Insiders and Outsiders: A Chapter in the Sociology of Knowledge

Author(s): Robert K. Merton

Source: The American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78, No. 1, Varieties of Political Expression in
Sociology (Jul., 1972), pp. 9-47
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2776569
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 Insidersand Outsiders:A Chapterin the Sociology
of Knowledge'
RobertK. Merton
ColumbiaUniversity

The sociologyof knowledgehas long been regardedas a complexand

esotericsubject,remotefromthe urgentproblemsof contemporary social
life.To someof us, it seemsquite the otherway.2Especiallyin timesof
greatsocial change,precipitated by acute social conflictand attendedby
muchculturaldisorganization and reorganization, theperspectives provided
by the various sociologiesof knowledgebear directlyupon problems
agitatingthesociety.It is thenthatdifferences in thevalues,commitments,
and intellectualorientations of conflictinggroupsbecomedeepenedinto
basic cleavages,bothsocial and cultural.As thesocietybecomespolarized,
so do the contending claimsto truth.At the extreme,an active and re-
ciprocaldistrustbetweengroupsfindsexpression in intellectual
perspectives
thatare no longerlocatedwithinthesameuniverseof discourse.The more
deep-seatedthe mutualdistrust,the moredoes the argumentof the other
appear so palpablyimplausibleor absurdthatone no longerinquiresinto
its substanceor logical structureto assess its truthclaims.Instead,one
confronts theother'sargument withan entirelydifferent sortof question:
how does it happento be advancedat all? Thoughtand its productsthus
becomealtogetherfunctionalized, interpreted only in termsof theirpre-
sumedsocial or economicor psychological sourcesand functions. In the
politicalarena,wherethe rulesof the game oftencondoneand sometimes
supportthepractice,thisinvolvesreciprocated attackson the integrityof
1 A firsteditionof thispaper was read on November6, 1969 to the seminarcelebrating
the 50th anniversaryof the departmentof sociology at the Universityof Bombay,
India. A second edition was read at the CentennialSymposiumof Loyola University
(of Chicago) on January 5, 1970 and at the annual meetingsof the Southwestern
Sociological Associationin Dallas, Texas, on March 25, 1971. This third edition was
presentedat the annual meetingof the AmericanSociological Associationin Denver,
Colorado, September1, 1971. Any errorsI have retainedafterthe criticalexaminations
of the paper by Walter Wallace and Harriet Zuckermanare of courseentirelymy own.
Aid from the National Science Foundation is gratefullyacknowledged,as is indis-
pensable help of quite anotherkind provided by Hollon W. Farr, M.D.
2 As witness the spate of recent writingsin and on the sociology of knowledge,
includingfartoo many to be cited here.Some essentialdiscussionsand bibliographyare
provided by Berger and Luckmann (1966), Stark (1958), Wolff (1965), Curtis and
Petras (1970). The application of the sociology of knowledge to the special case of
sociology itself has also burgeonedsince 1959 when the Fourth World Congress of
Sociology held by the International Sociological Association focused on the social
contextsof sociology. See, for prime examples,Gouldner (1970), Friedrichs (1970),
Tiryakian (1971).

9
RobertK. Merton
the opponent;in the academicforum,wherenormativeexpectationsare
somewhatmore restraining,it leads to reciprocatedideologicalanalyses
(whichoftendeteriorateinto barelyconcealedad homineminnuendos).
In both,theprocessfeedsupon and nourishescollectiveinsecurities.3

SOCIAL CHANGE AND SOCIAL THOUGHT

This conceptionof the social sourcesof the intensified interestin the

sociologyof knowledgeand someof the theoreticaldifficultieswhichthey
fosterplainlyhas thecharacter,understandablytypicalin thesociologyof
scientific
knowledge, of a self-exemplifying
idea. It posits reciprocalcon-
nectionsbetweenthoughtand society,in particularthe social conditions
thatmakeforor disrupta commonuniverseof intellectual discoursewithin
which the most severe disagreements can take place. Michael Polanyi
(1958, 1959, 1964, 1967) has noted,moreperceptively than anyoneelse
I know,4howthegrowthofknowledge dependsuponcomplexsetsof social
relationsbased on a largelyinstitutionalized
reciprocityof trustamong
scholarsand scientists.In one of his manypassages on this theme,he
observesthat
in an idealfreesocietyeachpersonwouldhaveperfect accessto thetruth:
to the truthin science,in art,religion, and justice,bothin publicand
privatelife.Butthisis notpracticable;eachpersoncanknowdirectly very
littleof truthand musttrustothersforthe rest.Indeed,to assurethis
processof mutualrelianceis one of themainfunctions of society.It fol-
lowsthatsuchfreedom of themindas can be possessedby menis due to
theservices of socialinstitutions,
whichsetnarrow limitsto man'sfreedom
and tendto threaten it evenwithinthoselimits.The relation is analogous
to thatbetweenmindand body:to thewayin whichtheperformance of
mentalactsis restricted by limitations
and distortionsdue to themedium
whichmakestheseperformances possible.[1959,p. 68]
But as cleavagesdeepenbetweengroups,social strata or collectivities
of whateverkind, the social networkof mutual reliance is at best

3 This passage on the conditionsmaking for intensifiedinterestin the sociology of

knowledgeand forderivativeproblemsof theoreticalanalysisin the fieldhas not been
writtenfor this occasion. It is largelydrawn frommy paper in Gurvitchand Moore
(1945, but now out of print) and reprintedin Merton (1968, pp. 510-14). Since the
cognitiveorientationsof group membersand nonmembershas long been a problemof
enduringinterestto me, I shall have occasion to referto my writingsthroughoutthis
paper.
4 Polanyi's detailed developmentof this theme over the years representsa basic con-
tributionto the sociologyof science by providinga model of the various overlapping
cognitive and social structuresof intellectualdisciplines.Ziman (1968) has useful
observationsalong these lines and Campbell (1969) has contributedsome typically
Campbellian (i.e., imaginativeand evocative) thinkingon the subject, in developing
his "fish-scalemodel" of overlapping disciplines.

10
 Insidersand Outsiders
strainedand at worstbroken.In place of the vigorousbut intellectually
disciplinedmutualcheckingand rechecking that operatesto a significant
extent,thoughneverof course totally,withinthe social institutions of
scienceand scholarship, theredevelopsa straintowardseparatism, in the
domainof theintellectas in thedomainof society.Partlygroundedmutual
suspicionincreasingly substitutesforpartlygroundedmutualtrust.There
emergeclaimsto group-basedtruth:Insidertruthsthat counterOutsider
untruthsand OutsidertruthsthatcounterInsideruntruths.
In our day, vastlyevidentsocial changeis beinginitiatedand funneled
througha varietyof social movements. These are formallyalike in their
objectivesof achievingan intensified a deepened
collectiveconsciousness,
solidarityand a new or renewedprimaryor totalallegianceof theirmem-
bersto certainsocial identities,statuses,groups,or collectivities.
Inspect-
ing the familiarlist of thesemovements centeredon class,race,ethnicity,
age, sex, religion,and sexual disposition,we note two otherinstructive
similaritiesbetweenthem.First, the movementsare for the most part
formedprincipallyon the basis of ascribedratherthan acquiredstatuses
and identities,witheligibilityforinclusionbeingin termsof who you are
ratherthan what you are (in the sense of status being contingenton
roleperformance). And second,the movements largelyinvolvethe public
affirmationof pridein statusesand solidaritywithcollectivities thathave
long been sociallyand culturallydowngraded,stigmatized, or otherwise
victimizedin the social system.As withgroupaffiliations generally,these
newly reinforcedsocial identitiesfind expressionin various affiliative
symbolsof distinctivespeech,bodily appearance,dress,public behavior
patternsand, not least,assumptionsand fociof thought.

THE INSIDER DOCTRINE

Withinthis contextof social change,we come upon the contemporary

relevanceof a long-standingproblemin the sociologyof knowledge:the
problemof patterneddifferentialsamongsocial groupsand stratain access
to certaintypesof knowledge. In its strongform,the claimis put forward
as a matterof epistemological principlethat particulargroupsin each
momentof historyhave monopolistic access to particularkindsof knowl-
edge.In theweaker,moreempiricalform,theclaimholdsthatsomegroups
have privilegedaccess,withothergroupsalso beingable to acquire that
knowledgeforthemselves but at greaterriskand cost.
Claims of thisgeneralsorthave been periodicallyintroduced.For one
imposingand consequentialexample,Marx, a progenitor of the sociology
of knowledgeas of muchelse in social thought,advancedthe claim that
aftercapitalisticsocietyhad reachedits ultimatephase of development,

11
Robert K. Merton

the strategiclocationof one social class would enable it to achieve an

understanding of the societythat was exemptfromfalse consciousness.5
For another,altogetherunimposingbut also consequentialexamplein-
volvingascribedratherthanachievedstatus,theNazi Gauleiterof science
and learning,ErnestKrieck (1935), expressedan entireideologyin con-
trastingtheaccessto authenticscientificknowledgeby menof unimpeach-
able Aryanancestrywiththe corruptversionsof knowledgeaccessibleto
non-Aryans.Krieck could referwithouthesitationto "Protestantand
Catholicscience,Germanand Jewishscience."And,in a specialapplication
of the Insiderdoctrine,the Nazi regimecould introducethe new racial
categoryof "whiteJews"to referto thoseAryanswho had defiledtheir
race by actual or symboliccontactwith non-Aryans. Thus, the Nobel
Prize physicist,WernerHeisenberg,became the most eminentmember
of thisnew race by persistingin his declarationthat Einstein'stheoryof
relativityconstituted"an obvious basis for furtherresearch."While
anotherNobel laureatein physics,JohannesStark,couldcastigatenot only
Heisenbergbut his other great scientificcontemporaries-Planck, von
Laue, and Schrodinger-for acceptingwhatStarkdescribedas "the Jewish
physicsof Einstein"(Merton 1968,pp. 538-41).
For ourpurposes,we neednotreviewthearrayof elitistdoctrineswhich
have maintainedthatcertaingroupshave, on biologicalor social grounds,
monopolisticor privilegedaccess to newknowledge.Differing in detail,the
doctrinesare alike in distinguishingbetweenInsideraccess to knowledge
and Outsiderexclusionfromit.

SOCIAL BASES OF INSIDER DOCTRINE

The ecumenicalproblemof the interactionbetweena rapidlychanging
social structure
and the development of Insiderand Outsiderdoctrinesis
examinedherein a doublyparochialfashion.Not onlyare myobservations
largelylimitedto the United States in our time but they are further
limitedto theimplications advocatedby spokesmenforcertain
of doctrines
black social movements,since thesemovements have oftencome to serve
as prototypicalforthe others(women,youth,homosexuals, otherethnics,
etc.).
AlthoughInsiderdoctrineshave been intermittently set forthby white
elitiststhroughthecenturies,whitemale Insiderismin Americansociology
5 Observationson the advantaged position of the proletariatfor the perception of
historicaland social truthare threadedthroughoutMarx's writings.For some of the
crucial passages, see his Poverty of Philosophy (1847, e.g., pp. 125-26). On Marx's
thinkingalong these lines, Georg Luk'acs, in spite of his own disclaimersin the new
introductionto his classic work, History and Class Consciousness,remainsof funda-
mental importance(1971, esp. pp. 47-81, 181-209).

12
 Insidersand Outsiders

duringthepast generations has largelybeen of thetacitor de factorather

thandoctrinalor principledvariety.It has simplytakenthe formof pat-
ternedexpectationsabout the appropriateselectionof specialitiesand of
problemsforinvestigation. The handfulof Negrosociologists werein large
part expected,as a resultof social selectionand self-selection, to study
problemsof Negrolifeand relationsbetweenthe racesjust as the handful
of womensociologistswereexpectedto studyproblemsof women,prin-
cipallyas theserelatedto marriageand the family.
In contrastto thisde factoformof Insiderism,an explicitlydoctrinal
formhas in recentyearsbeen put forwardmostclearlyand emphatically
by someblackintellectuals. In its strongversion,the argument holdsthat,
as a matterof social epistemology, onlyblack historianscan trulyunder-
standblack history,onlyblack ethnologists can understandblack culture,
onlyblack sociologistscan understandthe social lifeof blacks,and so on.
In the weakerformof the doctrine,somepracticalconcessionsare made.
With regardto programsof Black Studies,for example,it is proposed
that some whiteprofessors of the relevantsubjectsmightbe broughtin
sincethereare not yet enoughblack scholarsto staffall the proliferating
programsof study.But as Nathan Hare, the foundingpublisherof the
Black Scholar,stated severalyears ago, this is only on temporaryand
conditionalsufferance:"Any white professorsinvolvedin the program
would have to be black in spiritin orderto last. The same is true for
'Negro' professors."6 Apart fromthis kind of limitedconcession,the
Insiderdoctrinemaintainsthat thereis a body of black history,black
psychology, blackethnology, and blacksociologywhichcan be significantly
advancedonlyby black scholarsand social scientists.
In its fundamentalcharacter,this representsa major claim in the
sociologyof knowledgethat impliesthe balkanizationof social science,
withseparatebaronieskept exclusivelyin the hands of Insidersbearing
theircredentialsin theshape of one or anotherascribedstatus.Generaliz-
ing thespecificclaim,it wouldappearto followthatif onlyblack scholars
can understandblacks, thenonly whitescholarscan understandwhites.
Generalizing furtherfromraceto nation,it wouldthenappear,forexample,
that only Frenchscholarscan understandFrenchsocietyand, of course,
thatonlyAmericans, not theirexternalcritics,can trulyunderstand Amer-
ican society.Once thebasic principleis adopted,the list of Insiderclaims
to a monopolyof knowledgebecomesindefinitely expansibleto all manner
of social formationsbased on ascribed (and, by extension,on some
achieved) statuses.It would thus seem to followthat only womencan
understand women-and men,men.On the same principle,youthalone is

6 Nathan Hare as quoted by Bunzel (1968, p. 32).

13
RobertK. Merton

capable of understanding youthjust as, presumably, onlythe middleaged

are able to understandtheirage peers.7Furthermore, as we shiftto the
hybridcases of ascribedand acquired statusesin varyingmix, on the
Insider principle,proletariansalone can understandproletariansand
presumably capitalists,capitalists;only Catholics,Catholics;Jews,Jews,
and to halt the inventory of sociallyatomizedclaimsto knowledgewitha
limitingcase that on its face would seem to have some merit,it would
then plainly followthat only sociologistsare able to understandtheir
fellowsociologists.8
In all theseapplications,the doctrineof extremeInsiderismrepresents
a new credentialism.9 This is the credentialism of ascribed status, in
whichunderstanding becomesaccessibleonlyto thefortunate fewor many
whoare to the mannerborn.In thisrespect,it contrastswiththe creden-
tialismof achievedstatusthat is characteristic of meritocraticsystems.10
ExtremeInsiderismmovestowarda doctrineof groupmethodological
solipsism.1"In this formof solipsism,each groupmustin the end have a
monopolyof knowledgeabout itselfjust as accordingto the doctrineof

fromthat of other ascribed

7 Actually,the case of age status is structurallydifferent
statuses. For although, even in this time of advanced biotechnology,a few men
become transformedinto women and vice versa, this remains a comparativelyrare
instance of the ordinarilyascribed status of sex becomingan achieved status. But in
contrastto sex and other ascribed statuses,each successive age status has been ex-
perienced by suitably long-lived social scientists (within the limits of their own
inexorablyadvancing age cohorts). On the basis of a dynamic Insider doctrine,then,
it mighteven be argued that older social scientistsare better able than very young
ones to understandthe various other age strata. As context,see the concept of the
reenactmentof complementaryroles in the life cycle of scientistsin Zuckerman and
Merton (1972).
8As we shall see, this is a limitingtype of case that mergesinto quite another type,
since as a fully acquired status, rather than an ascribed one, that of the sociologist
(or physicianor physicist) presumablypresupposesfunctionallyrelevant expertise.
9 I am indebtedto Harriet Zuckermanfor these observationson the new credentialism
of ascribed status. The classic source of meritocracyremainsYoung (1958); on the
dysfunctionsof educational credentialism, see Miller and Roby (1970, chap. 6).
10 But as we shall see, when the extremeInsider position is transformedfrom a doc-
into a set of questionsabout the dis-
trineof assumptions-treated-as-established-truth
tinctiveroles of Insiders and Outsidersin intellectualinquiry,there develops a con-
vergencethoughnot coincidencebetween the assumptionsunderlyingcredentialsbased
on ascribedstatus and credentialsbased on achieved status. In the one, early socializa-
tion in the culture or subcultureis taken to provide readier access to certain kinds
of understanding;in the other, the componentin adult socialization representedby
disciplinedtrainingin one or another field of learningis taken to provide a higher
probabilityof access to certainother kinds of understanding.
11As Agassi (1969, p. 421) remindsus, the term "methodologicalsolipsism" was in-
troduced by Rudolf Carnap to designate the theoryof knowledge known as sensa-
tionalism: "the doctrine that all knowledge-of the world and of one's own self-
derivesfromsensation." The belief that all one really knows is one's subjective expe-
rience is sometimesdescribedas the "egocentricpredicament."

14
 Insidersand Outsiders
individualmethodological solipsismeach individualhas absoluteprivacy
of knowledgeabout him-or her-self.The Insiderdoctrinecan be put in
thevernacularwithno greatloss in meaning:you have to be one in order
to understandone. In somewhatless idiomaticlanguage,the doctrine
holds that one has monopolistic or privilegedaccess to knowledge,or is
whollyexcludedfromit, by virtueof one's groupmembership or social
position.For some,the notionappearsin the formof a question-begging
pun: Insideras Insighter,one endowedwithspecial insightinto matters
necessarilyobscureto others,thus possessedof penetrating discernment.
Once adopted,the pun providesa specioussolutionbut the seriousIn-
siderdoctrinehas its own rationale.
We can quicklypass overthe trivialversionof thatrationale:the argu-
mentthattheOutsidermaybe incompetent, givento quick and superficial
foraysinto the groupor cultureunderstudyand even unschooledin its
language.That thiskind of incompetence can be foundis beyonddoubt
but it holds no principledinterestforus. Foolish men (and women) or
badlytrainedmen (and women)are to be foundeverywhere, and anthro-
pologistsand sociologistsand psychologistsand historiansengaged in
studyofgroupsotherthantheirownsurelyhave theirfairshareof them.12
But such cases of special ineptitudedo not bear on the Insiderprinciple.
It is not merelythat Insidersalso have theirshareof incompetents. The
Insiderprincipledoes not referto stupidlydesignedand stupidlyexecuted
inquiriesthathappento be madeby stupidOutsiders;it maintainsa more
fundamental position.Accordingto the doctrineof the Insider,the Out-
sider,no matterhow carefuland talented,is excludedin principlefrom
gainingaccess to the social and culturaltruth.
In short,the doctrineholds that the Outsiderhas a structurally im-
posed incapacityto comprehendalien groups,statuses,cultures,and
societies.UnliketheInsider,theOutsiderhas neitherbeensocializedin the
groupnorhas engagedin therunof experiencethatmakesup its life,and
therefore cannothave the direct,intuitivesensitivitythat alone makes
empathicunderstanding possible.Only throughcontinuedsocializationin
the life of a groupcan one become fullyaware of its symbolismsand
socially shared realities; only so can one understandthe fine-grained
meaningsof behavior,feelings,and values; onlyso can one decipherthe
unwritten grammarof conductand the nuancesof culturalidiom.Or, to
take a specificexpressionof this thesisby Ralph W. Conant (1968):
"Whitesare not and neverwill be as sensitiveto the black community

12 As I have noted in the firstedition of this paper, the social scientistsof India, for
one example,have long sufferedthe slingsand arrows of outrageouslyunpreparedand
altogetherexogenoussocial scientistsengagingin swift,superficialinquiriesinto matters
Indian (Merton 1971, p. 456).

15
Robert K. Merton
preciselybecause they are not part of that community."Correlatively,
Abd-lHakimuIbn Alkalimat(Gerald McWorter)drawsa sharpcontrast
betweenthe conceptsof "a black social science" and "a white social
science" (1969, p. 35).
A somewhatless stringent versionof the doctrinemaintainsonly that
Insiderand Outsiderscholarshave significantly differentfoci of interest.
The argument goes somewhatas follows.The Insiders,sharingthe deepest
concernsof thegroupor at theleast beingthoroughly awareof them,will
so directtheirinquiriesas to have thembe relevantto thoseconcerns.So,
too, the Outsiderswill inquireinto problemsrelevantto the distinctive
values and interestswhichtheysharewithmembersof theirgroup.But
theseare boundto differ fromthoseof the groupunderstudyif onlybe-
cause theOutsidersoccupydifferent places in thesocialstructure.
This is a hypothesiswhichhas the not unattractivequality of being
readilyamenableto empiricalinvestigation. It shouldbe possibleto com-
pare the spectrumof researchproblemsabout,say, the black population
in the countrythat have been investigated by black sociologistsand by
whiteones,or say, the spectrumof problemsaboutwomenthathave been
investigated by femalesociologistsand by male ones,in orderto findout
whetherthe fociof attentionin factdiffer and if so, to what degreeand
in whichrespects.The onlyinquiryof thiskindI happento knowof was
publishedmore than a quarter-century ago. William Fontaine (1944)
foundthatNegroscholarstendedto adopt analyticalratherthanmorpho-
logical categoriesin theirstudyof behavior,that they emphasizeden-
vironmental ratherthan biologicaldeterminants of that behavior,and
tendedto makeuse of strikingly dramaticratherthanrepresentative data.
All thiswas ascribedto a caste-induced resentment amongNegroscholars.
But sincethislonestudyfailedto examinethefrequency of subjects,types
of interpretation,and uses of data amonga comparablesampleof white
scholarsat the time,the findings are somewhatless thancompelling.All
the same, the questionsit addressedremain.For there is theoretical
reasonto supposethat the fociof researchadoptedby Insidersand Out-
sidersand perhapstheircategoriesof analysisas well will tendto differ.
At least, Max Weber's notionof Wertbeziehung suggeststhat differing
social locations,withtheirdistinctive interestsand values,will affectthe
selectionof problemsforinvestigation (Weber 1922, pp. 146-214).
Unlike the stringentversionof the doctrinewhich maintainsthat
Insidersand Outsidersmustarriveat different (and presumablyincom-
patible) findingsand interpretations even when they do examine the
sameproblems, thisweakerversionarguesonlythattheywillnotdeal with
thesamequestionsand so willsimplytalkpast one another.Withthe two
versionscombined,the extendedversionof the Insiderdoctrinecan also
be put in thevernacular:one mustnot onlybe one in orderto understand

16
 Insidersand Outsiders

one; one mustbe one in orderto understandwhatis mostworthunder-

standing.
Clearly,the social epistemologicaldoctrineof the Insiderlinksup with
whatSumner(1907, p. 13) longago definedas ethnocentrism: "the tech-
nicalnamefor[the] viewofthingsin whichone'sowngroupis thecenterof
everything, and all othersare scaled and rated with referenceto it."
Sumnerthengoes on to includeas a componentof ethnocentrism, rather
than as a frequentcorrelateof it (thus robbinghis idea of some of its
potentialanalyticalpower), the beliefthat one's groupis superiorto all
cognategroups: "each groupnourishesits own pride and vanity,boasts
itselfsuperior,exaltsits own divinities,and looks withcontempton out-
siders" (p. 13). For althoughthe practiceof seeingone's own groupas
thecenterofthingsis empirically correlatedwitha beliefin its superiority,
centralityand superiority need to be keptanalyticallydistinctin orderto
deal withpatternsof alienationfromone'smembership groupand contempt
forit.13
Supplementing the abundanceof historicaland ethnologicalevidence
oftheempiricaltendency forbeliefin one'sgroupor collectivity as superior
to all cognategroupsor collectivities-whether nation,class, race,region,
or organization-isa recentbatch of studiesof what TheodoreCaplow
(1964, pp. 213-16) has called the aggrandizement effect:the distortion
upwardof the prestigeof an organizationby its members.Caplow ex-
amined33 different kindsof organizations-ranging fromdance studios
to Protestantand Catholicchurches,fromskid rowmissionsto big banks,
and fromadvertising agenciesto university departments-andfoundthat
members overestimated theprestigeof theirorganizationsome"eighttimes
as oftenas theyunderestimated it" (when comparedwithjudgmentsby
Outsiders).More in pointforus, whilememberstendedto disagreewith
Outsidersabout the standingof theirown organization,theytended to
agreewiththemabout theprestigeof the otherorganizations in the same

13 By introducingtheiruseful term "xenocentrism"to referto both basic and favor-

able orientationsto groups other than one's own, Kent and Burnight (1951) have
retainedSumner's unusefulpractice of prematurelycombiningcentralityand evalua-
tion in the one concept ratherthan keepingthem analyticallydistinct.The analytical
distinctioncan be captured terminologicallyby treating"xenocentrism"as the generic
term,with the analyticallydistinctcomponentsof favorable orientationto nonmem-
bershipgroups (as with the orientationof many white middle-classAmericanstoward
blacks) being registeredin the term "xenophilia" and the unfavorableorientationby
Pareto's term "xenophobia." The growingtheoreticalinterestin nonmembershipref-
erence groups (a concept implyinga type of Outsider) (Hyman 1968; Merton and
Rossi 1950) and the intensifiedspread of both ethnocentrism and xenocentrism in our
timeshave given the termxenocentrismgreaterrelevance than ever and yet, for ob-
scure reasons,it has remainedlargelysequesteredin the pages of the AmericanJournal
of Sociology where it firstappeared 20 years ago. Caplow (1964, p. 216) and Horton
(1965) are the only ones I know to have made good use of the term,but their unac-
customedbehavior only emphasizesits more generalneglect.

17
RobertK. Merton

set. These findings can be takenas something of a sociologicalparable.In

thesemattersat least,the judgmentsof "Insiders"are best trustedwhen
theyassessgroupsotherthantheirown; thatis, whenmembersof groups
judge as Outsidersratherthanas Insiders.
Findingsof thissortdo nottestify, of course,thatethnocentrism and its
frequentspiritualcorrelate,xenophobia,fearand hatredof the alien,are
incorrigible.They do, however,remindus of the widespreadtendencyto
glorifythe ingroup,sometimesto that degreein which it qualifiesas
chauvinism:the extreme,blind, and oftenbellicose extollingof one's
group,status,or collectivity. We need not abandon "chauvinism"as a
conceptusefulto us heremerelybecauseit has latelybecomeadoptedas a
vogueword,bluntedin meaningthroughindiscriminate use as a rhetorical
weaponin intergroup conflict.Nor need we continueto confinethe scope
of theconcept,as it was in its originsand laterby Lasswell (1937, p. 361)
in his short,incisivediscussionof it, to the special case of the state or
nation.The conceptcan be usefully,not tendentiously, extendedto desig-
nate theextremeglorification of any social formation.
Chauvinismfindsits fullestideologicalexpressionwhengroupsare sub-
ject to the stressof acute conflict.Underthe stressof war, forexample,
scientistshave beenknownto violatethevaluesand normsof universalism
in whichtheyweresocialized,allowingtheirstatusas nationalsto dominate
overtheirstatusas scientists. Thus, at the outsetof WorldWar I, almost
a hundredGermanscholarsand scientists-including many of the first
rank,such as Brentano,Ehrlich,Haber, Eduard Meyer,Ostwald,Planck,
and Schmoller-couldbring themselvesto issue a manifestothat im-
pugned the contributions of the enemyto science,chargingthem with
intellectualdishonestyand, when you came
nationalisticbias, logrolling,
rightdownto it, the absenceof trulycreativecapacity.The Englishand
Frenchscientistswerenot far behindin advertisingtheirown brand of
chauvinism.'4
Ethnocentrism, then,is not a historicalconstant.It becomesintensified
underspecifiableconditionsof acute social conflict.Whena nation,race,
ethnicgroup,or any otherpowerfulcollectivity has long extolledits own
admirablequalities and, expresslyor by implication,deprecatedthe
qualitiesof others,it invitesand providesthe potentialforcounterethno-
centrism.And whena oncelargelypowerlesscollectivity acquiresa socially
validatedsense of growingpower,its membersexperiencean intensified
need forself-affirmation.Undersuch circumstances, collectiveself-glorifi-

14Currentclaims of Insiderismstill have a distance to go, in the academic if not the

political forum,to match the chauvinisticclaims of those days. For collectionsof such
documents,see Pettit and Leudet (1916), Duhem (1915), Kellermann (1915), Kherk-
hof (1933).

18
 Insidersand Outsiders
cation,foundin somemeasureamongall groups,becomesa predictableand
intensified counterresponseto long-standing belittlement fromwithout.15
So it is that,in the United States,the centuries-long institutionalized
premisethat "white (and forsome,presumablyonly white) is true and
good and beautiful"induces,under conditionsof revolutionary change,
the counterpremise that"black (and forsome,presumably onlyblack) is
trueand good and beautiful."And just as the social systemhas forcen-
turiesoperatedon the tacitor explicitpremisethatin cases of conflictbe-
tweenwhitesand blacks, the whitesare presumptively right,so there
now developsthe counterpremise, findingeasy confirmation in the long
historyof injusticevisitedupon AmericanNegroes,that in cases of such
conflicttoday,the blacksare presumptively right.
What is beingproposedhere is that the epistemological claimsof the
Insiderto monopolistic or privilegedaccess to social truthdevelopunder
particularsocial and historicalconditions.Social groupsor strataon the
way up developa revolutionary elan. The new thrustto a largershare
of power and controlover theirsocial and political environment finds
variousexpressions, amongthemclaimsto a unique access to knowledge
about theirhistory,culture,and social life.
On thisinterpretation,we can understand whythisInsiderdoctrinedoes
not arguefora Black Physics,Black Chemistry, Black Biology,or Black
Technology.For the new will to controltheirfate deals with the social
environment, not the environment of nature.There is, moreover, nothing
in the segregatedlifeexperienceof Negroesthatis said to sensitizethem
to the subjectmattersand problematics of the physicaland lifesciences.
An Insiderdoctrinewouldhave to forgegeneticassumptions about racial
modesof thoughtin orderto claim,as in thecase of theNazi versionthey
did claim,monopolistic or privilegedaccess to knowledgein thesefieldsof
science. But the black Insider doctrineadopts an essentiallysocial-
environmental rationale,not a biologicallygeneticone.
The social process underlyingthe emergenceof Insider doctrineis
reasonablyclear. Polarizationin the underlying social structurebecomes
reflectedin the polarizationof claimsin the intellectualand ideological
domain,as groupsor collectivities seek to capturewhatHeidegger called
the "public interpretation of reality."16With varyingdegreesof intent,
groupsin conflictwantto make theirinterpretation the prevailingone of
howthingswereand are and willbe. The criticalmeasureof successoccurs
whentheinterpretation movesbeyondtheboundariesof theingroupto be
15This is not a predictionafterthe fact. E. Franklin Frazier (1949, 1957) repeatedly
made the generalpoint and Merton (1968, p. 485) examinedthis patternin connection
with the self-fulfilling
prophecy.
16 Heidegger(1927) as cited and discussedby Mannheim (1952, pp. 196 if.).

19
Robert K. Merton

acceptedby Outsiders.At the extreme, it thengivesrise,throughidentifi-

able processesof reference-group behavior,to the familiarcase of the
convertedOutsidervalidatinghimself,in his own eyes and in those of
others,by becomingeven morezealous than the Insidersin adheringto
thedoctrineof thegroupwithwhichhe wantsto identify himself,if only
symbolically(Merton 1968, pp. 405-6). He thenbecomesmoreroyalist
than the king,morepapist than the pope. Some whitesocial scientists,
forexample,vicariously and personallyguiltriddenovercenturiesof white
racism,are preparedto outdo the claimsof the grouptheywould sym-
bolicallyjoin. They are ready even to surrendertheirhard-wonexpert
knowledge if theInsiderdoctrineseemsto requireit. This typeof response
was perhapsepitomizedin a televisededucationalprogramin whichthe
whitecuratorof Africanethnologyat a major museumengagedin dis-
cussionwitha blackwho,as it happens,had had no prolongedethnological
training. All thesame,at a crucialjuncturein thepublicconversation, the
distinguished ethnologist could be heardto say: "I realize,of course,that
I cannotbeginto understandthe black experience, in Africaor America,
as you can. Won'tyou tell our audienceabout it?" Here, in the sponta-
neityof an unrehearsed publicdiscussion,the Insiderdoctrinehas indeed
becomethepublicinterpretation of reality.
The black Insider doctrinelinks up with the historicallydeveloping
social structure in still anotherway. The dominantsocial institutions in
thiscountryhave longtreatedtheracialidentityof individualsas actually
if not doctrinally relevantto all mannerof situationsin everysphereof
life.For generations, neitherblacksnorwhites,thoughwithnotablydiffer-
ing consequences, werepermitted to forgettheirrace. This treatment of a
social status (or identity)as relevantwhenintrinsically it is functionally
irrelevantconstitutesthe verycore of social discrimination. As the once
firmly rootedsystemsofdiscriminatory institutionsand prejudicialideology
began to lose theirhold, this meantthat increasingly many judged the
worthof ideas on theirmerits,not in termsof theirracialpedigree.
What the Insiderdoctrineof the mostmilitantblacks proposeson the
level of social structure is to adopt the salienceof racialidentityin every
sortof role and situation,a patternso long imposedupon the American
Negro,and to makethatidentitya total commitment issuingfromwithin
thegroupratherthanone imposedupon fromwithout.By thusaffirming
it
theuniversalsaliencyof race and by redefining race as an abidingsource
ofprideratherthanstigma,theInsiderdoctrine effect in modelsitselfafter
doctrinelongmaintainedby whiteracists.
Neitherthiscomponent of the Insiderdoctrinenor the statementon its
implications is at all new.Almosta century ago, FrederickDouglass (1966)
hingedhis observations alongtheselineson thedistinction betweencollec-
tiveand individualself-images based on ascribedand achievedstatus:

20
 Insidersand Outsiders
Oneof thefewerrorsto whichwe are clinging mostpersistently and,as
I think, mostmischievously has comeintogreatprominence of late. It is
thecultivationandstimulation amongus ofa sentiment whichwearepleased
to call racepride.I findit in all ourbooks,papers,and speeches.For my
partI see no superiorityor inferiorityin raceor color.Neithertheonenor
theotheris a propersourceof prideor complacency. Our raceand color
are notof ourownchoosing. We haveno volitionin thecase one wayor
another. The onlyexcuseforpridein individuals or racesis in thefactof
theirownachievements. ... I see no benefitto be derivedfromthisever-
lastingexhortation of speakersand writers amongus to thecultivation of
racepride.On thecontrary, I see in it a positiveevil.It is building on a
falsefoundation. Besides,whatis the thingwe are fighting against,and
whatare we fighting forin thiscountry? Whatis themountain devil,the
lionin thewayof ourprogress? Whatis it, but American racepride;an
assumption of superiorityuponthegroundof race and color?Do we not
knowthateveryargument wemake,andeverypretension wesetup in favor
of raceprideis givingtheenemya stickto breakoverourheads?
In rejectingthe cause of racial chauvinism,Douglass addressedthe
normative ratherthanthecognitiveaspectof Insiderism. The call to total
commitment requiringone grouployaltyto be unquestionably paramount
is mostapt to be heardwhentheparticulargroupor collectivity is engaged
in severeconflictwithothers.Justas conditionsof war betweennations
have longproduceda straintowardhyperpatriotism amongnationalethno-
centrics,so currentintergroup conflictshave produceda straintoward
hyperloyalty amongracial or sex or age or religiousethnocentrics. Total
commitment easilyslidesfromthe solidaritydoctrineof "our group,right
or wrong"to the morallyand intellectually preemptivedoctrineof "our
group,alwaysright,neverwrong."
Turningfromthe normativeaspect,withits ideologyexhorting prime
loyaltyto thisor thatgroup,to the cognitive,specifically epistemological
aspect,we notethattheInsiderdoctrinepresupposesa particularimagery
of social structure.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

Fromthediscussionthusfar,it shouldbe evidentthatI adopt a struc-

turalconceptionof Insidersand Outsiders.In thisconception, Insidersare
themembers of specifiedgroupsand collectivities
or occupantsof specified
social statuses; Outsidersare the nonmembers.17 This structuralconcept
comescloserto Sumner'susage in his Folkwaysthanto variousmeanings
assignedthe Outsiderby Nietzsche,Kierkegaard,Sartre,Camus (1946)

17 This is not the place to go into the theoreticalproblemsof identifying

the bounda-
ries of groups, the criteria of group membership,and the consequent varieties of
membersand nonmembers.For an introductionto the complexitiesof these concepts,
see Merton (1968, pp. 338-54, 405-7).

21
 Robert K. Merton

or, forthatmatter,by ColinWilson(1956) just as, to comenearerhome,

it differsfromtheusagesadoptedby Riesman,Denny,and Glazer (1950),
Price (1965, pp. 83-84), or Howard S. Becker (1963). That is to say,
Insidersand Outsidersare here definedas categoriesin social structure,
not as insidedopestersor the speciallyinitiatedpossessorsof esotericin-
formation on the one hand and as social-psychological typesmarkedby
alienation,rootlessness,or rule breaking,on the other.
In structuralterms,we are all, of course,both Insidersand Outsiders,
membersof some groupsand, sometimesderivatively, not of others;oc-
cupantsof certainstatuseswhichtherebyexcludeus fromoccupyingother
cognatestatuses.Obviousas thisbasic factofsocialstructure is,itsimplica-
tions for Insider and Outsiderepistemological doctrinesare apparently
not nearlyas obvious.Else, thesedoctrineswouldnot presuppose, as they
typicallydo, thathumanbeingsin sociallydifferentiated societiescan be
sufficiently located in termsof a singlesocial status,category,or group
affiliation-black or white,men or women,under30 or older-or of sev-
eral such categories,takenseriatimratherthan conjointly.This neglects
the crucial fact of social structurethat individualshave not a single
status but a status set: a complement of variouslyinterrelated statuses
whichinteractto affectboththeirbehaviorand perspectives.
The structuralfact of status sets, in contrastto statusestaken one
at a time,introducesseveretheoreticalproblemsfor total Insider (and
Outsider)doctrinesof social epistemology. The arrayof statussets in a
populationmeansthat aggregatesof individualssharesome statusesand
not others; or, to put this in context,that theytypicallyconfrontone
anothersimultaneously as Insidersand Outsiders.Thus, if only whites
can understandwhitesand blacks,blacks,and only men can understand
men,and women,women,this gives rise to the paradox whichseverely
limitsbothpremises:forit thenturnsout, by assumption, thatsome In-
sidersare excludedfromunderstanding otherInsiderswithwhitewomen
beingcondemnednot to understandwhitemen,and black men,not to
understandblack women,18 and so throughthe variouscombinationsof
statussubsets.
Structuralanalysisin termsof shared and mutuallyexclusivestatus
sets will surelynot be mistakeneitheras advocatingdivisionswithinthe
ranksof collectivities definedby a singleprimecriterionor as predicting
thatsuch collectivities cannotuniteon manyissues,despitetheirinternal
18 The conflictsperiodicallyreportedby black women-for example, the debate be-
tween Mary Mebane [Liza] and Margaret Sloan (in defense of Gloria Steinem)
betweenidentification with black liberationand the women's liberationmovement,re-
status sets. The problemof coping with these
flectthis sociologicalfact of crosscutting
structurallyinduced conflictsis epitomizedin MargaretSloan's (1971) "realizationthat
I was going to help the brothersrealize that as black women we cannot allow black
men to do [to] us what white men have been doing to theirwomen all these years."

22
 Insidersand Outsiders
divisions.Such analysisonly indicatesthe bases of social divisionsthat
stand in the way of enduringunityof any of the collectivities and so
mustbe coped with,divisionsthatare not easily overcomeas new issues
activatestatuseswith diverseand oftenconflicting interests.Thus, the
obstaclesto a unionof womenin England and North Ireland resulting
fromnational,political,and religiousdifferences betweenthem are no
less formidablethanthe obstacles,notedby Marx, confronting the union
So, too, women'sliberationmovements
of Englishand Irish proletarians.
seekingunityin the UnitedStatesfindthemselves periodicallycontending
withthe divisionsbetweenblacks and whiteswithintheirranks,just as
black liberationmovementsseekingunity find themselvesperiodically
contending withthe divisionsbetweenmen and liberatedwomenwithin
theirranks(Chisholm1970; LaRue 1970).
The problemof achievingunityin large social movementsbased on
any one statuswhenits membersare differentiated by crosscutting status
sets is epitomizedin these wordsabout women'sliberationby a black
womanwhereidentification withrace is dominant:"Of coursetherehave
beenwomenwhohave been able to thinkbetterthanthey'vebeen trained
and have producedthe canonof literaturefondlyreferred to as 'feminist
literature':Anais Nin, Simonede Beauvoir,Doris Lessing,BettyFriedan,
etc. And the questionforus arises: how relevantare the truths,the ex-
periences,thefindings of whitewomento Black women?Are womenafter
all simplywomen?I don'tknowthatour priorities are the same,thatour
concernsand methodsare thesame,or evensimilarenoughso thatwe can
affordto dependon thisnew fieldof experts(white,female).It is rather
obviousthatwe do not. It is obviousthat we are turningto each other"
(Cade 1970,p. 9).
the following
Correlatively, passage epitomizesthe way in whichinter-
nal differentiationworksagainstunityof the black liberationmovement
where dominantidentification with sex status is reinforced by further
educationaldifferentiation:
Seemsto me theBrother does us all a greatdisservice
by tellingherto
fight themanwiththewomb.Betterto fight withthegunand themind.
. . .The all too breezyno-pill/have-kids/mess-up-the-man's-plannotion
thesecomic-book-loving Sistersfindso excitingis veryseductivebecause
andeasythingforherto do forthecausesinceit nourishes
it'sa clear-cut
hersenseof martyrdom. If thethingis numbers merely,whatthe hell.
But if we are talkingaboutrevolution, creatingan armyfortodayand
tomorrow, I thinktheBrothers who'vebeenscreaming thesepast years
hadbetter go do theirhomework. [Cade 1970,pp. 167-68]
of collectivitiesbased on a single status
The internaldifferentiation
bases fordiverseand oftenconflicting
thusprovidesstructural intellectual
and moralperspectives
withinsuch collectivities. of religionor
Differences

23
RobertK. Merton

age or class or occupationworkto dividewhat similarities of race or sex

or nationalitywork to unite. That is why social movementsof every
varietythatstriveforunity-whethertheyare establishmentarian move-
mentswhippedup by chauvinistic nationalsin timeof war or antiestab-
lishmentarian movementsdesignedto undo institutionalized injustice-
pressfortotalcommitments in whichall otherloyaltiesare to be subordi-
nated,on demand,to the dominantone.
This symptomatic exercisein status-setanalysismay be enoughto in-
dicate that the idiomaticexpressionof total Insiderdoctrine-one must
be one in orderto understand one-is deceptively simpleand sociologically
fallacious(just as we shallsee is thecase withthe totalOutsiderdoctrine).
For, fromthe sociologicalperspectiveof the status set, "one" is not a
man or a black or an adolescentor a Protestant,or self-defined and so-
cially definedas middle class, and so on. Sociologically,"one" is, of
course,all of these and, dependingon the size of the status set, much
more.Furthermore, as Simmel(1908, pp. 403-54; Coser 1965,pp. 18-20)
taughtus long ago, the individuality of humanbeingscan be sociolog-
ically derivedfromsocial differentiation and not onlypsychologically de-
rived fromintrapsychicprocesses.Thus, the greaterthe numberand
varietyof groupaffiliations and statusesdistributed amongindividualsin
a society,the smaller,on the average,the numberof individualshaving
preciselythe same social configuration.
Followingout the implicationsof this structuralobservation,we note
that,on its own assumptions, the total Insiderdoctrineshouldhold only
forhighlyfragmented smallaggregatessharingthe same statussets. Even
a truncatedstatusset involvingonly threeaffiliations-WASPS,for ex-
ample-would greatlyreducethe numberof people who, under the In-
siderprinciple,wouldbe able to understandtheirfellows(WASPS). The
numbersrapidlydeclineas we attendto moreof the sharedstatus sets
by includingsuch social categoriesas sex, age, class, occupation,and so
on, towardthe limitingcase in whichthe unique occupantof a highly
complexstatusset is alone qualifiedto achievean understanding of self.
The tendencytowardsuchextremesocial atomizationis of coursedamped
by differences in the significance of statuseswhich vary in degreesof
dominance,saliency,and centrality.'9 As a result,the fragmentation of
thecapacityforunderstanding thatis impliedin the totalInsiderdoctrine
willnotempirically reachthisextreme.The structural analysisin termsof
statussets,ratherthanin the fictionaltermsof individualsbeingidenti-
19 This is not the place to summarizean analysis of the dynamicsof status sets that
takes up variationin key statuses (dominant,central,salient) and the conditionsun-
der which various statuses tend to be activated,along lines developed in unpublished
lecturesby Merton (1955-71). For pertinentuses of these conceptionsin the dynamics
of status sets, particularlywith regardto functionallyirrelevantstatuses,see Epstein
(1970, esp. chap. 3).

24
 Insidersand Outsiders
fiedin termsof singlestatuses,servesonlyto push the logicof Insiderism
to its ultimatemethodological solipsism.
The factof structuraland institutional differentiationhas otherkinds
of implicationsforthe effortto translatethe Insiderclaim to solidarity
into an Insiderepistemology. Since we all occupy variousstatusesand
have groupaffiliations of varyingsignificance to us, since, in short,we
individually linkup withthedifferentiated societythroughour statussets,
thisrunscounterto the abidingand exclusiveprimacyof any one group
affiliation.
Differing situationsactivatedifferent statuseswhichthen and
theredominateovertherivalclaimsof otherstatuses.
This aspect of the dynamicsof statussets can also be examinedfrom
the standpointof the differing marginsof functionalautonomypossessed
by varioussocialinstitutions and othersocial subsystems. Each significant
affiliationexacts loyaltyto values, standards,and normsgoverningthe
giveninstitutional domain,whetherreligion, science,or economy.Sociolog-
ical thinkerssuch as Marx and Sorokin,so wide apart in manyof their
otherassumptions, agreein assigninga marginof autonomyto the sphere
of knowledge20 even as theyposit theirrespectivesocial, economic,or
culturaldeterminants of it. The alterego of Marx, forexample,declares
the partialautonomyof spheresof thoughtin a well-known passage that
bears repetitionhere:
According to thematerialist conception of history thedetermining ele-
mentin history is ultimatelytheproduction and reproduction in reallife.
Morethanthisneither MarxnorI haveeverasserted. If therefore some-
bodytwiststhisintothestatement thattheeconomic element is theonly
determining one,he transforms it intoa meaningless, abstract and absurd
phrase.Theeconomic situationis thebasis,butthevariouselements ofthe
superstructure-political formsof theclassstruggle and its consequences,
constitutionsestablished by thevictorious classaftera successful battle,
etc.-formsof law-and theneventhereflexes ofall theseactualstruggles
in the brainsof the combatants: political,legal,philosophical theories,
religiousideasandtheirfurther development intosystems of dogma-also
exercisetheirinfluence uponthecourseof thehistorical struggles and in
manycasespreponderate in determining theirform.Thereis an interaction
of all theseelements in which. .. theeconomic movement finallyasserts
itselfas necessary.Otherwise theapplication of thetheory to anyperiod
ofhistory onechooseswouldbe easierthanthesolution of a simpleequa-
tionof thefirstdegree.[Engels1936,p. 381; see also p. 392]
We can see structuraldifferentiationand institutionalautonomyat
workin current
responsesofscholarsto theextremeInsiderdoctrine.They

20 For a detailed discussionof the partial autonomy of subsystemsin the conceptions

of Marx and Sorokin, see Merton and Barber (1963, pp. 343-49; Merton 1968, pp.
521 ff.). On the general notion of functionalautonomy as advanced by Gordon W.
Allportin psychology,see the discussionand referencesin Merton (1968, pp. 15-16);
on functionalautonomyin sociology,see Gouldner (1958, 1959).

25
RobertK. Merton

rejectthemonopolistic doctrineof theInsiderthatcalls fortotalideologi-

cal loyaltyin whichefforts to achievescholarlydetachment and objectivity
becomeredefined as renegadism just as ideologicalreinforcementof collec-
tiveself-esteem becomesredefined as the higherobjectivity.It is here,to
continuewith our case in point, that Negro scholarswho retain their
double loyalty-to the race and to the values and normsof scholarship
-part companywiththe all-encompassing loyaltydemandedby the In-
sider doctrine.Martin Kilson (1969), for example,repudiatescertain
aspects of the doctrineand expresseshis commitment to both the in-
stitutionalizedvalues of scholarshipand to the black community in these
words:

I am opposedto proposalsto makeAfro-American studiesintoa plat-

formfora particular ideologicalgroup,and to restrict thesestudiesto
Negrostudents and teachers. For,and we mustbe frankaboutthis,what
thisamountsto is racismin reverse-blackracism.I am certainly con-
vincedthatit is important fortheNegroto knowof his past-of his
ancestors,of theirstrengthsandweaknesses-and theyshouldrespectthis
knowledge, whenit warrants respect,and theyshouldquestionit and
criticize
it,whenit deserves Butitis ofnoadvantage
criticism. to a mature
andcriticalunderstanding orappreciation ofone'sheritage ifyouapproach
thatheritagewiththeassumption goodandnoble,and
thatit is intrinsically
intrinsically
superiorto the heritage of otherpeoples.That is, afterall,
whatwhiteracistshavedone;andnoneofmymilitant friendsin theblack
studiesmovement haveconvinced methatracistthought is anylessvulgar
anddegenerate becauseitis usedbyblackmen.... WhatI am suggesting
hereis thattheseriousstudyof theheritage of anypeoplewillproducea
curiousmixture of thingsto be proudof, thingsto criticizeand even
despiseand things to be perpetuallyambivalent toward.Andthisis as it
shouldbe: onlyan ideologically oriented Afro-American studiesprogram,
seekingto propagate a packagedviewof theblackheritage, wouldfailto
evokein a student thecuriousyetfascinating mixture of pride,criticism
and ambivalence whichI thinkis, or oughtto be theproductof serious
intellectual
and academicactivity. [Pp. 329-30;italicsadded]

Along withthe faultsof neglectingthe implicationsof structuraldif-

ferentiation,status sets, and institutionalautonomy,the Insider (and
comparableOutsider) doctrinehas the furtherfaultof assuming,in its
claimsof monopolistic or highlyprivilegedstatus-basedaccess to knowl-
edge, that social positionwhollydeterminesintellectualperspectives.In
doingso, it affordsyet anotherexampleof theease withwhichtruthscan
declineinto errormerelyby beingextendedwell beyondthe limitswithin
whichtheyhave been foundto hold. (There can be too muchof a good
thing.)
A long-standing conceptionsharedby various"schools"of sociological
thoughtholds that differences in the social locationof individualsand
groupstendto involvedifferences in theirinterestsand value orientations

26
 Insidersand Outsiders
(as wellas thesharingof someinterestsand values withothers).Certain
traditionsin thesociologyof knowledge have goneon to assumethatthese
structurally patterneddifferences should involve,on the average,pat-
terneddifferences in perceptions and perspectives.And these,so the con-
vergent traditionshold-theirconvergence beingoftenobscuredby diversity
in vocabularyratherthan in basic concept-shouldmake fordiscernible
differences,on the average,in the definitions of problemsfor inquiry
and in the typesof hypothesestaken as pointsof departure.So far,so
good. The evidenceis farfromin, sinceit has also been a traditionin the
sociologyof scientific knowledgeduringthe greaterpart of the past cen-
turyto preferspeculativetheoryto empiricalinquiry.But the idea, which
can be taken as a generalorientationguidingsuch inquiry,is greatly
transformed in Insiderdoctrine.
For one thing,that doctrineassumestotal coincidencebetweensocial
positionand individualperspectives. It thusexaggeratesintoerrorthecon-
ceptionof structural analysiswhichmaintainsthatthereis a tendencyfor,
not a fulldetermination of, sociallypatterneddifferences in the perspec-
tives,preferences, and behaviorof people variouslylocated in the social
structure.The theoreticalemphasison tendency,as distinctfromtotal
uniformity, is basic, not casual or niggling.It providesfor a rangeof
variabilityin perspective and behavioramongmembers of thesamegroups
or occupantsof the same status (differences which,as we have seen,
are ascribableto social as well as psychologicaldifferentiation). At the
sametime,thisstructural conception also providesforpatterned differences,
on the whole,betweenthe perspectives of membersof different groupsor
occupantsof different statuses.Structuralanalysisthusavoids what Den-
nis Wrong (1961) has aptly describedas "the oversocializedconception
of manin modernsociology."'21
21 Wrong's paper is an important formulationof the theoreticalfault involved in
identifyingstructuralposition with individual behavior. But, in some cases, he is
preachingto the long since converted.It is a tenet in some formsof structuralanaly-
sis that differences
in social location make for patterneddifferencesin perspectivesand
behavior between groups while still allowing for a range of variabilitywithingroups
and thus,in structurallyproximategroups,for considerablyoverlappingranges of be-
havior and perspective.On the general orientationof structuralanalysis in sociology,
see Barbano (1968); for some specificterminologicalclues to the fundamentaldistinc-
tion betweensocial position and actual behavior or perspectiveas this is incorporated
in structuralanalysis,see Merton (1968, passim) for the key theoreticalexpressions
that "structuresexert pressures"and structures"tend" to generateperspectivesand
behaviors. For specificexamples: "people in the various occupationstend to take dif-
ferentparts in the society,to have different shares in the exerciseof power, both ac-
knowledgedand unacknowledged,and to see the world differently"(p.180). "Our pri-
mary aim is to discoverhow some social structuresexerta definitepressureupon cer-
tain personsin the societyto engagein nonconforming ratherthan conformingconduct.
If we can locate groups peculiarlysubject to such pressures,we should expect to find
fairlyhighratesof deviantbehaviorin thosegroups" (p. 186). And forimmediaterather
than generaltheoreticalbearingon the specificproblemshere under review,see Merton

27
Robert K. Merton

Importantas such allowancefor individualvariabilityis for general

structuraltheory,it has particularsignificance fora sociologicalperspec-
tiveon thelifeof the mindand the advancement of scienceand learning.
For it is preciselythe individualdifferencesamongscientistsand scholars
that are oftencentralto the development of the discipline.They often
involvethe differences betweengood scholarshipand bad; betweenimagi-
nativecontributions to scienceand pedestrianones; betweenthe conse-
quentialideas and stillbornones. In arguingfor the monopolistic access
to knowledge, Insiderdoctrinecan make no provisionforindividualvari-
abilitythat extendsbeyondthe boundariesof the ingroupwhichalone
can developsound and fruitful ideas.
Insofaras Insiderdoctrinetreatsascribedratherthanachievedstatuses
as centralin forming perspectives, it tendsto be staticin orientation.
For
withtheglaringexceptionofage statusitself,ascribedstatusesaregenerally
retainedthroughout thelifespan. Yet sociologically,thereis nothingfixed
about the boundariesseparatingInsidersfromOutsiders.As situationsin-
volvingdifferent values arise,differentstatusesare activatedand the lines
of separationshift.Thus, for a large numberof whiteAmericans,Joe
Louis was a memberof an outgroup.But whenLouis defeatedtheNazified
Max Schmeling,manyof the same whiteAmericanspromptlyredefined
him as a memberof the (national) ingroup.National self-esteem took
precedenceoverracialseparatism.That thissortof dramain whichchang-
ing situationsactivatediffering statusesin the statusset is playedout in
the domainof the intellectas well is the point of Einstein'sironicob-
servationin an addressat the Sorbonne:"If my theoryof relativityis
provensuccessful,Germanywill claim me as a Germanand France will
declarethatI am a citizenof the world.Shouldmy theoryproveuntrue,
Francewillsay thatI am a Germanand Germanywill declarethatI am
a Jew."22
Like earlierconceptionsin the sociologyof knowledge,recentInsider
(1957): "In developingthisview, I do not mean to implythat scientists,any more than
othermen [and women] are merelyobedientpuppets doing exactly what social insti-
tutionsrequireof them.But I do mean to say that,like men [and women] in otherin-
stitutionalspheres,scientiststend to develop the values and to channeltheirmotivations
in directionsthe institutiondefinesfor them" (p. 640).
22 On the generalpoint of shiftingboundaries,see Merton (1968, pp. 338-42, 479-80).
Einstein was evidently quite taken with the situational determinationof shifts in
group boundaries.In a statementwrittenfor the London Times at a time (November
28, 1919) when the animositiesof World War I were still largelyintact,he introduced
slightvariationson the theme: "The descriptionof me and my circumstancesin the
Times shows an amusing flareof imaginationon the part of the writer.By an appli-
cation of the theoryof relativityto the taste of the reader, today in GermanyI am
called a German man of science and in England I am representedas a Swiss Jew.
If I come to be regardedas a 'bete noire' the descriptionwill be reversed,and I shall
become a Swiss Jew for the Germanand a German for the English" (Frank 1963, p.
144).

28
 Insidersand Outsiders

doctrinesmaintainthat,in the end, it is a special categoryof Insider-

a categorythat generallymanagesto includethe proponentof the doc-
trine-thathas sole or privilegedaccess to knowledge.Mannheim(1936,
pp. 10, 139,232), forexample,founda structural warranty forthevalidity
of social thoughtin the "classlessposition"of the "socially unattached
intellectuals"(sozialfreischwebendeIntelligenz).In his view,theseintel-
lectualscan comprehend theconflicting
tendencies of thetimesince,among
other things,they are "recruitedfromconstantlyvaryingsocial strata
and life-situations."(This is morethan a littlereminiscent of the argu-
mentin the Communist Manifestowhichemphasizesthat"the proletariat
is recruited fromall classesof thepopulation.")23Withoutstretching this
argumentto the breakingpoint,it can be said that Mannheimin effect
claimsthatthereis a categoryof sociallyfree-floating intellectuals
whoare
bothInsidersand Outsiders.Benefiting fromtheircollectively diverseso-
cial originsand transcending groupallegiances,theycan observethe social
universewithspecialinsightand a synthesizing eye.

INSIDERS AS "OUTSIDERS"

In an adaptationof thissame kindof idea, whatsomeInsidersprofessas

Insiderstheyapparentlyrejectas Outsiders.For example,whenadvocates
of black Insiderdoctrineengagein analysisof "whitesociety,"tryingto
assay its power structureor to detect its vulnerabilities, they seem to
denyin practicewhattheyaffirm in doctrine.At any rate,theirbehavior
testifiesto theassumptionthatit is possibleforself-described "Outsiders"
to diagnose and to understandwhat they describe as an alien social
structure and culture.
This involvesthe conceptionthat thereis a special categoryof people
in thesystemof social stratification
whohave distinctive, if not exclusive,
perceptionsand understanding in theircapacitiesas both Insidersand
Outsiders.We need not reviewagain the argumentforspecial access to
knowledgethat derivesfrombeing an Insider.What is of interesthere
is the idea that special perspectivesand insightsare available to that
categoryof Outsiderswho have been systematically frustratedby the
social system:the disinherited,
deprived,disenfranchised, dominated,and
exploitedOutsiders.Their runof experiencein tryingto cope withthese
problemsservesto sensitizethem-and in a more disciplinedway, the
trainedsocial scientistsamongthem-to the workingsof the cultureand
socialstructure thatare moreapt to be takenforgrantedby Insidersocial
scientistsdrawnfromsocialstratawhohave eitherbenefited fromthegoing
social systemor have not greatlysufferedfromit.
23 For furtherdiscussion of the idea of social structuralwarrantiesof validity,see
Merton (1968, pp. 560-62).

29
RobertK. Merton

This reminder thatOutsidersare not all of a kind and the derivedhy-

pothesisin the sociologyof knowledgeabout socially patterneddiffer-
ences in perceptiveness is plausibleand deservingof far moresystematic
investigationthan it has received.That the white-dominated societyhas
long imposedsocial barrierswhichexcludedNegroes fromanythingre-
motelylike fullparticipationin that societyis now knownto even the
more unobservantwhites.But what many of themhave evidentlynot
noticedis thatthe highwalls of segregation do not at all separatewhites
and blacks symmetrically fromintimateobservationof the social life of
the other.As sociallyinvisiblemen and women,blacks at workin white
enclaveshave forcenturiesmovedthroughor aroundthe walls of segre-
gationto discoverwithlittleeffort whatwas on the otherside. This was
tantamount to theirhavingaccess to a one-wayscreen.In contrast,the
highlyvisiblewhitescharacteristically did not wantto findout about life
in the black community and could not, even in those rare cases where
theywould.The structure of racialsegregationmeantthatthe whiteswho
pridedthemselves on "understanding" Negroesknewlittlemorethantheir
stylizedrole behaviorsin relationto whitesand nextto nothingof their
privatelives.As ArthurLewis has noted,something of the same sortstill
obtains with the "integration"of many blacks into the largersociety
duringthe day coupledwithsegregation at nightas blacks and whitesre-
turnto theirrespectiveghettos.In theseways,segregation can make for
asymmetrical acrossthe divide.
sensitivities
Althoughthereis a sociologicaltraditionof reflection and researchon
marginalityin relationto thought, have hardlybegunthehard
sociologists
workof seriouslyinvestigating the familyof hypothesesin the sociology
of knowledgethat derivefromthis conceptionof asymmetrical relations
betweendiversekindsof Insidersand Outsiders.

OUTSIDER DOCTRINE AND PERSPECTIVES

The strongversionof the Insiderdoctrine,withits epistemological claim

to a monopolyof certainkindsof knowledge,runscounter,of course,to
a longhistoryof thought.Fromthe timeof FrancisBacon, to reachback
no further,studentsof the intellectuallife have emphasizedthe corrupt-
ing influenceof grouployaltiesupon the humanunderstanding. Among
Bacon's fourIdols (or sourcesof falseopinion),we need only recall the
second,the Idol of the Cave. Drawingupon Plato's allegoryof the cave
in theRepublic,Bacon undertakesto tell how the immediatesocial world
in whichwe live seriouslylimitswhat we are preparedto perceiveand
how we perceiveit. Dominatedby the customsof our group,we maintain
receivedopinions,distortour perceptions to have themaccordwiththese
opinions,and are thus held in ignoranceand led into errorwhichwe

30
 Insidersand Outsiders
parochiallymistakeforthetruth.Onlywhenwe escape fromthe cave and
extendour visionsdo we provideforaccess to authenticknowledge.By
implication,it is throughthe iconoclasmthat comeswithchanginggroup
affiliations
that we can destroythe Idol of the Cave, abandon delusory
doctrinesof our own group,and enlargeour prospectsfor reachingthe
truth.For Bacon,thededicatedInsideris peculiarlysubjectto themyopia
of thecave.
In thisconception,Bacon characteristicallyattendsonlyto thedysfunc-
tionsof groupaffiliation forknowledge.Since forhim access to authentic
knowledgerequiresthatone abandonsuperstition and prejudice,and since
thesestemfromgroups,it wouldnot occurto Bacon to considerthe pos-
sible functionsof social locationsin societyas providingforobservability
and access to particularkindsof knowledge.
In a far moresubtlestyle,the foundingfathersof sociologyin effect
also arguedagainstthestrongformof theInsiderdoctrinewithoutturning
to theequal and oppositeerrorof advocatingthestrongformof the Out-
siderdoctrine(whichwouldhold that knowledgeabout groups,unpreju-
diced by membership in them,is accessibleonlyto outsiders).
The ancientepistemological problemof subject and object was taken
up in the discussionof historicalVerstehen. Thus, firstSimmeland then,
repeatedly,Max Webersymptomatically adoptedthe memorablephrase:
"one neednot be Caesar in orderto understand Caesar."24In makingthis
claim,theyrejectedtheextremeInsiderthesiswhichassertsin effectthat
one mustbe Caesar in orderto understandhim just as theyrejectedthe
extremeOutsiderthesisthat one mustnot be Caesar in orderto under-
standhim.
The observations of Simmeland Weberbear directlyupon implications
of the Insiderdoctrinethat reachbeyondits currently emphasizedscope.

24 Thanks to Donald N. Levine (1971, p. xxiii), I learn that in often attributingthe

aphorism,with its many implicationsfor social epistemology,to Weber, I had inad-
vertentlycontributedto a palimpsesticsyndrome:assigninga strikingidea or formu-
lation to the author who firstintroducedus to it when in fact that author had simply
adopted or revived a formulationthat he (and others versed in the same tradition)
knew to have been createdby another.As it happens,I firstcame upon the aphorism
in Weber's basic paper on the categoriesof a verstehendesociologypublishedin 1913.
In that passage, he treats the aphorismas common usage which he picks up for his
own analyticalpurposes: "Man muss,wie oft gesagtworden ist, 'nicht Casar sein, um
Casar zu verstehen.'" Alertedby Levine's note, I now find that Weber made earlier
use of the aphorismback in 1903-6 (1951, pp. 100-101) as he drew admiringlyupon
Simmel'sProblemeder Geschichtsphilosophie to whichhe attributesthe mostthoroughly
developed beginningsof a theory of Verstehen.Properly enough, Weber devotes a
long, long note to the general implicationsof Simmel's use of the aphorism,quoting
it just as we have seen but omittingthe rest of Simmel's embellishedversion: "Und
kein zweiterLuther, um Luther zu begreifen."In his later work, Weber incorporated
the aphorism wheneverhe examined the problem of the "understandability"of the
actions of others.

31
Robert K. Merton

The Insiderarguesthat the authenticunderstanding of grouplifecan be

achievedonly by thosewho are directlyengagedas membersin the life
of thegroup.Taken seriously, thedoctrineputsin questionthevalidityof
just about all historicalwriting,as Weberclearlysaw ([1922] 1951, p.
428).25 If directengagement in the life of a groupis essentialto under-
standingit,thentheonlyauthentichistoryis contemporary history,written
in fragments by thosemostfullyinvolvedin makinginevitably limitedpor-
tionsof it. Ratherthanconstituting onlythe raw materialsof history,the
documentspreparedby engagedInsidersbecomeall thereis to history.
But once thehistorianelectsto writethe historyof a timeotherthanhis
own, even the most dedicatedInsider,of the national,sex, age, racial,
ethnic,or religiousvariety,becomesthe Outsider,condemnedto error
and misunderstanding.
Writingsome 20 yearsago in anotherconnection,Claude Levi-Strauss
notedtheparallelismbetweenhistoryand ethnography. Both subjects,he
observed,
are concerned otherthantheonein whichwe live.Whether
withsocieties
thisotherness
is dueto remoteness slight)or to remote-
in time(however
is of secondaryimportance
ness in space, or even to culturalheterogeneity,
comparedto the basic similarityof perspective.All that the historianor
ethnographer can do, and all that we can expectof eitherof them,is to
enlargea specificexperienceto the dimensionsof a more general one,
whichtherebybecomesaccessibleas experienceto men of anothercountry
or anotherepoch.Andin orderto succeed,bothhistorianand ethnographer,
musthave the same qualities: skill,precision,a sympathetic approachand
objectivity.26

Our questionis, of course,whetherthe qualitiesrequiredby the his-

torianand ethnographer as well as othersocial scientistsare confinedto
or largelyconcentrated amongInsidersor Outsiders.Simmel(1908), and
afterhim, Schlitz (1944), and othershave ponderedthe roles of that
incarnationof the Outsider,the strangerwho moves on.27In a fashion
oddly reminiscent of the anything-but-subtle Baconian doctrine,Simmel
developsthe thesisthat the stranger,not caughtup in commitments to
the group,can more readilyacquire the strategicrole of the relatively
objectiveinquirer."He is freer,
practicallyand theoretically,"notesSimmel
(1950), "he surveysconditionswithless prejudice;his criteriaforthem

25 Having quoted the Caesar aphorism,Weber goes on to draw the implicationfor

historiography:"Sonst ware alle Geschichtsschreibung
sinnlos."
26 The essay fromwhich this is drawn was firstpublishedin 1949 and is reprintedin
Levi-Strauss (1963, p. 16).
27It is symbolicallyappropriatethat Simmelshould have been attuned to the role of
the strangeras outsider.For as Lewis Coser (1965, pp. 29-39) has shown, Simmel's
influencedby his role as "The Strangerin
style of sociologicalwork was significantly
the Academy."

32
 Insidersand Outsiders
are moregeneraland moreobjectiveideals; he is not tied down in his
actionby habit,piety,and precedent"(pp. 404-5). Above all, and here
Simmeldepartsfromthe simpleBaconian conception,the objectivityof
the stranger"does not simplyinvolvepassivityand detachment;it is a
particularstructurecomposedof distanceand nearness,indifference and
involvement." It is the stranger,too, who findswhat is familiarto the
groupsignificantly unfamiliarand so is promptedto raise questionsfor
inquiryless apt to be raisedat all by Insiders.
As was so oftenthe case with Simmel'sseminalmind,he thus raised
a varietyof significantquestionsabout the roleof the strangerin acquir-
ing sound and new knowledge,questionsthat especiallyin recentyears
have begun to be seriouslyinvestigated.A great varietyof inquiries
into the roles of anthropological and sociologicalfieldworkers have ex-
ploredthe advantagesand limitations of the Outsideras observer.28 Even
now,it appears that the balance sheet for Outsiderobserversresembles
thatforInsiderobservers, both havingtheirdistinctive assets and liabili-
ties.
Apart fromthe theoreticaland empiricalworkexaminingthe possibly
distinctiveroleof the Outsiderin social and historicalinquiry,significant
episodesin the development of such inquirycan be examinedas "clinical
cases" in point.Thus, it has been arguedthat in mattershistoricaland
sociologicalthe prospectsforachievingcertainkindsof insightsmay ac-
tually be somewhatbetterfor the Outsider.Soon afterit appeared in
1835, Tocqueville'sDemocracyin Americawas acclaimedas a masterly
workby "an accomplishedforeigner." Tocquevillehimselfexpressedthe
opinionthat "thereare certaintruthswhichAmericanscan only learn
fromn strangers."These includedwhat he describedas the tyrannyof
majorityopinionand the particularsystemof stratification whicheven
in that timeinvolveda widespeadpreoccupationwith relativestatus in
the communitythat left "Americansso restlessin the midst of their
prosperity."(This is Tocqueville,not Galbraith,writing.)All the same,
thismostperceptiveOutsiderdid not manageto transcendmanyof the
deep-seatedracial beliefsand mythshe encountered in the UnitedStates
of the time.
28 Many of these inquiriesexplicitlytake offfrom Simmel's imageryof the roles and
functionsof the stranger.From the large and fast-growingmass of publicationson
fieldworkin social science, I cite only a few that variously try to analyze the roles
of the Outsider as observer and interpreter.From an earlier day dealing with
"strangervalue," see Oeser (1939), Nadel (1939), Merton (1947), and Paul (1953). For
more recent work on the parametersof adaptation by strangersas observers,see
especiallythe imaginativeanalysis by Nash (1963) and the array of papers detailing
how the sex role of women anthropologistsaffectedtheir access to field data (Golde
1970). On comparable problemsof the roles of Insiders and Outsidersin the under-
standing of complex public bureaucracies,see the short, general interpretationby
Merton (1945) and the comprehensive, detailed one by Frankel (1969).

33
 RobertK. Merton
Having condemnedthe Anglo-Americans whose"oppressionhas at one
strokedeprivedthedescendantsof theAfricansof almostall theprivileges
of humanity"(Tocqueville[1858] 1945, 1:332);
havingdescribedslaveryas mankind's greatestcalamityand having
arguedthattheabolition of slaveryin theNorthwas "notforthegood
of theNegroes, butforthatof thewhites"(ibid.,1:360-61);
havingidentified themarksof "oppression" uponboththe oppressed
Indiansandblacksandupontheirwhiteoppressors (ibid.,vol. 1, chap.18,
passim);
havingnoted"thetyranny of thelaws"designed to suppressthe"un-
happyblacks"inthestatesthathadabolished slavery(ibid.,1:368);
havingapproximately notedtheoperation of theself-fulfillingprophecy
in theremark that"toinducethewhitesto abandontheopiniontheyhave
conceived of themoraland intellectual inferiority
of theirformer slaves,
theNegroesmustchange;butas longas thisopinion to changeis
subsists,
impossible" (ibid.,1:358,n.);
havingalso approximated theidea of relativedeprivation in thestate-
mentthat"thereexistsa singular principle
ofrelative justicewhichis very
firmly implanted in thehumanheart.Menare muchmoreforcibly struck
by thoseinequalities whichexistwithin thecircleof thesameclass,than
withthosewhichmaybe remarked betweendifferent classes"(ibid.,1:
373-74;
havingmadetheseobservations and judgments, thistalentedOutsider
nevertheless acceptsthedoctrine, relevantin histime,thatracialinequal-
ities"seemto be foundedupontheimmutable laws of natureherself"
(ibid.,1:358-59); and,to stopthelistof particulars here,assumes, as an
understandable andinevitable ratherthandisturbing factthat"theNegro,
whoearnestly desiresto mingle hisracewiththatof theEuropean, cannot
effectit" (ibid.,1:335).29
Withoutanachronistically asking,as a Whig historianmight,for al-
togetherprescientjudgmentsfromthis Outsiderwho was, afterall, re-
cordinghis observationsin the early 19th century,we can nevertheless
note that the role of Outsiderapparentlyno moreguaranteesemancipa-
tionfromthemythsof a collectivity thantheroleof theInsiderguarantees
fullinsightinto its social life and beliefs.
What was in the case of Tocquevillean unplannedcircumstance has
since oftenbecomea matterof deliberatedecision.Outsidersare sought
out to observesocial institutions and cultureson the premisethat they
are moreapt to do so withdetachment. Thus, in the firstdecade of this
century,the CarnegieFoundationfor the Advancement of Teaching,in
29 Tocqueville also assumes that "fatal oppression"has resultedin the enslaved blacks
becoming"devoid of wants," and that "plunged in this abyss of evils, [he] scarcely
feels his own calamitous situation," coming to believe that "even the power of
thought . . . [is] a useless gift of Providence" (1:333). Such observationson the
dehumanizingconsequences of oppression are remarkable for the time. As Oliver
Cromwell Cox (1948) observes about part of this same passage, Tocqueville's point
"stillhas a modicumof validity" (p. 369, n.).

34
 Insidersand Outsiders
its search for someoneto investigatethe conditionof medical schools,
reachedout to appointAbrahamFlexner,afterhe had admittednever
beforehavingbeen insidea medicalschool.It was a matterof policyto
selecta totalOutsiderwho,as it happened,producedthe uncompromising
Reportwhichdid muchto transform thestateof Americanmedicaleduca-
tionat thetime.
Later,castingabout fora scholarwho mightdo a thoroughgoing study
of theNegroin the UnitedStates,the CarnegieCorporation searchedfor
an Outsider,preferablyone, as they put it, drawn froma countryof
"high intellectualand scholarlystandardsbut with no backgroundor
traditionsof imperialism." These twinconditionsof course swiftlynar-
rowedthescope of thesearch.Switzerlandand the Scandinaviancountries
alone seemedto qualify,with the quest ending,as we know,with the
selectionof GunnarMyrdal. In the prefaceto An AmericanDilemma,
Myrdal (1944, pp. xviii-xiv)reflected on his statusas an Outsiderwho,
in his words,"had neverbeen subjectto thestrainsinvolvedin livingin a
black-white society"and who "as a strangerto the problem. . . has had
perhapsa greaterawarenessof theextentto whichhumanvaluationsevery-
whereenterinto our scientific discussionof the Negroproblem."
Reviewsof the book repeatedlyalluded to the degreeof detachment
fromentanglingloyaltiesthat seemedto come fromMyrdal's being an
Outsider.J. S. Redding(1944), forone, observedthat "as a European,
Myrdalhad no Americansensibilities to protect.He hits hard withfact
and interpretation."RobertS. Lynd (1944), foranother,saw it as a prime
meritof this Outsiderthat he was freeto findout forhimself"without
any side glancesas to what was politicallyexpedient."And fora third,
FrankTannenbaum(1944) notedthatMyrdalbrought"objectivityin re-
gard to the special foiblesand shortcomings in Americanlife.As an out-
sider,he showedthe kindof objectivitywhichwouldseemimpossiblefor
one rearedwithinthe Americanscene." Even later criticismof Myrdal's
work-forexample,thecomprehensive critiqueby Cox (1948, chap. 23)-
does not attributeimputederrorsin interpretation to his havingbeen an
Outsider.
Two observations shouldbe made on the Myrdalepisode.First,in the
judgmentof criticalminds,the Outsider,far frombeing excludedfrom
the understanding of an alien society,was able to bringneededperspec-
tives to it. And second,that Myrdal,wantingto have both Insiderand
Outsiderperspectives, expresslydrewinto his circleof associatesin the
studysuch Insiders,engagedin the studyof Negro life and cultureand
of race relations,as E. FranklinFrazier,ArnoldRose, Ralph Bunche,
MelvilleHerskovits, Otto Klineberg,J. G. St. Clair Drake, Guy B. John-
son, and Doxey A. Wilkerson.
It shouldbe notedin passingthatotherspheresof science,technology,

35
Robert K. Merton

and learninghave accordeddistinctive and oftenrelatedrolesto both the

Insider and the Outsider (Zuckermanand Merton 1972, pp. 311-14).
As longago as the 17thcentury, ThomasSprat,thehistorianof the Royal
Society,for example,took it "as evident,that divers sorts of Manu-
factureshave been givenus by menwhowerenot bredup in Trades that
resembled thosewhichtheydiscover'd.I shallmention Three; thatofPrint-
ing, [Gun]Powder,and the Bow-Dye."Spratgoes on to expandupon the
advantagesof the Outsiderforinvention,concludingwith the less-than-
science-basedobservationthat "as in the Generationof Children,those
are usually observ'd to be most sprightly,that are the stollen Fruits
ofan unlawfulBed; so in theGenerations of theBrains,thoseare oftenthe
most vigorous,and witty,whichmen beget on otherArts,and not on
theirown" (Sprat 1959,pp. 391-93).
In our own time,Gilfillan(1935, p. 88) reportedthat the "cardinal
inventions are due to menoutsidethe occupationaffected, and the minor,
perfective inventionsto insiders."And in a recentand moreexactingin-
quiry,JosephBen-David (1960) found that the professionalization of
scientificresearch"does not in itselfdecreasethe chancesof innovation
by outsidersto the variousfieldsof science."For the specialcase of out-
sidersto a particulardiscipline,Max Delbriick(1963, p. 13), himselfa
founding fatherof molecularbiology,notesthatalthough"nuclearphysics
was developedalmostexclusivelywithinthe framework of academic in-
stitutesat universities,
molecularbiology,in contrast,is almostexclusively
a productof outsiders,of chemists,physicists,medical microbiologists,
mathematicians and engineers."
The cumulativepoint of this varietyof intellectualand institutional
cases is not-and this needs to be repeatedwithall possibleemphasis-
is not a proposalto replacethe extremeInsiderdoctrineby an extreme
and equally vulnerableOutsiderdoctrine.The intentis, rather,to trans-
formthe originalquestionaltogether. We no longerask whetherit is the
Insideror the Outsiderwho has monopolistic or privilegedaccess to social
truth;instead,we beginto considertheirdistinctive and interactive roles
in the processof truthseeking.

INTERCHANGE, TRADE OFFS, AND SYNTHESES

The actual intellectualinterchangebetweenInsidersand Outsiders-in
whicheach adoptsperspectives fromthe other-is oftenobscuredby the
rhetoricthatcommonly conflict.Listeningonlyto that
attendsintergroup
rhetoric,we may be broughtto believe that therereally is something
"blackknowledge"and "whiteknowledge,"
likeantithetical "man'sknowl-
edge" and "woman'sknowledge,"etc., of a sort that allows no basis for

36
 Insidersand Outsiders

judgingbetweentheirdiffering claims to knowledge.Yet the boundaries

betweenInsidersand Outsiderstend to be far morepermeablethan this
allows.Justas withtheprocessof competition generally,so withthe com-
petitionof ideas. Competingor conflicting groups take over ideas and
proceduresfromone another,therebydenyingin practicethe rhetoricof
totalincompatibility.Even in thecourseof socialpolarization, conceptions
withcognitivevalue are utilizedall apart fromtheirsource.Conceptsof
powerstructure, co-optation,the dysfunctions of establishedinstitutions
and findingsassociated with these conceptshave for some time been
utilizedby social scientists,
irrespective
of theirsocial or politicalidenti-
ties. Nathan Hare (1967), for example,who remainsone of the most
articulateexponentsof theInsiderdoctrine,made use of thenotionof the
prophecyin tryingto explainhow it is that organizations
self-fulfilling
run by blacks findit hard to workout.30As he put it, "White people
thoughtthat we could not have any institutionswhich were basically
black whichwereof good quality.This has the effectof a self-fulfilling
prophecy,because if you thinkthat black personscannotpossiblyhave
a good bank,thenyou don'tput yourmoneyin it. All thebest professors
leave black universitiesto go to whiteuniversitiesas soon as theyget
the chance.The blacksevendo the same thing.And thismakesyourpre-
diction,whichwasn'ttruein thebeginning, comeout to be true" (p. 65).
Such diffusionof ideas across the boundariesof groupsand statuseshas
long been noted.In one of his moreastute analyses,Mannheim(1952)
states the generalcase forthe emergenceand spread of knowledgethat
transcendseven profoundconflictsbetweengroups:
Synthesesowetheirexistence tothesamesocialprocessthatbringsabout
polarization;groupstake over the modesof thoughtand intellectual
achievements of theiradversaries underthesimplelaw of 'competitionon
thebasisofachievement.' . . . In thesocially-differentiated
thoughtprocess,
eventheopponent is ultimately andforms
forcedto adoptthosecategories
of thoughtwhichare mostappropriate in a giventypeof worldorder.In
theeconomic sphere,oneofthepossibleresultsof competition is thatone
competitoris compelledto catchupwiththeother's technological
advances.
In justthesameway,whenever groupscompete forhaving
theirinterpreta-
tionof realityacceptedas thecorrect one,it mayhappenthatone of the
groupstakesoverfromtheadversary somefruitful hypothesis
or category
-anythingthatpromises cognitive gain. . [In due course,it becomes

30 Elsewhere, Hare treats certain beliefs of "Negro dignitaries"as a self-fulfilling

prophecy(1970, p. 44). A recentwork (Hole and Levine 1971) on women's liberation
movements,both new and old, also observes: "Feministsargue furtherthat thereis a
self-fulfillingprophecycomponent:when one group dominatesanother,the group with
power is, at best, reluctantto relinquishits control.Thus in order to keep woman in
'her place,' theoriesare propoundedwhich presumethat her place is definedby nature"
(p. 193).

37
RobertK. Merton
possible]to finda positionfromwhichbothkindsof thought can be
envisaged yetat thesametimealsointerpreted
in theirpartialcorrectness,
as subordinateaspectsof a higher [Pp. 221-23]
synthesis.
The essentialpoint is that,withor withoutintent,the processof in-
tellectualexchangetakes place preciselybecause the conflictinggroups
are in interaction.The extremeInsiderdoctrine,forexample,affectsthe
thinking blackand white,whorejectits extravagant
of sociologists, claims.
Intellectualconflictsensitizesthemto aspectsof theirsubject that they
have otherwisenot taken into account.

Social Sadismand SociologicalEuphemism

As a case in pointof thissortof sensitization throughinteraction,I take
what can be describedas a compositepatternof social sadism and so-
ciologicaleuphemism. "Social sadism"is morethana metaphor.The term
refersto social structures whichare so organizedas to systematically in-
flictpain, humiliation,suffering, and deep frustration upon particular
groupsand strata.This need have nothingat all to do withthe psychic
propensitiesof individualsto findpleasurein cruelty.It is an objective,
sociallyorganized,and recurrentset of situationsthat has these cruel
consequences,howeverdiverseits historicalsources and whateverthe
social processesthatmaintainit.
This type of sadisticsocial structureis readilyoverlookedby a per-
spectivethatcan be describedas thatof the sociologicaleuphemism. This
termdoes notreferto theobviouscases in whichideologicalsupportof the
structureis simplycouchedin sociologicallanguage.Rather,it refersto
thekindof conceptualapparatusthat,once adopted,requiresus to ignore
such intensehumanexperiences humiliation,
as pain, suffering, and so on.
In this context,analyticallyusefulconceptssuch as social stratification,
social exchange,rewardsystem,dysfunction, symbolicinteraction,etc.,
are altogetherbland in the fairlyprecise sense of being unperturbing,
suave, and soothingin effect.To say this is not to implythat the con-
ceptual repertoire of sociology(or of any othersocial science) must be
purgedof such impersonalconceptsand filledwithsentiment-laden sub-
stitutes.But it shouldbe notedthatanalytically usefulas theseimpersonal
conceptsare forcertainproblems,theyalso serveto excludefromthe at-
tentionof the social scientistthe intensefeelingsof pain and suffering
that are the experienceof some people caughtup in the social patterns
underexamination. By screening out theseprofoundly humanexperiences,
theybecomesociologicaleuphemisms.
Nor is thereany easy solutionto theproblemof sociologicaleuphemism.
True, we have all been warnedoffthe Whiteheadianfallacyof misplaced

38
 Insidersand Outsiders
concreteness, the fallacyof assumingthat the particularconceptswe em-
ploy to examinethe flowof eventscapturetheirentirecontent.No more
thanin otherfieldsof inquiryare sociologicalconceptsdesignedto depict
the concreteentirety of the psychosocialrealityto whichtheyrefer.But
the methodological rationaleforconceptualabstractionhas yet to provide
a way of assessingtheintellectualcostsas wellas the intellectualgainsof
abstraction.As Paul Weiss (1971) has put the generalissue: "How can
we everretrieve information aboutdistinctive featuresoncewe have tossed
it out?" (p. 213).
Considersomeoutcomesof the establishedpracticeof employing bland
sociologicalconceptsthat systematically abstractfromcertainelements
and aspectsof the concreteness of social life.It is thenonlya shortstep
to the furthertacit assumptionthat the aspects of psychosocialreality
whichtheseconceptshelp us to understand are theonlyonesworthtrying
to understand. The groundis thenpreparedforthe nextseemingly small
but altogether conclusivestep.The social scientistsometimes comesto act
as thoughthe aspectsof the realitywhichare neglectedin his analytical
apparatusdo not evenexist.By thatroute,eventhemostconscientious of
social scientistsare oftenled to transform theirconceptsand modelsinto
scientificeuphemisms.
All thisinvolvesthe specialironythat the moreintellectually powerful
a set of social scienceconceptshas provedto be, the less the incentive
fortryingto elaborateit in waysdesignedto catchup thehumanlysignifi-
cant aspectsof the psychosocialrealitythatit neglects.
It is this tendencytoward sociologicaleuphemism,I suggest,that
some (principallybut not exclusivelyblack) social scientistsare forcing
upon the attentionof (principallybut not exclusivelywhite) social sci-
entists.No one I knowhas put thismorepointedlythan KennethClark
(1965): "More privilegedindividualsmay understandably need to shield
themselvesfromthe inevitableconflictand pain whichwould resultfrom
acceptanceof the fact that they are accessoriesto profoundinjustice.
The tendencyto discussdisturbing social issuessuch as racialdiscrimina-
tion,segregation, and economicexploitationin detached,legal, political,
socio-economic, or psychologicaltermsas if thesepersistent problemsdid
notinvolvethesuffering of actualhumanbeingsis so contrary to empirical
evidencethatit mustbe interpreted as a protectivedevice" (p. 75).

FromSocial Conflictto IntellectualControversy

Perhaps enoughhas been said to indicatehow Insider and Outsider
can converge,in spiteof such differences,
perspectives throughreciprocal
adoptionof ideas and the developingof complementary and overlapping

39
Robert K. Merton

fociof attentionin the formulation of scientific

problems.But thesein-
tellectualpotentialsforsynthesis are oftencurbedby social processesthat
dividescholarsand scientists.Internaldivisionsand polarizationsin the
societyat largeoftenstandin theway of realizingthosepotentials.Under
conditionsof acute conflict,each hostilecamp developshighlyselective
perceptionsof what is goingon in the other.Perspectivesbecome self-
confirming as both Insidersand Outsiderstend to shut themselvesoff
fromideas and information at odds with theirown conceptions.They
come to see in the otherprimarilywhat theirhostiledispositionsalert
themto see and thenpromptly mistakethepart forthewhole.The initial
interactionbetweenthecontending groupsbecomesreducedin responseto
thereciprocalalienationthatfollowsuponpublicdistortions of theothers'
ideas. In the process,each group becomesless and less motivatedto
examinetheideas of theother,sincethereis manifestly smallpointin at-
tendingto the ideas of thosecapable of such distortion. The membersof
each group then scan the outgroup'swritingsjust enoughto findam-
munitionfornew fusillades.
The processof increasedselectiveinattention to ideas of the otherpro-
duces rigidified all-or-nonedoctrines.Even intellectualorientations that
are not basicallycontradictory come to be regardedas thoughtheywere.
Eitherthe Insideror the Outsiderhas access to the sociologicaltruth.In
the midstof such polarizedsocial conflict,thereis little room for the
thirdpartyuncommitted in the domainof knowledgeto, forthem,situ-
ationallyirrelevant grouployalties,who tryto convertthat conflictinto
intellectual
criticism. Typically,thesewould-benoncombatants are caught
in the crossfirebetweenhostilecamps.Dependingon the partisanvocab-
ulary of abuse that happens to prevail,they are tagged as intellectual
mugwumps, phariseesor renegades, or somewhatmoregenerously, as "mere
eclectics"withtheepithetsmakingit unnecessary to examinethesubstance
of what is beingassertedor to considerhow far it holds true.Perhaps
most decisively,they are definedas mere middle-of-the-roaders who,
throughtimidityor expediency, will not see that theytryto escape the
fundamental conflictbetweenunalloyedsociologicalgood and unalloyed
sociologicalevil.31
When a transitionfromsocial conflictto intellectualcontroversy is
achieved,whenthe perspectives of each groupare takenseriouslyenough
to be carefullyexaminedratherthan rejectedout of hand, there can
develop trade offsbetweenthe distinctivestrengthsand weaknessesof
Insiderand Outsiderperspectivesthat enlargethe chances for a sound
and relevantunderstanding of social life.

31 The foregoingtwo paragraphsare drawn almost verbatimfroma not easily acces-

sible source: Merton 1961, pp. 21-46.

40
 Insidersand Outsiders

and Typesof Knowledge

Insiders,Outsiders,
If indeedwe have distinctive to maketo social knowledge
contributions
in our rolesas Insidersor Outsiders-and it shouldbe repeatedthat all
of us are both Insidersand Outsidersin varioussocial situations-then
thosecontributions probablylink up witha long-standing be-
distinction
tweentwo major kindsof knowledge,a basic distinctionthat is blurred
in the oftenambiguoususe of the word"understanding." In the language
of WilliamJames (1932, pp. 11-13), drawnout of JohnGrote (1865,
p. 60), who was in turnprecededby Hegel (1961 [1807]),32 this is the
distinction between"acquaintancewith"and "knowledgeabout." The one
involvesdirectfamiliarity withphenomenathat is expressedin depictive
representations;theotherinvolvesmoreabstractformulationswhichdo not
experienced
at all "resemble"whathas beendirectly (Merton1968,p. 545).
As Grotenoteda centuryago, the distinction has been imbeddedin con-
trastingpairs of termsin variouslanguagesas shownbelow.
"Acquaintancewith" "Knowledgeabout"
noscere scire
kennen wissen
connaitre savoir
These interrelated kinds of understanding may turn out to be dis-
tributed,in varyingmix,amongInsidersand Outsiders.The introspective
meaningsof experiencewithina status or a groupmay be morereadily
accessible,forall the seemingly evidentreasons,to thosewhohave shared
partor all of thatexperience.But authenticawareness,even in the sense
as theconcept
of acquaintancewith,is notguaranteedby socialaffiliation,
of falseconsciousness is designedto remindus. Determinantsof social life
-for an obvious example,ecological patternsand processes-are not
necessarilyevidentto thosedirectlyengagedin it. In short,sociological
understanding involvesmuchmorethanacquaintancewith.It includesan
empiricallyconfirmable comprehension and oftencomplex
of theconditions
processesin whichpeopleare caughtup withoutmuchawarenessof whatis
going on. To analyze and understandthese requiresa theoreticaland
technicalcompetence which,as such,transcendsone's statusas Insideror
Outsider.The role of social scientistconcernedwithachievingknowledge
about societyrequiresenoughdetachmentand trainedcapacityto know
how to assembleand assess the evidencewithoutregardfor what the
analysisseemsto implyabout theworthof one's group.
32Hegel catches the distinctionin his aphorism: "Das Bekannte uberhauptist darum,
weil est bekanntis, nicht erkannt."Polanyi (1959, 1967) has made a significanteffort
to synthesizethese modes of understanding,principallyin his conception of "tacit
knowing."

41
RobertK. Merton

Otherattributesof the domainof knowledgedampenthe relevanceof

Insiderand Outsideridentitiesforthe validityand worthof the intellec-
tual product.It is thecharacterof an intellectual disciplinethatits evolv-
ing rules of evidenceare adopted beforethey are used in assessinga
particularinquiry.These criteriaof good and bad intellectualworkmay
turnup to differing extentamongInsidersand Outsidersas an artifactof
immediatecircumstance, and thatis itselfa difficult
problemforinvestiga-
tion.But themarginof autonomyin thecultureand institution of science
means that the intellectualcriteria,as distinctfromthe social ones, for
judgingthe validityand worthof that worktranscendextraneousgroup
allegiances.The acceptanceof criteriaof craftsmanship and integrity in
scienceand learningcuts across differences in the social affiliations
and
loyaltiesof scientistsand scholars.Commitment to the intellectualvalues
dampensgroup-induced pressuresto advancetheinterests of groupsat the
expenseof thesevaluesand of theintellectual product.
The consolidation of group-influenced perspectives and the autonomous
valuesof scholarship is exemplifiedin observations by JohnHope Franklin
who,formorethana quarter-century, has been engagedin researchon the
historyof AmericanNegroesfromtheirancientAfricanbeginnings to the
present.33 In the firstannual MartinLutherKing,Jr.,MemorialLecture
at the New School for Social Research,he observesin effecthow great
differences in social locationof both authorsand audiencescan make for
profound differences in scholarlymotivation and orientation.Franklinnotes
that it was the Negro teacherof history,"outragedby the kind of dis-
tortedhistorythathe was requiredto teachthechildrenof his race,"who
tooktheinitiativein the 19thcenturyto undo whatone of themdescribed
as "thesin of omissionand commission on thepartof whiteauthors,most
of whomseemto have written exclusivelyforwhitechildren"(1969, p. 4).
The pioneeringrevisionisteffortsof W.E.B. DuBois and othersfound
organizedexpressionin the foundingin 1915 of the Associationfor the
Study of Negro Life and Historyand, a year later, of the Journalof
NegroHistoryby CarterG. Woodsonandhis associates.This institutionali-
zationofscholarship helpedmakefortransfer and interchange ofknowledge
betweenInsidersand Outsiders,betweenblack historiansand white.In
Franklin'swords,the studyof Negrohistorybecame"respectable.Before
themiddleof thetwentieth centuryit wouldenticenotonlya largenumber
of talentedNegroscholarsto join in thequest fora revisedand morevalid
Americanhistory,but it would also bringinto its fold a considerable
numberof theablestwhitehistorianswho could no longertoleratebiased,
one-sidedAmericanhistory.Thus, VernonWharton'sThe Negro in Mis-
sissippi,KennethStampp'sThe PeculiarInstitution, Louis Harlan's Sepa-
33 Perhaps the best known of Franklin'smany writingsis From Slavery to Freedom,
now in its thirdedition.

42
 Insidersand Outsiders
rate But Unequal and WinthropJordan'sWhiteOver Black-to mention
onlyfour-rankamongthebestof theefforts thatany historians,whiteor
black,have made to revisethe historyof theirown country.In that role
they,too, became revisionistsof the historyof Afro-Americans" (1969,
pp. 5-6).
These effortsonly began to counterthe "uniformed,arrogant,un-
charitable,undemocratic,and racisthistory[which]. .. spawnedand per-
petuatedan ignorant,self-seeking, superpatriotic, ethnocentricgroup of
whiteAmericanswho can say, in this day and time,that they did not
know that Negro Americanshad a history"(1969, p. 9). But much
needed counterdevelopments can induce otherkinds of departurefrom
scholarlystandards.Franklinnotesthatthe recent"greatrenaissance"of
interestin the historyof Negro Americanshas foundproliferated and
commercialized "Publishersare literallypouringout handbooks,
expression.
anthologies,workbooks,almanacs,documentaries, and textbookson the
historyofNegroAmericans.... Soon,we shallhave manymorebooksthan
we can read; indeed,manymorethanwe shouldread.Soon,we shall have
moreauthorities on Negrohistorythanwe can listento; indeed,manymore
thanwe shouldlistento" (1969, pp. 10-11).
Franklin'sapplicationof exacting,autonomousand universalistic stan-
dardsculminatesin a formulation that,once again,transcends thestatuses
of Insidersand Outsiders:

Slavery, unspeakable
injustice, thesellingof babiesfromtheir
barbarities,
mothers, thebreeding burnings
of slaves,lynchings, at thestake,discrimi-
nation,segregation, thesethingstoo are a part of the historyof this
country. If thePatriotsweremorein lovewithslaverythanfreedom, if
theFounding Fathersweremoreanxiousto writeslaveryintothe Con-
stitutionthantheywereto protect therightsof men,and if freedom was
begrudgingly givenand theneffectivelydeniedforanothercentury, these
thingstoo are a partof thenation'shistory. It takesa personof stout
heart,greatcourage, and uncompromising honesty to lookthehistory of
thiscountry squarelyin thefaceandtellit likeit is. Butnothing shortof
thiswillmakepossiblea reassessment of American historyand a revision
of American historythatwill,in turn,permittheteaching of thehistory
of NegroAmericans. Andwhenthisapproach prevails, thehistoryof the
UnitedStatesandthehistory of theblackmancan be written andtaught
byanyperson, white,
black,orotherwise. Forthereis nothing so irrelevant
in tellingthetruthas thecolorof a man'sskin.[1969,pp. 14-15]

Differingprofoundly on manytheoreticalissues and empiricalclaims,

to Hare 1970) and Frazier(1957, 1968) are
Cox (1948; also introduction
agreedon the relativeautonomyof the domainof knowledgeand, spe-
thatwhitescholarsare scarcelybarredfromcontributing
cifically, to what
Frazier describedas a "grasp of the conditionand fate of American
Negroes."Recognitionof whathas been called "the markof oppression,"

43
RobertK. Merton

Fraziernotes,"was theworkof twowhitescholarsthatfirstcalled atten-

tionto thisfundamental aspectof thepersonality of the AmericanNegro.
Moreover,it was theworkof anotherwhitescholar,StanleyM. Elkins,in
his recentbook on Slavery,who has shownthe psychictraumathat Ne-
groessuffered whentheywereenslaved,the pulverization of theirsocial
lifethroughthedestruction of theirclan organization, and annihilationof
their personalitythroughthe destructionof their cultural heritage"
(Frazier 1968 p. 272). And Cox, in his strongcriticismof what he de-
scribesas "the black bourgeoisieschool" derivingfromFrazier's work,
emphasizesthedistorting effects
of theimplicitly blacknationalistideology
of thisschoolon thecharacterof its work(Cox 1970,pp. 15-31).
It shouldnowbe evidentthatstructural analysisappliedto thedomain
of knowledgeprovidesan ironicallyself-exemplifying pattern.For just as
theunionof any othercollectivity based on a singlestatus-of Americans
or of Nigerians,of blacks or of whites,of menor of women-is continu-
ouslysubjectto thepotentialof innerdivisionowingto theotherstatuses
of its members, oftendescribedas the scientific
so withthe collectivities
community and the community of scholars.The functionalautonomyof
scienceand learningis also periodicallysubjectto greatstress,owingin
partto thecomplexsocialdifferentiation of thepopulationof scientistsand
scholarsthatweakenstheirresponseto externalpressures.The conditions
and processesmakingfor the fragilityor resiliencyof that autonomy
constituteone of the greatquestionsin the sociologyof knowledge.
thatautonomywhichstillenablesthepursuitof truth
It is nevertheless
to transcendotherloyalties,as Michael Polanyi (1959), morethan most
of us, has longrecognized:"People whohave learnedto respectthe truth
will feelentitledto upholdthe truthagainstthe verysocietywhichhas
taughtthemto respectit. They willindeeddemandrespectforthemselves
on the groundsof theirown respectfor the truth,and this will be ac-
cepted,even against theirown inclinations,by those who share these
basic convictions"(pp. 61-62).3
A papersuchas thisone needsno peroration. Nevertheless,hereis mine.
Insiders and Outsidersin the domain of knowledge,unite. You have
nothingto lose but yourclaims.You have a worldofunderstanding to win.

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