Embankment Dam Breach Parameters

and Their Uncertainties

David C. Froehlich, Ph.D., P.E., M.ASCE1

Abstract: Potential flood hazards that would be created by breached embankment dams need to be evaluated to select spillway design
floods and to prepare emergency action plans. The breaches are often modeled simply, usually in the shape of a trapezoid that is defined
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by its final height, base width or average width, and side slopes, along with the time needed for the opening to form completely. Data
collected from 74 embankment dam failures were used to develop mathematical expressions for the expected values of the final width and
side slope of a trapezoidal breach along with its formation time. Information is provided that allows variances of the predicted quantities
to be calculated as well. The findings of the statistical analysis were then applied in a Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the degree of
uncertainty of predicted peak flows and water levels downstream from breached embankment dams.
DOI: 10.1061/共ASCE兲0733-9429共2008兲134:12共1708兲
CE Database subject headings: Embankment; Dam failure; Parameters; Uncertainty principles; Floods.

Introduction
Because almost 80% of the major dams in the United States are
formed by embankments constructed from natural erodible mate-
rials 共U.S. Committee on Large Dams 1975兲, accurate assess-
ments of the breaches created when they fail are needed to reduce
exposure to flood hazards. The various ways in which breaches
can form in embankment dams, and the large number of factors
that influence the speed and extent of embankment erosion, are
difficult to describe with rigorously precise mathematical formu-
las. Embankment breach formation by overtopping floodwaters
has been simulated using complex two-dimensional depth-
averaged flow models combined with soil erosion and slope fail-
ure algorithms by Froehlich 共2004兲, Wang and Bowles 共2006兲,
and Faeh 共2007兲. Models based on one-dimensional cross-
section-averaged flow calculations combined with various sedi-
ment erosion and transport formulations have also been
developed, including those by Cristofano 共1965兲, Brown and
Rogers 共1977兲, Lou 共1981兲, Ponce and Tsivoglou 共1981兲,
Nogueira 共1984兲, Fread 共1985兲, Al-Qaser 共1991兲, Visser 共1998兲,
and Hanson et al. 共2005兲.
Such physically based breach formation models, consisting of
coupled simulations of the hydrodynamic and material aspects of
embankment erosion, are being used more often to evaluate dam
failures as the underlying physical processes are understood bet-
ter, and as increased computational capabilities enable compli-
cated mathematical calculations to be carried out in acceptably
short amounts of time. However, dam failure algorithms of low
levels of complexity are still needed when detailed simulations
are not required or are not possible to apply easily or conve-
niently. For these reasons, a simple empirical model that consid-
ers a breach to form in a presupposed way, usually growing in the
shape of a trapezoid 共Fig. 1兲 is applied often in practice 共see, e.g.,
Fread and Harbaugh 1973; Fread 1984; U.S. Army Corps of En-
gineers 1978; Brunner 2002兲.
Values of parameters used in such empirical breach-formation
models can be estimated using relations developed based on data
collected from historic failures 共U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
1988; Froehlich 1995; MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis
1984; Wahl 2004兲. The uncertainties of parameter estimates ob-
tained in such a way can be large, as can their effects on planning
actions developed to minimize flood hazards. Such uncertainties
may be quantified so that reasonable bounds on parameter values
can be estimated and used to establish the reliability of predicted
outflow hydrographs at the dams, and the peak flood elevations
and flow rates at downstream locations given by one-dimensional
cross-section-averaged flow calculations.
Data collected from past dam failures are analyzed here using
multivariate regression analysis to obtain expressions for the ex-
pected values of the average width of a trapezoidal breach, its
side-slope ratio 共horizontal to vertical兲, and the formation time
共i.e., the needed time from initiation of a breach until it has
reached its maximum size兲, along with their uncertainties. Predic-
tion intervals of estimated parameters based on the levels of the
regression variables can be found, and random variations about
the expected values can be generated, using results of the analy-
sis. The breach-parameter relations are then applied in a stochas-
tic dam-breach flood model to determine the degree of uncertainty
of predicted peak flow rates and water-surface elevations resulting
from potential embankment dam failures.

1
Consulting Engineer, 303 Frenchmans Bluff Dr., Cary, NC 27513-
5662.
Note. Discussion open until May 1, 2009. Separate discussions must
be submitted for individual papers. The manuscript for this paper was
submitted for review and possible publication on April 25, 2007; ap-
proved on June 16, 2008. This paper is part of the Journal of Hydraulic
Engineering, Vol. 134, No. 12, December 1, 2008. ©ASCE, ISSN 0733-
9429/2008/12-1708–1721/$25.00.
Empirical Breach Formation Models
How a breach forms in an embankment dam depends on numer-
ous factors including the embankment geometry, material compo-
sition, construction methods, type and degree of embankment
crest and slope protective cover, reservoir dimensions, inflow to
the reservoir during failure, and the mode of failure. An empirical

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J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.


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Fig. 1. Final dimensions of a trapezoidal dam breach approximation,
including height Hb, average width B̄, and side-slope ratio z 共horizon-
tal to vertical兲. Breaching begins when the reservoir water-surface
elevation reaches the failure elevation Y f .
model developed originally by Fread and Harbaugh 共1973兲 is
used here to approximate breach formation. The model is prima-
rily empirical and, as a result, requires fewer input data than more
intricate models that describe the physical processes of embank-
ment erosion in greater detail.
Three variations of the empirical model of breach formation
commonly used to evaluate dam failures are shown in Fig. 2 as
Models A, B, and C. Each of the three models assumes that a
breach begins to form at the top of a dam and grows with time
into the shape of a triangle or a trapezoid. The geometry of the
breach is described in terms of the height, average width, and side
slope of the final trapezoidal opening in the dam. Breaches de-
velop initially in the shape of triangles in Model A, until the
bottom of the breach reaches its lowest elevation. Lateral expan-
sion then begins as the breach takes on a trapezoidal shape. In
Model B, the base width of the trapezoidal shape increases lin-
early as the breach deepens, and maximum height and width of
the breach are reached simultaneously. The bottom width of the
Fig. 2. Schematic representations of three empirical breach forma-
tion models
JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008 / 1709
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
trapezoidal breach is considered constant in Model C. Observa-
tions of past embankment dam failures and experimental studies
suggest that breach development is represented best by Model A.
Ralston 共1987兲 and Powledge et al. 共1989a,b兲 provide good
descriptions of the mechanics of embankment erosion from over-
topping stream flows, and Miller and Ralston 共1987兲 describe
several case histories. If the downstream face of an embankment
is not submerged by floodwaters, erosion of the embankment will
likely begin when small headcuts are formed near the downstream
toe. However, erosion can begin anywhere on the downstream
slope or along the crest, particularly where protective soil covers
have been removed or damaged. As erosion continues, the head-
cuts advance upstream until the crest of the dam is breached. In
some instances, a series of stair-step headcuts form on the down-
stream face of a dam.
Hanson et al. 共2005兲 divided the breaching process into the
following four stages: 共1兲 Formation of a headcut on the down-
stream slope; 共2兲 advancement of headcut through the embank-
ment crest; 共3兲 breach formation as the headcut enters the
reservoir; and 共4兲 lateral expansion of the breach during reservoir
drawdown. Wahl 共2004兲 refers to the period of downstream em-
bankment erosion prior to breaching as the breach initiation
phase, which corresponds to Stages 1 and 2 described previously,
and the remainder of the breaching process as the breach forma-
tion phase, which corresponds to Stages 3 and 4. If overtopping
flow stops during the initiation phase, the dam will not have
failed, although the embankment will certainly have been dam-
aged.
Large-scale experiments of embankment dam failure from
overtopping have been carried out on a fuse plug dam at the
Yahekou Reservoir located in Henan Province, China 共Loukola
and Pan 1993兲, and at several test embankments constructed at a
site downstream from the Røssvass Dam near Mo-I-Rana, Nor-
way as part of the European Commission IMPACT Project 共Mor-
ris et al. 2007兲. Both studies show that embankment dam breach
shapes are approximated rather well as trapezoids, the side slopes
of which will vary depending on soil characteristics and embank-
ment dimensions.
Embankment Dam Failure Data
To evaluate the parameters needed to apply the empirical breach-
formation models, data from 74 embankment dam failures were
assembled from a variety of sources and are summarized in Table
1. These data include a brief description of each dam, the mode of
failure, average width of the embankment 共between toes of the
downstream and upstream slopes兲 W̄, water volume above the
breach bottom at the time of failure Vw, height of water above the
breach bottom at the time of failure Hw, the measured dimensions
共height Hb, average width B̄, and side slope ratio z兲 of a trapezoi-
dal approximation of the breach, and the formation time of the
breach t f .
For most cases, the final breach dimensions were obtained
from ground-surveyed cross sections taken through the narrowest
part of the breach or from topographic maps of the breached
section of the embankment. For other cases, breach dimensions
were acquired by taping or from other approximate measure-
ments. Breach heights were calculated as the difference between
the elevation of the top of the dam at the location of the breach
and the elevation of the bottom of the trapezoidal approximation.
 Table 1. Characteristics of Breached Embankment Dams and Breach Dimensions
Volume Height
of water of water Average
above above breach
Average breach breach Height of Average side Breach
embankment, bottom, bottom, breach, breach slope formation
Dam name Embankment Year Year Failure width W̄ Vw Hw Hb width,B̄ ratio, z time, t f
and location typea built failed modeb 共m兲 共m3 ⫻ 106兲 共m兲 共m兲 共m兲 共h:v兲 共h兲 References

Apishapa, Colo. E, H 1920 1923 P 82.4 22.8 28.0 31.1 93.0 0.44 0.75 “Failure of Apishapa” 共1923兲;
Field et al. 共1923兲
Baldwin Hills, Calif. E, H 1951 1963 P 59.6 0.910 12.2 21.3 25.0 0.31 0.33 California Dept. of Water Resources 共1964兲;
Jessup 共1964兲; Warne 共1964兲
c
Bearwallow Lake, N.C. E, H 1963 1976 S 17.1 0.0493 5.79 6.40 12.2 1.43 – C. H. Gardner,
N.C. Dept. of Natural Resources and
Community Development
共written communication, 1987兲
d
Buckhaven No. 2, Tenn. E, H — 1991 O 13.4 0.0247 6.10 6.10 4.72 0.73 — P. L. Bentley, Tenn. Dept. of
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Environment and Conservation,

Safe Dams Section,
共written communication, 1994兲
Bullock Draw Dike, Utah E, H 1971 1971 P 18.6 0.740 3.05 5.79 12.5 0.21 — MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis
共1984兲
Butler, Ariz. E, H — 1982 O 9.63 2.38 7.16 7.16 62.5 0.85 — B. N. Aldridge, U.S. Geological Survey
共written communication, 1987兲
Castlewood, Colo. E, M 1890 1933 O 47.4 6.17 21.6 21.3 44.2 0.50 0.50 “Castlewood Dam” 共1933兲; Field 共1933兲;
Follansbee and Sawyer 共1948兲;
Houk 共1933兲
Caulk Lake, Ky. E, H — 1973 P or S 32.0 0.698 11.1 12.2 35.1 1.38 — J. Marchant, Kentucky Dept. for
Environmental Protection,
Dam Safety and Floodplain Compliance
Section 共written communication, 1991兲
Clearwater Lake, Ga. E, H 1965 1994 O 15.0 0.466 4.05 3.78 22.8 1.03 — S. Watts, George Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program
共written communication, 1994兲;
on-site survey by Froehlich 共July, 1994兲
d
Coedty, U.K. E, H, C 1924 1925 O — 0.311 11.0 11.0 42.7 2.22 0.25 Gruner 共1963兲;
Jansen 共1983, pp. 138–139兲;
“Lessons learnt” 共1964兲
Cougar Creek, Alta., Canada R, H 1982 1990 O 21.7 0.0298 11.1 10.4 — — 0.050 McEwen 共1991兲
East Fork Pond River, Ky. E, H — 1978 P 38.9 1.87 9.80 11.4 17.2 0.44 — J. Marchant,
Kentucky Dept. for Environmental
Protection, Dam Safety and
Floodplain Compliance Section
共written communication, 1991兲
Elk City, Okla. E, H, C 1925 1936 O 50.4 1.18 9.44 9.14 36.6 1.00 — “Elk City Dam” 共1936兲;
“Overtopping” 共1936兲
Emery, Calif. E, H — 1966 P 22.2 0.425 6.55 8.23 10.8 0.35 — C. S. Nomura,
California Dept. of Water Resources,
Division of Safety of Dams
共written communication, 1989兲.
FP&L Martin Plant, Fla. E, H 1977 1979 P 27.7 125 5.09 9.14 183 0.1 6.0 South Florida Water Management
District 共1980兲
Fogelman, Tenn. E, H 1958 1991 P 21.3 0.493 11.1 12.6 7.62 0.36 — P. L. Bentley,
Tennessee Dept. of Environment and
Conservation, Safe Dams Section
共written communication, 1994兲.
French Landing, Mich. E, H 1925 1925 P 34.3 3.87 8.53 14.2 27.4 0.97 0.58 “Undermining causes failure” 共1925兲
Frenchman Creek, Mont. E, H 1952 1952 P 37.3 16.0 10.8 12.5 54.6 0.50 — Babb and Mermel 共1963兲;
Oltman 共1955兲;
M. Ulrick, Mont and Water
Resources Division, Dam Safety Section
共written communication, 1992兲
d
Grand Rapids, Mich. E, Z 1874 1900 O 14.8 0.0255 6.40 6.40 19.0 2.26 — “The failure of the distributing reservoir”
共1900兲
Haas Pond, Conn. E, H — 1984 P 16.7 0.0234 2.99 3.96 10.7 0.38 — J. Sangivanni,
Connecticut Dept. of Environmental
Protection 共written communication,
1988兲
Hart, Mich. E, H 1920 1986 P 31.1 6.35 10.7 10.8 73.9 3.03 — J. G. Meier,
Michigar Dept. of Environmental
Protection 共written communication, 1987兲
Hatchtown, Utah E, Z 1908 1914 P or S 44.8 14.8 16.8 18.3 151 2.42 1.0 “Ninth biennial report” 共1915, pp. 13–14兲;
Sterling 共1914, 1916兲
Hell Hole, Calif. R, Z 1964 1964 P 103.2 30.6 35.1 56.4 121 0.96 0.75 “Hell Hole Dam” 共1965兲;
Scott and Gravlee 共1968兲;
“The failure of Hell Hole Dam” 共1965兲
d
Herrin, Ill. E, H — 1935 O 28.8 — 10.7 10.7 47.2 1.14 — Green 共1936兲
Horse Creek, Colo. E, H 1971 1993 P 26.8 12.8 7.01 12.8 73.1 0.83 — Hall and Field 共1914兲;
Hinderlider 共1914兲;
Justin 共1932, pp. 27–30兲
Hutchinson Lake, Ga. E, H 1960 1994 O 14.0 1.17 4.42 3.75 33.4 1.14 — S. Watts,
Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program
共written communication, 1994兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共July, 1994兲
Iowa Beef Processors, Wash. E, H 1971 1993 P — 0.333 4.42 4.57 16.8 0.33 — D. L. Johnson,
Washington Dept. of Ecology,
Dam Safety Section
共written communication, 1993兲

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J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.

 Table 1. 共Continued.兲
Volume Height
of water of water Average
above above breach
Average breach breach Height of Average side Breach
embankment, bottom, bottom, breach, breach slope formation
Dam name Embankment Year Year Failure width W̄ Vw Hw Hb width,B̄ ratio, z time, t f
and location typea built failed modeb 共m兲 共m3 ⫻ 106兲 共m兲 共m兲 共m兲 共h:v兲 共h兲 References
Ireland No. 5, Colo. E, H — 1984 P 18.0 0.160 3.81 5.18 13.5 0.38 0.50 L. H. DeGrave,
Colorado Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication,
1986兲
Jacobs Creek, Penn. E, Z 1901 1904 P — 0.423 20.1 21.3 17.5 0.61 — Murphy 共1905, pp. 172–173兲
Johnston City, Ill. E, H 1921 1981 P 21.5 0.575 3.05 5.18 8.23 1.00 — MacDonald and
Langridge-Monopolis 共1984兲
Kelly Barnes, Ga. E, H 1948 1977 P 19.4 0.777 11.3 12.8 27.3 0.85 — Crisp et al. 共1977兲;
“Dam collapses” 共1977兲;
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Sanders and Sauer 共1979兲

Kraftsmens Lake, Ga. E, H — 1994 O 8.1 0.177 3.66 3.2 14.5 1.48 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program
共written communication, 1994兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共July,
1994兲.
La Fruta, Tex. E, H 1930 1930 P 40.0 78.9 7.90 14.0 58.8 0.30 — “Building new dam” 共1930兲;
“Corpus Christi Dam fails” 共1930兲;
“Corpus Christi Dam failure” 共1930兲
Lake Avalon, N.M. E, R 1894 1904 P 42.7 31.5 13.7 14.6 130 0.52 — Murphy 共1905, pp. 172–173兲
Lake Francis, Calif. E, H 1899 1899 P 47.4 0.789 14.0 17.1 18.9 0.65 — Justin 共1932, pp. 46–48兲;
Sherard 共1953, pp. 39–43兲
Lake Genevieve, Ky. E, H 1930 1985 P 19.8 0.680 6.71 7.92 16.8 1.54 — J. Marchant, Kentucky Dept. for
Environmental Protection, Dam Safety and
Floodplain Compliance Section 共written
communication 1991兲
Lake Latonka, Penn. E, H 1966 1966 P 28.0 4.09 6.25 8.69 39.2 1.18 — “Earthfill” 共1966兲;
J. J. Ellam, Pennsylvania. Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication, 1987兲
Lake Philema, Ga. E, H 1965 1994 O 28.0 4.78 9 8.53 47.2 0.33 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program 共written
communication, 1994兲; and on-site survey
by Froehlich 共July, 1994兲.
Lambert Lake, Tenn. E, H 1957 1963 P 53.9 0.296 12.8 14.3 7.62 0.21 — P. Lyle Bentley, Tennessee Dept. of
Environment and Conservation, Safe Dams
Section 共written communication, 1994兲
Laurel Run, Penn. E, H — 1977 O 40.5 0.555 14.1 13.7 35.1 2.40 — Brua 共1978兲; Chen and Armbruster 共1980兲;
“Johnstown” 共1977兲; Hoxit et al. 共1982兲;
and on-site inspection by Froehlich 共Sept.
1978兲
Lawn Lake, Colo. E, H 1903 1982 P 14.2 0.798 6.71 7.62 22.2 0.96 — Jarret and Costa 共1986兲;
on-site survey by Froehlich 共Sept. 1985兲
Lily Lake, Colo. E, H 1913 1951 W — 0.0925 3.35 3.66 10.8 0.13 — W. J. Graham, U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
Denver 共written communication, 1987兲.
Little Deer Creek, Utah E, H 1962 1963 P 63.1 1.36 22.9 27.1 29.6 0.75 0.33 Collins 共1964兲;
Rostevdt 共1968, pp. B84–B87兲;
Lindon 共2004兲
Long Branch Canyon, Calif. E, H — 1938 P 11.3 0.284 3.17 3.66 9.14 0.40 — C. S. Nomura, California Dept. of Water
Resources, Division of Safety of Dams
共written communication, 1989兲
Lower Latham, Colo. E, H — 1973 P 25.7 7.08 5.79 7.01 79.2 6.3 1.5 L. H. DeGrave, Colorado Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication, 1986兲
Lower Otay, Calif. R, C 1897 1916 O 53.3 49.3 39.6 39.6 133 1.00 1.0 Jansen 共1983, pp. 151–153兲;
Justin 共1932, pp. 41–43兲;
Silent 共1916兲
Lower Two Medicine, Mont. E, H — 1964 P — 29.6 11.3 11.3 67.0 1.50 — Boner and Stermitz 共1967兲;
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
共1965, 1986兲
Lynde Brook, Mass. E, H, C 1871 1876 P 41.8 2.88 11.6 12.5 30.5 1.22 — Ellis et al. 共1876兲
Melville, Utah E, Z 1907 1909 P 25.1 24.7 7.92 9.75 32.8 0.70 – Justin 共1932, pp. 44–46兲;
Lyman 共1909兲
Merimac 共Upper兲 Lake, Ga. E, H 1939 1994 O 17.5 0.0696 3.44 3.05 14.2 0.41 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program
共written communication, 1994兲;
on-site survey by Froehlich 共July 1994兲
Mossy Lake, Ga. E, H 1955 1994 O 14.3 4.13 4.41 3.44 41.5 1.24 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of Natural
Resources, Safe Dams Program
共private communication, 1994兲;
on-site survey by Froehlich 共July 1994兲.
Noppikoski, Sweden E, H — 1985 O — 1.00 — — — — 0.38 Kung et al. 共1993兲
Otter Lake, Tenn. P 20.6 0.109 5.00 6.10 9.30 1.28 — P. L. Bentley, Tennessee Dept. of
Environment and Conservation,
Safe Dams Section
共written communication, 1994兲.
Oros, Brazil E, R, Z 1960 1960 O 110 660 35.8 35.5 — — 8.5 International Commission on Large
Dams 共1974, pp. 68–70 and 510-512兲;
Jansen 共1983, pp. 166–167兲
Pierce Reservoir, Wyo. E, H E, H — 1986 — 4.07 8.08 8.69 30.5 0.77 1.0 On-site survey by Froehlich 共1986兲;
and Mr. and Mrs. Donald Sims
共written communication, 1986兲

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J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.

 Table 1. 共Continued.兲
Volume Height
of water of water Average
above above breach
Average breach breach Height of Average side Breach
embankment, bottom, bottom, breach, breach slope formation
Dam name Embankment Year Year Failure width W̄ Vw Hw Hb width,B̄ ratio, z time, t f
and location typea built failed modeb 共m兲 共m3 ⫻ 106兲 共m兲 共m兲 共m兲 共h:v兲 共h兲 References
d
Potato Hill, N.C. E, H 1947 1977 O 23.5 0.105 7.77 7.77 16.5 1.25 — C. H. Gardner, North Carolina Dept. of
Natural Resources and Community
Development 共written communication,
1987兲
Prospect, Colo. E, H 1914 1980 P 13.1 3.54 1.68 4.42 88.4 0.69 2.5 L. H. DeGrave, Colorado Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication, 1986兲
d
Puddingstone, Calif. E, H 1926 1926 O — 0.617 15.2 15.2 — — 0.25 “Flood damage” 共1926兲; International
Commission on Large Dams 共1974, pp.
867–869兲
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Quail Creek, Utah E, H 1986 1989 P 56.6 30.8 16.7 21.3 70.0 0.10 1.0 “Investigation” 共1989兲;
Richard Hall, Utah Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication,
1989兲
Rainbow Lake, Mich. E, H — 1986 O 28.2 6.78 10.0 9.54 38.9 2.52 — J. G. Meier, Michigan. Dept. of
Environmental Protection
共written communication, 1987兲
d
Renegade Resort Lake, E, H 1970 1973 O 11.0 0.0139 3.66 3.66 2.29 0.63 — P. L. Bentley, Tennessee Dept. of
Tenn. Environment and Conservation,
Safe Dams Section
共written communication, 1994兲
Rito Manzanares, N.M. E, H — 1986 P 13.3 0.0247 4.57 7.32 13.3 0.77 — MacDonald and Langridge-Monopolis
共1984兲
Schaeffer, Colo. E, H, C — 1975 O 80.8 4.44 31.9 30.5 137 2.25 0.50 International Commission on Large
Dams 共1974, pp. 769–770兲;
Follansbee and Jones 共1922兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共Sept.
1985兲
Scott Farm Dam No. 2, E, H 1947 1948 P 39.3 0.086 10.4 11.9 15.0 0.00 — B. Hurndall, Alberta Environment,
Canada Water Resources Management Service,
Dam Safety Branch 共written
communication, 1992兲
South Fork, Penn. E, H 1853 1889 O 64.0 18.9 24.6 24.4 94.5 1.38 0.75 Francis et al. 共1891兲;
Jansen 共1983, pp. 184–191兲;
McCullough 共1987兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共May 1989兲
Statham Lake, Americus, E, H 1955 1994 O 12.6 0.564 5.55 5.12 21 0.54 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of
Ga. Natural Resources, Safe Dams Program
共private communication, 1994兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共July 1994兲
Teton, Idaho E, Z 1975 1976 P 250 310 77.4 86.9 151 1.00 1.25 Brown and Rogers 共1977兲; and Jansen
共1983, pp. 191–213兲
Timberlake, Va. E, H 1926 1995 O 26.8 1.80 7.33 7.32 56.7 1.5 — Gearan 共1995兲;
B. Prugh, U.S. Geological Survey,
Richmond, Va.
共written communication, 1995兲;
and on-site survey by Froehlich 共June 1995兲
Trial Lake, Utah E, H — 1986 P 7.62 1.48 5.18 5.18 21.0 0.82 — C. Gourley, Utah Dept. of Natural
Resources 共written communication, 1988兲
d
Trout Lake, N.C. E, H — 1916 O 21.6 0.493 8.53 8.53 26.2 1.79 — C. Karpowicz,
U.S. National Park Service,
Engineering and Safety Services
Division, Washington, D.C.
共written communication, 1988兲.
d
Upper Pond, Conn. E, H — 1984 O — 0.222 5.18 5.18 16.5 1.71 — J. Sangivanni, Connectucut
Dept. of Environmental Protection
共written communication, 1988兲
Wheatland No. 1, Wyo. E, H 1893 1969 P — 11.6 12.2 13.7 35.4 0.75 1.5 “Wyoming dam fails” 共1969兲
Wilkinson Lake, Ga. E, H, C 1956 1994 P 13.2 0.533 3.57 3.72 29 1.74 — S. Watts, Georgia Dept. of
Natural Resources, Safe Dams
Program 共written communication, 1994兲;
on-site survey by Froehlich 共July 1994兲.
Winston, N.C. E, H, C 1904 1912 O 7.76 0.662 6.40 6.10 19.8 0.20 — Ambler 共1912兲;
Justin 共1932, pp. 43–44兲
a
E = earthfill; R = rockfill; H = homogeneous; Z = zoned; M = masonry; C = corewall.
b
O = overtopping; P = piping; S = sliding; W = wave action.
c
Information not available.
d
Height of water assumed equal to height of dam breach.

Average breach width is one-half the sum of the trapezoid top
width and bottom width.
For the purpose of predicting an outflow hydrograph, a breach
is considered to begin forming when erosion of the downstream
embankment slope has reached the crest of the dam 共i.e., when
the initiation phase comes to an end兲 and rapid downward erosion
of the breach starts, accompanied by a rapid increase in the out-
flow through the opening. Breach formation ends when the breach
reaches its maximum size. Estimates of breach formation time
presented in Table 1 were made based on eyewitness accounts of
the failures, photographs, and recorded stage and discharge mea-
surements that helped to establish the time when the breaches
began to form. Breach formation time has a large influence on
calculated outflow hydrographs from a failure, and on predicted
peak water-surface elevations and flood wave travel times at
downstream locations.

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J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.

 Breach Formation Model Parameters
Breach formation model parameters that need to be estimated
consist of the reservoir water-surface elevation at which breach
formation begins Y f 共or, equivalently, the critical overtopping
depth Hc兲, the height Hb, average width B̄, and average side slope
ratio z of the final trapezoidal breach, as shown in Fig. 1, and the
breach formation time t f 共i.e., the time needed for complete de-
velopment of the breach following the initiation phase兲. Relations
for both expected values and their variances are presented. Pre-
diction equations for the parameters B̄, z, and t f were determined
from multiple regression analysis of the assembled data. Logarith-
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mic transformations of all dependent and independent variables
were found to provide the best linear relations.
Dimensional Analysis
Dimensional analysis 共White 1994, Chap. 5兲 is a conceptual tool
often applied to understand physical situations involving a mix of
different kinds of physical quantities. Basically, it is a method for
reducing the number and complexity of variables that affect a
given physical phenomena by combining them into dimensionless
quantities. Dimensional analysis is used routinely in hydraulic
engineering to form reasonable hypotheses about complex physi-
cal situations that can be tested by experiment or by more devel-
oped theories of the phenomena. In its most primitive form,
dimensional analysis is used to check the plausibility of derived
equations 共i.e., the two sides of any equation must be commen-
surable or have the same dimensions兲.
Here we develop functional relations between a set of relevant
variables and three measures of breaches that form in embank-
ment dams when they fail, i.e., B̄, z, and t f . The variables pre-
sented in Table 1, along with gravitational acceleration g, form
the following set: S1 = 兵B̄ , z , t f , Mode, W̄ , Vw , Hw , Hb , g其, where
Mode= qualitative description of the failure mode. Combining the
variables gives the revised set of dimensionless quantities:
S2 = 兵B̄/Hb,z,t f 冑g/Hb,Mode,W̄/Hb,Vw/H3b,Hw/Hb其
This set does not include everything relevant to the matter in
hand. However, it does include physically relevant variables that
were able to be collected for embankment dam failures from a
wide variety of sources 共see Table 1兲. Noticeably absent from the
set are data describing soil characteristics of the embankments,
which might have significant influence on the speed and extent of
breach development. However, because detailed soil characteris-
tics are available for so few of the dam failures reported in Table
1, they have not been included in the data summary.
Failure Mode
Breaches form in embankment dams in several different ways.
For some of the cases in Table 1, deciding on the mode of failure
was difficult, especially if eyewitness accounts of the failure were
not available. The International Commission on Large Dams
共1974兲 found that about one-third of all embankment-dam failures
have been caused by inadequate spillway capacities that result in
overtopping of the embankments. Roughly another one-third were
attributed to piping caused by concentrated seepage through the
embankments that erodes soil particles along the path of leakage,
gradually enlarging the flow passage until failures occur. Other
failures were created by embankment slides that lower the dam
crests and allow overtopping, foundation settlement, and insuffi-
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
cient protection against wave action. On the basis of these find-
ings, failure modes presented in Table 1 have been classified as
overtopping 共O兲, piping or seepage 共S兲, or wave action 共W兲.
Breach Height and Reservoir Volume
The bottom of a fully formed breach usually is the dam founda-
tion, which is more resistant to erosion than the embankment
material. However, the maximum height of a breach might be
limited by the volume of water in the reservoir at the time of
failure, or by the presence of a layer of erosion-resistant material
located in the embankment. The maximum height of a breach, or
the minimum bottom elevation of the trapezoidal breach approxi-
mation, needs to be presupposed with reasonable certainty. The
volume of water contained in the reservoir at the time of failure
that will be used to predict breach formation model parameters,
denoted as Vw, is the volume above the final breach bottom that
will eventually flow out of the reservoir. Depending on the em-
bankment design and the elevation of the breach bottom, Vw
might be substantially less than the reservoir capacity.
Average Breach Width
The best prediction equation for dimensionless average breach
width B̄* = B̄ / Hb from Eq. 共1兲 was found from multiple linear
regression analysis to be
ln B̄* = − 1.30 + 0.278 ⫻ Mode + 0.316 ⫻ ln Vw* 共2兲
where Mode= 1 if the failure is from overtopping, and 0 other-
wise, and Vw* = Vw / H3b. The regression model is based on 69 cases
from the assembled data 共breach width is missing from four of the
dam failures summarized in Table 1, and reservoir volume is
missing from another兲. The coefficient of determination of the
expression for the logarithm of B̄* = 0.652, and ␴ˆ ln ¯B = 0.4602
*
= standard error of estimate of the regression model for ln B̄*.
Transforming Eq. 共2兲 gives
共1兲
B̄* = 0.27koVw0.32
* 共3兲
where
再 冎
1.3 for overtopping failures
ko = 共4兲
1.0 for other failure modes
is a factor that accounts for the effect of failure mode. Dimen-
sionless variables have been used in Eq. 共2兲 primarily to make the
formula easier to use with any system of consistent units. Addi-
tionally, using dimensionless parameters in the analysis effec-
tively scales the data, reducing the possibility that one or more
values will have inappropriate influence on the relation. Expand-
ing the dimensionless terms yields the following expression for B̄:
B̄ = 0.27koV0.32 0.04
w Hb . 共5兲
Because dimensionless parameters are used in Eqs. 共2兲 and 共3兲,
variables having consistent length units need to be used in Eq. 共5兲,
that is, if the unit of B̄ is meters, then the unit of Vw is cubic
meters and the unit of Hb is meters.
Predicted values of B̄ given by Eq. 共5兲 are plotted against
measured values in Fig. 3. The assembled data show that over-
topping failures produce breaches that are, on average, about 30%
wider than those caused by other failure modes, as reflected in the
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Fig. 3. Comparison of measured and predicted average breach
widths
overtopping factor k0. The factor k0 might also account indirectly
for the effect of large inflows to a reservoir during an overtopping
failure, which are not included in the estimate of Vw and which
would increase the maximum breach width. Surprisingly, average
embankment width W̄ does not add significantly to the prediction
of B̄. Measures of the cohesiveness of embankment soils would
likely explain more of the variation of final breach width.
The exponent of Hb in Eq. 共5兲 is small, showing that a ten-fold
variation in Hb, from say 5 to 50 m, results in a 10% increase in
breach width. One might wonder if the effect of breach height on
average breach width is significant enough to be included in the
relation. The answer depends on the variability of the coefficient
of ln Vw* in Eq. 共2兲. The exponent on Hb in Eq. 共5兲 will vanish if
we can justify letting the coefficient equal one-third.
The errors 共residuals兲 given by a linear regression model are
considered to be normally and independently distributed with
mean zero and variance ␴2. As the least squares estimators of a
coefficient ␤ j are linear combinations of the observations, it fol-
lows that ␤ j is also normally distributed with variance ␴2C jj
共Montgomery and Peck 1982, p. 125兲, where C jj = diagonal ele-
ment of the 共X⬘X兲−1 matrix corresponding to ␤ˆ j 共i.e., the esti-
mated value of ␤ j兲. Consequently, each of the statistics
␤ˆ j − ␤ j
冑␴ˆ 2C jj , j = 0,1, . . . ,k
is distributed as student’s t with n − p degrees of freedom. With
C33 = 0.003975 共see Appendix I兲, ␴ˆ 2 = 0.2118, n = 69, and p = 2, the
scaled difference
␤ˆ 3 − ␤3 0.316 − 0.333
冑␴ˆ 2C33 = 冑0.2118 ⫻ 0.003975 = − 0.586
has a 28% chance of being equaled or exceeded, a probability
small enough to conclude that the coefficient ␤3 ⬍ 1 / 3 and, con-
sequently, that embankment height does indeed have a significant
influence on the average width of a breach. A physical explana-
tion for the effect of embankment height is that larger impounded
water depths result in faster outflow velocities and greater shear
stresses that erode the embankment to a slightly wider final state.
1714 / JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
Nonetheless, final average breach widths given by the
approximation
B̄ = 0.27koV1/3
w 共6兲
will likely be accurate enough in application.
Breach Side-Slope Ratio
An approximate estimate of the side slope ratio obtained from 70
cases 共side slope is missing from four of the dam failures pre-
sented in Table 1兲 is given by
ln z = − 0.416 + 0.389 ⫻ Mode 共7兲
which has a small coefficient of determination of only 5% and a
standard error of estimate ␴ˆ ln z = 0.8273. Nonetheless, the regres-
sion model coefficient for Mode is highly significant, showing
that embankment side slope is larger when failure is caused by
overtopping. This general dependence is given adequately by fail-
ure mode alone and is not improved by the addition of impound-
ment volume or embankment height. Transforming Eq. 共7兲 gives
the simple relation
z= 再 1.0 for overtopping failures
0.7 for other failure modes
冎 共8兲
Breach Formation Time
Dimensionless breach formation time t f * = t f 冑g / Hb, where
g = gravitational acceleration, is given by the regression equation
ln t f * = 4.15 + 0.495 ln Vw* 共9兲
which has a coefficient of determination of 0.929 and a standard
error of estimate ␴ˆ ln t f * = 0.2979. Breach formation time is missing
from 51 of the cases reported in Table 1, consequently Eq. 共9兲 is
based on only 23 cases. Transforming Eq. 共9兲 gives
t f * = 63.2Vw0.50
* 共10兲
which, after expanding the dimensionless terms, can be written as
冑
Vw
t f = 63.2 共11兲
gH2b
Predicted values of t f given by Eq. 共11兲 are plotted against
measured values in Fig. 4. Notwithstanding the comparatively
few cases with observed values, the relation is strong and shows
that breach formation time increases with Vw, and decreases with
larger values of Hb. Dependence of t f on failure mode is not
significant. We reiterate that t f given by Eq. 共11兲 refers to the
length of time needed for the final trapezoidal breach to form,
which takes place after the breach initiation phase as defined by
Wahl 共2004兲, and which corresponds to Stages 3 and 4 of the
breaching process described by Hanson et al. 共2005兲.
Critical Overtopping Depth
Breach formation is considered to begin after water, either over-
topping the embankment or seeping through it, has eroded the
downstream embankment slope and crest width to the point of the
upstream face. At this stage of a failure, outflows through the
breach will increase quickly. Recorded water levels in the reser-
voir or in the downstream channel will show sudden changes

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Fig. 4. Comparison of measured and predicted breach formation
times
soon after the breach has begun to form. For modeling purposes,
formation begins either at a specified time or when the reservoir
level reaches a specified elevation Y f = Y d + Hc.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 共FEMA兲 pro-
vides critical depths of overtopping Hc ranging from 0 to 0.6 m
that depend on the physical condition of the embankment 共FEMA
1987兲. However, no estimates of uncertainty are given. Neverthe-
less, Powledge et al. 共1989a,b兲 provide data that suggest the vari-
ance of Hc is comparatively large, and that both depth and
duration of overtopping are important factors affecting breach ini-
tiation. Sparseness of data prevents a more thorough statistical
assessment.
Breach Progression
The rate at which a breach enlarges or progresses using either
Model A, B, or C is controlled by the parameter ␤ = 共bti − Bt0兲 /
共Bt − Bt0兲, where bti = instantaneous topwidth of the breach,
Bt = final topwidth of the breach, and Bt0 = initial topwidth of the
breach 共Bt0 = 0 for Models A and B兲. With B̄ given by Eq. 共5兲 and
z by Eq. 共8兲, Bt = B̄ + zHb.
Rates at which breaches enlarge are decided on the basis of
limited evidence consisting of photographs, eyewitness accounts,
and some small-scale experiments. If reservoir levels are con-
stant, and if tailwater plays no role in controlling flow through the
breach, once a breach has eroded to its base level the gap will
widen at a constant rate. However, reservoir water levels usually
fall rapidly after breaches are formed. Also, as flood flows fill
the downstream channel tailwater elevation increasingly limits
flow through the opening. Consequently, linear progression might
describe the major portion of breach growth well. Alternately,
Brunner 共2002兲 proposes a sine-curve progression, which might
be a better choice as it reflects slower growth at the start and
finish of breach development. Although other breach progression
rates can be hypothesized, often ␤ is calculated as follows:
JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008 / 1715
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
冦再 冧
t
for linear progression
冋 冉 冊册冎
tf
␤=
1 t 1
1 + sin ␲ − for sine-curve progression
2 tf 2
共12兲
With ␤ given by Eq. 共12兲, instantaneous topwidth of the breach is
calculated as
bti = ␤共Bt − Bt0兲 + Bt0 共13兲
With bti obtained from Eq. 共13兲, the instantaneous height of the
breach hi 共measured vertically downward from the initial em-
bankment crest兲 is found as follows:
hi = 再 min兵bti/2z,Hb其 for Model A
␤ ⫻ Hb for Models B and C
冎 共14兲
Model Limitations
Although the trapezoidal breach formation model described is
used widely to estimate downstream flooding from potential dam
failures, it does not provide a thorough or detailed description of
the physical process of erosion that takes place when an embank-
ment dam does fail. Factors including soil characteristics, soil
composition, and protective soil covers in the form of vegetation,
rock riprap, or hardened surfaces of concrete or asphalt, have not
been taken into account when evaluating the model parameters B̄,
z, and t f .
Without doubt, the process of breach erosion involves many
more aspects than are portrayed by the mathematical representa-
tion given here. Nonetheless, the model does provide a compara-
tively uncomplicated way of estimating the consequence of an
embankment dam breach. It might be used most effectively as
part of a screening tool to identify extremely hazardous condi-
tions, which could then be examined in greater detail using more
sophisticated simulation tools that require more input data. We
make use of our knowledge of model parameter uncertainty in the
following section where stochastic simulations of flooding result-
ing from embankment dam failures are described.
Stochastic Dam Breach Flood Model
Mathematical models for dam breach flood forecasting used in
practice today are deterministic; that is to say, given a sequence of
inputs to the model, the outputs are uniquely determined. In
probabilistic descriptions of dam failure, the effects of uncertainty
in the model inputs, parameters, or descriptive equations are re-
flected in the degree of uncertainty of the output, thereby indicat-
ing their stochastic characteristics.
Evaluation of Uncertainty
Most dam failure flood analyses have been carried out using only
the best estimates 共that is, the expected values兲 of the input pa-
rameters. In some cases, sensitivity analyses have also been per-
formed in which a range of input estimates are used to assess the
robustness of decision justifications based on risk assessment out-
comes. However, the sensitivity analysis approach is severely
limited because it does not provide estimates of the distribution of
outputs that would result from the joint distribution of input un-
 certainties. Therefore, sensitivity analyses provide little, if any,
idea of the relative likelihood associated with the outputs that are
obtained from a particular combination of inputs. In contrast, un-
certainty analysis does provide the additional information.
Although the uncertainty of predicted breach parameters can
be large, there have previously been no quantitative assessments
of the effect of their inherent stochastic character on solution
outcomes. Consequently, breach parameter uncertainty has not
been incorporated into most risk assessment studies. In some
analyses, variations in thresholds of failure 共e.g., overtopping
depth to initiate breaching兲 have been included, usually through a
voting process in which study team members and technical ex-
perts use engineering judgment to assign probabilities to different
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failure thresholds. However, more thorough analysis of the ran-

domness of breach parameters during risk assessment might be
worthwhile, because the effect of breach parameter variability on
predictions might be significantly greater than the effects of other
factors, and could, as a result, dramatically influence decisions
based on dam breach flood simulations.

Model Overview
A stochastic dam breach flood model was developed for finding
approximate distributions of solution outcomes by means of the
Monte Carlo method 共Hammersley and Handscomb 1965兲 in
which artificial random sampling of input parameters is used to
assess breach parameter uncertainty. Standardized residuals of
B̄*, z, and t f * given by Eqs. 共5兲, 共7兲, and 共9兲, respectively,
shown in Fig. 5 are nearly uncorrelated, suggesting that random
samples can be safely generated considering each variable to be
independent.
The stochastic variables ln B̄*, ln z, and ln t f * given by the
regression equations for each are t distributed with prediction
variance 共Montgomery and Peck 1982, p. 141兲
Var关y 0兴 = ␴ˆ 2关1 + x⬘0共X⬘X兲−1x0兴 共15兲

where y 0 = either of ln B̄*, ln z, or ln t f *; x0 = a particular set of

regressor variables; ␴ˆ = standard error of estimate of the regres-
sion model for y 0; and X = regressor variable matrix associated
with y 0. Variance given by Eq. 共15兲 is not constant, but depends
on the 共X⬘X兲−1 matrix and the level of regressor variables con-
tainined in x0. The x0 and the 共X⬘X兲−1 matrices for ln B̄*, ln z, and
ln t f * are presented in the Appendix. The critical overtopping
depth Hc used to trigger breach formation is bounded below by
zero, and can achieve comparatively large values 共Powledge et al.
1989b兲, therefore, a lognormal distribution was used to model the
variation of Hc.
For each set of input variables sampled from these distribu- Fig. 5. Comparison of standardized residuals of empirical breach
tions, the dam breach flood model was run, and output values at formation models parameters B̄*, z, and t f *
selected locations were stored for future analysis. Runoff hydro-
graphs from contributing catchments were calculated using the diffusion is accounted for accurately 共Ponce 1986; Ponce and
National Resource Conservation Service 共NRCS兲 runoff curve Lugo 2001兲. An implicit four-point finite-difference approxima-
number technique to find precipitation excess, and NRCS dimen- tion 共Ponce and Yevjevich 1978兲 was used to solve the resulting
sionless unit hydrographs are used to transform the excess into single kinematic wave equation. The numerical solution scheme
sequential outflows 共McCuen 1989兲. is fast and accurate, and has been applied to dam-break flood
Stream flows were found based on numerical solutions of ki- simulations by Macchione 共1994兲.
nematic approximations to the governing mass and momentum
transport equations for cross-section-averaged one-dimensional
open channel flow that are carried out so that physical diffusion is Example Application
represented by discretization errors 共Cunge 1969兲. Making use of
Dooge’s 共1973, pp. 243–255兲 Laplace transform solution of the Use of the stochastic dam-breach flood model is shown by simu-
linearized momentum equation, the effect of Froude number on lating floods caused by failure of Bear Creek Dam. Data for the

1716 / JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008

J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.

 Table 2. Outflow Structure Characteristics of Bear Creek Dam which depends on Y f , the random critical overtopping depth Hc is
Reservoir outflow generated first, followed by calculation of expected values of
structure Feature Description ln B̄* and ln t f *, and their variances, and then the random esti-
Principal spillway 共orifice兲 Area 3.83 m2 mates of ln B̄* and ln t f *. The expected value of z = 1.0 and var
Discharge coefficient 0.7 共dimensionless兲 共ln z兲 = 0.7111 were used for all trials. Because Y f is a random
Centerline elevation 115.82 m parameter, failure might not occur for generated values that ex-
Head exponent 0.5 ceed the maximum reservoir water level that would occur without
Emergency spillway 共weir兲 Crest elevation 128.02 m breaching.
Length 60.96 m The number of Monte Carlo trials needed to achieve a particu-
Weir coefficient 0.54 共dimensionless兲
lar level of reliability is given by Harr 共1987, pp. 192–193兲 as

冉 冊
Head exponent 1.5
␸2␣/2 m
Dam 共weir兲 Crest elevation 131.67 m N= 共17兲
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Length 274.32 m 4␧2

Weir coefficient 0.54 共dimensionless兲
Head exponent 1.5
dam, including catchment and reservoir characteristics, spillway
and dam dimensions and elevations, probable maximum precipi-
tation 共PMP兲 depth 共i.e., the greatest depth of precipitation for a
given duration that is physically possible over a given size storm
area at a particular geographical location during a certain time of
the year兲, and channel cross sections, are given in the HEC-1
flood hydrograph package user’s manual 共USACE 1978, pp.
A1–A6, 1998, pp. 166–169兲. Spillway and dam crest information
for the dam are summarized in Table 2. The catchment area up-
stream of the reservoir is 186.7 km2 and the 24 h PMP is
698 mm.
Only failure from overtopping was considered, therefore in
all trials Mode= 1. The minimum elevation of the trapezoidal
breach is assumed to be known with certainty and is taken as the
bottom of the embankment 共i.e., 103.63 m兲, giving a maximum
breach height Hb = Y d − Y bmin = 131.67– 103.63= 28.04 m. Critical
overtopping depth Hc for an embankment in good condition is
taken as 0.6 m 共FEMA 1987兲. Based on information given in
Powledge et al. 共1989a,b兲, the coefficient of variation of Hc 共i.e.,
CvH = ␴ˆ Hc / Hc兲 is estimated to be 0.5, giving
c
var共ln Hc兲 = ln共Cv2H + 1兲 = 0.2231 共16兲
c
Therefore, the elevation at which breaching begins is stochastic
and is found as Y f = Y d + Hc. Because relations for B̄ and t f re-
quire the volume of impounded water at the time of failure Vw,
where ␸␣/2 = standard normal deviate corresponding to a two-
sided confidence level 共1 − ␣兲, ␧ = maximum allowable system
error; and m = number of random variables. For example, with
three random variables 共ln B̄*, ln t f *, and ln Hc兲, results from a
Monte Carlo simulation with 100,000 trials will not differ by
more than 12% from the estimated value 共␧ = 0.12兲 with 90%
confidence 共1 − ␣ = 0.90兲, for which ␸␣/2 = 1.645. For this reason,
we have settled on 100,000 Monte Carlo trials to estimate confi-
dence limits of dam-breach flood calculations. Alternate methods
requiring fewer calculations for estimating flood prediction reli-
ability are also possible and are under development.
We simulated runoff and routed the resulting hydrographs
through the reservoir for each of the Monte Carlo trials for the
PMP storm, which produced the probable maximum flood 共PMF兲,
i.e., the flood that may be expected from the most severe combi-
nation of critical meteorological and hydrological conditions that
are reasonably possible in the drainage basin under study. Means
and percentiles 共95 and 99%兲 of peak stages 共water depths兲 and
peak flow rates at the dam and at various downstream locations
are summarized in Table 3. Also provided in Table 3 are the
results from a simulation based on the expected critical overtop-
ping depth Hc = 0.61 m, for which Y f = 131.67+ 0.61= 132.28 m
and Vw = 18.298⫻ 106 m3, which give values of the expected
breach parameters B̄ = 92.5 m and t f = 3078 s = 0.855 h.
Peak stages and flow rates from the “expected breach” are
nearly the same as the means of the full PMP simulated values at
the dam and at all downstream locations. However, such close
agreement would not be found if many of the trials resulted in
nonfailure scenarios, as would be the case for runoff generated

Table 3. Bear Creek Peak Stages and Flow Rates Produced by the Full PMP Storm

Expected Monte Carlo simulation peak Expected Monte Carlo simulation peak
breach stage 共m兲 breach flow rate 共m3 / s兲
Distance peak Percentile peak flow Percentile
Location from dam stage rate
identifier 共m兲 共m兲 Mean 95% 99% 共m3 / s兲 Mean 95% 99%
DAM 0 28.87 28.95 29.55 30.01 10,625 10,821 15,532 18,176
CH-1 100 14.00 14.01 15.83 16.70 10,624 10,809 15,510 18,152
CH-3 500 13.99 13.99 15.80 16.67 10,612 10,760 15,411 18,050
CH-4 1000 13.96 13.96 15.76 16.61 10,547 10,695 15,302 17,856
CH-6 2000 13.96 13.92 15.68 16.51 10,482 10,578 15,073 17,493
CH-8 3000 13.91 13.87 15.61 16.41 10,422 10,472 14,857 17,168
CH-10 4000 13.87 13.83 15.54 16.30 10,351 10,374 14,652 16,858
CH-12 5072 7.38 7.37 8.12 8.50 10,273 10,256 14,392 16,437
CH-14 6072 7.37 7.35 8.08 8.42 10,206 10,149 14,125 16,032
CH-18 8230 7.34 7.30 7.96 8.24 10,042 9,886 13,498 15,045

JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008 / 1717

J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.

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Fig. 6. Box-and-whisker plots of peak stages generated by random
trials at three locations
from smaller storms, such as the “100-year” storm or perhaps
even the “one-half PMP” storm. At all locations for the PMF, the
95th percentile values of stage and discharge are significantly
higher than the means. For example, at the most downstream
location 共CH-18兲, the 95th percentile peak water-surface elevation
is two-thirds of a meter higher than the mean value, and the 95th
percentile peak flow rate is more than one-third greater than the
mean.
Variability of predicted of peak stages at three locations are
shown in “box-and-whisker” plots presented in Fig. 6. The plots
summarize stage distributions by displaying three components:
共1兲 A central line to indicate central tendency or location; 共2兲 a
box to indicate variability around this central tendency 共25th and
75th percentile values兲; and whiskers around the box to indicate
the range of the variable. Variation of peak stage at the dam is less
than at downstream locations because the maximum reservoir el-
evation depends primarily on the critical overtopping depth,
whereas peak stages at downstream locations depend more on
other stochastic breach parameters, such as average width and
formation time. Of note is the possibility of peak water-surface
elevations that are significantly higher than the means 共about 5 m
at CH-10兲. Large uncertainty of predicted peak flow rates is
shown by box-and-whisker plots in Fig. 7, where peaks more than
two and one-half times the mean value were generated at CH-10.
Prudent consideration of peak stage and flow rate uncertainties,
reflected in the variance of predicted outcomes, is needed to
evaluate potential flood hazards thoroughly.
Summary and Conclusions
The extent of flooding and travel time of a flood wave that would
result from the failure of a dam need to be predicted to establish
spillway capacities and to prepare emergency action plans that
would be used in the event of an actual dam failure 共McMahon
1981, FEMA 1998兲. A large factor in making accurate predictions
is deciding how to model breaches that form in embankment
dams. Data from 74 embankment dam failures were assembled to
evaluate parameters needed in empirical models of breach forma-
tion that consider the breach to form in the shape of a trapezoid.
Expressions for the parameters 共i.e., average breach width, the
side-slope ratio of the trapezoidal opening, and formation time of
the breach兲 and their variances were developed from the data.
1718 / JOURNAL OF HYDRAULIC ENGINEERING © ASCE / DECEMBER 2008
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
Fig. 7. Box-and-whisker plot of peak flow rates generated by random
trials at three locations
Although the empirical model does not account for many of
the physical processes directly that affect breach formation, we
have presented evidence from comparatively large scale experi-
mental tests carried out in China and Norway that confirm
breaches forming in the shape of trapezoids with nonvertical
sides. The model, therefore, is believed to provide a reasonable
approximation that is used to calculate dam outflows.
Taking into account the uncertain nature of the breach model,
expressions for expected values of breach parameters and their
variances were then used in a stochastic model of dam breach
flooding that evaluates the variability of predicted outcomes 共peak
stages and peak flow rates兲 using a Monte Carlo simulation ap-
proach. The stochastic dam breach model samples the probability
distributions randomly for each of the stochastic input variables,
carries out a dam breach simulation using the generated param-
eters, and then repeats this process over and over again. Simula-
tion results have probability distributions that cover all potential
outcomes of the flood model. Considering the uncertainty of so-
lutions evaluated in this way when deciding on spillway design
floods and when preparing emergency action plans will help re-
duce risk associated with potential dam failures.
Appendix
Random values of ln B̄*, ln z, and ln t f * are generated based on the
variance of predictions given by Eqs. 共2兲, 共7兲, and 共9兲, respec-
tively, using Eq. 共15兲. The transpose of the vector of predictor
variables for the expected value of ln B̄* given by Eq. 共2兲 is
⬘ ¯B = 关1 , Mode, ln Vw*兴, where the number of regression model
xln
*
parameters p = 2 共i.e., Mode and ln Vw*兲, and the inverse of the
X⬘X matrix for ln B̄* based on n = 69 observations was calculated
as follows:
冤 冥
0.239680 − 0.023674 − 0.029366
−1
共X⬘X兲ln ¯B = − 0.023674 0.062731 0.000128 共18兲
*
− 0.029366 0.000128 0.003975
⬘ z = 关1 , Mode兴, giving p = 1, and, based
For predictions of ln z, xln
on n = 69 observations,
 共X⬘X兲ln
−1
z= 冋 0.022727 − 0.022727
− 0.022727 0.061189
册 共19兲
Variations of ln t f * predictions are found with x⬘ln t f * = 关1 , ln Vw*兴,
and
冋 册
0.510122 − 0.066755
共X⬘X兲−1
ln t f * =
− 0.066755 0.009550
for which p = 1, and n = 23.
Notation
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The following symbols are used in this paper:
B̄ ⫽ average width of final trapezoidal breach;
B̄* ⫽ B̄ / H = dimensionless breach width;
b Brua, S. A. 共1978兲. “Floods of July 19–20, 1977 in the Johnstown area,
Bt ⫽ final top width of a trapezoidal breach;
Bt0 ⫽ initial top width of a trapezoidal breach;
bti ⫽ instantaneous top width of a trapezoidal breach;
Cv ⫽ coefficient of variation;
g ⫽ standard gravitational acceleration= 9.80665 m / s2
共exactly兲 or 32.174 ft/ s2 共approximately兲;
Hc ⫽ Y f − Y d = critical overtopping depth at which breach
formation begins;
Hb ⫽ maximum height of the final trapezoidal breach;
Hw ⫽ Y f − Y bmin = height of water above the final breach
bottom at the time of failure;
hi ⫽ instantaneous breach height measured vertically
downward from the initial dam crest;
ko ⫽ overtopping coefficient used to calculate average
breach width;
n ⫽ number of observed values used to develop a
regression model;
p ⫽ number of regression model parameters;
S1 ⫽ set of variables related to embankment dam breach
development;
S2 ⫽ set of dimensionless variables related to embankment
dam breach development;
t ⫽ time since start of breach formation;
t f ⫽ breach formation time 共i.e., the time needed for
complete development of the ultimate breach
from the initial breakthrough at the crest to the end
of significant lateral enlargement兲;
t f * ⫽ t f 冑g / Hb = dimensionless breach formation time;
Vw ⫽ reservoir volume at the time of failure;
Vw* ⫽ Vw / H3b = dimensionless reservoir volume at time of
failure;
W ⫽ average width of embankment;
X ⫽ 共n ⫻ p兲 matrix of independent variables augmented
by a column of ones;
x⬘ ⫽ transpose of the 共p + 1兲 vector of predictor variables;
Y b ⫽ elevation of the bottom of a trapezoidal breach;
Y bmin ⫽ bottom elevation of the final trapezoidal breach that
forms;
Y d ⫽ elevation of dam crest;
Y f ⫽ reservoir elevation at which breach formation
begins;
z ⫽ average side-slope ratio 共horizontal to vertical兲 of
trapezoidal breach;
␤ ⫽ breach progression parameter; and
␴ˆ ⫽ regression standard error.
J. Hydraul. Eng. 2008.134:1708-1721.
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