People vs.

Lauga Case Digest

Extrajudicial confession before a bantay bayan taken without counsel is inadmissible in evidence.

Facts:

Antonio Lauga was accused of qualified rape committed against his 13-year old daughter. One of the witnesses for the
prosecution was Moises Boy Banting, a bantay bayan in the barangay. Banting testified that after his assistance was sought, he
proceeded to Lauga's house and found the latter wearing only his underwear. He invited Lauga to the police station, to which
Lauga obliged. At the police outpost, Lauga admitted to him that he raped his daughter AAA because he was unable to control
himself. Lauga contested the admissibility in evidence of his alleged confession with Banting. He argues that even if he, indeed,
confessed to Moises Boy Banting, a “bantay bayan,” the confession was inadmissible in evidence because he was not assisted by
a lawyer and there was no valid waiver of such requirement.

Issue:

Is the extrajudicial confession made before a bantay bayan without the assistance of a lawyer admissible in evidence?

Held:

No. Bantay bayan is a group of male residents living in the area organized for the purpose of keeping peace in their community.
Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of watch groups, as in the case of the “bantay bayan,” are recognized by the
local government unit to perform functions relating to the preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus, without
ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Moises Boy Banting, and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated
to a “bantay bayan,” particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of
a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article
III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned. Therefore, the extrajudicial confession
of appellant taken without counsel was inadmissible in evidence. [People vs Antonio Lauga, G.R. No. 186228, March 15, 2010]

CORINTHIAN GARDENS ASSOCIATION, INC.,PETITIONER,

- versus -
SPOUSES REYNALDO AND MARIA LUISA TANJANGCO, AND SPOUSES FRANK AND TERESITA CUASO,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 160795, June 27, 2008]
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
Reynaldo and Maria Luisa Tanjangco own Lots 68 and 69 located at Corinthian Gardens Subdivision,
Quezon City, which is managed by petitioner Corinthian Gardens Association, Inc. ). On the other hand, Frank and
Teresita Cuaso own Lot 65 which is adjacent to the Tanjangcos' lots.
Before the Cuasos constructed their house on Lot 65, a relocation survey was necessary. As Geodetic
Engineer Democrito De Dios conducted all the previous surveys for the subdivision's developer, Corinthian referred
Engr. De Dios to the Cuasos. Before, during and after the construction of the said house, Corinthian conducted
periodic ocular inspections in order to determine compliance with the approved plans pursuant to the Manual of
Rules and Regulations of Corinthian. Unfortunately, after the Cuasos constructed their house employing the services
of C.B. Paraz Construction Co., Inc. build their perimeter fence encroached on the Tanjangcos' Lot 69 by 87 square
meters.
No amicable settlement was reached between the parties. Thus, the Tanjangcos demanded that the Cuasos
demolish the perimeter fence but the latter failed and refused, prompting the Tanjangcos to file with the RTC a suit
against the Cuasos for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
** The Cuasos ascribed negligence to C.B. Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper specifications of their house, and
to Engr. De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation survey, thereby, exposing them to litigation. The
Cuasos also faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without verifying their
accuracy and in making representations as to Engr. De Dios' integrity and competence. The Cuasos alleged that had
Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would not have been involved in a boundary dispute
with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that
they might incur as a result of such construction.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Corinthian Garden’s Association is liable for negligence, in approving the building plan
and whether or not it acted in good faith in doing so.

HELD:
YES, Corinthian cannot and should not be allowed to justify or excuse its negligence by claiming that its
approval of the Cuasos' building plans was only limited to a so-called "table inspection and not actual site
measurement. Corinthian's failure to prevent the encroachment of the Cuasos' perimeter wall into Tanjangcos'
property - despite the inspection conducted - constitutes negligence and, at the very least, contributed to the injury
suffered by the Tanjangcos.

A. JUDICIAL NOTICE

CORINTHIAN GARDENS VS SPOUSES TANJANGCO

FACTS: This case relates to a property dispute within the Corinthian Gardens Subdivision, managed
by their association (“Corinthian”). Sps. Tanjangco alleges that the perimeter fence of the Cuasos,
encroached on their lot which is directly adjacent to theirs. Because the Cuasos refused to demolish
the fence, the Tanjangcos filed a suit for Recovery of Possession with Damages.
In turn, the Cuasos filed a Third Party Complaint against Corinthian, Paraz Construction and
De Dios Realty and Surveying. They ascribed negligence to Paraz for its failure to ascertain the proper
specifications of their house; and to De Dios for his failure to undertake an accurate relocation
survey, thereby exposing them to litigation.
They faulted Corinthian for approving their relocation survey and building plans without
verifying their accuracy, as well as making representations as to De Dios' integrity and competence
(being the firm who conducted all the previous surveying for the developer, Corinthian recommended
the services of De Dios).
The Cuasos alleged that had Corinthian exercised diligence in performing its duty, they would
not have been involved in a boundary dispute with the Tanjangcos. Thus, the Cuasos opined that
Corinthian should also be held answerable for any damages that they might incur as a result of such
construction.
The RTC ruled that the fence did in fact encroach on the Tanjangco lot. However, since the
Cuasos were builders in good faith, the court gave the Tanjangcos the option to sell and the former
the option to buy the encroaching portion of the land, at a price to be agreed upon by both. In the
event that the Cuasos were unable and unwilling to purchase the said portion, the perimeter wall
should be demolished at the latter's expense. The RTC also ordered the Cuasos to pay monthly rentals
of P2,000.00 commencing from the time of the filing of the complaint. Paraz was found negligent for
their disregard of the boundaries and was ordered to pay damages. The complaint with respect to De
Dios and Corinthian was dismissed.
Because the RTC denied their Motion for Reconsideration, the Tanjangcos appealed to the CA.
The Cuasos and Paraz also appealed.
On appeal, the CA reversed. It held that the Cuasos were in bad faith and were land grabbers.
Thus the Tanjangcos were given the right to demand the demolition of the fence, subject to their
reimbursement to the Cuasos of the necessary expenses for the preservation of the fence. Also, the
Cuasos were ordered to pay, considering its location and category, P10k a month as rent for the use
and occupation of the lot. They were also ordered to pay hefty sums for damages and attorney’s fees.
 The Cuasos appeal against the Tanjangcos were dismissed. Paraz, De Dios and Corinthian
were all found negligent, and were ordered to contribute to all judgment sums that the Cuasos would
pay under the decision, and interest on the same.
Only Corinthian filed for reconsideration. Upon denial by the CA, Corinthian filed for Certiorari,
impleading the Cuasos as one of the respondents in the third party complaint in the RTC. Both
submitted their respective memorandums to the SC.

ISSUE RELEVANT TO RULE 129:

W/n the CA had legal basis to unilaterally increase the amount of the adjudged rent from P2,000.00 to
P10,000.00 (which was not prayed for by the Tanjangcos in their complaint and in the absence of
evidence adduced by the parties)? YES

RULING: The Tanjangcos opine that a court can take judicial notice of the general increase in the
rentals of real estate, as in this case, where the CA considered the value of their lot in the "posh-and-
swank" Corinthian Gardens Subdivision and the fact that they were deprived of it for almost two
decades. The Tanjangcos pray that this Court sustain the ruling of the CA.
On this issue, the ruling in Spouses Badillo v. Tayag is instructive:

Petitioners argue that the MTC may take judicial notice of the reasonable rental or the general
price increase of land in order to determine the amount of rent that may be awarded to them. In
that case, however, this Court relied on the CA's factual findings, which were based on the
evidence presented before the trial court. In determining reasonable rent, the RTC therein took
account of the following factors: 1) the realty assessment of the land, 2) the increase in realty
taxes, and 3) the prevailing rate of rentals in the vicinity. Clearly, the trial court relied, not on
mere judicial notice, but on the evidence presented before it.
[C]ourts may fix the reasonable amount of rent for the use and occupation of a disputed
property. However, petitioners herein erred in assuming that courts, in determining the amount of
rent, could simply rely on their own appreciation of land values without considering any evidence.
As we have said earlier, a court may fix the reasonable amount of rent, but it must still base its
action on the evidence adduced by the parties.
Also, in Herrera v. Bollos the Court declared that the reasonable amount of rent could be
determined not by mere judicial notice, but by supporting evidence:

x x x A court cannot take judicial notice of a factual matter in controversy. The court may take
judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Before taking
such judicial notice, the court must "allow the parties to be heard thereon."

Hence, there can be no judicial notice on the rental value of the premises in question without
supporting evidence. Truly, mere judicial notice is inadequate, because evidence is required for a court
to determine the proper rental value.
Now, contrary to Corinthian's arguments, both the RTC and the CA found that indeed rent was
due the Tanjangcos because they were deprived of possession and use of their property. This uniform
factual finding of the RTC and the CA was based on the evidence presented below. Moreover, in
Spouses Catungal v. Hao, we considered the increase in the award of rentals as reasonable given the
particular circumstances of each case. We noted therein that the respondent denied the petitioners the
benefits, including rightful possession, of their property for almost a decade.
Similarly, in the instant case, the Tanjangcos were deprived of possession and use of their
property for more than two decades through no fault of their own. Thus, we find no cogent reason to
disturb the monthly rental fixed by the CA. All told, the CA committed no reversible error.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY et al. v. ATIENZA

Note: this digest only contains facts, issue, and ratio in relation to the topic under which it was
assigned.

FACTS: Herein petitioners (SJS, Cabigao, Tumbokon) filed a case for mandamus (Rule 65) to compel
then Mayor Atienza to enforce Ordinance 8027, which was enacted in November 2001. Under the said
Ordinance, certain areas in Manila were reclassified from industrial to commercial area. As such, the
businesses of certain groups, including petroleum companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell are
intervenors in the case, since they were affected) became disallowed. The ordinance directed them to
cease and desist from operating in the Pandacan Terminals. Later, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was entered into between the Dept of Energy and the oil companies, which was to be effective
only for 6 months. The agreement was to the effect that there would be only a ‘scaling down’ of the
Pandacan terminals, and for this purpose, special business permits were issued to the oil companies.
The MOU was extended for a number of months. (This is why the petitioners filed a mandamus case -
to compel the Mayor to enforce the Ordinance instead). In 2007, the SC ruled that it was ministerial
for the mayor to enforce all ordinances.
The 3 oil companies and the DOE filed an MR. This case is the resolution of such MR. as it
turns out, in the beginning, the 3 companies filed a complaint in the Manila RTC to have the Ordinance
annulled. The court issued a preliminary injunction, ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing the
Ordinance.
Years after (in 2006), Ordinance 8119 known as the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and
Zoning Ordinance was enacted. Because of this new Ordinance, the oil companies filed new complaints
to nullify it and they filed motions to withdraw their earlier complaint (the one for nullifying the
original ordinance). In effect, their argument was that the later ordinance superseded that first one,
such that it was error for the SC to rule that the Mayor should enforce the first ordinance. (recall the
SC ruling in the first paragraph of this digest)

Issue: was the first Ordinance superseded by the second one? – No.
[should courts take mandatory judicial notice of local ordinances? – No]

Ruling: The 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of the second Ordinance. The
simple reason was that the SC was never informed about this ordinance.
While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with
respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters
covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court.
Section 50 of RA 409provides that: “Judicial notice of ordinances. - All courts sitting in the city
shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the SangguniangPanglungsod.”However, this
cannot be taken to mean that the SC, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken
steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the
Court about it. Because even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of
municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it
and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to
supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of.Counsels should
take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a
statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances.
The failure to present the Ordinance is inexcusable.

G HOLDINGS V. NATIONAL MINES

FACTS:The petitioner, “G” Holdings, Inc. (GHI), is a domestic corporation primarily engaged in the
business of owning and holding shares of stock of different companies. MMC was incorporated by the
Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP) and the Philippine National Bank (PNB) on account of their
foreclosure of Marinduque Mining and Industrial Corporation’s assets. Pursuant to a Purchase and Sale
Agreement executed between GHI and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), the former bought ninety
percent (90%) of MMC’s shares and financial claims. These financial claims were converted into three
Promissory Notes issued by MMC in favor of GHI totaling P500M and secured by mortgages over
MMC’s properties. Upon the signing of the Purchase and Sale Agreement and upon the full satisfaction
of the stipulated down payment, GHI immediately took physical possession of the mine site and its
facilities, and took full control of the management and operation of MMC.
Almost four years thereafter, a labor dispute arose between MMC and NAMAWU. Labor
secretary (Quisumbing) said that there was illegal dismissal and that MMC committed unfair labor
practice. He then ordered the reinstatement of the laid-off workers, with payment of full backwages
and benefits, and directed the execution of a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) incorporating
the terms and conditions of the previous CBA providing for an annual increase in the workers’ daily
wage. In two separate cases filed with this Court, we sustained the validity of the Quisumbing Order,
which became final and executory. Then DOLE Secretary Arturo D. Brion, on motion of NAMAWU,
directed the issuance of a partial writ of execution (Brion Writ), and ordered the DOLE sheriffs to
proceed to the MMC premises for the execution of the same. The Brion Writ was not fully satisfied
because MMC’s resident manager resisted its enforcement. On motion of NAMAWU, then DOLE
Secretary Patricia A. Sto. Tomas ordered the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution and Break-Open
Order (Sto. Tomas Writ). On October 11, 2002, the respondent acting sheriffs, the members of the
union, and several armed men implemented the Sto. Tomas Writ, and levied on the properties of MMC
located at its compound in Sipalay, Negros Occidental.
GHI filed a for Contempt with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Nullify the Sheriff’s Levy on Properties. GHI contended that the levied properties
were the subject of a Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage, executed by MMC in favor of GHI to
secure the aforesaid P550M promissory notes; that this deed was registered on February 24, 2000;
and that the mortgaged properties were already extrajudicially foreclosed in July 2001 and sold to GHI
as the highest bidder.
The CA ruled, among others, that the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
September 5, 1996 Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage yielded the conclusion that the deed
was sham, fictitious and fraudulent; that it was executed two weeks after the labor dispute arose in
1996, but surprisingly, it was registered only on February 24, 2000, immediately after the Court
affirmed with finality the Quisumbing Order. The CA also found that the certificates of title to MMC’s
real properties did not contain any annotation of a mortgage lien, and, suspiciously, GHI did not
intervene in the long drawn-out labor proceedings to protect its right as a mortgagee of virtually all
the properties of MMC.
The CA further ruled that the subsequent foreclosure of the mortgage was irregular, effected
precisely to prevent the satisfaction of the judgment against MMC.

ISSUE: To decide whether or not CA committed GADLEJ, the Court has to determine whether or not
GHI and MMC are one and the same company and whether or not the alleged mortgages were valid
mortgages. To do this, must the court consider its previous decisions related to the matter? Must it
take judicial notice? YES.

HELD: Judicial notice must be taken by this Court of its Decision in Maricalum Mining Corporation v.
Hon. Arturo D. Brion and NAMAWU, in which we upheld the right of herein private respondent,
NAMAWU, to its labor claims. Upon the same principle of judicial notice, we acknowledge our Decision
in Republic of the Philippines, through its trustee, the Asset Privatization Trust v. “G” Holdings, Inc.,
in which GHI was recognized as the rightful purchaser of the shares of stocks of MMC, and thus,
entitled to the delivery of the company notes accompanying the said purchase. These company notes,
consisting of three (3) Promissory Notes, were part of the documents executed in 1992 in the
privatization sale of MMC by the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) to GHI. Each of these notes uniformly
contains stipulations “establishing and constituting in favor of GHI” mortgages over MMC’s real and
personal properties. The stipulations were subsequently formalized in a separate document
denominated Deed of Real Estate and Chattel Mortgage on September 5, 1996. Thereafter, the Deed
was registered on February 4, 2000.
We find both decisions critically relevant to the instant dispute. In fact, they should
have guided the courts below in the disposition of the controversy at their respective levels.
To repeat, these decisions respectively confirm the right of NAMAWU to its labor claims and
affirm the right of GHI to its financial and mortgage claims over the real and personal
properties of MMC, as will be explained below. The assailed CA decision apparently failed to
consider the impact of these two decisions on the case at bar. Thus, we find it timely to
reiterate that: “courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine
whether or not the case pending is a moot one or whether or not a previous ruling is
applicable to the case under consideration.”
However, the CA correctly assessed that the authority of the lower court to issue the
challenged writ of injunction depends on the validity of the third party’s (GHI’s) claim of ownership
over the property subject of the writ of execution issued by the labor department. Accordingly, the
main inquiry addressed by the CA decision was whether GHI could be treated as a third party or a
stranger to the labor dispute, whose properties were beyond the reach of the Writ of Execution dated
December 18, 2001.
 In this light, all the more does it become imperative to take judicial notice of the two cases
aforesaid, as they provide the necessary perspective to determine whether GHI is such a party with a
valid ownership claim over the properties subject of the writ of execution. In Juaban v. Espina, we
held that “in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other
cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so
closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.” The
two cases that we have taken judicial notice of are of such character, and our review of the instant
case cannot stray from the findings and conclusions therein.

(REGARDING THE MERITS: Court ruled that the mortgage was valid, hence at that time, MMC had no
more properties to attach. Also, just because the GH bought majority of the shares of the MMC is not
valid reason per se to pierce the veil of corporate fiction.)

SPOUSES LATIP VS CHUA

B. JUDICIAL ADMISSION

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. ATIENZA

Facts: An ordinance was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila. This ordinance
reclassified a certain area from industrial to commercial. This area included the “Pandacan Terminals”
owned by the certain oil companies (Chevron, Petron and Shell). The ordinance directed the owners of
businesses located within the reclassified area to cease and desist their operations within 6 months
from the effectivity of the ordinance. Aggrieved, the oil companies filed separate complaints for the
annulment of the ordinance. In the case filed by Petron, the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw
complaint and counterclaim, which was granted.
Thereafter, the city of Manila passed another ordinance called the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006 (I think this was basically the same with the previous
ordinance). So again, the oil companies filed several complaints challenging the validity of this new
ordinance.
The oil companies are now arguing that the subsequent ordinance had repealed the earlier
one. They argue that in the case filed by Petron where the parties filed a joint motion to withdraw, it
was stated therein that “the issue… has been rendered moot and academic by the passage of [the
subsequent ordinance].” In addition, they also argue that in one of the complaints filed against the
subsequent ordinance, the city of Manila mentioned in its answer that “[the earlier ordinance], which
in effect, replaced [the subsequent ordinance]…” Hence, they argue that this was tantamount to an
admission by the city of Manila that the new ordinance repealed the old one.

Issue: W/N the city of Manila made an admission that the subsequent ordinance repealed the older
one. NO!

Held/Ratio:
Rule 129, Section 4
Judicial admissions. ― An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by
showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.

Judicial admission – must be made in the same case in which it is offered

While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position
contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the Rule 129, Section 4 is not applicable here. The
city of Manila made the statements regarding the ordinances in the civil cases (complaints for
annulment of the ordinance) which are not "the same" as this case before the SC. To constitute a
judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered.
Hence, the city of Manila is not estopped from claiming the new ordinance repealed the older
one. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the
argument that latter ordinance superseded the older one but, at the same time, also impugn its (the
subsequent ordinance’s) validity. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the
validity of a statute or ordinance.