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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

In the period from the second half of the 1920s to 1949, especially the decade
before the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the Guangxi Clique, with Li
Zongren as head, was one of the main factions within the Nationalist Party (Guomindang),
and the most powerful rival to Jiang Jieshi. As Jiang and his faction dominated the central
government and the Guomindang (GMD) leadership, they considered themselves the
representative of the Centre (zhongyang), and other GMD factions based on the different
regions (difang) were regarded as the regional party, headed by the Guangxi Clique, and in
opposition to the centre and to nationalism.1 The two groups opposed each other over a
series of domestic and external policies, a conflict which had an important impact on the
political development of China in the 1930s. Jiang used all his ingenuity to attempt to
eliminate the Guangxi Clique during the period before the Sino-Japanese War. However,
Li and the Clique managed to survive and recover from each defeat, and it remained
persistent in opposition to Jiang, particularly to his external policy. The reason why the
regional forces, with the Clique as head, were so active at that time can be explained by
looking at their historical background. Li and the Clique had vied with Jiang for nearly ten
years before they finally reached reconciliation and acted in unity to resist foreign
aggression. In other words, Li and the Clique’s policy were both anti-Japan and anti-Jiang.
Under this policy, the Guangxi Clique carried out provincial reconstruction and mass

1
See, for example, Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de Zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in
Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan qian shinian zhi Zhongguo, Shanghai:
Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui, 1937; reprinted Hong Kong: Longmen shudian, 1965,
pp. 1-20.

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mobilization according to their experience of local conditions; this demonstrated a strong
trend towards regional development, and the Clique strove for regional cooperation with
the neighbouring provinces in the common pursuit of regional power. Meanwhile, the
Clique also promoted nationalist consciousness among the masses in response to national
political demands for national salvation. Thus, the interaction of the above factors led the
Guangxi Clique to readjust their policies and strategies to meet the needs of the
establishment of the national united front, for which a precondition was to conciliate Jiang
Jieshi within the GMD, when China faced Japanese aggression after the “September 18
Incident” in 1931.

The Main Aim of this Study

The main aim of this study is to evaluate the roles and status of the policies pursued
by Li Zongren and his Guangxi Clique in relation to the achievement of internal unity of
the GMD and the Anti-Japanese National United Front (AJNUF) during the Nanjing
decade. It also analyzes and accounts for the theory and strategies followed by Li Zongren
to achieve political goals for himself and his Clique. Furthermore, it attempts to ascertain
the extent to which the Guangxi Clique transferred regionalism of the Guangxi-type into
mainstream nationalism, in the attempt to resist Japan and save the Chinese nation.
It is necessary to examine briefly the implications of Chinese nationalism and the
relevance of regionalism first. Chinese nationalism was an inevitable outcome of modern
China's social and historical development, the main political agenda in China's
modernization. The agenda was determined by the historical conditions of modern China.
Since the Opium War in 1840, China had been invaded and humiliated by the Western
powers both economically and culturally, and portions of China's territory were divided and
controlled by the powers. Furthermore, the Qing Dynasty was on decline owing to
domestic troubles, such as a series of rebellions aimed at overthrowing the dynasty, and
foreign invasion, particularly Japan's aggression since the first Sino-Japanese War in 1894.
As a result, China faced a gradually mounting national crisis, during which the imperialist
nations established their respective spheres of influence in China. The conflict between the
Chinese nation and foreign imperialism became more and more critical with each passing
day, and the crisis raised Chinese political awareness and demands for national salvation, a

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theme which was to become central to the Chinese revolution. At the end of the nineteenth
century and in the early twentieth century, the aims of the Chinese national revolution were:
(i) to break away from the control of imperialism, and (ii) to achieve national independence
and to maintain China's territorial integrity. This is the content of what is usually called
Chinese nationalism. Put differently, in the course of modern China's national revolution,
nationalism was the “motive force”, and a conviction widely held by intellectuals and
young soldiers with modern military education which contributed to the destruction of the
Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the beginning of a new era - Republican China.2
Parallel to the rise of Chinese nationalism in the late Qing dynasty was regionalism
founded on political consciousness of regional autonomy and identity. What is
regionalism? According to Raymond Breton, theoretically,
Regionalism as a strong sense of local identity and local integration is founded on a
sense of common regional identity. It is partly a frame of mind that leads to the
identification of circumstances and events related to the condition of a territorial
entity, and partly a process whereby these circumstances and events become a
political issue. Regionalism is a socio-psychological and political phenomenon. In
the socio-psychological dimension, regionalism refers to a set of attitudes and
feelings: an identification with an area; a sense of a certain distinctiveness from
other areas; an attachment to a territory, its people, and institutions. It is the result
of the process that leads to the transformation from a particular geographic space
into a social space - that is, a space imbued with meanings and emotional
connotations not attributed to other space. In the political dimension, regionalism

2
For a thorough discussion of Chinese nationalism, its origins and its impact on the
Chinese revolution, see: Mary Clabaugh Wright (ed.), China in Revolution: The First
Phase, 1900-1913, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968; James Townsend, “Chinese
Nationalism”, The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, No. 27 (January 1992), pp. 97-
130; Lucian W. Pye, “How China's Nationalism Was Shanghaied?” The Australian Journal
of Chinese Affairs, No. 29 (January 1993), pp. 107-133; Harold Z. Schiffrin, Sun Yat-sen
and the Origins of the Chinese Revolution, Berkeley, Los Angeles & London: University of
California Press, 1970; Gillert F. Chan and Thomas H. Etzold (eds.), China in the 1920s:
Nationalism and Revolution, New York & London: Newview Points, 1976; James
Harrison, Modern Chinese Nationalism, New York: Research Institute on Modern Asia,
Hunter College of City of New York, 1969; John E. Schrecker, Imperialism and Chinese
Nationalism: Germany in Shantung, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971;
Jack Gray (ed.), Modern China’s Searching for A Political Form, London: Oxford
University Press, 1969; Roger Pelissien, Awakening of China, 1793-1949, London: Secker
and Warburg, 1967; Edmund S. K. Fung, The Military Dimension of the Chinese
Revolution: The New Army and Its Role in the Revolution of 1911, Canberra: Australian
National University Press, 1981; and Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London:
Verso, 1991.

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refers to collective behaviour to defend to a certain extent traditions and gains
which may affect political interest in a certain region or territory.3
In a sense, regionalism is a step towards nationalism, it exists prior to nationalism.
But nationalism may develop from regionalism or may be formed by several kinds of
regionalism. In other words, nationalism is the positive culmination of regionalism, or the
highest expression of regionalism. If nationalism is the mainstream of a country,
regionalism is its tributaries.
In socio-psychological terms, the existence of distinctions of regionalism in a nation
adds to its variety of cultures and historical traditions. It is able to coexist with nationalism.
To a certain extent, however, a strong sense of political regionalism may threaten the
cohesiveness of the nation, if it has reached a point where it amounts to local nationalism,
to a desire to separate from the larger nation as a whole, such as in current political changes
in the former Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. Enormous distinctions between different
regions have existed since China was established over two thousand years ago.4 However,
because of the absence of major historical experiences of regional independence which
preceded incorporation into the Chinese state, and because of the long existence of
Confucian culture as a common tie of Han Chinese, regionalism in China has seldom been
a political problem, since it is not totally antagonistic to the state, except in the Inner Asian
frontier regions.5 That is to say, as a political force arising in the first half of the twentieth
century, regionalism in China was to some extent an alternative to nationalism when the

3
R. Breton, “Regionalism in Canada”, in David Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and
Supranationalism, Quebec and London: The Institute for Research on Public Policy and
Policy Studies Institute, 1981, pp. 58-9.
4
For a thorough discussion of Chinese regional distinctions, see He Bingdi (Ping-ti Ho),
Zhongguo Huiguan Shilun, Taipei: Xuesheng shuju, 1966; and Ping-ti Ho, “The
Geographical Distribution of Hui-Kuan in Central and Upper Yantze Provinces - with
Special Reference to Inter-regional Migrations”, Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies,
New Series V, No. 2 (December 1966), Singapore, pp. 120-152. Also see Li Jifeng,
Shengqu zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, unpublished PhD thesis, Nanjing
University, China, 1992, pp. 12-31; and Diana Lary, Region and Nation: The Kwangsi
Clique in Chinese Politics, 1925-1937, London: Cambridge University Press, 1974, pp. 2-
9.
5
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 2.

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central authority was weakened.6 But it could easily be forged into nationalism once the
central authority was strengthened, such as was the case with the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) regime in mainland China after 1949. In short, regionalism and nationalism were
not necessarily antagonistic, and could coexist. In the circumstances that most of the
Chinese masses had not yet gone through the process of the mobilization of nationalism,
political regionalism was a local nationalism with regional sentiments, and an indispensable
alternative for the political mobilization of the masses. It played a positive role in the
development of Chinese nationalism.7 Also, Chinese society had been based on the
patriarchal clan system (zongfa zhidu). In this system the political consciousness of the
masses towards the nation had never been a strong factor.8 The political consciousness of
the masses which was awakened through the identification of each individual with his or
her region or province, however, gave a strong impetus to the rise of nationalism once a
sense of larger patriotism was aroused,9 of which Guangxi was an example.10 In other
words, regionalism contributed to the growth of nationalism since it promoted China’s
transformation into a modern nation-state. However, there were problems. After the
establishment of the Republic, regionalism was believed to be a major source of

6
Even in the Beiyang warlord period, according to Pye, the expansion of regionalism as a
political force was a phenomenon of the open and competitive politics when an old order
had been destroyed but the new one has not been built up. The failure of the open and
competitive politics led China to the reunification under the GMD. See Lucian W. Pye,
Warlord Politics: Conflict and Coalition in the Modernization of Republican China, New
York: Praeger, 1971, especially “Introduction”.
7
A Chinese historian has discussed the origins and evolution of modern regionalism (or
provincialism). See Li Jifeng, Shengqu zhuyi yu minguo shengzhi de sanbian, p. 25.
8
For a thorough discussion of the rural society of China under the patriarchal clan
system, see Wang Zhaoshi, Zhongguo wenti de fenxi, Shanghai: SWYSG, 1935; and Fei
Xiaotong, Xiangtu Zhongguo, Shanghai: Zhongguo guanchashe, 1947; and Fei Hsiao Tung,
“An Interpretation of Chinese Social Structure and Its Changes”, in Fei Hsiao Tung (Fei
Xiaotong), Chinese Village Close-Up, Beijing: New World Press, 1983, pp. 124-157.
9
Yun Yiqun provides good examples how peasants moved outside their small and
limited circles such as clan, village and town and participated in the war of resistance
against Japan after they were mobilized through political propaganda. See Yun Yiqun,
Kangzhan yu nongmin, Shanghai: Da shidai chubanshe, November 1937.
10
For example, see Zhen Hua (comp.), Guangxi ge jiaoluo de jiuwang yundong,
Nanning: MTZKS, 1938.

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warlordism and social turmoil leading China to “regional disintegration” and “national
disunity”, according to some scholars.11
The GMD commenced the course of reunifying China in the 1920s, with the
Northern Expedition (1926-1928) - the Nationalist Revolution - which had two missions: to
remove warlordism and to free China from the control of foreign imperialism. The
Expedition ended in triumph two years after it was launched in Guangzhou in 1926, and
established Nationalist rule in Nanjing under Jiang Jieshi.12 However, in the following
decade (1928-1937) - the so-called Nanjing decade - the internal struggle within the GMD
became one of ideology and of military strength, as well as one over internal and external
issues, besides the struggle among different factions and groups for power in both regional
and central structures. The outcome of these struggles was a series of military conflicts
within the GMD, such as the conflict between Jiang Jieshi and the GMD’s other civilian
and powerful military leaders such as Hu Hanmin, Wang Jingwei, Li Zongren, Feng
Yuxiang, Yan Xishan, and others.13 Li Zongren was the first of these leading military
figures within the GMD to be brought down by Jiang Jieshi. The outbreak of military
conflict between Jiang and Li was a prelude to a series of civil wars between 1929 and
1931 among the factions of the GMD. Following this, Li kept Guangxi semi-independent
from Nanjing in the years until 1936, for which he was condemned by the Jiang group as a

11
For a thorough discussion of regional disintegration and national disunity in the
Beiyang warlord period, see Chen Zhirang (Joreme Ch’en), Junshen zhengquan, Hong
Kong: SLSD, 1979; and James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The Republican Era
in Chinese History, 1912-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975. For discussion of the
Beiyang Warlord period in details, see Hsi-sheng Ch’i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-
1928, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976; and L. W. Pye, Warlord Politics.
12
For a thorough discussion and description of the Northern Expedition and the
Nationalist Revolution, see C. Martin Wilbur, The Nationalist Revolution in China: From
Canton to Nanking, 1923-1928, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; and
Donald A. Jordan, The Northern Expedition: China’s National Revolution of 1926-1928,
Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976.
13
For conflicts and civil wars among the GMD factions, see Zhang Tongxin,
Guomindang xin junfa hunzhan shilue, Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1982; Lei Xiaocen, Sanshi
nian dongluan Zhongguo, Vol. 1, Hong Kong: Yazhou chubanshe, 1954; Zhongguo
qingnian junrenshe, Fan-Jiang yundong shi, Guangzhou: Zhongguo qingnian junrenshe,
1934, pp. 96-251; Li Taifen and Song Zheyuan (eds.), Xibeijun jishi 1924-1930, Hong
Kong: Dadong tushu gongsi, 1978; Chen Shaoxiao, Heiwang lu, Hong Kong, ZCCBS,
1966; and Hallett E. Abend, Tortured China, New York: Ives Washburn, Inc., 1930.

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representative of regionalism, regional militarism and regional separatism.14 Thus, within
the GMD, Li, who headed the big and small militarists and civilians at provincial level, and
who challenged Jiang’s domination in the central government, was considered to be the
most important rival to Jiang. For some scholars, the Nanjing decade was an era of
disintegration, and they suggest that regionalism contributed to it.15 In other words,
regionalism headed by Li was considered unhelpful to national unity and the kind of
centralization on which Jiang expended much of his energy. As Martin Wilbur points out,
The success of the Northern Expedition appeared to open the door to an era in
which China's new political leadership could tackle the three major problems
confronting the modern Chinese nation - regional separatism, foreign domination,
and socioeconomic maladjustment.16

14
That Li was officially attacked as a selfish regionalist and remnant warlord came from
Jiang’s declaration in the GMD’s 3rd national congress in March 1929 when Jiang issued
an order to wipe out the former’s troops in both Hubei and Guangxi provinces. Since then
Jiang’s attack on Li almost became a central tenet for Jiang's followers, even of scholars of
the GMD’s history. See Luo Jialun (ed.), Geming wenxian (hereafter as GMWX), No. 79,
p. 117; Guowen zhoubao (hereafter as GWZB), Vol. 6, No. 12 (March 30, 1929); and Pan
Gongzhan, “Shinian lai de Zhongguo tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui
(ed.), Kangzhan shinian qian zhi Zhongguo, pp. 1-20. Also see “Taofa Guixi junfa
wengao”, 1929, and “Taofa Guixi junfa xuanchuan dagang”, 1929, Archives of Editorial
Committee for War History, the Second Historical Archives of China, Nanjing.
15
The details see, for example, James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The
Republican Era in Chinese History, 1912-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975; Jiu-hwa
Lo Upshur, China Under the Kuomintang: The Problem of Unification, 1928-1937,
unpublished PhD thesis, the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1972; Robert
A. Kapp, Szechwan and the Chinese Republic: Provincial Militarism and the Central
Power, 1911-1938, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973; Lloyd E.
Eastman, China Under Nationalist Rule: Two Essays: The Nanking Decade, 1927-1937,
and The War Years, 1937-1945, Urbana, Illinois: Center for Asian Studies, University of
Illinois, 1982; and the same author, Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule,
1927-1937, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974; Zhang Xianwen (ed.),
Zhonghua minguo shigang, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1985; Zhang Tongxin, Guomindang
xin junfa hunzhan shilue; and the same author, Jiang Wang hezuo de guomin zhengfu,
Harbin: HLJRMCBS, 1988.
16
C. Martin Wilbur, “Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the
Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis:
Volume 1, China’s Heritage and the Communist Political System, Book One, Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1968, p. 258. Also see Jiu-hwa Lo Upshur, China Under the
Kuomintang, p. 11.

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From then on, according to some scholars, regionalism in the Nanjing decade seemed to
play the same role as militarists did in the Beiyang warlord period. It disrupted the
development of Chinese nationalism.17
However, Professor Diana Lary has argued through her case study of the Guangxi
Clique’s political role in the Republican period between 1925 and 1937 that regionalism
provided the sinews that held China together. She suggests that regionalism for the Clique
was not an end in itself but a stepping-stone on the way to nationalism. In the case of the
Clique between 1925 and 1937, the regionalists headed by Li Zongren set out on their
course of regionalism with the aim of serving the nation in such a way that regionalism and
nationalism could coexist. Moreover, the Clique linked its regionalism to militarism as the
most efficient means of achieving regional reconstruction. By an extension of the process
of justification, nationalism came not only to justify regionalism but also militarism.18 Lary
therefore provides a new explanation of the relations between regionalism and nationalism.
More importantly, she has conducted a comprehensive and painstaking investigation of the
political behaviour of the Clique as a political group, which was persistently attacked by
both Jiang’s followers and the Communists. In the field of studying China’s provincial
history, and in particular, the history of the Clique, Lary’s work is of great significance.
Her voice, moreover, has been echoed in recent works on the Clique published in mainland
China.19
Although Lary’s theoretical assumptions have inspired a reevaluation of the
Guangxi Clique's role in Chinese politics and revising some previous views on the Clique,
she does, however, overlook the following issues: 1) What were the factors affecting the
Clique’s political behaviour which could be seen to serve the nation? 2) To what extent

17
Particularly, some scholars studying modern Chinese history or the GMD’s history
have insisted on such a standpoint. See, for example, Furuga Keiji, Jiang zongtong milu,
Vol. 7, Taipei: Zhongyang ribaoshe, 1976, p. 122; Pan Gongzhan, “Shinian lai Zhongguo
de tongyi yundong”, in Zhongguo wenhua jianshe xiehui (ed.), Kangzhan shinian qian zhi
Zhongguo, pp. 1-20; Guo tingyi, Jindai Zhongguo shigang, Hong Kong: The Chinese
University Press, 1982, chapter 16; and Zhang Yufa, Zhongguo xiandai shi, Taipei:
Huadong chubanshe, 1977, pp. 229-36.
18
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, pp. 8-19.
19
See Mo Jijie and Chen Fulin (eds.), Xin Guixi shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990; and
Shen Xiaoyun, Li Zongren de yisheng, Zhengzhou: HNRMCBS, 1992.

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was regionalism transformed into nationalism? 3) What was the motive force that impelled
the internal political unity of the GMD, particularly the reconciliation between Li Zongren
and Jiang Jieshi? And 4) Did Li and the Clique play a positive or negative role in the
GMD’s internal political unity? Furthermore, although the period on which Lary focuses
was coincidental with the process of the formation of the Anti-Japanese National United
Front (AJNUF), she does not pay sufficient attention to the important role of the AJNUF in
influencing the political behaviour of most factions and individuals inside and outside the
GMD at that time. In fact, with respect to political unity throughout the country, the
Clique, regardless of whether it is categorized as a representative of regionalism or
nationalism, contributed much to the formation of the AJNUF. Both regionalism and
nationalism had at this time the same aim - to oppose Japanese aggression, an urgent task
facing the Chinese nation in the 1930s.
Based on Lary’s theoretical framework and by taking Li Zongren’s political
behaviour as a case study, the main objectives of this study are: (i) to focus on the
relationship between regionalism and nationalism; (ii) to discuss regionalism's roles in both
the process of the internal political unity of the GMD and the formation of the AJNUF; and
(iii) to deal with the issues mentioned above that Lary has failed to address. In so doing,
the scope of this study will be limited to the Nanjing decade, mostly to the first half of the
1930s, i.e. before the outbreak of the War of Resistance against Japan on July 7, 1937.
By analyzing Li Zongren’s practice in the Nanjing era, this study attempts to
address the following issues. First, it seeks to explore how the people in rural society were
mobilized to serve the promotion of regionalist and nationalist political consciousness by
Li’s efforts in Guangxi. Here, his advocacy of regionalism as a path to mass nationalism
became a means of changing their loyalties from the smaller social units of the family at the
basic level such as that of village and district, to that of the nation. In short, I will examine
whether Guangxi’s regionalism played a positive role in waking the political consciousness
of nationalism among the masses, a task the Clique had been undertaking in Guangxi for
years, as Eugene Levich has emphasized.20 Secondly, an attempt in this study is made to
appraise Li’s role in dealing with the relations between regionalism and nationalism from

20
For discussion of Guangxi’s mass mobilization for waking nationalist consciousness in
response to national crisis, see Eugene W. Levich, The Kwangsi Way in Kuomintang
China, 1931-1939, New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1993.

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two perspectives: i) the political and social conditions facing Li and his rivals at that time;
and ii) whether Li’s response helped the course of the War of Resistance. Furthermore, it
will demonstrate that what China really needed then was a wider political form of the
united front when the national crisis was in a desperate situation, in which the internal
political unity of the GMD was a prerequisite to that form. There was a desperate need to
arouse a strong sense of nationalism in the masses to inspire them to defend the country.
The rural revolution carried out by the CCP in Jiangxi and other areas in the 1930s had
already proved to be unsuccessful because it failed to meet the demands of the current
political situation.21 To survive themselves, and to retain hope of achieving their goals, the
CCP was also seeking a new political form, which was the AJNUF. No studies of modern
Chinese history can afford to neglect these issues. Political unity nationwide had to be the
first priority in the steps towards political integration, if any mobilization of the whole
nation to carry out a struggle against imperialism was to be successful. It will be argued
that the internal political unity of the GMD was prior to political integration of the whole
nation for the common purpose of resistance to foreign aggression and that the mark of the
achievement of such national political unity was the AJNUF. Contrary to Lary’s view that
“the persistence of regionalism undercut nationalism, the nationalism of national unity”,22
this study attempts to show the extent to what the Guangxi Clique and Li Zongren had
helped, not undercut, national unity. Through analysis and discussion of the above issues
this study also attempts to implement Lary’s approach to the interaction between
regionalism and nationalism by focusing on Li’s activity in Guangxi and his response to the
political situation of the 1930s.
Political Integration and Imperialism

The concept of political integration should be further defined here. “Integration”


refers to the condition of making whole or complete and to the process of bringing together
the parts of the whole into a coherent entity. Political integration refers to the process of

21
For a thorough study of the failure of the Chinese Communists’ experiment of the rural
revolution before the War of Resistance against Japan, see Conrad Brandt, Stalin’s Failure
in China, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1958; and Ilpyong J. Kim, The Politics of
Chinese Communism: Kiangsi under the Soviet, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London:
University of California Press, 1973.
22
Diana Lary, Region and Nation, p. 212.

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uniting all groups, communities and regions into a political organization striving for their
common goals in a nation-state. In a sense, according to Ronald L. Watts, the concept of
political integration is to be distinguished from national integration. The latter refers to the
process or condition of uniting the parts of a nation, that community living within a
territory that shares a common history, set of symbols, and subjective feeling that bind its
members to one another. Furthermore, Watts emphasizes,
Political integration is distinguished from the concepts of economic integration and
social integration, each of which may contribute to political integration but is itself
distinct. Economic integration refers to the closer linking together of economies in
a free trade area, a common market, or an economic union, but the degree to which
economic integration involves the creation of integrative political organs may vary.
Social integration refers to the process or condition of interrelating social
institutions, such as family and kinship systems, the systems of voluntary
associations, and all the other aspects of a society including its economic and
political institutions so that they operate in a cohesive and interdependent fashion.
In other words, political integration is the uniting of distinct groups, communities,
or regions into a workable and viable political organization. Political integration
may be coterminous with national integration in the case of the nation-state, but it
may be limited to a smaller sub-national unit or take the form of a wider,
multinational political organization, for political integration refers to the process of
unifying political institution into a cohesive whole over time or a condition of
political cohesion.23
What China needed during the Nanjing decade was just this kind of political integration.
The outcome of the Northern Expedition brought all provinces under the GMD’s
flag, which at least gave the appearance of national unification. To what extent such
unification was genuine is another question. It is true, as mentioned above, that the central
authority was so weak that China was considered not really “unified” because of the
existence of warlord remnants and other factors.24 But the question here is how to define
the meaning of unification and unity. The so-called “disunity” of China was attributed to
the struggles between the GMD and CCP in the ideological field, as well as the debates on
explaining the aspects and implications of unification between different factions and
groups, inside and outside the GMD. Since entering the twentieth century, China was

23
Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration”, in David
Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and Supranationalism, p. 5.
24
See Lloyd E. Eastman, Abortive Revolution: China under Nationalist Rule, 1927-1937;
and Martin. Wilbur, “Military Separatism and the Process of Reunification under the
Nationalist Regime, 1922-1937”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, p.
258.

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greatly affected by a variety of western ideas and ideologies which mixed with traditional
Confucianism, and there were many contradictory views. For example, after the Northern
Expedition, did unification mean centralization, or to be more exact, dictatorship under
Jiang Jieshi? To what extent was localism or regionalism to be tolerated? There was no
agreement on these and other questions. Since the limits of authority at the centre, the
region and district had been unclear, each faction and individual, in the debates and
conflicts within the GMD, could borrow theoretical support from Sun Yatsen’s doctrines
such as the Three Principles of the People (sanmin zhuyi) and the Fundamentals of
National Reconstruction (jianguo dagang) as their weapons against others. Sun Yatsen’s
doctrines were only an ideal that had not been put into practice before his death in Beijing
in 1925; but they remained a powerful influence on the Party's ideology of political
leadership and organization. Furthermore, there was disagreement on the methods to be
used to attain unification and the priorities in achieving different goals such as those
affecting national reconstruction. Some ideas and aspirations of unification conflicted with
others and, given the external factor which was beyond China’s control, and relative
domestic conditions, some aspirations clearly conflicted with actual political
circumstances.25 There was ideological conflict not only between the GMD and the CCP,
but also among factions of the GMD themselves. All of them contributed to the
phenomenon of “disunity” in the Nanjing decade. Consequently, political unity within the
GMD became the main problem that the Nationalists had to solve. To Jiang Jieshi, who
dominated the central government during this era, political unity was closely identified with
his personal leadership in the GMD party structure, in the government and the army, i.e.
centralization under his control.26 Since Jiang’s position within the GMD was by no means
supreme at the beginning of the Nanjing Government, his attempt to use military means to
wipe out his rivals at both the central government and provincial level in order to achieve
this sort of political unity was immediately challenged by his allies and colleagues, both
military and civilian. This was the historical background to the civil wars in 1929-1931
among the GMD factions and the holding of the Enlarged Congress of the GMD (kuoda
huiyi) in Beiping in 1930 as the opposition to Nanjing.

25
For a thorough analysis and discussion of these different problems of unification, see J.
Lo Upshur, China under the Kuomintang.
26
Ibid, p. 3.

12
Such “disunity” emphasized the necessity for political reconciliation within the
GMD and in the country because political integration was the prerequisite of a reborn
China. In short, China’s “disunity”, particularly from the completion of the Northern
Expedition until 1931, was reflected in political conflicts both within and outside the GMD,
apart from territorial conflicts. China’s territorial disintegration after 1931 was due to the
external factor of Japanese imperialist aggression, not to internal territorial separation. This
followed from the fact that Chinese political consciousness had not yet been unified to the
point of understanding the urgent need for political integration. Logically, political
integration was the premier task after the nation was unified even though this unification
was nominal.
To achieve political integration, certain conditions require to be satisfied, and these
have been identified by Ronald Watts. According to Watts, an understanding of the factors
which contributed to political integration would require an examination of the following
aspects:
(1) the background conditions, including (a) the degree of spill-over from pre-
existing national, economic, and social links or integration among the
components, (b) the proximity of the components, (c) the relative size and
bargaining power of the component units, and (d) the complementarity of
their elites;

(2) the strength of the integrative motives present, including (a) the desires for
security from external or internal threats, (b) the desires for utilitarian or
economic benefits, and (c) the desires for a common identity; and

(3) the character of the integrative process itself in terms of (a) the character of
the bargaining process, (b) the role of the leading elites, and (c) the timing
and sequence of steps in the process of negotiation and unification.27
China’s historical development in the 1920s and 1930s showed that, with respect to the
above factors of political integration, the second factor was the most important one. The
motive force of political integration was decisive, for the others were to a great extent
affected by it. In terms of motivation for action, this was the desire for security from
external or internal threats.
Fear of impending disaster and desire for security from external threats are strong
emotions which need to be channelled into a form of a practical and effective action. Only

27
Ronald L. Watts, “Federalism, Regionalism, and Political Integration”, in David
Cameron (ed.), Regionalism and Supranationalism, p. 6.

13
political integration can give shape and direction to these emotions. What then was the
motive force of China's political integration?
To answer this question, a brief review of the objectives of the Chinese national
revolution is in order. As mentioned earlier, the Northern Expedition was the most
important component of the Chinese national revolution, and also the concrete expression
of Chinese nationalism, one which had two missions. The outcome of the Northern
Expedition raised hopes that the mission of ending warlordism had at least, superficially,
been achieved. That is to say, it is true that a series of new problems were left over or
created during the campaign to end warlordism launched by the GMD. But these problems
belonged only to the internal conflicts or internal contradictions within China that needed
time to be resolved step by step. However, the mission of emancipating China from the
imperialist yoke and achieving national independence had failed. Moreover, the Nanjing
Government under Jiang resorted to making concessions to the Western powers and
Japanese imperialism, particularly in dealing with the “Nanjing Incident”, which was
launched by the British Navy in March 1927, and the “Jinan Massacre”, which was
engineered by the Japanese in May 1928. The GMD’s policy of compromise towards
imperialism added to the feeling of failure. In a sense, how to understand and how to
approach the task of anti-imperialism became the focus for the various factions of the GMD
which were involved in internal conflicts. It is not surprising that the left-wing GMD
attacked the Nanjing Government even in the process of the Northern Expedition.28 This
attack was motivated by strong feelings of patriotism, which was the core of Chinese
nationalism. Chinese patriotism had been fostered in the Han people's long resistance to
the aggression from other nationalities along its frontiers. After the Opium War in the
1840s, the Chinese were gradually awakened to the development of nationalism. In other
words, modern Chinese nationalism had sprung from humiliations and aggression inflicted
by foreign imperialism. This aroused a sense of Chinese patriotism gradually accompanied
by a desire for democracy, freedom, independence, and equality by the May Fourth
Movement in 1919. The accomplishment of the Northern Expedition was the inevitable

28
For a thorough discussion of the left GMD's anti-imperialism and their criticism of the
Nanjing Government’s foreign policy, see Edmund S. K. Fung, “Anti-Imperialism and the
Left Guomintang”, Modern China, Vol. 11, No. 1, pp. 39-76. For details of the criticism
from the Left-wing GMD, see the periodical of Geming pinglun, edited by Chen Gongbo
and published in Shanghai in 1928.

14
outcome of this widespread desire for national unification. More importantly, the goal to
enrich the state and strengthen the military (fuguo qiangbing) and to ward off the foreign
threat attracted a number of intellectuals and ardent youths to join in the Northern
Expedition - the Nationalist Revolution. However, the GMD did not continue to pursue the
goal after the Expedition, but fell into intense internal struggles for power. To some extent
its loss of support from young intellectuals was due to its failure to carry on its struggle
against imperialism. Chen Gongbo, leader of the left-wing GMD at that time, had already
pointed out this mistake of the GMD.29
After the “Jinan Massacre” in 1928, Japanese aggression was further intensified and
this sparked off the “September 18 Incident” in 1931 when the Northeast provinces were
occupied by the Japanese army. Japanese imperialism became the principal enemy of the
Chinese nation. In this situation, the main task of the Chinese revolution - anti-imperialism
- was provided both viable substance and a direct target. Resistance against Japanese
aggression became the most concrete expression of the Chinese revolution in the struggle
against imperialism. As the national crisis deepened, resistance against Japan became a
mark of national identification over which no party, nor individual or any factions within
and outside the GMD disagreed, however much they still struggled for different ideologies
and for a share in the political power both in the central government and the provinces.
Each of them exploited the need for resistance against Japan as their political slogan or as a
justification in their struggle against others. For example, the Red Army found it
convenient to borrow the slogan of “beishang kangri” (march northwards to resist Japan)
when it was forced to withdraw from its base in Jiangxi province in 1934. When Jiang
Jieshi attempted to establish centralization under his control, he condemned all of his rivals
in the GMD for delaying and obstructing the plan of national resistance against Japan for
which he had formulated his policy of “domestic pacification before external war”. On the
contrary, the opposition within the GMD attacked Jiang’s compromise policy and alleged
surrender to Japanese imperialism for which they upheld the slogan of “down with Jiang to
clear the way for resisting Japan”. The nature of these struggles and debates among
different parties and factions is difficult to evaluate.30 However, it is clear that resistance

29
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1979, Chapter 8.
30
For details of these views, see James E. Sheridan, China in Disintegration: The
Republican Era in Chinese History, 1921-1949, New York: The Free Press, 1975; Ke-wen

15
against Japan had become a central political concern, affecting the identity of the whole
nation. In this respect, such struggles and debates appeared to a certain extent to follow the
tide of history; all parties and factions within and outside the GMD, except for pro-
Japanese elements, moved voluntarily or involuntarily in a similar direction; that is, they
were all compelled to seek national political unity, which was a prerequisite to political
integration.
This new unity increasingly influenced the political behaviour of different parties
and factions and impelled them all to move closely together as they followed the direction
of resistance against Japan. Resistance against Japan was therefore the prime motive force
which promoted the quest for political unity of the Chinese nation prior to 1937. After
1937 China entered the nationwide War of Resistance, which initially gave the appearance
of political unity throughout the nation. This was a turning point in the history of China
because, except for pro-Japanese elements, all parties and groups throughout the country
came under one leader for the common aim - to resist Japan and to thwart her continental
ambitions. The historical situation at that time indicated that China had at least set foot on
the path to political integration. Whether or not the opportunity for political integration
was seized by those parties and groups is another question, and beyond the scope of this
thesis.31

Regionalism and Mass Nationalism as An Approach to Political Integration

What path could achieve political unity within both the GMD and the country? To
answer this question, it is necessary to briefly review the China's social structure, which to a
great extent affected political behaviours and interrelations of the people and factions or
parties.

Wang, The Kuomintang in Transition: Ideology and Factionalism in the “National


Revolution”, 1924-1932, unpublished PhD thesis, Stanford University, 1985; and Hung-
mao Tien, Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 1972.
31
For a thorough discussion of political integration in China and of the unity between the
Nationalists and Communists existing in 1937 and the period of the War of Resistance, see
Yang Kuisong, Shiqu de jihui? - Zhanshi guogong tanpan shilu, Guilin: The Guangxi
Teachers University Press, 1992.

16
China was largely a rural society, with the peasantry as the majority of the
population. Although the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat grew in numbers in the treaty
ports, they were not strong enough to change the structure of the nation during the
Nationalist era. Chinese nationalism first rose in the treaty ports as a response to foreign
imperialism. In the first phase of the Chinese revolution, intellectuals were the main force,
while peasants in rural areas retained their traditional life style; the peasantry still had not
been awakened by nationalism, for imperialism had less impact on rural society. The
effects of economic, social and other consequences of imperialism occurred mainly in the
treaty ports.32 The essential character of Chinese society was the “zongfa zhidu”
(patriarchal clan system) that had based itself on the family or clan hierarchy for several
thousand years. Under this system political loyalty lay first to the family head, then to the
emperor, the greatest head of the family - the great Chinese imperial family. This is the
Confucianism of “sangang wuchang” (the three cardinal guides - ruler guides subject,
father guides son, and husband guides wife - and the five constant virtues - benevolence,
righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity). If China was to become a modern sovereign
nation-state in which people could have rights of freedom of speech, assembly and
association, and be responsible for national reconstruction and national defence, the
prerequisite was the mobilization of the whole nation. The peasantry, naturally, were
central to this objective; in any plan for political integration, the peasantry had to be the
main consideration. Fully mobilized, nationalism could lead Chinese to unite together to
expel invaders and enable China to be a genuinely independent and self-determined
sovereign nation, as Sun Yatsen had envisioned. This was the fundamental factor
necessary for successful political integration. This mobilization of the masses was
premised on mass nationalism.33 This mass nationalism had showed its strength in the
course of the Chinese revolution, throughout the War of Resistance in 1937-1945 to the
victory of the CCP in 1949. As Mao Zedong pointed out in 1938,
The mobilization of the common people throughout the country will create a vast
sea in which to drown the enemy, create the conditions that will make up for our
32
Andrew Nathan, “Imperialism’s Effects on China”, Bulletin of Concerned Asian
Scholars, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1972), pp. 3-8.
33
For a detailed discussion of Peasant or Mass Nationalism, see Chalmers A. Johnson,
Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The Emergency of Revolutionary China,
1937-1945, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962, Chapter One.

17
inferiority in arms and other things, and create the prerequisites for overcoming
every difficulty in the war.34
Political integration is, to some extent, both a means to reestablish a political
system in a nation, particularly in a society in which the traditional order has broken down
but in which the new one has not been established. It requires all sub-national political
systems to serve the political system of the nation, which becomes a political organization
uniting all groups and parties. The mobilization of the masses is a fundamental condition
for this political organization, and hence the achievement of political integration. In other
words, the success of promoting political consciousness at levels below that of the national
political system is a prerequisite to encouraging political organization and the political
integration of the nation. For this reason, mass mobilization had to start from the region,
and be built on the basic level of Chinese social structure - the village. Li Zongren’s
practice in Guangxi offers an example of the mass mobilization of the 1930s, which
seemed to promise that regionalism could be combined with nationalism, when the cause of
anti-imperialism was exploited. As to what extent imperialism actually impacted harmfully
on the peasants, this was never fully defined by the Guangxi Clique. The important thing
was that Li and the Clique could use this to justify themselves in their struggle for power
with the Jiang group, and for meeting the needs of mobilizing the masses to achieve
political unity first within the GMD, and then the nation.
Meanwhile, in pursuing this theme, the Guangxi Clique could link the economic
suffering of the peasants from the taxation and other policies of the central and regional
governments to the impact of imperialism, in the course of which they successfully
transformed and re-directed the resentment of the peasants, caused by economic
exploitation, to one external cause - imperialist invasion. The peasants were mobilized in
this way. As a result, the mobilization of the masses, which commenced from the most
basic level of rural society, meant that regionalism could be combined with nationalism for
the special needs of national political unity - anti-imperialism, or to be more exact,
resistance against Japanese aggression at that time.
Furthermore, the goal of China’s national independence called for political
integration, for which the awakening and the mobilization of the masses was a first priority.

34
Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War”, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. 2, Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1975, p. 154.

18
Jiang Jieshi may have realized this, but he only attempted to arouse political consciousness
of the masses through propaganda, through the New Life Movement.35 However, the
Movement was mainly limited to towns and cities and based on dictatorship and
centralization, and Jiang’s policy of “Domestic pacification before external war”. In the
circumstances of increasing national crisis, the failure of Jiang’s policy was doomed
because he failed to carry out the most important task at that time: immediately fighting the
Japanese and mobilizing the masses in rural society. The internal conflict within the GMD,
particularly that between Jiang Jieshi and Li Zongren, should be considered in this context.
This indicated that where struggles for power occurred in the GMD, the success or failure
of the policy of the factions involved was determined by whether they pursued this political
imperative of resistance and mobilization. It must be remembered, however, that China is a
vast country; social, economic, and political development in each province or region was
different. A policy which met both the special circumstances of the region and the political
needs of the nation would be the successful one. What the Guangxi Clique carried out in
its province should be considered in this light.
Under the circumstances prevailing during the 1930s, Chinese nationalism rose to
an unprecedented height and there was intense political disunity within the GMD. Elite
unity was the key to political integration in which the internal unity of the faction and
political cooperation between the factions were essential. Li’s achievement in this respect
enabled the Clique to constitute a strong opposition force to Jiang Jieshi for the entire
decade, to reestablish a sound political structure in Guangxi, to mobilize the whole
province, and to cooperate with other factions in the southwestern region. The major
method of mobilizing the masses was to create mass organizations. For example, the
militia system created by Li and the Clique had its own distinctive features but was
embraced by the masses as a familiar and welcome part of everyday life.
In addition to the successful formation of mass organizations, indoctrination also
played a major role in the mobilization of the masses by Li and the Clique. One of the
approaches to the mobilization of the masses was to employ Sun Yatsen’s Three Principles
of the People combined with a theory of regional identity and loyalty, the theory of the

35
For a detailed discussion of the New Life Movement, see Arif Dirlik, “The Ideological
Foundations of the New Life Movement: A Study in Counterrevolution”, The Journal of
Asian Studies, Vol. XXXIV, No. 4 (August 1975), pp. 955-980.

19
Pearl River Valley Revolution which was used to encourage the masses, especially in
Guangxi, to divert their attention from domestic problems to the external crisis. In other
words, the nationalism of anti-imperialism served as a tool used by Li and the Clique both
to challenge Jiang’s domination of power in the Nanjing Government and to consolidate
their base - Guangxi province.
Other approaches used were the methods of arming and educating the masses.36 In
this sense, the ideal of Li and the Clique of “reconstructing Guangxi to serve the end of
restoring China” (jiangshe Guangxi fuxing Zhongguo) did have real substance.
Regionalism served nationalism as a political force, through its combination with
militarism, as Lary has pointed out. Once the conditions matured, regionalism would
readily fuse with nationalism to serve political integration. As Tang Tsou points out,
Political development in China can be understood as a process in which a small
group of men accepted a modern ideology, adapted it to Chinese conditions,
perfected a system of organizations, developed a set of practices to the whole
nation.37
This appropriate comment must incorporate the work of Li and his Clique. When the
conditions matured, as discussed below, Li’s regional political system was available to be
combined into the national political system to achieve something approaching political
unity and political integration. In this sense, regionalism coexisted with and made a
considerable contribution to nationalism.

The Anti-Japanese National United Front and National Political Unity

36
For a thorough discussion and evaluation of mobilization in Guangxi, see Eugene
Levich, Mobilization and Reconstruction in Kwangsi Province, 1931-1939, PhD
dissertation, Chicago University, 1984; and the same author, The Kwangsi Way in
Kuomintang China, 1931-1939. Levich’s research focuses on the mobilization and
reconstruction done by the Clique and points to the Clique’s reform within the GMD and
its contribution to nation building, this seen as an alternative to the Communist success in
Yan’an. In his thesis entitled “1930 niandai Guangxi de dongyuan yu chongjian” (in
ZYYJYJDSYJSJK, No. 17b [December 1988], pp. 307-53), Chu Hongyuan also suggests
that the Clique was the reformer within the GMD and its mass mobilization and
reconstruction in the province to some extent contributed to the GMD’s nation building
efforts. The research achievements of Levich and Chu will be employed in this study.
37
Tang Tsou, “Revolution, Reintegration, and Crisis in Communist China: A Framework
for Analysis”, in Ping-ti Ho and Tang Tsou (eds.), China in Crisis, p. 285.

20
Achievement of national political unity required a political organization that could
tolerate within it different forces which were willing to set their differences aside in order to
serve the higher goal. It demanded a form capable of bringing all political forces together.
In the 1930s, that form was the Anti-Japanese National United Front (AJNUF). The
formation of the AJNUF was the foundation of resistance to imperialism and a reborn
China. It was the highest expression of Chinese nationalism, as well as a key prerequisite
to any political integration.
The AJNUF was an outcome of Chinese nationalism and a common aspiration of
many parties, groups and individuals opposed to Japanese aggression. The final formation
of the AJNUF resulted from the reconciliation between the GMD and the CCP.38
However, an important question arises: how did the GMD reconcile with the CCP before
Jiang settled his conflicts with his rivals within the GMD? It will be shown that the
achievement of internal political unity of the GMD was a precondition for national political
unity. It will be argued in that to achieve the internal unity of the GMD, particularly the
reconciliation between Jiang and Li, his most powerful rival in the 1930s, was a critical
step in this process. Until this point had been reached, the AJNUF was impossible of
achievement. Guangxi’s “June 1 Movement”, which occurred in June and September
1936, appealed for an immediate war of resistance against Japan and virtually forced Jiang
to promise to lead the national resistance. This was the high point of reconciliation within
the GMD.
The arguments stated above lead this study to challenge the traditional view that the
“Xi’an Incident” which occurred in December 1936 marked the formation of the AJNUF.
Instead, this study will suggest that the “Xi’an Incident” was but a continuation of the “June
1 Movement”. In short, the latter was the prelude to the former. We argue further that Li’s
and the Clique’s contribution to the AJNUF should be judged on the following issues. Li
had insisted on an anti-Japanese policy, calling for much more active resistance against
Japanese aggression. Li’s stand partly forced Jiang finally to abandon his policies of
“rangwai bixian annei” (domestic pacification before external war) and to conciliate with
both his rivals within the GMD and the CCP. On the other hand, Li made Guangxi a base

38
For a thorough discussion of the CCP’s approach to the AJNUF, see Kui-kwong Shum,
Chinese Communists’ Road to Power: The Anti-Japanese National United Front, 1935-
1945, Hong Kong and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

21
of anti-Jiang activity and mobilized the whole province for self-defence as well as
resistance against Japan. Li not only established alliances with military groups or factions
in neighbouring provinces, but also formed a united front with many groups and factions
within and outside the GMD, particularly during the “June 1 Movement”. These factors
forced Jiang to settle internal conflicts within the GMD peacefully, and laid the foundation
for Li’s transformation of his anti-Jiang policy into one supporting Jiang to resist Japan.
Moreover, Li’s military alliance with Sichuan militarists and the Red Army in 1936-37
suggests that their cooperation had gone beyond the scope of mere military defence for their
territories and added a political meaning. That was, in a sense, a means of applying
political pressure to Jiang and the GMD, and a positive action after the “Xi’an Incident” to
ensure the official formation of the AJNUF.

In order to pursue this discussion of the interaction between regionalism and


nationalism, the second and third chapters of this study will discuss the rise of Li Zongren
and the Guangxi Clique, and analyze the internal structure of the Clique. The tradition and
development of Guangxi’s regionalist characteristics, as well as relationship between
regional identity and the Clique’s internal structure, will also be addressed in the two
chapters. The perception of Chinese society and Chinese revolution which affected the
Clique’s mobilization of the masses and its methods, including theoretical framework, and
its impact on reconstruction and mass mobilization in the province, will be the subject of
the fourth chapter. The fifth chapter will analyze the relationship of Li and the Clique with
the Southwest regional factions, and the role of these relationships in the approach to the
internal political unity of the GMD. The following three chapters will focus on the anti-
Japanese ideas and the strategy of Li and his group, as well as the practice of carrying out
their advocacy of resistance, as they pursued the national political objectives and their own
political interests during the formation of the AJNUF. These three chapters also account
for the reactions of Li and the Clique to the political situation during the Nanjing era,
during which the Li and Jiang groups moved from confrontation to reconciliation. Through
analysis and discussion of these issues, this study attempts to provide a better understanding
of Chinese political conflicts within the GMD, the political attitudes and ideals of certain
outstanding political figures, such as Li and other leaders of the Clique, as well as the
relationship between nationalism and regionalism.

22
Before we address these issues, it is necessary to briefly explain two issues. The
first one is the term “Guangxi Clique”. The term has two meanings. One refers to the
Guangxi military group under the leadership of General Lu Rongting. As this group was
only active in the Constitution Protection Movement between 1917 to 1920, the
Nationalists at that time preferred to call it “Guixi” (the Guangxi Clique) as Lu Rongting
vied with Sun Yatsen for power in the period of the Guangzhou Military Government from
1917 to 1920.39 The other refers to a new political and military group which emerged from
the womb of the Lu Rongting group and from the same place - Guangxi province - with Li
Zongren as its head; this group emerged after the fall of the Lu group in 1921 and was
active throughout the Nationalist era and exerted a great impact on Chinese political
development. To distinguish both Lu’s and Li’s groups, Chinese historians usually call the
former “jiu Guixi” (the old Guangxi Clique), the latter “xin Guixi” (the new Guangxi
Clique). In fact, the term “Guangxi Clique”, which refers in particular to the group under
Li Zongren and other Guangxi leaders, was first used by some factions of the Nationalists
to attack the expanding influence of Li and his group in both the GMD and the Nationalist
Government during the period before and after Jiang Jieshi was first forced to announce his
retirement in August 1927. According to Chen Gongbo, the term “Guixi” which refers in
particular to Li Zongren and his group was first invented by General Zhang Fakui, who
attempted to replace General Li Jishen as leader of the Guangdong armies. At that time Li
Jishen was Commander of the 4th Army (before the Northern Expedition), Chairman of
Guangdong province, Chairman of the Guangzhou Political Branch of the GMD, and Chief
of General Staff of the Nationalist Revolutionary Army, as well as the ex-superior of Zhang
Fakui. As Li Jishen was a native of Guangxi, he was a powerful supporter of Li Zongren
and his Guangxi group, though not formally a leader of this group. Meanwhile, Li Zongren
and Guangxi leaders played an important role in the Nanjing regime after Jiang’s short
retirement in the second half of 1927. Capitalizing on the situation in which regional
militarists came to be despised, and exploiting the desire of the people of the province to
govern themselves and their own provincial affairs, Zhang Fakui employed the term to

39
For the conflict between Lu’s group and Sun Yatsen and other southern leaders in the
Guangzhou Military Government during the Constitution Protection Movement and Lu’s
defeat, see Li Peisheng, Guixi ju-Yue zhi youlai jiqi jingguo, Guangzhou, 1921; Mo
Shixiang, Hufa yundong shi, Nanning: GXRMCBS, 1990; and Lu Juntian and Su Shuxuan,
Lu Rongting zhuan, Nanning: Guangxi minzu chubanshe, 1987.

23
serve his purpose.40 It should be noted, however, that Guangxi leaders never called
themselves by this name before 1949 because they regarded the term as highly pejorative
and never indeed thought of their group as a “clique”. From the time Li Zongren and other
Guangxi leaders emerged on the Chinese political and military stages, they referred to
themselves as “tuanti” (group), which they regarded as an organization with certain
political ideals and policies.41 For convenience, the term “Guangxi Clique” in this study
refers to Li Zongren and his group because they were usually referred to by the collective
noun “Guixi” after the Northern Expedition. However, the term is politically neutral in this
thesis, except where it quotes from works on this Guangxi group. Similarly, as Li Zongren
was the supreme leader of the Guangxi Clique, his activities and responses to the Chinese
political situation were inseparable from the Clique. For this reason, the terms “Li
Zongren” and “the Guangxi Clique” or “the Clique” in the text are largely interchangeable.
The other issue is the difficulty in obtaining reliable sources for the study of the
Guangxi Clique. Indeed, this is a problem which confronts all scholars of modern Chinese
history. On the one hand, collections of official and private sources that are available pay
little attention to Guangxi and the Clique; and some sources are also frankly tendentious,
having been compiled and published by individuals and organizations sympathetic to either
Jiang Jieshi or the Communists regimes. Li Zongren and the Guangxi Clique were
regarded by these regimes as an opposition by Jiang and a reactionary force by the
Communists;42 consequently, it is important to understand that these sources are unable to
reflect completely and truthfully the events in which the Clique was involved at that time.
If we do not know the above backgrounds and do not use these sources carefully, we can
easily, willingly or unwillingly, be misled by the sources. Moreover, there is still no one
detailed collection of sources relating to Guangxi history in the Republican era available.

40
Chen Gongbo, Ku xiao lu, p. 156. Also see Huang Shaohong, “Xin Guixi de jueqi yu
liangguang tongyi ji dageming beifa”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 6 (1964), p. 1.
41
See Wei Yongcheng, “Tan wangshi”, ZJWX, Vol. 31, No. 6, p. 116; and Diana Lary,
Region and Nation, p. 34.
42
See, for example, Huai Xiang, Li Zongren he zhongmei fandongpai, Hong Kong:
Yuzhou shuwu, 1948; Zhou Quan, Guixi jiepou, Shanghai: Qixing shuwu, 1949;
Zhonggong Guilin diwei (ed.), Hongjun changzheng guo Guangxi, Nanning: GXRMCBS,
1986; and Yi Ming (Anonymous), Liangguang panluan neimu: Tezhong zhengzhi tongxun,
n.p., 1936.

24
This also adds to the difficulty in studying this area. The scholar of the Guangxi Clique
thus has to confront problems of bias and incompleteness in his sources.
To overcome these difficulties, this study follows three principles. The first is to
use original archives and official records, particularly those relating to Guangxi and the
Clique, as much as possible. Of course, these original archives and documents are not
easily accessed, for reading and borrowing them are restricted by the authorities of the
archives in China, at both national and provincial levels. The archives are also not easy to
search. Another factor is that most of Guangxi's records were destroyed by Japanese
bombing during the War, as I was informed in Nanning when I conducted my field work
there for this study. This may be the reason that scholars, including Diana Lary and Eugene
Levich, have not employed these original records in their studies on Guangxi.43
Nevertheless, the documents, especially in the archives of the editorial committee for war
history and of the Nationalist Government that I unearthed in the Second Historical
Archives of China at Nanjing, are extremely valuable. The second principle is to refer as
widely as possible to publications of both Guangxi and other places from the 1920s and
1930s, including newspapers and periodicals. I will use these materials, which originate
from different political and ideological orientations to avoid the bias of relying too heavily
on one particular source of information. The third principle is to use oral historical sources,
including published personal memoirs, collections of written historical materials and
interviews. Oral historical sources might reflect the author's personality and attitudes, some
might provide one-side views, and even make mistakes on dates and places as well as
figures of the events recalled;44 but they are very important sources as they provide us with

43
It is understood that Diana Lary’s study of the Guangxi Clique was conducted in the
1960s when China had not opened her door to western countries, during which she did not
have any chance to search archives in China. For the same reason, although Eugene Levich
has collected numbers of Guangxi official publications for his work in the second half of
the 1970s and the early 1980s, he was still unable to employ archives in his study.
44
For example, Zhou Dai, Yan Xishan’s Artillery Commander in the 1920s, recalled that
he and Bai Chongxi, one of three top leaders of the Guangxi Clique, took part in the
Disarmament and Rehabilitation Conference (bianqian huiyi) in Nanjing at the end of 1928
and in the early 1929, and even that there was a discussion of the disarmament proposals
between them during the conference. In fact, Bai Chongxi had stayed at Beiping from June
1928 when the Northern Expedition Army occupied the city until he was forced to leave
there in March 1929. Only Li Zongren, on behalf of the Guangxi Clique (the Fourth Army
Group of the NRA at that time), took part in the conference. Therefore, the person whom

25
many untold inside stories of the important events of that time, especially those relating to
the secret political organization of the Guangxi Clique. Chapter Two is mainly based on
such sources. Unfortunately, both Lary and Levich did not use these valuable sources in
their studies. If we use these sources very carefully and check the reliability and the
truthfulness of the facts they mention against other sources, they, to a certain extent, are
able to function as an alternative to the records destroyed in the War or to gaps in the
official documents.
Based on these sources, this study attempts to provide a balanced and
comprehensive account of Guangxi's actions in the complicated circumstances of Chinese
politics at that time. In short, this study intends to explain and analyze the actual situation
of Guangxi under the Clique by drawing on a whole range of historical sources, especially
those relating to the province and the Clique.

Summary

This study mainly focuses on the interaction of regionalism and nationalism during
the Nanjing decade through a case study of the Guangxi Clique’s response to the
complicated political situation in the 1930s. In particular, it deals with the following issues.
Did Li Zongren and his Clique undercut nationalism through carrying out a series of
policies in their region in the context of the complicated internal conflicts of the GMD and
under the threat of Japanese aggression? How did the Clique, through its perception of
Chinese society and the Chinese revolution, form its political framework and tactics to
mobilize the masses? Why and how did the situation and conditions at that time lead Li
and the Clique to compromise with Jiang for internal unity of the GMD? And, to what
extent did the Clique contribute to the political unity of the nation in the formation of the
AJNUF, which was a prerequisite of political integration?
The above issues come from rethinking and reevaluating the history of Guangxi and
its role in national affairs during the 1930s. Historians of Guangxi, such as Diana Lary and

Zhou Dai met and talked with should be Li Zongren, not Bai Chongxi. See Zhou Dai,
“Huiyi bianqian huiyi”, WSZLXJ, No. 52. Also see Zhang Guangwei, “Xin Guixi de di
shisan jun”, GXWSZLXJ, No. 3, pp. 28-34; and Li Renren, “Bai Chongxi zai Beiping,
Tangshan huodong de pianduan huiyi”, GXWSZL, No. 21, pp. 84-87.

26
Eugene Levich, have not fully discussed these questions or have not responded to them at
all. They have, however, made a valuable contribution to this area through focusing on the
political behaviour, provincial reconstruction and mass mobilization of the province. Their
studies have, nevertheless, not explained, with sufficient depth and clarity, the interrelations
between regionalism, headed by the Clique, and nationalism. The interaction between
Guangxi's mass mobilization and its perception of Chinese society and the Chinese
revolution is an issue which needs further analysis. In fact, to fully understand the roles and
status of the Clique in the changeable and complicated Chinese politics of the Republic, it
is necessary to pose these questions. This study contributes to a comprehensive
understanding of Guangxi history through analysis and examination of the above issues,
based as it is on newly unearthed documents and relevant materials relating to the Clique
and its reactions to the political trends in the nation during the 1930s.
In so doing, the main arguments of this study are as follows. First, the Clique’s
conception of Chinese society and the Chinese revolution guided the formation of its
policies of mobilization throughout the province. From this, a Pearl River Valley
Revolution theory was formed to arouse the masses’ sense of their own regional history and
to establish pride in regional identity. These emotions were then transferred to the level of
nationalism. Secondly, Li and the Clique successfully established a regional political
system in both the province and the southwest area through the efforts of reconstruction and
mass mobilization in Guangxi and the close relations and cooperation with the southwest
regional factions. Those actions became part of their campaign to achieve the political
unity of the nation for the common aim of resistance against Japan. Furthermore, in
dealing with the national crisis caused by Japanese aggression, Li and his Clique put
forward anti-Japanese ideas and practised them through the June 1 Movement, which was
the prelude to the Xi’an Incident. Thus the Clique made a considerable contribution to both
the internal political unity of the GMD and the formation of the AJNUF. The following
chapters will pursue these arguments in considerable detail.

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