CIVIL LAW

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS

HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO VS. SERVACIO AND GO

Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the conjugal property
after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only after the liquidation; otherwise, the
disposition is void.

Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Marta’s share in the conjugal
partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of Marta’s share without an actual
partition of the property being first done either by agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that
he had was an ideal or abstract quota in Marta’s share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided
share; hence, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners.

Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-
owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby effectively
transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s share. Article 105 of the Family Code,
supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is
"without prejudice to vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession
of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the
meanwhile, Servacio would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any
portion that might not be validly sold to her.
QUIAO VS. QUIAO

FACTS:

Rita C. Quiao (Rita) filed a complaint for legal separation against petitioner Brigido B. Quiao (Brigido).
RTC rendered a decision declaring the legal separation thereby awarding the custody of their 3 minor
children in favor of Rita and all remaining properties shall be divided equally between the spouses
subject to the respective legitimes of the children and the payment of the unpaid conjugal liabilities.

Brigido’s share, however, of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor of the
common children because Brigido is the offending spouse.

Neither party filed a motion for reconsideration and appeal within the period. After more than nine
months from the promulgation of the Decision, the petitioner filed before the RTC a Motion for
Clarification, asking the RTC to define the term “Net Profits Earned.”

RTC held that the phrase “NET PROFIT EARNED” denotes “the remainder of the properties of the parties
after deducting the separate properties of each [of the] spouse and the debts.” It further held that after
determining the remainder of the properties, it shall be forfeited in favor of the common children
because the offending spouse does not have any right to any share of the net profits earned, pursuant
to Articles 63, No. (2) and 43, No. (2) of the Family Code.

The petitioner claims that the court a quo is wrong when it applied Article 129 of the Family Code,
instead of Article 102. He argues that Article 102 applies because there is no other provision under the
Family Code which defines net profits earned subject of forfeiture as a result of legal separation.

When a couple enters into a regime of absolute community, the husband and the wife become joint
owners of all the properties of the marriage. Whatever property each spouse brings into the marriage,
and those acquired during the marriage (except those excluded under Article 92 of the Family Code)
form the common mass of the couple's properties. And when the couple's marriage or community is
dissolved, that common mass is divided between the spouses, or their respective heirs, equally or in the
proportion the parties have established, irrespective of the value each one may have originally owned.

In this case, assuming arguendo that Art 102 is applicable, since it has been established that the spouses
have no separate properties, what will be divided equally between them is simply the “net profits.” And
since the legal separation decision states that the ½ share of Brigido in the net profits shall be awarded
to the children, Brigido will still be left with nothing.

On the other hand, when a couple enters into a regime of conjugal partnership of gains under Article
142 of the Civil Code, “the husband and the wife place in common fund the fruits of their separate
property and income from their work or industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the
marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse
during the marriage.” From the foregoing provision, each of the couple has his and her own property
and debts. The law does not intend to effect a mixture or merger of those debts or properties between
the spouses. Rather, it establishes a complete separation of capitals.
In the instant case, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses have no separate
properties, there is nothing to return to any of them. The listed properties above are considered part of
the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily, what remains in the above-listed properties should be divided
equally between the spouses and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the
petitioner the guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in favor
of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code. Again, lest we be confused, like in
the absolute community regime, nothing will be returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership
regime, because there is no separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party's favor.

FLORES VS. LINDO

Article 124 of the Family Code of which applies to conjugal partnership property, is a reproduction of
Article 96 of the Family Code which applies to community property.

Both Article 96 and Article 124 of the Family Code provide that the powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without the written consent of the other spouse. Any disposition or encumbrance without
the written consent shall be void. However, both provisions also state that “the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be
perfected as a binding contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse x x x before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.”

In this case, the Promissory Note and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage were executed on 31 October
1995. The Special Power of Attorney was executed on 4 November 1995. The execution of the SPA is the
acceptance by the other spouse that perfected the continuing offer as a binding contract between the
parties, making the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage a valid contract.

SPOUSES AGGABAO VS. PARULAN

Article 124, Family Code, applies to sale of conjugal properties made after the effectivity of the Family
Code. The sale was made on March 18, 1991, or after August 3, 1988, the effectivity of the Family Code.
:

“Article 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to
the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision.

In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of
the conjugal properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration.
These powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the
part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either
or both offerors.”

The power of administration does not include acts of disposition or encumbrance, which are acts of
strict ownership. As such, an authority to dispose cannot proceed from an authority to administer, and
vice versa, for the two powers may only be exercised by an agent by following the provisions on agency
of the Civil Code (from Article 1876 to Article 1878).

AGUETE VS. PHIL. NATIONAL BANK

If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, that contract falls within the term "x x x x
obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership."

Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the family is apparent at the
signing of the contract. Where the husband contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the
law presumes, and rightly so, that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership.

DELA PEñA VS . AVILA

In the case Ruiz vs. Court of Appeals, the phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of
the wife and cannot be interpreted to mean that the husband is also a registered owner. Because it is
likewise possible that the property was acquired by the wife while she was still single and registered
only after her marriage, neither would registration thereof in said manner constitute proof that the
same was acquired during the marriage and, for said reason, to be presumed conjugal in nature. "Since
there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired, the fact that the title is in the
name of the wife alone is determinative of its nature as paraphernal, i.e., belonging exclusively to said
spouse."
FUENTES VS. ROCA

Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the law that applies to this case is the Family Code, not
the Civil Code. Although Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, Tarciano sold the conjugal property
without the consent of his wife on January 11, 1989, a few months after the Family Code took effect on
August 3, 1988.

In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil Code which gives the wife right to have the sale annulled during the
marriage within ten years from the date of the sale, Article 124 of the Family Code does not provide a
period within which the wife who gave no consent may assail her husband’s sale of the real property. It
simply provides that without the other spouse’s written consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
same would be void. The passage of time did not erode the right to bring such an action.

The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. Its Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains expressly
superseded Title VI, Book I of the Civil Code on Property Relations Between Husband and Wife. Further,
the Family Code provisions were also made to apply to already existing conjugal partnerships without
prejudice to vested rights.

Art. 105. x x x The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal partnerships of gains already
established between spouses before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws, as provided in Article 256. (n)

Munoz v. Ramirez G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010

As a general rule, all property acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have
been made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal
unless the contrary is proved. In the present case, clear evidence that Erlinda inherited the residential
lot from her father has sufficiently rebutted this presumption of conjugal ownership pursuant to Articles
92 and 109 of the Family Code. The residential lot, therefore, is Erlinda’s exclusive paraphernal property.

Article 120 of the Family Code, which supersedes Article 158 of the Civil Code, provides the solution in
determining the ownership of the improvements that are made on the separate property of the
spouses, at the expense of the partnership or through the acts or efforts of either or both spouses.
When the value of the paraphernal property is considerably more than the conjugal improvement, said
paraphernal property does not become conjugal property.
REPUBLIC v. GRANADA G.R. No. 187512, June 13, 2012

After nine years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead with the
RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion for
Reconsideration arguing that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed
to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead. The motion was denied. The OSG then
elevated the case on appeal to the CA. Yolanda filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had
no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death,
based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is
immediately final and executory and, thus, not appealable.

A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of contracting a
subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding “as provided for”
under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the Family Code provide that
since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is a summary proceeding, the judgment of the
court therein shall be immediately final and executory.

As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial court's judgment in a summary
proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family
Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to
question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still alive or
is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death of the
absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances occurring
before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the inquiries
made by present spouse.
TEVES VS. PEOPLE

Petitioner claims that since his previous marriage was declared null and void, "there is in effect no
marriage at all, and thus, there is no bigamy to speak of;" especially since the first marriage had already
been legally dissolved at the time the bigamy case was filed in court.

It does not matter whether the case for declaration of nullity was filed before the case for bigamy was
instituted, for as long as the offender contracted a subsequent marriage while his previous marriage is
subsisting thereby not being able to secure a Declaration of Nullity of the First marriage AT THE TIME HE
CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage
to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. Parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must
first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the person who marries again
cannot be charged with bigamy. A judicial declaration of nullity is required before a valid subsequent
marriage can be contracted; or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and
immoral.

ANTONE VS. BERONILLA

ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.

This was exhaustively discussed in Mercado (G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000), where this Court settled
the "conflicting" jurisprudence on "the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous
marriage." After establishing that Article 40 is a new provision expressly requiring a judicial declaration
of nullity of a prior marriage, this Court concluded, in essence, that under the Family Code a subsequent
judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage is immaterial in a bigamy case because, by then,
the crime had already been consummated. Otherwise stated, a person who contracts a subsequent
marriage absent a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous one, is guilty of bigamy
ISIDRO ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC

Petitioner filed in the RTC in Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of
the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and
Leonila Honato, alleging that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950. Accordingly, since
he is the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue, he is entitled to one-half of
the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the the Civil Code.

This specifically extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988, but, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings
commenced after March 15, 2003.

Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the
estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit.

JARILLO VS. PEOPLE

On November 1979, the petitioner, being previously married in 1974, and without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved, contracted a second marriage. The RTC found petitioner guilty of bigamy
in 2001. In 2003, judgment was promulgated declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage null and void ab initio
on the ground of petitioner spouse’s psychological incapacity. In her motion for reconsideration,
petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for the reversal of her conviction.

Petitioner’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even
one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second
marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to
the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.

YU VS. JUDGE CARPIO AND YU

Finally, petitioner asserts that the deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and
property relations would amount to an ambiguous and fragmentary judgment on the main issue. This
argument does not hold water. The Court En Banc Resolution in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC clearly allows the
deferment of the reception of evidence on custody, support, and property relations. Conversely, the
trial court may receive evidence on the subject incidents after a judgment granting the petition but
before the decree of nullity or annulment of marriage is issued. Petitioner's assertion that ruling the
main issue without receiving evidence on the subject incidents would result in an ambiguous and
fragmentary judgment is certainly speculative and, hence, contravenes the legal presumption that a trial
judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence submitted by the parties.

DIÑO V. DIÑO (G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011)

The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC that in a void marriage, regardless of its cause, the property
relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either by Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of parties who are legally capacitated
and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void, such
as petitioner and respondent in the case before the Court.

For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:

1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;

2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and

3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.

The trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage shall be issued only after
liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code. The
ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule does not apply to cases governed under Articles
147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of the Rule provides: Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court
renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein that the decree of absolute nullity or
decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the
Family Code as implemented under the Rule on Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties. It is
clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages which
are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the Family Code.

In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by absolute community of
property or conjugal partnership of gains unless the parties agree to a complete separation of property
in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the property relations of the parties is
governed by absolute community of property or conjugal partnership of gains, there is a need to
liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a decree of annulment could be issued.

That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code because the marriage
is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.

Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared void ab initio under Article
36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for the liquidation of the
properties of the parties.

PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL 2011

On 25 October 2004, Maria Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated parricide
against Joselito Pimentel (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo
City for the pre-trial and trial of a civil case (Maria Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question.

ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that
warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is
whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated
parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of execution which would have killed
respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of petitioner’s will. At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and
respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the
alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable
since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
We cannot accept petitioner’s reliance on Tenebro v. CA that “the judicial declaration of the nullity of a
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the
marriage insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x.” First, the issue in Tenebro is
the effect of the judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity on a criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in
that case. Second, the Court ruled in Tenebro that “[t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.” In fact, the
Court declared in that case that “a declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.”

KALAW VS. HERNANDEZ 2011

The burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff (petitioner). Petitioner’s experts heavily
relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that
respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and quantity of
time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his
experts, were not actually proven.

REPUBLIC v. GALANG (G.R. No. 168335, June 6, 2011)

It is not absolutely necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability can be duly established. [Brenda Marcos vs. Marcos]

Instead of serving as a guideline, the Molina Doctrine unintentionally became a straightjacket; it forced
all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it. [Ngo Te vs. Yu-Te] In Ting vs.
Velez-Ting, far from abandoning Molina, the Ngo Te case simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements; the Ngo Te case merely stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological incapacity.
AURELIO V. AURELIO G.R. No. 175367, June 06, 2011

The following are the guidelines to aid the courts in the disposition of cases involving psychological
incapacity: (1) Burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff; (2) The root
cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage; (4) Such incapacity must
also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable; (5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage; (6) The
essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife, as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to
parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition,
proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision; (7) Interpretations given by the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts; (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be
handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

OCHOSA VS. ALANO 2011

In Marcos v. Marcos, it was held that the foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician examine
the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated and that what is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the party’s psychological condition. In the case at bar, the
evidence presented were the testimonies of Jose, his military aides and the psychiatrist. But this is
inadequate in proving that her “defects” were already present at the inception of, or prior to, the
marriage. Only the uncorroborated testimony of Jose supported the allegation that Bona’s sexual
promiscuity already existed prior to the marriage. The psychiatrist’s testimony on Bona’s histrionic
personality disorder did not meet the standard of evidence required in determining psychological
incapacity as her findings did not emanate from a personal interview with Bona herself and merely
relied on her interview with Jose and his other witnesses.

This factual circumstance evokes the possibility that the information fed to the psychiatrist is tainted
with bias for Jose’s cause, in the absence of sufficient corroboration. In view of the foregoing, the
badges of Bona’s alleged psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and abandonment, can only
be convincingly traced to the period of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception of the
said marriage.

Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before
the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
YAMBAO VS. REPUBLIC AND YAMBAO 2011

Psychological Incapacity

Article 36 contemplates incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations and not merely difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill
will. This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials of
marriage; (b) this inability to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the
conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological abnormality. It is not
enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married person; it is
essential that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to some psychological illness.

That respondent, according to petitioner, “lack[ed] effective sense of rational judgment and
responsibility" does not mean he is incapable to meet his marital obligations. His refusal to help care for
the children, his neglect for his business ventures, and his alleged unbearable jealousy may indicate
some emotional turmoil or mental difficulty, but none have been shown to amount to a psychological
abnormality. Moreover, even assuming that respondent’s faults amount to psychological incapacity, it
has not been established that the same existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage.

Furthermore, as found by both RTC and CA, respondent never committed infidelity or physically abused
petitioner or their children. In fact, considering that the children lived with both parents, it is safe to
assume that both made an impact in the children’s upbringing. Still, the parties were able to raise three
children into adulthood “without any major parenting problems," and such fact could hardly support a
proposition that the parties’ marriage is a nullity.

MARABLE v. MARABLE G.R. No. 178741, January 17, 2011

ANTI-SOCIAL PERSONALITY DISORDER- PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY

In cases of annulment of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code, the psychological illness and
its root cause must be proven to exist from the inception of the marriage. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag
merely made a general conclusion that petitioner is suffering from an Anti-social Personality Disorder.
As held in the case of Suazo v. Suazo, the presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of nullity
of marriage based on psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of
the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable
presence of psychological incapacity. The evaluation of Dr. Tayag falls short of the required proof which
the Court can rely on as basis to declare as void petitioner's marriage to respondent. It is indispensable
that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

Petitioner tried to make it appear that his family history of having a womanizer for a father, was one of
the reasons why he engaged in extra-marital affairs during his marriage. However, it appears more likely
that he became unfaithful as a result of a general dissatisfaction with his marriage rather than a
psychological disorder rooted in his personal history. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the intention of the
law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage.

BACCAY VS. BACCAY 2011

The phrase “psychological incapacity” is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It
refers to no less than a mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly non-cognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as expressed by Art. 68, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. The intendment of the law has been to confine it to the most
serious of cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.

In this case, the totality of evidence presented by Noel was not sufficient to sustain a finding that
Maribel was psychologically incapacitated. Noel’s evidence merely established that Maribel refused to
have sexual intercourse with him after their marriage, and that she left him after their quarrel when he
confronted her about her alleged miscarriage. He failed to prove the root cause of the alleged
psychological incapacity and establish the requirements of gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability. The report of the psychologist, who concluded that Maribel was suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder traceable to her experiences during childhood, did not establish how the
personality disorder incapacitated Maribel from validly assuming the essential obligations of the
marriage.

CAMACHO-REYES VS. REYES 2010

Within their acknowledged field of expertise, (THREE) doctors can diagnose the psychological make up
of a person based on a number of factors culled from various sources. A person afflicted with a
personality disorder will not necessarily have personal knowledge thereof. In this case, considering that
a personality disorder is manifested in a pattern of behavior, self-diagnosis by the respondent consisting
only in his bare denial of the doctors’ separate diagnoses, does not necessarily evoke credence and
cannot trump the clinical findings of experts.

A recommendation for therapy does not automatically imply curability. In general, recommendations for
therapy are given by clinical psychologists, or even psychiatrists, to manage behavior. In short, the
recommendation that respondent should undergo therapy does not necessarily negate the finding that
respondent’s psychological incapacity is incurable.
In the case at bar, however, even without the experts’ conclusions, the factual antecedents (narrative of
events) alleged in the petition and established during trial, all point to the inevitable conclusion that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations.

In the instant case, respondent’s pattern of behavior manifests an inability, nay, a psychological
incapacity to perform the essential marital obligations as shown by his: (1) sporadic financial support; (2)
extra-marital affairs; (3) substance abuse; (4) failed business attempts; (5) unpaid money obligations; (6)
inability to keep a job that is not connected with the family businesses; and (7) criminal charges of
estafa.

In fine, given the factual milieu of the present case and in light of the foregoing disquisition, we find
ample basis to conclude that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
marital obligations at the time of his marriage to the petitioner.

TORING VS. TORING AND THE REPUBLIC -2010

Reiterated Santos v. CA and Republic v. CA and Molina

-Grounds for denial of Psychological Incapacity

-First of all, the testimony given by Dr. Albaran was based solely on the testimony of Ricardo, the
petitioner and their son, Richardson. No personal evaluation was made as to the condition of Teresita to
properly conclude that she is indeed inflicted with the Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Conclusions and
generalizations about Teresita’s psychological condition, based solely on information fed by Ricardo, are
not any different in kind from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of
such evidence.

-Second, it was not proven that the condition of Teresita was present from the moment the marriage
was celebrated.

-Third, the statement of the root cause is a requirement that cannot be dispensed with but it may be
proven either by an express statement or through the description of its physical manifestations.
SILVINO A. LIGERALDE v. MAY ASCENSION A. PATALINGHUG and the REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. 168796, April 15, 2010)

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage. It
must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.

The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its
incapacitating nature fully explained and established by the totality of the evidence presented during
trial.

Private respondent's act of living an adulterous life cannot automatically be equated with a
psychological disorder, especially when no specific evidence was shown that promiscuity was a trait
already existing at the inception of marriage. Petitioner must be able to establish that respondent's
unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes her completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE G. R. No. 183622, February 08, 2012

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT

Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of
foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be
proven by the divorce decree itself.

The best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record
of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
CORPUZ v. TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

(G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010)

FACTS:

Petitioner Corpuz, a naturalized Canadian citizen married respondent Sto. Tomas but subsequently filed
for divorce in Canada which was granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Two years
later, Corpuz fell in love with another Filipina. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the
Canadian divorce decree on his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration,
an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the
Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce decree by a competent
judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.

Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz
cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a
naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can
institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino
citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grant aliens the right to institute a
petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

RESOLUTION:

No. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens BUT the
foreign divorce decree obtained by such alien, may be proven in court and recognized according to our
rules of evidence. Thus, it serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of the alien, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.

RULES ON HIDDEN TREASURE

What is the concept of hidden treasure?

1. Hidden and unknown

2. Unknown owner

3. Consists of Money, jewels, or other precious objects. (Not raw materials)

 What is the meaning of “other precious objects”?

Under the ejusdem generis rule, the phrase should be understood as being similar to money or
jewelry.

 What is the rule regarding discovery of hidden treasure?

General Rule:

If the finder is the owner of the land, building, or other property where it is found, the entire hidden
treasure belongs to him.

Exception:

If the finder is not the owner or is a stranger (includes the lessee or usufructuary), he is entitled to ½
thereof. (Art 566, NCC)

When is the finder entitled to any share in the hidden treasure?

Requisites:

1. Discovery was made on the property of Another, or of the State or any of its political subdivisions;

2. Made by Chance; and

3. He is not a Trespasser or Agent of the landowner. (Art. 438 par. 2, NCC)

Note: If the things found be of interest to science or the arts, the State may acquire them at their
just price, which shall be divided in conformity with the rule stated. (Art. 438, NCC)

PRESUMPTION OF DEATH

What are the kinds of presumed death?

1. Ordinary presumption-ordinary absence; absentee disappears under normal conditions without

danger or idea of death.

2. Extraordinary presumption-qualified absence; disappearance with great probability of death.

What are the rules in ordinary presumption of death?

In case of:

1. Disappearance upon or before reaching the age of seventy five (75) years:

a. After an absence of seven (7) years?

* The absentee is presumed dead for all purposes except, succession.

b. After an absence of ten (10) years?

* The absentee is presumed dead for all purposes including succession.

2. Disappearance at the age of seventy six (76) years or older:

a. After an absence of five (5) years?The absentee is presumed dead for all purposes including
succession.

When is the absentee presumed to have died under an ordinary presumption?

= At the end of the five, seven or ten year period as the case may be.

Who are presumed dead for all purposes including the division of estate among heirs in case of
extraordinary presumption of death?

1. Person on board a Vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an airplane which is missing, who has not
been heard of for four (4) years since the loss of the vessel or airplane;

2. Person in the Armed forces who has taken pat in war, and has been missing for four (4) years;

3. Person who has been in Danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not
been known for four (4) years.
SURVIVORSHIP RULE

If in doubt as to who died first between 2 or more persons called to succeed each other.

Burden of Proof: Whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the same;

Absent such proof: Presumption is they all died at the same time. There shall be no transmission of
successional rights.

What are the conditions that may warrant the application of the survivorship rule?

It applies when the following conditions are present:

1. The parties are heirs to one another

2. There is no proof as to who died first

3. There is doubt as to who died first

What is the presumption under the survivorship rule?

Presumption of simultaneity of deaths. When two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, die, they shall be presumed to have died at the same time.

PRESUMPTIONS ON SURVIVORSHIP UNDER THE RULES OF COURT:

The Rules of Court provide that:

1. when two or more persons

2. perish in the same calamity and

3. it is not shown who died first, and

4. there are no particular circumstances from which it can be inferred that one died ahead of the
other.
 PROPERTY UNIONS WITHOUT MARRIAGE

ARTICLE 147

APPLICABILITY

1. No legal impediment to marry;

2. Void marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Salaries & wages

Owned in equal shares

Property exclusively acquired

Belongs to party upon proof of acquisition through exclusive funds

Property acquired by both through their work or industry

Governed by rules of co-ownership

Presumption
Property acquired while living together presumed obtained by their

joint efforts, work or industry and owned by them in equal shares.

If one party did not participate in acquisition: presumed to have

contributed through care and maintenance of family and household.

Forfeiture

When only one is in GF, share of party in BF in the co-ownership be

forfeited in favor of:

1. their common children

2. innocent party in default of / waiver by any/all

common children, or by their descendants

Proof of actual contribution

Not necessary
ART. 147
APPLICABILITY
Presence of legal impediment:

1. Adulterous relationships

2. Bigamous/polygamous marriages

3. Incestuous void marriages under Art 37

4. Void marriages by reason of public policy (Art. 38)

SALARIES AND WAGES

Separately owned by the parties. If any is married, his/her

salary pertains to the CPG of the legitimate marriage.

PROPERTY EXCLUSIVELY ACQUIRED

Belongs to such party

Property acquired by both through their work or industry

Owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions

PRESUMPTION
No presumption of joint acquisition. Actual joint contribution of money,

property or industry shall be owned by them in common proportion.

However, their contributions are presumed equal, in the absence if proof to the

contrary

FORFEITURE
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his/her share

in the co-ownership shall accrue to the ACP or CPG existing in the marriage.

If the party who acted in BF is not validly married to another or if both parties

are in BF, such share be forfeited in manner provided in last par of Art. 147

Proof of actual contribution

NECESSARY
Doctrine of Operative Fact – Acts done pursuant to a law which was subsequently declared
unconstitutional remain valid, but not when the acts are done after the declaration of
unconstitutionality.

Doctrine of Processual Presumption – The foreign law, whenever applicable, should be

proved by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall be presumed to be exactly the same as the
law of the forum.

Transmission theory – Provides that when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a
foreign law, but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that refers it to a third country, the law
of the third country shall apply.

Renvoi Doctrine- takes place when the conflicts rule of the forum makes a reference to a foreign
law, but the foreign law is found to contain a conflict rule that returns or refers the matter back to the
law of the forum (Remission).

Republic Act 9048

An Act Authorizing C/MCR or Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical Error in an Entry
and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order.

What is Republic Act 9048?

Republic Act (RA) 9048 authorizes the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to correct a
clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change the first name or nickname in the civil register
without the need of a judicial order.

RA 9048 amends Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which prohibit the change of
name or surname of a person, or any correction or change of entry in a civil register without judicial
order.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the act on the 22nd of March 2001. With the law taking
effect on the 22nd of April 2001, the Civil Registrar-General promulgated Administrative Order No. 1
Series of 2001, which was published in the newspapers in August that year.

What corrections can be made by RA 9048?

RA 9048 allows these corrections:

Correction of clerical or typographical errors in an entry in civil registry documents, except corrections
involving the change in sex, age, nationality and status of a person.

(A clerical or typographical error refers to an obvious mistake committed in clerical work, either in
writing, copying, transcribing, or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such
as a misspelled name or misspelled place of birth and the like, and can be corrected or changed only by
reference to other existing record or records.)

Change of a person's first name in his/her civil registry document under certain grounds specified under
the law through administrative process.
What are the conditions under RA 9048 that the petitioner needs to comply with?

The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;
The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or,
The change will avoid confusion.
Who may file the petition?

Whether it is for correction of clerical or typographical error, or for change of first name, the petition
may be filed by a person of legal age who must have a direct and personal interest in the correction of
the error or in the change of first name in the civil register.

A person is considered of legal age when he is eighteen years old and above. Thus, a minor (less than
eighteen years old) cannot by himself file a petition, neither for correction of clerical or typographical
error nor for change of his first name.

Only the following persons are considered to have a direct and personal interest in the correction of
clerical error or change of first name:

Owner of the record that contains the error to be corrected or first name to be changed.
Owner's spouse, children, parents, brothers, sisters, grandparents, guardian, or any other person duly
authorized by law or by the owner of the document sought to be corrected.
What should be the form and content of the petition?

The petition, whether it is for correction of clerical error or for change of first name, should be
accomplished properly and in the prescribed form. Section 5 of RA 9048 and Rule 8 of Administrative
Order No. 1, S. 2001 require that the petition should be in the form of an affidavit, hence, it should be
subscribed and sworn to before a person authorized to administer oath.

Basically, the petition must contain the following facts or information:

Merits of the petition

Competency of the petitioner
Erroneous entry to be corrected and proposed correction; first name to be changed and the proposed
new first name
What supporting documents are required for correcting a clerical or typographical error in a civil registry
document?

The petition shall not be processed unless the petitioner supports it with the required documents. The
supporting documents should be authentic and genuine, otherwise, the petition shall be denied or
disapproved pursuant to Rule 5.8 of Administrative Order No. 1, S. 2001. The following supporting
documents are admissible as basic requirements:
Certified machine copy of the certificate containing the alleged erroneous entry or entries
Not less than two (2) public or private documents upon which the correction shall be based. Examples of
these documents are the following: baptismal certificate, voter's affidavit, employment record, GSIS/SSS
record, medical record, school record, business record, driver's license, insurance, land titles, certificate
of land transfer, bank passbook, NBI/police clearance, civil registry records of ascendants, and others.
Notice and Certificate of Posting
Certified machine copy the Official Receipt of the filing fee
Other documents as may be required by the City/Municipal Civil Registrar (C/MCR)
What are the supporting papers for change of first name?

As is the case of correction of clerical error, no petition for change of first name shall be accepted unless
the petitioner submits the required supporting papers, as follows:

All the documents required of the petitioner for the correction of clerical error shall also be required of
the petitioner for change of first name.
Clearance from authorities such as clearance from employer, if employed; the National Bureau of
Investigation; the Philippine National Police; and other clearances as may be required by the concerned
C/MCR.
Proof of Publication. An affidavit of publication from the publisher and copy of the newspaper clippings
should be attached.
How much is the fee in filing a petition?

The C/MCR and the District/Circuit Registrar (D/CR) are authorized to collect from every petitioner the
following rates of filing fees:

One thousand pesos (Php 1,000.00) for the correction of clerical error
Three thousand pesos (Php 3,000.00) for the change of first name
In case of a petition filed with the Consul General (CG), the fees are the same for all Philippine
Consulates. The fees are the following:

Fifty U. S. dollars ($ 50.00) for the correction of clerical or typographical error

One hundred fifty U. S. dollars ($ 150.00) for the change of first name
A migrant petitioner shall pay an additional service fee to the Petition Receiving Civil Registrar (PRCR).
This service fee shall accrue to the local treasury of the PRCR.

Five hundred pesos (Php 500.00) for correction of clerical or typographical error
One thousand pesos (Php 1,000.00) for change of first name
Where should the petition be filed?

The general rule is that petition be filed with the Local Civil Registry Office (LCRO) where the record
containing the clerical error to be corrected or first name to be changed is kept. Included in this general
rule is the case of the Office of the Clerk of Shari'a Court where records of divorces, revocations of
divorces, conversions to Islam are kept and where some Muslim marriages are registered.

However, in case the petitioner is a migrant within or outside the Philippines, meaning his present
residence or domicile is different from where his civil registry record or records are registered, he may
file the petition in the nearest LCRO in his area. His petition will be treated as a migrant petition.
ABANDONED CHILD

An abandoned child is one who has no proper parental care or guardianship; No legal guardianship or
parental authority exercised over him/her.

One whose parents or guardians have deserted him for at least six (6) consecutive months.

-Art. 141, Child and Youth Welfare Code

Nature and Importance of Marriage

- Purpose of procreation but also for the purpose of mutual help and protection physically, morally
and materially.

- At least a civil contract, with status and interest of the State added to it.

- Special contract which cannot be restricted by discriminatory policies.

- Validity of a marriage is determined by the law effective at the time of the celebration of the
marriage.

- Nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by subsequent amendment of the
law.

- Although a marriage is void, vested rights can be acquired from such relationships, like those
which refer to property relationship.

- If the ground for nullity is Article 36, there is no more prescriptive period whether or not the
marriage has been celebrated before or after August 3, 1988.

CO-OWNERSHIP

ADILLE V. CA
157 SCRA 455

FACTS:

Alzul originally owned the land. She had Adille as child from first marriage and Asejos from the second
marriage. She sold the land pacto de recto but wasn't able to repurchase because she died. Adille was
able to redeem the land and was able to place the title to the land solely in his name. This prompted his
siblings and the heirs to file an action for partition and
accounting.
HELD:

Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain the
property and consolidate title thereto to his name. Even so, this doesn’t mean that the redeeming co-
owner has the right to the entire property. It doesn't provide a mode of transferring co- ownership.

SIBAL V. VALDEZ
50 PHIL 512

FACTS:

The Deputy Sheriff, through a writ of execution, attached the personal properties of Sibal,
including the sugar cane in question in the 7 parcels of land described in a complaint. The personal
properties were then sold in public auction, including the sugar canes. Included also in those attached
were real properties wherein 8 out of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin were bought by
Valdez through the public auction. He also bought the sugar cane in question.

HELD:

Generally, sugar cane comes under the classification of “ungathered products” under real
properties in the CC. However, under certain conditions, it may be considered as personal
property. For purposes of attachment and execution, as well as for the purposes of the Chattel
Mortgage Law, ungathered products have the nature of personal property.

Property Relationship In A Void Marriage

In Lupo Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006, Lupo, a married man
cohabited with Yolanda as husband and wife. During their coverture, they allegedly acquired a real
property and registered it under the name of Yolanda. Their cohabitation turned sour, hence, they
parted. He filed an action for partition contending that they owned it in common under the concept of
limited co-ownership. Yolanda contended that she alone was the owner as she acquired it thru her own
savings as a businesswoman. The RTC declared the property subject of co-ownership, but the CA
reversed it as he failed to prove material contribution in the acquisition of the same. On appeal, he
contended that he was not burdened to prove that he contributed in the acquisition of the property
because with or without contribution he was deemed a co-owner adding that under Article 484, NCC,
for as long as they acquired the property during their extramarital union, such property would be legally
owned by them in common and governed by the rule on co-ownership. Is the contention correct?
Explain.

Held: No. It is not disputed that the parties herein were not capacitated to marry each other because
Lupo Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his cohabitation with Yolanda. Their
property regime, therefore, is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous
marriages, adulterous relationship, relationships in a state of concubinage, relationships where both
man and woman are married to other persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man. Under
this regime, …only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. (Cariño v. Cariño, 351 SCRA 127 (2001)). Proof of actual contribution is required. (Agapay
v. Palang, 342 Phil. 302).

As it is, the regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife,
applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions.
Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal. (Adriano v. CA, 385 Phil. 474 (2000); Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April
12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718; Atienza v. Yolanda de Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006).

Here, although the adulterous cohabitation of the parties commenced in 1983, or way before the
effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148 thereof applies because this provision was
intended precisely to fill up the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code. (Saguid v. CA, et al., G.R. No.
150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678). Before Article 148 of the Family Code was enacted, there was no
provision governing property relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage. Hence,
even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property occurred before the Family Code took effect,
Article 148 governs. (Tumlos v. Fernandez; Article 256, F.C.).

The applicable law being settled the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by
competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not
upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. The petitioner as plaintiff below is not automatically
entitled to the relief prayed for. The law gives the defendant some measure of protection as the plaintiff
must still prove the allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court is
convinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party alleging a fact has
the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.

It is the petitioner’s posture that the respondent, having no financial capacity to acquire the
property in question, merely manipulated the dollar bank accounts of his two (2) corporations to raise
the amount needed therefor. Unfortunately for petitioner, his submissions are burdened by the fact
that his claim to the property contradicts duly written instruments, i.e., the Contract to Sell dated March
24, 1987, the Deed of Assignment of Redemption dated March 27, 1987 and the Deed of Transfer dated
April 27, 1987, all entered into by and between the respondent and the vendor of said property, to the
exclusion of the petitioner.

The claim of co-ownership in the disputed property is without basis because not only did he fail
to substantiate his alleged contribution in the purchase thereof but likewise the very trail of documents
pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds to the benefit of the respondent. In contrast,
aside from his mere say so and voluminous records of bank accounts, which sadly find no relevance in
this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof. Allegations must be proven by sufficient
evidence. Simply stated, he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it; mere allegation is not
evidence.

True, the mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose the
possibility that the real property covered thereby may be under co-ownership with persons not named
in the certificate or that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired
interest subsequent to the issuance of the certificate of title. However, as already stated, petitioner’s
evidence in support of his claim is either insufficient or immaterial to warrant the trial court’s finding
that the disputed property falls under the purview of Article 148 of the Family Code. In contrast to
petitioner’s dismal failure to prove his cause, herein respondent was able to present preponderant
evidence of her sole ownership. There can clearly be no co-ownership when, as here, the respondent
sufficiently established that she derived the funds used to purchase the property from earnings, not only
as an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign currency trading, money lending and
jewelry retain. She presented her clientele and the promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with
her clients. She also presented her bank account statements and bank transactions, which reflect that
she had the financial capacity to pay the purchase price of the subject property.

Personality To Have A Void Marriage Declared Void

The basic issue in Felicitas Amor-Catalan v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007 is the
personality of a spouse to file a complaint for declaration of nullity of the second marriage of the other
spouse after an alleged divorce obtained abroad.

Felicitas and Orlando got married; then migrated to the USA and allegedly became naturalized
American citizens. After 38 years of marriage, they divorced. Two months thereafter, Orlando got
married to Merope. Felicitas filed a complaint to have the second marriage declared void due to a prior
marriage of Orlando with her. She prayed for damages. Orlando filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of lack of cause of action (should be failure to state a cause of action) alleging that she’s not a real party-
in-interest. It was denied, hence trial was conducted where the RTC declared the subsequent marriage
void and held Orlando and Merope liable for damages. The CA reversed on appeal, hence, a petition for
review was filed with the SC contending among others, thus:

She has the personality to file the complaint;

She and her children suffered embarrassment and humiliation, hence, they are entitled to damages;
The CA committed an error in reversing the RTC decision despite overwhelming evidence of the nullity
of the second marriage and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.
The SC ruled that the main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a
petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However,
this issue may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the
petitioner and Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had actually
been judicially granted a divorce decree.

Issue of naturalization.

Both the RTC and Court of Appeals found that the parties were naturalized American citizens and
that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1998. However, the records are bereft of competent
evidence to prove their naturalization and divorce.

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or
contest the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and Orlando were American citizens at the time
they secured their divorce in April 1998, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and divorce.
The petitioner was the one who alleged in her complaint that they acquired American citizenship and
that Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the
burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence. (Rep. v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October
5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114).

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But
divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. (Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723 (2001)). A divorce obtained
abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the
national law of the foreigner. (Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608 (2003)). However, before it can be
recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved considering that our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. (Rep. v. Orbecido III).

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, the Court cannot rule on the
issue of whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
After all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute. (Garcia v. Recio). In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of
the respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates.

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner has
no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

“Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest
nor should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent marriage
will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas.”
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were
married, or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate “proper interest” can file the same.
A petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest (Rule 3, Sec. 2, Rules of Court) and must be based on a cause of
action. (Rule 2, Sec. 1, Rules of Court). Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661 (2000), the Court held
that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:

SECTION 2. Petitioner for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.
xxxx
 In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which granted
the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained and the
same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should declare respondent’s
marriage as bigamous and void ab initio. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained which allowed Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to
declare nullity of marriage on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to
file the same.

No presumption of conjugality.

In Metrobank, et al. v. Jose Tan, et al., G.R. No. 163712, November 30, 2006, a property was
registered under the names “Jose Tan married to Eliza Go Tan”. The husband contracted an obligation
secured by a mortgage over the property. Since the husband failed to pay, there was foreclosure of the
mortgage which was objected to by the wife on the ground that the property was mortgaged without
her consent, hence, it is void contending that a conjugal property cannot be mortgaged without the
consent of the spouse.

In brushing aside the contention, the SC

Held: The lack of consent to the mortgage covering the title in question would not render the
encumbrance void under the second paragraph of Article 124 of the Family Code. For proof is wanting
that the property covered by the title is conjugal – that it was acquired during respondents’ marriage
which is what would give rise to the presumption that it is conjugal property. (Article 116, F.C.). The
statement in the title that the property is “registered in accordance with the provisions of Section 103 of
the Property Registration Decree in the name of JOSE B. TAN, of legal age, married to Eliza Go Tan does
not prove or indicate that the property is conjugal. In Ruiz v. CA, G.R. No. 146942, April 22, 2003, 401
SCRA 410, it was ruled that the phrase “married to “ is merely descriptive of the civil status of a person
and should not be construed to mean that the spouse is also a registered owner. Furthermore,
registration of the property is not proof that such property was acquired during the marriage, and thus,
is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have been acquired by a spouse while he was still single,
and registered only after the marriage. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different
acts. The presumption under Article 116 of the Family Code that properties acquired during the
marriage are presumed to be conjugal cannot apply in the instant case. Before such presumption can
apply, it must first be established that the property was in fact acquired during the marriage. In other
words, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the
presumption in favor of conjugal ownership. No such proof was offered nor presented in the case at bar.
(Metrobank, et al. v. Jose Tan, et al., G.R. No. 163712, November 30, 2006).

Conjugal partnership not liable for an indemnity agreement entered into by the husband to
accommodate a third party.

Once again in Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar Tierra Corp., et al., G.R. No. 143382, November
29, 2006 (Corona, J), the basic question on the liability of the conjugal partnership for an indemnity
agreement entered into by the husband to accommodate a third party was asked. It appears that Mar
Tierra Corporation entered into a credit line agreement with SBTC. Wilfredo Martinez and others
executed an indemnity agreement holding themselves solidarily liable for such obligation. There was no
payment by the corporation, hence, a suit for collection of sum of money was filed. Judgment was
rendered and it became final and executory. May the conjugal properties of Martinez and his wife be
made to answer for such obligation? Why?

Held: No. In acting as a guarantor or surety for another, the husband did not act for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership but for a third party. (Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. de Garcia, 140 Phil. 509 (1969)).

Under Article 121(2) of the Family Code the conjugal partnership is liable for “all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.”

In Ayala Investment and Development Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 942 (1998) it was ruled
that, if the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., the direct recipient of the money
and services to be used in or for his own business or profession, the transaction falls within the term
“obligations for the benefit of the conjugal partnership.” In other words, where the husband contracts
an obligation on behalf of the family business, there is a legal presumption that such obligation
redounds to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. (Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Mar Tierra Corp., et
al., G.R No. 143382, November 29, 2006).

On the other hand, if the money or services are given to another person or entity and the
husband acted only as a surety or guarantor, the transaction cannot by itself be deemed an obligation
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It is for the benefit of the principal debtor and not for the
surety or his family. No presumption is raised that, when a husband enters into a contract of surety or
accommodation agreement, it is for the benefit of the conjugal partnership. Proof must be presented to
establish the benefit redounding to the conjugal partnership. In the absence of any showing of benefit
received by it, the conjugal partnership cannot be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by
the husband to accommodate a third party.

In this case, the principal contract, the credit line agreement between petitioner and respondent
corporation, was solely for the benefit of the latter. The accessory contract (the indemnity agreement)
under which individual respondent Martinez assumed the obligation of a surety for respondent
corporation was similarly for the latter’s benefit. Petitioner had the burden of proving that the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Martinez benefited from the transaction. It failed to discharge that burden.

To hold the conjugal partnership liable for an obligation pertaining to the husband alone defeats
the objective of the Civil Code to protect the solidarity and well being of the family as a unit. (Ching v.
CA, G.R. No. 124642, February 24, 2004, 423 SCRA 356). The underlying concern of the law is the
conservation of the conjugal partnership. (Ayala Investments & Dev. Corp. v. CA). Hence, it limits the
liability of the conjugal partnership only to debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership.

Duty to reimburse under Article 120, FC; not the purchaser.

In Josefa Ferrer v. Sps. Manuel & Virginia Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006,
prior to his marriage with Josefa, Alfredo owned a real property. He obtained a loan from the SSS to
build improvements on the land, but the loan was paid during their marriage. Alfredo sold the property
to his brother. After his death, Josefa demanded that she be reimbursed one half (1/2) of the value of
the improvements and demanded for such reimbursement from the brothers of Alfredo who are now
the registered owners.

Is her contention correct? Why?

Held: No. While there is an obligation to reimburse the cost of the improvements, the obligation to
reimburse rests on the spouse upon whom ownership of the entire property is vested. There is no
obligation on the part of the purchaser of the property, in case the property is sold by the owner-
spouse.

Indeed, Article 120 provides the solution in determining the ownership of the improvements that
are made on the separate property of the spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the acts
or efforts of either or both spouses. Thus, when the cost of the improvement and any resulting increase
in value are more than the value of the property at the time of the improvement, the entire property of
one of the spouses shall belong to the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the value of
the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the improvement; otherwise, said property shall be
retained in ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to reimbursement of the cost of the
improvement. (Ferrer v. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 166496, November 29, 2006).

Psychological Incapacity

Once again, the SC in Rep. v. Laila Tanyag-San Jose, et al., G.R. No. 168328, February 28, 2007 had
occasion to rule that the mere fact that a spouse is jobless and cannot support the family is not a ground
to declare a marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The term refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage.

In this case, the woman filed a complaint to declare her marriage void alleging that the husband was
jobless and hooked to gambling and drugs. She was a fish vendor. At the trial, she testified that aside
from being jobless and hooked to drugs and gambling, there was no other ground. Dr. Nedy Tayag a
clinical psychologist at the National Center for Mental Health declared that from the psychological test
and clinical interview she conducted on the woman, she found the husband whom she did not
personally examine to perform the duties of a spouse. In her report, she narrated that respondent
refused to get a job. Instead, he spent most of his available time with his friends drinking intoxicating
substances and gambling activities. Furthermore, the doctor reported that the petitioner later
discovered that he was into drugs. He described him to be a happy-go-lucky individual spending most of
his time hanging out with friends. The doctor then concluded thus:

“Through the evaluation of test data, correlated with clinical interviews and description of their
marital plight, it is the opinion of the undersigned that the disintegration of the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was caused primarily by the latter’s psychological incapacity to perform the
essential roles and obligations of a married man and father.

His behavioral pattern characterized mainly by constant irresponsibility, lack of concern for the
welfare of others, self-centered orientation, absence of remorse, violent tendencies and his involvement
in activities defying social and moral ethics; suits under the classification of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder.
 Such disorder is considered to be grave and is deeply immersed within the system. It continues to
influence the individual until the later stage of life.”

The RTC dismissed the complaint ruling that the portrayal of the defendant as jobless and
irresponsible is not enough. It cited Molina and said that it is not enough to prove that the parties failed
to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.

There was no showing that the doctor interviewed the defendant.

Motion for Reconsideration was filed but it was denied. The CA reversed the decision on appeal and
ruled that the defendant was already psychologically incapacitated within the contemplation of the law
at the time of the celebration of the marriage. It ruled:

“If being jobless (since the commencement of the marriage up to the filing of the present petition)
and worse, a gambler, can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill – what then can we describe
such acts? Are these normal manners of a married man? We are not at all swayed that a union affirmed
in church rites and subsequently having children, are proofs that either of the spouses is mature and
responsible enough to assume marital responsibilities.

It was further said by the CA, thus:

“Accordingly, We can safely conclude that said deficiency is so grave and so permanent as to deprive
one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in
its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but to declare the
marriage between the herein petitioner and the respondent herein dissolved. While the law provides
that the husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Article
68 of the Family Code), however, what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party
to the cohesion and creation of a family as an inviolable social institution. In fine, Laila Tanyag-San Jose
must be allowed to rise from the ashes and begin a new life – freed from a marriage which, to Us, was
hopeless from the beginning and where the bonding could not have been possible.”

The Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied, hence, petition for review was
filed with the SC interposing the following arguments:

1. That the plaintiff failed to prove that the defendant was suffering from psychological incapacity to
perform his marital obligations as she merely relied upon the doctor’s report;

2. That even if psychological examination of the defendant is not necessary, the totality of the
evidence does not show the defendant’s psychological incapacity;

3. That the defects of the defendant did not exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage, or are
incurable.

In reversing the CA’s decision, the SC

Held: The plaintiff has the burden to show the nullity of the marriage.
 Psychological incapacity, as a ground for nullity of marriage, has been succinctly expounded in the
recent case of Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris, G.R. No. 162368, July 17, 2006, thus:

“The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of the awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is
hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of “psychological
incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the
Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However,
the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully
explained.”

As earlier-stated, the doctor’s report showed that her conclusion about the defendant’s psychological
incapacity was based on the information supplied by the plaintiff which she found to be “factual”. That
the plaintiff supplied the basis of her conclusion, makes the doctor’s conclusion hearsay. It is
“unscientific and unreliable”, so the Court declared in Choa v. Choa, 441 Phil. 175 (2002), where the
assessment of the therein party sought to be declared psychological incapacitated was based merely on
the information communicated to the doctor by the plaintiff.

The doctor’s report did not even show that the alleged anti-social personality disorder of the
defendant was already present at the inception of the marriage or that it is incurable. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder nor identify its root cause. It merely stated that
“such disorder was considered to be grave and is deeply immersed within the system and continued to
influence the individual until the later stage of life.

No need of personal physical examination.

There is of course no requirement that the person sought to be declared psychologically incapacitated
should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non to arrive at
such declaration. (Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840; Antonio v. Reyes, 484 SCRA 353; Rep. v. Iyoy, 470
SCRA 508). If it can be proven by independent means that one is psychologically incapacitated, there is
no reason why the same should not be credited.

The defendant’s alleged psychological incapacity was premised on his being jobless and a drug user, as
well as his inability to support his family and his refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. His state or condition or attitude has not been shown, however, to be a malady
or disorder rooted on some incapacitating or debilitating psychological condition.

In Molina, where the respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends than with his family,
the Court found the same to be more of a “difficulty” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations.

In Ferraris, it was ruled:

 “We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. (Underscoring supplied)

Also in Ferraris, the Court held that habitual alcoholism, just like infidelity or perversion and
abandonment, did not by itself constitute ground for declaring a marriage void based on psychological
incapacity. (Hernandez v. CA, 377 Phil. 919 (1999)). Neither is emotional immaturity and irresponsibility.
(Dedel v. CA, 421 SCRA 461 (2004); Pesca v. Pesca, 356 SCRA 588). Or failure or refusal to meet duties
and responsibilities of a married man if it is not shown to be due to some psychological (not physical)
illness. (Rep. v. CA, 335 Phil. 664 (1997)).

Note:

In Antonio v. Reyes, it was held:

“The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices of
the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have been
consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary framework
that guides courts in adjudicating petitioners for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the same
time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-to-case
perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of Article 36.
There is no cause to disavow Molina at present… There is need though to emphasize other perspective
as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.

No need to present expert opinion in psychological incapacity cases.

The basic question in Bernardino Zamora v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007 (Azcuna, J) is
whether there is a need for the presentation of expert opinion of psychologist and psychiatrist in every
petition filed under Article 36, Family Code. The RTC and CA dismissed an action for declaration of nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. The arguments of the petitioner before the SC
are as follows:

1. There is nothing in Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995), upon which private respondent relies, that
requires as a condition sine qua non the presentation of expert opinion of psychologists and
psychiatrists in every petition filed under Article 36 of the Family Code. This Court merely said in that
case that “[t]he well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with expertise in
psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable”. However, no expert opinion is helpful or
even desirable to determine whether private respondent has been living abroad and away from her
husband for many years; whether she has a child; and whether she has made her residence abroad
permanent by acquiring U.S. citizenship; and

2. Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of
the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
Among the essential marital obligations embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the same Code is to procreate
children through sexual cooperation which is the basic end of marriage. To live together under one roof
for togetherness spells the unity in marriage. The marriage had been existing for twenty four years when
private respondent filed a legal separation case against petitioner. Throughout this period, private
respondent deliberately and obstinately refused to comply with the essential marital obligation to live
and cohabit with her husband.

The Supreme Court

Held: It is true that the case of Santos v. CA, 310 Phil. 21 (1995), did not specifically mention that the
presentation of expert opinion is a vital and mandatory requirement in filing a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity referred to under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Even in the subsequent case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February
13, 1997, 268 SCRA 198, (also known as the Molina case), wherein the Court laid down the guidelines in
the interpretation and application of the aforementioned article, examination of the person by a
physician in order for the former to be declared psychologically incapacitated was likewise not
considered a requirement. (Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000, 343 SCRA 755). What
is important, however, as stated in Marcos v. Marcos, is the presence of evidence that can adequately
establish the party’s psychological condition. If the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to.

Likewise, Section 2(d) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, states:

(d) What to allege. – A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the
complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying
with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration.

The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.

The rule is that the facts alleged in the petition and the evidence presented, considered in totality,
should be sufficient to convince the court of the psychological incapacity of the party concerned.
Petitioner, however, failed to substantiate his allegation that private respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. His allegations relating to her refusal to cohabit with him and to bear a child was strongly
disputed, as the records undeniably bear out. Furthermore, the acts and behavior of private respondent
that petitioner cited occurred during the marriage, and there is no proof that the former exhibited a
similar predilection even before or at the inception of the marriage. Hence, the SC upheld the ruling of
the lower courts. (Zamora v. CA, et al., G.R. No. 141917, February 7, 2007, Azcuna, J).
Foreign Divorce

In Edgar San Luis v. Felicidad San Luis, G.R. No. 133743; Rodolfo San Luis v. Felicidad Sagalongos
(Felicidad San Luis), G.R. No. 134029, February 6, 2007, the late Governor Felicisimo San Luis got married
three (3) times. In his first marriage, he had six (6) children. Then, his first wife died and got married
again. They had a child. After the divorce obtained his second wife in the USA, he got married in the
USA. He died in the Philippines. The third wife, Felicidad filed a petition to settle his estate, alleging that
she was married to Felicisimo before he died and after his second wife obtained a decree of divorce in
the USA. Two children of Felicisimo opposed on the ground that Felicisimo and Felicidad were not legally
married as the divorce decree obtained by the second wife was not valid and binding in the Philippines,
hence, it’s a bigamous marriage. The divorce decree was obtained in 1973 in Hawaii. It was contended
that since their marriage was solemnized in 1974 or before the effectivity of the Family Code in 1988,
the law cannot be given retroactive effect. Rule on the contention.

Held: In resolving the issue, the SC said that the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien
spouse abroad may validly remarry in the Philippines considering that Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving
this issue, the SC said that it need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Article 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing the retroactivity of
the Family Code.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 (1985), involved a marriage between a foreigner
and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained abroad by
the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however,
recognized the validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus, it was held:

“In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

“The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.”

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.”

As to the effect of divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court held that she can no longer be considered
married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital duties and
obligations. It held:
 “To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife’s obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. “

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 (1989), where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the alien spouse is
not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that “the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence
the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 406 (1998), the Court stated that where a Filipino is
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. Although decided on
December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions
were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of divorce in the
Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing marital ties between
parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence
of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that “if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippines law.” In Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2,
2001, 366 SCRA 437, the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, the historical background and legislative intent behind
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise
known as the “Family Code”, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:

“All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those
prohibited under Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38.”

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was
likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36 and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was
added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

“ARTICLE 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a divorce between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.” (Emphasis supplied)
 Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr..
The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein
that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and paragraph 2, Article
26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance intolerable to one of
the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way should be
obtainable. (Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252 (1916)). Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one
is considered released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of
affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse.

Petitioner cited Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void under Philippine
law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of the Court’s rulings in the cases discussed
above, the Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. (Van Dorn v. Romillo). In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 259 (1987),
the Court stated:

“But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to
render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply
them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance
between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not autonomous. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. “Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law”, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, “where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them.”

xxxx
 More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice “as the constant and perpetual wish to
render every one his due”. That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus
when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.”

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage
of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or
official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by
the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy
must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the
Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to Felicidad’s marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign law as they must be alleged
and proved.

Therefore, the case was remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce
decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry Felicidad in 1974, nevertheless, the latter
has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be
considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:

Section 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. – A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An “interested person” has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an
heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and
direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Saguinsin v. Lindayag, 116 Phil. 1193 (1962)).

In the instant case, Felicidad would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the
estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners.
If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her
marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a
co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property relations between
parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void
from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal,
unless the contrary is proven. (Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Q.C., 328 Phil. 1289 (1996)).

Meanwhile, if Felicidad fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the marriage, the applicable
provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil
Code by expressly regulating the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but
are incapacitated to marry. In Saguid v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678,
which occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148 governs. The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
“The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are not legally
capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to
properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-
ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent any proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be
presumed to be equal.

xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of co-ownership of
properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an adulterous relationship, respectively,
we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or
the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence
and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponent’s defense. x x x

Thus, the legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her
status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article
148 of the Family Code.
LAW in General

According to Justice Bradley, US Supreme Court:

Law is a science of principles by which the civil society is regulated and held together, by which right is
enforced, and wrong is detected and punished.

According to De Page:

The body of rule governing the conduct of persons living in association with others, under the guaranty
of social compulsion.

According to Sanchez Roman:

Law is a rule of conduct, just, obligatory promulgated by legitimate authority, and of common
observance and benefit.

Repealing Law Is Repealed

What if the repealing law itself was repealed?

1. If a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
revived, unless there is an express provision. (Sec. 14, Rev. Adm. Code)

2. If a law which impliedly repeals a a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall be revived,
unless there is an express provision. (U.S. vs. Soliman, 36 Phil. 5)

Take note that what matters here is the way in which the second law, or the the first repealing law was
repealed, it may either be express or implied.

Conflict Between Special and General Law

What are the rules when a conflict arises between a special and a general law?
1. If the general law was enacted first, the special law is considered the exception to the general law.
Therefore the general law remains a good law, and there is no repeal (Lichauco v. Apostol, 44 Phil 138),
except insofar as the exception or special law is concerned. However if there are inconsistencies with
the general law it is considered as a repeal to the general law.

2. If the special law was enacted first, both special law and general law are good laws unless:

a. There is an express declaration to tho contrary.

b. Or the is a clear , necessary and unreconcilable conflict (Cia General v. Coll. of Customs, 46 Phil. Cool
c. Or unless the subsequent general law covers the whole subject and is clearly intended to replace the
special law on the matter. (Joaquin v. Navarro, 81 Phil. 373)

Sources of Philippine Civil Law

1. Constitution

2. Administrative or general orders not contrary to the constitution.

3. Statutes, laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, or batas pambansa.

4. Jurisprudence and judicial customs.

5. Decisions of foreign courts if applicable.

6. Principles governing analogous cases.

7. Principles of legal hermeneutics.

8. Equity and general principles of law (morals).

Unconstitutionality of Laws, Treaties, Executive or Administrative Orders

The declare a law or a treaty unconstitutional, according to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the constitution:

All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which
shall be heard by the supreme court en banc, and all other cases which under the rules of court are
required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations shall be
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

Cases or matters heard by division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon, and in
no case, without the concurrence of at least three of such members.When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down by
the Court in a decision rendered en banc or in division, may be modified or reversed except by the Court
sitting en banc. [Sec. 4 (3), Art. VIII]

The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal
or certiorari as the law of the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments or orders of lower courts in:
All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation in in question. [Sec. 5
(2-a), Art. VIII]
Effectivity of Laws

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the the completion of the publication in the Official
Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation unless it is otherwise provided.

Effectivity date of an ordinary law:

1. The date it is expressly provided to take effect.

2. If no date, 15 days following the completion of the publication

Waiver of Rights

Art. 6.- Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or
good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law.

Generally, rights may be waived given that:

1. The person making the waiver is capacitated to do so. Meaning not a minor or Insane.

2. The waiver must be made clearly but not necessarily express.

3. The person must have the right he is renouncing,

4. It must comply to formalities if it calls for one.

5. The waiver must concur with Art. 6.

Civil Law Definition

Branch of Law that treats the personal and family relations of a person, his property and successional
rights, and the effects of obligation and contracts. "Civil" is derived from the Latin "civiles", a citizen.
Originally, the word pertained to a member of "civitas" or a free political community (Black's Law
Dictionary)

Lapse of Laws
Laws may lapse- it may expire based on the period it was made to be effective, without the necessity of
repeal or any further legislation.

Mandatory or Prohibitory Laws

Art. 5 New Civil Code- Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be
void, except when the law itself authorizes their validity. Kinds of mandatory legislation a. Positive-
something must be done. b. Negative/ Prohibitory- something should not be done.
Non Observance of Laws

Disuse, custom, or practice to the contrary does not repeal a law. Thus, although hardly enforced, or
never enforced at all, the law still remains good.

PUBLICATION OF LAWS

No publication is needed when:

1. The provides for it's own effectivity and;

2. It is not punitive in character.

Publication must be full or no publication at all.

Repeal of Laws

Art. 7, New Civil Code. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non
observance shall not be excused by disuse,or custom or practice to the contrary.

When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid ony when they
are not contrary to laws or the constitution.

How laws are repealed:

1. Expressly- by direct act of congress.

2. Impliedly- occurring inconsistencies on all points between a prior and a subsequent law.

Rights
Right according to Black's Law Dictionary is the power or privilege given to one person and as a rule
demandable to another.

1. Real Rights (jus in re, jus in rem)- eforceable against the whole world (absolute).

2. Personal Rights (jus in personam, jus ad rem)- enforceable against certain person or persons
(relative).

Prospectivity of Laws

In general laws should be prospective not retroactive. However, there are some exceptions:

1. If the laws themselves povide for their retoractivity (Art. 4 Civil Code).
2. If the laws are remedial in nature.

3. If the statute is penal in nature, provided:

a. It is favorable to the accused or convict.

b. The accused or convict is not a habitual delinquent as defined in Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code.

4. If the laws are of an emergency nature and are authorized by the police power of the government.
(Santos vs. Alvarez 44 O.G. 4259)

5. If the law is curative (necessarily retroactive for the precise purpose to cure errors or irregularities).
This kind of law to be valid must not impair vested rights nor affect final judgments. (Frivaldo vs.
Comelec and Lee G.R. 120295, June 28, 1996)