisma could be conveyed by designation, as Yao
named Shun as his successor, and Shun, YU; though with the latter, the reputed founder
of the Hsia dynasty, the hereditaryprinciple became operative.
352 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

the feudal period. For there is no doubt that in China, as in Egypt, the
bureaucracyentrustedwith water-controland constructionworks goes back
to high antiquity,and was developedfrom among the ruler'spersonal re-
tainers.The presenceof this officialdomfrom the outset temperedthe nature
of feudalismin the age of the WarringStates, and constantlydirectedthe
thoughtsof the literatito questionsof administrativetechniqueand a bureau-
cratic organizationthat could serve the useful ends of the state."12
Notable here are (1) Weber's correct assignmentof the beginningsof
"rational"policies in internal administration,militaryorganizationand the
like, to the WarringStates period; (2) the importancehe gives to water-
control as the factor mainly responsiblefor the growth of centralizedpo-
litical authority;13 and (3) his unerringidentificationof the "literati"as the
key status group in Chinese society, and of the bureaucracyas its creation
and creature.
History,for Weber,is alwaysthe handmaidenof sociology,and it was no
part of his plan or purposein studyingthe "economicethic"of Confucianism
to describeor account for China'stransitionfrom feudalismto the "patri-
monial-bureaucratic" empire. Nor do his scatteredremarks,often no more
than hints, offer a sufficientsubstitutefor such a descriptionand explana-
tion. In this sense the judgmentmade above must be confirmed:namely,that
Weber's main interest lies in the morphologicalunderstandingof societies,
their institutionsand the patternsof behaviorthat characterizethem; and in
answeringthe question:why is this what it is and not somethingelse, how
does it work, what gives it stability(or instability)?This it not to say that
Weber refuses to concern himself with problems of genesis and mutation
where these'arise naturallyin the course of his inquiry, but only that he
normallyregardssuch questionsas secondary,and is content to throw out
suggestionswhich, howeverfruitfulthey may prove themselvesin stimulating
the work of others,he does not feel obligedto follow up himself.14
12 KuT, 318-19. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 37.
13 Weber makes this point most forcefully in KuT, 298-9, where he writes: "The need
for water-control, both in China and in Egypt, as the prerequisite for any rational
conduct of economic life, was decisive for the emergence of a centralized authority
together with its patrimonial officialdom." See also his General Economic History
(Collier Books ed., New York, 1961), 237. The importantmonograph by Chi Ch'ao-ting,
Key Economic Areas in Chinese History as Revealed in the Development of Public
Works for Water-control(London, 1936), is, in part, a brilliant and balanced working
out of this idea. The early work of K. A. Wittfogel, Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft Chinas
(Leipzig, 1931), should also be consulted, especially the sections entitled: "Too much or
too little water - a fateful question for Chinese agriculture"and "China's hydraulic
system" (189-300). In his later writings, especially Oriental Despotism (New Haven,
1957), Wittfogel seriously overplays his theme, loading so much on to the back of the
"hydraulichypothesis" that it breaks under the strain. Cf. the excellent review of this
book by S. N. Eisenstadt in The Journal of Asian Studies, 17, 3 (May 1958), 435-46.
14 For instance, no account with pretensions to thoroughness of China's transition from
feudalism to centralized state control could fail to note the importance of the creation
of centrally-administeredlocal government areas (hsien) out of territories held on
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 353
II

In the remainder of this paper I shall examine (and on a number of points

disagree with) the picture that Weber presents of Chinese society as it
functioned in the two thousand years covered by the Empire.15In so doing,
it will be necessary to simplify, and concentrate attention on what appear to
be the major strands in his analysis.
One of the features of Chinese society that most impressed Weber was its
enduring stability. This was in his opinion the result of a delicate balance
between two opposing forces: on the one hand the Emperor, representing the
central government, who with his patrimonial bureaucracy as instrument
was able to spread a net of centrally-directed administration over the Empire;
on the other, recalcitrant to this administrative network and stubbornly
pursuing its own infinitely divided interests, the local lineages and the gilds.
The power relations between these two social forces were complex, but they
lie at the very heart of Weber's picture of traditional Chinese society. The
product of their millennial confrontation was in fact an inherently unstable
balance, but one in which the two antagonists were so evenly matched, with
each in the last analysis able to limit the activities of the other, and with
neither willing to risk a conflict a' outrance for fear of bringing to light
internal weaknesses, that a continuing situation of "stalemate" resulted which
had all the surface appearance of stability.16
We may begin with the central power, whose embodiment is the Son of
Heaven, and whose agent is the bureaucracy. The Chinese bureaucracy, in
all periods from the Han to the Manchus, is invariably qualified by Weber
as "patrimonial", and further as strongly marked by "irrational" features.17

feudal tenure which for one reason or another escheated to the crown, or out of lands
newly conquered from neighboring states or from frontier barbarians. There is no
obvious reason why such lands, freely at the disposal of the ruler, should not have
been granted as feudal holdings. In the event they were not; and from the seventh
century B.C. hsien existed side by side with feudal domains. Their effect was at once
to strengthen the fiscal and military power of the ruler and weaken the barony.
For a full discussion see D. Bodde, China's First Unifier (Leiden, 1938), 133-46 and
Appendix on "The Rise of the hsien and chfin System in Ancient China", 238-46.
15 From 221 B.C. to A.D. 1911. In spite of the wealth of material Weber adduces
from the early sources (and notwithstanding the opinion expressed by Bendix in the
passage quoted earlier - see note 5 above) the Empire is his real subject. Almost
nothing of what he has to say either about the bureaucracy, the examination system,
Confucianism as a "status ethic", the local lineage, the gild or the city can be intelli-
gibly related to the period before the unification of 221 B.C.; though almost all of -it
has relevance to an understandingof the imperial age.
16 Less polite words than "stability" are also in order. Weber somewhere in his
writings speaks of the "chinesische Erstarrung des Geisteslebens". Here something
more like rigor mortis is suggested.
17 In a long footnote to his passage cited above on the Chou Ritual Weber briefly
resumes the government organization of the Han, basing himself on Ed. Chavannes,
Memoires historiques de Se-ma Ts'ien, 2 (Paris, 1897), App. I, 513-33 (cited by Weber
354 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

We have already noted his view that a movement towards rational adminis-
tration was clearly discernible in the period of the Warring States in the
fifth to third centuries B.C. Rational elements must therefore have been
present and, one would think, to an even greater extent, in the administration
of the unified Empire under the Han (206 B.C.-A.D. 220) and later. The
requirements of Weber's system lead him to minimize their importance.
According to his typology of authoritarian modes, the patrimonial is one
variant, among several, of patriarchal authority. But "it is characteristic of
patriarchal authority (and of the patrimonial sub-class that belongs to it) that,
besides the system of inviolable sacred norms whose infraction results in
magical or religious disaster, it also acknowledges a sphere in which the
arbitrary decision of the ruler has free play, an area in which decisions are
taken, in principle, on personal rather than on functionally appropriate
grounds. In this sense patriarchal authority is irrational'8 Hence the govern-
ment organization of the Han, and indeed of later dynasties too, because
they are classed as patrimonial, is necessarily "irrational" since all patrimo-
nial domination is by definition "irrational".
No sinologist would be disposed to quarrel with the view that there were
irrational elements (in the Weberian sense) in Chinese government, nor would
he dispute that possession of the imperial office often conferred wide powers
of arbitrary decision on its holder. Nevertheless certain modifying factors
should be noted: namely (1) that a great deal depended on the personality
and caliber of the Emperor; rulers of forceful character and strong purpose
like Wu Ti of the Han, T'ai-tsung and Empress Wu of the T'ang, or the
K'ang-hsi Emperor of the Ch'ing, by their vigorous action enlarged the scope
of the office, while other lesser incumbents allowed it to dwindle almost
to insignificance; 19 (2) that there was no doctrine of divine right in China.
The Mandate of Heaven to rule had to be merited by performance. It was
not granted in perpetuity to any ruler or ruling house, and could be forfeited
by bad behavior. This doctrine, which implied a contingent right of rebellion

as App. II, and the error repeated by Gerth, Religion, 263). After listing the principal
Han offices he writes: "It will be seen that this list exhibits, in sharp contrast to the
rational and hence historically less credible constructions of the Chou Li, all the irra-
tional features of a patrimonial officialdom which has grown out of the management
of the ruler's household, the ordering of his ritual functions and the organization of the
army, and to which has been added offices required for the administration of justice,
the water-control economy and for other more purely political reasons" (KuT, 318n3;
cf. Gerth, Religion, 264).
18 "Die Wirtschaftsethikder Weltreligionen:Einleitung", GAzRS, 1, 269-70; cf. trans-
lation in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology
(New York, 1946), 296.
19 A similar observation has been made about another, and less obviously "irrational",
executive post: that of President of the United States. It is clear that this was a very
different office when Jackson, Lincoln, and the second Roosevelt were in the, White
House from what it was under Polk, Fillmore, and Arthur.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 355
in the subject,certainlyacted as a check on arbitraryrule; (3) that in state
mattersthe Emperorwas normallyexpected to act in accordancewith the
adviceof his chief ministers.20In theoryof coursetheir appointmentand dis-
missal were exclusively his decision; in practice they often enjoyed long
tenuresof office.2'
The centralgovernmentof imperialChinawas not, as it is today, mono-
lithic, but composite. The Chinese themselves distinguishedbetween what
they called the "innercourt" (nei t'ing) and "outercourt" (wai t'ing). The
formercomprisedthe Emperorand variousgroupsthat revolvedaroundhim
as their center. These groups, whose relative strength varied in different
periods of China'shistory, normallyincluded some or all of the following:
(1) the Emperor'sconsort and influentialmembersof her clan, (2) members
of the clan of the Emperor'smother, the Empress Dowager, (3) the Heir
Apparent,where one had been designated,and his supporters,(4) the palace
eunuchs,often comprisingseveralfactions in alliancewith other groups,(5)
militarynotabilities,and (6) civil officialswho were the close advisersof the
Emperor:in some periods a Chief Minister,in others a collegium.Decisions
in generalhad a collective backgroundbut were finally taken either by the
Emperor,by the personswho controlledone or more of these groups,or by
both together.Whethera particularEmperormeasuredup to his task or not,
whetherhe ruled or only reigned,the imperialoffice still remainedtheoreti-
cally the fount of honor and the ultimatesource of all authority.Its control,
especiallywhen the incumbentwas weak, incompetentor a minor, was the
greatprize of inner court politics.
The wai t'ing or outer court consistedessentiallyof the bureaucracy,and
while the political maneuversof the nei t'ing were played out for the most
part in the palaces and courts of the ForbiddenCity, the theater of opera-
tions of the wai t'ing embracednot only the centralministriesof the capital
but extendedover the whole territoryof the Empire.22What precisely was
the natureof this bureaucraticapparatus?It was in the first place a hierar-
20 Cf. Sources of Chinese Tradition, ed. W. T. de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and B.
Watson (New York, 1960), 172-3. Note Eberhard'sview that Ch'in Shih Huang-ti "is
the only Chinese ruler who could be called a despot", Conquerors and Rulers (Leiden,
1952), 12, n.4. He also writes: "EmperorWu of the Han dynasty apparently tried again
to become an absolute ruler, but he did not succeed. In the following periods we see
that the emperor was always an instrument or an exponent of different cliques of great
and powerful gentry families. They determined his decisions and his policy" (op. cit.,
27). Eberhard'spoint, though perhaps too dogmatically expressed, is a sound one, even
if we do not follow him all the way in attributing decisive power to the "great gentry
families."
21 No detailed study covering all the major dynasties has to my knowledge been made
of this question; but for long tenures in the Ming (1368-1644) see my article "High
Officials of the Ming" in Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, 14
(1953), 87-114, especially 91-3 and Table V; and Tilemann Grimm, "Das Neiko der
Ming-Zeit von den Anflingen bis 1506" in Oriens Extremus, 1 (1954), 139-77.
22 Weber seems to have been under the impression
that a clearly drawn line divided
the services of the capital from those of the provinces. This was not so. The normal
356 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

chically-orderedelite of administratorsrecruited almost exclusively from

the ranksof the educatedgentry.23Withinthe servicepromotionwas largely
by merit, as revealedby fitness reportsdrawnup by the subject'simmediate
superiorand furnishedat regularintervalsto the authoritiesat the capital
with whom decisions as to promotionor demotionlay. Its members,from
the sixth century on, were increasinglyselected by public competitiveex-
amination.24They constituted,to use Weber'sformula, "a status group of
certifiedclaimantsto office prebends".25 They were, finally, a cohesivebody
imbuedwith a strongespritde corps and a lively sense of the social distance
which separatedthem, the "twiceborn",from the ordinarypeople, the min.
Parallelingthe tensions alreadynoted as operativewithin the inner court
therewas also a fundamental,if often latent, contradictionwithinthe bureau-
cracy, the outer court: namely, that between the official in his role as an
official, as a servantof the state, and in his capacityas a gentry-member with
loyalties to his social group and, in particular,to the membersof his own
lineage.
* Moreoverthere were also and inevitablydifferencesof interest and out-
look between the inner and outer courts themselves:between, on the one
hand, the Palace and all it included and stood for; and, on the other, the
elaboratelystructuredbureaucracywhose members were immersed at all
levels in problemsof day-to-dayadministrationas well as participating,at the
higherlevels at least, in the formulationand testing of policy.26This conflict
official career would include a number of provincial postings, interspersed with terms
of duty in the ministries and bureaus of the central government. This constant move-
ment between the center and the periphery applied to even the highest officials.
23 In earlier periods it was mainly the preserve of the upper gentry. From Sung
times on (10th-ilth centuries), with the spread of printing and the consequent increased
availability of books needed for acquiring a classical training, the social reservoir from
which the officials were drawn was gradually expanded to include the middle and even
lower levels of the gentry group.
24 Weber's account of the role played by the examination system is considered below.
For the system as it operated under different dynasties see: R. des Rotours, TraitWdes
examens (Paris, 1932); E. A. Kracke, Civil Service in Early Sung China (Cambridge
Mass., 1953); and Etienne Zi, Pratique des examens litteraires (Shanghai, 1894). The
first of these works relates to the T'ang, and the third to the Ch'ing.
25 KuT, 404, "eine Schicht diplomierter PfrUndenanwirter". Cf. Gerth, Religion, 115.
26 To complicate the picture further, there was also a certain "spilling over" of sec-
tions of the bureaucracyfrom the outer court, its own proper province, into the more
restricted circles and rarified atmosphere of the inner court. Here we must distinguish
between the Chief Ministers who formed the apex of the bureaucratic pyramid and
whose interests were broadly the same as those that motivated the mandarinate as a
whole, and the more specialized officials who were the Emperor's personal assistants.
The latter are well exemplified by the Grand Secretaries (Ta Hsiieh Shih) of the Ming.
In the beginning these officials had been seconded mainly to give secretarial assistance
to the Emperor but by the early decades of the fifteenth century they already formed
a sort of "cabinet"(the Nei Ko) and had taken over the leading executive role in the
government. It was the practice that those who passed highest in the examinations
were appointed immediately to the Han-fin Academy, and it was from their number
that the Grand Secretaries were chosen. A recent writer on Ming government has this
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 357
was important,and Weber was right in drawingattentionto it, though his
interpretationof it was, as we shall see, mistaken. Hucker's illuminating
commentthat "in an ideologicalsense, it might be called a tension between
Legalisticprinciplesand Confucianprinciplesof government"is nearerthe
mark.27
Weber is inclined to discount the efficacy of the Chinese civil service in
part on the groundthat it was technicallyimpossiblefor so small an estab-
lishment28 to control effectivelyan empire so vast and so lacking in means
of communication.29 He writes: "As the territoryof the Empire was so im-

to say: "The association of the Grand Secretaries with the Han-lin Academy embar-
rassed them in their relations with the administrativehierarchy. The men who served
as functioning Ministers or Vice-Ministers in the Ministries were normally men of
long administrative experience, not only in the capital, but in the Provinces as well.
But the men selected to be Grand Secretaries almost invariably rose through a succes-
sion of Han-lin posts, broken if at all by an appointment in some service or ceremonial
agency such as the Ministry of Rites... To officials of the administrative hierarchy,
this meant that the Grand Secretaries were representativesand spokesmen of the inner
court, not of the outer court with which they themselves were identified. That is, the
Grand Secretariat was considered an instrument of imperial authority, not of ministe-
rial or bureaucratic authority. Grand Secretaries, in consequence, often found them-
selves in the uneasy roles of mediators trusted by neither the Emperors whom they
served nor the officialdom which they aspired to lead." See Charles 0. Hucker,
"GovernmentalOrganization of the Ming Dynasty", Harvard Journal of Asian Studies,
21 (1958), 1-66, esp. 29-31. Cf. T. Grimm's article on the Nei Ko already cited.
27 Hucker, op. cit., 21. "Legalism"here refers to the authoritarian teachings of the
Fa chia, the School of Laws and Punishments (or as Waley has it, the "Realists"),
teachings that were naturally attractive to the ruler. The literati on the other hand
were the natural guardians of the Confucian ideology, which commended itself to them
on many grounds, not the least being that it underwrote their privileged position in
society. On the relations of emperor and bureaucracy see also H. Maspero, "Comment
tombe une dynastic chinoise: la chute des Ming", Melanges posthumes Ill, Etudes
historiques (Paris, 1950), 211-27, esp. 215-6.
28 In absolute numbers the established civil service was never very large. The highest
figure for the Northern Sung (960-1126), which may include military as well as civil
officials, is given by a modern Chinese historian as 34,000 (see Y. C. Chang, "Wang
Shou-Jen as a Statesman" in Chinese Social and Political Science Review, 22 (1939),
167). A contemporary Ming source, the Hsi! wen-hsien t'ung-k'ao compiled toward
the end of the sixteenth century by Wang Ch'i, gives a total of 24,683 officials, of
whom 1,416 served in Peking, 558 in Nanking, and the remaining 22,709 in the
provinces.
29 In fact, almost to the end of the eighteenth century the Chinese were far in advance
of the rest of the world in matters of administrative organization. Moreover, China's
road and canal systems and courier service, under the major dynasties at least, were
models of efficiency. Her extensive geographical literature and great achievements in
cartography(maps were often associated with itineraries) are here to the point. See J.
Needham, Science and Civilization in China, vol. 3, "Geography and Cartography",
497-590. It is certainly difficult for a European to realize how long-established in
China were practices that in the West we associate mainly with the modern age.
Writing of the end of the eighteenth century, E. J. Hobsbawm remarks that "outside
the colonies the official nominated by his central government and sent to a succession
of provincial posts was only just coming into existence" (The Age of Revolution:
Europe from 1789 to 1848 [London, 1962], 10). Similar arrangements had existed in
China for two thousand years.
358 OTTO B. VANDER SPRENKEL

mense and the numberof officials in proportionto the total populationso

small, the Chinesegovernmentwas not only extensivein characterbut, under
rulers of merely averageability, it even failed to function as a centralized
government.Directivescoming from the center were often acceptedby sub-
ordinateofficialsless as bindinginstructionsthan as advicewhich they could
follow or not as they chose. Here, as in otherpartsof the worldwheresimilar
conditionsprevailed,the officialdomfound itself compelledto take account
of and come to termswith the counter-vailingforces of traditionalism,in the
personsof the lineage elders and gild leaders,in orderto be able to operate
at all."30
Weber is beginninghere to sound the theme which underlieshis whole
analysisof the structureof Chinese society. The centralgovernment,facing
the task of imposingits will on the innumerableif disunitedcentersof local
self-rulethat existed in every county of the empire, had at its disposal the
instrumentof the bureaucracy.But this instrumentpossessedonly a limited
effectiveness,and moreoveritself representeda potentialthreat to the con-
tinuingauthorityof the Emperor.Its efficiencycould certainlybe improved,
but only at the risk of making this potential threat actual; for unless the
bureaucracywas kept weak and disunited,and its effectivenesschecked by
various institutionaldevices, its memberswould succeed in "appropriating
theirbenefices"andtransformingtheminto "hereditaryoffice-domains".Such
a process of refeudalizationwould inevitablyend in reducingthe imperial
institutionto a nullity.
In supportof his view that refeudalizationwas a real and pressingdanger
Weber urges one general theorem and several particular"theories".The
theorem,which receivesits fullest statementin the chapter"BUrokratie" in
Part III of Wirtschaftund Gesellschaft,is that "the developmentof a money
economy, permittingthe paymentof officials in cash, is the primarysocial
and economic condition of bureaucracyin its modern form... A money
economy developedto a certainlevel is the antecedentcondition,if not for
the emergence,then for the persistencewithout attenuatingchanges, of a
pure bureaucraticadministration.History shows that in the absence of a
money economy it is hardly possible that a bureaucraticstructurecould
avoid undergoingsubstantialinternal modification,or even transformation
into somethingquite different.The allocationto officials of fixed allowances
paid in kind from stocks in the store-housesof the ruleror out of his current
receiptsof tax-goods- a type of paymentwhich for thousandsof years was
the rule in Egypt and China, and which played a significantr6le in the late
Roman monarchy and elsewhere - means easily a first step towards the
appropriationof the sourcesof taxationby the official and their exploitation
as privateproperty."31
30 WuG, Part II, ch. 7, "Patrimonialismus",708.
31 WuG, Part III, ch. 6, 655. Cf. Gerth and Mills, From Max Weber, 204-5.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 359
This picture of "the appropriationof prebends"by mandarinswho thus
transformthemselves into an hereditaryquasi-feudalterritorialnobility is
quite implausibleto the studentof Chinese history.Weber is writing about
imperialChina and his argumentshould properlyapply first and foremost
to those periodsin which a majordynasty,havingunited the countryunder
a single sway, employeda fully-fledgedbureaucracyto administerits empire.
But it wat precisely in such periods, notably the Sung, Ming and Ch'ing-
roughlythe last thousandyears, from 960 to 1911 with a brief interruption
duringthe rule of the Yuan between 1280 and 1367 - that the mandarinate
achievedits most "rational"(in Weber'ssense) organizationunderthe close
directionof relativelystrongcentralizinggovernments.No hereditarynobility
existed during these centuries, nor were there any discerniblesigns of a
processof refeudalization.32The positionwas somewhatdifferentin the T'ang
period,which howeverwas also the one that saw the beginningsof the selec-
tion of officials by open competitiveexaminationand of the bureaucracyin
its modem form. Underthe T'angthe greatlandedfamilieswere still a strong
force;but, as Balazs remarks,"thenecessityof passingexaminationsin order
to enterupon the official careersoon broughtinto existencea counter-weight
to the influence of the hereditarynobility, who then still possessed great
power."33 This puts the mandarinate in a different, one might almost say an
opposite,light to that in which Weber sees it.
The classicalperiodof Chinesefeudalismwas the WesternChou (c. 1050-
770 B.C.). Its characteristicinstitutions, as Weber correctly noted, were
challengedand in part subvertedin the time of the WarringStates;though
the decisivedestructionof the territorialbases of feudalpower was the work
of the Ch'in. Feudalism was replaced by a unitary and bureaucratically-
administeredempire, a political arrangementto which the Chinese world
became habituated,and which it came to regardas part of the naturalorder
of things,duringthe four centuriesof the Formerand Later Han (206 B.C.-
A.D. 220). It was in the subsequentage of disunionwhich began with the
collapse and disintegrationof the Han and lasted until the Sui reunification
in 589 that a form of feudalismagain emergedto masterlarge areas of the
formerempire.The breakdownof all public order meant that both rich and
poor had to look to their own protectionand safety as best they might. The
rich turnedtheir domainsinto fortressesand armedthemselves,their tenants
32 The granting of noble rank (often bestowed posthumously) to elder statesmen, and
of titles and estate-revenues to princes of the imperial house (which was particularly
important under the Ming), present no ground for modifying this statement. Such
ranks were automatically diminished by one grade with every generation so that the
remote posterity of the original holder of a title reverted to the status of commoner.
Episodes such as the so-called "War of the Three Feudatories" (San fan chih luan) of
1673-81, which was a bid for imperial power on the part of Wu San-kuei, cannot be
brought under the rubric of "refeudalization".
33 E. Balazs, "Les T'ang", in Aspects de la Chine, I (Publications de Musee Guimet,
Bibl. de Diffusion, t. LXIII, Paris, 1959), 78.
360 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

and slaves for the better defense of their property.The poor either soughtto
flee the troubledcountrysideor offered themselvesas "clients"to the rich.
"By the beginningof the third century",writes Maspero,"five-sixthsof the
population thus found themselves under the protection of the other one-
sixth."34 An unsuccessfulattempt to check or limit this developmentwas
made by the WesternChin (265-316), but fratricidalstrugglesin the ruling
house and barbarianinvasionswhich expelledthe dynastyfrom north China
to the Yangtse frustratedtheir efforts. In the event the Chinesecountryside
from the fourthto the end of the sixth centurieswas dominatedby the great
landedfamilies.They, and not the membersof the formerbureaucracy,were
the carriersand beneficiariesof the renascentfeudalismof the Six Dynasties
period. These wealthy families, powerfulby reason of the number of their
clients and the strengthof their private armies,formed a ruralnobility (the
kao men or "high gates") which wielded well-nigh absolute power within
theirown domainsand on occasionintervenedwith decisiveeffect in dynastic
politics. The rulersof the EasternChin (317-419) preferredto rely on com-
moners to fill the highest ministerialoffices, seeking in these men, whose
advancementwas due to personalqualityand imperialfavor and not to noble
birth, a counter-weightto the aristocracy.But the latter resolutelyclosed
their ranks against such upstartswhom they called han jen; ("cold men").
The middleechelons of the bureaucracy,and in particularthose who served
in the provinces,presentedlittle problemto the dominantruralnobility.The
examinationsystem, still in its earlieststage of developmentunderthe Han,
did not survivethe declineof the empire.It was replaced,apparentlyon the
initiativeof Ts'ao Ts'ao the founderof the Wei (220-264), by the so-called
"Nine Categories",accordingto which aspirantsto office were graded in
respect to their virtues and abilitiesby functionariesof the central govern-
ment known as the "Impartialand Just". This arrangement,which was in-
tended-to strengthenthe position of the ruler as againstthe rich nobles of
the provinces, was soon subvertedby them and in their hands became a
weapon which enabledthem to control the officialdom.By the beginningof
the fourth century,writes the authorof the most recent study of the "Nine
Category"system, "the highest grades had become hereditary and were
awardedafter consultingthe tables of genealogy... nominationsand pro-
motionswere made by a scribein the Bureauof Civil Office on the basis of
the registersof nobility. In fact, to the historian,the main interest of the
system of the 'Nine Categories'is that-it allowed the great families of the
Wei and Chin to arrogateto themselvesthe power of selectingthe personnel
of the bureaucracy... Althoughthe originalpurposeof the systemhad been
to withdrawthis power from the provincial nobility and return it to the
central government,in practice it proved to be one of the main factors

34 H. Maspero, Les institutions de la Chine (Paris, 1952), 74.

 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 361
promotingthe decentralizationthat marked the succeeding centuries:the
system conferredon the rich aristocratsa legal means of dividing up the
administrationamongthemselvesand so of establishingthe type of feudalism
that characterizedthe Chinese Middle Ages."35
We have turnedback from the bureaucraticempirethat was beginningto
create its typical institutionsin the T'ang, and achievedits full development
in the Sung, to glance at earlier periods: those of high feudalism and of
feudalismin decline in the WesternChou and WarringStates respectively;
that of the destructionof feudalismand the creationof the first centralized
and bureaucraticallyadministeredempire in the Ch'in-Han;and that of the
re-emergenceof a form of feudalismin the Age of Divisionthat followedthe
dismembermentof the empire. In the last of these periods China again ex-
periencedthe rise to power of an aristocracy.The most highly regardedof
the noble families were those whose founders had won land, wealth and
clients in the civil wars that testified to the break-up of the Han. These
were the "OldFamilies"or chiu men. Next to them in prestigewere the so-
called "SecondaryFamilies"or tz'u men, and then the "LaterFamilies"or
hou men. These comprisedthe lesser nobility.Followingthem in the social
hierarchy,but at an appreciabledistance,came the hsfin men, families who
owed their titles of nobility to the meritoriousservices,usually military,of
their founders.They too were carefully graded, and families who had en-
joyed their titles for two or more generationsoutrankedhsfinmen of the first
generation.This was a stratifiedsociety in which distinctionsof class and
rankwere prizedand well guarded.The intermarriageof personsof different
rankwas stronglydiscouragedand in some instancesforbiddenby law. There
was probablyless social mobilityin China at this time than at any other.36
This summarypictureof the orderingof society duringthe Six Dynasties
period837suggestsconclusionsas to the place of the bureaucracyin the process
35 The quotation is from the admirable study by Donald Holzman, "Les debuts du
system medieval de choix et de classement des fonctionnaires", in Melanges publies
par L'lnstitut des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, vol. 1 (Paris, 1957), 414.
36 E. Balazs is to the point when he suggests that "to understand the Chinese middle
ages it is necessary to read Saint-Simon, with his persons of quality, of birth, of distin-
guished birth, of the first quality, of lesser quality, and with his 'extended and precise
knowledge of houses, births and alliances"', Traits economique du Souei-chou (Leiden,
1953), 12, n.3. Birth was indeed of first importance, and it is no accident that the
compilation of family genealogies, then known as p'u tieh (the ancestors of the later
tsung p'u) should date from this period. According to the historian Chao Yi (1727-
1814) the keeping of such records broadly coincides with the introduction by the Wei
of the "Nine Categories" system discussed above (see his Kai-yui ts'ung-k'ao, ch. 17,
6a-9a). Hsiao Kung-ch'ian, to whom I owe the above reference, writes: "During the
Six Dynasties, when the line between 'high' families and commoners became quite
rigidly drawn, acquaintancewith the p'u tieh (genealogical records) attained the dignity
of an independent branch of 'learning"', Rural China: Imperial Control in the Nine-
teenth Century (Seattle, 1960), 665, n.59.
37 What has been written above refers mainly of course to the Chinese dynasties that
from the fourth to the sixth centuries ruled the South from Nanking. A similar type
 362 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

of refeudalizationrather differentfrom those arrivedat by Weber. In the

only periodof Chinesehistoryin which such a processoccurred,its protago-
nists were not the old officialdomof the Han but the great families who
carved positions of local power for themselvesby seizing the opportunities
offered by the breakdownof public order. Some of these families stemmed
from men who had achievedwealth as provincialgovernorsunder the Later
Han; others from successfulmilitaryleaders;while others again owed their
influence to the prior possession of landed estates which they were able in
the confusion'of war and civil upheavalto transforminto semi-autonomous
domains.A generalexplanationof refeudalizationin termsof "appropriation
of prebends"is quite unacceptable.
This, however,is preciselythe dangerthat Weber saw as threateningthe
authorityof the emperorin later andmore settledperiods- when the bureau-
cracy,far frombeing the tool of a local noblesse,was the obedientinstrument
of a centralgovernmentthat not only controlledthe selectionand indoctrina-
tion of its membersthroughthe examinationsystembut also habituallyexer-
cized powers of appointment,promotion,demotionand removalover every
part of the civil serviceestablishment.It is hard to avoid the conclusionthat
Weberwas led to judge as he did, not by the evidence,but by his conceptof
what matrimoniallbureaucracy",as an ideal-type,entailed. This notion of
Weber'sthat the eventualaim of the official was to appropriatehis prebend
and transmuteit into an hereditarybenefice colors his whole view of the
bureaucracy,suggestsreasonsto him for a numberof the institutionaldevices
that were part of its structure,and underlies his explanationof why the
Chinesebureaucracyfailed to progressfrom patrimonialismto full rational-
ity. ThoughWeberregardsthe mandarinateas patrimonialin the sense that
it developedfrom the ruler'sown household and never completelyemanci-
pated itself from this inheritance,and also in the sense that it was an exten-
sion of and emanationfrom the ruler's own authorityand subject to his
arbitrarywill or whim,he is convincedneverthelessthat betweenthe emperor
and his patrimonialstaff of administratorsthere existed a basic opposition
of interestswhich, if sometimeslatent, was yet alwayspresent.Here he was
certainlyright, though not perhapsentirely so about the interestsinvolved.
In the following importantpassage Weber, while conceding a certain
measureof rationalityto the Chinesebureaucracy,gives his own reasonsfor
the presence of some of the features which in his view preventedit from

of feudalism also characterized the "barbarian"northern dynasties though there, in

addition to factors present in the South, the phenomenon of "ethnic super-stratification"
also played a significant role. In the North the Turco-Mongol conquerors little by
little found themselves compelled to share their power with the Chinese noble families
who had chosen to remain, and who on the whole succeeded in preserving their local
status and privileges intact. On this point see the interesting material on the Northern
Wei (386-550) brought together by W. Eberhard in Das Toba-Reich Nordchinas (Lei-
den, 1949), ch. 5, "Die Lehen", 84-96, esp. 86-7 and Table 10.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 363
either developingnormallyor degenerating.In the event it was forced to
remaina stuntedgrowth.
He writes: "To defend itself againstthe constantlyrenewedthreatof the
appropriationof offices, to inhibit the buildingup by officials of a client-
following based on patronage,and to prevent official posts from coming
underthe controlof monopolisticgroupsof local notabilities,the patrimonial
governmentof the emperor, besides relying on such usual expedients as
short-tenureappointments,the exclusion of officials from posts in districts
where their own clan memberswere resident,and surveillanceby spies (the
so-calledCensors),introduceda furtherdevice - which here appearsfor the
first time anywherein the world- namelythe systemof qualifyingexamina-
tions and certificatesof conduct for office-holding.A man's suitabilityfor
office, and for a particularrank in the hierarchy,was decided, in theory
exclusivelyand pretty much in practiceas well, by the numberof examina-
tions he had passed. The nominationof officials to their posts, their promo-
tion to higheroffices or demotionto lower ones, was carriedout on the basis
of conductreports... In termsof formalstructurethis representedthe most
thorough-goingapproachthat could have been made to civil service objec-
tivity, and in this sense the Chinese was a radical departurefrom the true
type of patrimonialbureaucracy,in which official positionprimarilydepends
on grace and favor. And if personalpatronageand the purchaseof benefices
continuedto exist - whichwas only to be expected- then neverthelessneither
feudalization,nor the appropriationof benefices,nor the formationof client
groups,was allowedto happen.These tendencieswere checkedby the action
of both negative and positive factors: among the former was the intensive
competitionand mutualdistrustwhich dividedthe officialdomagainstitself;
among the latter was the extreme value which Chinese society placed on
certificatesof education acquiredby passing the examinations.As a result
the status conventionsof the officialdomtook on certaincharacteristictraits
which markedwith an indeliblestampthe whole of Chineselife. These con-
ventionswere of a specificallybureaucratictype, were orientedto practical
ends, and were the creationof an educatedelite which,trainedin the classics,
regardeddignityand poise as highestamongthe virtues."38
38 WuG, 708-9. Cf. the partial paraphrase in Bendix, Max Weber, 353. In the para-
graph that follows the passage quoted above Weber gives another reason why China
never developed a modern-style bureaucracy, namely that no provision was made for
the specialization of functions. Any tendency in that direction was indeed officially
discouraged. Hence little attention was given to that specialized training which Weber
regarded as a necessary feature of all rational bureaucracy. He refers to English expe-
rience, but misses the point completely that a classical education was seen in England
(and to some extent is still so seen) as a test of character and a measure of general
ability, and therefore as a good practical criterion for the selection of upper bureau-
crats. English thinking on this point seems to run parallel to Chinese. Weber contrasts
the Confucian ideal, summed up in the saying that "the superior man is not a utensil"
(Anal. II, 12), with Western insistence on specialized technical training. But the weight
 364 OTTO B-. VAN DER SPRENKEL

This passage, like all of Weber'shigh-densitywriting,raises a numberof

points simultaneously.The most importantis clearly his interpretationof
the role played by the examinationsystem. The Chinese were well aware
that no imperialgovernmentwith a vast territoryto administercould exist
withoutan efficientlyfunctioningbureaucracy;and that thereforethe quality
and training, and above all the method of selection, of its officials were
mattersof the greatestmoment.The examinationsystem was the end result
of a millennial preoccupationwith these problems. At its best it tested
directly the scholarshipof the candidate, particularlyhis mastery of the
Classicsand Histories,and his abilityto expresshimself,clearlyand elegantly
if still in conventionalform, as to their meaningand the lessons to be drawn
from them; and indirectlyit was also a test of character,for the preparation
requiredwas a long and arduousone. This is not the place for a detailed
analysisof the system. It is enough to note here that Weber systematically
neglectsthe main purposeof the examinations,and regardsthem instead as
the centralgovernment'sprincipalweapon against the bureaucracy.By him
the emphasisis placed on the use of the examinationtechniqueto divide and
so weakenthe officialdom,whichotherwisewouldform-a threatto the power
of the ruler. He writes, for example, that by stimulating"a competitive
strugglefor offices on the part of the seekers after prebends, and so pre-
ventingthemfromjoiningtogetherto become a feudaloffice-holdingnobility,
the system thoroughlyachieved its aim".39And again: "The examination
system, which was fully operativefrom the end of the seventh century,was
one of the instrumentsby means of which the patrimonialrulerwas able to
preventthe formationof-a closed Estatewhich,in contradistinction to himself,
and in the mannerof feudallords and office nobles, would have monopolized
all claimsto officialprebends."40
To write in this way is completelyto misconceivethe purposeserved,and
the resultsproduced,by the examinations.They were, as is well known, in
theory at least open to all, and were certainlycompetitive.The competition
indeed was severe, as only a very small proportionof those who sat for an
examinationcould expect to pass. But it is illegitimateto concludefrom this
that the competitivestrugglewas carriedover with the same intensityfrom
the examinationsthemselvesinto the official careerto which they gave en-
of the argument is by no means all on one side. Specialization can lead, not to greater
efficiency, but to what Robert K. Merton calls "dysfunctions" in the bureaucracy.
Compare Veblen's concept of "trained incapacity", glossed by Merton as "that state of
affairs in which one's abilities function as inadequacies or blind spots". See his Social
Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 1949), 153. A gain in expertise might be more
than offset by a loss in flexibility. It is relevant here that the Chinese mandarin was
regarded as an "all-purposes"official. A District Magistrate, for example, was ex-
pected to administer his territory, see to its economic prosperity, preside over the
district court and, if need be, take personal control of local military operations.
39 KuT, 408. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 119.
40
KuT, 405. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 116.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 365
trance. On the contrary,the fact of having passed the examinationtrans-
formed the successfulcandidatefrom an ordinaryperson into a memberof
a restrictedelite enjoyingimmense social prestige and power.41To win ad-
mission to this influentialand privilegedgroup was the goal of every ambi-
tious gentry-member;but once in, it was to the interest of the newly cer-
tificatedchMU en or chin shih (Masteror Doctor) so to conducthimself as to
maintainand reinforcethe privilegedstatus of the group to which he now
belonged.This is not to say that there.were no.rivalries or factions in the
Chinese civil service, which in these respects was no differentfrom other
similarinstitutions,but ratherto insist that status solidarityand not internal
strugglewas the featureby which it was most stronglymarked.
It was suggestedabove that membersof.the Chinesebureaucracy,because
they were recruitedalmost exclusivelyfrom the gentry class, were subject
to the pull of divided, and on occasion conflicting,allegiances.On the one
hand, their loyalty was demandedby the service whose functionariesthey
were; on the other, they had obligations to their social:class and, more
particularly,to theirsib members.It must at the same time be bornein mind
that the privilegedgentry,as a group,had an overridinginterestin the pre-
servationof the social order which underlayand guaranteedtheir privileged
position. It was to their advantageto supportany and all forces makingfor
politicaland social stability,42and this imposedcertainlimits on the distance
they were preparedto go in pursuit of their private goals whenever such
action seemed likely to weaken unduly the authorityof the regime. The
presenceof a dividedloyalty amongthe membersof the bureaucracyremains
all the same an importantfact, and one with which the central government
had to reckon.Hence the "otherusual devices"referredto by Weberin the
passage quoted above. The rule limiting office-tenuresto three years was
41 The term "twice-born"applied earlier in this paper to members of the bureaucracy
is hardly an exaggeration. The change of personal status which came with success in
the examinations must indeed have seemed the beginning of a new life. It is significant
that in the biographical chapters of the Standard Histories the year of the subject's
birth is seldom if ever given, but only the year in which he passed the examination
to become chii jen or chin shili. A good account which brings out vividly the excite-
ment which attended the notification of an examination success will be found in the
opening chapter of the late Ch'ing novel by Wen Kang, the Erh nii ying hsiung chuan;
translatedby Franz Kuhn under the title Die Schwarze Reiterin (Zurich, 1954).
42 The gentry were at no time a revolutionary force. Nevertheless they were always
ready to abandon a de jure governmentwhich had shown itself incapable of maintaining
order, and transfer their support to a revolutionary authority which had seized power
and was wielding it effectively. By associating themselves with the new order the
educated gentry had little to lose, while if they succeeded in penetrating and influ-
encing it, they had everything to gain. The disorders preceding the establishment of
the Ming offer a good example of this pattern of gentry behavior. The movement
headed by Chu YUan-chang began as a social war; but its character changed rapidly
as more and more gentry elements, foreseeing its success, and despairing that the YUan
would ever be able to restore the country to peaceful and orderly conditions, infiltrated
its ranks and gave it their support.
366 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

rigorouslyenforced for provincial appointmentsbut, understandably,was

largelyignoredfor posts in the bureausand ministriesof the capital,where
longer tenureshad some advantageand the particulardangersagainstwhich
the rule was intendedto guardwere absent. The regulationagainstofficials
servingin their native provincewas again inspiredby the desire of the cen-
tral governmentto see that its servantswould not be unduly exposed to
pressuresfrom their own sib members and influential neighbors.Neither
these nor other measuresof a like kind need to be explainedby the fear of
a patrimonialrulerthat his officialswould seek to appropriatetheirbenefices
and convert them into hereditaryprebends.The gentry origin of the man-
darinateis sufficientexplanation.
Weber's argumentmay be summarizedas follows: (1) the Chinese bu-
reaucracy,while incorporatingcertain rationalfeatures, was patrimonialin
origin and remainedessentiallyso in characterdown to the end of the im-
perial era; (2) the fact that it functionedin a society whose economy was
predominantlynatural,and was never more than partiallymonetized,meant
that there existed an ever-presentdangerthat the sources of taxationwould
be appropriatedby officials and exploited as privateproperty;(3) the most
importantof the measuresintroducedby the centralgovernmentto prevent
such a developmenttaking place was the state examinationsystem: this
system institutionalizeda competitivestruggle for prebends among office-
seekers,excitedmutualdistrustamongofficials,and so dividedand weakened
the bureaucracy;(4) this, togetherwith the fact that the bureaucracywas of
necessityextensiveratherthan intensive,owing to the smallnessof its num-
bers and the size and imperfectcommunicationsof the empireit administered,
meantthat it was never able fully to masterthe forces of local traditionalism
that dominatedthe countryside.It is to these that we must now turn.
The last remainingtensionof those whichWeberemphasizedin his analysis
of Chinesesociety was that betweenthe governmentas a whole, comprising
both the inner and outer courts, and the countless, though geographically
dispersed, representativesof traditionalself-rule in the provinces, the sib
elders and leadersof gilds and otherprofessionalgroups.
Weber deservesthe highest praise for his recognitionof the lineage as a
main key to an understandingof ruralChina.At the time that he wrote very
little attentionhad been given to this most importantinstitution,and sino-
logists have only recentlybegun to appreciateits significanceand subjectit
to detailed study.43

43 The pioneering work by D. H. Kulp, Country Life in South China, The Sociology
of Familism (New York), was published only in 1925. Outstanding in the more recent
literature devoted to this subject are: Hu Hsien-chin, The Common Descent Group in
China and Its Functions (New York, 1948); Maurice Freedman, Lineage Organization
in Southeastern China (London, 1958); Hsiao Kung-ch'Uan, Rural China, Itihperial
Control in the Nineteenth Century (Seattle, 1960). Also useful, despite its semi-
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 367

The, role which Weber assigns to lineage organizationsemerges clearly

from the following quotations."The sib, which had in the West as good as
lost every particleof its meaningby the MiddleAges, was fully preservedin
China; developingto a degree which finds no parallel elsewhere, even in
India;and playinga partboth in the local administrationof even the smallest
units and in the life of economic associations.The patrimonialgovernment,
exercisingits rule from above, clashed with stronglyorganizedlineage in-
stitutionswhose power sprangfrom below."44Again: "In practicethe patri-
monial bureaucracyfound itself facing a considerablemeasureof local self-
government,usurpedor conceded.On the one hand there were the lineages;
on the other the organizationsof the ruralpoor. Bureaucraticrationalitywas
confrontedby a determinedtraditionalistpower which, on balance and in
the long run, provedstrongerthan itself, both becauseit possessedcontinuity
and because it was the expression of close-knit personal relationships." 45
And finally: "It was the tremendouspower of the lineage, under its strictly
patriarchalleadership,that in actualfact made China'sso-called'democracy'
possible. But this 'democracy',which has been so much writtenabout, had
nothingwhateverin common with 'modern'democracy.On the contrary,it
owed its existenceto (1) the abolitionof feudal class relations,(2) the fact
that the patrimonialbureaucraticadministrationwas so thinly spread over
the country,and (3) the structuralsolidarityand all-embracingauthorityof
the patriarchalsib."46
Recent studiesof the Chineselineagesuggestthat this pictureis somewhat
overdrawn.The evidence shows that lineage organizationswere more nu-
merous, better organizedand more influentialin South China than in the
North.47This may be partly due to southwardpopulationmovementsof the
Han Chinese under "barbarian"pressure. Such internal migrationswere
importantas early as the Six Dynastiesperiod, and notably after the fall of
the NorthernSung and duringthe Mongol conquest.There are also strong
groundsfor associatingdeveloped lineage structureswith local prosperity.
The areas of fertile soil, productiveagriculture,and dense population,con-
ditions which are found predominantlyin the southern and south-eastern
provinces, are also those where clan organizationis most frequentlymet

fictional form, is Lin YUeh-hua, The Golden Wing, A Sociological Study of Chinese
Familism (London, 1948).
4 KuT, 375. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 86.
45 KuT, 386. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 95. The point about continuity is an important one.
The short tenures of officials serving in the provinces, particularly of District Magis-
trates, made continuity in the carrying out of government policies extremely difficult.
Time was generally on the side of the local notabilities.
46 KuT, 386. Cf. Gerth, Religion, 96. The italics and quotation marks are Weber's own.
47 See the present writer's article, "The Geographical Background of the Ming Civil
Service" in Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 4 (1961), 302-
36, esp. 327-9 and Table V.
 368 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

with. What forms of social organization,then, took its place in the north
and northwest?As often happens,Weber'sbroad generalizations,which are
signpost directionsfor future and.fruitfulinvestigations,are shown to. need
modificationby the very researchthey provoke.
Weber's view, explained above, that the bureaucracywas deliberately
subjected to institutionaldisabilitiesby the patrimonialruler in order to
weakenit as a potentialthreatto his own power, goes hand in hand with an
overestimationof the patriarchalforces of local self-rule:by which the bu-
reaucracywas confronted.On the one hand we have the officialdomwhich,
by the use of variousdevices,is "frozen"at a relativelyinefficientlevel, and
preventedeitherfrom degeneratinginto an openlyfeudal systemwith heredi-
tary offices, or from throwingoff its patrimonialnature and progressively
growinginto a fully rational system; on the other we have the -patriarchal
clans, nourishedat the grass-rootslevel by the principleof filial piety, whose
great local strength and gentry leadershipmake them a match, and even
more than a match, for the officials who briefly sojournamong them. It is
no surpriseto find Weber writing that "the Chinese official was regularly
quite powerlessagainstthe local associations,lineages and gilds, whenever
these made commoncause on particularissues. If they put up a seriousand
united opposition the mandarin would certainly lose his post".48In so
depicting the. power relationship between. central. government officials.
and the local associationsWeber is ascribingfar too much influence to
the latter. A..significantmeasure of local self-governmentexisted in rural
China but, to use his own phraseology,it owed its existence.more to "con-
cession"from abovethanto "usurpation" frombelow. It is to these manifesta-
tions of ruralself-rule.that Wittfogelhas appliedthe term "beggars'democ-
racies".4
It is of. some interestto note that Wittfogel'saccountof Chinese society,.
whichin the last analysisis presentedas a monolithicdespotism,is the exact
opposite of that given by Weber. Both scholars can be accused of taking
extremepositions.Wittfogel,however,operateswith a single majorconcept:
that.of the hydraulicsociety "from which all curses flow";.and while not
completelyignoring.such factors as internalcontradictionswithin the court,
or the conflict between ruler and bureaucracy,or that between the govern-
ment as such and the local associations,he either dismissesthem as irrele-
vant to the- realities-of the power struggle or assigns them a minor and
secondaryr6le. In spite of the mass of detail which he brings together,his-
picture is essentiallymonochromeand simplist.In pursuingto the point of
48 WuG, 524. Cf. Martindale and Neuwirth, The City, 83.
49 See his Oriental Despotism, 108-26. Wittfogel explains these areas of social action,
in which certain "politically irrelevant freedoms" are allowed to exist, in terms of the
operation of -a. "law of diminishing administrative returns". After a -point has been
reached where additional "administrativeendeavours cost more than they yield", the
central power will allow its measures of control to taper off.
 MAX WEBER ON CHINA 369

exhaustionhis theme of the hydraulicsociety Wittfogelhimself falls victim

to a "law of diminishingreturns"in yet anotherguise.
Returningto the questionof central versus local power, it must be said
that, while "beggars'democracy"is a graphic enough phrase, it conceals
more of the truth than it reveals. TraditionalChinese governmenthad its
own "style";and it was one that, whereverfeasible, preferredunder- to
over-administration. The devolutionof powers and responsibilitiesto extra-
legal and even informal, as well as to officially constituted,bodies, was a
recognizedand widely used practice. To write of all local liberties as "po-
litically irrelevant",as Wittfogeldoes, is misleading.Their political signifi-
cance, and the areas of social life into which they entered,inevitablyvaried
from time to time and place to place. Some spheresof actionwere tradition-
ally regardedas mainlythe businessof the family, the lineage, and the craft
and merchantgilds; and here the central governmentintervenedonly as a
regulatorof last resort, and often on the appeal of the local organizations
themselves.In this way the lineages and gilds dealt with a wide variety of
their internalaffairsthroughtheir own arbitrationaland-disciplinaryorgans,
the governmentremainingin the background.Other activitieswere equally
recognizedas fallingproperlywithinthe competenceof government.Among
them, naturally,were certainmatters,such as the assessmentand collection
of taxes, which the central governmentheld to be vital to its authorityand
continuedexistence;and in these "sensitive"areas it brookedno opposition
from local interests.In the last analysis,the emergenceof such oppositionin
an organizedform would be classed as rebellion and treated accordingly.
Between these two extremes lay an extensive range of local affairs which
were carriedon in collaborationbetweenthe two parties,with the initiative
coming now from one, now from the other. The partnershipmight run
smoothly, or not; but the exigencies of the situation and the generally
pianissimo style of Chinese governmentdemandedthat it should be con-
tinuous. Compromiseswere of its essence; and the questionas to who, in a
given instance, would hold the upper hand, was decided partly by the
importancewhich governmentattachedto gettingits own way on some par-
ticular point, and partly by the tightnessof the local organizationand the
vigor of its leadership.50
If what is written above approachesa true picture, it can be said that
Weber, who was writinga full generationbefore Wittfogel,and was more-
over no sinologist, offers an analysis that much more nearly matches the
complexityof the subject, and identifiesits elements,than the one given in
50 This complicated balance between closely related and sometimes even inter-
penetratingforces is not easily described in simple terms. Useful material for its study,
particularly in the nineteenth century, is presented in Hsiao's Rural China (see note 43
above), esp. chs. 7-10, 261-500. Also important are the two books by Chang Chung-li:
The Chinese Gentry, Studies on Their Role in Nineteenth-Century Chinese Society
(Seattle, 1955); and The Income of the Chinese Gentry (Seattle, 1962).
370 OTTO B. VAN DER SPRENKEL

OrientalDespotism. Some of Weber'sevidence is insecurelyfounded. Some

of his judgmentsare wrong.He can be convictedof errorsof emphasisand
stress. He was also a conceptualize of genius, and on occasion was the
prisonerof his concepts.Nevertheless,his successin breakingopen a way to
a much more searching and profound understandingof the structureof
Chinesesociety and the forces operativein it, is little short of amazing.The
account he gives of the bureaucracywell exemplifies the merits and dis-
advantagesof his work. Taken en gros, it incorporatesbasically incorrect,
or at any rate one-sided, judgmentsas to the social r6le, authority,and
effectivenessof the officialdom. As against this, everythingis gone into;
every issue is raised and every importantquestion asked. With his excep-
tional insight and flair, and with the great wealth of illustrativecomparisons
his wide readingenabledhim to bringto bear on every aspectof his subject,
Weberis continuallythrowingout ideas that have served, and can still serve,
to initiateinnumerableand alwaysproductivenew lines of inquiry.A balance
struckbetweenthe negativeand positivesides of his achievementcomes out
magnificentlyin Weber'sfavor.

Australian National University