CASE 1: Municipality of Mangaldan v Municipality of
Manaoag, G.R. No. 11627. August 10, 1918
1. The municipality of Mangaldan (Pangasinan)
filed a complaint against the municipality of
Manaoag for having been deprived of their use
and enjoyment of the waters of Tolon and
Tagumising Rivers.
2. Defendant had obstructed the flow of the rivers
by building a strong dam.
3. Mangaldan prayed that the court will order
Manaoag to tear down the dam and to pay the
costs.
ISSUE: who has better right over the river between the
two municipalities?
RULING: Both have equal rights over it because it
belongs to the public domain according to the
Law of Waters. Art. 411 of Old Civil Code that use
of public waters is acquired by prescription of 20
years, which means that both municipalities
where the rivers pass through have the same
right to its enjoyment since both municipalities
have been using it for more than 20 years.
But since it was Manaoag’s dam which
caused the obstruction of the flow of the river to
Mangaldan, it was ordered to pay the costs in
removing the accumulated land near its land in
order for the river to flow again to Mangaldan.
CASE 2: Mercado vs Reyes GR No. 45768 Dec 23 1937
1. Mercado owns a hacienda in Macabebe,
Pampanga wherein his predecessor-in-interest
(previous owner) caused the construction of
dikes at both ends of a creek to close the traffic
and convert the same to a fishpond.
2. The CFI ordered the removal of the dikes
declaring the creeks as extension of the arms of
a river hence part of the public domain.
3. During the pendency of the case, de Leon was
the lessee of the portion of the hacienda where
the creek is located.
4. Mercado still refuses to remove the dikes and
now uses as an excuse the lease of de Leon so
as not to remove the dikes which will destroy
the fishponds.
ISSUE: should the dikes be removed?
RULING: Yes. There is no reason to exempt the
petitioner from complying with the obligation
which is to remove the dikes at the ends of the
creek passing through her hacienda.
The municipality of Macabebe could not have
exempted the hacienda by the mere fact of the
lease, because an unlawful act cannot be ratified
expressly or impliedly.
CASE 3: De los Santos vs Roman Catholic Church GR
No. L-6088 Feb 25, 1954
1. Julio Sarabillo was granted a homestead patent
in Midsayap, Cotabato in 1938. In 1940, he sold
2 hectares of which to the Roman Catholic
Church of Midsayap for P800 subject to the
condition that it be used exclusively for
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educational and charitable purposes and the
approval of DENR.
2. When Sarabillo died, his heirs assailed the
validity of the sale in violation of Sec. 118 of CA
141 – no conveyance must be made within 5
years after the grant of a patent.
3. The Catholic Church invokes the principle of pari
delicto and the fact that Sec. 121 of CA 141
allows corporations to acquire homestead
patents if used for educational and charitable
purposes.
ISSUE: Is the sale void?
RULING: Yes. The provision of the law which prohibits
the sale or encumbrance of a homestead within
5 years after the grant of the patent is
mandatory.
While it is true that Sec. 121 allows a
corporation or a partnership to acquire a
homestead with the approval of DENR for
commercial and charitable purposes, it is subject
to the condition under Sec. 118. The fact that the
DENR approved the sale 10 years after does not
have a legal effect.
In pari delicto, on the other hand, is not
applicable because its enforcement will be
contrary to public policy.
Therefore, the Church cannot remain in
possession of the land to the prejudice of the
heirs during and until the government takes steps
toward the reversion of the lands.
CASE 4: Mesina vs Sonza GR No. L-14722 May 25 1960
1. Mesina claims to be the owner of a lot since
1914 and had been in public, open, and
peaceful possession of the same and is the only
one who benefits from the produce thereof.
2. The same land, however, was issued as a
homestead patent to Sonza which Mesina
claimed to be due to fraud since the Sonzas
knew that he owns the land when they applied
for its patent.
3. The CFI dismissed Mesina’s petition on the
ground that it has prescribed – one only has 1
year to assail a patent after its registration;
after which, it becomes indefeasible. The
issuance of the patent was in 1953 but Mesina
filed the petition to cancel in 1958.
ISSUE: does Mesina have a cause of action to assail the
validity of the grant of patent?
RULING: Yes. The CFI erred in dismissing the complaint
based on prescription without inquiring on the
validity of the claim regarding the land as a private
property.
If, by legal fiction (Act No. 926), Mesina
acquired the land by his open and public
possession thereof, the land ceased to be part of
the public domain hence a homestead patent
would be null and void.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the CFI
for further proceedings to inquire whether or not
the land has become a private property before it
was granted as a homestead patent.

CASE 5: RP vs Sioson GR No. L-13687 Nov 29 1963
1. The Siosons sought to register 4 parcels of land
under the Land Registration Act but was only
given a registration for Lots 1, 2, and 3.
2. Lot 4 was not registered because the Director of
Lands filed an opposition claiming that Lot 4 is
part of the public domain because the lot forms
part of a navigable stream or river.
3. However, the registration over Lot 4 under the
Siosons proceeded.
4. Within 1 year after the registration, the Solicitor
General filed a petition for cancellation of the
registration of Lot 4. It alleges fraud and
connivance between the Siosons and the land
inspector.
5. The RTC dismissed the petition of the Sol Gen.
ISSUE: did the court a quo err in dismissing the petition?
RULING: Yes. The petition was filed within 1 year after
the registration decree hence it has not prescribed
yet. The Republic should be given the opportunity
to provide evidence in support of the allegation of
fraud.
Furthermore, the RTC should inquire whether
or not Lot 4 is indeed part of a river or creek, for if
it is the case, the Siosons could not have acquired
right over it because it is part of the public domain.
Navigable rivers cannot be appropriated and
registered under the Land Registration Act.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the RTC
to resolve the petition of the Republic.
CASE 6: De los Angeles vs Santos GR No. L-19615 Dec
24 1964
1. In 1959, delos Angeles and 7 others filed for an
application for registration of 12 parcels of land
in San Mateo, Rizal.
2. OPPOSITION filed by: (1) The Province of Rizal
filed an opposition claiming that Lot 11 form
part of the Ampid river and creek; and (2)
private oppositor Hidalgo also opposed the
registration by delos Angeles claiming that they
already acquired Lot 11 by homestead patent.
The Director of Lands also issued homestead
patent in favor of Hidalgo over Lot 11 during the
pendency of the application of delos Angeles to
register it.
3. Hence RTC dismissed the application of
registration by delos Angeles.
ISSUE: whether the court lost its jurisdiction by the
subsequent administrative act of the Director of
Lands of issuing a homestead patent to
oppositor
RULING: No. Applicants (delos Angeles) should still be
given opportunity to prove registrable title to
said lot. If they can prove their lawful right over
the same, the court would have to order a
decree of title for delos Angeles et. al and
declare Hidalgo’s homestead patent a nullity
which vested no title in the patentee
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as against the real owners.
CASE 7: Miguel vs CA GR No. L-20274 Oct 30 1969
1. Eloy Miguel had been occupying and cultivating
a land since the Spanish period (1894) and had
declared it for tax purposes.
2. In 1932, Reyes, an ambulatory notary public,
promised Miguel assistance in applying for a
homestead application.
3. However, instead of filing the same, Reyes filed
a sales patent claiming that his wife acquired
the land and that Miguel is their tenant.
4. After WWII, Reyes died and his widow applied
to register the land. In 1950, she had the land
surveyed telling Miguel that it is part of his
patent application.
5. Suspicious, Miguel and his son inquired with the
land office and found out about the fraud.
6. Miguel filed a petition for cancellation of the
title of Reyes on the ground of fraud.
7. The RTC ordered the cancellation of the title of
Reyes and returned the patent to the Bureau of
Lands to give due course to the application of
Miguel for a homestead patent.
8. Miguel appealed the RTC decision praying for
the reconveyance of the land from Reyes to him
but CA dismissed the claim.
ISSUE: Is the CA correct in dismissing the claim for
reconveyance?
RULING: No. The CA erred in its claim that an objection
based on fraud should have been raised within 1
year from the issuance of the sales patent,
because this action is not about breach in sales
but a constructive trust – the ultimate object of
which is the reconveyance of the property lost
through breach of fiduciary relations and fraud.
This prescribes in 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud. Miguel discovered the fraud in 1950
when the land was surveyed. The action was filed
in 1953.
Fiduciary relation arises when one assumes to
act as an agent of another and the other reposes
confidence in him even though there is no
contract at all. This relation existed when Reyes
promised to help Miguel apply for a patent and
Miguel reposed confidence on him. A breach of
this fiduciary duty gives rise to a constructive trust
which will allow the court to adjudge
reconveyance. Hence, there is no need for the Sol
Gen to file for a reversion of the land back to the
government so that Miguel can apply for a patent.
It is simple a reconveyance of the private property
from Reyes to the trustee, Miguel, after the
former breached the fiduciary duty.
NOTES:
 The law of trust in America is derived from fidei
commissa of the Roman Law and is based on
civil law. The Civil Code directs the adoption of
the principles of general law of trust that are
not in conflict with our own laws. Fox v.
Simmons in the US was a similar case where
 reconveyance was ordered in favor of the be raised in a land registration proceeding of a
trustee. claimant but in a separate action (such as
 A natural born Filipino citizen, who is not an reconveyance, reversion, or for damages in case
owner of more than twenty-four hectares of the land was passed to the hands of an innocent
land, and who since prior to July 4, 1926 (under purchaser for value).
R.A. 782, approved June 21, 1952, occupation
and cultivation since July 4, 1945, or prior
thereto, is deemed sufficient) has continuously
occupied and cultivated a parcel of land not
more than twenty-four hectares in area, is
entitled to apply for a free patent for, or
gratuitous grant, of said land. This is known as
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles
by administrative legalization.
 Miguel’s possession of land prior to July 26,
1894 which has been continuous,
uninterrupted, open, adverse and in the
concept of owner, raises a presumption juris et
de jure that all necessary conditions for a grant
by the State have been complied with and such
possessor is entitled by force of law — pursuant
to the provisions of Sec. 48 (b) of the Public
Land Act — to the registration of his title to the
land.

CASE 8: Lahora vs Dayanghirang GR No. L-28565 Jan 30

1971

1. In 1965, spouses Lahora applied for the

registration of 9 parcels of land in Manay,
Davao – half of which was acquired through
inheritance, the other through continuous,
open, public and adverse possession in the
concept of owner.
2. Dayanghirang opposed the registration claiming
that they owned some of the said lands and had
been included in their title.
3. Hence the RTC dismissed the application of
Lahora.
4. Lahora contends that the patent to
Dayanghirang, issued 9 years ago, should be
declared void for fraud since it was the Lahoras,
not the Dayanghirangs, who had been in open
and continuous possession of the said land.
ISSUE: Can the Lahoras assail the validity of the title
based on a patent of the Dayanghirang?
RULING: No. Where land is granted by the government
to a private individual, the patent is recorded and
the certificate of title is issued to the grantee.
Thereafter, the land is automatically brought
within the operation of the Land Registration Act
(LRA).
Sec. 38 of LRA provides that the title based on a
patent becomes irrevocable and indefeasible after
1 year from its issuance. Here, the Lahoras assailed
the validity 9 years after the Dayanghirangs were
issued their title.
Assuming arguendo that there is a case to
cancel the title, the proper party to bring the
action is the person prejudiced by the fraudulent
act which is the owner, not another patent
applicant or claimant. And the same action cannot
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