The Fall of Phuoc Tuy PDF Note 7 2019

1
The Fall of Phuoc Tuy

and Vung Tau
– April 1975
Ernest Chamberlain
2019
2
Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Copyright © Ernest Chamberlain 2019
Email : ernestchris@tpg.com.au ; chamber@pipeline.com.au
This work is copyright. Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of private study,
research, criticism or review as permitted under the Copyright Act, no part may be
reproduced by any process, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any
means, electronic, mechanical photocopying or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the author. Inquiries should be made to the author/publisher.
The author has also written and published the following books:
The Struggle in Iliomar: Resistance in rural East Timor; Editions - 2003, 2004 and 2008
(ISBN 9780980562309).
Perjuangan di Iliomar: Perlawanan di Pedesaan di Timor-Leste, 2004 (ISBN 0-9750350-1-
0). A Bahasa Indonesia version of “The Struggle in Iliomar”.
Faltering Steps – Independence Movements in East Timor in the 1950s and 1960s; 2005
(ISBN 0 97500350 2 9).
Faltering Steps: Independence Movements in East Timor – 1940s to the early 1970s; Editions
– 2007, 2008 and 2010 (ISBN 9780980562330).
Rebellion, Defeat and Exile: The 1959 Uprising in East Timor; Editions - 2007 and 2009
(ISBN 9780980562316).
Forgotten Men: Timorese in Special Operations during World War II, 2010
(ISBN 978-0-9805623-2-3).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, 2011 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-4-7).
The Viet Cong D440 Battalion: Their Story, 2013 (ISBN 978-0-9805623-5-4).
The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their Story, 2014 (ISBN 978-0-9750350-5-4).
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan) 2016 –
(ISBN 978-09805623-4-7).
The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their History, 2017 (ISBN 978-0-9750350-61).
Series of “Research Notes” on the Vietnam War: 2010-2019.
Subjects: Vietnam. Quân đội nhân dân. Vietnam War, 1961-1975, Regimental histories.
Vietnam War – Campaigns: Ho Chi Minh 1975. Vietnam Armed Forces - History.
Every effort has been made by the publisher/author to contact holders of copyright to obtain
permission to reproduce copyright material. However, if any permissions have been
inadvertently overlooked, apologies are offered, and should the rightful party contact the
publisher, all due credit and necessary and reasonable arrangements will be made at the
earliest opportunity.
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CONTENTS
page
Sources 5
Australian Forces Withdraw from Vietnam – and the 6
Communist “Nguyễn Huệ” Offensive of Easter 1972
The Battle of Xuân Lộc 5
The Withdrawal Down Route 2 15
The Defence of Bà Rịa 24
The 3rd NVA (Sao Vang/Yellow Star) Division
in Phước Tuy 27
The Defence of Bà Rịa – ARVN Captains’ Accounts 30
Cỏ May Bridge: Destroyed - and NVA Crossing Attempts 33
The Advance to Vũng Tàu – the 3rd NVA Division Account 36
The Advance to Vũng Tàu –
the Account of the 2nd Regiment/3rd NVA Division 40
Fighting in Vũng Tàu – the 3 NVA Division Advances
rd
40
Departure from Vũng Tàu 42
The “Last Stand” at the Palace Hotel 43
Conclusion 45
The Aftermath 45
The Phước Tuy Diaspora 49
BIBLIOGRAPHY 51
Annexes (A – D445 History 1991/2011, pp.60-63; B - D445 History 2004/2016,

pp.64-69; C - Châu Đức History 2004, pp.70-72; D - Đất Đỏ History 2006, pp.73-74;
E - Bùi Hương, “The Palace Hotel”, p.75; F - 274th, 275th VC Regiments, 33rd NVA
Regiment: April 1975, pp.76-78).
4
NVA T-54/55 tanks in the forecourt of the Phước Tuy Province Headquarters -
late April/early May 1975
A VC D445 Local Force Battalion soldier (left foreground)

firing an RPG-2 (B-40) rocket launcher
5
Ernie Chamberlain
Point Lonsdale VIC 3225
ernestchris@tpg.com.au
Research Note 7/2019
12 July 2019
Australian War Memorial – Canberra.
Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force - Wellington
Australian Army History Unit – Canberra.
ADFA/UNSW – Military Operations Analysis Team – Canberra.
Australian Army Military Intelligence Museum – Canungra.
National Vietnam Veterans’ Museum (NVVM) – Phillip Island.
MACV Advisory Team 89 (veterans)
Lieutenant Colonel (Retd) M.F. Fairhead.
The Fall of Phước Tuy – and Vũng Tàu: April 1975

“At the beginning of 1975 not even the most optimistic persons among us believed that the
war would end in the same year with total victory on our side.” Bùi Tín 1
Sources
The seizure of Phước Tuy Province – and subsequently the Vũng Tàu peninsula and
the City, by communist forces2 in April 1975 has been related in the writings of US,
Vietnamese, and Australian historians. This Note principally examines Vietnamese accounts
– both by officers of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and senior cadre of the
communist forces. Perhaps the most detailed accounts of military actions in Phước Tuy in
1975 are in the Việt Cộng (VC) D445 Battalion histories published in 1991 and 2004 and
extracts from those accounts are included at Annexes A and B – including their post-War
“pursuit” of armed “resistance remnants”. While the 274th and the 275th VC Main Force
Regiments - nor the 33rd NVA Regiment, were involved in the fighting in Phước Tuy and
Vũng Tàu in 1975, the operations of those three regiments in April 1975 are briefly related in
Annex F. Perspectives and accounts of events in April 1975 understandably differ – and
“reconciling” and accommodating these into a coherent narrative is quite challenging.
1
Bùi Tín, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 2002, p.113. Bùi Tín (1927-2018) was a senior journalist for the People’s Army of Vietnam
newspaper. Reportedly wounded at the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ, he was close to the senior Vietnamese
communist leadership during the “American War”. Disillusioned, he left Vietnam in 1990 and lived in Paris.
2
The official title of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) is the People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN), and the
“Việt Cộng” armed forces were termed by the communists as the – the People’s Liberation Armed Forces
(PLAF). “Việt Cộng” (VC) - ie meaning “Vietnamese Communist”, was a South Vietnamese Government
appellation. Author G.J. Veith notes that in January 1961, the Central Military Affairs Committee in Hanoi
“clearly established that the ‘Liberation Army of South Vietnam is a component of the People’s Army of
Vietnam, established, built, educated, and led by the Party.’ … The Southern-based Communist forces either
were forward-deployed elements of the People’s Army, or locally raised units … .” Veith, G.J., Black April,
Encounter Books, New York, 2012, pp.13-14 – citing “PAVN: The First 55 Years, Hanoi, 1999, p.195. In this
Note, the more commonly-used expressions familiar to Australian veterans are used - ie NVA and VC.
6
The concluding two chapters of the 2012 Australian Army Official History of the
Vietnam War3 – ie “The Last Act …” and “Assessment and Aftermath”, are particularly
recommended as English-language sources on the final year of the War. A number of reports
and bulletins – principally by USMACV’s Combined Document Exploitation Center
(CDEC), have been sourced on-line through The Vietnam Center and Archive (VCAT),
Texas Tech University, Lubbock – Texas, USA (cited as VCAT Item No. …).
NVA/VC T-54 tanks outside the Phước Tuy Province offices – late April 1975
(flying the National Liberation Forces flag) - D440 History (2013), p.112.
Australian Forces Withdraw from Vietnam –

and the Communist “Nguyễn Huệ” Offensive of Easter 1972
When the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) withdrew from Phước Tuy Province on 7
November 19714, all enemy units – and the Việt Cộng Infrastructure (VCI)5, had been
significantly weakened. Indeed, the strength of the Việt Cộng’s D440 Battalion was only
about 190, and the Provincial Mobile Battalion - D445, was assessed at about 135-strong –
and neither had operated as a battalion for quite some time. About 40 AATTV training
personnel remained in Phước Tuy Province – ie at the Jungle Warfare Training Centre
(within the ARVN Vạn Kiếp base on the eastern outskirts of Bà Rịa Town) and training
3
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, Australian War Memorial/Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest,
2012.
4
Subsequently, on 18 December 1972 the HQ Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam (AAAGV) and
remaining AATTV personnel departed Vietnam.
5
The Việt Cộng Infrastructure (VCI) – hạ tầng cơ sở, was the covert political and administrative organisation
that led the resistance movement – ie distinct from armed units. It included government, Party and Front
members – as well as lower-level functionaries. The VCI provided military elements with funds, food, recruits,
intelligence, refuge and guides. Politically, it prepared for an eventual assumption of power with an organisation
to replace the government of the Republic of Vietnam.
7
FANK (ie Khmer Army) battalions at the Phước Tuy and Long Hải Training Centres.6 In his
March 1972 monthly report, an AATTV advisor noted: “Intelligence reports indicate the
rapid run-down of the FWMAF 7 elements is providing a condition in which GVN forces are
unable to successfully counter the re-establishment and strengthening of VCI and base areas
throughout the Province. The overall impression is that overt enemy action is being limited
until such time as VCI and base camp re-establishment has been successfully completed.”8
On 30 March 1972, the communist forces launched their Easter “Nguyễn Huệ” Offensive
country-wide - beginning with attacks across the Demilitarized Zone into Military Region 1
by three NVA divisions with armour and artillery support.9
In Phước Tuy Province, “Communist main force units, reinforced by local Việt Cộng,
attempted to seize district capitals and block major highways while launching determined
attacks against Regional Force (RF)10 outposts and military installations around the province
capital Bà Rịa.” The 33rd NVA Regiment attacked outposts on Route 2 and the Đức Thạnh
Sub-Sector.11 “The main thrust was by the 4th ((274th)) Regiment in Đất Đỏ. The secondary
thrust was by the 33rd Regiment with the task of surrounding the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector. and
- attacking the enemy post at Cẩm Mỹ, liberating Route 2 from Cẩm Mỹ down to Bình Ba.
COSVN12 Headquarters’ intention was to task the 33rd Regiment to attack Bình Giã hamlet
[sic] and to liberate the strategic hamlet.”13 On 20 May, D445 Battalion and a battalion of the
274th VC Regiment attacked the Đất Đỏ District Headquarters and surrounding outposts,
6
In Saigon, HQ AAAGV (commanded by Brigadier I.A. Geddes) replaced HQ AFV on 5 March 1972.
7
“Allied” forces comprised US and Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF). In mid-1969, US forces
reportedly numbered 538,933 (111 infantry battalions). FMWAF reportedly comprised: Australia – 7,649 (three
infantry battalions); New Zealand – 556 personnel (an artillery battery), Republic of Korea - 50,289 (22
battalions); Thailand – 11,596 (six battalions); Philippines – 1,506; Republic of China – 31 personnel; Spain –
12 medical personnel. The Republic of Vietnam ARVN/Marines totalled 168 battalions. COMUSMACV,
Quarterly Evaluation Report (Second Quarter 1969: 1 April 1969 – 30 June 1969), MACJ3-051, Saigon, 20
August 1969. Annex E. http://www.458seatiger.info/vietnam1969_report.PDF . For FWMAF, see also: Larsen,
S.R. Lieutenant General & Collins J.L. Brigadier, Allied Participation in Vietnam, Vietnam Studies –
Department of the Army, Washington, 1975.
8
Carter, G.D. Major, RF/PF Advisor, Annex D to AATTV Monthly Report - March 1972, 21 April 1972.
9
MACV, The Nguyen Hue Offensive – MACVDI Study 73-01, 12 January 1973, VCAT Item No.
24991801005.
10
Vietnamese communist texts use the “out-dated” term “Bảo An” for Regional Forces (RF ie: “Địa Phương
Quân”). The Saigon Government forces included “Territorial Forces” – comprising Regional Forces and
Popular Forces (PF ie “Nghĩa Quân”). Additionally, at the village/hamlet level, the People’s Self-Defence Force
(PSDF- Nhân Dân Tự Vệ - and termed Phòng Vệ Dân Sự by the communist side) was established in July 1968.
11 NVA/VC operations in Phước Tuy Province in April 1972 are related in some detail in Ekins, A. with
McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.647-649. “The wide-spread attacks signalled the return of 33
NVA Regiment, 274 VC Regiment and D445 Battalion, all formerly held at bay by the Australian task force
before it departed four months earlier, leaving the province nominally ‘pacified’.” – p.647. According to US
MACV: “On 20 May, one-third of the town of Đất Đỏ in southern Phước Tuy Province was lost to the 33d NVA
Regiment. Xuyên Mộc and Đức Thạnh remained in friendly hands, but were isolated and had to be supplied by
air. The Province Chief was replaced on 21 May. On the 22d, in a contact east of Đất Đỏ an ARVN battalion
killed 31 enemy possibly from the 33d Regiment, with no friendly casualties.” MACV, 1972-1973 Command
History Volume I, p.59. 1972 – ADA995103.
12
The Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN – Văn Phòng Trung Ương Cục Miền Nam) - directed from Hà
Nội and located in the Cambodia/South Vietnam border area north-west of Saigon, was the communist political
and military headquarters responsible for South Vietnam south of the Central and Southern Highlands - an area
termed “Nam Bộ”. Within South Vietnam, COSVN did not command the Trị-Thiện-Huế (TTH) Military
Region, Military Region 5, nor the Central Highlands B3 Front – all commanded directly from Hà Nội.
13
Chamberlain, E.P., The 33rd Regiment – North Vietnamese Army: Their History (1965 – 1989), 2017, p.67.
8
isolating the defending territorial units.14 However, by the end of June 1972, government
control was gradually restored. The Official Australian History notes that: “Since the
departure of the Australian Task Force in late 1971, the influence of the Việt Cộng in Phước
Tuy province had grown ‘extremely strong’ … as numerous RF troops with relatives among
the local Việt Cộng or family who were sympathisers bowed to pressure to avoid combat or
to reach an accommodation with the enemy.”15
A report on the communists’ Easter 1972 Offensive to the US Senate in Washington
included: “Elsewhere in Military Region 3, the only other action of any size had been in
Phước Tuy Province, southeast of Saigon on the coast, where at one time or another the
enemy had held or had under attack four district towns. These actions occurred almost
immediately following the withdrawal of the Australian troops which had been in the
province for many months [sic]. The South Vietnamese Government had been sensitive about
enemy successes in Phước Tuy Province because it is so close to Saigon and because it is the
site of the Vũng Tàu beach resort which is a popular place for government officials to pass
Sundays and weekends. Following the attacks in Phước Tuy, the province chief, long reputed
to be more aggressive in commerce than in military matters was removed, and units of the
18th ((ARVN)) Division, whose normal mission has been protecting the approaches to
Saigon, were sent to bolster the local defences.”16
In early December 1972, the newly-elected Australian Labor government ordered the
termination of the remaining Australian military presence in South Vietnam.17 On 18
December, the Australian Army Assistance Group (AAAGV) and the remaining Australian
Army Training Team (AATTV) personnel in Phước Tuy departed Vietnam.18
The Paris Peace Agreement of 27 January 1973 required a ceasefire and the
withdrawal of US troops within 60 days. The withdrawal of NVA troops was not required by
the Agreement, but no further “infiltration” of NVA forces was permitted. However, in 1973-
74, the flow of men and materiel from the North increased, and communist forces within the
Province threatened district towns.19 Without the threat of US air attacks, large NVA truck
convoys travelled down the Hồ Chí Minh Trail in daylight – and a 1,700-kilometre petroleum
pipeline with 101 pumping stations paralleled the troop movement corridors.20
14
The D445 History relates D445 - having been “reconcentrated” in May 1972, attacking Đất Đỏ on 19 May
1972 – together with the 2nd Battalion of the 274th Regiment. The D445 History also noted that - for their
“combat success, the Battalion was awarded the Military Feats Medal 2 nd Class (Huân chương Chiến công hạng
hai). Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion – Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), 2016,
pp.149-152.
15
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.650 - citing the US Phước Tuy Province
Senior Advisor, Raymond L. Perkins.
16
Vietnam – May 1972, Staff Report – Committee on Foreign Relations – US Senate, 29 June 1972, VCAT
Item No. 2390704002 and 2390704003.
17
In late February 1973, Prime Minister Whitlam announced that Australia had established diplomatic relations
with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Hanoi – while retaining diplomatic relations with the Saigon
Government. - Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.657.
18
On 11 January 1973, the Australian Governor-General - Sir Paul Hasluck, formally declared the cessation of
hostilities in Vietnam by Australian forces.
19
The author (Chamberlain) served as the Vietnam desk officer in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) in
Canberra from late 1972 to April 1975 – visiting Vietnam in August 1974 to observe the military situation and
status of the “cease fire”.
20
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., p.69, p.362. A Chinese eight-inch diameter pipeline was added to the Soviet
4-inch pipeline system and extended deep into South Vietnam. Infiltrating troops now moved from the North by
vehicle in a few weeks. In April 1974, one group was noted as travelling entirely by vehicle from Vịnh in North
Vietnam to the Lộc Ninh area north of Saigon in only 18 days. VCAT Item No. 1337011200. In comparison, the
D440 Battalion History notes that: “After travelling for a full five months without a break ((from February
9
The 275th VC Main Force Regiment had deployed into Cambodia in April 1970 and
“reconfigured” to create new formations. However, the 274th VC Main Force Regiment –
together with the 33rd NVA Regiment, continued to operate in Biên Hòa, Long Khánh, Bình
Tuy, and Phước Tuy Provinces.
On 9 January 1975, the Politburo in Hanoi decided to launch a major operation in the
Central Highlands in early 1975 – prior to a final offensive to take the South in 1976. The
communists’ “2/75 Campaign” in the Central Highlands began on 4 March 1975, and Ban
Mê Thuột Town was seized on 11 March.21 On 25 March 1975, the North Vietnamese
“Politburo decided to conquer Saigon in May, before the onset of the rainy season.”22 NVA
formations in North Vietnam moved south to join the campaign. Huế fell to NVA forces on
25 March 1975, and Đà Nẵng - South Vietnam’s second-largest city, fell on 29 March 1975,
and the communist forces swiftly advanced farther south. The communists had “amassed a
total of 15 NVA infantry divisions – supported by a sapper division, an artillery division,
armour brigades23, and anti-aircraft units. This massive force of 270,000 combat troops was
organised into five army corps – each comprising three divisions and support formations.”24
The Battle of Xuân Lộc
In Military Region 3, Xuân Lộc Town – the capital of Long Khánh Province, was an
important strategic position, situated at the intersection of Routes 1 and 20. The Town -
defended by the 18th ARVN Infantry Division, was the gateway westwards to Saigon for
communist forces advancing from the Central Highlands and down the coast from Central
Vietnam. Beginning in mid-March 1975, elements of the 4th NVA Corps gradually attacked
and occupied positions around Xuân Lộc Town. The defending ARVN formation at Xuân
Lộc was the 18th Infantry Division (commanded by Brigadier-General Lê Minh Đảo)
comprising: the 43rd Task Force, 52nd Task Force, and the 58th Task Force – each based on an
infantry regiment.
The 12-day Battle of Xuân Lộc began on 9th April with the 6th NVA Division crossing
Route 2 south of Xuân Lộc and attacking ARVN positions on Route 1 west of the Town.
Three NVA divisions were involved in the Battle: the 6th, the 7th and the 341st.
On 12 April, the 1st Airborne Brigade (commanded by Colonel Nguyễn Văn Ðỉnh) –
deployed by Chinook helicopters, and replaced the 48th Task Force that was then redeployed
to the Tân Phong-Long Giao area on Route 2 south of Xuân Lộc. With considerable air and
artillery support, the 18th ARVN Division and the Airborne Brigade thwarted the attacks by
the formations of the 4th NVA Corps commanded by General Hoàng Cầm (the nom-de-guerre
of Đỗ Văn Cầm). Vietnamese air support included “C-130 gunships firing 20-mm shells”,
and the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) “used C-130s in a bomber role with stacks of 750-
1967)), the unit ((as infiltration “Group 211”)) was finally able to reach the Province of Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu.”
Chamberlain, E.P. The Viet Cong D440 Battalion – Their Story, 2013, p.24.
21
For detail, on the development of the plan, the Politburo meeting, and Lê Duẩn’s speech summarizing the
Politburo’s thinking, see Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.85-89. See also Ekins, A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.668-671.
22
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.142-170.
23
The NVA had two armoured brigades (lữ đoàn): the 202nd and the 203rd, equipped with T-34/85, T-54/55, T-
59 (PRC) tanks, the PT-76 light amphibious tank (K63-85), the BRDM scout car, BTR-series APCs, and K-63
(PRC) armoured personnel carriers – as well as self-propelled air defence vehicles.
24
Ekins, A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, p.671 and p.1062 (Endnote 70) – plus
“180,000 rear service and support troops.”
10
pound bombs strapped onto wooden pallets and rolled out the rear cargo hatches.”25 The
VNAF also used recently-supplied US CBU-5526 “Daisy Cutters” bombs on “high-priority”
targets. On 14 April the first Daisy Cutter was dropped seven miles northeast of Xuân Lộc on
the suspected location of the 4th Corps Headquarters. Seventy-five percent of the headquarters
was reportedly destroyed.27
Brigadier-General Lê Minh Đảo (Commander 18th ARVN Infantry Division) –

is seated at the “lower right”.
The Conduct of the Battle of Xuân Lộc 28
25
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, p.450.
26
Some RVNAF reporting indicates the weapon was the “BLU-82 – Daisy Cutter”. Nguyễn Hữu Chế - Major
(CO 2/43.18th Inf Div), Trận Chiến Cuối Cung - Tuyến Thép Xuân Lộc (The Last Battle – the Steel Line at
Xuân Lộc, 7 October 2015.
27
Ibid, p.454. In a post-war memoir, Major General Lê Minh Đảo related that a 20-man SIGINT team from
RVNAF Joint General Staff Headquarters’ “7th Branch” was deployed to Xuân Lộc and successfully intercepted
NVA 4 Corps communications – including noting “75% of the ((4 Corps)) Headquarters had been wiped out.” -
Phạm Phong Dinh, THIẾU TƯỚNG LÊ MINH ĐẢO VÀ SƯ ĐOÀN 18 BỘ BINH: CUỘC CHIẾN ĐẤU
CUỐI CÙNG Ở XUÂN LỘC, Gia Đình Sư Đoàn 18 Bộ Binh. Trận Chiến Xuân Lộc. Six Parts. For “Phòng
7/7th Branch”, see also: Nguyễn Hữu Chế, Giở Những Tờ Lịch Cũ 1975: Tuyến Thép Xuân Lộc, 4 May 2016.
28
Xuan Loc: The Meatgrinder Battle of the Vietnam War, 1975 – 2011 - https://www.quora.com/What-was-the-
moral-e-like-for-the-ARVN-troops-during-the-Battle-of-Xuan-Loc-in-April-1975 . Diễn Biến Trận Đánh Xuân
Lộc - 15 min 40 sec. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oCfTv5y9qAY
11
An ARVN account – by Colonel Hứa Yến Lến,29 (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN
Infantry Division), related the fighting:
“After 12 days and nights of ferocious combat against the North Vietnamese
Communists, the steel defensive line at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh) still held firm. The forces of
the North Vietnamese 4th Corps engaged in the battle had suffered heavy losses in men,
armor, artillery, etc. For this reason, the Headquarters of the Hồ Chí Minh Campaign hastily
changed their plan for the attack on Saigon. Their 3rd Corps ((NVA)) in Tây Ninh and 2nd
Corps ((NVA)) at the Nước Trong base would be used to make the ‘major effort’ to attack
and capture Saigon. 4th ((NVA)) Corps would abandon its efforts against Xuân Lộc 30 and
would become a ‘reserve force’. For this reason, Xuân Lộc was no longer a ‘hot point’, and
the Headquarters of ARVN 3rd Corps/Military Region 3 ordered the 18th ARVN Infantry
Division and all units participating in the Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh) battle to move to Biên Hòa
on 20 April 1975 to establish a new line defending the outer approaches to Saigon. The
movement back to Biên Hòa to assume the new mission was carried out during the night of
20 April 1975. … In Phase I - Units would move from Xuân Lộc to the Đức Thành assembly
area in Phước Tuy (Bà Rịa) Province. In Phase 2 - The entire 18th ARVN Infantry Division
would move by truck to Long Bình (the Division's rear support base) to be re-equipped and to
receive reinforcements.”
An NVA T-54 tank destroyed by ARVN forces at Xuân Lộc

– but mistakenly captioned in a communist history as: “The Victory on Route 2” 31
At the NVA 4 Corps Headquarters on 13 April, General Trần Văn Tra – the deputy
commander of the Hồ Chí Minh Campaign under General Văn Tiến Dũng, came from his
Lộc Ninh headquarters and directed that: “it was no longer to our advantage to attack Xuân
Lộc … no longer a key ((ARVN)) strong point as it lay outside the defensive line … we
29
Hứa Yến Lến, Colonel (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN Division), The Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh) -
12 Days and Nights of Ferocious Combat (8-20 April 1975), Seattle, 5 February 1988, VCAT Item No.
3670101001.
30
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, p.451. See also: Văn Tiến Dũng – Senior General, Đại Thắng Mùa
Xuân (Great Spring Victory), Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Army Publishing House), Hà
Nội, 1977, p.205.
31
ARVN soldiers are standing atop a destroyed NVA T-54 tank at Xuân Lộc – the writing on the tank reads:
“18th Division LK ((Long Khánh)) 11 April ((1975)). Further detail on the tank’s glacis plate identifies the
victorious ARVN armoured sub-unit. However, this photograph also appears in the VC Châu Đức District
History (2014), but incorrectly titled as NVA/VC troops celebrating the destruction of an ARVN tank “on Route
2”. - Lê Minh Đức and Hồ Song Quỳnh (ed), Lịch Sử Lực Lượng Vũ Trang Huyện Châu Đức, op.cit., 2014,
p.184+. This photograph is also on the cover of Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012 – noting that the
photograph was given to G.J. Veith post-War by the ARVN commander at Xuân Lộc, Brigadier General Lê
Minh Đảo.
12
would withdraw from Xuân Lộc.” “Tra realized that as long as the 18th had effective air
support, his troops would have an extremely difficult time taking the ruined city. … The
North Vietnamese began pulling back from the city outskirts on the night of 12 April.
((Brigadier-General)) Đảo quickly pushed forward and reoccupied the previously taken
outlying areas.”32
A major post-War communist history summarizes: “The battle in Xuân Lộc raged.
Although we captured targets, killed troops, and held major posts, our units were badly hurt
after three days of fighting. To devalue the position of Xuân Lộc, Operation Command
planned to cut its links with Biên Hòa by attacking Dầu Giây Fork and Tân Phong. The
Command suspended its attack on Xuân Lộc.33 On 13 April, our divisions left only a
battalion to contain the enemy, withdrawing the rest to consolidate.”34
An NVA T-54 tank destroyed by ARVN forces at Xuân Lộc (see footnote 31)
32
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, p.451. See also: Văn Tiến Dũng – Senior General, Đại Thắng Mùa
Xuân (Great Spring Victory), op.cit., 1977, p.205.
33
A 2012 major communist history – in English, recounts: “The General Chief-of-Staff’s Office and the
command of the Sài Gòn liberation campaign deemed it necessary to change the way of fighting. Trần Văn Tra
from Lộc Ninh came to Army Corps 4 to take direct charge of the implementation of the new way of combat.
During the night of April 20th, in the face of the threat of annihilation, the whole enemy forces in Xuân Lộc fled
in the direction toward Bà Rịa. … The liberation of Xuân Lộc marked the opening of the last door on the way to
Sài Gòn-Gia Định. On April 21st, the forces of Army Corps 2 advanced through Xuân Lộc Town. Trần Đoàn
Lâm, The 30 Year War, Memoirs of War, Thế Giới Publishers, Hà Nội, 2012, pp.711-712.
34
Phạm Vĩnh Phúc (ed – et al), Operations in the US Resistance War, Memoirs of War, Thế Giới Publishers, Hà
Nội, 2009, p.187.
13
According to ARVN Colonel Lến, during the 12-day battle at Xuân Lộc, “ARVN
losses were 30% for all units participating in the battle, except for the 52nd Task Force which
suffered 60% losses; North Vietnamese casualties were reportedly: 5,000-6,000 killed or
wounded, and 37 armored vehicles destroyed.”35
In 2004, a major communist history36 summarized casualties and losses at the Battle
of Xuân Lộc: “After 12 days of combat, the 4th ((NVA)) Corps and the armed forces of
Military Region 7 had wiped out 1,056 enemy, captured 2,785, seized 48 vehicles, 1,499
weapons of various types, and destroyed 42 tanks and armoured vehicles. … In our victory at
Xuân Lộc, our 4th Corps lost 460 comrades killed, and 1,530 wounded.”
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History relates the detail of Province forces in support
of the attack on Xuân Lộc - and their subsequent engagements within Phước Tuy Province,
the fighting in Bà Rịa Town, and also describes the seizure of Vũng Tàu in detail.37 In the
period “9-21 April 1975”, the Province’s forces participating in the Xuân Lộc Campaign
included: “D445, D440, K8 – Xuân Lộc, C204 - Cao Su, and C34 - Châu Đức.” That account
begins with noting: “On 13 April 1975, Comrade Lệ Minh Nguyện – the Deputy Secretary of
the Province Party Committee briefed key Bà Rịa Province cadre at the Suối Châu Pha
stream on COSVN plans to liberate the Province and Bà Rịa Town.” This account relates
preparations for an “uprising” in the Town – to be led by cadre in the Town’s “14 hamlets”,
and the preparation by the Công Khanh “sewing factory” of National Liberation Front (NLF)
flags. On 20 April, Lệ Minh Nguyện directed that “the districts ((forces)) would liberate the
districts and the villages would liberate the villages.”
A chapter in that major 2004 communist history compendium noted above relates
engagements by the Việt Cộng D445 Provincial Mobile Battalion during the Xuân Lộc
battle.38 Engagements by D445 reportedly began:
“From the very beginning of the year ((1975)), 445 Battalion attacked and wiped out
the post at Bờ Đập (Hội Mỹ); and seized the Phước Hải post taking control of the hamlets of
Hải Lạc and Hải Trung. In fear of our Battalion’s attacks, the enemy abandoned many
outposts along Route 23 and Route 52. During the preparations for attacks on Xuân Lộc - to
increase the strength of forces in the Military Region’s key areas – and also of COSVN,
Province deployed 445 Battalion from the Long Đất area to the front south of Xuân Lộc. …
In coordination with the total Military Region campaign - only a few days after being
35
Hứa Yến Lến, Colonel (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN Division), The Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh) -
12 Days and Nights of Ferocious Combat (8-20 April 1975), Seattle, 5 February 1988, VCAT Item No.
3670101001. These figures are also cited in Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr. in his book: Historical Atlas of the
Vietnam War, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1995.
36
Lê Hoàng Quân, Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc – Long Khánh Trong Cuộc Tổng Tiến Công và Nổi Dậy Mùa Xuân
1975 (The Xuân Lộc – Long Khánh Victory in the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising), Nhà Xuất Bản Tổng
Hợp, Đồng Nai, 2004. 437 pages – comprising chapters by 77 senior NVA cadre and historians.
37
Trần Văn Khánh (et al/đtg), Ban Chấp Hành Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (Executive Committee of the Bà
Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party), Lịch sử Đảng bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu 1930 - 1975 (The History of the Party in Bà Rịa-
Vũng Tàu Province 1930-1975), Nhà Xuất bản Chính trị Quốc gia (National Political Publishing House), Vol II,
Chapter IX, Hà Nội, 2000.
38
Xuân Thanh, Tiểu đoàn 445 Trong Tiến Công Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh (445 Battalion in the Attack on Xuân
Lộc-Long Khánh, pp.129-131 in Lê Hoàng Quân, Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc – Long Khánh Trong Cuộc Tổng Tiến
Công và Nổi Dậy Mùa Xuân 1975 (The Xuân Lộc – Long Khánh Victory in the 1975 Spring Offensive and
Uprising), op.cit., 2004 – see the preceding footnote 36.
14
deployed, 445 Battalion began a series of attacks along Route 239 liberating the hamlets of
Bảo Bình 1 and 2, and wiping out the enemy at Lò Than Mountain – then deploying to Route
1 to liberate Bảo Hòa hamlet and inflicting a heavy defeat on two Regional Force battalions
at Bình Phú and Bảo Toàn and cutting Route 1 for a distance of two kilometres thus isolating
Xuân Lộc Town. … 445 Battalion – together with K8 Xuân Lộc, the 34th Company, the 41st
Company (Châu Đức)40, and the 207th Company (Cao Su District) formed a force equivalent
to a provincial regiment – and led by Phạm Văn Còn (deputy chief-of-staff of the Province
Unit) attacked and liberated Xuân Lộc from the south. 445’s principal task was responsibility
for restricting access on Route 1 and Route 2 three kilometres from Xuân Lộc Town, and
blocking enemy approaches from Suối Cát (Route 1) and Suối Râm (Route 2) – preventing
their reinforcement of Xuân Lộc. … In the south, 445 inflicted heavy casualties on two
enemy battalions (the 3rd Battalion of the 18th Division and the 234th Regional Forces
Battalion) on the road from Suối Cát … After four days of attacks at Xuân Lộc, in the south
445 continued to hold the hamlets of Bảo Hòa and Bảo Toàn, while still attacking Bảo Thọ,
Bảo Liệt, and the Gia Lưu bridge. In these engagements, we captured 117 enemy, and seized
43 radio sets. … On the afternoon of 19 April, there was heavy rain – and the water flowed
like water-falls. … At the Headquarters, Comrade Phạm Văn Còn had a rushed meeting with
our D445 cadre and planned to block any retreating enemy. On the night of 19 April 1975,
our 2nd Company was ordered to deploy from Bảo Bình back to the “Letter S” area on Route
2. The 3rd Company and the 1st Company moved from Bảo Hòa on Route 1 to Con Rắn
Mountain (Cẩm Mỹ - on Route 2) … the cadre and soldiers of 445 ran for tens of kilometres
in order arrive in time to block the enemy and engage them. … In the morning of 20 April,
the 2nd Company arrived at the “Letter S” and “Letter C” areas (Route 2 – in the area of the
Hoàng Quân plantation). That very afternoon, we attacked and destroyed two Regional Force
posts. … Our 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies reached Cẩm Mỹ, and the 1st Company attacked and
dispersed an enemy platoon on Con Rắn Mountain. At the Cẩm Mỹ T-junction, the 3rd
Company wiped out 83 enemy and seized two 105mm artillery pieces. Our Battalion
Headquarters consolidated on Con Rắn Mountain. … On the afternoon of 20 April, 445
Battalion and a number of local district companies had completed our deployments and were
located in the area from the Hoàng Quân plantation to the Quang Minh plantation. Just as we
had guessed, at about 2200hrs more than 220 enemy mechanized vehicles began to leave
Xuân Lộc Town and move south down Route 2 to Bà Rịa.
39
The D445 Battalion’s 2004 History notes that in the period 18-25 March 1975, D445 Battalion “attacked and
wiped out a Regional Force company located in the post in the Ông Quế rubber plantation (about 10 [sic]
kilometres west of the 12 kilometre-mark on Route 2). However, as our encirclement was not tight enough …
we pursued them … were not able to inflict heavy casualties on them. Ông Quế village ((vic YS 370980))
became the first village to have been liberated in the 1975 Spring Campaign on the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh
battlefield.” Chamberlain, E. P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point
Lonsdale, 2016, p.173.
40
Châu Đức District’s 41st Company had been “re-established on 6 April 1975” – see footnote 61.
15
“Tanks of NVA 4th Corps advancing to liberate the Long Khánh Province capital
on the morning of 21-4-1975”41
The Battle of Xuân Lộc: A Post-War Communist Accounting

In August 1976, an article in a major Vietnamese communist magazine: related:
“The army and people of Xuân Lộc helped the main force troops destroy and rout an
important force of the enemy, a force comprised of one infantry division, one paratroop
brigade, four ranger battalions, one armored regiment, and nine security battalions, destroyed
or confiscated 366 military vehicles of all types, including 55 tanks, shot down 14 aircraft,
captured 3,795 weapons of all types, including 35 artillery pieces, and so forth; …”.42
The Withdrawal Down Route 2
Lieutenant General Nguyễn Văn Toàn – the commander of III Corps/Military Region
3, flew in to see Brigadier-General Lê Minh Đảo on the morning of 20 April. “His orders
were blunt: retreat immediately. Toàn needed Đảo’s forces for the coming battle for Saigon.
Once they had retreated, they would be moved by truck to Long Bình to re-equip and receive
reinforcements. Đảo and Toàn decided that the 18th would escape along Route 2, the dirt [sic]
road leading south out of Xuân Lộc that had been attacked a month earlier by the 6th ((NVA))
Division.”43 Route 2 from Xuân Lộc Town south to Bà Rịa Town was 40 kilometres.
41
Đăng Tùng, “Mở ‘cánh cửa thép’, tiến công giải phóng Sài Gòn” (“Opening the ‘steel gate’ – attacking
to liberate Saigon”), Voice of Đồng Nai, 19 April 2019.
42
Sau Nguyen, “Xuân Lộc is Overcoming its Difficulties to Move Forward’, Học Tập magazine, No. 248,
pp.58-61, Hà Nội, August 1976. VCAT Item No. 2322108022.
43
16
Route 2 – in “bold”, runs north-south through the centre of Phước Tuy Province
Post-war, a former 18th ARVN Infantry Division veteran - Hồ Đinh, recounted 44: “At
10am on 20 April 1975, the order was issued to abandon Long Khánh by Headquarters 18th
ARVN Division. All forces were to withdraw down Route 2 via Tân Phong and Long Giao to
Phước Tuy in three groups - the 18th Infantry Division; Long Khánh Sector and the Regional
Forces; and the Airborne Brigade with its 3rd Artillery Battalion. Many kilometres of Route 2
from Tân Phong to Đức Thành, Long Lễ and Bà Rịa were not settled – and it was an unusual
operation for a force with confused groupings of civilians. Consequently, during the night of
the withdrawal on 20 April, Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc – the Long Khánh Sector commander,
and Lieutenant Colonel Lê Quang Định – his deputy, were killed by B-40s in an attack on
their column.45 The 1st Airborne Brigade was the last to withdraw – and only its 3rd Artillery
Battalion and Reconnaissance Company moved on the Route, with its combat battalion
opening the way through the flanking jungle. At 0400hrs on 21 April – at Suối Cá hamlet
near the Long Khánh - Phước Tuy border, the 3rd Airborne Battalion was ambushed by two
44
Hồ Đinh, 1st Battalion/43rd Regiment – 18th ARVN Division, Mặt Trận Xuân Lộc (The Xuân Lộc Front),
http://nguyentin.tripod.com/xuanloc-u.htm . See also Hồ Đinh’s account “Sư Đoàn 18 và Những Ngày Tử Chiến
Tại Xuân Lộc” (The 18th Division – its deadly days in Xuân Lộc), March 2005.
http://motgoctroi.com/StLichsu/LSCandai/VNCH/QLVNCH/SD18.htm ; or: http://hon-
viet.co.uk/HoDinh_SuDoan18TuChienTaiXuanLoc.htm
45
Colonel Phúc was not killed – see footnotes 62, 68, 73, 153, 160 and 168. According to the 1991 D445
History: “The fate of Colonel (Ranger) Phạm Văn Phúc – the Province Chief of Long Khánh, was also decided
immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed.” - Chamberlain, E.P., … D445: Their Story, op.cit.,
2011, p.95. Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc’s capture and subsequent movements – and that of several other senior
officers, was described in a 2006 article: Vũ Ánh, “Những tin tức cuối cùng về Đại Tá Phạm Văn Phúc”, Hưng
Việt, 22 September 2006. The capture of Colonel Phúc – including a photograph, is related in an article that also
includes detail on the fighting on Route 2. - Danh Trường, “Bắt Sống Tỉnh Trưởng Long Khánh – 1975” (“Long
Khánh Province Chief captured alive - 1975”), Đồng Nai, 19 April 2010; and also related in Mai Thanh Xuân,
“Bắt Đại Tá …”, op.cit., 2004. Following several years of post-War “re-education”, Colonel Phúc immigrated to
the US in about 2002 – and reportedly returned to Vietnam in 2006.
17
NVA battalions. In the communist human wave attacks, all the soldiers of C Artillery Battery
and the Reconnaissance Platoon were casualties. The leading element – the 9th Airborne
Battalion also engaged in fierce fighting with the communists in the Gia Ray Valley ((vic YS
6311)) at the foot of Cam Tiên Mountain. Apart from the casualties noted above, the
withdrawal down Route 2 was completed and regarded as quite satisfactory. The 18th Infantry
Division was subsequently ordered to defend a line to the east of the Saigon capital from
Long Bình to the armament depot at Tuy Hạ - together with the Thủ Đức Infantry School and
the Armored School. The Airborne Brigade was given responsibility for Route 15 from Long
Thành to Bà Rịa.”
The account by ARVN Colonel Hứa Yến Lến (Chief of Staff – 18th ARVN Infantry
Division) continued and related the ARVN account of the withdrawal down Route 2: “In
Phase I, Major General Lê Minh Đảo 46 - the Front Commander, and the Operational
Headquarters of the 18th ARVN Infantry Division travelled with the troop columns ((down
Route 2)) to provide command and take immediate action in response to problems
encountered along the route of march. A command helicopter flew over the route of march
throughout the night to provide directions and to support the troop columns when necessary.
Inter-Provincial Route 2 was the main road to be used by vehicles and families moving from
Xuân Lộc to the Đức Thành ((District Headquarters)) assembly area.47 Although the North
Vietnamese 4th Corps tried to seize a number of points along the line-of-march and to
establish ambush positions on a number of hills along Inter-Provincial Route 2 to slow the
progress of the march and inflict casualties on our forces, soldiers of all ranks of the 18th
Infantry Division and attached units - fighting with high combat morale, easily brushed aside
the enemy road-blocks and ambushes. As a result, all forces were able to safely reach the Đức
Thành assembly area early in the morning of the next day, ie 21 April 1975.48 As for the 1st
Airborne Brigade and 2nd Battalion/43rd Regiment, these units continued to fight under the
command of Colonel Lê Xuân Hiếu, Commander of the 43rd Task Force, who constantly
flew overhead in a helicopter to guide and support them as they fought their way to the Đức
Thành assembly area. After a two-day march, this force reached the designated area with only
light losses. On 25 April 1975, the 1st Airborne Brigade was detached from the control of the
18th Infantry Division. Phase 2: After two days spent regrouping and re-organizing our units
at the Đức Thành assembly area, the entire 18th Infantry Division was transported by truck to
its rear base at Long Bình to receive new equipment and replacements to enable it to carry
out a new mission assigned to it by Headquarters, 3rd Corps/3rd Military Region. …”
46
President Trần Văn Hương – who had replaced Nguyễn Văn Thiệu when he resigned on 21 April 1975,
promoted Lê Minh Đảo to major general on 23 April 1975 for his valour at the Battle of Xuân Lộc.
47
The order-of-march down Route 2 was: 48 Regt/18 Div, HQ 18 Div, 18 Div direct support units, 175mm SP
Gun Platoon, 82 Ranger Bn, Long Khánh Sector HQ - and RF and PF elements, 43 Regt/18 Div, and 1 st
Airborne Bde. Civilian refugees followed. An Airborne artillery troop and an airborne reconnaissance platoon
were established at Cẩm Mỹ to support the withdrawal, but were over-run by two NVA battalions and three
105mm artillery pieces were destroyed. By the afternoon of 21 April, most of the withdrawing elements had
reached Bình Giã (ie the vicinity of the Đức Thành District/Sub-Sector Headquarters). Second Lieutenant
Nguyễn Hiệp, “Xuân Lộc – Trận Đánh Cuối Cùng” (“Xuân Lộc – The Final Battle”), February 2015.
http://www.chinhnghia.com/xuan-loc-tran-danh-cuoi-cung.asp
48
According to a recent detailed account, the Airborne Brigade elements reached Đức Thành between 1600-
1800hrs on 22 April. Trịnh Ân - Mũ Đỏ ((Red Beret)), “Mặt Trận Xuân Lộc tháng Tư 1975” (“The Xuân Lộc
Front in April 1974”), 12 April 2019.
18
The withdrawal of the Airborne Brigade down Route 2 (1st, 8th, and 9th Battalions, an
artillery unit, and supporting M113s) is related by Captain Tường Vy (ie Callsign Tường Vi
– company commander of the 93rd Company/8th Battalion).49 The withdrawal – followed by
civilians, began on morning of 21 April – with the Airborne’s march-order: 1, 8, 9 Battalions.
His unit passed through Long Giao (formerly the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment’s
Blackhorse base) – and Captain Tường Vy was wounded by 60mm mortar fire in the morning
of 22 April in the Gia Ray Valley [sic].50 The Airborne units passed Bình Giã and reached the
ARVN Núi Đất base at mid-day [sic] on 24 April 1975.
A US historian – G.J. Veith, wrote: “In spite of the tremendous difficulties in moving
an entire division, plus attached units and civilians, twenty-five miles along a dirt trail at night,
Đảo and the 18th Division conducted a masterly retreat. The Division slipped out of Xuân Lộc
and escaped to Phước Tuy Province with ease. Đảo’s personal leadership again made the
difference. His chief of staff recalls, ‘Brigadier Lê Minh Đảo walked with the troop columns
to provide command and take immediate action in response to problems along the route of
march … As a result, all forces were able to safely reach the assembly area early in the morning
of 21 April.’ The North Vietnamese, caught off guard by the sudden move, ordered all element
to pursue the retreating South Vietnamese but were unable to catch them.”51
However, not all the 18th Division elements withdrew down Route 2 from Xuân Lộc
safely and intact. The 300-strong 2/43rd Battalion (Major Nguyễn Hữu Chế) and its
reconnaissance company did not receive the Xuân Lộc withdrawal order from the 1st
Airborne Brigade Headquarters until 0300hrs on 21 April. Having destroyed several 155mm
artillery pieces, Major Chế then withdrew from the Núi Thi feature – but his force clashed
with communist elements as he attempted to move south down Route 2. Chế was forced to
move westward – ie “cross-country”, through the Hắc Dịch towards Long Thành in southern
Biên Hòa Province.52 After four days being pursued by the enemy – and with his force
reduced to only 28, he made radio contact with the 43rd Regiment Headquarters. Despite
communist ground-fire, four UH-1B helicopters extracted Major Chế’s element which
rejoined the regrouped 18th Division elements at Long Bình on 24 April 1975.
49
Mđ ((Red Beret)) Tường Vy, “Những ngày trong quân ngũ” (“Days in the ranks”), April 2013 – for an
account by an Airborne Brigade soldier. http://nhaydu.com/MuDo68/GiaTuVuKhi.html . For an account of the
1st Battalion’s engagements, see: 242, “Trận đánh cuối cùng của Tiểu Đoàn 1 Nhảy Dù tại mặt trận Long Khánh
và Cuộc vượt biển có một không hai của QLVNCH, Lữ Đoàn I Nhảy Dù Vượt biển Đông 30/4/1975 (“The Last
Battles of the 1st Airborne Battalion on the Long Khánh Front … the 1st Airborne Brigade crosses the South
China Sea”)”, 29 April 2016.
50
In his account of the withdrawal, Brigadier-General Lê Minh Đảo notes the Airborne elements being
ambushed by the NVA/VC forces at Qui Ca hamlet near the Long Khánh-Phước Tuy border at 1600hrs on 21
April. Brigadier Đảo notes that only the Airborne Brigade’s artillery battalion and its reconnaissance company
followed the “abandoned road” – with its battalions: 1, 2 [sic], 8, and 9 moving through the jungle and hills off
Route 2. Phạm Phong Dinh, THIẾU TƯỚNG LÊ MINH ĐẢO VÀ SƯ ĐOÀN 18 BỘ BINH: CUỘC CHIẾN
ĐẤU CUỐI CÙNG Ở XUÂN LỘC, Gia Đình Sư Đoàn 18 Bộ Binh. Trận Chiến Xuân Lộc. Part Five.
51
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, p.457. Veith notes however that “things did not go as smoothly for
Dao’s rear guard … During this withdrawal, the 1 st Airborne Brigade confronted the most danger and suffered
the most losses because it was the last column and was assigned to cover the rear … the brigade’s dead and
wounded … had to be left behind.” The 18th Division’s rear unit in the withdrawal was the 2nd Battalion/43rd
Regiment (Major Nguyễn Hữu Chế ) – see Hồ Đinh, Người Ở Lại Địa Ngục (“Those Left in Hell”), 9 April
2015 - https://vi-vn.facebook.com/ThongTinTuDo/posts/688356674619604:0
52
Nguyễn Phúc Sông Hương (the pen name of Nguyễn Phúc – commander 1st Battalion/48th Regiment/18th
Division), “Người lính Đeo càng trực Thăng” (“A soldier holding on to a helicopter”), 1 March 2019. Attacks
on the 2nd/43rd Battalion are related in the D440 History – see page 22.
19
On 21 April 1975, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu resigned. “In his farewell speech that
night, he voiced his frustrations regarding what he saw as American perfidy. He bluntly
declared that he had reluctantly accepted the Paris Accords only after President Nixon promised
him that if North Vietnam attacked, the U.S. would respond militarily. He also revealed that
the U.S. had threatened to cut off aid if he did not sign the accords.”53
As noted, on 21 April, the South Vietnamese forces abandoned Xuân Lộc Town and
withdrew southward down Route 2 through southern Long Khánh and Phước Tuy provinces.
The retreat to Bà Rịa is also described in the following several communist accounts.
“The captured headquarters of the enemy’s Long Khánh Sector”54
PAVN (ie NVA) General Trần Văn Tra 55 summarised the fighting and the ARVN
withdrawal from Xuân Lộc – that included the following criticism of VC local forces: “We
were able to wipe out only part of the fleeing troops because our unit ((to)) which the Bà Rịa
Military Command had assigned responsibility for blocking Route 2 was careless and failed
to prevent the enemy from fleeing.”56
53
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.460-461. President Thiệu was replaced by 71 year-old Trần Văn
Hương – ill, but renowned for his “honesty and patriotism”. “Hương had never acquired a large role within the
Thiệu administration.”
54
A very poor quality copy of this photograph is included at p.160 of the D440 Battalion History (2011).
55
General Trần Văn Tra had commanded the B2 Front in Central Vietnam. In April 1975, he became the deputy
commander of the A75 Headquarters under Senior General Văn Tiến Dũng. With the 4th NVA Corps stalled at
Xuân Lộc, it was reinforced by the 95th NVA Regiment, and General Trần Văn Tra was detached from the
battles at Lọc An to “supervise and speed up the implementation of new fighting methods” at Xuân Lộc: Văn
Tiến Dũng – Senior General, Đại Thắng Mùa Xuân (Great Spring Victory), op.cit., 1977, p.205. Post-War,
General Tra’s pronouncements and writings fell out of favour, and he lived under a form of “house arrest” until
his death in 1996.
56
Trần Văn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, Vol 5: Concluding the 30-Years War, Văn Nghệ
Publishing House, Hồ Chí Minh City, 1982, p.176.
20
The VC D445 Battalion History (2006)57 relates that – following the defeat of the
ARVN forces at the Battle of Xuân Lộc in southern Long Khánh Province:
“Judging that the enemy had the capability to withdraw and abandon Long Khánh, the
Province Unit sent a radio message to 445 Battalion directing the Battalion to deploy back to
Route 2 and block the fleeing enemy. To block the enemy in time, the cadre and soldiers of
445 Battalion had to both walk and run for tens of kilometres through the rain.58 This was
difficult and strenuous, but everyone was enthusiastic and determined to contribute to the
common victory of the whole of the Province, the whole of the Region, and the whole of the
country. On the afternoon of 20 April 1975, the complete Battalion had fully regrouped at its
determined positions and set an ambush to block the enemy at the Letter-C and Letter-S
locations ((on Route 2)).
Our blocking positions on Route 2 – which incorporated the local District troops,
stretched over 10 kilometres from the area of the Letter-S bends to the Quang Minh
Plantation ((YS 465885)). At 11pm on 21 April 1975, a convoy of mixed vehicles –
comprising hundreds of vehicles with tanks and armoured vehicles leading, escaped from
Long Khánh down Route 2. Because our troops were over-tired and fell asleep, the Battalion
allowed the first groups of the withdrawing enemy to pass59 – and could only use the
Battalion’s mortars to fire into the ranks of the withdrawing enemy.60
At 4am on 21 [sic] April 1975, the large fleeing enemy group reached the area of the
Quang Minh Plantation. Châu Đức District’s C41 Company61 – the forward element of our
ambush, set fire to two tanks and captured a number of the enemy – including Phạm Văn
Phúc, the Long Khánh Province Chief.62 Next, 445 Battalion together with the C41 Company
57
Chamberlain, E. P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan), Point Lonsdale,
2016, pp.174-177 – see also at Annex B. The account in the earlier 1991 D445 History ie Chamberlain, E. P.,
The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011, is included at Annex A to this Note.
58
The Wet Season in southern Vietnam begins in April/May; and the Dry Season begins in November.
According to the Long Khánh Town Party History: “it rained heavily on the afternoon of 19 April ((1975)).
Captain Phạm Văn Còn ((see footnotes 153 and 157)) – commanding the local forces, deployed the K8 Xuân
Lộc unit and the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion from Bảo Bình back to Route 2. On 20 April, our forces
destroyed two Regional Force units at the Letter-S and Letter-C locations (Route 2) and then deployed to block
the fleeing enemy. The 3rd Company of 445 Battalion had to move tens of kilometres [sic] from Bảo Hòa to
strike the enemy at Con Rắn Mountain. Faced by the 3rd Company’s strong attack, the enemy ran helter-skelter.
We killed 83 enemy, and seized two 105mm artillery pieces.” - Trần Quang Toại & Phan Đình Dũng, Lịch sử
Đảng bộ Thị xã Long Khánh 1930 – 2007 (The History of the Party in Long Khánh Town 1930-2007), Nhà
Xuẩt Bản Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai Publishing House), Biên Hòa, 2009, p.159.
59
Note that “fell asleep” – is not admitted in the account in: Xuân Thanh, “Tiểu đoàn 445 Trong Tiến Công
Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” (“445 Battalion in the Attack on Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh”), in Military Region 7 (Quân
Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc ..., op.cit., pp.161-164., 2004.
60
As noted, PAVN General Trần Văn Tra related: “We were able to wipe out only part of the fleeing troops
because our unit ((to)) which the Bà Rịa Military Command had assigned responsibility for blocking Route 2
was careless and failed to prevent the enemy from fleeing.” Trần Văn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2
Theatre, op.cit., 1982, p.176.
61
According to the Châu Đức District History (2004): “On 6 April 1975 in the Hắc Dịch base, in response to
requests and a new task, Châu Đức District’s 41st Company was re-formed – with Comrade Bảy Cao as the
company commander, and Comrade Châu as its political officer.” - Nguyễn Công Danh …, … Châu Đức
District, op.cit., 2004. The consolidation of C41 Company on 6 April 1975 in the Hắc Dịch area - under
Aspirant Officer Lương Văn Cao (Bảy Cao) - and detail on the fighting on Route 2, is related in Mai Thanh
Xuân, “Bắt Đại Tá …”, op.cit., 2004.
62
According to the 1991 D445 History: “The fate of Colonel (Ranger) Phạm Văn Phúc – the Province Chief of
Long Khánh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed.” - Chamberlain, E.P.,
21
of Châu Đức District continued to pursue and attack the fleeing enemy, capturing some of the
remnants and seizing weapons and equipment etc. We took complete control of a stretch of
Route 2 from Xuân Lộc to Xà Bang ((YS 455864)) which we held until the launch of the Hồ
Chí Minh Campaign. The “steel gate”63 of Xuân Lộc had been shattered completely, and the
gateway from the east into Sài Gòn had been opened.64 President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was
forced to resign and to pass power to Trần Văn Hương. The puppet government and
authorities were in chaos. Their General Staff was crippled – with the general officers
abandoning their responsibilities and their units to find a way to flee overseas. A psychology
of despair overwhelmed the whole of the puppet forces and puppet administration.”
The history of the D440 VC Local Force Battalion 65 also recounts engagements on
Route 2 in April 1975: “Assessing that the enemy had the capability to flee and abandon
Long Khánh, the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Unit ordered the Province’s armed forces to
swiftly deploy, and to pursue and block the enemy on their withdrawal routes to the south
towards Bà Rịa. Our blocking positions on Route 2 involved the local District units spread
over a distance of almost 10 kilometres from the S-bend to the Quang Minh plantation.
Before 445 [sic] Battalion, the 41st Châu Đức Company and the Xuân Lộc and Cao Su
District units had time to occupy ambush positions on Route 2, a detachment from the
Province Unit’s reconnaissance and communications element – with firepower
reinforcements (60mm and 82mm mortars), threatened the enemy (of about a regiment) at the
Suối Râm base ((formerly the base of the US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment – taken over
by the 48th ARVN Infantry Regiment in 1972)), preventing them from bursting out to rescue
their comrades elsewhere and also limiting their fire support. Our forces were able to control
the situation until the enemy withdrew (on 21 April 1975). Then, the enemy risked the danger
to break out and flee towards Bà Rịa. Immediately the enemy withdrew, our forces swiftly
took over the enemy’s Suối Râm base.
On the night of 20 April – to dawn on 21 April 1975, the remnants of the puppet’s
th
18 Division and Long Khánh Sector fled down Route 2 (Bà Rịa) with over 200 armoured
vehicles of various types in columns stretching over three kilometres.66 Other vehicles
… D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.95. For Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc’s capture and subsequent movements,
see also footnotes 45, 68, 73, 153, 160 and 168.
63
The term - “steel gate/door” (“cánh cửa thép”) - ie blocking the NVA/VC’s north-eastern approaches to Sài
Gòn, was apparently coined by the commander of the 18 th ARVN Division, Brigadier General Lê Minh Đảo.
The 1991 D445 History included a D445 soldier’s poem: “We stand dauntless and dignified beneath the Xuân
Lộc sky. The ‘steel gate’ was burst wide-open with lightning speed by our feet.”
64
As noted at footnote 35, according to Colonel Hứa Yến Lến (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN Division), during the
12-day battle at Xuân Lộc: “ARVN losses were 30% for all units participating in the battle, except for the 52 nd
Task Force which suffered 60% losses; North Vietnamese casualties were reportedly: 5,000-6,000 killed or
wounded, and 37 armoured vehicles destroyed.” – Hứa Yến Lến, Colonel (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN Division),
The Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh), Seattle, 5 February 1988. VCAT Item No. 3670101001.
65
The D440 history was published in 2011 – for an exegesis, see Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D440
Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2013, pp.108-110.
66
For an ARVN account of the withdrawal on Route 2, see Hứa Yến Lến, Colonel (Chief of Staff, 18th ARVN
Division), The Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh), Seattle, 5 February 1988 - ie: On 20 April 1975, the
headquarters and elements of the 18th ARVN Division successfully withdrew south down Route 2 to an
assembly area at Đức Thạnh and enroute - “easily brushed aside the enemy road-blocks and ambushes … and
arrived the next morning.” They were soon joined by the 1 st Airborne Brigade and the 2nd Battalion of the 43rd
Regiment that had suffered “only light losses”. After two days of “regrouping and re-organizing our units at the
Đức Thạnh assembly area, the entire 18th Infantry Division was transported by trucks to its rear base at Long
Bình to receive new equipment and replacements.” VCAT Item No. 3670101001.
22
retreated along Route 10 [sic] towards Bình Sơn and Route 15. When the enemy reached the
Cao Su District ambush site, they were struck decisively and forced to flee - abandoning two
Jeeps, a Zeo vehicle, a 105mm artillery piece, and a large quantity of weapons, equipment
and war materiel. While fleeing, the enemy continued to be attacked by 445 Battalion and
Châu Đức District troops (C41) on several stretches of the Route.67 As a result of these
engagements, many of the enemy were killed, many were taken prisoner – including even the
colonel68 in charge of Long Khánh Province.
“ARVN prisoners captured on Route 2 during the Battle of Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” 69
At 10am on 21 April 1975, the Cao Su District Reconnaissance Unit – under the
direct command of Comrade Nguyễn Hùng Tâm (the District Unit commander) took the
initiative to attack an enemy group from the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Division’s 43rd Task
Force retreating from the Tân Phong T-Junction along Route 40 from Hàng Gòn to Cẩm
Đường-Bình Sơn. Although our numbers were few, we still took the initiative to open fire
and stop the enemy, while another platoon (reinforced with a 60mm mortar) moved from the
base and struck the rear of the enemy. Already on the defensive and in panic after having lost
the battle, the enemy fled chaotically in the direction of Cẩm Đường ((YS 355949)) – leaving
behind six bodies and over 50 weapons of various types. ((p.161)): We lost one killed (a
liaison soldier from the headquarters of the District Unit) and one wounded. Having fled to
Cẩm Đường, this enemy battalion was again attacked and completely wiped out (a number
were killed, more than one hundred were captured, and all its weapons and equipment were
seized). The whole of Long Khánh Town was liberated.
67
D445 Battalion’s engagements in southern Long Khánh Province and on Route 2 are related in detail in the
D445 Battalion History (1991) – see Chamberlain, E.P., … D445 …, op.cit., 2011, pp.93-95.
68
The capture of Colonel Phúc – including a photograph, is related in an article that also includes detail on the
fighting on Route 2. - Danh Trường, “Bắt Sống …, op.cit., 19 April 2010. For Colonel Phúc, see also footnotes:
45, 62, 73, 153, 160 and 168.
69
This poor quality photograph is included at p.159 of the D440 History (2011).
23
Both the Châu Đức District History (2014) 70 and the Đất Đỏ District History
(2006) 71 record the ARVN withdrawal and the fighting in Phước Tuy Provice. The Châu
Đức account begins:
“The humiliating defeat of the puppet 18th Division on the Xuân Lộc battlefield
created panic among the puppet military and officials in Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu.72 Our military
proselytising cadre and our agents took this opportunity to warn the evil thugs and to also tell
those who were luke-warm towards us that they should redeem themselves. On the night of
20-21 April 1975, Châu Đức District’s 41st Company – led by Comrade Sởi, deployed for its
first engagement, and ambushed an enemy convoy fleeing from Long Khánh Town in the
area of the Quang Minh plantation (Route 2). They set fire to three tanks, and captured
Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc – the Long Khánh province chief.73
On 19 April 1975, while our troops and the villagers throughout the whole Province
were preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising, our agent – Phạm Văn Năm, who
was assigned to the Long Lễ Sub-Sector ((headquartered in Hòa Long village)), placed a
timed explosive charge that killed 17 of the Sub-Sector’s soldiers while they were eating and
drinking in a nearby stall. The dead included Bé – the commander of an evil enemy
intelligence network in the Hòa Long-Long Phước area.
Planning the Liberation of Route 2 74
70
Lê Minh Đức and Hồ Song Quỳnh (eds), Lịch Sử Lực Lượng Vũ Trang Huyện Châu Đức 1945 - 2014 (The
History of the Armed Forces of Châu Đức District 1945 – 2014), NXB Chính Trị Quốc Gia – Sự Thật, Hà Nội,
2014.
71
Trần Quang Toại & Đặng Tấn Hương (eds), Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Và Xây Dựng Của Đảng Bộ, Quân Và Dân
Huyện Đất Đỏ (The History of the Struggle and Development of the Party, Military and People of Đất Đỏ
District 1930-2005), Nhà Xuất Bản Tổng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 2006. The account in the Đất Đỏ History
only briefly mentions the withdrawal – but covers the attack on Bà Rịa Town and fighting in the Province.
72
For a detailed account, see: Military Region 7 Headquarters (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc-Long
Khánh (The Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Victory), Nhà Xuẩt Bản Tồng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 2004.
73
Translator’s (Chamberlain) Note: This action by C-41 Company is related in the 1991 D445 History that adds:
“Châu Đức District’s 41st Company was the unit that stopped the head of the enemy’s formation (south of the
Quang Minh plantation) ((YS 465885)) and set fire to two enemy tanks and captured a number of prisoners –
including a vehicle carrying Colonel Phúc, the Province Chief of Long Khánh … The fate of the Colonel – the
Province Chief of Long Khánh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed.” -
Chamberlain, E.P., … D445 …, op.cit., 2011, p.95. The capture of Colonel (Ranger) Phạm Văn Phúc –
including a photograph, is related in an article that also includes detail on the fighting on Route 2. - Danh
Trường, “Bắt Sống …”, (“Captured Alive …”), op.cit., 19 April 2010. See also footnotes 45, 62, 68, 153, 160
and 168.
74
“Planning Meeting for Route 2” - Lê Minh Đức and Hồ Song Quỳnh (eds), Lịch Sử Lực Lượng Vũ Trang
Huyện Châu Đức 1945 – 2014 (The History of the Armed Forces of Châu Đức District), op.cit., 2014, p.184.
24
On 20 April 1975, Comrade Lê Minh Nguyện - the deputy secretary of Bà Rịa-Long

Khánh Province, came to the ((Suối)) Châu Pha base to brief the Châu Đức District
Committee on the plan for the General Offensive and Uprising. His address directed that:
“Districts are to liberate districts, villages are to liberate villages”. The District Committee
members swiftly returned to the areas allocated to them to locally disseminate the plan for the
final General Offensive and Uprising. The Châu Đức District Committee gave orders to its
forces regarding the critical areas ie the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, the Long Lễ Sub-Sector, and
the Phú Mỹ Special Sector. In the villages – although there were still enemy posts, the people
in fact were already in control.
On 21 April 1975, Long Khánh Town was completed liberated, and the steel gate ((ie
Xuân Lộc Town)) northeast of Sài Gòn had been opened. The crumbling enemy force rashly
fled for their lives down Inter-Provincial Route 2.75 A number who fled grouped themselves
in Bà Rịa Town and in the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre. Puppet troops and officials in the Sub-
Sectors, and in Ngãi Giao and the villages, were all extremely alarmed.”
The Defence of Bà Rịa
Government Forces
Earlier in Phước Tuy: “As of 11 April 1975, about 40,000 ARVN troops - withdrawn
south from ((the Republic of Vietnam’s)) Military Regions 1 and 2, had reported to training
camps or had been reassigned to units in Military Region 3. The ARVN 3rd Infantry Division
on 11 April had about 1,100 men at Bà Rịa, Phước Tuy, and would be assigned another 1,000
soon, but it was short all types of weapons and equipment. The 1st Division was also at Bà
Rịa but with only two officers and 40 men. Near Bà Rịa, at Long Hải, was the 23d Division
with about 1,000 men and 20 rifles.”76
On arrival in Bà Rịa from Xuân Lộc on 22 April, 18th ARVN Division elements
“rested for two days and re-organised, then - on 24 April, were tasked to defend the area
south-east of Biên Hòa and the line east of the Saigon capital – a line that ran from the Long
Bình logistics complex to the Thành Tuy Hạ ammunition depot and continuing to link up
with the Airborne forces ((to the south on Route 15)) and the Armour and Infantry
Schools.”77
On 24 April, the ARVN 3rd Infantry Division was tasked to defend the Bà Rịa-Vũng
Tàu region and Route 15. Its forces reportedly comprised the 2nd Squadron of the 15th ((or
5th)) Cavalry Regiment and the 1st Airborne Brigade.78 According to Nguyễn Duy Hinh –
75
Descriptions of the fighting on Route 2 are also in the 1991 D445 History – see Chamberlain, E.P., … D445
…, op.cit., 2011, pp.92-96. See also See also Ekins A. with McNeill, I., Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp.
674-676.
76
Le Gro, W.E. Colonel, From Cease Fire to Capitulation, United States Army Center of Military History,
Washington D.C., 1981. VCAT Item No. 8850505001, VCAT Item No. 13370152001, p.173. See also
Willbanks, J.H. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), The Last 55 Days, Leavenworth, 15-17 April 1999, VCAT Item No.
3400102001.
77
…, “Thời Chinh Chiến: 27.4.1975 - Sư Đoàn 3BB Giữ Bà Rịa” (“A Time of War: 27.4.1975 – the 3rd Infantry
Division holds Baria”), 2 February 2009. http://thoichinhchien.blogspot.com/2009/02/ngay-24-4-1975-su-oan-
3bb-giu-ba-ria.html
78
Alamit, “The 3rd Infantry Division, RVNAF – Vũng Tàu, April 1975” (“SƯ ĐOÀN 3 BB QLVNCH - VŨNG
TÀU ● 4/1975”) - edited by alamit; 05-03-2013. http://ydan.org/showthread.php?t=23720&page=6
25
the ARVN 3rd Infantry Division Commander/Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Front Commander 79, each
airborne infantry battalion was only at 50% strength – ie the 1st, 8th and 9th Airborne
Battalions. The 3rd Infantry Division ((regrouping in the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre))
included a number of personnel integrated from the 1st Infantry Division – numbering more
than 1,000, and temporarily grouped to form two battalions – one for the 2nd Infantry
Regiment and one for the 56th Infantry Regiment.
Bà Rịa Town – 1 ATF Baria (Special) 1:10,000

Route 15 runs to west – and to the south to Vũng Tàu City (21 km); Route 2 (LTL 2)
to the north-east (to Hòa Long, Núi Đất …); Route 23 (LTL 23) to the east – with the Vạn
Kiếp Camp north-east of Xóm Bào; Lê Lợi St (in red) runs north from the Town centre,
beside the Sông Dinh River.
79
Major General Bùi Thế Lân – commander of the Marine Division, was appointed Governor of Vũng Tàu.
26
The 1st Airborne Brigade remained in Phước Tuy Province to shield Vũng Tàu. “The
1st Airborne Brigade and the Phước Tuy Regional Forces ((938th Group)) had to defend a
huge swath of territory and two major roads: Route 2 coming from Xuân Lộc and Route 15
from Saigon. The brigade was placed under the command of Major General Nguyễn Duy
Hinh, who was in charge of the Phước Tuy/Vũng Tàu Front. Hinh had only the Airborne
Brigade, the 14th Marine Battalion holding Vũng Tàu, local RF/PF80, plus the remnants of his
own 3rd Infantry Division and bits and pieces of various units.”81
The Phước Tuy Province Chief and Sector Commander in 1975 was Colonel Phạm
Ngọc Lân – who had previously been the chief-of-staff of the Airborne Division. However –
early in the battle for Bà Rịa, Colonel Phạm Ngọc Lân and his staff withdrew by helicopter to
Vũng Tàu. The defence of the Bà Rịa Town area then became the responsibility of ARVN
Colonel Đỗ Duy Nhượng – the Commander of the Bà Rịa-based Logistic Support Centre
since 1974, who established his small headquarters element in the Sector Headquarters in the
Town’s centre. Two of the Airborne Brigade elements (the 1st and 8th Battalions) – with
some M113s, were principally safeguarding Route 15 to the north-west of Bà Rịa with
artillery based at Chu Hải about six kilometres west of the Town - and a force defending the
Cỏ May Bridge82 on Route 15 four-and-a-half kilometres to the south of the Town.83 Two
battalions of the 3rd ARVN Infantry Division were also reportedly deployed to defend Route
15 from Long Thành to Bà Rịa.84 There was concern that the 341st NVA Division in the
adjacent Long Thành area of Biên Hòa Province85 would cut Route 15 and advance south
down Route 15 and attack Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu.86 On 27 April, communist forces cut Route
15 in Biên Hòa Province and advanced towards the Long Bình complex.
80
For detail on the Regional Forces (RF), Popular Forces (PF) and People’s Self Defence Force (PSDF) see
footnote 8.
81
82
The Cỏ May Bridge – located at YS 379572, was the major bridge on Route 15 from Bà Rịa Town soth-east
to Vũng Tàu City. About five kilometres south of Bà Rịa Town - surrounded by mangroves, it crossed the Cỏ
May River estuary. The bridge is described in USMACV/JGS Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam (CICV),
Area Analysis Study 66-36 – National Route 15, 1 March 1966 as Bridge 192: 237 metres/880 feet by 12 feet,
Class 30/15 tons. – VCAT Item No. F015900190068a.pdf. Post-War, a major PAVN/PLAF memorial was
erected at the Cỏ May Bridge – see page 59, and also Chamberlain, E.P., Research Note 8/2019, Monuments
and Memorials of the War in Phước Tuy, Long Khánh, and Vũng Tàu, 25 April 2019.
83
Mđ ((Red Beret)) Tường Vy, “Những ngày trong quân ngũ” (“Days in the ranks”), April 2013 – for an
account by an Airborne soldier. https://dongsongcu.wordpress.com/2017/11/26/nhung-ngay-trong-quan-ngu/ .
84
According to a US report: “Remnants of the (3 rd ARVN) division were evacuated by sea ((from Đà Nẵng in
Military Region 1 on 29 March)) and eventually regrouped at Bà Rịa. Units representing the 2nd and 56th
Regiments were involved in combat at Bà Rịa, which fell on 27 April. What remained of the 3 rd Div was
deployed to defensive positions on the approach to Vũng Tàu.” Smith, H.D. Major General - Defence Attaché
Saigon, DAO Final Assessment: 1 January – 25 April 1975, 15 June 1975. DTIC A0944292.
85
“On 26 April, the North Vietnamese launched supporting attacks by the 6 th, 7th, and 341" NVA Divisions
against Biên Hòa and the former US base at Long Bình. At the same time, the 304 th and 325th NVA Divisions
attacked ARVN positions at Long Thành in an attempt to cut Route 15, the remaining overland link between
Saigon and Vũng Tàu on the coast.” Willbanks, J.H. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), The Last 55 Days,
Leavenworth, 15-17 April 1999, pp.33-34.
86
For President Thieu’s plan to withdraw his government and forces to Cần Thơ in the Mekong Delta – and the
“redoubt” concept by General Nguyễn Khoa Nam (the IV Corps/MR 4 commander) – and also Phú Quốc island
in the South China Sea, see: Nguyen, A., “War Never Dies – the Holdouts”, 30 April 2018.
https://www.warneverdies.com/home/2018/4/30/holdouts
27
The 3rd NVA (Sao Vang/Yellow Star) Division 87 in Phước Tuy
Having fought at Phan Rang on the central coast, the 3rd NVA Sao Vàng Division was
ordered by NVA 2 Corps to join the “eastern group” for the Hồ Chí Minh Campaign – and
was reinforced with a tank company (five vehicles), an artillery company (four 130mm
guns), and an anti-aircraft company (four 100mm guns). On 23 April 1975, the first units of
the Division concentrated in the Cẩm Mỹ rubber plantation (vicinity YS 4692) south of Xuân
Lộc Town – and, that day, the Division’s commanders met with the Bà Rịa Province
Committee and the Province Unit to discuss a coordinated plan “to liberate Phước Tuy (Bà
Rịa), Vũng Tàu … and block any enemy fleeing by sea.”88 Reportedly: “Guided by the
Xuyên Mộc guerrillas, on 24 April the Division secretly and securely concentrated its forces
in the south [sic] of Xuyên Mộc District. … At 1600hrs on 26 [sic] April, the Division had
completed its preparations and was ready to give orders.89 The 12th Regiment and local forces
were tasked to attack the Đức Thành District Sub-Sector ((YS 463784)), and then advance
south to Đất Đỏ and Long Điền. The 141st Regiment – reinforced with the 4th Tank Company
and the 5th Infantry Battalion, was tasked to ‘cut through the jungle’ ((ie south-westward))
and attack Bà Rịa Town, the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre ((on Bà Rịa’s eastern outskirts)) –
and then despatch a force down Route 15 to seize the Cỏ May Bridge ((4 ½ km south of Bà
Rịa Town)) and hold a firm base for the 2nd Battalion to strike and seize Vũng Tàu in Phase
II.”90
Nguyễn Duy Thương – the 2ic and C-of-S of the 3rd Division
briefing preparations for the attacks on Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu
– Xuyên Mộc [sic] District base, 24 [sic]April 1975.
87
The 3rd NVA Division – with the “cover” designator: “Nông Trường 3” (“Agricultural Worksite 3”), was
founded on 2 September 1965 in Hoài Ân District of Bình Định Province (northern South Vietnam) as a main
force formation of Military Region 5 (B1 Front). Its area of operations was Bình Định Province and southern
Quảng Ngãi Province.
88
Nguyễn Duyên Tâm, “Sư đoàn 3 Sao Vàng trong chiến dịch mùa Xuân 1975” (“The 3rd Yellow Star Division
in the 1975 Spring Campaign”), Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party On-line, 3 April 2010.
89
In the 3rd NVA Division history, the Division Commander (Trần Bá Khúc) is noted as giving the combat
orders on 26 April – in the presence of the former 3rd Division commander (Huỳnh Hữu Anh – then the deputy
commander of Military Region 5), Năm Minh – the deputy commander of the Phước Tuy Province unit, and a
number of staff cadre of 2 Corps. Multiple authors, Lịch Sử Sư Đoàn Sao Vàng (The History of the Yellow Flag
Division), Spring 1975, Chapter 8, People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1984.
90
Nguyễn Duyên Tâm, “Sư đoàn 3 Sao Vàng …”, op.cit., 2010 – including the photograph and caption.
28
According to the 3rd NVA Sao Vàng Division history, at their 3rd Division operational
briefing, the Division Commander - Trần Bá Khúc, described the enemy forces as including
the “938th Regional Forces Group and three independent battalions located in the districts and
towns.” Additional to the headquarters element in Bà Rịa Town, the Commander also noted
“thousands of soldiers at the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre” and the “defeated remnants of the
ARVN 1st, 3rd, and 2nd Infantry Divisions, the Marine Division, and the Airborne Brigade –
together with a squadron of armour and armoured vehicles. …” The 3 NVA Division
Commander ordered: ‘Specifically, the 12th Regiment will invest the Đức Thành District
Capital – and then advance to Đất Đỏ and Long Điền. The 141st Regiment – reinforced by the
4th Tank Company and the 5th Infantry Battalion, will cut across-country and attack directly
into Bà Rịa Town and the Vạn Kiếp NCỎ Training Centre. Subsequently, a group will move
westward to block enemy advancing from Biên Hòa – and a group will move eastwards to
join up with the 12th Regiment, and swiftly seize the Cỏ May Bridge preventing the enemy
from destroying it, and holding a firm base for the 12th Regiment to undertake its task of
striking deep into Vũng Tàu in Phase 2. Each regiment will have a group of the Division’s
artillery in support. Province forces will liberate the area from Xuyên Mộc to Hàm Tân.’ ”91
The 3rd Sao Vàng Division History relates that at 1900hrs on 26 April 197592, the
Division’s 141st Regiment began its attack into Bà Rịa Town. “The 4th Tank Company –
carrying ((ie “desant”)) the 7th Battalion’s 3rd Company, advanced down Lê Lợi Street ((from
the north)) into the Town’s centre. … the enemy reacted: Tank No.3 was hit by a M-72 and a
track was broken, Tank No.4 fell into a ditch and had to wait to be dragged out. The crews
dismounted and used infantry weapons to defend their vehicles. … only two tanks were able
to get past the Phan Chu Trinh T-junction to the Nhà Tròn (“Round House”/Water Tower) in
the Town’s centre. 93
The “Round House/Water Tower”
91
Multiple authors, Lịch Sử Sư Đoàn Sao Vàng (The History of the Yellow Flag Division), op.cit, 1984.
92
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History notes that the artillery fire into the Town to launch the “Campaign”
against the Town began at “1700hrs on 26 April 1975”. Trần Văn Khánh (et al/đtg) and: Ban Chấp Hành Đảng
bộ tỉnh Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu (Executive Committee of the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party), The History of the Party in Bà
Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province 1930 1975), op.cit., Hà Nội, 2000, Vol II, Chapter IX, p.158.
93
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History – cited above, relates that the 141st NVA Regiment and the tanks “were
also supported by local forces and special forces who guided them in their attack on Bà Rịa Town and the Vạn
Kiếp Training Centre. … The Town’s security forces and special forces had the task of showing the way and
supporting our political forces to mobilise the people in the uprising.” Trần Văn Khánh, … The History of the
Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province, op.cit., Hà Nội 2000, Vol II, Chapter IX, p.158.
29
Tank No.2 followed, heading straight southward with infantry – but became bogged
beside the Dinh River and could not be extracted. Tank No.1 – after an hour roving freely in
the area of the Round House, lost contact with the infantry company and had to turn back. At
2200hrs, the 141st Regiment Headquarters assessed that … the enemy was resisting fiercely
and blunting the Regiment’s attacks. The Regiment’s infantry were unfamiliar with fighting
beside tanks – and progress had been too slow, and improved cooperation was needed
immediately between the units. That night, the 141st Regiment was ordered to hold the
positions that it had seized, swiftly dispatch its 8th Battalion to the Vạn Kiếp area, and to use
its 5th Battalion to cut-off the Town from the Vạn Kiếp base – and not allow the enemy to
concentrate. The attacks would continue on the 27th.
As dawn broke, Tank No.1 led the 7th Battalion in a direct attack on the Logistics
Support Centre ((vic YS 383618)). The tank’s guns – and B-40s and B-41s, fired
continuously into the enemy’s defences and bunkers. Following very closely behind the tank,
the 7th Battalion divided into two attacking groups to seize the Logistics Support Centre and
then crossed Lê Lợi Street and penetrated the Security Area, the Police Post, and the
Headquarters of the Regional Forces Group. The enemy withdrew gradually to the central
area, resisting fiercely. At 9, enemy tanks counter-attacked the flank of our 7th Battalion – but
as soon as their lead tank appeared it was destroyed by our Tank No.1. Their remaining tanks
turned and fled.
In the west, our 9th Battalion had seized Dinh Hamlet and advanced on Route 15 into
the Town. Four enemy tanks then confronted them. The commander of the Battalion’s
firepower support company led a recoilless rifle group that hit and set fire to two enemy tanks
- forcing them to withdraw. In the east, our 8th Battalion struck into the Families’
Accommodation Area and blocked the entrance to the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre. Nearly
1,000 trainees were force to retreat back into the Centre’s defences. The Battalion attacked
the enemy’s fire support base at Đồi Đá and seized four 105mm howitzers – and then
advanced along Route 23 to isolate the enemy between Vạn Kiếp and Bà Rịa Town. The
situation had developed very advantageously. Our 9th Battalion – supported by the 5th
Battalion, was ordered to advance quickly down to the Cỏ May Bridge with the aim of
seizing the bridge intact and not allowing the enemy to destroy it before they fled down to
Vũng Tàu.94
At 10am, the 141st Regiment began its all-out attack to seize Bà Rịa Town. Rather than
be surrounded, the enemy fled to the south – where they ran into our elements awaiting them.
A large number of the enemy were killed and captured. At 11.30am [sic?], the 11th Company
reported that they had seized the Cỏ May Bridge. This news greatly enthused the Division’s
headquarters. In coordination with the 141st Regiment, our 12th Regiment attacked the Đức
Thành District capital. The fighting lasted throughout the night. Only at 0400hrs on 27 April,
did the 6th Battalion occupy the District capital, and the 4th Battalion seized Bình Giã and Ngãi
Giao and advanced south to Bình Ba – and then attacked and seized Núi Đất. In the districts of
Xuyên Mộc, Long Lễ, and Long Điền, our local armed forces simultaneously attacked – forcing
the stubborn enemy to flee in panic. Seizing the opportunity, the Division ordered the 12th
Regiment to pursue the enemy. With the support of our local forces, in one day the 12 th
Regiment struck across three districts – from Đức Thành down to Đất Đỏ, and across to Long
Điền. In cooperation with the 2nd Regiment, they had attacked the 18th Division’s Training
Centre and a large number of posts along the shore-line killing and capturing thousands of
94
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History relates: “The 4th Tank Company was ordered to lead the 9th Battalion
down to attack and seize the Cỏ May bridge.” Trần Văn Khánh, … The History of the Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu
Province, op.cit., Hà Nội 2000, Vol II, Chapter IX, p.158.
30
enemy. … At mid-day on that day Bà Rịa was completely liberated – and a large flag flew from
the top of the water tower in the centre of the Town.95
The 3rd NVA Division – with armour, attacks Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu
– then to the northwest into Gò Công Province.96
The Defence of Bà Rịa – including ARVN Captains’ Accounts.

“At 6pm on 26 April, the Phuoc Tuy Front came to the boil, with communist forces
shelling Bà Rịa Town, the Phước Tuy Sector Headquarters, the Province Chief’s Offices, and
the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre. The rain of shells lasted three hours. ,,, At about 10pm, the
communist forces launched attacks on three axes into the Province capital: two with
combined infantry and armour attacked the Sector Logistics Support Centre ((vic YS
383618)) and the Province Chief’s Offices; and one into the area along the new highway
((Route 15)) to the south of the Town.”97
Post-War, an ARVN logistics officer – Captain Lê Ngọc Báu 98 related the fighting in
Bà Rịa Town. At 1800hrs on 26 April, communist forces – including tanks, having “snuck”99
95
At p.159, the Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History cited above relates: “The Bà Rịa Military Management
Committee was then formed and led by Lê Minh Hà as chairman (a member of the South Eastern Region ie
Miền Đông Nam Bộ) with Nguyễn Văn Đường (Năm Đường) as his deputy (the former secretary of the
Province People’s Revolutionary Committee). Trần Văn Khánh, … The History of the Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng
Tàu Province, op.cit., Hà Nội 2000, Vol II, Chapter IX.
96
Văn Tiến Dũng - General, Đại Thắng Mùa Xuân, Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Armed
Forces Publishing House), Hà Nội, 1977, extract from map at p.312. For an account of the NVA/VC operations,
see also Vũ Đình Tuyển, “Ký ức Cầu Cỏ May” (“Memories of the Cỏ May Bridge”), 26 April 2015.
97
Son Cao, “30 Năm Trước, Ngày 26-4-1975: Kịch Chiến Ở Bà Rịa” (“30 Years Ago: The Battle in Baria”),
Việt Báo On-Line, 26 April 2005.
98
Lê Ngọc Báu, “Trận đánh sau cùng tại Trung Tâm Yểm Trợ Tiếp Vận Tiểu Khu Phước Tuy” (“The final
battle at the Phước Tuy Sector’s Logistic Support Centre”), Costa Mesa – California, 27 April 2011. Captain Lê
Ngọc Báu was the acting second-in-command of the Centre. See: Ba Ria – Phước Tuy Fellowship Association
website - http://bariaPhướctuy.org/tailieu/ttyttv.html . A large number of individual accounts by RVNAF
personnel can be found at: https://hung-viet.org/p24/nguoi-linh-vnch
99
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, p.475: “The 3rd Division’s plan called for the 12th Regiment to strike
south along Route 2, while the 141st Regiment and a tank company would sneak behind ARVN lines and assault
the Phước Tuy province capital of Baria. They would then continue south on Route 15 and grab the bridge
spanning the Cỏ May River, the gateway to Vũng Tàu.” The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History notes that the
artillery fire into the Town to launch the “campaign” against the Town began at “1700hrs on 26 April 1975” –
see the preceding footnote 92.
31
down from the north along the axis of the Dinh River (east of the Núi Dinh Hills), entered the
Town from the north down Lê Lợi Street to the “Water Tower Round-about”. The Đất Đỏ
History (2006) relates that: “The 141st Regiment was strengthened with the 4th Tank
Company and the 5th Infantry Battalion to move through the jungle to Hắc Dịch and then
attack straight into Bà Rịa Town and the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre.”100 The NVA/VC force
was supported by artillery and 122mm rocket fire from the area of the Núi Dinh Hills.
Captain Báu’s platoon-plus sized group engaged the communist force, and the Airborne
Brigade’s 3rd Artillery Battalion engaged the enemy from its base at Chu Hải hamlet five
kilometres to the north-west on Route 15. Captain Báu‘s first-hand account notes that by 27
April, both Đức Thành and Xuyên Mộc had been lost to communist forces. That day, the US
Consulate staff in Bà Rịa withdrew by helicopter to US naval vessels off-shore in the South
China Sea.
Acting as the Phước Tuy Sector commander – Colonel Đỗ Duy Nhượng (Commander
of the Logistics Support Centre), appointed Captain Báu as his deputy and the “tactical
commander” of the defence. Soon after, Colonel Nhượng - a diabetic, was incapacitated as no
medication was available. Captain Lê Ngọc Báu’s account relates engagements within the
Town against the communist forces – including armour, by his small group, and Airborne
troops employing M-72 anti-tank weapons, M113 armoured personnel carriers, and a small
number of M-48 tanks.101 Captain Báu’s small force reportedly suffered one soldier killed
and two wounded while accounting for “about 50 communists killed”.
Airborne Brigade Captain Tường Vy – commanding the 93rd Airborne Company
recalled 102:
On 26 April, the Battalion ((91, 92, 93, 94 Companies)) – with 14 M113s, was
deployed to secure part of Route 15 leading from Saigon to Vũng Tàu – ie specifically the
section from Láng Cát ((YS 295615)) hamlet to Bà Rịa Town. The 94th Company was located
at the Vạn Kiếp firing range (near the base of the Nui Dinh – vicinity YS 363621)). On the
afternoon of 27 April, the Battalion Commander and the 92nd and 93rd Companies – together
with M113s, came into the Town. At dusk, near the river, we heard the sounds of tank tracks
– but observed no enemy. On 28 April, the 92nd and 93rd Companies came back into Town,
and reported events to the Sector Headquarters. At exactly 0800hrs on 28 April103 - outside
the Province Chief’s Headquarters Building, we came under artillery fire. All the civilians
had evacuated. At about 1400hrs, an enemy T-54 tank approached from the direction of the
100
Đặng Tấn Hương, Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh … Huyện Đất Đỏ (1930-2005), op.cit., 2006, p.287.
101
In the account of the fighting in Bà Rịa Town, Nguyễn Tấn Vinh – Second Lieutenant, 94th Company/9th
Airborne Battalion - under Major Lê Mạnh Đường, describes both NVA T-54 and PT-76 (light amphibious
tanks) in Bà Rịa Town. Vinh describes the 9th Battalion withdrawing from Cỏ May to Vũng Tàu on the
afternoon of 29 April, and leaving Vũng Tàu by fishing boat at 0100-0200hrs on 30 April to Vàm Láng in Gò
Công. Nguyễn Tấn Vinh, “Ngày Ấy Một Chặng Đường” (“A Long Road That Day”), Xmas 2017.
https://hoiquanphidung.com/showthread.php?26835-Ng%C3%A0y-%E1%BA%A4y-M%E1%BB%99t-
Ch%E1%BA%B7ng-%C4%90%C6%B0%E1%BB%9Dng
102
Mđ ((ie “Red Beret)) Tường Vy, “Những ngày trong quân ngũ” (“Days in the ranks”), op.cit., April 2013.
103
Another account relates that: “The Airborne Battalion set fire to five communist armoured vehicles (“chiến
xa”) during the night of 26 [sic] April.” … “At dawn on 27 [sic] April, the Airborne forces had swept the
communist forces from the Province capital. To block future attacking waves, the Headquarters of the Airborne
Brigade increased its forces defending the Town’s outskirts. At about 8am, the communist forces deployed two
infantry regiments and about 30 armoured vehicles (chiến xa) that advanced from two directions in a second
attack on Bà Rịa Town. The Airborne Brigade resisted fiercely, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. Vương
Hồng Anh, “Tưởng Niệm 30 Tháng 4 Năm 1975: Vòng Đai Sài Gòn, Trận Chiến Những Ngày Cuối Tháng 4-
75” (“A Requiem for 30 April 1975: The Saigon Belt – Battles in the Last Days of April 1975”), 26 April 2003.
32
Vạn Kiếp firing range into the Town down Lê Lợi Street. Our 57mm team - and soldiers of
the 93rd and 94th Companies taking cover in the trees beside the road, engaged the tank with
M-72 – but it did not catch fire. An order was relayed through the M113 radio for the
companies to withdraw to the Battalion location at the Cỏ May Bridge. While moving south,
in the area of the New Market, the Airborne companies engaged small groups NVA infantry.
The Battalion Commander then ordered the 93rd and 94th Companies to return and retake the
Town. Very soon after, that force (92, 93, and 94 Companies with eight M113s) was ordered
to withdraw south to defend the Cỏ May Bridge together with a Marine Company.104 At
1500hrs, engineers blew the Cỏ May Bridge – and all movement from Bà Rịa to Vũng Tàu
was cut. The Việt Cộng had taken Phước Tuy. Our 90th and 91st Companies of the 9th
Battalion were still trapped at Láng Cát hamlet ((on Route 15, YS 295615)), and the 1st and 8
Battalions defending the Route 15 access north-eastern Phước Tuy were stuck. These
elements had to later find their way to Vũng Tàu by way of Long Sơn Island through
inundated terrain. Our men had to cross swamps and overcome many subsequent difficulties.
With the withdrawal of Phuoc Tuy Sector Headquarters personnel to Vũng Tàu,
Regional Forces throughout the Province had received no information on the developing
situation. The 327th Artillery Platoon position (two 105mm howitzers) - at Móng Ngựa (The
Horseshoe) on Đất Đỏ Town’s northern edge, was tasked to support Núi Nhọn (YS 580633 –
astride Route 23), Xuyên Mộc and Đất Đỏ. On the artillery radio net, the Platoon heard the
communist attacks on Đức Thạnh (155mm guns) and Núi Đất (155mm guns), and the fall of
those two positions. At midday on 28th April – and “abandoned by Sector” and their
protecting RF company, the Platoon left their positions and moved south - via the Minh Đạm
(Long Hải) Hills, to the sea-side village of Phước Tỉnh105 where they joined fleeing refugees
and other disbanded RF troops seeking to cross to the Vũng Tàu peninsula.106
Bà Rịa towns-people “welcome” NVA T-54/T-59 tanks – some days after the Battle.
104
“The memoir of Major General Nguyễn Duy Hinh – commander of the Bà Rịa Front, relates that “at 2pm on
27 April 1975, the Airborne Brigade was ordered to withdraw from Bà Rịa and defend the Cỏ May Bridge.”
Vương Hồng Anh , “Tưởng Niệm 30 Tháng 4 Năm 1975: Vòng Đai Sài Gòn …” (“A Requiem for 30 April
1975: The Saigon Belt – Battles in the Last Days of April 1975”), 26 April 2003.
105
Phước Tỉnh/Tĩnh village (YS 395505) - a prosperous fishing village of almost solely Catholic northerners,
was on a peninsula jutting towards Vũng Tàu. The village’s population in 1971 was 10,697 - 1 Psyops Unit,
Province Survey – Phuoc Tuy Province, Nui Dat, 1971.
106
The 327th RF Artillery Platoon’s dispersal is related in a personal account by Lê Thành Giai, “Những ngày
tháng 4 năm 1975” (“The days of April 1975”); Số phận những thông dịch viên người Việt bên cạnh quân viễn
chinh Mỹ (The fate of the Vietnamese interpreters with the American expeditionary forces), 2 April 2006. RF
from Xuyên Mộc brought a 105mm howitzer to Phước Tỉnh where it was abandoned. Lê Thành Giai travelled to
Vũng Tàu – then to Tân Thành (Gò Công Province) in the upper Mekong Delta. Giai moved to the US in 2000.
33
Cỏ May Bridge: Destroyed - and NVA Crossing Attempts

The 3rd NVA Sao Vàng Division History107 relates: “At 11.30am, the 11th Company
reported that it had seized the Cỏ May bridge. That news greatly enthused the Division
Headquarters. … While the Division Headquarters was organising its forces to advance and
attack Vũng Tàu, there was a sudden loud explosion from the south of Bà Rịa Town. The
Chief of Staff was concerned when told that the Cỏ May Bridge had been collapsed. On the
road from Bà Rịa down to Vũng Tàu, there were many bridges. Our soldiers of the 9th
Battalion – unfamiliar with the terrain, had driven the enemy back some three kilometres
down Route 15 over the Rạch ((ie canal/stream)) Hao to take the Rạch Bông Bridge –
thinking that it was the Cỏ May Bridge, so they had stopped there. Having destroyed the Cỏ
May Bridge, the enemy hoped that they would delay any fighting in Vũng Tàu and find ways
to flee by sea. So, from our plan to expand our attacks to seize Vũng Tàu by motorised
infantry, the Division had to re-organise and develop a completely different plan.”
On the night of 28 April, the communist forces launched probing attacks. The 9th
Airborne Battalion – with an armoured squadron and a Marine company was defending the
road from Bà Rịa Town south to the Cỏ May Bridge – four-and-a-half kilometres south of the
Town. At least two communist battalions advanced on the bridge, and General Hinh’s
operational headquarters was forced to withdraw south and establish his headquarters at the
Vietnamese Navy’s 33rd Naval Group ((Cát Lở /Rạch Dừa – YS 358523)) in order to control
his units – on the Vũng Tàu Peninsula.
Multiple authors, Lịch Sử Sư Đoàn Sao Vàng (The History of the Yellow Flag Division), Spring 1975,
107
Chapter 8, People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1984.

34
On the evening of 27 April 1975, the communist’s Liberation Radio announced: “the
armed forces and people of Phước Tuy and Biên Hòa provinces staged unrelenting offensives
and uprisings, fought vigorously and scored great victories. attacking and occupying and fully
controlling Phước Lễ city, otherwise known as Bà Rịa city, the Đức Thành, Ngãi Giao, Long
Lễ, Long Điền, Xuyên Mộc, Đất Đỏ and Phước Hải military subsectors and district capitals
in Phước Tuy Province. … isolating the enemy at Vũng Tàu port.”108
When the Cỏ May bridge was blown, some Airborne Brigade elements were still in
the Bà Rịa area and to its north-west on Route 15. As noted, an Airborne Brigade captain
recalled109: “at 3pm, the engineers detonated explosives and brought down the Cỏ May
Bridge – all movement from Phước Tuy to Vũng Tàu appeared to be interrupted. … The Việt
Cộng had seized Phước Tuy, and the 8th and 9st Companies of our 9th Airborne Battalion
were trapped at Láng Cát hamlet ((on Route 15, northeast of Bà Rịa Town)). These elements
had to subsequently find their way to Vũng Tàu by way of Long Sơn Island through the
waters of the Rừng Sát 110. They had to cross the swamps and so faced many difficulties. …
At the Cỏ May Bridge, the 93rd Company was responsible for the defence to the north and
northwest. The 94th looked after the east, and Captain Ruân’s 94th defended the west. In the
south, there was armour – and a Marine company nearby. … On the night of 28 April, the
enemy used small boats to cross the river and attack us, but were driven off – a number of our
soldiers in the 93rd Company were wounded and evacuated back to the hospital in Vũng Tàu.
… On the morning of 29 April, we were ordered to withdraw to Vũng Tàu. When we reached
the naval base at Cát Lở, we were ambushed by the Việt Cọng, and my M113 was hit by a B-
40 round which broke its track.”
The Cỏ May Bridge had not been fully collapsed by the Marine engineers due to lack
of explosives. Only one span (“nhịp”) had been collapsed, but that was “enough” and “the
enemy tanks were forced to stop”.111
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History described the RVNAF defences as follows112:
“The enemy forces located in Vũng Tàu under the command of Brigadier Bùi Thế Lân –
although in decline and unable to save the situation, remained stubborn and resolved to resist
to the end. For the defence, they were concentrated along Route 15 (now Route 51), the
cross-roads, high points such as Núi Lớn and Núi Nhỏ, and in their training centres. All of the
22nd [sic] Airborne Division [sic], the 4th Marine Battalion, and their Police Field Force were
concentrated in the defence of the Cỏ May and Cây Khế bridges, the Lam Sơn camp, the
108
“Reports cite PLAF victories in Southern Provinces”, 2200hrs GMT, 27 April 1975. VCAT Item No.
2132607039.
109
Mđ ((Red Beret)) Tường Vy, “Những ngày trong quân ngũ” (“Days in the ranks”), op.cit., April 2013.
110
The Rừng Sắc/Sác/Sát lies about 32 kilometres south-southeast of Sài Gòn and comprises about 1,250 square
kilometres of tidal swamp. Its population in 1968 was about 18,000. The Lòng Tàu River runs through the Rừng
Sác and connects Vũng Tàu/South China Sea with Sài Gòn. For a very detailed US report (circa mid-1968) on
the Rừng Sắc and the Việt Cộng Đoàn 10 Group (997-strong, including 211 guerrillas) see Haines, E.B., Rung
Sat Special Zone Intelligence Study, 1968 – VCAT Item No. 4000105007. For a comprehensive history of the
conflict in the Rừng Sắc to 1975 – in Vietnamese, see: Hồ Sĩ Thành, Đặc Khu Rừng Sác, Nhà Xuất Bản Trẻ,
2003.
111
“sức công phá chỉ đủ sập một nhịp mà thôi. Như thế cũng khá lắm rồi.” - Comments by Captain Hoàng Văn
Tuất (9th Airborne Battalion) in “Trận Chiến Cuối Cùng Của Tiểu Đoàn 9 Dù”. In Phạm Phong Dinh, THIẾU
TƯỚNG LÊ MINH ĐẢO VÀ SƯ ĐOÀN 18 BỘ BINH: CUỘC CHIẾN ĐẤU CUỐI CÙNG Ở XUÂN LỘC.
112
Trần Văn Khánh, … The History of the Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province, op.cit., Hà Nội, 2000, Vol II,
Chapter IX, p.160. That History also relates the activities of the Z24 Sapper Unit – comprising A19, A30, A31,
and A32, on Long Sơn island and the Vũng Tàu peninsula.
35
Rạch Bà bridge, and the Giếng Nước intersection. … The trainees at the Rural Development
Training Centre were defending the Bãi Sau ((Back Beach)), the Signals School was
defending the area of the Rạch Dừa harbour to Bến Đình and Bến Đá, while the Officer Cadet
School ((Thiếu Sinh Quân)) had responsibility for the Bãi Trước ((Front Beach)) area.”
The communist attacks on the Cỏ May Bridge were described in an account by a

senior 3rd Division regimental cadre – the 2ic of its 2nd Regiment113, relating that: “on the
afternoon of 27 April, as ((our 3rd Battalion)) moved towards Vũng Tàu on Route 15 ((just
south of Bà Rịa Town)), came to a collapsed bridge. We stopped at the edge of the river, and
reported to the 3rd Division Headquarters that the bridge defended by the enemy and the
water was deep and quick-flowing. … the bridge was just short of 100 metres in length with
swamps each side of its approaches … the southern end was higher and advantageous to the
enemy’s defence. The bridge was defended by about a Marine battalion with tanks, armoured
vehicles, and solid positions. The previous night, our water sappers from the Vũng Tàu City
Unit and COSVN military intelligence had attacked the bridge many times, but were
unsuccessful. … On the afternoon of the 27 April, the enemy had collapsed the bridge, and
driven all the people’s fishing boats from the area to deny those vessels to us. After
discussion, the ((2nd)) Regiment decided to task the 3rd Battalion to find a way of crossing the
river. From the night of the 27th to the morning of the 28th – under the command of the
Battalion commander Lê Đình Như, the 3rd Battalion attempted many crossings of the river,
but were blocked by the enemy’s firepower. …
Cỏ May Bridge “intact”– circa 1969. An aerial low-oblique photograph from the south-east.
Bà Rịa Town and Nui Dinh shown in the top right of the photograph.
One span was “dropped” by Marine engineers at 1500hrs on 27 April 1975.
113
Vũ Đình Tuyển (as related by Colonel Nguyễn Văn Hồng – the former deputy commander of the 2nd
Regiment/3rd Sao Vàng Division), “Ký ức Cầu Cỏ May” (“Memories of the Cỏ May Bridge”), 26 April 2015.
https://realsv.qdnd.vn/ho-so-su-kien/40-nam-chien-thang-vi-dai-30-4/ky-uc-cau-co-may-259940 . NVA Colonel
Nguyễn Văn Hồng’s detailed account of fighting in Bà Rịa and at the Cỏ May Bridge is also related in his 2015
prize-winning monograph/article: “Cầu Cỏ May, ngày ấy-bây giờ” (“The Cỏ May Bridge – then and now”) -
http://cuuchienbinh.vn/cau-co-may-ngay-ay-bay-gio/ .
36
Cỏ May Bridge - intact
The Advance to Vũng Tàu – the 3rd NVA Division Account

The 3rd NVA Division History continued: “The problem that immediately arose in
discussions at the Division Headquarters was how to cross the river? Secretly or by the
strength of our firepower? Was it possible to get our motorised/towed artillery across the
river? Another problem was how to fight and yet lessen civilian casualties. According to the
local cadre, Vũng Tàu’s population was more than 200,000 – three times its usual population.
Finally, the Headquarters decided that the main method to attack Vũng Tàu would be to cross
the river in two ways – secretly and to employ the strength of our supporting firepower. The
plan developed to principally use our firepower. Our motorized/towed artillery could destroy
large bases and block ships full of fleeing troops.
The employment of our forces was redetermined as follows: The 2nd Regiment would
attack on the main axis, cross the Cỏ May River, and follow the line of Route 15 straight into
the north of the City – seizing all of Núi Lớn. The 12 Regiment would attack on the important
axis of crossing the Phước Tỉnh/Tĩnh114 straits and - striking into the southeast of Vũng Tàu,
seize Núi Nhỏ and the administrative area. The 141st Regiment would deploy a battalion to
cross the swamp areas of Rạch Cá Đôi and seize Núi Nưa on Long Sơn Island. The two
remaining battalions would be the Division’s reserve force. Throughout the night of 27 April
and the 28 April, the units employed all methods to rapidly deploy to their concentration
areas. Despite fatigue and difficulties - and the need to delay the H-hour, our resolve to
liberate Vũng Tàu in the shortest time possible never changed.”
114
Phước Tĩnh/Tỉnh village (YS 395505) – a prosperous fishing village of Catholic northerners on a peninsula.
At its closest point, the water gap to the Vũng Tàu peninsula was about four kilometres (see the following map).
37
Sketch 3 (above): The Phước Lễ (Bà Rịa) Province Capital and Adjacent Areas115
The 3rd NVA Division History related: “At 0300hrs that day, exploiting the rise in the
tide that forced the enemy to withdraw from its positions in the mangroves on the other side,
our 2nd Regiment commander - Lê Đình Như, secretly sent two recoilless rifle ((DKZ))
companies across the river to seize a firm base for the regiment. However, just as our soldiers
landed in the mangroves, it became light – and the tide started to fall. The situation became
extremely bad. Having discovered that our forces had crossed the river, the enemy counter-
115
Nguyễn Đức Phương, The Hồ Chí Minh Campaign, the eastern and south-eastern fronts, UK, 2013.
http://www.quocgiahanhchanh.com/mattran_huongdong.htm See also: Nguyễn Đức Phương, Chiến tranh Việt
Nam toàn tập - từ trận đầu (Ấp Bắc, 1963) đến trận cuối (Sài Gòn, 1975), Lang Van, Toronto, 2001. Note:
symbols for communist elements are depicted with double-line frames (vide STANAG 2019).
38
attacked. Their tanks that had been hidden in anti-artillery trenches began to emerge and fired
into the 3rd Battalion’s ranks and across the surface of the river. The ((2nd)) Regiment order
its battalions to hold their ground, dig positions, and called for divisional firepower support.
Very soon, our artillery poured uninterrupted fire onto the other side of the bridge. Exploiting
this firepower, the remaining companies of the 3rd Battalion attempted to cross but failed as
the enemy’s heavy machine guns covered the river. Hugging the ground among the mangrove
roots, our soldiers engaged the enemy for seven hours. Their blood reddened the mud. By
midday, the situation had still not improved, but the enemy had not been able to drive them
out of the mangroves.
Meanwhile, on the eastern flank, the 5th Battalion of the 12th Regiment – with the
assistance of the people’s fishing vessels116, had crossed the Phước Tĩnh estuary/straits, and
had landed on a beach in the east and were moving southwards towards the City.
Accordingly, the Division’s Party Standing Committee decided it was necessary to reverse
the direction of our attack. The main attack would be by the 12th Regiment. This was a timely
and talented ((nhạy bén)) decision. If we had continued to concentrate our forces to cross the
Cỏ May Bridge, our drive would be delayed. However, our flanking attack ((mũi vu hồi))
from Phước Tĩnh had the factor of secrecy and significant surprise for a very strong blow in
our advance to Vũng Tàu. The enemy relied on the straits and the obstructing swamps and
marshes – and never suspected that the Division would make an amphibious landing from
that direction. The change in direction of the main attack brought about changes in the
employment of the Division’s firepower. The 7th Battalion – preparing to join the Cỏ May
Bridge attack, was swiftly deployed to Phước Tĩnh as a reserve element for the 12th
Regiment. The 37th Air Defence Battalion was also added to strengthen that flank. Our chief-
of-staff - Nguyễn Duy Thương, was tasked to directly command that main thrust.
Having received the Division’s orders, the 12th Regiment Headquarters mobilised
additional vessels from the people to immediately deploy the 4th and 6th Battalions across the
straits to closely support the 5th Battalion and strike deeply into Vũng Tàu. This drive would
seize Núi Lớn and divide the City, and block areas to the rear thereby preventing the enemy
fleeing by sea. Our artillery was allocated in three levels. Level 1 comprised recoilless rifles
and 12.8mm heavy machine guns; Level 2 was 105mm and 85mm artillery pieces; Level 3
grouped 130mm guns that were commanded by the 2ic of the 68th Regiment - Nguyễn Văn
Lưu. These elements would directly support our troops crossing the river and the strait – and
support the attacks.
3rd NVA Division towed artillery being ferried across the Cửa Lấp
from Phước Tĩnh
116
The Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Party History recounts: “On the afternoon of 28 April, the fishermen of Long Hương,
Phước Lễ, and Phước Tỉnh were directed to assemble all of their boats and prepare to ferry the troops across the
river in order to liberate Vũng Tàu. Trần Văn Khánh, … The History of the Party in Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu Province,
op.cit., Hà Nội 2000, Vol II, Chapter IX, p.159.
39
The situation changed very quickly once the 12th Regiment became the main thrust of
our attacks. At 0915hrs, they seized High Point 31 and the Chi Ling [sic] hamlet, and then
advanced to wipe out enemy element in the Thủy Vân recreational camp. To support the
crossing of the Cỏ May River by the 2nd Regiment – which at that time had become an
important axis, the Division ordered two companies of the 6th Battalion to cross a sand hill of
nearly a thousand metres and, in a surprise attack, seize Phước Thành hamlet ((YS351516))
beside Route 15 in order to isolate the enemy at the Cỏ May Bridge ((about nine kilometres
to the north-east)) from the City’s centre. This second move greatly disturbed the enemy
Battle of Phước Thành Memorial (29 April 1975) – inaugurated in 2012 117
stuck at their key position at the Cỏ May Bridge. Taking the initiative, the 2nd Regiment
launched a new series of attacks against the far bank of the river. After a period of desperate
defence, the enemy’s infantry and tanks fled back to the Cây Khế Bridge ((YS 369541)),
breaking into smaller groups and withdrawing to Vũng Tàu. However – on reaching Phước
Thành, they were struck from both sides of the road by the 2nd Company of the 6th Battalion.
Large numbers of tanks and GMC trucks were set on fire. The remainder fled for their lives
to Vũng Tàu. Our soldiers of the 3rd Battalion and the 6th Battalion met in the middle of the
road. The 3rd Battalion commander - Lê Đình Như, embraced the deputy political officer of
the 6th Battalion Nguyễn Trọng Ba. … 30 minutes later, the two battalions were ordered to
jointly continue towards the City. Marines intended to destroy the Rạch Bá Bridge with
explosives, but were too late. The 2nd Company of the 3rd Battalion confronted the enemy and
focused their firepower on the pillars on both sides of the bridge. At 1800hrs, the 3rd Battalion
117
Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu media, “Tượng đài trận đánh Phước Thành” (“Memorial for the Battle of Phước Thành”),
21 June 2017. The withdrawing RVNAF forces were ambushed by the 62nd Company/6th Battalion of the 3rd
NVA Division’s 12th Regiment.
40
seized the Yên Thế naval base to the welcoming shouts of the people of the Thắng Nhứt
ward.
At that time, all the troops of the 2nd Regiment had crossed over the Cỏ May River –
and using enemy vehicles, had penetrated deep into the centre of the City. In the east, the 12th
Regiment had also entered the City directly in small groups. After analysing the situation, the
((3rd NVA)) Division commander ordered our artillery to cease firing on targets in the City,
and to move its fire to block sea-going vessels and to control and threaten the harbours.
The Advance to Vũng Tàu

– the Account of the 2nd Regiment/3rd NVA Division
More specifically, the 2ic of the 2nd Regiment - Nguyễn Văn Hồng, related: 118
“Faced with this disadvantageous situation at the Cỏ May bridge, the Headquarters of the 3rd
Division decided to change the main direction of our attack to the east. The 12th Regiment
moved to Long Hải [sic] and mobilised the people’s fishing vessels to cross the 1,000 metres
water gap and advance to Vũng Tàu. The 2nd Regiment became the secondary axis of attack
and continued to face difficulties … . the enemy were in solid defensive positions at the Cỏ
May Bridge, and we were unable to cross. Many who tried were struck by fire and killed. On
the night of the 28th April – and exploiting the Division’s firepower, the 3rd Battalion
launched further attacks … . At about 0300hrs on 29 April, led by its battalion commander Lê
Đình Như, the 3rd Battalion attempted to cross the river when the tide fell … but were driven
back by the enemy tank fire and the extensive swamps. Lê Đình Như ordered two companies
equipped with recoilless rifles (DKZ) to attack the Cỏ May Bridge … .
At 9am on 29 April, when the 12th Regiment had crossed the Cửa Lấp estuary from
Phước Tĩnh village on the way to Vũng Tàu, a company from the 6th Battalion broke off from
the formation of the 12th Regiment and advanced down Route 15 as a cut-off group to out-
flank and get behind the enemy Marines who were defending the southern end of the bridge –
and destroyed two enemy M113s at Phước Thành hamlet. Having been attacked by surprise
from the flank and the rear, all the enemy forces defending the southern end of the ((Cỏ
May)) bridge fled down to Vũng Tàu. Seizing the opportunity, the 3rd Battalion and our
forces on Route 15 poured across the Cỏ May bridge.
Fighting in Vũng Tàu – the 3rd NVA Division119 Advances
“At 0135hrs on 30 May, our 4th Battalion opened fire and seized the Engineer
Training Centre. In the south, the 5th Battalion – the 12 Regiment’s flanking force, attacked
Núi Bé [sic] at 0500hrs completely seizing the lighthouse area and the peak of the hill to the
south – killing and capture hundreds of the enemy, seizing 30 military vehicles including six
tanks and armoured vehicles.
118
Vũ Đình Tuyển (as related by NVA Colonel Nguyễn Văn Hồng – the former deputy commander of the 2nd
Regiment/3rd Sao Vàng Division), “Ký ức Cầu Cỏ May” (“Memories of the Cỏ May Bridge”), 26 April 2015.
https://realsv.qdnd.vn/ho-so-su-kien/40-nam-chien-thang-vi-dai-30-4/ky-uc-cau-co-may-259940 .
119
41
Map: showing the advance of 12th Regiment/3rd NVA Division; ARVN Brigade elements
“A” and “B”; the Hills: Núi Lớn, Núi Nhỏ; and the Grand and Palace Hotels.
At 0430hrs on 30 April, the 2nd Regiment had attacked and seized the Radio Relay
Communications Centre, the radar towers, Bến Đình, and High Point 236. Anticipating the
enemy’s withdrawal route, one of our groups moved to Bến Đa and took the parking area
capturing 500 enemy, and 29 vehicles including seven tanks. The fighting continued – most
fiercely in the centre of the City at the Palace Hotel ((“K/S Palace” - YS275438)) which was
the last engagement of the campaign.”
42
Departure from Vũng Tàu

The 3rd ARVN Infantry Division account 120 relates: “On the morning of 29 April
1975 – as it became light, the communist forces fiercely shelled all locations within Vũng
Tàu City. … Vũng Tàu became an oasis [sic] just awaiting the enemy forces to flood in.
There were no forces defending the City in these hours after the withdrawal of the Marine
Division and the Airborne Brigade under Colonel Nguyễn Văn Ðỉnh. Within the Vũng Tàu
Special Zone, there was only the Military Police Academy and the ARVN Junior Military
Academy. Other units – such as the Signals School, the Rạch Dừa Police Training Centre, the
Chí Linh ((Rural Development)) Centre, the Region 3 Naval Coastal Headquarters – as well
as the Special Zone Headquarters, had all lost contact. … .”
“At 0730hrs, the communists shelled the Vũng Tàu Special Zone Headquarters, the
harbour, and the National Police Training Centre. The situation became progressively more
numbing as the North Vietnamese forces directed their heavy artillery against Bãi Trước
((Front Beach)) and Bến Đá – two areas in which many of our military and civilians had
concentrated. On the morning of 30 April – after President Dương Văn Minh had announced
the surrender121 and requested our units to remain in place awaiting the take-over, the City of
Vũng Tàu had been lost into the hands of the North Vietnamese communists.”122
ARVN troops had “commandeered” a number of vessels123 in Vũng Tàu. On 30 April,
the remaining Airborne Brigade troops – under its commander Colonel Nguyễn Văn Đỉnh,
sailed124 to nearby Vàm Láng – 20 kilometres west of Vũng Tàu City, a small town on the
Tiền Giang River in Gò Công Province.125 With heavy fighting yet to break out in the
Mekong Delta’s Military Region 4/IV Corps, Colonel Đỉnh and Major Ngô Tùng Châu
(Commander, 1st Airborne Battalion) travelled to Saigon to “receive orders”126 and evacuate
120
Alamit, “The 3rd Infantry Division, RVNAF – Vũng Tàu, April 1975” (“SƯ ĐOÀN 3 BB QLVNCH -
VŨNG TÀU ● 4/1975”) - edited by alamit; 05-03-2013. http://ydan.org/showthread.php?t=23720&page=6
121
Senior officers of the RVNAF Joint General Staff (JGS) departed Vietnam on 28 April, and President Dương
Văn Minh appointed Major General Vĩnh Lộc to head the JGS. On announcing the surrender, President Minh
declared Saigon an “open city” – and such also limited further casualties. For an account of the departures of
RVNAF senior officers and Brigadier Khôi’s “re-education” until 1992, see Trần Quang Khôi – Brigadier
General, Role of the Army …, 14 pages, Virginia, 1 October 1995. VCAT Item No. 13370611002.
122
Mđ ((Red Beret)) Tường Vy, “Những ngày trong quân ngũ”, op.cit., April 2013.
123
Vietnamese Navy (VNN) vessels left their Saigon base at 2300hrs on 29 April for the South China Sea.
Under the VNN Fleet Commander Phạm Mạnh Khuê, the vessels sailed to Côn Sơn Island – with a consolidated
26 VNN vessels carrying RVNAF personnel and refugees then sailing to Subic Bay in the Philippines. See
Khuê’s summary letter to US Admiral Zumwalt, 6 March 1975. VCAT Item No. 4820103013.
124
The Airborne Brigade elements were principally aboard the vessel “Vĩnh Nguyên” – a wooden-hulled vessel
that traded between Saigon and Hong Kong.
125
Nguyễn Bá Toản - 242 ((Callsign 11th Company, 1st Airborne Battalion)), “Trận đánh cuối cùng của Tiểu
Đoàn 1 Nhảy Dù tại mặt trận Long Khánh và Cuộc vượt biển có một không hai của QLVNCH, Lữ Đoàn I Nhảy
Dù Vượt biển Đông” (“The Last Battles of the 1st Airborne Battalion on the Long Khánh Front … the 1 st
Airborne Brigade crosses the South China Sea – 30/4/1975”), 29 April 2016.
126
After the fall of Xuân Lộc, some senior RVNAF officers recommended abandoning Military Region 3 – and
Saigon, and defending Military Region 4 and the Mekong Delta provinces, with a headquarters in Cần Thơ (170
kilometres south-east of Saigon). “We planned to move everything to Cần Thơ and try to hold the Delta – and
set up a resistance movement. … because Hanoi cannot move tanks and heavy equipment in this area.”.
“However, there is no evidence that such a plan … was ever seriously considered by the Joint General Staff.
“Hosmer, S.T., Kellen, K., Jenkins, B.M., The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and
Civilian Leaders, R-2208-OSD (HIST), Rand, Santa Monica, December 1978, p.123. This work - written for the
Office of the US Secretary of Defense, provides insights on the 1973 Peace Agreement, the loss of Phước Long
Province, and the fall of Saigon. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/reports/2005/R2208.pdf .
43
their families. Before departing, Colonel Đỉnh told his Airborne Brigade troops that: “We’ll
all go together, we’ll emigrate and live in Australia.”127 The troops were given the choice of
returning to their families or sailing from Vietnam. At 2230hrs on 30 April, vessels carrying
the Airborne Brigade headquarters and its 8th and 9th Battalions sailed into the South China
Sea.128
The “Last Stand” at the Palace Hotel (YS 275438) 129

“The Palace Hotel was a nine-storey building standing by the seaside in the south of
the City. A group of enemy officers had concentrated there, awaiting sea-going vessels for
their escape. Looking at the tall, imposing building, the 2ic of the 6th Battalion - Lê Anh
Kiên, was unable to take the site - but ordered his 61st Company to occupy surrounding
defences and to take any prisoners. Around dawn, a ((ARVN)) tank leading six troop-laden
GMC trucks came from the beach area into the 61st Company’s positions, The Company’s
political officer - Nguyễn Viết Năng, led our troops in capturing the whole enemy group that
included Major Bình. Bình revealed that there were 400 to 500 enemy officers and soldiers
within the Hotel. They had detained refugees on the lower floors as shields against our
attacks. This situation was reported to the battalion and to the regiment. The 12th Regiment’s
political officer Trần Hữu Biển ordered: “Use ((Major)) Bình to call upon the enemy to
surrender – if they are stubborn, attack. Find all ways to get the civilians out first.
Palace Hotel
As it got light on 30 April, the 6th Battalion re-positioned its forces and began military
proselytising activities – but the enemy were silent and unresponsive, refusing to surrender.
The 6th Battalion opened fire. Our troops launched several attacks but were driven back by
127
Nguyễn Bá Toản - 242 ((Callsign 11th Company, 1st Airborne Battalion)), “Trận đánh cuối cùng của Tiểu
Đoàn 1 Nhảy Dù tại mặt trận …”, op.cit., 29 April 2016. In Vietnamese: “chúng ta sẽ cùng nhau đi sang Úc Đại
Lợi định cư.” : “nghe anh Đỉnh tuyên bố với AE ((anh em)) đại khái như: sẽ đưa AE sang Úc định cư, v.v.”
128
Ibid. With US assistance, the Airborne troops and some dependants sailed to Subic Bay (Philippines), then
by air to Guam and the US. Many settled in the Pennsylvania area.
129
44
the fire of the enemy’s heavy machine guns and grenades. Directly commanding the fighting,
the Regiment’s deputy commander - Nguyễn Hồng Sơn, ordered continuous fire for 30
minutes to support our troops scaling the walls into an adjacent building and, using grenades
to destroy the doors to the lower floors, led the refugees out. Next, our troops moved to the
south through the alleys of the people’s housing area and attacked the flank of the Hotel.
Gaining those metres of ground was very bloody. The commander of the 3rd Platoon/63rd
Company was killed – and his deputy replaced him. The deputy commanders of the 1st and
2nd Platoons were seriously wounded but continued to lead their units and wiped out the
enemy’s heavy machine gun posts. A B.41 ((RPG-7)) grenadier - Đinh Sĩ Cương, fired four
rounds, but was still unable to defeat the enemy on the fourth floor. From the rear, a soldier
of the 62nd Company swiftly carried a heavy machine gun up the slope of the adjacent hill
and provided fire support for his comrades’ unit. The enemy’s firing positions were
suppressed, but that brave young soldier was killed by fire from another enemy heavy
machine gun.
At the ((3rd NVA)) Division Headquarters – while everyone was closely following the
battle at the Palace Hotel, the commander of the reconnaissance section - Nguyễn Khác Vẽ,
reported that Dương Văn Minh ((President, Republic of Vietnam)) was calling for a ceasefire
in order to hand-over government. Comrade Vẽ switched on Radio Saigon for everyone to
hear the taped announcement that ran repeatedly. The Division’s political officer - Mai Tân,
exchanged ideas in a meeting with the Standing Party Committee and, immediately after, a
signal message was sent down to all units - advising: “The enemy is using political tricks to
restrict our victory. The Division’s orders are for the troops to continue their attacks and
suppress all of the enemy’s final resisting outposts. They have to be completely wiped out.
They are absolutely not to retain their weapons.”
At that time, the 12th Regiment was preparing a new assault on the Palace Hotel. The
floors of the Hotel had been successive seized by the Sao Vàng soldiers. Finally, unable to
withstand the daily-increasing pressure of our infantry and their firepower, the enemy was
forced to raise a white flag – and announced their surrender by a loud-speaker. We then
ceased fire. Our soldiers stood in the stairways checking each enemy group as they descended
from the various floors. More than 400 enemy were lined up in ranks from the Hotel’s
veranda to the front gate.
With the Palace Hotel now seized, the 6th Battalion had crushed a principal outpost of
the most stubborn enemy in the City. At 1100 hrs in the late morning, the whole of Vũng Tàu
City had been completely liberated. In the Headquarters at this time, no-one spoke to any-one
as all were listening to the radio – but we couldn’t find the Saigon Radio broadcast at all.
Everyone believed that our units that had advanced into the centre of Vũng Tàu City now had
to be ready to move to Saigon on command. However, soon after, all were again able to tune
to Radio Saigon. The voice however was not that of the announcer, but the puppet President
Dương Văn Minh making the unconditional surrender declaration. Saigon had been
liberated.”130
Post-War, a memorial plaque was affixed to the Palace Hotel on 27 July 2017.131
130
The 3rd NVA Division History adds that while communist forces were occupying Military Region 4 and the
Mekong Delta provinces, the Division’s 6th Battalion embarked on 2 May 1975 to liberate the “prison-islands”
of the Côn Đảo archipelago in the South China Sea.
131
Ngọc Linh, “Lễ Khánh thành Bia ghi công trận đánh khách sạn Palace” (“Plaque Inauguration Ceremony –
Palace Hotel Battle”), Vũng Tàu City On-line News, August 2017. Bùi Hương, “Khách sạn Palace - dấu ấn lịch
sử” (“The Palace Hotel – an historical landmark”), Ba Ria - Vũng Tàu News On-line, 23 July 2017 ((“M19”
should be “M79”)). Đức Trung, “Bia ghi công trận đánh Khách sạn Palace, địa chỉ đỏ giáo dục truyền thống bất
khuất và tinh thần yêu nước của cha ông.” Thành Phố Vũng Tàu On-line, 26 March 2015.
45
Palace Hotel – Plaque Inauguration – 27 July 2017
Accounts of the action at the Palace Hotel are also included in the D445 Battalion
2004 History (see Annex B) and Đất Đỏ District History 2006 (see Annex D).
Conclusion
In mid-November 1972 during the Paris peace negotiations, President Richard

Nixon reportedly gave President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu his “absolute assurance” that the
United States would “take swift and severe retaliatory action” and “respond with full
force” if Hanoi violated the pending cease-fire once it was in place. 132
Subsequently - without US military and financial support, victory to the determined
communist enemy was inevitable. US congressional restraints on aid to the South “crushed
South Vietnamese morale and emboldened the North Vietnamese. … the South Vietnamese
could not defend everywhere. Because of the country’s geographical features - not because of
a lack of RVNAF willingness to fight – U.S. airpower was needed to stem a major
offensive.”133
The Aftermath
Re-education – and “Resistance Remnants”
With the communist victory, a “blood-bath” - although feared by many, did not occur.
Nor were communist “people’s courts set up on every corner”. 134 While most general-
132
Gwertzman, B., “Thieu Aide Discloses Promises of Force by Nixon to Back Pact”, New York Times, 1 May
1975. The contents of letters to President Thiệu were reportedly disclosed by Nguyễn Tiến Hưng, South
Vietnam’s former Minister of Development and Planning. See also Professor Hưng’s 2005 book: Khi Đồng
Minh Tháo Chạy (When Your Ally Cuts and Runs); and 2010: Tâm Tư Tổng Thống Thiệu (In the Mind of
President Thieu). Both books were published by Hứa Chấn Minh Publishing, San Jose – California.
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/library/world/asia/050175vietnam-thieu-bg.html
133
Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., pp.497-498.
134
Bùi Tín, From Enemy to Friend: A North Vietnamese Perspective on the War, Naval Institute Press,
Annapolis, 2002, p.119. For Bùi Tín’s background, see footnote 1 in this Note. For a negative critique of Bùi
46
ranking RVNAF officers had fled Vietnam, five committed suicide , and several were
detained by the communist forces.135
Following the surrender, South Vietnamese military personnel – along with public
officials, were required to report, register, and be “re-educated”. They were falsely told that
re-education would take only up to 30 days.136 Reportedly, some “300,000” underwent re-
education.137
Tín, see NVA Colonel Bùi Biên Thùy’s article: “Paper Scorns Article by Dissident Bui Tin”, Vietnam News
Agency, Hà Nội, 16 February 1992. VCAT Item No. 2360105016.
135
Those who committed suicide were: Brigadier-General Trẩn Văn Hai (7th Infantry Division), Brigadier
General Lê Nguyên Vỹ (5th Infantry Division), Brigadier General Lê Văn Hưng (IV Corps), Major General
Nguyễn Khoa Nam (IV Corps), and Major General Phạm Văn Phú (II Corps). Colonel Hồ Ngọc Cẩn – the
former Province Chief of Chương Thiện, was publicly executed on 14 August 1975. For an account of the “last
days”, “fleeing” RVNAF senior officers and “re-education – 17 years”, see: Trần Quang Khôi – Brigadier
General, Role of the Army …, 14 pages, Virginia, 1 October 1995. VCAT Item No. 13370611002.
136
On 10 June 1975, “revolutionary authorities indicated that the course would last 3 days for ordinary soldiers,
10 days for Junior officers or middle echelon civil servants and one month for senior officers and officials when
the re-education programme was announced on June 10. The fact that the length of the courses could be
extended was not set out precisely on that date.” – De Nerciat, A., “Saigon Denies Rumours Former ARVN
Officers Killed”, Saigon, 11 July 1975.
137
Trương Như Tảng, Journal of a Viet Cong, Jonathan Cape, London, 1986. The author was a PRG Minister
who – disaffected principally by the post-War communist regime’s “side-lining” of Southern communists, fled
Vietnam by boat in August 1978.
47
Re-education – Tây Ninh Province

For senior NCOs and officers, conditions in remote re-education (cải tạo) camps were
harsh – those closest to Núi Đất were at Xuyên Mộc and on the Long Khánh border in the
former US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment base at Long Giao/“Blackhorse”. Some officers
served very long sentences – of over 10 years. Some were summarily executed – including
intelligence officers. Three senior officers associated with the 1st Australian Task Force in
Phước Tuy served from seven to nine years– including in the harshest camps in the North.
Colonel Nguyễn Bá Trước – the Phước Tuy Province Chief from 1967 to 1970, underwent
re-education in the North (Hà Nam Ninh Province) for 12 years.138 Bùi Trọng Nghĩa – the
Phước Tuy Province Police Chief in 1969, did nine “hard” years - mostly in the North.
Huỳnh Bá Phụng, the OC of the 10th Military Intelligence Detachment (10 MID - that
supported Detachment 1st Divisional Intelligence Unit) was in the camps for seven years.
138
Colonel Nguyễn Bá Trước (b. 1922) – the Phước Tuy Province Chief from September 1967 to September
1970 (then CofS 7th ARVN Infantry Division), underwent re-education in a camp in Hà Nam Ninh Province
(northern Vietnam) from early June 1975 until his release on 9 September 1987. Soon after Colonel Trước’s
release in September 1987, he left Vietnam under the UNHCR’s Orderly Departure Program (ODP). VCAT
Item No. 1849048040000. The ODP was initiated in 1979, and by 1998 about 623,000 Vietnamese had
reportedly left Vietnam under the Program (about 74% to the US, 3.1% to France – and 7.5% to Australia). The
Province Chiefs of Phước Tuy from 1962 to April 1975 – all ARVN officers, were successively: Hồ Văn Phang,
Lê Đức Đạt, Nguyễn Bá Trước, Nguyễn Văn Tú, Trần Đình Bích, Huỳnh Bửu Sơn, and Phạm Ngọc Lân.
Colonel Lê Đức Đạt was killed in action on 24 April 1972 in Kontum Province while serving as the commander
of the 22nd Infantry Regiment/commander of the Tân Cảnh Front.
48
A Re-education (Cải Tạo) Camp – Location not known 139
The D445 History (2016) 140 details the Battalion’s role in re-education and the
“pursuit of puppet remnants” as follows:
“445 Battalion was tasked as the Province concentrated mobile force to be the nucleus
to engage the stubborn puppet military and puppet authorities. … On 8 June 1975, the
COSVN Military Committee promulgated Directive No. 27-CT-75 on the pursuit and re-
education of enemy officers and soldiers. That Directive clearly stated: ‘We must resolutely
attack and wipe out the ringleader groups of the enemy that are still stubbornly hiding among
the people and in the jungle. At the same time, in accordance with the lenient policy of the
revolution, we will establish re-education camps for the puppet officers and soldiers and
puppet authorities who had erred and lost their way so that they can become honest citizens.
…
The number of puppet soldiers and authorities who had surrendered in-place was quite
large (about 100,000). In that number, there was still a large proportion who had not reported
to the revolutionary administration (the majority of whom were wicked officers who had a
blood debt to the people). These people took the opportunity to hide in religious zones and
places that were difficult to access such as jungle areas in Xuyên Mộc, the Minh Đạm
Mountains (Long Đất), the Núi Nhỏ Mountain (Vũng Tàu), the Núi Dinh – Núi Thị Vải
Mountains (Bà Rịa), and the island of Long Sơn. The enemy’s operational scheme was to
make contact and consolidate their forces in order to conduct activities to cause trouble,
conduct sabotage, and to disrupt public order. … …
At the same time as continuing with its task of pursuing the defeated enemy remnants,
in September 1975, 445 Battalion’s cadre and soldiers participated in the X2 Campaign (re-
139
Lê Xuân Mỹ/Gấumisa, “Tôi, đứa con người tù học tập cải tạo” (“I took people to re-education camps”), 22
November 2017. Website: Hồn Việt (http://hon-viet.co.uk) ; http://phonhonews.com/toi-dua-con-nguoi-tu-hoc-
tap-cai-tao-ky-le-xuan-my%CC%83/ .
140
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion …, op.cit., 2016, pp.180-187.
49
educating the bourgeoisie and the comprador class); and the X3 Campaign (currency
exchange involving cancellation of the monetary system of the old Sài Gòn government and
issuing the currency of the Vietnam National Bank).141 …
To summarise the series of pursuit operations from 30 April to 15 December 1975, in
the whole of Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, 445 Battalion combined with higher units and our militia
and guerrillas of the villages and the town wards to conduct hundreds of pursuit operations –
both large and small, capturing hundreds of surrendered soldiers and seizing a large quantity
of military equipment. 21,274 puppet soldiers were rounded up - together with 9,490 puppet
administrators, and all were taken to undergo study and re-education.142 … By June 1976,
almost all of the large and stubborn armed groups of the enemy’s remnants in the Bà Rịa –
Vũng Tàu area had been wiped out.
The report of the Đồng Nai Province Unit also clearly advised that: “in the Châu
Thành area ((including part of the former Duc Thanh District)), there were groups and
counter-revolutionary organisations such as: ‘The Front to Destroy Communism’, ‘The
National Front to Liberate the People’, and ‘The Joint Anti-Communist Front’. Armed groups
had the titles of the ‘318th Regiment’ (in the Dinh – Thị Vải Mountains) and the ‘Special
Task Regiment’ (in the Phước Thắng road area). There were also the ‘Đông Sơn’, the ‘Hoàng
Quỳnh’ and the ‘Quý Sơn Đằng’ Secret Zones etc. These counter-revolutionary groups
operated clandestinely - making contacts and building their forces, and awaiting for the time
to overthrow the government.143
In 1978, within Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, we captured and forced the surrender of 1,217,
seized 151 weapons of various types, seven grenades, more than 2,000 rounds of
ammunition, and a number of documents. We also stopped 193 illegal attempts to leave the
country by sea, detaining 4,731 people, and seizing 14 weapons, 11 grenades etc”
The Phước Tuy Diaspora
In 2006, a community of “overseas Vietnamese”144 (“Người Việt hải ngoại”/Việt

kiều”) in California founded the “Hội Đồng Hương Bà Rịa - Phước Tuy” (“The Bà Rịa -
Phước Tuy Fellowship Association”).
141
In late September 1975, the currency in South Vietnam – the Republic of Vietnam piastre (đồng), was
changed to a "liberation đồng" worth 500 former “Southern đồng”.
142
According to the D440 Battalion History (2011): “In Bà Rịa-Long Khánh, there was one combined camp –
comprising four camps in the area of Hoàng Diệu (the rear base of the 43rd Regiment of the 18th Division) and a
camp in the area behind Chứa Chan Mountain and the Rừng Lá area (Xuân Hòa village beside Bình Trung and
the Suối Râm area).” A camp was also reportedly established in southern Long Khanh Province at Long Giao
(the site of the former US 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment base). There were also apparently “study and re-
education camps” (“trại học tập cải tạo”) farther south in the former Phước Tuy Province – principally in
Xuyên Mộc District, including at Bàu Lâm (ie the Thừa Tích area), Hồ Tràm, Sau Ac, T345, and TH6.
143
The National United Front for the Liberation of Vietnam (NUFRONLIV) was the largest of a number of anti-
communist resistance movements which were created in the years after 1975 by members of the Vietnamese
refugee community – principally those living on the west coast of the United States. Colonel Võ Đại Tôn – a
former ARVN Special Forces officer, escaped to Malaysia in 1975 before settling as a refugee in Australia. In
November 1981, he was captured in the Lao-Vietnamese border area while reportedly on an armed
reconnaissance mission. Tried and imprisoned in Hanoi, he was subsequently released and returned to Australia
in mid-November 1991.
144
Within Vietnam, overseas Vietnamese – about 4.5 million, are referred to as “Việt kiều” – “sojourners”. Most
overseas Vietnamese prefer the term “Người Việt hải ngoại” – literally “overseas Vietnamese”.
50
The Association has an active website145 – and organises reunions and cultural events. Their
website includes a history section that has articles on several battles including: the Battle of
Binh Giã (December 1964 – January 1965), the Battle of Long Tân (18 August 1966) – two
articles; and the April 2011 article by Captain Lê Ngọc Báu titled: “The Final Battle at the
Phước Tuy Sector’s Logistic Support Centre”.
ANNEXES:
A. D445 Battalion History (2011) – Extracts.
B. D445 Battalion History (2016) – Extracts.
C. Châu Đức District History (2014) – Extracts.
D. Đất Đỏ District History (2006) – Extracts.
E. Bùi Hương, “The Palace Hotel – an historical landmark”, 23 July 2017.
F. The 274th and 275th VC Main Force Regiments, and the 33rd NVA Regiment
– the 1975 Offensive.
145
http://www.bariaphuoctuy.org/
51
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55
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56
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phong-Vung-Tau-261859/
57
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Battle in Baria”), Việt Báo On-Line, 26 April 2005.
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26-4-1975-kich-chien-o-ba-ria-2/
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xuan-loc-thang-tu-1975-mu-do-trinh-an/
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2013 – for an account by an Airborne soldier.
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58
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Item No. 13370146001.
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Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Army Publishing House), Hà Nội, 1977.
Veith, G.J. and Pribbenow, M.L. II, “Fighting is an Art: The Army of the Republic of
Vietnam’s Defense of Xuân Lộc - 9-21 April 1975”, The Journal of Military History, Vol 8,
No.1, Lexington, January 2004.
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York, 2012.
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Phạm Văn Phúc”), Hưng Việt, 22 September 2006.
Vũ Đình Tuyển (as related by Colonel Nguyễn Văn Hồng – the former deputy commander of
the 2nd Regiment/3rd Sao Vàng Division), “Ký ức Cầu Cỏ May” (“Memories of the Cỏ May
Bridge”), 26 April 2015. https://realsv.qdnd.vn/ho-so-su-kien/40-nam-chien-thang-vi-dai-30-
4/ky-uc-cau-co-may-259940
Vương Hồng Anh, “Đại Tướng Cao Văn Viên Kể Lại Chiến Sự 1975: Mặt Trận Biên Hòa,
Bà Rịa Tuần Lễ Cuối Tháng 4-1975” (“General Cao Văn Viên Relates the Battles of 1975:
The Biên Hòa, and Bà Rịa Fronts in the Last Weeks of April 1975”, Việt Báo On-Line, 15
December 2001. https://vietbao.com/a6307/dai-tuong-cao-van-vien-ke-lai-chien-su-1975-
mat-tran-bien-hoa-ba-ria-tuan-le-cuoi-thang-4-1975
Vương Hồng Anh , “Tưởng Niệm 30 Tháng 4 Năm 1975: Vòng Đai Sài Gòn, Trận Chiến
Những Ngày Cuối Tháng 4-75” (“A Requiem for 30 April 1975: The Saigon Belt – Battles in
the Last Days of April 1975”), 26 April 2003. https://vietbao.com/a92096/tuong-niem-30-
thang-4-nam-1975-vong-dai-sai-gon-tran-chien-nhung-ngay-cuoi-thang-4-75
Willbanks, J.H. Lieutenant Colonel (Retd), The Last 55 Days, Leavenworth, 15-17 April
1999. VCAT Item No. 3400102001.
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Orleans, 19-22 April 2000. VCAT Item No. 3400102003.
Xuân Thanh, “Tiểu đoàn 445 Trong Tiến Công Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” (“445 Battalion in
the Attack on Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh”), pp.129-131 in Lê Hoàng Quân, Chiến Thắng Xuân
Lộc – Long Khánh Trong Cuộc Tổng Tiến Công và Nổi Dậy Mùa Xuân 1975 (The Xuân Lộc
– Long Khánh Victory in the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising), Nhà Xuất Bản Tổng Hợp,
Đồng Nai, 2004. (437 pages – comprising chapters by 77 senior NVA cadre and historians).
Board Game: “Defiance: The Battle of Xuan Loc”. A Vietnam War Game, Sweden. VCAT
Item No. 1078museum0691.
59
The Cỏ May Bridge Victory Monument – inaugurated in February 2007

60
Annex A
D445 Battalion History 2011 - Extracts
Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story, Point Lonsdale, 2011. pp.92-
96:
To strengthen our forces in important areas of the Military Region and also those of
COSVN, 445 Battalion was deployed from the Long Đất area up to Xuân Lộc. At this time,
the momentum of the Revolution’s attacks was like a rising tide or a crashing waterfall. Our
troops and the people of the whole South were preparing to launch the “Historic 1975 Spring
Campaign”. Now, liberating a strategic area was not just the sole responsibility of a local unit
or a main-force unit. It demanded high-level tactical coordination between all forces. The
peak of the multi-faceted people’s war waged by the whole nation had arrived, and the time
was ripe. The significance of this prodded 445 Battalion’s cadre and soldiers to improve
themselves in all aspects and strive to keep pace with events.
At this time, there were also changes among the principal cadre of 445 Battalion.
Comrade Tám Tổng was the Battalion commander. Comrade Nguyễn Văn Quang – an armed
forces hero, had studied in the North in the period 1968 to March 1972 and returned to 445
Battalion to take up the position of Battalion second-in-command. Now, he was both second-
in-command and chief-of-staff. Comrade Bùi Chính was the political officer - and
concurrently was the secretary of the Battalion’s Party Committee. On 21 March 1975, 445
Battalion attacked a Regional Forces company at Ông Quế village (the Ông Quế plantation)
on Route 2 in Xuân Lộc.
At 8am, when the last rounds fired by the 4th Company had exploded, the whole
Battalion simultaneously attacked on three axes (with a company on each axis) and cut the
Regional Force company’s position into many small clustered groups. The enemy had not
been able to recover from this surprise shelling - when they were unexpectedly assaulted in
daylight. Although the enemy’s defensive positions were well-developed, after only 20
minutes the Regional Forces company in the Ông Quế plantation had disintegrated. Ông Quế
was the first village on the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh battlefield to be completely liberated in the
1975 Spring Campaign.
With the impetus of that victory, only a few days later 445 Battalion advanced along
Route 2 to liberate the hamlets of Bảo Bình 1 and Bảo Bình 2, destroyed the enemy at Lò
Than Mountain - and then turned to Route 1, liberated Bảo Hòa hamlet, inflicted heavy
casualties on two battalions of Regional Forces at Bình Phú and Bảo Toàn, and interdicted
two kilometres of Route 1 isolating Long Khánh Town (Xuân Lộc) from the south. During
this time, the devastating attack to smash “the steel gate of Xuân Lộc” also took shape. 445
Battalion – together with K8 (Xuân Lộc), the 34th Company, the 41st Company (Châu Đức),
and the 207th Company (Cao Su District) formed a force equivalent to a regiment and - led
personally by Comrade Phạm Văn Còn (the deputy chief-of-staff of the Provincial Unit),
joined the attack to liberate Xuân Lộc from the south.146
146
For the attack on Xuân Lộc, our participating forces were more than a corps in strength and attacked the
enemy from four directions:
- from the east: 7th Division (of 4 Corps);
- from the north: 341st Division (of 4 Corps);
- from the west: 6th Division (of Military Region 7);
- from the south: the armed forces of Bà Rịa – Long Khánh.
61
The essential task for 445 Battalion was to interdict Route 1 and Inter-Provincial
Route 2 three kilometres from Long Khánh Town and block the enemy’s forces from Suối
Cát (Route 1) and Suối Râm (Route 2) from reinforcing Xuân Lộc.
At 5am on 9 April 1975, our main column began its attack on Xuân Lộc. To the north
and west, we had won great victories. In the east however, we were blocked by the enemy
and suffered many casualties.
In the south, 445 Battalion significantly wore down two enemy battalions from Suối
Cát (the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Regiment and the 234th [sic] Regional Forces Battalion) that
had tried to break through to the Town. At the same time, we seized the hamlet of Bảo Toàn.
Each day, the encirclement of Xuân Lộc tightened.
After four days of unsuccessful attacks on Xuân Lộc, our forces in the north and the
east were ordered to withdraw from the Town and to change our methods of attack.
In the south, 445 Battalion continued to invest the hamlets of Bảo Hòa and Bảo Toàn
– while at the same time attacking the enemy in Bảo Thị, Bảo Liệt and the Gia Liêu bridge …
At these locations, we captured 117 prisoners, seized 43 radios and satisfactorily completed
our task of holding the enemy and thus enabling our large forces on the main thrust line into
Xuân Lộc to change to a more effective operational method. The enemy’s 1st Airborne
Brigade (part of the Thiệu government’s general reserve) was inserted south of Tân Phong to
rescue Xuân Lộc. Only a few hours afterwards, they were heavily shelled by the 4th
Company’s artillery [sic] and suffered heavy losses. Next, the Battalion joined with the local
district companies and launched continuous ground and artillery attacks on small groups of
the 1st Airborne Brigade, killing hundreds of the enemy and preventing them from entering
Xuân Lộc to reinforce the rear areas of the 18th Division.
While the 52nd Task Force (of the puppet 18th Division) was being eliminated at Kiệm
Tân (Gia Kiệm – on Route 20), the enemy’s defensive line at Phan Rang was also being
shattered by our 2nd Corps – and the puppet forces at Xuân Lộc became extremely alarmed.
According to statements by the enemy’s Colonel Bảo – the deputy commander of the puppet
18th Division, on the afternoon of 18 April the headquarters of the 18th Division had decided
to flee Xuân Lộc and consolidate their forces on a defensive line at Trảng Bom.
On the afternoon of 19 April, there was heavy rain, and on the unpaved roads south of
Xuân Lộc the muddy water surged like streams and rivers. In the howling storm, the sounds
of the enemy’s artillery boomed repeatedly on the west of Xuân Lộc. The headquarters of our
local forces group (to the south of Xuân Lộc) assessed that the enemy were firing
diversionary barrages and were preparing to abandon Xuân Lộc. At the headquarters,
Comrade Phạm Văn Còn – the deputy chief-of-staff of the Provincial Unit, consulted very
briefly with the key cadre of 445 Battalion, and a plan to interdict the fleeing enemy was
formed. So, immediately on the night of 19 April, the 2nd Company was ordered to deploy
from Bảo Bình to the S-bend on Route 2. The 3rd Company and the 1st Company moved from
Bảo Hòa (Route 1) to Con Rắn Mountain (Cẩm Mỹ – Route 2).
With legs that had been toughened over 10,000 miles – and after more than 10 years
of hardships, of maturing and of winning victories, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion
now focused on running across tens of kilometres in order to interdict the enemy in time. The
heavy afternoon rains further increased the difficulties. Kilograms of the thick red soil stuck
to the soles of our soldiers’ sandals and shoes. The straps on their sandals snapped. There
were sounds of stumbling, falling and exhausted breathing. Then – sandals and shoes were
cast off into the jungle. Bare-footed, they raced on over all obstacles. The red soil of the
tracks was imprinted with their blood-stained footsteps. Everyone’s hearts and minds were
62
firmly focused on completing every stage of the journey. Fire-flies twinkled brightly, and the
final victory was also a dazzling light before them – calling and urging them on … Their bare
feet would have to win - they had to arrive before the enemy’s armoured columns.
On the morning of 20 April, the 2nd Company arrived at the S-shaped bend and C-
shaped bend on Route 2 (in the area of the Hoàng Quân plantation) and, on that very
afternoon, we destroyed two Regional Forces posts and deployed to stop the enemy. Would
the enemy flee through here – and had they already gone past ? No matter what – this had
been our plan.
The 1st, 3rd and 4th Companies had also reached Cẩm Mỹ. The 1st Company deployed
immediately for the attack and eliminated an enemy platoon on Con Rắn Mountain. The 3rd
Company killed 83 enemy and seized two 105mm howitzers at Cẩm Mỹ junction. We then
established our headquarters on Con Rắn Mountain. A helicopter from Biên Hòa planned to
land on Con Rắn Mountain - but as it came down, the enemy saw that the liberation flag was
flying and hurriedly climbed and flew away.
On the afternoon of 20 April, 445 Battalion and a number of the local district
companies completed their deployments to block the enemy on Route 2 from the area of the
Hoàng Quân plantation to the Quang Minh plantation – a distance of about 10 kilometres.
The accurate assessments by the leadership of our group of local forces south of Xuân
Lộc - and the first-rate efforts of the cadre and soldiers who ran for tens of kilometres to
block the enemy, produced a very satisfactory outcome. At 2am on 21 April, a mixed convoy
of mechanized vehicles led by tanks and armoured vehicles fled noisily south down Route 2.
This convoy of the Xuân Lộc puppet military and puppet civil authorities was divided into
two groups of about 70 vehicles. They were blocked and attacked by 445 Battalion and the
local companies. A vehicle carrying enemy troops was set on fire, and the soldiers leapt down
in panic seeking shelter on both sides of the road. In the area from the S-bend to Cẩm Mỹ, we
captured more than 100 prisoners. Still, the enemy fled onwards – fleeing and firing aimlessly
before them, and leaving the hulks of their vehicles and the bodies of their fallen soldiers
along the road. An hour later, another convoy of over 60 vehicles also fled down Route 2.
These were also stopped and destroyed.
We faced a large enemy force – more than a division with hundreds of vehicles,
fleeing with tactics of “opening a road of blood”. Our forces were not able to stop them all –
only to attack and destroy elements of their convoys over several kilometres. We hadn’t
assessed that the enemy vehicles would carry the enemy’s nerve centre or would have
included their important units in the fleeing convoys.
Châu Đức District’s 41st Company was the unit that stopped the head of the enemy’s
formation (south of the Quang Minh plantation) and set fire to two enemy tanks and captured
a number of prisoners – including a vehicle carry Colonel Phúc, the province chief of Long
Khánh.
At that point, our attacks against the “steel gate of Xuân Lộc” - that had gone on for
12 days and nights, now ended. The fate of the Colonel – the province chief of Long Khánh,
was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed. That day, a 445
Battalion cadre boldly wrote a few stanzas of poetry in his notebook (diary) to express his
happiness and pride in the victory in which he had played a part:
We stand dauntless and dignified beneath the Xuân Lộc sky.
The ‘steel gate’ was burst wide-open with lightning speed by our feet.
Uncle has returned ! Solemnly from the centre of the city, he looks upon his free
children !
63
After the victory at Xuân Lộc, the campaign to liberate Sài Gòn – Gia Định took
shape and was given Uncle Hồ’s revered name: THE HỒ CHÍ MINH CAMPAIGN !
In the province of Biên Hòa – Bà Rịa – Long Khánh, two attacking columns –
comprising two corps, were formed to strike into Sài Gòn.
After tens of years of hardship, sacrifice and holding on in a strategic area close to Sài
Gòn, the cadre and soldiers of 445 Battalion – together with the local armed forces and the
people, had frequently thought about and waited for this day. This was the day when the
lightning-fast steps of the main-force units symbolized the will of the whole people and the
whole Party as they passed through their homeland to sweep away the enemy in their final
lair.
While the 3rd Division (of the 2nd Corps) attacked the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector and Bà
Rịa Town, 445 Battalion attacked the Sub-Sectors of Long Điền and Đất Đỏ.
Long Điền and Đất Đỏ – very well-loved names and the homeland of almost all of the
cadre and soldiers of 455 Battalion, had been downtrodden by aggressors for years. It was
also the place where the order to “wipe out” 445 Battalion was first issued. A Battalion that
now stood before all and was now facing the final battle.
The 1st Company attacked the Long Điền junction. The 3rd Company attacked the
Long Điền District Headquarters. The 2nd Company attacked the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector –
together with two companies of the Long Đất local forces. The 4th Company (the fire support
company) was dispersed to strengthen our two forces attacking the two district capitals.
In the half-light of 27 April, the companies opened fire and attacked the enemy. After
20 minutes of shelling by our 4th Company on two locations at the junction and the Long
Điền District capital, the infantry of the 1st and 2nd Companies simultaneously assaulted the
enemy’s last-ditch defences and trenches. With our overpowering strength, after only half an
hour we had seized all of the Long Điền District capital buildings, captured hundreds of
prisoners, seized their weapons – and then released them all. At midnight, the 2nd Company
and our local forces also occupied the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector.
On 28 April, the 1st and 2nd Companies seized the Long Điền junction and eliminated
the enemy units from Vạn Kiếp and Bà Rịa Town that had fled there intending to regroup.
Our companies held the junction to secure that position and enable the 3rd Division to
advance and attack the enemy at Long Hải and in Vũng Tàu.
On 29 April, 445 Battalion joined with the 3rd Division to liberate Vũng Tàu. The
Battalion attacked the puppet’s 4th Marine Battalion - and at 10am on 30 April, the liberation
flag flew over the enemy’s Hoàng Hoa Thám base at Vũng Tàu147 – symbolizing the strength
and will of 445 Battalion after tens of years of development, reaching maturity and combat
victories. Following this, the Battalion continued to coordinate with the 3rd Division to cross
the sea and liberate Côn Sơn island – the last part of the South to rejoin the Fatherland.
Translator’s Note: D445’s attack on the RVNAF 4th Marine Battalion and the Hoàng Hoa Thám base at Vũng
147
Tàu is not included in D445’s later 2004 history (ie Chamberlain 2016) – see Annex B.
64
Annex B
D445 Battalion History 2016 - Extracts
Chamberlain, E. P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion: Their Story (and the Battle of Long Tan),
Point Lonsdale, 2016, pp.172-177.
With the continuous victories of our forces and the people across the whole of the South
in the 1974-1975 Dry Season Campaign – and, in particular, the victory of Phước Long148 (on
6 January 1975) when for the first time we liberated a province and took control of a city from
a weakening enemy, the Politburo concluded that the balance of forces on the battlefield had
basically changed, had swung towards the side of the revolution, and we now had the capability
to achieve a final victory. They then issued a strategic resolution: “Completely liberate the
South within 1975-1976”. The Politburo also foresaw that if opportunities arose, then the South
could be liberated immediately in 1975.
The Central Highlands Campaign opened victoriously.149 Exploiting our victory, we
continued with a series of campaigns to liberate the delta provinces of Central Vietnam. In
the face of this strategic opportunity, on 25 March 1975, the Party’s Politburo held a meeting
and issued a resolution to liberate the South before the Wet Season ((April-May)) in 1975.
On 29 March 1975, COSVN’s 15th Conference released their special resolution that
ordered direct and urgent tasks for its whole command. The Resolution affirmed: “The
revolution in the South is evolving in leaps and bounds, developing into a General Offensive
and General Uprising that can bring the whole government into the hands of the people. We
need to exploit the time available. District Committees must focus on their Districts; Province
Committees must concentrate against the Province capitals; and Regional Committees must
direct their efforts against the cities.”
At the beginning of April 1975, the Eastern Region Committee tasked the Bà Rịa –
Long Khánh Province Committee to prepare its forces to coordinate with the 6th Division150
(of the Eastern Military Region) and the Fourth (IV) Corps to liberate Xuân Lộc – Long
Khánh, and to open the gateway from the north-east to Sài Gòn. Following this, we were to
liberate Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu – and block the enemy’s withdrawal route to the sea. Having
received the mission from the Regional Committee – and fully understanding COSVN’s
Resolution 15, the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh Committee directed the Party Chapters and the
militias within the Province to prepare their forces, supplies, and their areas to receive the
148
Translator’s (Chamberlain)Note: The battle for Phước Long Province – about 120 kilometres north of Sài
Gòn and bordering Cambodia, was waged from 13 December 1974 to 6 January 1975 – see Veith, G.J., Black
April, op.cit., 2012, pp.100-111. The Province capital – Phước Binh, fell on 6 January 1975. The 4th NVA Corps
was the major NVA formation in that Campaign that aimed to test US support to the Republic of Vietnam
following the January 1973 Paris Accords - and when in December 1974, the US Congress passed the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1974 that cut-off all military aid to the Republic of Vietnam.
149
Translator’s Note: The communists’ “2/75 Campaign” in the Central Highlands began on 4 March 1975, and
Ban Mê Thuột was seized on 11 March, for detail, see Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.142-170. On 25
March 1975, the North Vietnamese “Politburo decided to conquer Saigon in May, before the onset of the rainy
season.” Huế fell to PAVN forces on 25 March 1975 – p.317; and Đà Nẵng - South Vietnam’s second-largest
city, fell on 29 March 1975 – p.328.
150
Translator’s Note: The 6th Division under Military Region 7 - and commanded by Đặng Ngọc Sĩ, was
formed in November 1974 (or August 1974) and “comprised the 33rd NVA Regiment, the ‘4 th’ ((ie 274th)) VC
Regiment, and artillery, sapper and engineer battalions.” - Military Region 7 Headquarters, 50 Năm … (50
Years), op. cit., 1995.
65
main-force troops and coordinate with these main-force elements to attack and rise up with
the guidelines of: Districts liberate Districts, and villages liberate villages”.
In accordance with the plan of the Province Unit, 445 Battalion struck the enemy in
the area south of Xuân Lộc.151 From 18 to 21 March 1975, 445 Battalion employed
encirclement and encroachment tactics to attack and wipe out a Regional Forces company
located in the post at the Ông Quế rubber plantation (about 10 kilometres west of the 12-
kilometre mark on Route 2). However, as our encirclement was not tight enough, the enemy
were able to secretly abandon their post and escape in the direction of Route 1. Although
their flight was discovered by 445 Battalion and we pursued them, we were not able to inflict
heavy casualties on them. Ông Quế village became the first village to have been liberated in
the 1975 Spring Campaign on the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh battlefield.152
With the momentum of that victory, 445 Battalion advanced across Route 2 and
liberated the hamlets of Bảo Bình 1 and Bảo Bình 2, and wiped out the enemy at Lò Than
Hill. We continued the attack towards Route 1 and liberated the hamlet of Bảo Hòa.153
151
Translator’s Note: PAVN General Trần Văn Tra related that in the period 15-18 March 1975, “the 6th
Division of Military Region 7 extended the liberated area along Route 2 from Xuân Lộc to Bà Rịa and ((moving
north-east)) completely liberated Route 3 from Hoài Đức to Gia Ray. On 20 March, it took the Ông Đồn
intersection and Suối Cát, and by 28 March it had mastered a 50 kilometers-long segment of Route 1 from Suối
Cát to Rừng Lá, thus cutting the lifeline connecting the central Vietnam coast with Biên Hòa - Sài Gòn.” - Trần
Văn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre – Vol 5: Concluding the 30-Years War, Văn Nghệ
Publishing House, Hồ Chí Minh City, 1982, p.148.
152
Translator’s Note: The D440 Battalion History (2011) relates: “On 22 March 1975, the Cao Su District
troops coordinated with the 3rd Company of 445 Battalion and continued to surround and attack the enemy in the
Ông Quế post.” That History also adds that: “On 8 April 1975, the Standing Committee of the Region
Committee decided to divide the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Party Chapter into three Party Chapters ie: Bà Rịa, Long
Khánh, and the Vũng Tàu City Committee (directly subordinate to the Region Committee). Comrade Phạm Văn
Hy was appointed as the Secretary of the Vũng Tàu City Committee, with Comrade Lê Minh Hà as the Bà Rịa
Secretary.” 445 Battalion’s “liberation” of Ông Quế on 21 March – with Cao Su District elements, is also
related in Đặng Tấn Hướng (ed), Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Huyện Xuân Lộc (The History of the
Revolutionary Struggle in Xuân Lộc District), Nhà Xuẩt Bản Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 1985, p.98.
153
Translator’s Note: According to a memoir, on 9 April 1975, “445 Battalion joined with the 9 th Battalion
(209th Regiment of the 7th Division) to attack and destroy two enemy battalions (3 rd/48th Regiment, 209th RF
Battalion) at Suối Cát.” – Phạm Thanh Quang, “Đập tan cánh cửa thép Xuân Lộc 1975 - Ký sự lịch sử”. The
1991 D445 History relates the early part of the Campaign in greater detail: “445 Battalion – together with K8
(Xuân Lộc), the 34th Company, the 41st Company (both of Châu Đức), and the 207th Company (Cao Su District)
formed a force equivalent to a regiment and - led personally by Comrade Phạm Văn Còn (the deputy chief-of-
staff of the Province Unit), joined the attack to liberate Xuân Lộc from the south. … At 5am on 9 April 1975,
our main column began its attack on Xuân Lộc. To the north and west, we had won great victories. In the east
however, we were blocked by the enemy and suffered many casualties. In the south, 445 Battalion significantly
wore down two enemy battalions from Suối Cát (the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Regiment and the 234th [sic]
Regional Forces Battalion) that had tried to break through to the Town. At the same time, we seized the hamlet
of Bảo Toàn. Each day, the encirclement of Xuân Lộc tightened. After four days of unsuccessful attacks on
Xuân Lộc, our forces in the north and the east were ordered to withdraw from the Town and to change our
methods of attack.” Phạm Văn Còn is also referred to as the Chief of Staff of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province
Unit commanding the “Southern Front Headquarters” at Cẩm Mỹ - see Mai Thanh Xuân, “Bắt Đại Tá Tỉnh
Trưởng Ngụy Phạm Văn Phúc” (“Capturing the Puppet Province Chief Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc”), in Military
Region 7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc - Long Khánh (The Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Victory), Nhà Xuẩt
Bản Tồng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa, 2004, pp.185-189. He is possibly Phạm Văn Cõn – b. Long Phước 1941,
probationary Party member 1963, platoon 2ic/1 st Company/445 Battalion in May 1965 – CDEC Log 12-2394-
66.
66
In the following days in the middle of April 1975, 445 Battalion attacked the enemy at
Bảo Thị, Bảo Liệt, and the Gia Liêu Bridge etc on Route 1.154 445 Battalion’s principal task
was to block the east-southeast flank of Xuân Lộc from the Suối Cát Bridge to the Tân Phong
crossroads and not allow the enemy fleeing from Central Vietnam join up with the enemy
who were making a last-ditch defence at Xuân Lộc. In this series of operations, 445 Battalion
attacked and significantly wore down two enemy battalions (the 234th Regional Forces
Battalion, and the 3rd Battalion of the 48th Task Force of the puppet’s main-force 18th
Division). Apart from the enemy killed, 445 Battalion captured 117 of the defeated remnants,
and seized 43 radios of various types. These victories had great significance for the
Campaign, hobbling the enemy so that our great army155 on the main axis was able to take the
tactical advantage and concentrate its forces to break up the puppet military’s strong
defensive line in the north-east and to then advance to liberate Sài Gòn.156
Judging that the enemy had the capability to withdraw and abandon Long Khánh, the
Province Unit sent a radio message to 445 Battalion directing the Battalion to deploy back to
Route 2 and block the fleeing enemy. To block the enemy in time, the cadre and soldiers of
445 Battalion had to both walk and run for tens of kilometres through the rain.157 This was
difficult and strenuous, but everyone was enthusiastic and determined to contribute to the
common victory of the whole of the Province, the whole of the Region, and the whole of the
country. On the afternoon of 20 April 1975, the complete Battalion had fully regrouped at its
154
Translator’s Note: According to the History of the Armed Forces of Đồng Nai: “To the south of the Town,
445 Battalion firmly held the area of Bảo Hòa and Bảo Toàn and drove back the enemy’s counter-attacks at the
Gia Liêu Bridge and Bảo Thị – capturing 117 and seizing a large quantity of weapons and military equipment.”
Trần Thị Minh Hoàng (foreword), Lịch Sử Lực Lượng Vũ Trang Tỉnh Đồng Nai 1945-1995 (The History of the
Armed Forces of Đồng Nai Province 1945 - 1995), Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân, Hà Nội, 1999.
155
Translator’s Note: In a footnote, the 1991 D445 History summarises: “For the attack on Xuân Lộc, our
participating forces were more than a corps in strength and attacked the enemy from four directions:
from the east: the 7th Division (of 4 Corps);
from the north: the 341st Division (of 4 Corps);
from the west: the 6th Division (of Military Region 7); and
from the south: the armed forces of Bà Rịa–Long Khánh.”
156
Translator’s Note: For the 1975 Xuân Lộc Campaign see: Veith, G.J., Black April, op.cit., 2012, pp.455-461;
and Phạm Văn Hy, “Tỉnh Ủy Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Với Chiến Trường Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” (“The Bà Rịa-
Long Khánh Province Committee and the Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Battlefield”), pp.161-164 in Military Region
7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh (The Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Victory), op.cit., 2004.
Phạm Văn Hy was the Secretary of the Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province Committee in the period September 1972-
1975 (b. Phạm Bàng, 1931, Nam Định; died Vũng Tàu 30 April 2010). For the defence of Xuân Lộc, see:
Veith, G.J. and Pribbenow, M.L. II, “Fighting is an Art: The Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s Defense of
Xuân Lộc - 9-21 April 1975”, The Journal of Military History, Vol 8, No.1, January 2004, pp.163-213. The
article includes clear annotated maps of key locations and deployments. See also Ekins A. with McNeill, I.,
Fighting to the Finish, op.cit., 2012, pp. 672-674. As noted, 445 Battalion’s participation in the Xuân Lộc
campaign is also related in Xuân Thanh, “Tiểu Đoàn 445 Trong Tấn Công Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh” (“445
Battalion in the Attack on Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh”), in Military Region 7 (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng Xuân Lộc
..., op.cit., 2004., pp.161-164.
157
Translator’s Note: According to the Long Khánh Town Party History, “it rained heavily on the afternoon of
19 April ((1975)). Captain Phạm Văn Còn ((see footnotes 58 and 153)) – commanding the local forces,
deployed the K8 Xuân Lộc unit and the 2nd Company of 445 Battalion from Bảo Bình back to Route 2. On 20
April, our forces destroyed two Regional Force units at the Letter-S and Letter-C locations (Route 2) and then
deployed to block the fleeing enemy. The 3rd Company of 445 Battalion had to move tens of kilometres [sic]
from Bảo Hòa to strike the enemy at Con Rắn Mountain. Faced by the 3rd Company’s strong attack, the enemy
ran helter-skelter. We killed 83 enemy, and seized two 105mm artillery pieces.” - Trần Quang Toại & Phan
Đình Dũng, Lịch sử … (The History of the Party in Long Khánh Town 1930-2007), op.cit., 2009, p.159.
67
determined positions and set an ambush to block the enemy at the Letter-C and Letter-S
locations ((on Route 2)).
Our blocking positions on Route 2 – which incorporated the local District troops,
stretched over 10 kilometres from the area of the Letter-S bends to the Quang Minh
Plantation. At 11pm on 21 April 1975, a convoy of mixed vehicles – comprising hundreds of
vehicles with tanks and armoured vehicles leading, escaped from Long Khánh down Route 2.
Because our troops were over-tired and fell asleep, the Battalion allowed the first groups of
the withdrawing enemy to pass – and could only use the Battalion’s mortars to fire into the
ranks of the withdrawing enemy.158
At 4am on 21 [sic] April 1975, the large fleeing enemy group reached the area of the
Quang Minh Plantation. Châu Đức District’s C41 Company159 – the forward element of our
ambush, set fire to two tanks and captured a number of the enemy – including Phạm Văn
Phúc, the Long Khánh Province Chief.160 Next, 445 Battalion together with the C41
Company of Châu Đức District continued to pursue and attack the fleeing enemy, capturing
some of the remnants and seizing weapons and equipment etc. We took complete control of a
stretch of Route 2 from Xuân Lộc to Xà Bang which we held until the launch of the Hồ Chí
Minh Campaign. The “steel gate”161 of Xuân Lộc had been shattered completely, and the
gateway from the east into Sài Gòn had been opened.162 President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu was
forced to resign and to pass power to Trần Văn Hương. The puppet government and
158
Translator’s Note: On 21 April, the South Vietnamese forces abandoned Xuân Lộc Town and withdrew
southward down Route 2 through Phước Tuy Province. PAVN General Trần Văn Tra related: “We were able to
wipe out only part of the fleeing troops because our unit ((to)) which the Bà Rịa Military Command had
assigned responsibility for blocking Route 2 was careless and failed to prevent the enemy from fleeing.” Trần
Văn Tra, Vietnam: History of the Bulwark B2 Theatre, op.cit., 1982, p.176.
159
Translator’s Note: According to the Châu Đức District History (2004): “On 6 April 1975 in the Hắc Dịch
base, in response to requests and a new task, Châu Đức District’s 41st Company was re-formed – with Comrade
Bảy Cao as the company commander, and Comrade Châu as its political officer.” - Nguyễn Công Danh …, …
Châu Đức District, op.cit., 2004. The consolidation of C41 Company on 6 April 1975 in the Hắc Dịch area -
under Aspirant Officer Lương Văn Cao (Bảy Cao) - and detail on the fighting on Route 2, is related in Mai
Thanh Xuân, “Bắt Đại Tá …”, op.cit., 2004.
160
Translator’s Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: “The fate of Colonel (Ranger) Phạm Văn Phúc – the
Province Chief of Long Khánh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed.” -
Chamberlain, E.P., … D445: Their Story, op.cit., 2011, p.95. The capture of Colonel Phúc – including a
photograph, is related in an article that also includes detail on the fighting on Route 2. - Danh Trường, “Bắt
Sống Tỉnh Trưởng Long Khánh – 1975” (“Long Khánh Province Chief captured alive”), Đồng Nai, 19 April
2010; and also related in Mai Thanh Xuân, “Bắt Đại Tá …”, op.cit., 2004. Following several years of post-War
“re-education”, Colonel Phúc immigrated to the US in about 2002. See footnotes 45, 62, 68, 73, 153, and 168.
161
Translator’s Note: The term - “steel gate/door” (“cánh cửa thép”) ie blocking the NVA/VC’s north-eastern
approaches to Sài Gòn, was apparently coined by the commander of the 18 th ARVN Division, Brigadier General
Lê Minh Đảo. The 1991 D445 History included a D445 soldier’s poem: “We stand dauntless and dignified
beneath the Xuân Lộc sky. The ‘steel gate’ was burst wide-open with lightning speed by our feet. … .”
162
Translator’s Note: For an ARVN account of the withdrawal on Route 2, see Hứa Yến Lến, Colonel (Chief of
Staff, 18th ARVN Division), “The Line of Steel at Xuân Lộc (Long Khánh)”, Seattle, 5 February 1988 - ie: On
20 April 1975, the headquarters and elements of the 18th ARVN Division successfully withdrew south down
Route 2 to an assembly area at Đức Thạnh and enroute - “easily brushed aside the enemy road-blocks and
ambushes … and arrived the next morning.” They were soon joined by the 1 st Airborne Brigade and the 2nd
Battalion of the 43rd Regiment that had suffered “only light losses”. After two days of “regrouping and re-
organizing our units at the Đức Thạnh assembly area, the entire 18th Infantry Division was transported by trucks
to its rear base at Long Bình to receive new equipment and replacements.” According to Colonel Lến, during
the 12-day battle at Xuân Lộc, “ARVN losses were 30% for all units participating in the battle, except for the
52nd Task Force which suffered 60% losses; North Vietnamese casualties were reportedly: 5,000-6,000 killed or
wounded, and 37 armoured vehicles destroyed.” – VCAT Item No. 3670101001, see footnotes 35 and 64.
68
authorities were in chaos. Their General Staff was crippled – with the general officers
abandoning their responsibilities and their units to find a way to flee overseas. A psychology
of despair overwhelmed the whole of the puppet forces and puppet administration.
At this time, in Bà Rịa and in Vũng Tàu, the enemy’s forces were still almost intact.
Apart from the Regional Forces, the police, the soldiers at the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre and
the Trại Nhái camp ((Vũng Tàu)), and the troops of the Region 3 Coastal Headquarters, there
were still a large number of their remnants from several places that had come from Central
Vietnam and from Xuân Lộc – with the total numbering about 22,000. All of these forces
were under the command of a brigadier – the commander of the puppet Marines, Bùi Thế
Lan, who had established a defensive line and last-ditch defence while they sought
opportunities to flee by sea.
On 23 April 1975, at the Cấm Mỹ base, Comrade Lê Minh Nguyện (the Deputy
Secretary of the Province Committee) and Comrade Nguyễn Minh Ninh (the Deputy
Commander of the Province Unit) representing the Bà Rịa – Long Khánh Province
Committee and the Province Unit met with the Headquarters of the 3rd Sao Vàng ((Yellow
Star)) Division to produce a coordinated plan to liberate Phước Tuy Province and Vũng Tàu.
The agreed plan was in two phases: Phase I was to liberate the town of Bà Rịa and the whole
of Phước Tuy, and to seize the Cỏ May Bridge163; Phase 2 was to liberate Vũng Tàu. The
Commander of the 3rd Sao Vàng Division gave his orders for the fighting at 1200hrs on 26
April 1975 – at exactly the same time the campaign to liberate Sài Gòn – Gia Dinh was titled
as “The Hồ Chí Minh Campaign”.
After deferring H-hour three times to allow units time to get closer to their targets, at
1700hrs on 26 April 1975, 19 heavy artillery guns of the Division simultaneously fired at
targets in the Phước Tuy Sector ((in Bà Rịa Town)) and the training centre at Vạn Kiếp – at
the same time, this was the signal to begin the attack to liberate Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu.
While the 3rd Division attacked the Sub-Sector at Đức Thạnh164 and Bà Rịa Town165,
the Province’s armed forces were given the task of launching the main attacks in the two
districts of Long Điền and Đất Đỏ. In accord with the tactical plan of the Bà Rịa Province
Unit, 445 Battalion divided into two forces. The first – comprising two of our companies (the
1st and the 3rd Companies) and an element of our 4th Company combined with Châu Đức
District’s C41 Company, attacked Long Điền Town. The second – comprising 445
163
Translator’s Note: The Cỏ May Bridge – located at YS 379572, was the major bridge on Route 15 from Bà
Rịa Town to Vũng Tàu City. About five kilometres south of Bà Rịa Town - surrounded by mangroves, it
crossed the Cỏ May River estuary. The bridge is described in USMACV/JGS Combined Intelligence Center
Vietnam (CICV), Area Analysis Study 66-36 – National Route 15, 1 March 1966 as Bridge 192: 237 metres/880
feet by 12 feet, Class 30/15 tons. – VCAT Item No. F015900190068a.pdf. Post-War, a major PAVN/PLAF
memorial was erected at the Cỏ May Bridge – see page 54, and also Chamberlain, E.P., Research Note 8/2019,
Monuments and Memorials of the War in Phước Tuy, Long Khánh, and Vũng Tàu, 25 April 2019.
164
Translator’s Note: The Châu Đức District History (2004) notes: “At dawn on 27 April 1975, the 12 th
Regiment (of the 3rd Division) took control of the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, and then continued to advance south
and seized the Long Lễ Sub-Sector.” Nguyễn Công Danh …, … Châu Đức District, op.cit., 2004.
165
Translator’s Note: The D440 Battalion History (2011) notes: “The 3rd Division’s 141st Regiment –
reinforced with the 4th Tank Company and the 5th Battalion also completed its task of seizing Bà Rịa Town at
5.30am on 27 April 1975. According to the Đất Đỏ District History (2006): “The 141st Regiment was
strengthened with the 4th Tank Company and the 5th Infantry Battalion to move through the jungle to Hắc Dịch
and then attack straight into Bà Rịa Town and the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre – after which a column drove along
Route 15 (present-day National Route 51) and seized the Cỏ May Bridge.” – Đặng Tấn Hương, Lịch Sử Đấu
Tranh … Huyện Đất Đỏ (1930-2005), op.cit., 2006, p.287.
69
Battalion’s 2nd Company and the remaining elements of the 4th Company, coordinated with
two companies of Long Đất District to attack and liberate Đất Đỏ.
At about 1800hrs on 26 April, the 1st and 3rd Companies of 445 Battalion attacked
Long Điền Town at the Long Điền T-Junction and the District Headquarters centre. After
about 20 minutes of overpowering fire, our infantry simultaneously assaulted. The enemy’s
resistance was weak, so by 0900hrs in the morning our troops had taken complete control of
Long Điền Town – capturing hundreds of prisoners and seizing weapons. Our second group
was to attack the Đất Đỏ District Headquarters centre and the Đất Đỏ police station.
However, when they reached An Nhứt they heard that the enemy in Đất Đỏ had disintegrated
- so that group turned around and returned to Long Điền.
Both of the Battalion’s groups – in coordination with the local force companies of
Châu Đức and Long Đất Districts, had outstandingly completed the Phase I tasks of the
Campaign as assigned to us by the Province Unit and the Province Committee. Two
companies of 445 Battalion (the 1st and 2nd Companies) occupying the Long Điền T-Junction
had completely destroyed the enemy remnants fleeing from Vạn Kiếp and Bà Rịa Town who
had intended to regroup and resist in that area. We held that communications zone firmly
(Route 44 and Route 23), ensuring that the 3rd Division’s units were able to continue their
advance down to Long Hải and Phước Tỉnh and create a springboard for the liberation of
Vũng Tàu.
Having completely liberated the Bà Rịa area, on 28 April 1975 the Campaign
Headquarters decided to use the 3rd Sao Vàng Division and 445 Battalion to achieve Phase II
of the Campaign by liberating Vũng Tàu from two directions: by land, and by sea.
The enemy had destroyed the Cỏ May Bridge on 27 April and developed a defensive line
there with the aim of blocking our attacks.
Model of the D445 Battalion Monument – April 2017, to be erected in Bà Rịa Town
70
Annex C
Châu Đức District History 2014 - Extracts
Lê Minh Đức and Hồ Song Quỳnh (eds), Lịch Sử Lực Lượng Vũ Trang Huyện Châu Đức
1945 – 2014 (The History of the Armed Forces of Châu Đức District 1945 – 2014), Nhà Xuất
Bản Chính Trị Quốc Gia – Sự Thật, Hà Nội, 2014.166
The humiliating defeat of the puppet 18th Division on the Xuân Lộc battlefield created
panic among the puppet military and officials in Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu.167 Our military
proselytising cadre and our agents took this opportunity to warn the evil thugs and to also tell
those who were luke-warm towards us that they should redeem themselves. On the night of
20-21 April 1975, Châu Đức District’s 41st Company – led by Comrade Sởi, deployed for its
first engagement, and ambushed an enemy convoy fleeing from Long Khánh Town in the
area of the Quang Minh plantation (Route 2). They set fire to three tanks, and captured
Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc – the Long Khánh province chief.168
On 19 April 1975, while our troops and the villagers throughout the whole Province
were preparing for the General Offensive and Uprising, our agent – Phạm Văn Năm, who
was assigned to the Long Lễ Sub-Sector, placed a timed explosive charge that killed 17 of the
Sub-Sector’s soldiers while they were eating and drinking in a nearby stall. The dead
included Bé – the commander of an evil enemy intelligence network in the Hòa Long-Long
Phước area.
On 20 April 1975, Comrade Lê Minh Nguyện - the deputy secretary of Bà Rịa-Long
Khánh Province, came to the Châu Pha base to brief the Châu Đức District Committee on the
plan for the General Offensive and Uprising. His address directed that: “Districts are to
liberate districts, villages are to liberate villages”. The District Committee members swiftly
returned to the areas allocated to them to locally disseminate the plan for the final General
Offensive and Uprising. The Châu Đức District Committee gave orders to its forces regarding
the critical areas - ie the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, the Long Lễ Sub-Sector, and the Phú Mỹ
Special Sector. In the villages – although there were still enemy posts, the people in fact were
already in control.
166
Translator’s (Chamberlain) Note: An almost identical account is related in the earlier 2004 Châu Đức District
History: Nguyễn Công Danh & Lê Minh Nghĩa (et al/dtg), Lịch sử Đấu Tranh Cách Mạng Của Đảng Bộ Và
Nhân Dân Huyện Châu Đức (1930-2000) – The History of the Revolutionary Struggle of the Party Chapter and
the People of Châu Đức District (1930 2000), Nhà Xuất Bản Chính Trị Quốc Giả - National Political Publishing
House, Hà Nội, 2004.
167
Translator’s Note: For a detailed account, see: Military Region 7 Headquarters (Quân Khu 7), Chiến Thắng
Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh (The Xuân Lộc-Long Khánh Victory), Nhà Xuẩt Bản Tồng Hợp Đồng Nai, Biên Hòa,
2004.
168
Translator’s Note: This action by C41 Company is related in the 1991 D445 History that adds: “Châu Đức
District’s 41st Company was the unit that stopped the head of the enemy’s formation (south of the Quang Minh
plantation) and set fire to two enemy tanks and captured a number of prisoners – including a vehicle carrying
Colonel Phúc, the Province Chief of Long Khánh … The fate of the Colonel – the Province Chief of Long
Khánh, was also decided immediately in the field by those whom he had oppressed.” - Chamberlain, E.P., …
D445 …, op.cit., 2011, p.95. The capture of Colonel (Ranger) Phạm Văn Phúc – including a photograph, is
related in an article that also includes detail on the fighting on Route 2. - Danh Trường, “Bắt Sống …,
(“Captured Alive”), op.cit.,19 April 2010.
71
On 21 April 1975, Long Khánh Town was completed liberated, and the steel gate169
northeast of Sài Gòn had been opened. The crumbling enemy force rashly fled for their lives
down Inter-Provincial Route 2.170 A number who fled grouped themselves in Bà Rịa Town
and in the Vạn Kiếp Training Centre. Puppet troops and officials in the Sub-Sectors - and in
Ngãi Giao and the villages, were all extremely alarmed.
Based on the Party’s Resolution, the order for the General Uprising was passed down
to the hamlets and villages to our A and B cadre 171 and our core cadre to promulgate to the
mass organisations. The District’s cadre were allocated down to the hamlet and village level,
divided into the three spearheads, and created Re-organisation Committees for the areas of
Route 15, Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, and Long Lễ Sub-Sector. The District Committee decided
to recall 25 cadre, soldiers and officials from the District’s organisations to reinforce the
villages and hamlets within the District. In particular, the Re-organisation Committee for the
Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector was strengthened with cadre, and an additional Party Chapter – of
seven Party members, was created for Bình Giã that worked with two cadres from the
masses, a guerrilla element, and an armed propaganda element.172* Parallel with the
allocation of cadres to the areas of military proselytising and political attack, the military
aspect was also consolidated with supplies of military equipment. We also took steps to
coordinate the three-spearheaded activities with higher-level forces and the activities on the
broader battlefield.
On the afternoon of 26 April 1975, the Ngãi Giao guerrillas and the Châu Đức District
reconnaissance element guided the main-force troops of the Sao Vàng (Yellow Star) Division
(the 3rd Division) to attack and seize the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector. The guerrillas and the
villagers along Inter-Provincial Route 2 rose up and pursued the enemy military’s remnants
and liberated their homeland.173
On the night of 26 April 1975, when our troops opened fire on Bà Rịa and the Đức
Thạnh Sub-Sector, the provincial military proselytising section - guided by our underground
agent Phạm Văn Năm, sent a group into the Long Lễ Sub-Sector and, using a loudspeaker,
called upon the enemy to surrender. The whole of the 13th Popular Force Platoon defending
the Sub-Sector threw down their weapons and surrendered. We seized 27 weapons, captured
the whole group, and had control of the Long Lễ Sub-Sector before the main-force troops
arrived.
On Route 15, the defeated enemy Rangers and Marines fled in larger numbers to Mỹ
Thạnh. The Châu Đức District revolutionary forces were ordered to deploy. On 26 April
1975, one enemy group was holding-on in the area of Mỹ Xuân village ((YS 258752)) on
Route 15, another was holding-on near Phước Hòa village ((YS 295620)). Our military
proselytising cadre organised the masses and our cadre to continuously threaten the enemy
troops – warning that the liberation forces were advancing on Phước Thái ((YS 235787)), and
this caused extreme anxiety among the puppet troops and officials. At the same time as our
169
Translator’s Note: The term - “steel gate/door” (“cánh cửa thép”) ie blocking the NVA/VC north-eastern
approaches to Sài Gòn, was apparently coined by the commander of the 18 th ARVN Division, Brigadier General
Lê Minh Đảo.
170
Translator’s Note: Descriptions of the fighting on Route 2 are also in the 1991 D445 History – see
Chamberlain, E.P., … D445 …, op.cit., 2011, pp.92-96.
171
Translator’s Note: “A” cadre were nominally overt/legal, while “B” cadre were “secret”.
172
* At that time, it was referred to as an official armed assessment element.
173
Translator’s Note: According to the 1991 D445 History: “While the 3 rd Division (of the 2nd Corps) attacked
the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector and Bà Rịa Town, 445 Battalion attacked the Sub-Sectors of Long Điền and Đất
Đỏ.” – see Chamberlain, E.P., … D445 …, op.cit., 2011, p.95.
72
military proselytising agents and the people attacked from midday to 2pm on 26 April 1975,
the defenders of the Phước Biên post began to flee to Phú Mỹ ((YS 252722)). The Phú Mỹ
post crumbled immediately, and the enemy within fled to the Cây Điệp and Ông Trịnh posts
(huddling in the artillery position at Ông Trịnh Mountain). The Route 15 area was basically
liberated by our District forces.
At 4pm on the same day, the District’s security forces joined with village guerrillas
and attacked the stubborn enemy remnants still resisting in Mỹ Thạnh hamlet and seized a
GMC truck and a Jeep. The District’s military proselytising forces used a loudspeaker to call
upon them to surrender. The 38th Popular Force Platoon (led by the priest Đạo) handed over
their weapons and led our guerrillas and military proselytising cadre to seize the weapons in
the Cây Điệp post and the Nguyễn Văn Bế post (in Ông Trịnh hamlet, Phước Hòa) – where
we seized more than 100 infantry weapons, a 105mm artillery piece, and a large amount of
ammunition. Our military proselytising agents in Lam Sơn hamlet also assisted in breaking
up the puppet military forces and officials there – who handed over a large number of
weapons, medical supplies, as well as food. Our local forces took complete control of Route
15 from the afternoon of 26 April 1975. Under the direct leadership of the District Party
Chapter, the military and the people of Châu Đức had made an important contribution -
together with the military and people of the whole country, in liberating the South and uniting
the nation on the historic date of 30 April 1975.174
174
Translator’s Note: A 1985 Đồng Nai Province publication includes the “People’s Armed Forces of Châu Đức
District” as an “Heroic Unit” and relates that: “From 1969 to January 1975, the District armed forces drove
7,600 enemy from the battlefield (including 40 Americans and 300 Australians), captured 216, killed 36 various
thugs, wiped out five platoons, crushed 30 PSDF units, captured 133, seized 50 weapons of various types,
destroyed 180 military vehicles (including 50 tanks and three armoured vehicles) shot down three aircraft, sunk
one vessel, destroyed 50 towers and posts, and seized 1,000 kg of explosives.” - Hồ Sơn Đài & Trần Quang
Toại, Đồng Nai - Đơn Vị Anh Hùng (The Heroic Units of Đồng Nai), Nhà Xuất Bản Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai
Publishing Company), Đồng Nai, 1985.
73
Annex D
Đất Đỏ District History 2006 - Extracts
Trần Quang Toại & Đặng Tấn Hương (eds), Lịch Sử Đấu Tranh Và Xây Dựng Của Đảng Bộ,
Quân Và Dân Huyện Đất Đỏ 1930-2005 (The History of the Struggle and Development of
the Party Committee, the Forces and the People of Đất Đỏ District 1930-2005), Nhà Xuất
Bản Tổng Hợp Đồng Nai (Đồng Nai Collective Publishing House), Biên Hòa, 2006.
On 8 April 1975, the Standing Committee of the Region Committee decided to divide
Bà Rịa-Long Khánh Province into three units: Bà Rịa Province, Long Khánh Province, and
Vũng Tàu City – all directly subordinate to the Eastern Nam Bộ Regional Committee. …
The 18th Division and the remnants of the Long Khánh Sub-Sector forces fled down Route 2
to Bà Rịa, Vũng Tàu and Long Đất. 445 Battalion and Châu Đức District’s local C.41 troops
blocked and attacked the enemy, destroying more than 10 tanks, and capturing 100 enemy
including Colonel Phạm Văn Phúc – the Long Khánh Province Chief. …
On 26 April 1975, the military and the people of the whole Province joined with the
Sao Vàng Division175 to launch the attack to liberate Bà Rịa-Vũng Tàu in two phases: Phase 1
– liberate the Province capital and the whole of Bà Rịa Province; Phase 2 – liberate the city of
Vũng Tàu.
The 12th Regiment was given the task – together with local forces, to attack the Đức
Thạnh District capital and then to push down to Đất Đỏ and Long Điền. The 141st Regiment
was strengthened with the 4th Tank Company and the 5th Infantry Battalion to move through
the jungle to Hắc Dịch and then attack straight into Bà Rịa Town and the Vạn Kiếp Training
Centre – after which a column drove down Route 15 (present-day National Route 51) and
seized the Cỏ May Bridge.
At 1700hrs on 26 April 1975, 19 heavy artillery pieces of the Sao Vàng Division
simultaneously opened fire on their targets in the Phước Tuy Sector ((in Bà Rịa Town)), the
Vạn Kiếp Training Centre, and the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector raising the curtain for the attacks
to liberate Bà Rịa- Vũng Tàu. Fierce fighting erupted in Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector and Bà Rịa
Town. (p.288)
On the morning of 26 April 1975, the Long Đất District Committee issued orders for
the uprising in the spirit of “districts liberate districts, villages liberate the villages.” A spirit
of self-reliance and self-effort was to ensure our control of the District, the villages, and the
hamlets. On the night of 26 April, COSVN’s 3rd Main-Force Division advanced to liberate
the Đức Thạnh Sub-Sector, and then moved farther south along Route 44 to Long Hải to
block any attempt by the enemy to withdraw by sea. On the morning of 27 April 1975, the
inter-village guerrilla company of Long Tân-Phước Thạnh-Phước Thọ-Phước Hòa Long -
that had just been established for the Campaign, joined with the 25th Long Đất District
Company to attack the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector and police offices. The enemy panicked and
disintegrated – abandoning their weapons and their posts, and fleeing for their lives. We
seized the Sub-Sector and the police offices in Đất Đỏ. The enemy in the posts at Da Quy
((The Horseshoe)), Phước Hải and Phước Tỉnh also panicked and fled. The puppet soldiers
threw away their uniforms, weapons and ammunition, hats and shoes – and these were strewn
all along Routes 52, 23, and 44.
Also on 27 April, the Province’s 445 Battalion and Châu Đức District’s 41st Company
moved in concert from Route 2 through Hòa Long to attack the Long Điền Sub-Sector, taking
control of the whole of the Long Điền battlefield by 9am on the morning of 27 April 1975. At
175
Translator’s (Chamberlain) Note: Sao Vàng (Yellow Star) Division – ie the 3rd NVA Division.
74
that time, the Xuyên Mộc armed forces had surrounded and pressured Xuyên Mộc Sub-
Sector, and the enemy fled in panic past Đất Đỏ and Long Điền to Bà Rịa and Vũng Tàu. 445
Battalion took control of Long Điền Town and coordinated with the Long Đất District troops
to block the enemy at the fields of An Nhứt. Here, they dispersed two Regional Force
battalions (the 302nd and the 347th), and supported the villagers to rise up and seize the Sub-
Sectors and village offices. In the villages of Long Mỹ, Phước Lợi, Hội Mỹ, Phước Hòa
Long, Phước Thạnh, Phước Thọ, An Ngãi, and Tam Phước, the cadre and village guerrillas
mobilised our infrastructure and the people to rise up and seize the military Sub-Sub-Sectors
((phân chi khi)) and the village offices. The villages of Phước Thạnh, Phước Thọ, and Phước
Hòa Long were liberated at 12.30pm on 27 April 1975.
At the Bờ Đập post ((on Route 44)), the guerillas of Long Mỹ and Hội Mỹ – and our
covert infrastructure, surrounded the enemy and used loudspeakers to call on the enemy to
throw down their weapons. The Regional Force company was in fear and did not dare to
leave its post. At 1600hrs the same day, the villages of Phước Lợi, Long Mỹ and Hội Mỹ
were liberated. Long Đất District was completely liberated on 27 April 1975. The
revolutionary government was established in Long Điền and Đất Đỏ. A sea of revolutionary
flags and banners filled the sky. The Long Đất District’s C.25 troops were ordered to move
down to Phước Hải and block the remnants of the enemy’s forces and prevent them from
fleeing by sea or regrouping towards Vũng Tàu. The village Party Chapters mobilised the
people to come onto the streets – some collected war souvenirs, and others took weapons
from the enemy remnants. The atmosphere on the streets was like a large celebration. (p.289)
The Anti-American Resistance War of National Salvation by the people and military
of Đất Đỏ was completely victorious after more than 30 years of dauntless struggle, hardships
and sacrifice. Through the close coordination between the offensive and the uprising,
between the main force troops, the local troops and our political forces, and the military
proselytising of the revolutionary masses, in a period of less than two days – from the
morning of 26 April to the afternoon of 27 April 1975, the military and the people of Đất Đỏ
had attacked and dispersed the whole of the puppet military and puppet authorities in the area
and had taken control of the Đất Đỏ Sub-Sector and District capital, defeating a force
equivalent to two enemy battalions moving from Xuyên Mộc, and completely liberating the
Fatherland and helping guide the main-force troops and Province troops to cross the Cửa Lấp
and achieve the Phase 2 victory of the campaign by liberating the city of Vũng Tàu.
75
Annex E
The Palace Hotel – Vũng Tàu
Communist accounts relate that following the ARVN withdrawal from the Cỏ May
Bridge, some of defeated ARVN elements gathered at the multi-storied Palace Hotel
(YS275438) in the south-east of Vũng Tàu City while seeking a way to flee by sea:
The account by Bùi Hương, “Khách sạn Palace - dấu ấn lịch sử” (“The Palace Hotel –
an historical landmark”), Bà Rịa - Vũng Tàu News On-line, 23 July 2017, relates:
“At dawn on 30 April, the 61st Company/6th Battalion of the 3rd NVA Division
captured a group of ARVN travelling in a tank and four GMC trucks from the beach area to
the Palace Hotel. The ARVN revealed that 400 to 500 ARVN officers and men were at the
Palace Hotel. They had reportedly detained refugees as shields and established defences on
the upper floors. The 6th Battalion deployed and called upon the ARVN to surrender – but
who stubbornly refused to comply. Rather, they fired machine guns and M19s [sic- M-79s]
and threw grenades – killing a company 2ic, a platoon commander, a reconnaissance section,
and two youth guides. … Guided by the people, our troops had seized at high position on the
Núi Nhỏ. At 1100hrs on 30 April, the 6th Battalion’s firepower company used 75mm
recoilless rifles to fire four rounds through the Hotel’s windows – then simultaneously
assaulted and seized each floor. Knowing it was futile to resist, the enemy troops were forced
to fly white flags and surrender. We ceased fire … more than 400 enemy troops surrendered.
… By 1230hrs on the afternoon of 30 April, Vũng Tàu was completely liberated.”
Accounts of the action at the Palace Hotel are also included in the D445 Battalion
History (see Annex A) and Đất Đỏ District History (see Annex D).
76
Annex F
The 274th and 275th VC Main Force Regiments – and the 33rd NVA Regiment:
1975 Offensive
274th VC Regiment:
From December 1974, the 274th VC Main Force Regiment – together with the 33rd
NVA Regiment, operated in Long Khánh, Bình Tuy, and Bình Thuận Provinces as
formations of the 6th NVA Division. In mid-April 1975, the 274th Regiment engaged in
attacks against 18th ARVN Division elements defending Xuân Lộc Town – see the marked
“battle map” at footnote 28. From 24 April, the 274th Regiment – reinforced by a tank
battalion, advanced westward towards Saigon. On 30 April, the Regiment attacked Biên Hòa
airfield and the ARVN III Corps Headquarters – and seized Biên Hòa City.176
275th VC Regiment 177

Following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk by Lon Nol in mid-March 1970, the 5th
VC Division178 began operations against Khmer Republic forces in Cambodia. In late April
1970, the 275th Regiment withdrew into Cambodian territory to defend NVA/VC base
areas.179 Following a “cross-country march of more than 100 kilometres”, on 5-6 May 1970
the 275th Regiment attacked and seized the Cambodian provincial town of Kratie on the
Mekong River – capturing the province chief. Moving “98 kilometres” to the north, the
Regiment seized the town of Stung Treng on 16 May 1970.180 In June 1970, the Regiment’s
3rd Battalion remained at Kratie and – according to the 5th Division History (2005), the 275th
Regiment “detached its 1st and 2nd Battalions to become the core element of the 205th
Regiment (an independent COSVN regiment) and continued to assist “our friends” ((ie the
Khmer Rouge)) in the Kompong Som-Siem Reap area and along Route 5 as part of Group
C40.181 The Regiment incorporated recruits to re-establish its 1st Battalion and formed a 3rd
176
Hồ Sơn Đài – Senior Colonel (ed), Lịch Sử Trung đòan Bộ Binh 4 (1965-2015) – The History of the 4th
((274th)) Infantry Regiment (1965-2015), Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Army Publishing
House), Hà Nội, 2015, pp. 138-147.
177
The 275th Regiment’s 220-page History was published in May 2015 – ie: Hồ Sơn Đài – Senior Colonel (ed),
Lịch Sử Trung Đoàn Bộ Binh 5 (1965-2015) - The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry Regiment, Nhà Xuất Bản
Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Armed Forces Publishing House), Hà Nội, 2015. A history of the 275th
Regiment is included at Annex O to Chamberlain, E.P., The Viet Cong D445 Battalion, 2016.
178
From October 1966 until 1969, the US MACV order-of-battle included a 5th NVA Division (Nông Trường 5)
operating in Phú Yên Province and north of the Đắc Lắc Plateau in central coastal Vietnam – including in VC
Military Region 5’s Base Area 101. However, it appears to have been an administrative and support formation,
and that “Division” was declared “defunct” in 1969 – see The NVA B3 Front Rear Services System, VCAT
Item No. 11272114004. From mid-late 1970, US MACV began to retitle the 5th VC Division as the “5th NVA
Division” - ie as its troop strength was significantly NVA.
179
There are no readily available records to indicate that the 275th Regiment engaged Australian forces in 1970
before its move into Cambodia in April 1970.
180
The Regiment was awarded the Military Feats Medal – Class I ie: Huân chương Chiến công - hạng nhất, for
its seizure of Kratie and Stung Treng. Hồ Sơn Đài – Senior Colonel (ed), The History of the 5th ((275th)) Infantry
Regiment (1965-2015), Nhà Xuất Bản Quân Đội Nhân Dân (The People’s Army Publishing House), Hà Nội,
2015, pp.112-115.
181
The 275th History (2015) relates that after the seizure of Skoun at the end of July, the Regiment withdrew to
“Tăng Cốc” and its title was changed to the 205th Regiment (under Military Region C40) – comprising two
77
Battalion from newly-arrived troops from the North.182 With the 205th Regiment subordinate
to C40, a new Regiment with the title of the 1st Regiment was incorporated into the 5th
Division with Comrade Tám Ní as that Regiment’s commander.”183 The 275th Regiment
History (2015) regards both the 205th Regiment and the 1st Regiment as 5th ((275th))
Regiment’s “successor” formations.
In mid-April 1972, the 205th Regiment became directly subordinate to COSVN and
attacked Lon Nol forces at Kompong Trabek. In May 1972, the Regiment returned to
Vietnam and operated in the Hớn Quản area of Bình Long Province.and participated in the
Nguyễn Huệ/Easter Offensive attacks against An Lộc. At the beginning of 1973, the 205th
Regiment deployed north-east to the Quảng Đức Front in the southern Central Highlands; and
in November 1973 Nguyễn Văn Hiệu was appointed commander of the Regiment. At the
beginning of 1974, the Regiment returned to Tây Ninh, and in 1975 fought as a formation of
Front 232. … …
In June 1972, the 1st Regiment moved into the Đồng Tháp Mười area (Plain of Reeds)
in the upper Mekong Delta region (VC Military Region 8) and fought in several battles. 184 In
March 1973, the Regiment moved back to its base area in northern Tây Ninh to regroup. In
May 1973, the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) in Sài Gòn noted the 5th Division’s “1st
Regiment (Group 11 – 275 Regiment)” had an assessed strength of 640.185 The 1st Regiment
returned to fight in Kiến Tường and Long An Provinces in the upper Delta in March 1974. In
mid-April 1975, the Regiment’s attack on Tân An Town – the base of the ARVN 9th Infantry
Division in Long An Province, failed and “more than 200 cadre and soldiers were killed.”
During the Hồ Chí Minh Campaign in late April 1975, the 5th Division interdicted Route 4 in
the upper Delta – with the 1st Regiment seizing the Củ Chi Special Sector (yếu khu) and
occupying Tân Hiệp Town on 30 April 1975.
battalions, with Nguyễn Bá as its commander. Group 2163 – recruits from the North, then became its 3 rd
Battalion – pp.116-117. According to contemporary US SIGINT reports, the 275 th Regiment “was temporarily
deactivated. Elements of the Regiment were used to form the nuclei of new, combined VC/Khmer communist
units such as the 203rd and 205th Regiments – and possibly the 201st and 207th Regiments. Some of the new units
eventually moved deep into Cambodian territory. The 203 rd Regiment, for one, was observed through SIGINT,
operating near Siem Reap in western Cambodia.” - National Security Agency, Focus on Cambodia –
Cryptologic History Series, Fort George G. Meade, January 1974 (released 2004 and 2008), pp. 63-64 and its
footnote 21.
182
In mid-1971, “Doctor Hoang” of the 205th Regiment was reportedly detained in the A35 Detention Camp in
Santuk District for the “mercy killing” of two 205 th Regiment soldiers. CIA Report, Phnom Penh, 3 March
1972. VCAT Item No. F02920010179.
183 th
5 Division History (2005). According to US reporting, the 275 th (ie 5th) Regiment was reorganised in
August 1970 – divided into the 275A Regiment (soon redesignated the 205 th NVA Regiment, the nucleus of the
Bình Long Group in Kompong Thom) and the 275B Regiment (redesignated the 203 rd NVA Regiment). - HQ II
Field Force Vietnam, Operational Report – Lessons Learned, period 1 November 1970 – 30 April 1971. For the
275A Regiment’s activities in Cambodia in mid-1970 – probably as “Đoàn” commanded by Nguyễn Văn Tiến,
see CDEC Log 01-1859-71, VCAT Item No. 2311203004.
184
Le Gro, W.E. Colonel, From Cease Fire to Capitulation, op.cit., 1981. VCAT Item No. 2861819001 or
8850505001. For the 275th Regiment’s activities in Cambodia and the Mekong Delta area from April 1970
onwards, see: Phan Trung Thứ - Colonel, “Ký ức người lính Sư đoàn 5” (“Memories of the 5th Division
Soldiers”), “Những trận đánh ở Đồng bằng Sông Cửu Long” (“The Battles in the Mekong River Delta”),
December 2009 -
http://www.cuuchienbinhf5.vn/ky-uc/bai-viet/nhungtrandanhodhongbangsongcuulong .
185
US Defense Attaché Office (DAO) - Saigon, PLAF/PAVN Troop Strength by Unit - May 1973, Saigon, 31
May 1973. VCAT Item No. 2311006085.
78
33rd NVA Regiment
The 33rd NVA Regiment did not take part in operations in Phước Tuy Province nor on
the Vũng Tàu peninsula during the April 1975 period. According to the Regiment’s 2016
History186, from 13 April 1975 the Regiment engaged elements of the 52nd Regiment/18th
ARVN Division west of Xuân Lộc in the Dầu Giây and Hưng Nghĩa areas (see the marked
“battle map” at footnote 28). As a formation of the 6th NVA Division, the 33rd Regiment -
under Nguyễn Huy Thản, attacked Trảng Bom Sector on 26 April 1975 during the Hồ Chí
Minh Campaign – and then advanced towards Biên Hoà.
186
Hồ Song Quỳnh (ed), Lịch Sử Trung Đoàn 33 Bộ Binh Anh Hùng (1965 – 1989) (The History of The Heroic
33rd Infantry Regiment 1965 – 1989), Ban Liên Lạc Cựu Chiến Binh Trung Đoàn 33 Bộ Binh Anh Hùng (The
War Veterans’ Liaison Committee of The Heroic 33rd Regiment – including Lê Bá Lộc and Võ Xuân Thu), Bà
Rịa - Vũng Tàu – April 2016, pp.120-124.

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The Fall of Phuoc Tuy

Ernest Chamberlain, Point Lonsdale VIC 3225.

Series of “Research Notes” on the Vietnam War: 2010-2019.

Annexes (A – D445 History 1991/2011, pp.60-63; B - D445 History 2004/2016,

A VC D445 Local Force Battalion soldier (left foreground)

The Fall of Phước Tuy – and Vũng Tàu: April 1975

Australian Forces Withdraw from Vietnam –

The Battle of Xuân Lộc

Brigadier-General Lê Minh Đảo (Commander 18th ARVN Infantry Division) –

The Conduct of the Battle of Xuân Lộc 28

An NVA T-54 tank destroyed by ARVN forces at Xuân Lộc

The Battle of Xuân Lộc: A Post-War Communist Accounting

The Withdrawal Down Route 2

“The captured headquarters of the enemy’s Long Khánh Sector”54

Planning the Liberation of Route 2 74

On 20 April 1975, Comrade Lê Minh Nguyện - the deputy secretary of Bà Rịa-Long

The Defence of Bà Rịa

Bà Rịa Town – 1 ATF Baria (Special) 1:10,000

The 3rd NVA (Sao Vang/Yellow Star) Division 87 in Phước Tuy

The “Round House/Water Tower”

The Defence of Bà Rịa – including ARVN Captains’ Accounts.

Cỏ May Bridge: Destroyed - and NVA Crossing Attempts

Chapter 8, People’s Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 1984.

The communist attacks on the Cỏ May Bridge were described in an account by a

Cỏ May Bridge - intact

The Advance to Vũng Tàu – the 3rd NVA Division Account

The Advance to Vũng Tàu

Fighting in Vũng Tàu – the 3rd NVA Division119 Advances

Departure from Vũng Tàu

The “Last Stand” at the Palace Hotel (YS 275438) 129

Palace Hotel – Plaque Inauguration – 27 July 2017

In mid-November 1972 during the Paris peace negotiations, President Richard

Re-education – Tây Ninh Province

A Re-education (Cải Tạo) Camp – Location not known 139

The Phước Tuy Diaspora

In 2006, a community of “overseas Vietnamese”144 (“Người Việt hải ngoại”/Việt

A. D445 Battalion History (2011) – Extracts.

B. D445 Battalion History (2016) – Extracts.

C. Châu Đức District History (2014) – Extracts.

D. Đất Đỏ District History (2006) – Extracts.

E. Bùi Hương, “The Palace Hotel – an historical landmark”, 23 July 2017.

MACV, 1972-1973 Command History Volume I, 1972 – DTIC ADA995103.

The Cỏ May Bridge Victory Monument – inaugurated in February 2007

D445 Battalion History 2016 - Extracts

275th VC Regiment 177

33rd NVA Regiment

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