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EUSEBIO vs EUSEBIO

100 Phils 593


(Gr No. L-8409, December 28, 1956)

FACTS:
Andres Eusebio, the decedent, lived in Pampanga for 75 years. Due to his illness, he bought a
house in Quezon City, transferred his belongings and where he eventually died. A deed of sale
was executed prior by Andres was found to which he referred himself as a resident of Pampanga.
Upon the death of Andres, his son, Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio,
who died on November 28, 1952. Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all
surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the
deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying, therefore,
that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed.

ISSUE:
1. Whether Andres Eusebio is considered a resident of Quezon City or Pampanga.
2. Whether or not the case was properly laid.
RULING:
He is a resident of Pampanga, thus, the case was improperly laid in Quezon City.
The Court found that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. If Andres Eusebio wanted to establish another domicile, it must have been one of
choice, for which the following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and
freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein
permanently, however, such intent was not shown. The fact that he bought a house in Quezon
City and moved there were not enough to establish proof of his residence.
Thus, Andres being a resident of Pampanga, the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority,
therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid
improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed
appellee's petition.

GARCIA-FULE vs CA
Gr. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976
FACTS:

Amado Garcia died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in
Calamba, Laguna, and in other places. Virginia Fule, filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna a
petition for letters of administration and moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix
over the estate of Garcia. The court granted her petition.

Preciosa Garcia, the surviving spouse of Amado, filed a motion for reconsideration arguing that the order
appointing Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction.

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case Sp. Proc. No. 270-C before Judge Malvar, Fule
presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death
was Quezon City, she also testified that Amado Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his
death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing
that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.

The motion was denied by the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition
and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

The Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Malvar, for lack of
jurisdiction and appointed Preciosa Garcia as Administratix.

Virginia Fule elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in annulling the proceedings rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Laguna for lack of Jurisdiction.

HELD: No.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of
administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he
resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance
of any province in which he had estate.

The word “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. It merely means the personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time
of residence is required; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
In this case, the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of the court. Amado Garcia
was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna based on his death certificate. And a death certificate is
admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. Thus, the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna does not have the jurisdiction to grant the petition for letters of
administration over the estate of Amado Garcia.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS:
Roberts vs Leonidas

Gr No. 55509, April 27, 1984

Facts:

Edward Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November
27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts
(McFadden), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco California. One will disposed of his Philippine
estate and the second will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.

The parties entered in to a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. The agreement
stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives(administrators)
of Grimm’s Philippine estate, and stated further that Maxine’s one-half conjugal share in the estate
should be reserved for her.

On January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage Ethel, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of
First Instance intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate. The intestate court in its order
appointed Maxine, Ethel and Pete appointed them joint administrators. The court disregarded the will
already in record.

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers (not signed by
Maxine and her two children) Judge Conrado Molina adjudicated to Maxine ½ of the decedent’s
Philippine estate and 1/8 each to his four children. No mention of the will was made.

Subsequently, in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, Vinluan of Angara Law firm filed in Branch 38 of the
lower court a petition praying for the probate of Grimm’s two wills (already probated in Utah),that the
1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked,
that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the
properties received by them and return the same to Maxine.

Grimm’ second wife and two children alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of the
Robert’s spouses, and that the 1978 Utah compromise Agreement was illegal, that the intestate
proceeding is void because Grimm died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent’s
will.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss, but was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit . Ethel then filed for a
petition for certiorari praying for the dismissal of the case, or alternatively, that the two proceedings be
consolidated and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior
to the petition for probate.

Issue:

Did Judge Leonidas err in his decision in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss?

Ruling:
No. Judge Leonidad did not err in denying Ethel’s motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “there shall be no will
passed either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed.

The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should
be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the with
the estate proceeding and the judge assigned to the estate proceeding should continue hearing the two
cases.

UTULO vs PACIA de GARCIA


66 Phil 303, September 30, 1938

Facts:
Juan Garcia died intestate and his surviving spouse Leona Pasion Vda. De Garcia (Leona) was
appointed as judicial administratrix of his property. Juan Garcia left 3 legitimate children one of
which is Luz Garcia. Luz Garcia was married to petitioner Pablo Utulo but during the pendency
of the administration proceedings of the property of Juan, Luz died without any legitimate
descendants and her only heirs are her husband and mother Leona.
Pablo initiated a judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife praying that he
should be appointed as the administrator of the due share of her deceased wife from the
intestate of Juan, since it is the only property left by the Luz.
Leona opposed the administration proceeding of the property of her daughter stating that the
deceased left no indebtedness and judicial administration is not necessary, but if the court grant
the administration of the property she should be appointed the administratrix since she has the
better right.
The trial rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner
Issue:
Whether or not there is a need for appointment of administrator in the due share of Luz in
intestate of Juan?
Ruling:
No
Section 596 of Code of Civil Procedure provides, that when a person dies without leaving
pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfuous and
unnecessary proceedings
In this case, it is unnecessary for Pablo initiate administration proceeding to intervene, and to
take part in the distribution of the property of Juan it would suffice to him to participate by right
of representation since he is a force heir of Luz.

AVELINO vs CA
Gr No. 115181, March 31, 2000

ROSA CUENCO vs CA

GR No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

Facts:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died. He was survived by his widow, petitioner Rosa Cuenco, 2
minor sons, and by his children of the first marriage, the respondents herein.

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI of Cebu
alleging the senator died intestate, that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his death.
Subsequently, Cebu Court issued an order setting the petition for hearing, however it issued
another order stating the petition for appointment of special administrator was not yet ready
for consideration because it will be premature for the court to act on it not having yet regularly
acquired jurisdiction because publication has not yet been complied with.

Later, petitioner filed a petition with the CFI of Quezon City for the probate of the deceased’s
last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary. Petitioner filed also in said
Cebu court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss. Cebu court issued an order holding in
abeyance its resolution to the motion to dismiss until after the CFI of Quezon shall have acted
on the petition for probate. Cebu court’s deference was not challenged by respondents, instead
filed in the Quezon city court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss.

CFI-Quezon denied motion to dismiss, finding that the resident of the decedent was at Quezon
City. At the hearing in CFI-Quezon, oppositors failed to appear. CFI-Quezon after receiving
evidence to the matter, admitted to probate the decedent’s will, and appointed petitioner as
executrix. Instead of appealing, respondents filed for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with the CA. CA ruled in favor of respondents granting prohibition, saying since the
first proceeding was instituted in Cebu CFI, it follows the said court must exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of the CFI-Quezon.

Issue:

1. Whether appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon
City Court?

2. Whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings?

Held:

1. YES. CA erred.

The Judiciary Act concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
Instance over "all matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates."

On the other hand, Rule 73, of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, "the
court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

The residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. In Sy Oa vs Co Ho, court
noted:

“xxx because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with
procedural matters, and, as we have said time and again, procedure is one thing and
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The law of jurisdiction, confers upon
Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of
residence of the deceased. Since however, there are many courts of First Instance in the
Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. Xxx”

The Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate
petition is filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

Such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided
with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to
take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to
the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will.

This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss
Lourdes' intestate petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal
motion and deferred to the Quezon City court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate
before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the will was duly admitted to
probate by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave
the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Likewise, by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the
question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at the time of his death was in
Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the
latter would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the
decedent within its territory and venue.

2. NO.

Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and
deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73,
section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must
exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City
court indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.
Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the probate petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction over the estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City
court should be left now, by the same rule of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts.

Citing Uriarte vs CFI of Negros Occidental, Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of
probate proceedings over intestate proceedings:

that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus, it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will,
proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that
state an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final
account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed.
This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be
rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted
to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over
intestate proceedings."

Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the
decedent's estate could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original
case. The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:

". . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record." (Rule 73)

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15,
1964 admitting the will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said
court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said order, the said order of probate has long since
become final and cannot be overturned in a special civil action of prohibition.
Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority
over all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that
venue was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay.

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.


A.W. FLUEMER, vs.ANNIE COUSHING HIX

G.R. No. L-32636 , March 17, 1930

Facts:
Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix, alleged that
the will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by Hix who had
his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated,
by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the
National Library, however Judge of First Instance Tuason denied the probate of the
document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased on the ground that
sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure were not complied as there was no
was printed or published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, further no
evidence was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in
force at the time the alleged will was executed.
Issue:
Whether it is necessary to prove in this jurisdiction the existence of such law and
domicile of the testator in West Virginia as a prerequisite to the allowance and
recording of the will.
Ruling: (YES)
The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of
the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be
proved as facts. (In re Estate of Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements
of the law were not met. There was no was printed or published under the authority of
the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge
of the original, under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301
of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show that the extract
from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on
this point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was
nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of
two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it
would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of
Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)

It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in
West Virginia and not establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will
and the testimony of the petitioner.

In the matter of the petition of PURIFICACION M. JOSON and EROTITA M. JOSON,


vs.
MARIANO NABLE, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
FELICISIMO C. JOSON, CAROLINA JOSON, RICARDO JOSON, VICTOR JOSON

Gr No. L-3450, September 19, 1950

FACTS:

 Petitioners, Purificacion M. Joson and Erotita M. Joson, are the daughters of the
deceased, Tomas Joson, had with his second wife, Pomposa Miguel, also deceased. The
respondents, surnamed, are the children and grandchildren of the deceased, Tomas Joson,
had with his first wife, Eufemia de la Cruz, also deceased.

Respondents filed with the Court for the probate of a supposed will left by the deceased Tomas
Joson. An order was issued by the court notifying all interested parties and said order was
published in the Philippines Free Press once a week for three consecutive weeks. The petition
was called for hearing but nobody appeared to contest the will. A decision was rendered finding
the will to have been executed by Tomas Joson in accordance with law. No appeal was taken
from this decision and the regular course of the proceedings was followed for the liquidation and
distribution of all the properties left by the deceased.

More than three years later, petitioners filed a motion to set aside the decision, upon the ground,
among others, that petitioners had not been notified of the hearing of the petition for probate. The
court granted the motion, but upon reconsideration the decision was restored into full force and
effect. Hence this petition for certiorari, instead of an appeal.

ISSUE: WON petitioners were duly informed of the petition for probate.

RULING: YES.
If the allegation of the petition was wrong and the true residence of petitioners was not known,
then notice upon them individually was not necessary. Under the Section 4 Rule 77 of rules of
court, individual notice upon heirs, legatees and devisees is necessary only when they are
known or when their places of residence are known. In other instances, such notice is not
necessary and the court may acquire and exercise jurisdiction simply upon the publication
of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. What is, therefore, indispensable to the
jurisdiction of the court is the publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation, and
the notice on individual heirs, legatees, and devisees is merely a matter of procedural
convenience to better satisfy in some instances the requirements of due process.

Petitioners are furthermore guilty of laches. There is sufficient data in the record to show that
petitioners had knowledge of the proceedings and yet without any jurisdiction whatsoever, they
failed to take any move, for more than three years, against the decision.

Leon vs. Manufacturers Life

90 Phil 459, November 29, 1951

Facts:

Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident Filipino, died in Brooklyn New York City, in 1945, leaving
a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court of New York County. James Ross and Ewald Selph
were named executors. Since the estate has been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.

The will contained this residuary clause bequeathing the remaining estate to Mercedes de Leon
who is to receive an amount sufficient for her current needs. James Madison Ross was appointed
as trustee. Ross bought an annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in
Toronto, Canada, paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a
monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime. De Leon has been receiving the
stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila Office. To get hold of the entire
amount, de Leon presented the will for probate in CFI, Manila with Ghezzi as administrator. After having
qualified, the administratrix filed the motion to demand accounting from Manulife which Judge Amparo
has denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner can demand accounting from Manulife.

Held:

No.
Section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Estate, how administered. - When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant letters
testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines. Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and
the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country.

Here, it is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside the
jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an annuity in Canada under a
contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the money. The party whose appearance the
appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession, the
agency's intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from
the home office. There is no showing oral legation that the funds have been transferred or removed to
the Manila Branch.

The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants the latter to
account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust for the administratrix. In
other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the motion and to the appellee.
There being no creditors, the only subject of the motion, we incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de
Leon to get the legacy in a lump sum in complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed
deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract which the annuitant herself applied for in
conjunction with the trustee.

Co vs Rosario
G.R. No. 160671, April 30, 2008

Parties: LUIS L. CO, petitioner vs. HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO, ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM,
GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN CO, EDWARD CO and the ESTATE OF LIM SEE TE,

FACTS:
RTC-Makati City in a special proceeding, appointed Luis Co, petitioner and Vicente Yu, Sr. as the special
administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun. However, on motion of the other heirs, the
trial court set aside petitioners appointments. Consequently, petitioner nominated his son, Alvin Co as special
co-administrator which was granted by the RTC.

Almost four years after, RTC, upon motion filed by one of the heirs, revoked the appointment of Alvin on the
ground that the latter had become unsuitable to discharge the trust given to him as special co-administrator
because his capacity, ability or competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by
the filing of several criminal cases against him though no conviction yet but had provided the heirs ample
reason to doubt his fitness to handle the subject estate with utmost, fidelity, trust and confidence.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration however it was denied by the RTC and on appeal, CA affirmed the
revocation of the appointment hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether the revocation of Alvin as special co-administrator by the trial court was valid?

HELD:

Yes, the revocation was valid.

Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of special administrators is not governed by the rules
regarding the selection or removal of regular administrators. Courts may appoint or remove special
administrators based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their discretion. This, however,
is no authority for the judge to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and
legal principles. Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court finds the
appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment. The special
administrator is an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is expected to work
for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect to its smooth administration and earliest
settlement.

In this case, the removal of Alvin is grounded on reason, justice and legal principle because of the
burden of defending himself in the proceedings of the criminal charges of falsification of commercial documents
filed against him, the latter’s ability and qualification to act as special co-administrator are beclouded and
revocation of his appointment is only proper under the said circumstances.

Tan vs Gedorio
Gr No. 166520, March 14, 2008

Facts:
Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001,
private respondents, who are claiming to be the illegitimate children of Gerardo Tan, filed with
the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
They moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a
special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be
resolved by the RTC. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be
appointed as the special administrator. The legitimate children of the decedent filed an
Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private
respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the
country and that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as
that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix
of his estate since his death.

However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the
estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals and was denied, hence the petition for
review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection
of a special administrator.

Ruling:
The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they


should pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay
which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.
VENTURA vs VENTURA
Gr. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

VILLAMOR v CA
Gr No. L-41508, June 27, 1988

FACTS:
 After the death of Bartolome Cortes, settlement of estate was instituted and Fr. D.
Camomot was named as administrator.
 Between1937-1938, Intestate proceedings was filed for the estate of the children
of Victor and Mana Cortes to the exclusion of Rufino, this is under Special
Proceeding No. 262-C. Atty Sato was appointed as administrator.
 In 1938, Ireneo and Paula, all surnamed Villamor, alleged children of Rufino,
filed a petition for administration of their father’s estate, this was under Special
Proceeding No. 343-C. Moises Mendoza was appointed as administrator.
 Mendoza made an inventory of Rufino’s estate, however, it was found to be the
same properties subject in Special Proceeding no. 262-C.
 Being the successors of the estate, Sixta and Villamor siblings (Ireneo and Paula)
entered an agreement of Partition called “Project Partition”
 Ireneo and Paula later sold the properties vested to them by virtue of “project
partition”.
 Upon the death of Sixta Ceniza, Cristina Ceniza, the sister of the respondent in
this case, instituted Special Proceeding No. 364-R, for the administration of the
estate of Sixta and prayed for them, nephews and nieces of Sixta to be declared as
sole and forced heir of Sixta despite the presence of Fr. Nicanor.
 RTC denied the petition of Cristina and declared Fr. Nicanor as the sole heir of
Sixta.
 Fr. Nicanor filed a petition to remove Escolastico Ceniza to be removed as the
administrator of his mother’s estate and instituted Fr. Camomot as his Atty-in-fact
and Victorino Perez was then appointed as special administrator.
 Upon the death of Fr. Nicanor, Daniela Ceniza Urot was appointed as
administrator of the estate. It was her who filed a petition to recover the
propertieds conveyed to the Villamor siblings in the project partition on the
ground of fraud.
 Urot alleged that the Villamor siblings are just natural children of Rufino and that
they misrepresented themselves as legitimate children of Rufino, influenced Sixta
who is blind and already of old age to enter into project partition. Urot also
alleged that the partition was made without the knowledge of Fr. Nicanor.
 Paula and Ireneo filed a motion to dismiss which was denied by the court. They
then filed their answer and raised as a special affirmative defense that the court
has no jurisdiction over the case having intrinsic fraud as the basis of the
complaint, that the complaint has no valid cause of action and is barred by statute
of limitations.
 RTC ruled in favour of Urot, declared that Paula and Ireneo took advantage of
Sixta for the project partition.
 Ireneo and Paula appealed to the CA, but CA affirmed the decision of the RTC,
hence this petition.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not project partition was valid despite the issue that Sixta was
taken advantaged of and that Fr. Nicanor has no knowledge of such partition.
2. Whether or not the appointment of an administrator who is a stranger despite
the presence of the nearest relatives valid?

RULING:

1. Yes.

The court ruled that just because a person is blind or of poor memory, it does
not follow that she is of unsound said. Where the mind of the testator is in
perfectly sound condition, neither old age, nor is health nor the fact that
somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to
invalidate his will.

Fr. Nicanor had known about the partition as evidenced in his letters to Dr.
Felicisima Veloso and Mrs. Gitgano. Assuming arguendo that there was fraud,
Fr. Nicanor remained silent and failed to assert his right. He even conveyed at
least three lands which were among those apportioned to Sixta Ceniza in the
Project of Partition to several persons. Her predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor
Cortes, not having filed any action for reconveyance within the prescriptive
period provided by law, neither could private respondent do so now, for her
right cannot rise higher than its source.

2. Yes.

The court do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court
and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that in both Special Proceedings in
question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the
decedents. There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud
and collusion as found by the courts. Section 642 of the Code of Civil
Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and
administrators. It provides that in case the persons who have the preferential
right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve,
administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.

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