CHAPTER 2

HUMAN RELATIONS (n)

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the
expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be
liable for indemnity if through the act or event he was benefited.

Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection.

Art. 25. Thoughtless extravagance in expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be stopped by order
of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable institution.

Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar
acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;

(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;

(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.

Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his
official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be
taken.

Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or
any other unjust, oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage.

Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted
during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of
immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which
has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a
right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any
criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal
statute.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be
brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case of danger to life or
property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil
action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with the same, for which no independent civil action is granted
in this Code or any special law, but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been committed, or the
prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings, the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender.
Such civil action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to indemnify the defendant in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

If during the pendency of the civil action, an information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be suspended until the
termination of the criminal proceedings.

Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules
of court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. NO. 165500 : August 30, 2006]

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS and ROMEO G. DELA ROSA, Petitioners, v. ELENITA B. TRAZO, Respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioners are asking Us to reverse, in this Petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals dated 25 March 2004 and its Resolution 2dated 23 September 2004 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

In order to facilitate the payment of her salaries and other monetary benefits from her employer, petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications
(PBCOM 3 ), respondent Elenita B. Trazo opened a payroll account with China Banking Corporation (CBC) under Current Account No. 101-003921-
9.

On or about 29 December 1997, petitioner Romeo G. dela Rosa, PBCOM assistant vice-president, instructed CBC to credit all accounts under its
payroll with the medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998. Accordingly, respondent Trazo's current account was credited on that date with the
amount of P7,000.00 for such annual subsidy.

On 31 December 1997, respondent Trazo, then project manager of the information technology and management group, resigned from PBCOM.

Since respondent Trazo severed her employment with PBCOM effective 1 January 1998 and was, therefore, no longer entitled to the medical and
clothing subsidy for the year 1998, petitioner dela Rosa wrote William Lim, CBC senior assistant vice-president, on 5 January 1997
authorizing/directing CBC/Lim to debit the sum of P7,000.00 from respondent Trazo's current account. Acting upon such authority/directive, CBC/Lim
debited said amount from respondent Trazo's account on the same date.

Meanwhile, respondent Trazo drew checks against her current account in favor of Bliss Development Corporation (BDC) and the House of Sara Lee
Phils., Inc. However, the checks were dishonored by CBC due to insufficiency of funds, which was occasioned by the P7,000.00 debit from her
current account.

Averring that PBCOM, through dela Rosa, had no authority to unilaterally order the debiting of her current account and that CBC, through Lim, made
such debit without her knowledge and consent resulting in the dishonor of her checks, respondent Trazo instituted an action for damages against
PBCOM, dela Rosa, CBC, and Lim before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 79).

Summons was served on CBC and Lim on 19 May 1998 and on petitioners herein, PBCOM and dela Rosa, on 27 May 1998. On 27 May 1998 and
11 June 1998, or before the expiration of the reglementary period for filing their answers, CBC and Lim, and PBCOM and dela Rosa, respectively,
filed motions for 15-day extension of time.

On 8 June 1998, respondent Trazo filed a Motion to Declare Defendants China Banking Corporation and William Lim in Default and Opposition to
Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer and/or Responsive Pleading. On 15 June 1998, respondent Trazo filed a Motion to Declare Defendants
Philippine Bank of Communication and Romeo G. dela Rosa in Default.

On 16 June 1998, CBC and Lim filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. On 24 June 1998, PBCOM and dela Rosa filed
their own Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.

On 7 October 1998, the lower court issued an Omnibus Order granting the motions to dismiss and declaring the motions to declare defendants in
default moot and academic. The dispositive portion of the Omnibus Order is as follows:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case against defendants China Bank and William Lim is DISMISSED on the ground of improper venue. The case
against defendants Philippine Bank of Communications and Romeo G. dela Rosa is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action. 4

Respondent Trazo filed with the trial court a Notice of Appeal. In the assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of respondent Trazo,
disposing of the case in the following manner:

WHEREFORE, the omnibus order dated October 7, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 79) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE
and the complaint REINSTATED. Appellant is given ten (10) days from notice of finality of this decision within which to amend the complaint.5

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration on 14 April 2004, while CBC and Lim filed their Motion for Reconsideration on 19 April 2004. On 23
September 2004, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Resolution wherein both motions for reconsideration were denied for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant Petition, where petitioners PBCOM and Trazo bring before us the following issues:

A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE COMPLAINT STATED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST PETITIONERS ARISING OUT OF THE ALLEGED UNLAWFUL DEBITING OF RESPONDENT'S CHINABANK ACCOUNT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IT WAS CHINABANK WHICH DEBITED THE ACCOUNT, NOT PETITIONERS.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE COMPLAINT PLEADED A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ABUSE
OF RIGHTS AGAINST PETITIONERS.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE AMENDMENT OF THE COMPLAINT DESPITE THE COMPLAINT'S
ABSOLUTE FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETTIONERS.

D.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE VENUE CLAUSE IN THE APPLICATION FOR NEW CURRENT
ACCOUNTS IS NOT EXCLUSIVE.6

Only CBC, and not petitioners PBCOM and dela Rosa, can move for dismissal on the ground of improper venue.

The Application for New Current Accounts, which embodies the terms and conditions of respondent Trazo's relationship with CBC, contains a
stipulation on venue, to wit:

In case of litigation hereunder, venue shall be in the City Court or Court of First Instance of Manila as the case may be for determination of any and
all questions arising thereunder.7

The RTC of Quezon City dismissed the complaint against CBC and Lim based on this stipulation, but the Court of Appeals reversed said dismissal.
According to the Court of Appeals, absent any qualifying or restrictive words, a stipulation on venue should be considered merely as an agreement
on an additional forum, and not to be considered as limiting venue to the specified place.8

Before proceeding any further, it bears to point out that among the multiple defendants in the case filed by respondent Trazo, only CBC and its
officer Lim can assert the alleged impropriety of venue since they are privy to and covered by the contract containing the venue stipulation. Indeed,
the dispositive portion of the RTC decision shows that the dismissal on the ground of improper venue was effective only as against CBC and Lim. As
CBC and Lim did not appeal the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the RTC ruling, such decision has become final and executory as regards
its disposition on the issue regarding venue.

Nevertheless, We agree with the Court of Appeals that it was incorrect for the RTC to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue. The
parties must be able to show that the stipulation is exclusive. Thus, sans words expressing the parties' intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a
particular place, courts will allow the filing of a case in any of the venues prescribed by law or stipulated by the parties, as long as the jurisdictional
requirements are followed.9 The subject clause contains no qualifying nor restrictive words, such as "must," or "exclusively," as would indicate the
parties' intention "mandatorily to restrict the venue of actions to the courts of (Manila) only." 10 In the 8 December 2000 case of Langkaan Realty
Development, Inc. v. United Coconut Planters Bank, 11 where the venue stipulation contained the word "shall," 12 we held that the stipulations of the
parties "lack qualifying or restrictive words to indicate the exclusivity of the agreed forum," 13 and therefore "the stipulated place is considered only as
an additional, not a limiting venue." 14 Consequently, the dismissal by the RTC of the complaint against CBC and Lim on ground of improper venue is
erroneous, and was correctly reversed by the Court of Appeals.

Respondent Trazo's complaint contains a cause of action against petitioners PBCOM and dela Rosa.

As discussed above, the RTC dismissed the complaint, insofar as it operates against CBC and Lim, on the ground of improper venue. In the same
Omnibus Order, the RTC also dismissed the same complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, this time, insofar as the complaint
operates against petitioners PBCOM and dela Rosa. The Court of Appeals, in reversing the Order of the RTC dismissing the complaint on the
ground of failure to state a cause of action, held:

Par. 13 of the complaint recites appellant's alleged cause of action against [PBCOM and dela Rosa]. It reads:

"13. Upon further personal inquiry with [PBCOM], [respondent Trazo] found out that on January 5, 1998 [petitioner] ROMEO G. DE LA ROSA,
without [respondent Trazo's] knowledge, consent and approval, wrote a letter and authorized/directed x x x CHINABANK and WILLIAM LIM `to debit
the account of Elenita Trazo under C/A #101-003921-9 in the amount of PESOS: SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS ONLY - P7,000.00 representing her
medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998.' He even acknowledged and admitted that [respondent Trazo] resigned from PBCom effective
December 31, 1997. He further stated that CHINABANK make the `Manager's check payable to Philippine Bank of Communications.' x x x."

Crucial to appellant's action against [PBCOM and dela Rosa] is the issue of whether the latter had the right to authorize/direct [CBC and Lim] to debit
the amount of P7,000.00 from appellant's current account and, if so, whether appellant was entitled to notice of such authority/directive.

In authorizing/directing [CBC and Lim] to debit appellant's current account, [PBCOM and dela Rosa] had, in effect, sought to recover, without
resorting to a court action, an amount erroneously credited to her. And because appellant was not given the courtesy of a notice of such
authority/directive, she was lulled into the belief that her funds at CBC were sufficient to cover the checks she was issuing.

Nevertheless, the lower court ruled that the averment in par. 13 of the complaint is insufficient to make out a cause of action against [PBCOM and
dela Rosa] on the theory that the "debit (of) the amount of P7,000.00 from the account of [respondent Trazo] x x x cannot be attributed as the fault of
(PBCOM) since the fiduciary relationship exists only between (CBC) and [respondent Trazo] as its depositor and the primary responsibility whether
to deposit or not lies with (CBC) alone."

However, the lower court did not consider whether the act of authorizing/directing CBC/Lim to debit appellant's current account without giving notice
to her constitutes a cause of action against [PBCOM and dela Rosa], for abuse of rights.
The modern tendency is to depart from the classical and traditional theory and to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is an abuse of
rights, even when the act is not illicit (Sea Commercial Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 319 SCRA 210). But even supposing that the asserted act
of [PBCOM and dela Rosa] is insufficient to make out a case of abuse of rights, the lower court could have simply ordered appellant to amend the
complaint. Thus, Sec. 1, Rule 10, in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 16, id., allows amendment of pleadings before a responsive pleading is served.

Amendment of the complaint, by way of supplementing and amplifying facts as would carve out a clear abuse of rights situation, would prevent
multiplicity of suits. This is so because of Our ruling that the dismissal of the complaint against [CBC and Lim] on ground of improper venue is
erroneous, with the effect that the complaint against them is reinstated. However, affirmance of the dismissal of the complaint against [PBCOM and
dela Rosa] anchored on failure to state a cause of action would trigger the filing of a new action against the latter, thereby spawning two suits, i.e.,
the instant action and the new one.

Amendment, not dismissal, of the complaint is proper to avoid multiplicity of suits (Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425). The policy in this
jurisdiction is that amendment of pleadings is favored and liberally allowed in the interest of substantial justice. Amendment of the complaint may be
allowed even if an order for its dismissal has been issued provided that the motion to amend is filed before the order of dismissal acquired finality
(Tirona v. Alejo, 367 SCRA 17). Rules of Procedure, after all, are but tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice (Valenzuela v. Court of
Appeals, 363 SCRA 779).15

Petitioners argue that the afore-quoted paragraph 13 shows that PBCOM and dela Rosa merely requested CBC to debit the account of respondent
Trazo, and that nothing in said paragraph shows that PBCOM and dela Rosa were actually responsible for the alleged unlawful debiting of
respondent's account.16

As regards the Court of Appeals' finding that the complaint contains a cause of action against petitioners for abuse of rights, 17 petitioners claim that
the elements of abuse of rights are not found in the complaint, since no bad faith was imputed to PBCOM and dela Rosa in requesting the debiting of
the amount stated, and since there was no allegation showing that PBCOM and dela Rosa acted with the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
respondent in requesting the same.18

While we agree with petitioners that the complaint does not contain a cause of action against them for abuse of rights, their petition would,
nonetheless, fail.

A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. 19 A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint.20 The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against
the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer
therein. A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.21

The Court of Appeals, like the RTC, seems to have acquiesced in the petitioners' statement 22 that respondent's cause of action against them is
found exclusively in paragraph 13 of the complaint. An examination of the subject complaint, 23 however, reveals that it contains other provisions
establishing the cause of action against petitioners PBCOM and de la Rosa, not the least of which is paragraph 23, which provides:

23. In debiting the checking/current account of the plaintiff, without her knowledge, consent and approval, defendants acted in a wanton, reckless
and oppressive manner. Defendants PBCOM and ROMEO G. DE LA ROSA had no cause nor reason to unilaterally order the debiting of plaintiff's
account as it was her personal property and not of defendant PBCOM. Even if defendant PBCOM erroneously credited plaintiff with monetary
benefits, plaintiff was to receive, as she did receive separation benefits equivalent to more than FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P500,000.00) more or less, from defendant PBCOM itself. A reasonable set-off or compensation should and could have been resorted to. However,
defendant PBCOM never utilized this option. Defendant PBCOM neither informed plaintiff of said transaction, much less seek her approval and
authority to debit her CHINABANK account when at the time of the debitting (sic), January 5, 1998, she was no longer an employee of PBCOM.
(Emphasis supplied.) 24

As regards respondent Trazo's entitlement to damages, the complaint recites that:

In order not to jeopardize her housing loan obligations with BDC and Sara Lee, Phil., Inc., and considering the legal actions foisted against her, x x x
[respondent Trazo] made immediate restitution to BDC and Sara Lee Phil., Inc. for her outstanding obligations, which included unwarranted charges
and penalties which were not [respondent Trazo's] making.25

The Complaint also claims that the actions of defendants therein, including petitioners PBCOM and dela Rosa, caused "mental anguish, moral
shock, besmirched reputation, social humiliation, serious fright and anxiety, sleepless nights and wounded feelings." 26 The same was reiterated in
Annex K of said complaint, wherein respondent Trazo, through her legal representative, wrote to petitioner dela Rosa, in his capacity as Assistant
Vice-President of petitioner PBCOM, stating:

On January 5, 1997, you, as AVP of PBCOM's Human Resource Management Department, authorized CHINA BANKING CORPORATION to debit
our client's account under C/A # 101-003921-9 in the amount of SEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P7,000.00), representing her medical and clothing
subsidy for the year 1998, without notifying our client, much less acquiring her consent and approval. However, our client resigned from PBCOM
effective July 1, 1998, during which time the same account already ceased to be a payroll account.

As a result of your action[,] our client incurred damages and injury in several personal transactions involving check payments made by her under
said checking account with CHINA BANKING CORPORATION. This unfortunate incident caused her untold sufferings, not to mention lost
opportunities in her profession and other businesses, besmirched reputation, sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded feelings.27

Paragraph 20 28 of the complaint makes its Annex K an integral part thereof.

We find a sufficient cause of action in the above-quoted allegations. If these allegations are assumed to be true, respondent Trazo would indeed be
entitled to damages, though the amount of the same would still depend on the evidence presented during trial.

We carefully scrutinize the allegations in the Complaint. It provides that "(d)efendants PBCOM and ROMEO G. DE LA ROSA had no cause nor
reason to unilaterally order the debitting (sic) of plaintiff's account as it was her personal property and not of defendant PBCOM." 29 The Complaint
also described the action of all defendants, including petitioners PBCOM and dela Rosa, as unjust and illegal, 30 and done in a wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.31 The cause of action stated in the Complaint, therefore, consists in (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff, which in this case consists
of a right to her personal property; 32 (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect her right to her personal property; and (3) an act
of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff, which in this case is the order by petitioners to CBC and Lim to debit respondent Trazo's
account, an act which petitioners allege to have caused them damage.

In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint verily show a cause of action. To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
Complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or
uncertain.33

We, however, disagree with the Court of Appeals when it decided that the allegations in the complaint show a cause of action against petitioners for
abuse of rights under Article 19 34 of the Civil Code. The elements of abuse of rights are: (1) a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
and (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.35 Rather, the allegations bare commission of an act contrary to law under Article 20 of the
same Code, which provides:

Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Whereas Article 19 provides for a cause of action for damages in cases when there is no law violated, the act causing damage being within rights or
duties of defendant, Article 20 furnishes a general sanction for violations of provisions of law which do not especially provide their own
sanction.36 The complaint clearly alleges a violation of respondent Trazo's property rights with respect to her checking account. Article 429 of the
Civil Code provides that the owner or lawful possessor of the thing has the right to exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof.

Petitioners retort that the complaint did not base its claim for damages on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code, 37 and faults the Court of Appeals
for making out "a cause of action for respondent on grounds not even alleged in the Complaint. 38 We, however, have held in Consolidated Dairy
Products, Co. v. Court of Appeals, 39 that the applicable law to a set of facts stated in the complaint need not be set out directly. Consequently, the
complaint need not state that the property right alleged to have been violated is found in Article 429 of the Civil Code, or that such violation entitled
petitioner Trazo to damages pursuant to Article 20 of the same Code, which provides a cause of action therefor.

Petitioners' claim that respondent failed to specify in the complaint the standard of proper conduct and decency required of PBCOM and the basis of
invoking such standard on PBCOM 40 did not improve their position any. The complaint should state only ultimate facts, not conclusions of law, nor
evidentiary facts. In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, the complaint does not have to
establish or allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the
case.41 Ultimate facts refer to the principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action rests. The term does not
refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence which establish the material ingredients.42

In their last ditch efforts to save their cause, petitioners assert that the duty to notify respondent regarding the debiting of her account properly
belongs to CBC 43 and that, had CBC denied petitioners' "request," then there would have been no alleged debit of respondent's
account.44 Petitioners add that the mere act of "requesting" a bank to return a certain amount of money erroneously credited to one of the bank's
depositors cannot be considered an act which violates the rights of said depositor.45

Petitioners' allegations are in the nature of defenses, and, thus, cannot be considered in determining the sufficiency of the cause of action. For the
complaint to be dismissed for failure to state the cause of action, the insufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the
complaint.46 If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be assessed by the defendants.47

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and
set aside the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City's 7 October 1998 Omnibus Order dismissing respondent's complaint, are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
 CASE DIGEST
TOPIC: Test of Sufficiency of Complaint

G.R. No. 165500 August 30, 2006

TITLE: PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS and ROMEO G. DELA ROSA, Petitioners,

vs. ELENITA B. TRAZO, Respondent

PONENTE: Chico-Nazario, J.

NATURE OF ACTION: review on certiorari

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCOM[3]), respondent Elenita B. Trazo opened a payroll account with China Banking
Corporation (CBC) under Current Account No. 101-003921-9

. 29 December 1997, petitioner Romeo G. dela Rosa, PBCOM assistant vice-president, instructed CBC to credit all accounts under its payroll with
the medical and clothing subsidy for the year 1998

Respondent Trazo resign from petitioner PBCom on 31 December 1997

Petitioner dela Rosa wrote William Lim, CBC senior assistant vice-president, on 5 January 1997 authorizing/directing CBC/Lim to debit the sum of
P7,000.00 from respondent Trazos current account Respondent Trazo drew checks against her current account in favor of Bliss Development
Corporation (BDC) and the House of Sara Lee Phils., Inc.However, the checks were dishonored by CBC due to insufficiency of funds, which was
occasioned by the P7,000.00 debit from her current account Respondent Trazo instituted an action for damages against PBCOM, dela Rosa, CBC,
and Lim before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City (Branch 79) averring that they had no authority to debiting her account

16 June 1998, CBC and Lim filed a Motion to Dismiss the case on the ground of improper venue. On 24 June 1998, PBCOM and dela Rosa filed
their own Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action.RTC RULING

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the case against defendants China Bank and William Lim is DISMISSED on the ground of improper venue. The case
against defendants Philippine Bank of Communications and Romeo G. dela Rosa is DISMISSED for lack of cause of action

CA RULING: WHEREFORE, the omnibus order dated October 7, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 79) is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the complaint REINSTATED. Appellant is given ten (10) days from notice of finality of this decision within which to amend the
complaint

ISSUES:

Whether or not the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action

Whether or not the COURT OF APPEALS erred in finding that the venue clause in the application for new current accounts is exclusive.

HELD:

Yes.

In the case at bar, the allegations in the complaint verily show a cause of action. We carefully scrutinize the allegations in the Complaint. It provides
that defendants PBCOM and ROMEO G. DE LA ROSA had no cause nor reason to unilaterally order the debitting (sic) of plaintiffs account as it was
her personal property and not of defendant PBCOM. The Complaint also described the action of all defendants, including petitioners PBCOM and
dela Rosa, as unjust and illegal, and done in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner. The cause of action stated in the Complaint, therefore,
consists in

(1) a right in favor of the plaintiff, which in this case consists of a right to her personal property;

(2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect her right to her personal property; and

(3) an act of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff, which in this case is the order by petitioners to CBC and Lim to
debitrespondent Trazos account, an act which petitioners allege to have caused them damage

. No.

The stipulation (In case of litigation hereunder, venue shall be in the City Court or Court of First Instance of Manila as the case may be for
determination of any and all questions arising thereunder) concerning the venue clause did not contain any restricting words. The parties must be
able to show that the stipulation is exclusive. Thus, sans words expressing the parties intention to restrict the filing of a suit in a particular place,
courts will allow the filing of a case in anyof the venues prescribed by law or stipulated by the parties, as long as the jurisdictional requirements are
followed.DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, which reversed and
set aside the Regional Trial Court of Quezon Citys 7 October 1998 Omnibus Order dismissing respondents complaint, are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
DOCTRINE: A cause of action exists if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or
omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.

Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.

Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:

Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious
purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.

According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.

On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to
leave the office keys.

On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature,
and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.

On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in the
anomalies.

Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a
report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be conducted.

Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal
charges against him.

On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating other documents pertaining to the
alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh. "B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings,
signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie
detector tests conducted on Tobias also yielded negative results.

Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the private investigator, was, by its own
terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later
amended to just estafa. Subsequently five other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of
Correspondence).lâwphî1.ñèt Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office, which however, remanded them to the
fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the
criminal complaints with the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.

In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective
December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the
NLRC ruling, reinstated the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During the
pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise agreement regarding the latter's
complaint for illegal dismissal.

Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.

Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.
Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages,
two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as
to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners'
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.

The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss private respondent.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhuman treatment
he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had suffered.

One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the
law, but failed to draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the
fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society,
to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that
pronounced in Article 19 which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.

This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not
only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone
his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article
19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its
violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.

Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:

Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.

However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely exercising their legal right to
dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:

Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA, G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA
237, 247].

In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not
hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd.,
100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v.
CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404;
Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated
resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the
instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused
the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.

The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous
transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a
one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner
Hendry)" [RTC Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who
reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who
harbors suspicions that an employee has committed dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation
and directing the employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such employer. But the
high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when
private respondent returned to work on November 20, 1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by
Hendry who said. "Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police investigators was
submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and
the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The
Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised
and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-
Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc., G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-
21871, September 27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate
manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.

But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's
termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to
Hendry to protest the actions taken against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the
company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be trusted." The threat
unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand, the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as
Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and "swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].

The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which,
Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for
damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to forewarn other
employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the
accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And
this includes warning one's brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and
integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent Tobias from getting a job, even
after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.

Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend that there is no case against them
for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints
against an employee who was their principal suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which
defrauded them of substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].

While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for redress of wrongs and vindication of
their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in
bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R. No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016, May 31,
1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an
indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R.
No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20 SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all of which were dismissed.

To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and humiliate a person and that it
was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190,
October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602]. Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder
Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the criminal complaint is not a ground for an
award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David,
G.R. No. L-11268, January 28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal complaints against Tobias,
observing that:

xxx

Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of which were for
estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code "discovering secrets
thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the
cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above
adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring
criminal cases involving civilians to the civil courts.

xxx

To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document Examiner of
the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent transactions complained of,
despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled plaintiff to undergo, and although the police
investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered,"
defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of
commercial document and one (1) for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all
six (6) cases were dismissed, with one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed,
the haphazard way this case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against
respondent Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.

xxx

[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].

In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints were filed during the pendency of the
illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted.
But petitioners, to prove their good faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one
hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However, petitioners' good faith is belied
by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible
filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the
criminal complaints were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the threat made by
Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from involvement in the anomalies committed
against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were
motivated by malicious intent in filing the six criminal complaints against Tobias.

Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias prayed for the following: one
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand
pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation
of the damages incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand pesos
(P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and, costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of
committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e., the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of
guilt and the harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on Filipinos; the
poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the malicious filing of the criminal complaints.
Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to
Tobias was reasonable under the circumstances.

Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum absque injuria. It is argued that "[t]he only
probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his
employment, which was a valid and legal act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lâwphî1.ñèt " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].

According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a legal right or amount to a legal wrong
is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board
of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R. No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating that
even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in which that right was exercised amounted
to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover, the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive
manner in which he was dismissed but was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.

Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26,
1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.

Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts,
exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence," the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R.
No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1, ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its
imposition justified when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zulueta case, the nature of the wrongful acts
shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of exemplary damages to the latter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.
 CASE DIGEST
Facts:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual
capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager.
In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY... discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November 10, 1972 to his immediate
superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE
MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him by stating that he was the
number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open,... and to
leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry went up to him and called him a
"crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He was also instructed to submit specimen of his... handwriting,
signature, and initials for examination by the police investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6, 1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing private respondent of participation in
the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on December 10, 1972, submitted a
report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that further investigation was still to be... conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work preparatory to the filing of criminal
charges against him.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has been terminated effective
December 13, 1972.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner Hendry, without being asked by
RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners.

Issues:
W/N petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Ruling:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order.
The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that... spring from the fountain of good conscience" and
which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach
its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice"
Foremost among... these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed.
A right, though by itself legal because... recognized or granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article
21 would be proper.
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have
actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral... wrongs which it is
impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes"
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied.
While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application... he question of whether or
not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable... provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case.
And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed
abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private... respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous
transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private respondent herein) that he was the number one... suspect and to take
a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias after the latter's
termination from work.
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been
dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Principles:
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be applied. While the Court has not
hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for its application [See for e.g., Velayo v.
Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., G.R. No. L-48250, December 28,
1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA, G.R. No. L-46558, July 31, 1981, 106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc. v.
Paler, G.R. No. L-30205, March 15, 1982, 112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the question of whether
or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21 or other applicable... provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private... respondent and for which the latter
must now be indemnified.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-29041 March 24, 1981

BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
FIRST FARMERS MILLING CO., INC., ETC.; RAMON NOLAN in his capacity as Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration, ET AL.,
defendants; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

This is an appeal taken by Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc. from the Order dated November 28, 1967 issued by the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch VI (Pasig), in Civil Case No. 9185, as well as the Order dated March 5, 1968 denying the Motion for its reconsideration. The Order had
dismissed, after a preliminary hearing, on the ground of lack of cause of action, the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the defendants
Philippine National Bank (PNB) and National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC).

Plaintiff-appellant had commenced, on March 18, 1966, an action for Injunction and Prohibition with Damages against defendants First Farmers
Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC), various named planters including those similarly situated, and Ramon Nolan in his capacity as Administrator of the Sugar
Quota Administration. It was alleged,

9. That in the year 1964 the defendant First Farmers Milling Co., Inc., established and operated a sugar central known as the
First Farmers Sugar Central and for the crop years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the defendants transferred their quota "A" allotments
to their co-defendant First Farmers Milling Co., Inc. and are actually milling their sugar with the said First Farmers Milling Co.,
Inc., which illegal transfer has been made over the vigorous protest and objections of the plaintiff, but with the unwarranted,
unjustified and likewise illegal approval of their co-defendant the Sugar Quota Administration;" 1

After the defendants FFMC, the adhering planters, and the Sugar Quota Administrator had filed their respective Answers, plaintiff-appellant filed, on
May 2, 1967, a Motion to admit Amended and Supplemental Complaint. As amended, PNB and NIDC were included as new defendants in view of
the FFMC allegation in its Answer that the non-inclusion of PNB and NIDC as party defendants, "who became creditors of defendant FFMC central
prior to the institution of the instant case, and who therefore are necessary parties, is fatal to the complaint. " It was alleged this time,

20. That defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans to defendant sugar mill in the amount of P12,210,000.00 on June 18,
1965, and P4,000,000.00 on Dec. 14, 1966, respectively, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence, a joint
tortfeasor in the trespass of plaintiff's rights, aggravated by the fact that defendant mill has only a paid up capital stock of
P500,000.00, hence, said loans are far beyond the limits fixed by law; 2

It was then prayed that defendants be ordered

... jointly and severally to pay plaintiff actual and exemplary damages of not less than Fl million pesos and attorney's fees in the
amount of 101-C of said damages, plus legal interest from the filing of the original complaint, plus costs.

The defendants. except the Sugar Quota Administrator, filed their respective Answer to the Amended and Supplemental Complaint. For their part,
PNB and NIDC followed this with a Motion to Set for Preliminary Bearing their special and affirmative defenses, which were also grounds for
dismissal. Opposition, reply memoranda, rejoinder, and supplementary reply memoranda on the Motion were submitted by the contending parties.

In their Answer, the PNB and NIDC had contended:

xxx xxx xxx

5. That both the defendants PNB and NIDC have no participation whatsoever either directly or indirectly on the alleged illegal
(transaction) transfers of the defendant planters from the plaintiff to the defendant mill, and therefore, the defendants PNB and
NIDC could not be held liable for any damage that the plaintiffs alleged to have suffered from the said particular act complained
of;

6. That the granting of loans by the defendants PNB and NIDC in favor of the defendant mill to finance the construction of a
sugar central did not violate any rights of the plaintiff in view of the fact that the said loans were extended in the ordinary and
usual course of business, as specifically authorized-under the respective Charter of the defendants PNB and NIDC, hence, the
latter defendants did not commit any tortious action against the plaintiffs and, consequently, the plaintiffs have no cause of action
against the defendants PNB and NIDC. 3

As stated at the outset, the trial Court dismissed the Amended and Supplemental Complaint against the PNB and the NIDC after a preliminary
hearing on the ground of lack of cause of action.

The only issue then is whether or not the allegations of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of action against
the PNB and NIDC.

A negative finding is called for.

It is basic that the Complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. "Ultimate facts" are the
important and substantial facts which either directly form and basis of the plaintiff's primary right and duty, or directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions by the defendant. 4

When the ground for dismissal is that the Complaint states no cause of action, the rule is that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering
the facts alleged in the Complaint and no other. 5 The court may not consider other matters outside of the Complaint. 6 Defenses averred by the
defendant are not to be taken into consideration in ruling on the motion. 7 The allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true and it is not
permissible to go beyond and outside of them for date or facts. 8 And the test of sufficiency of the facts alleged is whether or not the Court could
render a valid judgment as prayed for accepting as true the exclusive facts set forth in the Complaint. 9

The subject Amended and Supplemental Complaint fails to meet the test. It should be noted that it charges PNB and NIDC with having assisted in
the illegal creation and operation of defendant sugar mill. Granting, for the sake of argument, that, indeed, assistance in the "illegal" act was
rendered, the same, however, is not supported by well-pleaded averments of facts. Nowhere is it alleged that defendants-appellees had notice,
information or knowledge of any flaw, much less any illegality, in their co-defendants' actuations, assuming that there was such a flaw or illegality.
This absence is fatal and buoy-up instead the PNB-NIDC's position of lack of cause of action.

Although it is averred that the defendants' acts were done in bad faith, 10 the Complaint does not contain any averment of facts showing that the acts
were done in the manner alleged. Such a bare statement neither establishes any right or cause of action on the part of the plaintiff-appellant. It is a
mere conclusion of law not sustained by declarations of facts, much less admitted by defendants-appellees. It does not, therefore, aid in any wise the
complaint in setting forth a cause of action. 11 Defendants-appellees are not fairly apprised of the act or acts complained of.

Besides, bad faith is never presumed (Civil Code, Art. 527). And, it has been held that "to support a judgment for damages, facts which justify the
inference of a lack or absence of good faith must be alleged and proven." 12

While it is a settled rule that a defective complaint may be cured by the introduction of sufficient evidence so as to constitute the cause of action
which the plaintiff intended to set forth in the complaint, the same merits the Court's blessings only and unless there is no objection or opposition
from the side of the defendant. It is obvious that the defendants-appellees, in the case at bar, were vigilant of their right and were on their guard from
the very initiation of the complaint against them.

Plaintiff-appellant's allegation "that defendants NIDC and PNB have extended loans to defendant sugar mill ..., to assist in the illegal creation and
operation of said mill, hence, a joint tortfeasor in the trespass of plaintiff's rights. ..." is, therefore, a mere conclusion not warranted by sufficient facts.
What appears from the record is that PNB and NIDC came into the picture in the ordinary and usual course of its business after the borrowing entity
had established itself as capable of being treated as a new milling district (FFMC is officially designated as Mill District No. 49) because it could
already operate and had its array of adhering planters. "The doing of an act which is in itself perfectly lawful win not render one liable as for a tort,
simply because the unintended effect of such act is to enable or assist another person to do or accomplish a wrong," 13 assuming, of course, that
there was such a wrong.

WHEREFORE, without resolving the issue in the main case regarding the alleged illegal creation and operation of First Farmers Milling, Co., Inc.,
there having been no presentation of evidence as yet in the lower Court, the challenged Order dismissing the Amended and Supplemental Complaint
against defendants-appellees as well as the Order denying reconsideration thereof, is hereby affirmed, and the appeal dismissed. Costs against
plaintiff-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

 CASE DIGEST
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
FIRST FARMERS MILLING CO., INC., ETC.; RAMON NOLAN in his capacity as Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration, ET AL.,
defendants; PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK and NATIONAL INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, defendants-appellees.

G.R.No. L-29041

March 24, 1961

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

FACTS:
Plaintiff-appellant had commenced, on March 18, 1966, an action for Injunction and Prohibition withDamages against defendants First Farmers
Milling Co., Inc. (FFMC), various named planters nearby, andRamon Nolan being the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Administration. It was
alleged, that in the year of1964, the defendant FFMC that operated a sugar central known as the First Farmers Sugar Central. Then, forthe crop
years 1964-65 and 1965-66, the defendants transferred their quota allotments to their co-defendantsFFMC and are actually milling their sugar with
FFMC. This illegal transfer of the quota allotments wasdone over the protest and objections of the plaintiff, but with the unjustified illegal approval of
their co-defendant the Sugar Quota Administration.After the defendants (FFMC, the adhering planters, and the Sugar Quota Administrator) had filed
theirrespective answers, the plaintiff-appellant filed a Motion to admit Amended and Supplemental Complaint.PNB(Philippine National Bank) and
NIDC (National Investment and Development Corporation) as partydefendants, “who became creditors of defendant FFMC central prior to the
institution of the instant case,and who therefore are necessary parties, is fatal to the complaint.”

It was alleged, that defendants NIDC andPNB extended loans to FFMC in the amount of P12,210,000.00 on June 18,1965 and P4,000,000.00 on
Dec.14, 1966, to assist in the illegal creation and operation of said mill, hence a joint tortfeasors in the trespass
of plaintiff’s rights. It was prayed that they be ordered to jointly and severally pay plaintiff actual andexemplary damages of not less that P1 million
pesos.Then the defendant filed their respective answer. In their answer, the PNB and NIDC had contended thatthey had no participation whatsoever
either directly or indirectly on the alleged illegal transfer of thedefendant planters from the plaintiff to the defendant mill.

In addition, the granting of loans by thedefendants PNB and NIDC in favor of the defendant mill did not violate any rights of the plaintiff becausethese
loans were extended in the ordinary and usual course of business as authorized by their charter. Hence,the latter defendants did not commit any
tortious action against the plaintiffs and, consequently the plaintiffshave no cause of action against the defendants (PNB and NIDC).

ISSUE
W/N the allegations of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint constituted a sufficient cause of actionagainst PNB and NIDC.
H/R:
NO.

It is basic that the complaint must contain a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting
the plaintiff’s cause of action. “Ultimate facts” are the important and substantial facts, which either directlyform and basis of the plaintiff’s primary ri
ght, and duty, or directly make up the wrongful acts or omissions by the defendant.When the ground for dismissal is that the complaint states that the
Complaint states no cause of action, therule is that its sufficiency can only be determined by considering the facts alleged in the Complaint and no
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39019 January 22, 1988

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O.
CHAVES, respondents-appellees.

YAP, J.:

In an action for recovery of damages for embarassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride, caused to herein private respondents, by
reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners, the then Court of First Instance of Manila, Sixth Judicial District, Branch
XXIV, rendered a decision dated December 13,1967, ordering herein petitioners jointly and severally to pay private respondents the sum of Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as moral damages, Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages and, One Thousand (P1,000.00)
Pesos as attorney's fees, and dismissing petitioners' counterclaim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals and in toto the trial court's decision. Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed the
instant petition for certiorari.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the consumption of the general public in
Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO.

Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O. Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages, together with their children, Isaac O.
Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were
practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.

The facts as found by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

Plaintiff Isaac Chaves became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and his family were residing at No.
211-D Rubi, Manila. In connection with the contract for electrical service, he deposited the sum of P5.00 (Exh. "A") with
defendant MERALCO on February 12, 1953. This deposit in the name of plaintiff Isaac Chaves was retained by MERALCO and
made to apply to subsequent contracts for electrical service entered into after subsequent transfers of the Chaves family to other
residences and up to the time this family went to reside at the place aforementioned, at No. 2656 Mercedes Street, Singalong,
Manila. ...

At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue bills,
one for January 11 to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 (Exhibit "C"), and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the
amount of P7.20 (Exhibit "C"). Juana O. Chaves, however, informed Yambao that these bills would be paid at the MERALCO
main office.

Accordingly, on April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the defendant's main office at San Marcelino, Manila, but paid only the bill
marked as Exhibit 'C" leaving the other bill Identified as Exhibit "C-l" unpaid.

Past 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon of April 21,1965, MERALCO caused the electric service in plaintiff's residence to be
discontinued and the power line cut off.

The next day, April 22, 1965, at about 9:00 a.m., plaintiff Rosendo O. Chaves went to the MERALCO main office and paid the
amount of P7.20 for the bill marked as Exhibit "C-l", and the sum of P7.00 for the subsequent bill corresponding to the period
from March 10 up to April 8, 1965 (Exhibit "C-2") after his attention was called to the latter account. Rosendo O. Chaves then
sought the help of Atty. Lourdy Torres, one of the defendants' counsel, and, thereafter, the power line was reconnected and
electric service restored to the Chaves residence at about 7:00 p.m. of that same day. 1

Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent. However, since only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioners, 'for the sake of argument and for the purpose of giving focus on the legal
issues', do not take issue with such finding.

Petitioners contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney's fees. The
failure to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not
constitute bad faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with fraudulent intent.Petitioners also maintain that '
private respondents were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be
recovered by them under the 'clean hands' doctrine enunciated in Mabutas vs. Calapan Electric Company, CA-G.R. No. L-9683-R, May 26, 1964.

In its decision, the respondent Court of Appeals held that MERALCO's right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer "is an
absolute one, subject only to the requirement that defendant MERALCO should give the customer a written notice of disconnection 48 hours in
advance." This requirement is embodied in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission which provides as follows:

Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, may require that bills for service be paid within a specified time after rendition.
When the billing period covers a month or more, the minimum time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified
time, service may be discontinued for the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours' written notice of such disconnection has
been given the customer: Provided, however, that disconnections of service shall not be made on Sundays and official holidays
 and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided, further, that if at the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer
tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to effect the disconnection, the said agent or
employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and shall desist from
disconnecting the service. 2

The respondent court stressed the importance and necessity of the 48-hour advance written notification before a disconnection of service may be
effected. Said the court:

... It sets in motion the disconnection of an electrical service of the customer by giving the notice, determining the expiration date
thereof, and executing the disconnection. It, therefore, behooves the defendant MERALCO that before it disconnects a
customer's electrical service, there should be sufficient evidence that the requirements for the disconnection had been duly
complied with, otherwise, the poor consumer can be subjected to the whims and caprices of the defendant, by the mere
pretension that the written notice had been duly served upon the customer. 3

We find no reversible error in the decision appealed from. One can not deny the vital role which a public utility such as MERALCO, having a
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro Manila and some nearby municipalities, plays in the life of people living in such areas. Electricity
has become a necessity to most people in these areas justifying the exercise by the State of its regulatory power over the business of supplying
electrical service to the public, in which petitioner MERALCO is engaged. Thus, the state may regulate, as it has done through Section 97 of the
Revised Order No. 1 of the Public Service Commission, the conditions under which and the manner by which a public utility such as MERALCO may
effect a disconnection of service to a delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written notice to the customer is required before disconnection of
the service. Failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort, as held by us in a similar case, 4 where we said:

... petitioner's act in 'disconnecting respondent Ongsip's gas service without prior notice constitutes breach of contract amounting
to an independent tort. The prematurity of the action is indicative of an intent to cause additional mental and moral suffering to
private respondent. This is a clear violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides that any person who wilfully causes loss
or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
damages. This is reiterated by paragraph 10 of Article 2219 of the Code. Moreover, the award of moral damages is sanctioned
by Article 2220 which provides that wilfull injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court
should find that, under the circumstances, such damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

Likewise, we find no merit in petitioners' contention that being in arrears in the payment of their bills, the private respondents are not entitled to moral
damages under the doctrine that "he who comes to court in demand of equity, must come with clean hands." We rejected this argument in the Manila
Gas Corporation case, supra, wherein we held that respondents' default in the payment of his bills "cannot be utilized by petitioner to defeat or null
the claim for damages. At most, this circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages to which
respondent ... is entitled."

Accordingly, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent court in affirming the trial court's decision. The petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

 CASE DIGEST

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVES, and JUAN O.
CHAVES, respondents-appellees.

G.R. No. L-39019

January 22, 1988

Yap, J.

Facts:
To recover the damages due to embarrassment, humiliation, hurt pride, and wounded feelings inflicted by MERALCO and Yambao during the
disconnection of the Chavez family’s electrical service; the Chavez family filed a complaint at CFI-Manila.

Private respondents Isaac Chavez and Juana O. Chavez, husband and wife, filed the complaint for damages, together with their children, Isaac O.
Chaves, Jr. and Rosendo O. Chaves. Isaac Sr. and Isaac Jr. and Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac, Sr. and Isaac, Jr. were
practicing lawyers and Rosendo was a Legal Officer at the Agricultural Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a public school teacher.

Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a public utility corporation providing electric power for the consumption of the general public in
Metro Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of MERALCO.

Plaintiff Isaac Chavez became a customer of defendant MERALCO in the year 1953 when he and his family were residing in Manila. On February
12, 1953, Chavez deposited the sum of P5.00 with defendant MERALCO in connection with the contract for electrical service.

At or about the end of March, 1965, defendant Pedro Yambao went to the residence of plaintiffs and presented two overdue bills, one for January 11
to February 9,1965, for the sum of P7.90 and the other for February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the amount of P7. Juana O. Chaves, however, informed
Yambao that these bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office.

Unfortunately, Isaac went to the main office only to pay the bill of P7.90 leaving the other bill unpaid. Thus, in the afternoon of April 21, 1965,
MERALCO caused the electric service of the Chavez family to be disconnected and the power line cut off.

Petitioners dispute the finding that there was no notice given to herein respondent.

They contend that in the absence of bad faith, they could not be held liable for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. The failure
to give a notice of disconnection to private respondents might have been a breach of duty or breach of contract, but by itself does not constitute bad
faith or fraud; it must be shown that such a failure was motivated by in or done with fraudulent intent. They also maintain that ‘private respondents
were in arrears in the payment of their electricity bills when their electric service was connected, no moral damages may be recovered by them under
the ‘clean hands’ doctrine.

Issue:

Whether or not, in the absence of bad faith in disconnecting the service to Chavez family, MERALCO and Yambao could be held liable for damages.

Held:

YES, MERALCO and YAMBAO CAN BE HELD LIABLE.

There is no abuse of discretion in the part of the CA in affirming the assailed decision of the CFI Manila. The right to disconnect the electric service of
a delinquent customer shall be accompanied by a given notice 48 hours in advanced as provided for in Section 97 of the Revised Order No. 1 of the
Public Service Commission which provides as follows:

Section 97. Payment of bills. — A public service, may require that bills for service be paid within a specified time after rendition. When the billing
period covers a month or more, the minimum time allowed will be ten days and upon expiration of the specified time, service may be discontinued for
the non-payment of bills, provided that a 48 hours’ written notice of such disconnection has been given the customer: Provided, however, that
disconnections of service shall not be made on Sundays and official holidays and never after 2 p.m. of any working day: Provided, further, that if at
the moment the disconnection is to be made the customer tenders payment of the unpaid bill to the agent or employee of the operator who is to
effect the disconnection, the said agent or employee shall be obliged to accept tender of payment and issue a temporary receipt for the amount and
shall desist from disconnecting the service.

In accordance with the previous rulings, failure to give such prior notice amounts to a tort. And since, MERALCO and Yambao in this particular case
disregarded the rule on 48-hour notice prior to disconnection which is protected by law, MERALCO and Yambao can be held liable for damages
according to Article 1170 of the civil code, therefore, the Chavez family was entitled to claim damages.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 83768 February 28, 1990

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) and GLOBE MACKAY AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

Salalima, Ungos and David for petitioners.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for private respondent.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the then Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Branch 17-B, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-26623 ordering petitioner Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. [RCPI] and
their co-defendant Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation (Globe Mackay), jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff, private respondent herein, a total
amount of Two Hundred Thirteen Thousand One Hundred Forty Eight Pesos (P213,148.00) broken down as follows: a) P100, 000.00 as moral
damages; b) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages; c) P43,148.00 as actual damages; and d) P20,000.00 as attorney's fees by way of damages.

This is the second time that this case has been brought to us. The first was when petitioner RCPI questioned the decision of the Court of Appeals
which refused to set aside the orders of the lower court directing execution pending appeal of the money awards. In that case (G.R. No. 59311, 134
SCRA [1985]) we set aside the decision of the appellate court and entered a new order authorizing execution pending appeal of the award of actual
damages but enjoining the execution of the award of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees until after the resolution of the issues
in the main case. We summarized the facts of the case as follows:

On September 8, 1978, Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law Students (WALS), sent two
cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one addressed to Mohamed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union, and the other
to Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The cablegram were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their
foreign destination The telegram to Taha advised him of Rodriguez's pending arrival in Khartoum on September 18, 1978, while
the telegram to Merger advised her of the scheduled WALS conference in Khartoum. Rodriguez left the Philippines on
September 15, 1978. On September 18, 1978, he arrived in Khartoum, Sudan at 9:30 in the evening. Nobody was at the airport
to meet him. Due to the lateness of the hour, he was forced to sleep at the airport. He lined up five (5) chairs together and lay
down with his luggages near him. Because of the non-receipt of the cablegram, Taha was not able to meet him. Worse all
preparations for the international conference had to be cancelled. Furthermore, Fernando Barros, the Vice-President, arrived the
next day from Chile, followed by the other officers from other countries except Diane Merger, the organization's secretary. It
turned out that the wire sent by Rodriguez to Merger was delivered to the address on the message but the person who delivered
it was told that the address was no longer staying there. This fact was not accordingly reported to Rodriguez in Metro Manila.
The undelivered cablegram was not returned by the correspondent abroad to Globe for disposition in the Philippines.

On December 8, 1978, Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages in the amount of P45,147.00, moral damages in
the amount of P200,000.00, and exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00 against RCPI and GLOBE.

On March 17, 1980, the then Presiding Judge Lino L. Anover of the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff
the total sum of TWO HUNDRED THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT PESOS
(P213,148.00) by way of damages and to pay the costs of this suit."

The above amount is broken down as follows by the trial court:

"Moral damages consequent to the humiliation and embarrassment that the plaintiff suffered under the two
causes of action in the amount of P100,000.00 are adequate. Exemplary damages under both counts are
fixed reasonably at P50,000.00. On the actual damages, the court accepts plaintiffs expenses for the
preparation of the trip at P10,000.00; plane fare at P20,000.00; stay in transit in Pakistan at P5,000.00; his
hotel bills in Khartoum at P4,000.00; his meals in Khartoum at P4,000.00 and the telegraphic toll at P78.00.
The court refuses the sum spent for the dinner that he allegedly tendered as not established by sufficient
proof.

With respect to the telegram sent to Diane Merger, the court finds that the actual damages amount to P70.00
representing the cost of cablegram. As for attorney's fees, the court finds that the amount of P20,000.00
including litigation expenses are reasonable. (at pp. 396-398)"

Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this petition filed by RCPI. The title of the case includes Globe Mackay but the petition proper and the name on counsel show that only RCPI
comes to this Court through the petition. Globe Mackay did not join as petitioner and its counsel Atty. Romulo P. Atencia did not sign the petition.

The issues raised by petitioner RCPI are two-fold — 1) whether or nor petitioner RCPI is responsible for the non-delivery of the two (2) telegrams
notwithstanding the fact that RCPI relayed said telegrams to Globe Mackay and 2) whether or not under the attendant facts and circumstances
petitioner RCPI is liable for moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00; actual damages in the
amount of P43,148.00 and attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00.

RCPI insists that its responsibility vis-a-vis the two (2) telegrams ceased after it relayed and transmitted the telegrams on the same day they were
filed to Globe Mackay. It argues that it was not incumbent upon RCPI to advise respondent Rodriguez the status of his telegrams because Globe
Mackay did not also inform RCPI what happened to the telegrams since the respective operating agency of the country of destination did not also
inform Globe Mackay about the non-delivery of the telegrams.

Moreover, RCPI blames respondent Rodriguez for the non-delivery of the two telegrams. Regarding the telegram addressed to Elsir Taha, RCPI
avers that it has an incomplete address as it did not include P.O. Box 1850 per instruction of Taha in an earlier cable asking for respondent to reply
via telex, to wit:

... send me a telegram immediately after receiving this one a telex number if any. Thanks. Mohammed Elsir Taha Regional
Director WALS Africa Youth Committee SSU, Khartoum, P.O. Box 1850. (Exhibit D). (Rollo, p. 27)

In regard to the telegram addressed to Diane Merger which she did not receive because she had moved, to another place RCPI avers that
respondent Rodriguez was partly at fault for not verifying the address of Diane before sending the telegram and that Merger was negligent by not
leaving her forwarding address with the present occupant of the apartment she vacated.

Petitioner RCPI is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of receiving and transmitting messages. Mr. Alfredo Catolico, Jr., manager,
Customer and Relations Office testified that RCPI does not have facilities for foreign countries, hence it has a contract to course all international
communications thru Globe Mackay. On the other hand, Wenceslao Felix, the Traffic Operations Manager of Globe Mackay testified that Globe
Mackay has an inter-connecting agreement with RCPI under which the latter's international messages are coursed thru Globe Mackay in the same
way that local and domestic messages received by Globe Mackay are coursed thru RCPI.

Respondent Rodriguez and RCPI entered into a contract whereby for a fee RCPI undertook to send the respondent's messages overseas. When,
therefore, respondent Rodriguez paid RCPI to deliver his messages overseas by telegram, RCPI obligated itself to transmit the messages to the
addressee. Clearly, RCPI reneged on its obligation when it failed to deliver the messages or to inform the sender about the non-delivery, thus
making it liable for damages. (Article 1170, Civil Code; Article 2176; see also Telefast Communication/Philippine Wireless, Inc. v. Castro, Sr., 158
SCRA 445 [1988]).

Parenthetically, RCPI cannot escape liability for damages by passing off the blame for negligence to Globe Mackay. It has an inter-connecting
agreement with Globe Mackay. RCPI receives messages for overseas destinations and conducts its business to transmit foreign messages only
through Globe Mackay. To allow it to escape liability for damages by attributing sole negligence to Globe Mackay for the expedient reason that it had
already delivered the messages to the latter would deprive the general public availing of the services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.
(See Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 657 [1986]). It cannot simply wash its hands of all
responsibility.

RCPI's similar attempt to pass the total blame for the non-delivery of the telegram intended for Taha to respondent Rodriguez is not supported by the
records. The evidence clearly demonstrates that an earlier cablegram dated July 27, 1978 (Exhibit "E") similarly addressed to Taha, Africa, Youth
Committee, Khartoum, SSU and without P.O. Box 1850 was received by Taha. This is conclusively shown by a cable (Exhibit "F") addressed by
Taha to respondent Rodriguez acknowledging the receipt of the July 27 cablegram. Evidence was also introduced to show that the Africa Youth
Committee is a very important office in Khartoum, Sudan and the building that houses it is a very popular building known to the people.

We rule that the arguments about the alleged negligence on the part of respondent Rodriguez in not verifying the address of Diane Merger before
sending the telegram and also the alleged negligence on the part of Merger for not leaving a forwarding address do not deserve much consideration.
Considering the public utility nature of RCPI's business and its contractual obligation to transmit messages, it should exercise due diligence to
ascertain that messages are delivered to the persons at the given address and should provide a system whereby in cases of undelivered messages
the sender is given notice of non-delivery. Messages sent by cable or wireless means are usually more important and urgent than those which can
wait for the mail.

For recovery of damages, Article 2217 of the New Civil Code applies. It is provided therein that: "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental
anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feeling, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act or omission." (Emphasis
supplied)

There is no doubt that RCPI's failure to deliver the two questioned telegrams resulted in the suffering that respondent Rodriguez, had to undergo.

Respondent Rodriguez left Manila for Khartoum, Sudan believing that Taha received his telegram and would meet him at the airport. He related his
experience at the airport of Khartoum, Sudan as follows:

Q. All right, from 9:30 in the evening up to 12:00 midnight, was there any person or officer of the World
Association of Law Students who met you?

A. None.

Q. Now, inform the Court what was your feeling during that time in a foreign country?

A. First of all, when I arrived at 9:30 A.M., I was thinking that Mr. Taha was first late in fetching me but when
it was already 10:30 to 11:00 P.M., I was already afraid because there was no one there that I know and it
was already late in the evening that I could not go to the address of Mr. Taha. (TSN pages 18 and 19, August
20, 1979).

Q. What were you doing at that time from 9:30 in the evening until 6:00 in the morning?

A. I was every tired and what I did was pulled five chairs together. I remember there were about ten (10)
persons and some tourists in that restaurant. I got five chairs together and laid my baggage trying to sleep
 but which I was not able to do because of fear and anxiety. (TSN, pages 10 and 11, August 20, 1979). (Rollo,
p. 15)

We are convinced that respondent Rodriguez suffered a certain degree of mental anguish, fear and anxiety considering his experience at the airport
of a foreign country. His suffering was caused by the non-appearance of Taha who did not receive the telegram sent by the respondent due to the
gross negligence of RCPI. There is moreover, the dismay arising from the fact, that after so much preparation and travel on the part of Rodriguez,
his pains were all for nothing. Hence, RCPI is liable for moral damages.

Nevertheless, we find the award of P100,000.00 as moral damages in favor of respondent Rodriguez excessive and unconscionable. In the case
of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc. (148 SCRA 440 [1987]) we said:

... [I]t is undisputed that the trial courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages (Alcantara v. Surro, 93
Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can only modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably and
scandalously excessive 'so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court'
(Gellada v. Warner Barnes & Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co., Inc., 57 O.G. [4] 636 and Adone
v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57 O.G. 656). But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary damages are far
too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to
more reasonable amounts.

Thus, in the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals (116 SCRA 85 [1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that while the amount of
moral damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of a court, the same when found excessive should be reduced to
more reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary
estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer.

In a much later case (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 578-579 [1985]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the above ruling,
reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages which were far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by
the aggrieved parties and where the records show that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and, therefore, out of
proportion to the amount of damages generously awarded by the trial court.

In any case the Court held that 'moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a
defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by reason of the defendants' culpable action.' The award of moral damages must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (R & B Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 745
[1984] citing Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA 966). (Emphasis supplied)

The respondent is not entirely blameless for the problems which befell him. Apart from the various arguments raised by RCPI in its petition, there are
other factors to be considered in fixing the amount of damages. Anybody who has been involved in international conferences and meetings knows
that a telegram is not adequate preparation. Considering the lackaidaisical attitude of public utility employees in the Philippines and presumably in
Africa, the head of an international student organization cannot simply send a telegram and nonchalantly assume that every preparation will proceed
as he anticipates it. The planning expertise and degree of thoroughness incumbent upon conference organizers is missing from the records. The trial
court appears to have been influenced by the impressive title of World Association of Law Students. There is nothing in the records pointing to a
certain degree of distinction earned by WALS which would warrant substantial damages because of a failed meeting.

Be that as it may, damages are warranted. People depend on telecommunications companies in times of deep emotional stress or pressing financial
needs. Knowing that messages about the illnesses or deaths of loved ones, births or marriages in a family, important business transactions, and
notices of conferences or meetings as in this case, are coursed through the petitioner and similar corporations, it is incumbent upon them to exercise
a greater amount of care and concern than that shown in this case. Every reasonable effort to inform senders of the non-delivery of messages
should be undertaken. From the pleadings filed by counsel in this case, RCPI does not seem to be particularly concerned about its responsibility.

We rule that the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the respondent would be reasonable considering the facts and circumstances
surrounding the petitioner's liability.

The award of exemplary damages is not proper considering that there is no showing that RCPI acted in "a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive,
or malevolent manner." (Article 2232, New Civil Code).

Respondent Rodriguez was awarded the total amount of P43,148.00 as actual or compensatory damages broken down as follows: (a) P10,000.00
for the preparation of the trip; (b) P20,000.00 for plane fare; (c) P5,000.00 for respondent's stay in transit in Pakistan; (d) P4,000.00 for hotel bills in
Khartoum; (e) P78.00 for the telegraphic toll, and P70.00 for the cost of the cablegram sent to Diane Merger. The trial court rejected the expenses
allegedly incurred by the respondent for a dinner he tendered for the officers, organizers and students at Khartoum for insufficiency of evidence. It is
to be noted that the petitioner does not controvert the amounts. Instead, the petitioner concentrates its opposition to the award of actual damages on
the argument that the respondent's expenses were actually paid by the organization and the Sudanese government. The petitioner, however, fails to
substantiate its allegations with clear proof. On the other hand, what is evident on record is that due to the non-receipt of the telegram which would
have confirmed the scheduled conference on September 20, 1978, Taha cancelled all preparations and stopped the soliciting of funds for the
conference which would have included the expenses of the respondent. As a result of the cancellation of the conference, triggered by the non-
delivery of the telegrams, the officers were constrained to schedule another meeting in Santiago, Chile in April 1979. Therefore, we see no reason to
disturb these findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court as these were not sufficiently controverted by the petitioner (See Ganzon v.
Court of Appeals, 161 SCRA 646 [1988]).

Finally, petitioner RCPI objects to the award of attorney's fees. Citing the case of Mirasol v. De la Cruz (84 SCRA 337 (1987]), RCPI contends that
the award of attorney's fees was improper because there was no allegation in the complaint with respect to attorney's fees; respondent Rodriguez
did not present any evidence to prove attorney's fees and the decision failed to explain why attorney's fees are being awarded.

We agree. In the recent case of Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, (G.R. No. 88376, May 29,1989), we ruled:

In Abrogar v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 67970, January 15, 1988, 157 SCRA 57) the Court had occasion to state
that '[t]he reason for the award of attorney's fees must be stated in the text of the court's decision, otherwise, if it is stated only in
 the dispositive portion of the decision, the same must be disallowed on appeal. (at p. 61 citing Mirasol v. dela Cruz, G.R. No. L-
32552, July 31, 1978, 84 SCRA 337).

A cursory reading of the trial court's decision shows that the award of attorney's fees was stated only once — "As for attorney's fees, the court finds
that the amount of P20,000.00 including litigation expenses are reasonable" — just below the dispositive portion of the decision which reads:
"WHEREFORE judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants jointly and severally liable to pay the plaintiff the total sum of TWO HUNDRED
THIRTEEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED FORTY EIGHT PESOS (P213,148.00) by way of damages and to pay the costs of this suit." The trial
court failed to justify the payment of attorney's by RCPI, therefore, the award of attorney's fees as part of its liability should be disallowed and
deleted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent court is MODIFIED. The award directing
Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc., to pay P100,000.00 moral damages is reduced to P10,000.00. The award ordering it to pay
exemplary damages and attorney's fees is DELETED. In all other respects, the questioned decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes JJ., concur.

 CASE DIGEST
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI) and GLOBE MACKAY AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
RUFUS B. RODRIGUEZ, respondent.

G.R. No. 83768

February 28, 1990

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987

CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8
January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where
respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the
aforestated criminal cases.

It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.

The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio, through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.

The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina

During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial
was then set on January 8, 1987.

In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as presiding judge of Branch 105.

On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground
that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime
against property but public order."

The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.

Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on March 25, 1987.

In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.

The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the
appearance of a private prosecutor.

The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against
public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided
for by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may intervene.

On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be
recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 so provides.

A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in the case at bar.

Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable"
(Art. 100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two
entities namely ( 1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of
that society whose person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or damaged by the same punishable act or omission.
However, this rather broad and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in criminal procedure. It can be misleading in
its implications especially where the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a tort in another or where the law allows
a separate civil action to proceed independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars
treat as a misconception or fallacy the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it
does not. While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation
and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally or
negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same felonious act
or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently the
foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for, to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978,
Revised Edition, pp. 246-247).

Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:

 Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.

Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides, indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage, loss
or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another. The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part
of the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil.
692). Every crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing,
repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265).

Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the
petitioner too is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks were good when she
parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.

In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless
check transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too
recognized the wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the
holder, but also an injury to the public."

Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the
worthless check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense.

Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-
handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the
errant drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.

The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to 40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of
1987). A separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly, burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the
final disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before
the trial court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.

WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of
petitioner Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued
by this court a quo for further proceedings. This decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

CASE DIGEST
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18630 December 17, 1966

APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI SANTOS, respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R) revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No.
Q-4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.

The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted
the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also in
due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of defendant's promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to defendant's
pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in
having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and
social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff
became unable to support herself and her baby; that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered mental anguish,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize
the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral
and exemplary damages, plus P10,000.00 attorney's fees.

Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.

Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action
was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the complaint did state a cause of action for damages,
premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:

ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.

Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking
the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September 30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962;
and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.

We find this appeal meritorious.

In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted
from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to
Article 23 of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:

But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are
countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually suffered material
and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the
following rule:

"ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage."

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of marriage
either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above
eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong
has been committed, and though the girl and her family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any
action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor
who has been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it
connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the
promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43
Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions
 and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual
embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of
intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recover.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords
her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to
the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47
Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material allegations there are as follows:

I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single and
residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;

II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the
defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;

III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and
dates, became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage,
the plaintiff consented and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out
of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with the
plaintiff;

VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;

VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the
plaintiff since about July, 1959 has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his promises.

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction.
Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit,
artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut chart all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his
promises. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint.

Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the
defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are not here involved.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur
 CASE DIGEST
TANJANCO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-18630

Dec. 17, 1966

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Facts:

From December, 1957, petitioner APOLONIO TANJANCO courted the respondent, ARACELI SANTOS, both being of legal age. Tanjanco
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for Santos who eventually reciprocated such feelings. With Tanjanco’s promise of marriage
in mind, Santos acceded to his pleas for carnal knowledge sometime in July, 1958. For one year, Tanjanco had carnal access to Santos which
eventually led to Santos getting pregnant. As a result of her pregnancy, Santos had to resign from her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc. In her
state of unemployment Santos became unable to support herself and her baby, and because Tanjanco did not fulfill his promise of marriage she
suffered mental anguish, a besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social humiliation. Santos prayed to the court that Tanjanco
be compelled to recognize the unborn child she was bearing, and pay her for support and damages.

Tanjanco filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted for failure to state cause of action. Santos appealed the case to the Court of Appeals and
the latter decided the case, stating that no cause of action was shown to compel recognition of the unborn child nor for its support, but a cause of
action was present for damages, under Article 21 of the Civil Code. Tanjanco appealed such decision pleading that actions for breach of a promise
to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction.

Issue:

W/N Tanjanco is compelled to pay for damages to Santos for breach of his promise to marry her.

Held:
No
case can be made since the plaintiff Araceli was a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such is not compatible to the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived
she would not have again yielded to his embraces much less for one year without exacting fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage and she
would have cut all relationship upon finding that the defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises. One cannot be held liable for a breach of promise
to marry.
In its decision, Court of Appeals relied upon the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to support the original
draft of the Civil Code. In the example set forth by the memorandum, Court of Appeals failed to recognize that it refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. Seduction connotes the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the
woman has yielded. That definition of seduction is not consistent with the position of Santos, who was of legal age, and granted carnal access to
Tanjanco and had sexual relations with him for one whole year. Rather than being deceived, Santos exhibited mutual passion to Tanjanco which is
incompatible with the premise behind the idea of seduction.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner appeals for the reversal of the decision 1 of respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on May 17, 1991 in CA-G.R. CV No. 07054, entitled
"Zenaida B. Cirilo vs. Conrado Bunag, Sr. and Conrado Bunag, Jr.," which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XI at
Bacoor, Cavite, and, implicitly, respondent court's resolution of September 3, 1991 2 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Respondent court having assiduously discussed the salient antecedents of this case, vis-a-vis the factual findings of the court below, the evidence of
record and the contentions of the parties, it is appropriate that its findings, which we approve and adopt, be extensively reproduced hereunder:

Based on the evidence on record, the following facts are considered indisputable: On the afternoon of September 8, 1973,
defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse. Later that
evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10,
1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant
Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an
unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a
motel where she was raped. The court a quo, which adopted her evidence, summarized the same which we paraphrased as
follows:

Plaintiff was 26 years old on November 5, 1974 when she testified, single and had finished a college course
in Commerce (t.s.n., p. 4, Nov. 5, 1974). It appears that on September 8, 1973, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, while she was walking along Figueras Street, Pasay City on her way to the San Juan de Dios
Canteen to take her snack, defendant, Conrado Bunag, Jr., came riding in a car driven by a male companion.
Plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. were sweethearts, but two weeks before September 8, 1973, they had a
quarrel, and Bunag, Jr. wanted to talk matters over with plaintiff, so that he invited her to take their merienda
at the Aristocrat Restaurant in Manila instead of at the San Juan de Dios Canteen, to which plaintiff obliged,
as she believed in his sincerity (t.s.n., pp. 8-10, Nov. 5, 1974).

Plaintiff rode in the car and took the front seat beside the driver while Bunag, Jr. seated himself by her right
side. The car travelled north on its way to the Aristocrat Restaurant but upon reaching San Juan Street in
Pasay City, it turned abruptly to the right, to which plaintiff protested, but which the duo ignored and instead
threatened her not to make any noise as they were ready to die and would bump the car against the post if
she persisted. Frightened and silenced, the car travelled its course thru F.B. Harrison Boulevard until they
reached a motel. Plaintiff was then pulled and dragged from the car against her will, and amidst her cries and
pleas. In spite of her struggle she was no match to the joint strength of the two male combatants because of
her natural weakness being a woman and her small stature. Eventually, she was brought inside the hotel
where the defendant Bunag, Jr. deflowered her against her will and consent. She could not fight back and
repel the attack because after Bunag, Jr. had forced her to lie down and embraced her, his companion held
her two feet, removed her panty, after which he left. Bunag, Jr. threatened her that he would ask his
companion to come back and hold her feet if she did not surrender her womanhood to him, thus he
succeeded in feasting on her virginity. Plaintiff described the pains she felt and how blood came out of her
private parts after her vagina was penetrated by the penis of the defendant Bunag, Jr. (t.s.n. pp. 17-24, Nov.
5, 1974).

After that outrage on her virginity, plaintiff asked Bunag, Jr. once more to allow her to go home but the latter
would not consent and stated that he would only let her go after they were married as he intended to marry
her, so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. Thereafter, they took a taxi
together after the car that they used had already gone, and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon,
Bunag, Jr.'s grandmother in Pamplona, Las Piñas, Metro Manila where they arrived at 9:30 o'clock in the
evening (t.s.n., p. 26, Nov. 5, 1974). At about ten (10) o'clock that same evening, defendant Conrado Bunag,
Sr., father of Bunag, Jr. arrived and assured plaintiff that the following day which was a Monday, she and
Bunag, Jr. would go to Bacoor, to apply for a marriage license, which they did. They filed their applications
for marriage license (Exhibits "A" and "C") and after that plaintiff and defendant Bunag, Jr. returned to the
house of Juana de Leon and lived there as husband and wife from September 8, 1973 to September 29,
1973.

On September 29, 1973 defendant Bunag, Jr. left and never returned, humiliating plaintiff and compelled her
to go back to her parents on October 3, 1973. Plaintiff was ashamed when she went home and could not
 sleep and eat because of the deception done against her by defendants-appellants (t.s.n., p. 35, Nov. 5,
1974).

The testimony of plaintiff was corroborated in toto by her uncle, Vivencio Bansagan who declared that on
September 8, 1973 when plaintiff failed to arrive home at 9:00 o'clock in the evening, his sister who is the
mother of plaintiff asked him to look for her but his efforts proved futile, and he told his sister that plaintiff
might have married (baka nag-asawa, t.s.n., pp. 5-6, March 18, 1976). However, in the afternoon of the next
day (Sunday), his sister told him that Francisco Cabrera, accompanied by barrio captain Jacinto Manalili of
Ligas, Bacoor, Cavite, informed her that plaintiff and Bunag, Jr. were in Cabrera's house, so that her sister
requested him to go and see the plaintiff, which he did, and at the house of Mrs. Juana de Leon in Pamplona,
Las Piñas, Metro Manila he met defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr., who told him, "Pare, the children are here
already. Let us settle the matter and have them married."

He conferred with plaintiff who told him that as she had already lost her honor, she would bear her sufferings as Boy Bunag, Jr.
and his father promised they would be married.

Defendants-appellants, on the other hand, deny that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. abducted and raped plaintiff-
appellant on September 8, 1973. On the contrary, plaintiff-appellant and defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. eloped on that date
because of the opposition of the latter's father to their relationship.

Defendant-appellants claim that defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant had earlier made plans to elope and get
married, and this fact was known to their friends, among them, Architect Chito Rodriguez. The couple made good their plans to
elope on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, when defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., accompanied by his friend Guillermo
Ramos, Jr., met plaintiff-appellant and her officemate named Lydia in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The foursome
then proceeded to (the) aforesaid hospital's canteen where they had some snacks. Later, Guillermo Ramos, Jr. took Lydia to
Quirino Avenue where she could get a ride home, thereby leaving the defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant
alone. According to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., after Guillermo Ramos, Jr. and Lydia left, he and plaintiff-appellant took a
taxi to the Golden Gate and Flamingo Hotels where they tried to get a room, but these were full. They finally got a room at the
Holiday Hotel, where defendant-appellant registered using his real name and residence certificate number. Three hours later, the
couple check out of the hotel and proceeded to the house of Juana de Leon at Pamplona, Las Piñas, where they stayed until
September 19, 1873. Defendant-appellant claims that bitter disagreements with the plaintiff-appellant over money and the threats
made to his life prompted him to break off their plan to get married.

During this period, defendant-appellant Bunag, Sr. denied having gone to the house of Juan de Leon and telling plaintiff-
appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. In fact, he phoned Atty. Conrado Adreneda, member of the
board of directors of Mandala Corporation, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.'s employer, three times between the evening of
September 8, 1973 and September 9, 1973 inquiring as to the whereabouts of his son. He came to know about his son's
whereabouts when he was told of the couple's elopement late in the afternoon of September 9, 1973 by his mother Candida
Gawaran. He likewise denied having met relatives and emissaries of plaintiff-appellant and agreeing to her marriage to his son. 3

A complaint for damages for alleged breach of promise to marry was filed by herein private respondent Zenaida B. Cirilo against petitioner Conrado
Bunag, Jr. and his father, Conrado Bunag, Sr., as Civil Case No. N-2028 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIX at Bacoor, Cavite. On August 20,
1983, on a finding, inter alia, that petitioner had forcibly abducted and raped private respondent, the trial court rendered a decision 4 ordering
petitioner Bunag, Jr. to pay private respondent P80,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P20,000.00 by way of temperate
damages, and P10,000.00 for and as attorney's fees, as well as the costs of suit. Defendant Conrado Bunag, Sr. was absolved from any and all
liability.

Private respondent appealed that portion of the lower court's decision disculpating Conrado Bunag, Sr. from civil liability in this case. On the other
hand, the Bunags, as defendants-appellants, assigned in their appeal several errors allegedly committed by trial court, which were summarized by
respondent court as follows: (1) in finding that defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr. forcibly abducted and raped plaintiff-appellant; (2) in finding
that defendants-appellants promised plaintiff-appellant that she would be wed to defendant-appellant Conrado Bunag, Jr.; and (3) in awarding
plaintiff-appellant damages for the breach of defendants-appellants' promise of marriage. 5

As stated at the outset, on May 17, 1991 respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing both appeals and affirming in toto the decision
of the trial court. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner Bunag, Jr. is before us on a petition for review, contending that (1)
respondent court failed to consider vital exhibits, testimonies and incidents for petitioner's defense, resulting in the misapprehensions of facts and
violative of the law on preparation of judgment; and (2) it erred in the application of the proper law and jurisprudence by holding that there was
forcible abduction with rape, not just a simple elopement and an agreement to marry, and in the award of excessive damages. 6

Petitioner Bunag, Jr. first contends that both the trial and appellate courts failed to take into consideration the alleged fact that he and private
respondent had agreed to marry, and that there was no case of forcible abduction with rape, but one of simple elopement and agreement to marry. It
is averred that the agreement to marry has been sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the witnesses for both parties and the exhibits presented in
court.

This submission, therefore, clearly hinges on the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented by the parties and the weight accorded thereto
in the factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. In effect, what petitioner would want this Court to do is to evaluate and analyze
anew the evidence, both testimonial and documentary, presented before and calibrated by the trial court, and as further meticulously reviewed and
discussed by respondent court.

The issue raised primarily and ineluctably involves questions of fact. We are, therefore, once again constrained to stress the well-entrenched
statutory and jurisprudential mandate that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are, as a rule, conclusive upon this Court. Only questions of law,
distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, subject to clearly settled exceptions in
case law.

Our jurisdiction in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings
of fact being conclusive. This Court has emphatically declared that it is not its function to analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed by the lower court. Barring, therefore, a showing that the findings
complained of are totally devoid of support in the record, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute serious abuse of discretion, such
findings must stand, for this Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the
parties. 7 Neither does the instant case reveal any feature falling within, any of the exceptions which under our decisional rules may warrant a review
of the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. On the foregoing considerations and our review of the records, we sustain the holding of respondent
court in favor of private respondent.

Petitioner likewise asserts that since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.

It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.

However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Correlatively,
under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the
countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered material and moral
injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide for in the statutes. 10

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.

Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.

Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12

In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not
in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.

The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a
civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, and the assailed judgment and resolution are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J. and Padilla, J., concur.

Nocon, J., took no part.

 CASE DIGEST

CONRADO BUNAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO, respondents.

G.R. No. 101749

July 10, 1992

REGALADO, J.:

FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel where they had sexual
intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-
appellant Bunag, Jr. and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a
marriage license.
Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with an unidentified male
companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped.

ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.

RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civil law,
apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of
promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents
thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil
Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219, any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral
damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though
they have actually suffered material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent and having carnal knowledge
with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after
cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly constituteacts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and
reprehensible transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages, pursuant to Article 21 in
relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible
abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to
another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation
stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not
in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the
penal action did not carry with it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties. Furthermore, it has long been
emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in
criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt, while in a civil action it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al.
vs. Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted to final judgment before a
civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted and prosecuted to final judgment.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.

Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1 of the respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the
basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

The antecedents of this case are not complicated:

On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a complaint 2 for damages against the
petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges
in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get
married; they therefore agreed to get married after the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the
private respondent's parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the petitioner
forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him; a week before the filing of the complaint,
petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries;
during a confrontation with a representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for
actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The
complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.

In his Answer with Counterclaim,3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in the complaint and denied the rest
of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those
alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private
respondent; he neither sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only told
her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money and passport; and finally, no confrontation
took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a
result thereof, he was unnecessarily dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched
reputation, he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.

After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order4 embodying the stipulated facts which the parties had agreed
upon, to wit:

1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single, Iranian citizen and
resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the present;

2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second year medicine
proper;

3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July, 1986 up to the
present and a (sic) high school graduate;

4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino introduced
the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a decision5 favoring the private
respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:

IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant.

1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
 2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees and two
thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.

3. All other claims are denied.6

The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is
not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false
pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d) because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him,
(e) by reason of that deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions — made some
preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting friends and relatives and
contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused
Philippine hospitality, have offended our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and expose her honor and reputation
to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false.7

The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private respondent in the foregoing decision,
digested by the respondent Court as follows:

According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before, defendant started
courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times and she accepted his love as
well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with her to her hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon,
Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their relationship and their intention to get married. The
photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken
that day. Also on that occasion, defendant told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the
semestral break in October, 1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his
proposal for him to marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the
few days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live together
in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's hands and feet while he
went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her sleep the whole day and night until the
following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort
the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he
could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to
her parents, and thereafter consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her
lawyer, her godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod City, although
the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.

Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry Marilou, he already
looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and chickens, and even already
invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8

Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief,9 he
contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.

On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's ruling of 16 October 1989. In
sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following analysis:

First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does not appear to
be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience with defendant and never
had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and accustomed to trend of modern urban life",
and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her." In fact, we
agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff must have thought because
of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be photographed with defendant in public in
so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs. "D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's
pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted
that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27,
1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic) a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette
on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her
daughter (pp. 55-56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to
go to plaintiff's hometown in Bañaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between them? And this
special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff, communicated not only to her
but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where plaintiff was working and where defendant
first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared
was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn
March 7, 1988).

Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and have so little
respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City for several years where he
finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other
words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not
surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young,
innocent, trustful country girl, in order to satisfy his lust on her. 11

and then concluded:

In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for
and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and
 sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these (sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made
plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of
appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals, good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply
derogatory and insulting to our women, coming as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people
and taking advantage of the opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be
made, under Art. 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused
plaintiff, as the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12

Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single issue of whether or not Article 21 of
the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13

It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court
for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had made a
promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim
Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner
asseverates that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also promised to marry
her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not actionable. 14

On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed his Reply thereto, this Court gave
due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.

As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear that questions of fact, which boil
down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's
findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their
deportment and manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case. 15

Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of substance or values which could
alter the result of the case.

Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It is not
the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however,
recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus, in Medina vs.Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:

xxx xxx xxx

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257
[1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.) (6) When
the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622 [1970];
Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case. Consequently, the factual findings
of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.

And now to the legal issue.

The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New
Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil
Code, from which We quote:

The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely decided in the
case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to
the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of the American states. . . . 19

This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20

As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:

But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that
there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even though they have actually
suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the
proposed Civil Code the following rule:
 Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A promise of
marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws, there is no crime,
as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore,
though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and family have suffered incalculable moral damage,
she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a
right of action.

Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number
of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the statutes. 21

Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done.
Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in Spanish legal treatises
as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law concept. Torts is much broader than culpa
aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment
and deceit. In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil
Code, intentional and malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even postulated that together with Articles
19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and
adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts. 23

In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the
proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and
reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.

In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every single
Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the
private respondent was above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.

Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the woman is a victim of moral
seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,25 this Court denied recovery of damages to the woman because:

. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10)
years younger than the complainant — who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high
school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere
apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because,
"overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the
benefit of clergy.

In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral seduction, recovery was eventually
denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said
case:

The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a
tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or
a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of confidence
on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).

It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —

To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman
must yield because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the
intercourse is from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be
induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which
are calculated to have and do have that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her
person to the sexual embraces of her seducer (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the
injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
 Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and
the defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been
emphasized that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex,
and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur.
662)

xxx xxx xxx

Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a
woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not
have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of
marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not
intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27

In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in a breach of promise
to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:

. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic); Beatriz Galang
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise to marry, and the EFFECT be
the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction, hence recovery of moral damages will
prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . .
.

together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33
Phil. 471).

Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:

It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present article31 in the
Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there was seduction, not necessarily in the legal sense, but in
the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of
authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an
injury which can be the basis for indemnity.

But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must weigh the
degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which would deceive a girl
sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age. But so long as there is a wrongful
act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not punishable under the criminal law and there should
have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that reason.

We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the
Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even
goes as far as stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily because of her own
doing, 33 for:

. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a plain high
school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a luncheonette and
without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need of financial assistance. (TSN,
pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition that may have been offered by the
petitioner. 34

These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable
employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so
circumstances could not have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended
to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his life's partner. His was
nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she
would be able to enjoy a life of ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the
Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and
in the performance of his obligations.

No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.

The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled by the purest of intentions, she
eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not,
therefore, in pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." 35At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.

Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about by the
imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or where his consent to the
 transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36

In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:

Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art. 1412, New Civil
Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is, more or less, equivalent. It
does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f. Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).

We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of
parents to protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

 CASE DIGEST

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.

G.R. No. 97336

February 19, 1993

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner was a medicine student at Lyceum Northwestern Colleges at Dagupan City. He was an Iranian exchange student and was 29 years old.
Respondent was a former waitress on a luncheonette, and was 22 years old. Petitioner was allegedly the lover of the respondent, and was said to
promise marriage to the latter, which convinced her to live with him in his apartment. It was even alleged that the petitioner went to the house of the
respondent to inform her family about the marriage on the end of the semester. However, the marriage did not materialize, with several beatings and
maltreatment experienced by the respondent from the petitioner.

The case was filed in the RTC of Pangasinan, and the decision was held in favor of the respondent. However, the petitioner claimed that the
judgment of the RTC was an error, for the claims of the respondent are not true, and that he did not know about the custom of the Filipinos; his acts
were in accordance of his custom. The decision of the RTC was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal to the
Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent could claim payment for the damages incurred by the petitioner.

RULING:

Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to have a good moral character, and that she had just
let her virginity be taken away by the petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for damages.
Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal
desire, then she could have her claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs and chicken for the
marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the
claims of the respondent against the petitioner.