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The "Origin"of Geometry
Reuben Hersh
The German phenomenologist Edmund Husserl wrote a famous essay, "The Ori-
gin of Geometry" that called for a new kind of "historical" research, to recover the
"original"meaning of geometry, to the man, whoever he was, who first invented it.
It seems to me not that hard to imagine the origin of geometry. Once upon a time,
even twice or several times, someone first noticed some simple facts. For example,
when one stick lies across another stick, there are four spaces that you can see. You
can see that they are equal in pairs, opposite to opposite. It happened something like
this, perhaps at some campfire, 20 or 30,000 years ago.
In the dead ashes are lying two sticks, one across the other.
Ancient #1: Look at that! Do you see that?
Ancient #2: What? See what?
1: Those two sticks. How they cross-see, they make four spaces. Two big ones, two
little ones. The big ones are across from each other on the sides, and the little ones are
across from each other, one the top and bottom.
2: So what? (Kicks one of the stocks.) Now what happened to your four spaces?
1: You changed them around. Now the top and bottom are bigger, and the ones on
the side are littler. There are still four spaces. And you still have little facing little, big
facing big.
2: Yes, that'sthe way it is now.
1: Turn them any way you like, you always get four spaces, and they are equal in
opposite pairs.
2: I don't believe it.
1: How can't you believe it? Can't you see it?
2: Just watch now. I turn the top stick, little by little. The top and bottom spaces get
smaller, the side spaces get bigger.
1: All right.
2: What if I stop now? Where are your big and little spaces now, Mr. Smart Aleck
Wise Guy?
1: You stopped before they could switch around. Before the little spaces became
bigger than the big ones and the big spaces became smaller than the little ones.
2: Yes, that's what I did. That shows you're way off, you're screwed up.
1: When the sticks cross now, they make four equal spaces. That's a special interest-
ing way to make two sticks cross. I like that. You did something good.
2: Let's go chase a rabbit and eat it.
Something like this must have happened more than once. Someone noticed some-
thing interesting about a couple of sticks, or bits of straw,or crossed fingers. Something
that has to be so, whether you want it or not. An invariant.A geometric fact.
208 ( THEMATHEMATICAL
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M: Aboutthis figure,this diagram.
R: No, not really.Melissahas you on that.
M: OK. It's a fact aboutthe correctandintendedinterpretation of the diagram.
R: Now, an intendedinterpretation, as you well putit, is whatkindof a thing?
M: Whatdo you mean?Well, it's abstract,it's not physical.
R: Isn'tintendingandinterpretinga kindof activitythatis engagedin by creatures
like you andme?
M: Oh,I see whatyou'regettingat.Youthinkyou'releadingme intoa trapwhereI'll
be forcedto admitthatmathematicalfactslike this one arereferringto sharedthinking
or understanding of humanbeings, ratherthanto objectivepropertiesof entitiesthat
exist independentlyof humanthought.
R: I wouldn'tcall it a trap.Justtryto thinkaboutwhatwe've been saying,andwhat
it meansin termsof whatsome philosopherslike to call "ontology".The questionof
whatexists, or, if you prefer,whatwe're talkingaboutwhen we talkaboutsomething
or anything.
M: No, it's a trap,you know exactlywhatyou'redoing andwhereall this has been
leading.
R: Don't upsetyourself,Merton.This shouldjust be a friendlychatabouttopics of
mutualinterest.
M: Well, I reallydon't have a lot of time for this kindof thing.I shouldbe getting
backto work.
So I imaginethe conversationgoing. But I may be unfair.I may be wrong about
Merton'swillingnessto face up to the meaningof mathematicaltalk.Let's scratchout
the last bit of dialogue,andcontinuein a seriousandthoughtfulway.
M: It doesn'tmakea differencehow we talkor whatwordswe mightuse. Of course
thereis an intentionand an understanding involvedin looking at this diagram.There
is an objectiverealitywhich cannotbe diagrameddirectly,but only suggestedby in-
completebutcorrectlyunderstooddiagrams.Suchis the case here.
R: That'sinteresting.Wesee two line segmentscrossing,andwe knowthatwe could
interpretthemas partsof two infinitelines. Is thatright?
M: Of courseit is. Youknowit is.
R: Just as we know that the lines are not supposedto have any thickness,even
thoughin theactualdrawingwe couldn'tsee themunlesstheyhada positivethickness?
M: That'smoreor less the sameissue.
R: And the segmentsare supposedto be perfectlystraight,even thoughif we were
fussy enoughwith super-accurate measurementswe mightdetecta little curvature?
M: Yes, yes, right,right.
R: If whatwe see werereallya smallpartof a muchbiggerpicture,it couldbe that
in the bigger pictureit turnedout that the two segmentswe see are partsof curved
lines, lines thatmighteven intersectagainsome place faraway?
M: Why wouldyou wantto supposeanythingas weirdas that?
R: I'm tryingto clarify and examinethe way we have this correctunderstanding.
And areyou sureit is correct?Youknow,the Earthisn't reallyflat.
M: Yes, so I've heard.
R: So-
M: Don't say it! I knowwhatyou'retryingto do. You'retryingto tell me thatif we
210 ? THEMATHEMATICAL
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or theirthoughtsor theirconversationsor theirwritings.You haven'tsaid so, but of
course you know it is so.
M: How could I not knowthat?
R: Right.Thatcorrespondsto the notionof soundas subjectivesensation.
M: I see whereyou'regoing.
R: And you'rejust sayingthatapartfrom that,thereis the objectivemathematical
reality,just as thereis the objectivephysicaleventthatis also referredto as sound.
M: Yes, I wouldacceptthatanalogy.
R: And I say it's a false analogy.
M: What'sfalse?
R: Simply thatthereis no observable,identifiable,locatable,describablyinhuman
objectivemathematicalrealitywhich you or anyonecan show me, thatwould corre-
spondto the soundwavesof acoustics.
M: What do you mean? You know that it's objectivelytrue that two intersecting
lines in the plane cut it into four parts.You could even make a physical model of
it, and experiencethe separationphysicallyby puttingup two very long intersecting
fences. Whatdo I haveto do to makeyou see thatthat'sa fact aboutlines in the plane,
independentof whetheranyoneevernoticesit or says it?
R: I fully agree.It is such a fact. But the lines in the planeare simplyourmutually
agreedon, intendedand understoodinterpretations of this diagram.They'rean idea
thatwe understandveryclearly,andcan talkaboutwithcompleteagreement.Andthat
ideaor conceptionindeedhas objectiveproperties,in the sensethatmanyotherclearly
understood,agreed-onmutualideasdo haveobjectiveproperties.Likethe factsof law,
of music,of literature,of properbehaviorin publicplacesin the U.S. in the year2002.
Thereare lots of facts aboutsuch things,andthey arereal facts, objectivelyandhave
objectiveproperties.Theyarewhatwe obviouslysee andexperiencethemas-mutual
understanding. There'sno need andno basis in logic or science to imaginethatthese
ideasandunderstanding canor didexist withoutus as a society,a culture,a profession,
to understandthem.
M: Youmeanthatif somewhereelse in the universeat some timein the veryremote
pastor future,two lines intersectin the plane,they wouldn'tmakefourpieces?
R: If people,or creaturesmuchlike people,hadsuchthoughts,thenandthere,those
thoughtswould have the same consequences.Thatis a big "if".You canjust as well
imagineotherculturalartifactsreoccurringin yourscience-fictionimagination.People
can imagineas they please. But of coursetherecouldn'tbe an infiniteplane andtwo
infinitelines in thatplane,ever, anywhere,as far as our physicalunderstanding per-
mits. Such thingsare used in physicsto statetheoriesof mathematicalphysics.They
are not phenomena,data,observations,or possiblephenomena,data,or observations.
Thereforeto talk aboutwhatwouldhappenif suchphenomenawere impossiblysup-
posed to occuron Antaresor Sirius,way backwhenthe worldwas young,is vacuous.
Whathappenswhenone sticklies on top of anotheris a physicalregularity.We notice
it, conceptualizeit, andthereforecreatemathematics.
References
1. J. Derrida,EdmundHusserl's Origin of Geometry:An Introduction.Translated,with a preface, by John P.
Levey, Jr.David B. Allison, ed., Nicolas Hays, Ltd., Stony Brook, NY, 1978.
2. M. Gardner,Opinion,MathematicalIntelligencer23:1 (Winter2001).
3. R. Hersh,Reply to MartinGardner,MathematicalIntelligencer23:2 (Spring2001).