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Last Updated: 08 November 2015
Published: 10 March 2015
Written by David Swanton
The death penalty is morally unacceptable
By David Swanton

Posted Thursday, 5 March 2015 in in ON LINE opinion - Australia's e-journal of social and political debate

Capital punishment has recently become an increased focus of international attention and debate. From an ethical
perspective, many of the arguments for and against the death penalty are missing a consideration of key issues.

Criminologists consider that the major reasons for criminal penalties are rehabilitation (reforming the prisoner to be a better
citizen), incapacitation (preventing the prisoner from committing other crimes), deterrence (discouraging the prisoner and
others from further crime) and retribution (society punishing the prisoner as vengeance for a criminal act). Rehabilitation
and incapacitation can be achieved through appropriately lengthy jail sentences. The only reasons that could possibly be
offered in support of a death penalty are deterrence and retribution.

However, the large majority of experts consider that there is no credible scientific evidence supporting the contention that
the death penalty deters criminal behaviour. This is a surprising result for some, but perhaps the criminal mind doesn’t think
of consequences or has difficulty computing the risk profiles associated with undertaking a criminal act.

That leaves retribution. Consider whether people would advocate retribution in a hypothetical situation. Imagine that you
are the world’s best neurosurgeon and you have surgically removed a patient’s large brain tumour, which would have caused
extremely violent outbursts. At the same time, a DNA test links your patient to the violent deaths and rapes of your closest
friends. As the world’s foremost surgeon, you know that this person will no longer commit such crimes (they were a model
citizen until the tumour developed). There is no need for incapacitation, your patient has been rehabilitated through your
surgery, and there is no need for deterrence (as people don’t plan to have brain tumours). Yet some people might still
consider that retribution, through capital punishment, is desirable, despite its unjustness. What would we want to happen if,
instead, each of us were the patient?

This hypothetical situation is not unrealistic, because many people and cultures consider it acceptable to kill people against
their will. Many religions teach that their gods or deities of choice have killed many others, through great floods, the
Passover (death of newborn infants), and much general smiting done without presumptions of innocence and trials. Many
people believe that these religious teachings are good. Over time, these beliefs have manifested themselves in many legal
systems. Indeed, the four most populous countries, China, India, the United States of America and Indonesia, have the death
penalty on their statute books.

Although many might support retribution as an argument for the death penalty, it doesn’t conform to modern notions of how
we should treat fellow humans. A better alternative to many people’s eye for an eye system of morality is one based on an
ethical principle that it is wrong to kill other people against their will. There are some exceptions to this of course, self
defence being the most notable. According to this principle the death penalty would be forbidden. If it is wrong for one
individual to kill another then it should be unacceptable for the state to cause a person’s death in civilised societies. The
state, as a collective of individuals, should not generally have moral rights that individuals do not have.
Modern societies recognise that prisoners should be treated humanely, consistent with human rights obligations. Some
criminals do commit horrific crimes, but capital punishment, torture, or mistreatment of prisoners serves no utilitarian
purpose and signals, wrongly, that violence can solve problems. An eye for an eye society is one that is of years gone by,
and unsuited to a modern civilised society.

It seems clear then that any countries that want to take the moral high ground and campaign against capital punishment for
their nationals who have committed crimes in other countries should abide by some rules.

First, they should not have the death penalty on their own statute books. That would be hypocritical.

Second, they must not consider that killing some people is acceptable according to some of their belief systems. It is
hypocritical to denounce killing in somebody else’s moral or legal system, if you accept it in your own.

Third, they should not campaign against capital punishment only for their citizens. In moral matters, what is right for one
nationality ought to be right for people of other nationalities. To do otherwise is self-serving, nationalistic, and a form of
racial/cultural/ethnic discrimination.

Fourth, they should make representations against the death penalty with equal vigour to all countries that have capital
punishment. To make representations to one country, and not for example, to China or the United States, indicates bias.
International relations are complex, but moral campaigns aimed at one country over others cannot be morally sound.

If countries follow these rules, they can work diplomatically and cooperatively with each other to endorse and uphold the
principle that killing others against their will is wrong, and in so doing eliminate capital punishment. This principle should
be applied to all people, in all countries, at all times.

Pros And Cons Of The Death Penalty

by Ashanthi Warunasuirya
The much anticipated
judgement on Bharath
Lakshman Premachandra
murder case was delivered
recently. Accordingly, five
people including former
MP Duminda
Silva were given the capital
punishment. The issue of
Death Penalty and life
imprisonment has become a
much discussed topic in the
society at present. With the
issue of child molestation
and murder there was a
outcry from the society to impose the capital punishment. However the death penalty is not implemented and the
convicts are automatically given a life imprisonment.
Therefore there is a common belief in the society that these convicts are pardoned and released All this is centered
around the imbalances and inequalities of our legal system.
The following are some of the comments made by intellectuals and civil society activisits regarding the pros and cons
of imposing the death penalty in Sri Lanka.

Brito Fernando - Chairman, Organisation of the Family Members of the Disappeared

 Some aruge that the criminals have lost their fear to commit crimes as death penalty is
imposed When considering the long time it takes for our judicial system to arrive at a
decision and the cost, the society expects a quicker punishment.
Some people may thus claim that cutting the arm of a thief is an appropriate punishment.
The reason for this is the long delay in convicting the criminals But we must understand
that many countries now think that it is pointless to kill the criminals. One may argue in
both ways in this regard.
For an example when the crime rates are increasing the people want increased
punishments to minimise crimes. In this regard until steps are taken to speed up the
justice system the rule of law cannot be upheld.
So until then the demand for the death penalty will not stop. So we must dispense justice faster then public will not
demand a short term solution.

——————————————————-

Saman Rathnapriya - Social Activist

Death Penalty is not imposed or implemented carried out in civilized countries. But when
we look at the wave of murders rapes and other crimes that were reported in the country
no wonder the people demand death penalty as a solution. it was even discussed in
parliament.When the public trust on the law and its agencies are shattered people tend to
demand more grusome solutions’. People tend to think that killing the criminals is the
best way to prevent them from being released back in to the society. But unfortunately
there are no country in the world that has disciplined the people by imposing death
panelty or inhumane punishemtns.
The main reason for this problem as I see is the inefficiency of the rulers of the the
country so far. As informed citizens we cannot agree with the idea of preventing crimes
by killing off criminals. Just because a man kills another human we cannot attain justice by killing the criminal So it is
important to rehabilitate criminals. We must give them an opportunity to change themselves. So we must change the
society in order to prevent crime.

——————————————————-

Sagara Kariyawasam – Attorney At Law

The way I see itdeath penalty is a form of inhuman punishment. The concept of “an eye
to an eye” is not suitable for a civilszed society. We have no right to end the life of
another human being. So even our laws must evolve from such primitive states and move
towards civilization. By killing a person the state could only send a threatening message
to the public. Other than that it does not prevent any person from doing the
crime again. If we take the countries that impose the most gruesome punishments in the
world for an example, in countries like \Kuwait and Saudi Arabia there are weekly
executions of criminals by beheading and stoning. But still those societies have not been
devoid of crimes.
If anyone is in the view that the society can be disciplines by punishing those who
commit crimes then it is not a practical solution. Crimes can only be prevented by developing the morals of the
people. Education and spiritual upliftment is the key in this. If anyone believes that criminals can be discouraged
by hanging, then that is a false belief. If we could reform our laws and remove the death penalty from our legal
system then in my view that is the most appropriate thing to do.
We must remove those who commit crimes from the society and rehabilitate
them. If there are those who cannot be rehabilitated then there is no problem imposing life sentences on them. But still
when it comes to the right of taking a life, I still belive that no one has a right to do so.
If by killing the criminal we intend to punish him, it is an unsuccessful attempt as the criminal is being freed from the
bonds of his life. What is the punishment there? Some try to justify this by saying that others learn a lesson by seeing
the executions. But in reality the crime rates of the countries that do carry out the death penalty has not been reduced.
Therefore in my opinion removing the gallows is the least we could do as a civilied society.

———————————————————

Rev. Shantha Sagara - Editor, Gnanarathna Pradeepaya

In our legal system the parties are being tortured in a lengthy legal procedure. But when
the life time imprisonment is imposed, we still cannot see any strict application of justice.
Therefore there is a common belief in our society that the law in Sri Lanka ia not strict
and that it is not enforced. It has been confirmed by the way the trials are being
conducted and the final outcomes of those trials.
The convict who receives a life time imprisonment goes out smiling. He shows his
handcuffs to the public as he thinks that this is only for a short time.
The death penalty has become a joke at present no wonder the people are laughing at the
law.
In the past those court decisions were respected. But today it is not so. The convicts are
either being freed under the frame work of human rights or on moral grounds based on the disgrace it creates in the
international community. So we have to look for an
alternative method. We must take the right decision on this regard. If we do impose capital punishment then we must
carry it out or we must not impose the capital punishment at all.
Here we must look into the religious point of view when imposing capital punishment. Even though Sri Lanka is a
Buddhist country the law and dministration must not take that into consideration when enforcing the law. Giving fair
punishment for a crime is not something that is gainst the culture.
Especially when it comes to the fight against narcotics we see a deterioration of entunsiasm among our leaders. No
matter how much we talk about it still there are kilos of narcotics being confiscated often. We even see foreigners
moving freely inside the country with narcotics. THe number of pardons available to criminals has removed all sense
of repentance for the crime.
Even if we could not bring back the gallows we must do something to strengthen the seriousness of the law. The jail
has now become a place that offers people free
food and lodging. Some are even willing to stay in jail than be free. Words such as death penalty and gallows have lost
there meaning. So we must find out a solution for this. Otherwise it’s the law that is being disgraced.

———————————————————

Dr. Tudor Weerasinghe – Senior Lecturer, J’Pura University

It is normal for humans to make mistakes.But unlike those who are compelled to break
the law due to poverty or physical and mental deformities, there are group of people
who commit organised crimes in order to enhance their power or wealth in the society.
This latter group of individuals must be punished for their actions.
Under existing laws if anyone is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt then there
is no problem in imposing the maximum punishment that is available, be it the death
penalty, for he has committed the offense intentionally.
That is something that should not have happened in a civilised society. But we must also keep in mind that the society
cannot be rectified by imposing the death penalty alone. The society can only be changed by making structural
changes.
\Even though there is a legal frame work in our country that permits the death penalty it is not being executed on
moral grounds.
Instead the convicts are given a life imprisonment. But here the jail tem can vary on the government changes and
other factors. So this has a serious effect on the society. This might allow people to think that they could evade justice
by doing any kind of crime. This is only going to
encourage criminals to do more crimes.
In a less developped society like ours the gap between social classes, wealth and power could have impact on law The
capital punishment is the bench mark of the discipline of a country. So it has an effect on the society than we think. so
we may argue that death penalty could do an injustice to those who have been wrongfully convicted. In our judicial
system innocent people as well as criminals are being convicted and acquitted all the time.
That is is problem with the system. Our judicial system is tied to finances and how it floats. So on practical grounds it
is not easy to expect justice. It may vary on money, power, social status, political influence
etc
So there are many things that affects the dispensing of justice. In this regard it may be questionable for the people how
the death penalty is carried out. Therefore it has become an important part in driving the society to a disciplined status

EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 140900 & 140911 August 15, 2001
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @ TUNGKOY/UNYOK, PEDRO MABANSAG @
PUTOL (At large), ALEX PLACIO (At large), JOJO SAJORGO (At large), ALLAN PLACIO (At large),
NOEL DELOS REYES (At large), DODONG ADOLFO (At large), and BENJIE MABANSAG (At
large), accused,
RODERICK LICAYAN @ RUDY, ROBERTO LARA @ TUNGKOY/UNYOK, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:
This is an automatic review of the Consolidated Decision,1 dated September 9, 1999, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 272, Marikina City, finding accused-appellants Roderick Licayan and Roberto Lara guilty of Kidnapping for
Ransom under Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death by
lethal injection and to indemnify private complainants in the amount of P100,000.00, as moral and exemplary
damages, and the additional amount of P20,000.00 for Private Complainant Joseph Co as actual damages. Accused-
appellants were acquitted of the crime of Robbery.
The Information2 for Kidnapping for Ransom against accused-appellants and their other co-accused charged —
"That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating
and mutually helping one another, armed with a handgun and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force and intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and
LINDA MANAYSAY for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P10 million at Goodies Pares
Mami House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St., Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the
aforementioned victim Co and thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX likewise owned by
Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this
 Honorable Court where they were kept under detention against their will until they were able to escape the
following day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on August 11, 1998.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The Information3 for Robbery charged —
"That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina City and within the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent to gain, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and divested JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANAYSAY of
the following personal properties after forcible taking them as hostages for ransom, to wit:
"1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy of official receipt (OR), certificate of
registration (CR) of his two (2) L-300 vans;
"2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela Branch;
"3. Casio G-Shock watch;
"4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
"5. P10,000.00 cash
"to the damage and prejudice of said victim as owners thereof against their will.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The facts are as follows:
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies Pares Mami House with branches in Valenzuela,
Cubao, and Sampaloc.4 Co's regular routine was for him and the other complainant, Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's
cashier and accounting officer, to make the rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of left-over food
and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in the evening and last until early in the morning of the next
day.5
The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants went to the Goodies Valenzuela branch where
they stayed until midnight.6 From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch where they stayed until about 12:45 a.m.,
August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at the Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.7
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX
service vehicle, three men approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he asked what they wanted. The men
were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .38 revolver. None of the men wore any masks.8
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the store. The men refused to get money from the
store. Without any warning, one of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard the shot, she came out and asked
the men what they wanted. She told them that they could get money from the store, but they refused to do so.9 Instead,
complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw FX.10 Two of the men's companions were already seated in
the front seat. The man in the driver's seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle.11 The three other men also boarded the
vehicle with the complainants. Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five abductors.12
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were made to wear caps over their heads as the
vehicle reached Quezon Avenue in Quezon City.13 After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the vehicle stop. The rear door
was opened and he heard the voices of people approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light materials and which had no ceiling.14 They were
made to sit on the floor.15 Then, they were transferred to another room where the covers of their eyes were removed
and their feet were tied. Manaysay testified that she saw accused-appellants in the house after the masking tape was
removed from their eyes.16 Co's wallet which contained P5,000.00 in cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace and
earrings were taken from them.17 A person was left to guard them inside the room, whom both complainants identified
as accused-appellant Roberto Lara.18
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate. Hence, Co asked their guard if Manaysay could
go outside to do it.19 The guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which he gave Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard and pleaded with him to let them go. But the guard replied that he was just following
orders. Co offered him some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the money and instead threw it away.20
The guard later fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out
outside their room.21 After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a house. An old woman living in
the house allowed them to use the telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police Headquarters.22The
woman told them that they were in Kaolin St., Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina.23 Two police officers from
the Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.24 Complainants' case was later turned over to the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) for investigation.25
On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF raided the safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang,
Marikina where Co and Manaysay had been held captive.26 A man seen running away was arrested by SPO3 Ismael
Fajardo Jr.27 Upon being questioned, the man identified himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara.28 SPO3 Fajardo
identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown to him in court as the man he arrested.29 Lara pointed to
accused-appellant Licayan as one of his companions and told the PAOCTF members that Lara was hiding in his
(Lara's) uncle's house at the back of the San Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The PAOCTF members thereafter proceeded
to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant Licayan.30
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF headquarters in Camp Crame where they were identified by
Co and Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF members.31
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that he was twice called in his office by unidentified
persons who demanded P10 million for the release of complainants.32 The kidnappers were of course frustrated as
complainants were able to escape.
Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan claimed that on August 11, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m.,
he was at home in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas Salvivia, a dump truck
driver;33 that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he was arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having
drinks with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's residence in Sta. Cecilia Village;34 and that when he was
arrested, he was not informed of the charges against him. He said he only learned that he was arrested for the
kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to Camp Crame.35
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to stand in a police-line up. They were not assisted
by counsel.36 The complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who kidnapped complainants.37 Licayan
claimed he only saw complainant Co for the first time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.38
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker, testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August
10, 1998, he was in his place of work in Antipolo.39 At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he went home to Novaliches,
stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Lara's family out of
his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's belongings.40 However, before he could do so, he was arrested by
the Marikina Police at Greenheights.41
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help.42 The police beat him up and told him that they would go to
Salvivia's house. He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a plastic bag and he was again beaten
up.43 The police found Salvivia and Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered the two to drop to the ground.44The
police poked a gun to Lara's head and told him to identify his companions, otherwise he would be killed. Thus,
according to Lara, he pointed to Licayan.45
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified by complainants in a police line-up, they were
forced to sign a statement.46 They were not informed of their right to remain silent and to be assisted by
counsel.47 Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano, who appeared to have assisted him in making his statement,
actually assisted him.48
After trial, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City, rendered its decision acquitting accused-appellants of
robbery but convicting them of kidnapping and sentencing them to death and to pay damages to complainants. The
dispositive portion of its decision states:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding RODERICK LICAYAN and ROBERTO LARA
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom penalized under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, and imposing upon both of them the penalty of death by
lethal injection and the solidary payment to each of the victims the amount of One Hundred Thousand
(P100,000.00) Pesos as moral and exemplary damages and an additional amount of Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos for Joseph Co as actual damages for the valuables taken from him. However, both
accused are acquitted for the crime of robbery for the reasons previously discussed in keeping with the
constitutional presumption of innocence of any man whose guilt is not within the standard of moral certainty.
The cases against the other accused Pedro Mabansag @ Tata Pandak, Jose Sajorgo, Allan Placio, Noel Delos
Reyes, Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag who all remain at large are ordered archived and let alias
warrants for their arrest be issued."
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants contend that —
"I. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES DESPITE THE MANIFEST INCONSISTENCIES IN THEIR
TESTIMONIES.
"II. THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE ACCUSED APPELLANTS
WERE ILLEGALLY ARRESTED, AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH THEY WERE
ARRESTED DO NOT FALL UNDER THE WARRANTLESS ARREST.
"III. ASSUMING IN ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE GUILTY, THE COURT A
QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ACTED IN CONSPIRACY
WITH THE OTHER CO-ACCUSED AND IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS'
PARTICIPATION IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME AS MERE ACCOMPLICES."
The Court finds the appeal to be without merit.
First. As in all criminal cases where conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely on the victim's positive
identification of the culprit, the basic issue presented in the case at bar deals with the credibility of the complainants.
For this purpose, the assessment of the evidence by the trial court is given the highest degree of respect because of the
judge's opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand.49
Accused-appellants make much of complainants' failure to remember the physical features and characteristics of their
abductors. The following testimony on cross-examination of complainant Joseph Tomas Co is cited:
"ATTY. LARACAS:
You were not able . . . Mr. Witness, the person who investigated you did not require you to prepare
any sketch of these three persons who were in front of you at the FX?
WITNESS:
 No ma'am.
ATTY. LARACAS:
Because you cannot very recall what their faces?
WITNESS:
No ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. LARACAS:
Now, Mr. Witness, you were seated at the rar (rear[sic]) portion of the FX, you cannot see the faces of
the person driving the FX and that man seated at the front portion.
WITNESS:
Yes ma'am."50
With respect to complainant Manaysay, the following portion of her answer on cross-examination is cited:
"ATTY. LARRACAS:
Of course, Madam Witness when you were seated at the place where you said you were seated, you
cannot see the faces of the persons at the two section of the FX?
A: The person in front of us I was able to see, ma'am.
Q: The person who you saw which you said was seated in front of at the back of FX is not of the two
persons who are inside the courtroom?
A: None, ma'am.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So Madam witness, you said that there was a curtain which separates the room and the curtain was
always spread out during that time that you were inside?
A: Yes, ma'am.
ATTY. LARRACAS:
Q: So you did not see the faces of the persons outside that curtain?
A: Just their feet ma'am."51
Whether or nor complainants saw the faces of any or all the abductors while they were inside the vehicle is
immaterial. What is important is that complainants positively identified accused-appellants as among those who
abducted them on August 10, 1998. Complainant Co said that accused-appellant Lara guarded them in the kidnappers'
safehouse on August 10, 1998, while Licayan guarded them the next day, August 11, 1998.52 In the police line-up
conducted on the same day that complainants escaped, complainant Co was able to identify and point to accused-
appellants as part of the group of men who took part in their kidnapping.53 On the other hand, complainant Manaysay
positively identified accused-appellant Licayan as one of two persons she saw when the tapes placed over their eyes
were removed in the safehouse.54 Like Co, she identified accused-appellant Lara as the person who guarded them in
their room when they first arrived there and as the person who brought her a half-gallon container in response to her
request to go out so she could urinate.55 She said she and Co tried to offer accused-appellant Lara money to help them
escape, but he refused the money and threw it away.56 And like Co, Linda Manaysay was also able to identify and
point to accused-appellants during the police line-up in Camp Crame as their abductors.57
Having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying,58 the trial court had
reason to declare:
"[Complainants] assertions as to the identities of the accused were made in a clear straightforward and frank manner
and their testimonies are compatible on material points and should be respected considering the lengthy visible
exposure of the accused to the victims from the time of the kidnapping and up to the time of their escape . . ."59
In the light of complainants' positive identification of accused-appellants, the latter's defense of alibi must fail. Alibi is
an inherently weak defense and must be rejected when the accused's identity is satisfactorily and categorically
established by the eyewitnesses to the offense,60 especially when there is no showing that such eyewitnesses had any
improper motive to testify falsely.61 In the case at bar, the defense failed to show that Co and Manaysay were
motivated by ill will in testifying against accused-appellants. It is noteworthy that accused-appellants' self-serving
testimonies were not corroborated by other witnesses.
Second. Accused-appellants contend that their arrest was illegal because the arresting officers had no personal
knowledge that accused-appellants had committed a crime. Their arrest, according to accused-appellants, was based
only on the information given by complainants.62 Accused-appellants argue that their warrantless arrest does not fall
under any of the cases enumerated in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure under which
warrantless arrests may validly be made. In addition, accused-appellants claim that after their arrest, they were already
under custodial investigation and, therefore, should have been informed of their constitutional rights, which the
arresting officers did not do.
We likewise find no merit in this contention.
Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty without moving to quash the information on the ground that
their arrest was invalid. Accused-appellants are, therefore, estopped from questioning the legality of their arrest. Any
irregularity attendant to accused-appellants' arrest was cured when they voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the
trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and participating in the trial.63
Anent the claim that they were not assisted by counsel during their custodial investigation, suffice it to say that the
trial court held:
"Further, the admission of participation in the commission of the crime by accused Roberto Lara was made
voluntarily, as attested by counsel de officio who legally assisted him in giving his sworn statement at the
office of the latter, has shown compliance with the constitutional requirements on pre-interrogation
advisories. Albeit an extra-judicial confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes
it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of the co-accused (People
vs. Suarez, 267 SCRA 119)."64
Third. Accused-appellants contend that even assuming that the prosecution's version of the facts is true, they can only
be found guilty as accomplices to the crime65 because the record does not clearly show that they acted in conspiracy
with the other accused. They maintain that it was never shown that they directly conspired in abducting the
complainants nor that they were the ones who called and demanded ransom from Benjamin Co. Accused-appellants
assert that, if at all, their participation was limited only to their act of guarding the victims in the safehouse. They are
mere accomplices since there is no showing that they knew beforehand the criminal design of their co-accused.
This argument must be rejected.
Conspiracy can be inferred from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interests.66 Although the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy, it need not be proven by direct
evidence. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.67 In the
instant case, the trial court correctly held that conspiracy can be deduced from the acts of accused-appellant and their
co-accused which show a concerted action and community of interest. By guarding Co and Manaysay and preventing
their escape, accused-appellants exhibited not only their knowledge of the criminal design of their co-conspirators but
also their participation in its execution.
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, imposes the penalty of death if the person
kidnapped is a female or if the crime was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other
person. These circumstances being present in this case, the crime proven to have been committed by accused-
appellants is kidnapping for ransom.
Four (4) Justices of the Court maintain their position that R.A. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death
penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
As already stated, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay jointly and severally each of the complainants the
amount of P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages without specifying the amount of each item of damages.
An award in the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the complainants is proper, consistent with the
current case law.68 However, no award of exemplary damages can be made considering the absence of aggravating
circumstances.69 Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages in criminal offenses may be made only when
the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. The award of actual damages in this case should
likewise be disallowed. Actual damages must be proved with certainty and cannot be presumed. No evidence to
sustain this award has been presented in this case.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272, Marikina City finding accused-appellant
RODERICK LICAYAN and ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each of the accused-
appellants is ORDERED to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the complainants. The award of P20,000.00
as actual damages made in favor of complainant Joseph Co is deleted. Costs against accused-appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this
decision, let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines for the possible
exercise of the pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C .J ., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr. and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 120851. May 14, 1997.]

NINOY AQUINO INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY and EDUARDO CARRASCOSO, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
LEONARDO M. RIVERA and SALEM INVESTMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.

The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Arturo S. Santos for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; BREACH OF CONTRACT COMMITTED IN BAD FAITH; AWARD OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEY’S FEES PROPER IN CASE AT BENCH. — On the sole issue of the propriety of the award of compensatory damages and
attorney’s fees, including costs of suit, . . . we hereby affirm the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, with the observation, however,
that the award of compensatory, damages of P500.000.00 per annum should be reckoned, not from March 1984 but from February 14, 1991 when
private respondent Salem amended its Complaint and therefore prayed for the issuance of the building permit to construct the proposed hotel
envisioned under the lease contract. . . Petitioners’ refusal to issue the building permit to allow Salem to construct the air freight offices and/or the
proposed hotel, however is not as innocent as they wish it to appear. . . What is undeniable from the nexus of circumstances surrounding the
unwarranted, arbitrary and defiant refusal of petitioners to perform their obligations under the lease contract, is that such refusal is patently ill-
motivated and grossly tainted with malice and bad faith. "For, ‘bad faith’ contemplates a ‘state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design
or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose." Petitioners, willfully oblivious to the obvious — that the additional fees
and charges sought to be collected from Salem, were not contained in the subsisting lease contract — and the learned directive of the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel — that the lease contract is the law between the parties — consciously chose to harass and coerce private
respondent Salem into accepting the increased rental charges in exchange for the issuance of the building permits. Put simply, the plan of
petitioners was to blackmail private respondent Salem, and so petitioners must now answer for their malevolent scheme.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF P200,000.00 ATTORNEY’S FEES REASONABLE IN CASE AT BENCH. — Petitioners contend that the
award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00 is excessive. We disagree. In the first place, it is the trial court that is principally tasked
with fixing such amount. Secondly, the facts and circumstances in the instant case point to the reasonableness of the amount fixed by the trial
court. Lastly, in view of the pecuniary considerations at stake in the instant controversy, the voluminous pleadings filed by private respondent
Salem’s counsel in the trial court, the Court of Appeals and in this court, and the nature and importance of the litigation involved herein, we find
sufficient basis for the determination by the trial court of the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00.

DECISION

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals 2 which affirmed in toto the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court 3 in favor of private respondent Salem Investment
Corporation (hereafter, "Salem").

Salem had filed an action for specific performance with damages and mandatory injunction 4 against petitioners Ninoy Aquino International
Airport Authority (hereafter, "NAIAA") and Eduardo Carrascoso when the latter, with evident bad faith and manifest intent to avoid its
obligations under a subsisting Contract of Lease, unilaterally increased the rentals fixed in said lease contract and refused to issue the
corresponding building permit to construct the hotel subject of said lease contract unless Salem agreed to such unilateral rental increase.

The respondent Court of Appeals narrated the relevant antecedents of this case, as to which there is no dispute, in this manner: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sometime in 1967, the predecessor-in-interest of appellant Ninoy International Airport Authority (’NAIAA’), the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (’CAA’), an agency of the Republic of the Philippines, leased to the appellee a parcel of land fronting the Manila Domestic Airport
in Pasay City. This is a portion of the land described in TCT No. 6735 registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines.

This piece of government property was leased because the area was ‘an eyesore to the airport premises due to the fact that a major portion of it
consist[ed] of swampy and talahib infested silt and abandoned fishponds and occupied by squatters and some CAA employees with ungainly
makeshift dwellings’ Thus, in accordance with its general plan to improve and beautify the airport premises and in pursuance of its desire to
provide facilities and conveniences as may be necessary for the comfort, convenience and relaxation of transients, tourists and the general public,
the CAA leased the subject premises to appellee, a private corporation engaged in hostelry and allied businesses, who [was] ready, willing and
able to cooperate with the CAA in the implementation of its general development plan for the airport premises.

The lease contract provided, among other things, that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘2. That within the leased premises, the LESSEE shall construct the hotel building and other necessary improvements . . . The final plans and
specifications for the hotel building and other necessary improvements including the ‘Golf Driving Range’ . . . shall be submitted to the LESSOR
for approval within Ninety (90) days from receipt of a copy of this Contract as approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. .
. The LESSEE shall begin construction within Ninety (90) days from receipt by the LESSEE of the written notification by the LESSOR that the
leased premises are free from squatters and other occupants, to be completed within Two (2) years thereafter.

x x x

3. That the term of the lease shall be for a period of Twenty-Five (25) years, commencing from the date of receipt of approval of this Contract by
the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and at the option of the LESSEE, renewable for another Twenty-Five (25) years. It is
understood, that after the first 25 years lease, the ownership of, and full title to, all the buildings and permanent improvements introduced by the
LESSEE on the leased premises including those introduced on the Golf Driving Range shall automatically vest in the LESSOR, without cost.

x x x

4. That the renewal of this lease contract shall be for another period of Twenty-Five (25) years, under the same terms and conditions herein
stipulated; provided, however, that, since the ownership of the hotel building and permanent improvement have [sic] passed on to the LESSOR,
the LESSEE shall pay as rental, in addition to the rentals herein agreed upon, an amount equivalent to One (1%) percent of the appraised value of
the hotel building and permanent improvements at the time of expiration of Twenty-Five (25) years lease period, payable annually . . .’

The lease was approved on 15 February 1967.

In compliance with its obligation under the lease contract, appellee paid the stipulated monthly rentals. It also ejected about 700 squatter families
on the leased premises and filled up the area which was then swampy and overgrown with ‘talahib’ (i.e., cogon grass). The appellee also prepared
the plans and specifications of the proposed [h]otel and submitted the same to [the CAA]. The plans were approved by the CAA through its Senior
Civil Engineer, Chief of the Airport Division and the Director of Civil Aviations. The construction of the hotel, however, did not materialize as the
previous officials of appellant corporation under the administration of the late President Ferdinand Marcos withheld approval allegedly to avoid
displeasing former First Lady Imelda Romualdez Marcos who was then in the process of constructing the nearby Philippine Village Hotel . . .

In lieu of the hotel, appellee was instead allowed to construct a cinema, a driving range and other structures in a portion of the leased premises . . .

Sometime afterwards, appellee requested the appellants to allow it to construct offices and stores in the vacant portions of the leased areas to
avoid its being idle but such request was declined by appellants in a letter to appellee dated 20 July 1989. In said letter, it was explained that the
rental rate, which is P2,007.60 a month was one of the reasons why the construction permit was not granted. The appellee was also informed that
the appellant found the renewal clause . . . as disadvantageous to the latter. Hence, as early as August 1987, the then Manila International Airport
Authority (MIAA) Board of Directors had instructed the MIA Management to renegotiate the terms and conditions of the lease contract before the
application for a construction permit can be considered . . .

On 18 August 1989, appellee replied and asked for a reconsideration of the denial of the application for a construction permit. Two other follow-
up letters were also sent by the appellee on 4 October 1989 and 8 November 1989 . . .

In November 1989, the appellant responded through a letter stating that it has deferred action on the application as it was updating its master plan
of development of the NAIA that will involve utilization of the property leased to the appellee . . .

Earlier, the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Department of Justice, released its Opinion No. 071, dated 3 April 1989, stating that
appellant NAIAA cannot decline appellee’s application for permit to construct offices and stores within the leased premises.

Notwithstanding this opinion as well as the series of letters sent by the appellee, the appellant corporation, however, still refused to issue the
requested construction permit.

The appellee then instituted a complaint for specific performance with prayer for damages and mandatory injunction on 17 August 1990 before
the Regional Trial Court in Pasay City. Through their complaint, the appellee sought to compel the appellants to issue a construction permit for the
construction of a building housing offices and stores within the leased premises . . .

In their answer, the appellants controverted the action on the ground that the lease contract envisions a hotel and not the construction of offices
and stores . . .

The appellee then filed an amended complaint with leave of court on 14 February 1991 praying alternatively for the construction of a hotel as
provided for in the lease contract . . .

On 17 April 1991, while the case was pending, the appellant wrote the appellee requiring the latter to submit the plans and drawings of the
proposed hotel for endorsement to Air Transportation Office. This request was made in anticipation of possible amicable settlement that may be
achieved during the pre-trial of the case . . .

On 29 April 1991, the appellee submitted the required plans and specifications with a reminder that the same had been previously submitted and
that the Director of Civil Aviation, now Air Transportation Office, had already approved it . . .

A supplemental complaint with petition for preliminary injunction and restraining order was filed on 30 July 1991 by the appellee. The appellee
prayed that the appellant be restrained from collecting concessionaire’s privilege fees for its subleases and other amounts not contemplated in the
lease contract . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

On January 15, 1992, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining petitioners from collecting aforementioned Concessionaire’s
Privilege Fees on the sub-lessees’ use of the premises leased out to private respondent Salem and from evicting the latter from the premises in
case of non-payment of said fees.

Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.

On May 20, 1993, upon private respondent Salem’s motion, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction pendente lite enjoining
petitioners from collecting the aforementioned fees and from committing any and all acts in furtherance of or aimed at enforcing said collection.

On July 20, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondent Salem, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Ordering [NAIAA] to issue permit to [Salem] for the construction of offices and stores and/or the hotel pursuant to the Lease Contract . . . and
allowing [Salem] to use and occupy the leased premises for a period of 25 years counted from the issuance of the construction permit, the lease to
be renewable for another 25 years thereafter at the option of the plaintiff under the same terms and conditions specified in the Lease Contract;
provided, however, that the period herein fixed shall not apply with respect to [Salem’s] existing improvements in the leased premises, the term of
which shall be the remaining period of 25 years representing the renewal option exercised by [Salem] after the expiration of the original period;
cdti

2. Declaring null and void [NAIAA’s] concessionaires fees . . . and all other similarly situated collection process imposed unto [Salem] not
otherwise covered, embranced [sic] or authorized under the Lease Contract . . .;

3. Making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued;

4. Ordering . . . NAIAA to pay [Salem] the sum of P500,000.00 compensatory damages per annum beginning March 1984 and yearly thereafter,
until the subject construction permit is finally issued;

5. Ordering . . . NAIAA to pay [Salem] the sum of P200,000.00 . . . as . . . attorney’s fees; and

6. Cost against [NAIAA]." 5

Unable to agree with the trial court’s decision, petitioners filed an appeal with respondent Court of Appeals. Before the respondent appellate court,
petitioners contended that the trial court erred in: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1) ordering [NAIAA] to issue a permit to [Salem] for the construction of offices and stores and/or hotel pursuant to the lease contract;

2) allowing [Salem] to use and occupy the leased premises for a period of twenty-five years from the issuance of the permit, the same to be
renewable for another twenty-five years thereafter at [Salem’s] option under the same terms and conditions;

3) declaring null and void [NAIAA’s] concessionaires fees and all other similarly situated collection process imposed unto [Salem] not otherwise
covered embraced or authorized under the lease contract;

4) ordering [NAIAA] to pay [Salem] the sum of P500,000 compensatory damages per annum beginning March 1984 and yearly thereafter, until
the subject construction permit is finally issued; [and]

5) ordering [NAIAA] to pay [Salem] the sum of P200,000 as attorney’s fees." 6

The lease contract being sought to be enforced by private respondent Salem having already expired on February 15, 1992, or twenty-five (25)
years after its approval on February 15, 1967, petitioners anchored their arguments before the respondent Court of Appeals on the fact of the
expiration of said lease contract. Petitioners asseverated that the fact of the expiration of the lease contract in question, rendered moot and
academic, and thus, unenforceable, the orders of the trial court for NAIAA to issue the building permits and to allow Salem to use and occupy the
leased premises for a period of twenty-five (25) years from the issuance of the building permit, renewable for the same period at the option of
Salem.

The respondent appellate court, however, was utterly unconvinced. It ratiocinated its affirmance of the trial court’s judgment, in this wise: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The first argument hinges on the fact that, by its terms, the lease contract had expired on 15 February 1992.

The trial court opined that: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘By and large, considering that the obligation to issue the permit to construct the hotel devolves upon the defendants and that the principal purpose
of the Lease Contract was to construct the hotel, the period of the lease should commence on the date when the construction permit is issued. In
other words, unless the permit is issued, the term of the lease cannot be deemed to have commenced, with respect to the envisioned hotel aspect.
The rationale being that ‘when a contract is subject to a suspensive condition, its birth or effectivity can take place only if and when the event
which constitutes the condition happens or is fulfilled.’ However, with respect to the other areas which have been occupied by the plaintiff, upon
prior authorization from the defendants, the remaining period by reason of partial novation of contract shall be 25 years only, representing the
renewal term which plaintiff had the option . . .’

Strictly speaking, the term of the contract should be reckoned from the date of its approval by the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, which was on 15 February 1967. This is expressly provided for in the contract itself.

We do agree with the trial court, however, that under the circumstances of this case, the term of the contract cannot be considered as having
commenced on the date of such approval.

It will be recalled that, as stated by the trial court, the principal objective of the lease contract is the construction of a hotel within the leased
premises. This is in line with the desire to improve and beautify the airport premises. It was not merely for the appellant to lease out the premises.

The construction of the hotel is, likewise the principal obligation of the lessee. The accomplishment of this obligation, however, is conditioned on
the grant of a construction permit by the appellant corporation. The construction permit, in turn, was to be granted after the appellee complied
with certain preliminary obligations, such as clearing and filling up the area, and preparation of plans and specifications for the hotel to be
constructed.

While the appellee complied with its preliminary obligation as well as its obligation to pay rentals, the appellant refused to grant the necessary
construction permit. This refusal was not due to defects in the plans and specification or some other fault on the part of the lessee, but to some
impediment attributable to the appellant. Since the permit is, by the terms of the lease contract, a necessary condition for the construction of the
hotel, the project never materialized.

Under the circumstances, there is basis for the trial court to consider the issuance of the construction permit as a suspensive condition before the
contract can become effective. The principal object of the contract, its reason for being, as it were, which is the construction of a hotel will never
materialize without the issuance of the permit.

Indeed, the appellee’s right to compel appellant to comply with its obligations under the lease contract should not be rendered moot and academic
by the supposed expiration of the contract. This is because the failure of the appellee to enjoy the full benefits and to implement the principal
objective of the contract is not due to its fault but to the appellants’ fault. The appellee, in fact, had applied for the construction permit even before
the term of the lease supposedly expired. It must also be stressed that the plans and specifications submitted by the appellee were already
approved by the officers of the then Civil Aviation Administration. Thus, no fault can be attributed to the appellee with respect to the non-
implementation of the primary objective of the lease contract.

We, therefore, find no reversible error in the conclusion of the trial judge that the term of the lease contract with respect to the hotel aspect cannot
be deemed to have commenced, unless the permit is issued.

The contract not having expired, it still remains the law between the appellant and the appellee with respect to their obligations relating to the
property in question . . .

The appellant, therefore, cannot object to the application of the renewal clause which objection is now being raised in the appellant’s second
assignment of error. Likewise, the appellant cannot impose fees or payments on the appellee which were not contemplated in the lease contract.
Significantly, the appellant has not shown us any provision of the contract or an alternative interpretation of its terms that would show that the
imposition of additional fees is not precluded by the contract.

The alleged disadvantage to the appellant due to the relatively low rental rate vis-a-vis the increasing commercial value of the property is not
enough reason to disregard the obligatory force of the contractual stipulations regarding rentals and renewal, or for that matter, of all other
obligations arising from contract. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a contract, unless there has
been fraud, mistake or undue influence . . . As has been held, the fact that the bargain was a hard one coupled with the mere inadequacy of price,
when both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the contract, is not a sufficient ground for cancellation of the
contract . . .

It also does not help the appellants’ cause for them to argue that the lease contract in question was a political favor granted during the term of the
late President Marcos. Significantly, no moves has been made to have the contract nullified. The appellants also have not shown any concrete
proof to show that fraud or undue influence has attended the execution of the lease contract.

Under the circumstances, the trial court did not err in upholding the renewal clause of the lease contract as well as in disallowing the
concessionaire and other fees imposed on the appellee by the appellant." 7

The respondent appellate court, echoing the disquisition of the trial court, categorically found petitioner liable for a patent violation by petitioners
of its obligation under the lease contract to issue the building permit that would have officially allowed private respondent Salem to proceed with
the construction of the proposed hotel.

Such violation of the lease contract was not, however, merely a matter of non-performance by petitioners of their obligations under the lease
contract. The violation, in fact, was tainted with evident bad faith and a manifest intent to blackmail private respondent Salem into agreeing to a
unilateral increase in the rentals in exchange for the issuance of the building permit applied for by Salem in 1989 for the construction of air freight
offices and shops for other allied services. There is no denying this grossly malicious intent to blackmail private respondent Salem especially after
petitioners assessed and demanded from Salem, additional charges in the form of accumulated Privilege Concession Fees amounting to
P245,960.00. In the face of this blatant bad faith dealing by petitioners, the trial court found petitioners liable for compensatory damages in the
amount of P500,000.00 per annum from March, 1984 until the issuance of the building permit. chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Petitioners did not hesitate to question the aforementioned award in its appeal taken to the respondent appellate court. The Court of Appeals,
however, found the award of damages, attorney’s fees and costs of suit in favor of private respondent Salem to be justified in view of petitioners’
bad faith dealing with private respondent Salem. The Court of Appeals reasoned: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"With respect to the award of compensatory damages and of attorney’s fees, the appellant has not convinced us that such award is unjustified.
Those who in the performance of their obligation are guilty of delay are liable for damages . . .

It is an undisputed fact that the appellee has not been able to construct the hotel it envisioned due to the fault of the appellant. Instead it was only
allowed to construct a driving range, cinema and a building housing several offices. Meanwhile, a good part of the land cleared up and prepared
by the appellant remained idle. Clearly, therefore, it has not realized the profits it would have earned had it been allowed to build the hotel as early
as 1967 when the contract was entered into by the parties.

We also agree with the trial court’s finding of bad faith on the part of the appellant. This is contrary to the argument of the appellant that it was not
guilty of bad faith or grave abuse of discretion. The unjustified refusal of the appellant to act on the application for the construction permit forced
the appellee to institute this case to protect its interests, thereby incurring expenses in the process. We note that the appellant still refused to issue
the permit even as the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel rendered an opinion categorically stating that the appellant cannot escape its
obligations under the lease contract. Another circumstance evidencing bad faith is the fact that the refusal of the appellant to issue a permit is not
due to the fault of the appellee or defects in its plans and specifications but rather to force the negotiation of a higher lease rental.

The award of damages is, therefore, proper." 8

Hence this petition on the following grounds: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

"I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHICH IS CONTRARY TO EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF COMPENSATORY DAMAGES ON THE BASIS OF SUCH
FINDING WHICH IS CONTRARY TO LAW.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES EXCESSIVE." cralaw virtua1aw library

At the outset, we take note of the fact that petitioners no longer dispute the disposition of the respondent appellate court as regards the issues of
the non-expiration of the lease contract, the right of Salem to obtain the building permit to construct the proposed hotel, the continuous effectivity
of the renewal clause in favor of private respondent Salem, and the nullity of any rental fees and all other additional charges not found in the lease
contract. These issues were the subject of the first three assigned errors raised by Salem before respondent Court of Appeals. As those portions of
the decision of the respondent appellate court containing the latter’s disposition of said first three assigned errors, are deemed final and no longer
subject of this appeal, this court has no authority to disturb the same.

Petitioners only now take exception to the award of compensatory damages as being unwarranted in the absence of bad faith on the part of
petitioners in refusing to issue the building permit to construct the proposed hotel which private respondent Salem is obligated to build under the
lease contract, as well as the award of attorney’s fees which petitioners claim to be excessive under the circumstances of the instant case. We shall
thus proceed to rule on the sole issue of the propriety of the award of compensatory damages and attorney’s fees, including costs of suit.

The petition lacks merit, and we hereby affirm the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, with the observation, however, that the award
of compensatory damages of P500,000.00 per annum should be reckoned, not from March, 1984 but from February 14, 1991 when private
respondent Salem amended its Complaint and theretofore prayed for the issuance of the building permit to construct the proposed hotel envisioned
under the lease contract.

Petitioners insist that they have proceeded to collect various charges not contemplated by the lease contract on the honest belief that the new
schedule of rental fees and Privilege Concession Fees were imposable on private respondent Salem. They claim that they withheld the issuance of
the building permits, first in 1967 to construct the proposed hotel on the pretext that the same would pose competition to the then First Lady’s
Philippine Village Hotel; second, in 1989 to construct air freight offices on the ground that the rental fees being paid by Salem were very low and
the renewal clause in the lease contract was disadvantageous to petitioners; and, third, in 1991 to construct the originally proposed hotel under the
lease contract on the ground that the lease contract was going to expire in 1992.

Petitioners’ refusal to issue the building permit to allow Salem to construct the air freight offices and/or the proposed hotel, however is not as
innocent as they wish it to appear. In fact, petitioner Carrascoso, in his letter dated July 20, 1989, minced no words in conveying the message to
private respondent Salem that its application for a building permit to construct air freight offices was being denied because Salem was paying very
low rental fees under the subsisting lease contract. Petitioner Carrascoso, in said letter, laid the ground work for the subsequent assessment and
demand by petitioners for private respondent Salem to pay additional fees and charges not at all included in the lease contract. Thereafter, Salem
repeatedly pleaded, through letters, for the issuance of the building permit, but petitioners simply continued demanding for additional fees in the
form of Privilege Concession Fees. This, notwithstanding the unequivocal recommendation of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel
that petitioners issue the said building permit as they are duty bound to do so under the lease contract whose provisions cannot be unilaterally
defeated or unjustifiedly evaded by petitioners.

What is undeniable from the nexus of circumstances surrounding the unwarranted, arbitrary and defiant refusal of petitioners to perform their
obligations under the lease contract, is that such refusal is patently ill-motivated and grossly tainted with malice and bad faith. "For, ‘bad faith’
contemplates a ‘state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose." 9
Petitioners, willfully oblivious to the obvious — that the additional fees and charges sought to be collected from Salem, were not contained in the
subsisting lease contract — and the learned directive of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel — that the lease contract is the law
between the parties — consciously chose to harass and coerce private respondent Salem into accepting the increased rental charges in exchange
for the issuance of the building permits. Put simply, the plan of petitioners was to blackmail private respondent Salem, and so petitioners must
now answer for their malevolent scheme.

It must be noted, however, that while we uphold the herein assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, we believe that the award of compensatory
damages should be reckoned, not from March, 1984, but from February 14, 1991. Nowhere in the records of this case is there any mention of the
significance of March, 1984 as to justify the award of damages to be reckoned from said date. Rather, said award should be reckoned from
February 14, 1991 when private respondent Salem amended its Complaint and alternatively prayed for the issuance of the building permit to
construct the originally proposed hotel under the lease contract subject of this case. The inclusion of the alternative prayer for the issuance of the
building permit for the proposed hotel, through the amendment of the Complaint on February 14, 1991, amounted to the proper demand by private
respondent Salem for the issuance of said permit. Since petitioners did not forthwith issue the permit, as it should have done, considering that
Salem had an absolute right thereto under the lease contract, private respondent Salem inevitably suffered damages from the time of such denial.

Finally, petitioners contend that the award of attorney’s fees in the amount of P200,000.00 is excessive. We disagree. In the first place, it is the
trial court that is principally tasked with fixing such amount. 10 Secondly, the facts and circumstances in the instant case point to the
reasonableness of the amount fixed by the trial court. Lastly, in view of the pecuniary considerations at stake in the instant controversy, the
voluminous pleadings filed by private respondent Salem’s counsel in the trial court, the Court of Appeals and in this court, and the nature and
importance of the litigation involved herein, we find sufficient basis for the determination by the trial court of the award of attorney’s fees in the
amount of P200,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R CV No. 42806 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
slight modification that the award of compensatory damages of P500,000.00 per annum be reckoned not from March, 1984, but from February 14,
1991 until the building permit for the construction of the proposed hotel under the Contract of Lease is issued by petitioners. chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., is on leave.

Endnotes:

1. In CA-G.R. CV No. 42806, promulgated on March 8, 1995 and penned by Associate Justice Antonio M. Martinez and
concurred in by Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Ruben T. Reyes; Rollo, pp. 70-81.

2. Sixth Division.

3. Branch 117, National Capital Judicial Region? Pasay City with the Honorable Leonardo M. Rivera as Presiding Judge.

4. Docketed as Civil Case No. 7500.

5. Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated July 20, 1993, pp. 19-20; Rollo, pp. 68-69.

6. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8 1995 p. 7; Rollo, p. 76.

7. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1995, pp. 7-11; Rollo, pp. 76-80.

8. Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 8, 1995, p. 11; Rollo, p. 80.

9. Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155, 166-167 [1966].

10. Id., p. 171.

477 Phil. 752
VITUG, J.:
On 30 October 1996, ten (10) informations, one for each count of rape, allegedly committed on ten
different dates - 07 October 1995, 14 December 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 29 February
1996, 08 May 1996, 02 July 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August 1996 - were filed
against appellant EFREN MATEO. Except for the variance in dates, the ten informations, later
docketed Criminal Cases No. 9351 to No. 9360, inclusive, in the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
uniformly read -
"The undersigned OIC Provincial Prosecutor upon preliminary investigation conducted by
the MTC, Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 1, accuses Efren Mateo of Brgy. Buenavista, Tarlac, Tarlac
of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

"That on or about January 12, 1996, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Efren
Mateo y Garcia, who is the guardian of the complaining witness, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation have carnal
knowledge with said Imelda C. Mateo in their house against her consent."[1]

The trial ensued following a plea of "not guilty" entered by appellant to all the charges.

According to Imelda Mateo, she was born on 11 September 1980 to the spouses Dan Icban and
Rosemarie Capulong. Rosemarie Capulong and appellant started to live together without the benefit of
marriage when private complainant was only two years old. Imelda stayed with her mother and
appellant in a house in Buenavista, Tarlac, and adopted the surname of appellant when she started
schooling.

Imelda recalled that each time the ten rape incidents occurred her mother, Rosemarie, was not at home.
On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, Rosemarie went to Bamban and returned home only the
next day. The second rape was said to have occurred on 14 December 1995, while her mother was
attending a seminar for day-care workers. Imelda recalled the third rape to have been committed on 05
January 1996, the same day her mother resigned from her job and left for Manila. The fourth rape, she
said, happened a week later, on 12 January 1996, when Rosemarie Capulong was attending yet another
seminar for day-care workers. The fifth incident was on 29 February 1996, when Rosemarie left for
Manila to follow-up her application for an overseas job. The sixth rape took place on 08 May 1996
when Rosemarie was once again in Manila to attend to her application papers. On 01 July 1996,
Rosemarie and appellant left for Manila as Rosemarie was scheduled to depart for Jeddah. Appellant
returned home in the evening of the next day, 02 July 1996, the same day the job recruiter relayed the
news that Rosemarie Capulong could not yet leave for Jeddah. During the night, appellant again
molested Imelda. With Rosemarie finally away, appellant frequented his nocturnal visits. On the night
of 18 July 1996, appellant went into her room and abused her while her siblings were sleeping in
the sala. The same incident was repeated on the night of 16 August 1996 when appellant, already
naked, entered the room and sexually assaulted Imelda. The last rape was committed on 28 August
1996. According to private complainant, she never reported any of the ten incidents to anybody
because the accused had threatened to kill her and her mother if she were to disclose the matter to
anyone.

Imelda stated that each of the ten rape incidents were committed in invariably the same fashion. All
were perpetrated inside the house in Buenavista, Tarlac, during the night and, each time, she would try
to ward off his advances by kicking him but that he proved to be too strong for her. These incidents
occurred in the presence of her three sleeping siblings who failed to wake up despite the struggles she
exerted to fend off the advances. She recalled that in all ten instances, appellant had covered her mouth
with a handkerchief to prevent her from shouting. Subsequently, however, she changed her statement
to say that on two occasions, particularly the alleged sexual assaults on 02 July 1996 and 18 July 1996,
appellant had only covered her mouth with his hands. Still much later, Imelda testified that he had not
covered her mouth at all.

The predictable pattern of the rape incidents testified to by Imelda prompted the defense to ask her
whether she had, at any one time, taken any protective measure in anticipation of the rape incidents.
She replied that once she had requested her brothers and sister to keep her company in the bedroom at
night but appellant had scolded them. On the night of the fourth rape, she narrated that she armed
herself with a knife but, when appellant entered her room that night, she was not able to retrieve the
bladed weapon from under the bed as appellant was sitting right on top of it.

Dr. Rosario Fider, the second witness for the prosecution, stated that she had physically examined
private complainant on 14 October 1996 and found superficially healed lacerations at 3:00, 6:00 and
9:00 positions on her private organ that could have been caused by an insertion of an instrument or by
sexual intercourse. According to Dr. Fider, the lacerations pointed to possibly one or two, and at most
three, incidents of rape, which had happened not earlier than two weeks before the date of the physical
examination.

Appellant denied each of the charges. On 07 October 1995, the date of the first rape, he claimed that he
was in Barangay Talaga, Capas, to pick up newly hatched ducklings, numbering about a thousand,
which had to be properly fed, kept warm and constantly cared for that required him to be around the
entire day and night for two weeks. The fowls had then to be brought into an open field located one
and a half kilometers away which could be traversed by foot. He continued to tend to the animals from
20 October 1995 until sometime in February 1996. During the period, he was able to go home only
once a week or three times a month.

On 14 December 1995, the supposed date of the second rape, appellant admitted that he had
temporarily left the care of his ducks to go caroling with his wife, their daughter Imelda and some
friends. He immediately returned to care for his ducks, located some 500 meters from their residence,
that kept him busy and away from home when the third, fourth and fifth rape incidents were said to
have taken place on the 5th and 12th of January and 29th of February of 1996. While he admitted to
leaving occasionally the animals in order to go home, these visits, however, were said to be brief and
mainly for getting some food and fresh clothes. Appellant could not recall when exactly he sold the
ducks but it was definitely prior to 08 May 1996, the day he was accepted and reported for work at
the LA Construction of Hacienda Luisita, Tarlac, located some three kilometers away. On 08 May
1996, the date of the sixth rape, he was at work from seven o'clock in the morning until the following
day to finish a rush job.

On 01 July 1996, he accompanied his wife, Rosemarie, to Manila who was scheduled to leave for
Jeddah the following day. Upon being advised that her flight was postponed, the couple stayed in the
house of one Luding Sevilla in Caloocan. On 03 July, he returned to Tarlac. From 15 July to
September, 1996, he was given the nightshift at the LA Construction. Appellant asserted that it was
impossible for him to have raped private complainant on 28 August 1996 because at six o'clock that
evening, his friends Boy Botio, Boy Pineda, Marvin Dalangin and Nelson Castro had picked him up at
his house to attend the fiesta at Barangay Murcia, Concepcion, Tarlac, where they spent the night.

Appellant dismissed the charges against him as being the malicious "retribution" of a vengeful
stepdaughter. Allegedly, on 11 October 1996, he took private complainant to task after his son, Marlon
Mateo, who had reported seeing her engaged in sexual intercourse with one Pikong Navarro inside the
room of their house. Earlier, on 05 August 1996, he also learned that Sharon Flores, a neighbor and a
friend of private complainant, had caught his stepdaughter and Navarro in a very compromising
position. In anger, he hit Imelda twice with a piece of bamboo. He then forbade her from going out at
night and leaving her siblings alone in the house.

Rosemarie Capulong, the mother of private complainant, rose to testify in defense of her common-law
husband. Capulong asserted that she had not at any time, prior to her departure for Jeddah, spent any
night outside their house. Rosemarie said that she was a day-care teacher from June 1990 until June
1996. On 07 October 1995, the date of the supposed first rape, she was at home and did not go to
Bamban as so claimed by private complainant. Capulong disputed the claim of private complainant
that she attended a seminar for day-care workers on 12 January 1996 since her job did not require her
to attend seminars except for regular meetings held on the last Friday of every month, with each
meeting lasting for only half a day. The last seminar she had attended was in June of 1990 in Tarlac.
On 29 February 1996, Rosemarie was also certain that she spent the night at home as she had to report
for work the following day. She started obtaining documents for her planned employment abroad only
on 12 February 1996, when she secured her birth certificate in Bamban as so attested by the date
appearing on the certification from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Bamban. On 08 May 1996, she
admitted being away from home while attending a general assembly of day-care workers in Zambales.
On that day, appellant was likewise not at home due to his overtime work up until about three or four
o'clock in the early morning. Imelda herself, Capulong testified, had attended on that day the San
Miguel fiesta. Contrary to the allegation of private complainant, the witness was not in Manila on the
5th and 12th of January 1996 because, at that time, she had yet no plans of working overseas. She
denied the assertions of private complainant that Capulong had resigned from her day-care work on 05
January 1996, saying it was actually months later, or in June of 1996, when she quit her job. It was on
13 February 1996 when she went to Manila for the first time to attend to her application for a possible
overseas work. She made subsequent trips to the city, that is, on the 3rd, 5th, 8th and 24th of the
month of June, to follow-up her employment papers and to submit herself to a medical check-up. All
these visits only took a day, and she would always be home in Buenavista at nightfall. On 01 July
1996, appellant accompanied her to Manila but, upon learning that her flight was postponed, they spent
the night in Caloocan. The couple stayed together in Manila until 03 July 1996, when appellant
decided to return to Tarlac. Rosemarie worked in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, until 11 November 1996 when
she decided to return home.

Rosemarie Capulong corroborated the testimony of appellant regarding his whereabouts from October
1995, when the ducks were first brought to the field, until 15 December 1995, when appellant had
joined her and their friends caroling. Capulong believed that the charges may have been fabricated by
her relatives who were "jealous" of appellant because it was he, not they, who had been receiving the
remittances of her earnings from Saudi Arabia.

Sharon Flores, a neighbor, testified that, about noontime on 05 August 1996, she repaired to the house
of private complainant to investigate rumors regarding a man seen entering the Capulong residence.
When she went in, she saw private complainant and Pikong Navarro lying on the bed, embracing each
other under a blanket.

Anselmo Botio, a friend of appellant, and Marlon Mateo, a brother of private complainant,
corroborated appellant's alibi. Botio said that on 28 August 1996, at six o'clock in the evening, he,
together with appellant and some friends, went to attend the fiesta in Barangay Murcia upon the
invitation of one Ruben Santos. The group arrived in Murcia at seven o'clock that evening and
promptly had dinner and a drinking spree which lasted until the morning of the next day.

Marlon Mateo testified that one day in October 1996, while his mother was working overseas, he
arrived home from school, and saw Pikong Navarro and private complainant, both naked, on the bed.
Navarro was on top of private complainant and was making thrusting motions. Marlon Mateo
hurriedly left to report the incident to his father.

At the conclusion of the trial, the court a quo issued its decision, dated 23 January 2001, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10) counts of rape -
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ten (10)
counts of rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each
count of rape and to indemnify the complainant the sum of P50,000.00 as actual damages
and P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape."[2]

More often than not, the Court has deemed it sufficient to convict an accused for rape solely on the
basis of the testimony of the victim.[3] The heavy reliance normally given by the Court on the narration
of the victim finds justification on the fact that, generally, she would be the sole witness to the incident
and the shy and demure character of the typical Filipina would preclude her from fabricating that
crime. It is imperative, nonetheless, that the testimony must be convincing and straightforward in order
to avoid any serious doubt from being cast on the veracity of the account given.

Relative to the first supposed rape incident, private complainant categorically stated that she had slept
in the lone bedroom of the house while her siblings and her stepfather slept in the sala
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?

"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. How did (sic) he able to take you out from the room? In what way?

"A. She (sic) lifted me and still my mouth was covered, my hands were stocked and I
cannot move, sir.

"Q. She (sic) lifted you by his two hands, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir."[4]

"Q. You testified on direct examination that there is only one room in your house, is that
right?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. And you were then sleeping inside your house in that one room, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. While your brothers as well as your stepfather were then sleeping outside your
room, you [were] also sleeping, is that right?

"A. Yes, sir."[5]

In the next breath, however, she testified that all her three siblings were sleeping with her on the night
of 07 October 1995 -
"Q. How did (sic) he able to remove your t-shirt and shorts?

"A. He brought me to the sala and in that place when he undressed me, sir.

"Q. Do you want to tell this Honorable Court that he brought you to the sala where your
brothers Ryan and Marlon and your sister Iris were then sleeping?

"A. My brothers and sister were sleeping in the room, sir.

"Q. Is it not a fact that there was only one room in your house?

"A. But they slept there on that night, sir.

 "Q. In other words, Madam Witness, you were sleeping together with Ryan, Marlon,
and Iris by that time in one room together in one bed?

"A. Yes, sir."[6]

Still, later, Imelda changed her testimony and said that her brothers were in the sala and that it was only
her sister Iris who was with her in the bedroom when the rape incidents were committed -
"Q. How about your brother Ryan where did he sleep on October 7, 1995?

"A. At the sala, sir.

"Q. Who was with him in the sala?

"A. He [was] sleeping with my stepfather and my brother Marlon, sir.

"Q. How about Iris, where was she sleeping?

"A. She was with me, sir.

"Q. You mean to imply to the Court that according to you the accused abused you on
October 7, 1995, Iris [was] with you in the room?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. Are you sure of that?

"A. Yes, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. You stated in your direct testimony that on October 7, 1995 your father entered
your room where you were sleeping, covering your mouth and forced you to go to the sala,
do you recall that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Do you not remember that you have testified that he was able to take you to the
sala?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And then when you reached the sala, you stated that the accused criminally abused
you?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Do you not remember having been asked by the prosecutor examining you, and
 now I cite to you your statement; `Q - Public Prosecutor Llobrera, `Now, let us make it
clear. You said you were brought to the sala and your answer, `Yes, sir.''' Do you not
remember having made that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And another question, `When you reached the sala what were the first things he did
to you and your answer, `He kissed me, sir.'' Do you remember that?

"A. No, sir. The first time he abused me was in the room, sir."[7]

The Solicitor General would posit that the claim of private complainant that she had the sole privilege
of sleeping in the lone bedroom of their house while the rest of the family, namely both her parents and
her three siblings, had to squeeze themselves in the sala strained credulity, and that the testimony of her
mother, Rosemarie Capulong, to the effect that the couple were the occupants of the single bedroom
while their children stayed in the sala where the television was located, made more sense.

Imelda testified that her three siblings - Marlon, Ryan and Iris - were sleeping inside the house every
time the rape incidents were committed. The identical testimony of everyone else in the Mateo
household, including her mother Rosemarie Capulong and brother Marlon Mateo, exposed such
assertions to be a blatant lie and categorically stated that Ryan himself had never stayed in the Mateo
residence because he was living with his grandparents since childhood.

Private complainant testified that during the rape incidents she was gagged with a handkerchief which
rendered her unable to shout for help. Later on, however, she gave different versions on whether
appellant covered her mouth with his hand or with a handkerchief during the rape incidents occurring
on 07 October 1995, 05 January 1996, 12 January 1996, 18 July 1996, 16 August 1996 and 28 August
1996. Eventually, she repudiated her earlier testimony by stating that appellant had never covered her
mouth, either with a handkerchief or with his hand -
"Q. Both the incidents of July 2 and July 18, according to you, he only covered your
mouth on both occasions?

"A. Yes, sir.

"Q. He did not tie your mouth with anything?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. Miss Witness, in your statement also on August 20, 1997, you stated that the
accused covered your mouth and tied your mouth with a handkerchief on both occasions.
Do you remember having given that statement?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. So, you do not remember having made that statement?

 "A. No, sir.

"Q. Recalling your testimony you gave on August 20, 1997, for the July 2 occasion and
the testimony that you gave as appearing on page 18 of the transcript of stenographic
notes. These questions and answers were given and answered by you. `Q. While he was
doing all these things to you, did you call for help? A. I cannot shout because my mouth
was covered with a handkerchief, sir. Q. Was he holding that handkerchief? A. It was
tied, sir.' On July 17, 1997, you said that the accused tied your mouth on July 2, 1996, and
you said that you cannot shout because your mouth was tied with a handkerchief. Do you
remember having stated that?

"A. No, sir.

"x x x xxx xxx

"Q. On the July 18 occasion, you also stated in your direct testimony on August 29,
1997, when asked these following questions appearing on page 21 of the transcript of
stenographic notes. `Q. Tell the Court how did he rape you on that night? A. On that night
while I was sleeping in my room, he tied a handkerchief in my mouth so I could not shout,
sir.' Do you remember having stated that?

"A. No, sir.

"Q. And also you were asked this question: `Q. After tying this handkerchief to your
mouth, what did he do to you?' You said that he raped you. Do you remember having
given this statement?

"A. No, sir."[8]

Also quite telling were some discrepancies in the testimony of private complainant regarding the
whereabouts of her mother Rosemarie Capulong on the dates of the incidents. According to private
complainant, it was when her mother Rosemarie was not at home when appellant would commit the
dastardly crimes. Not only did the account of Imelda contradict that of Rosemarie but that Imelda
herself would appear to have made irreconcilable statements. According to her, on 07 October 1995,
the date of the first rape, Rosemarie had gone to Bamban to visit her mother. Subsequently, however,
she said that Rosemarie went to Bamban because she worked there, only to later say that, at that time,
Rosemarie had already resigned from work. Imelda would further change her story by stating that
Rosemarie Capulong did not report for work that day; then, in a quick turnaround, she remarked that
her mother did go to Bamban not to work but to get her birth certificate. Interestingly, Imelda said that
07 October 1995 was a working day, and that she had gone to school the following day. Judicial notice
could be taken of the fact, however, that 07 October 1995 was a Saturday and that the following day, a
Sunday, could not have been a school day. With respect to the rape committed on 12 January 1996,
Imelda testified that Rosemarie was attending a seminar; yet, when cross-examined, she told the trial
court that on that day Rosemarie went to Manila to borrow money from her cousin.
The subsequent conduct of a victim could also either confirm or negate her claim of rape.[9]The human
nature, characterized by an instinct for self-preservation and an aversion to humiliation, would dictate
that a typical victim of rape could display changes in behavior, erratic mood swings and an alteration in
her daily routine. No such changes were observed in the case of private complainant. She testified that
on the day after the first incident on 07 October 1995, she woke up at six o'clock in the morning,
washed her face, and went to school. There was no apparent attempt on her part to run away from
home despite every chance to escape from her tormentor or to exercise every means available to ensure
that the incidents would not be repeated. At fifteen years old, already old enough to think of her safety
and well-being, Imelda Mateo went about her usual business as if nothing unusual had occurred. She
continued to sleep in the same bedroom with nary any precaution against the bestiality she was sure
would come everytime her mother was away.

While it may be argued that appellant's moral ascendancy over Imelda was enough to intimidate her to
suffer in silence; still, it could well be improbable for a victim who had been raped no less than ten
times not to make a simple outcry against her unarmed rapist when she had every opportunity to do so.

The Solicitor General assails the factual findings of the trial court and recommends an acquittal of
appellant.

The records would disclose that the first half of the trial, from 17 July 1997 until 15 October 1997, was
conducted by Judge Lino L. Diamsay. Judge Edgardo F. Sundiam conducted the trial from 14 January
1999 until 24 February 1999. From 11 May 1999 until the day of the last hearing, it was Judge Arsenio
P. Adriano who heard the case. While this change of the presiding judges would not invalidate the
proceedings, it did deny to the deciding magistrate the opportunity to observe in entirety the demeanor
of the witnesses which could well be vital to the decision-making process, particularly where
credibility would, by and large, constitute the singular issue.

The law demands that only proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt can justify a verdict of guilt.

Up until now, the Supreme Court has assumed the direct appellate review over all criminal cases in
which the penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment (or lower but involving
offenses committed on the same occasion or arising out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is
imposed). The practice finds justification in the 1987 Constitution
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the
Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

"x x x xxx xxx

"(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher."
The same constitutional article has evidently been a thesis for Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659,[10] as well as procedural rules contained in Section
3 of Rule 122,[11] Section 10 of Rule 122,[12] Section 13 of Rule 124[13]and Section 3 of Rule
125[14] of the Rules of Court. It must be stressed, however, that the constitutional provision is not
preclusive in character, and it does not necessarily prevent the Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, from adding an intermediate appeal or review in favor of the accused.

In passing, during the deliberations among the members of the Court, there has been a marked absence
of unanimity on the crucial point of guilt or innocence of herein appellant. Some are convinced that the
evidence would appear to be sufficient to convict; some would accept the recommendation of acquittal
from the Solicitor General on the ground of inadequate proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed,
the occasion best demonstrates the typical dilemma, i.e.,the determination and appreciation of primarily
factual matters, which the Supreme Court has had to face with in automatic review cases; yet, it is the
Court of Appeals that has aptly been given the direct mandate to review factual issues.

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and compelling to provide in
these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court. Where
life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his guilt or innocence must be accorded
an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can ever be overdone. A prior determination by
the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues, would minimize the possibility of an error of
judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing the corresponding penalty as the circumstances
so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme
Court for its final disposition.[15]

Statistics would disclose that within the eleven-year period since the re-imposition of the death penalty
law in 1993 until June 2004, the trial courts have imposed capital punishment in approximately
1,493,[16] out of which 907 cases[17] have been passed upon in review by the Court. In the Supreme
Court, where these staggering numbers find their way on automatic review, the penalty has been
affirmed in only 230 cases comprising but 25.36% of the total number. Significantly, in more than half
or 64.61% of the cases, the judgment has been modified through an order of remand for further
proceedings, by the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law or by a reduction of the sentence.
Indeed, the reduction by the Court of the death penalty to reclusion perpetua has been made in no less
than 483 cases or 53.25% of the total number. The Court has also rendered a judgment of acquittal in
sixty-five (65) cases. In sum, the cases where the judgment of death has either been modified or
vacated consist of an astounding 71.77% of the total of death penalty cases directly elevated before the
Court on automatic review that translates to a total of six hundred fifty-one (651) out of nine hundred
seven (907) appellants saved from lethal injection.
Under the Constitution, the power to amend rules of procedure is constitutionally vested in the
Supreme Court -
Article VIII, Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

"(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional

rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts."

Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely within the rule-making prerogative of the
Supreme Court than the law-making power of Congress. The rule here announced additionally
allowing an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate appellate court, before the case
is elevated to the Supreme Court on automatic review, is such a procedural matter.

Pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, more particularly Section 3 and
Section 10 of Rule 122, Section 13 of Rule 124, Section 3 of Rule 125, and any other rule insofar as
they provide for direct appeals from the Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court in cases where the
penalty imposed is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the resolution of the
Supreme Court en banc, dated 19 September 1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases
similarly involving the death penalty, are to be deemed modified accordingly.

WHEREFORE, the instant case is REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition, consistent with the
discussions hereinabove set forth. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio,

Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.

[2] Rollo, p. 53.

[3] People v. Paranzo, G.R. No. 107800, 26 October 1999 (317 SCRA 367).

[4] TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 16 September 1997, pp. 17-19.

[5] TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 16 September 1997, pp. 4-5.

[6] TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 16 September 1997, pp. 17-18.

[7] TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 14 January 1999, pp. 5-12.

[8] TSN, Imelda Mateo, Cross-examination, 11 May 1999, pp. 22-25.

[9] People v. Bayron, G.R. No. 122732, 07 September 1999 (313 SCRA 727); People v.Ablaneda, G.R.
No. 128075, 14 September 1999 (314 SCRA 334).

[10] ART. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic Review of death
penalty cases. - x x x
In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment by the court en banc,
within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen (15) days after promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript
shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic
reporter.

[11] Sec. 3. How appeal taken.

xxx xxx xxx
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by the Regional
Trial Court is reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or where a lesser penalty is imposed
but for offenses committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence
that gave rise to the more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance with
paragraph (a) of this Section.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the death penalty is imposed by the
Regional Trial Court. The same shall be automatically reviewed by the Supreme Court as
provided in section 10 of this Rule.

[12] Sec. 10. Transmission of records in case of death penalty. - In all cases where the death penalty is
imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review
and judgment within five (5) days after the fifteenth (15th) day following the promulgation of the
judgment or notice of denial of a motion for new trial or reconsideration. The transcript shall also be
forwarded within ten (10) days after the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter.

[13] Sec. 13. Quorum of the court; certification or appeal of cases to Supreme Court. - Three (3)
Justices of the Court of Appeals shall constitute a quorum for the sessions of a division. The
unanimous vote of the three (3) Justices of a division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a
judgment or final resolution, which shall be reached in consultation before the writing of the opinion by
a member of the division. In the event that the three (3) Justices can not reach a unanimous vote, the
Presiding Justice shall direct the raffle committee of the Court to designate two (2) additional Justices
to sit temporarily with them, forming a special division of five (5) members and the concurrence of a
majority of such division shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a judgment or final resolution.
The designation of such additional Justices shall be made strictly by raffle and rotation among all other
Justices of the Court of Appeals.

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law involved, shall
render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment as the
circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment and forthwith certify the
case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for review..

[14] Sec. 3. Decision if opinion is equally divided. - When the Supreme Court en banc is equally
divided in opinion or the necessary majority cannot be had on whether to acquit the appellant, the case
shall again be deliberated upon and if no decision is reached after re-deliberation, the judgment of
conviction of the lower court shall be reversed and the accused acquitted.

[15] In this instance, then, the Supreme Court may exercise its "exclusive appellate jurisdiction" over
all cases where the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed by lower
courts, under applicable laws like Republic Act No. 296 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

[16] As of 06 July 2004, the total number of cases pending in the Supreme Court are as follows:
Death Penalty ------------------------------------------------------------------- 586
Life
------------------------------------------------------------------- 375
Imprisonment
Reclusion
------------------------------------------------------------------- [1320]
Perpetua
2281

The total number of cases certified by the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court for review are as
follows:
Death Penalty ------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
Life
------------------------------------------------------------------- 3
Imprisonment
Reclusion
------------------------------------------------------------------- [28]
Perpetua
32

[17] As per report from the Judicial Records Office of the Supreme Court, the following are the data as
of 08 June 2004:
DISMISSED due to death of the Accused-Appellants ----------------- 26
AFFIRMED --------------------------------------------------------- 230
MODIFIED:
a. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS ------------------------------ 31
b. RECLUSION PERPETUA ------------------------------- 483
c. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE ------------------------- 72
ACQUITTED -------------------------------------------------------- 65
 907

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 121176. July 8, 1999]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARLON PARAZO

Y FRANCISCO, accused-appellant.

RESOLUTION
PURISIMA, J.:

This case was docketed on November 27, 1995, upon the elevation for automatic review of
Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and 6168, for rape and frustrated homicide, from Branch 27, Regional Trial
Court, Cabanatuan City, which imposed on accused-appellant Marlon Parazo y Francisco the supreme
penalty of death.
On May 14, 1997, this Court handed down a Decision,[1] affirming with modification subject Joint
Decision of Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija, in Criminal Case Nos. 6167 and
6168, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the joint decision appealed from dated March 24, 1995, is hereby
AFFIRMED with respect to Crim. Case No. 6167, and accused Marlon Parazo y
Francisco is found guilty of the crime of rape under Section 11 of Republic Act No.
7659 amending Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and is sentenced to the penalty of death, with two (2)
members of the Court, however, voting to impose reclusion perpetua.
The decision appealed from with respect to Crim. Case No. 6168, for frustrated
homicide is MODIFIED in that the accused is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum penalty to twelve (12) years
of prision mayor maximum, as maximum penalty.
In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659 amending Article 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this decision, let the records of this case be
forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning
power.
SO ORDERED.
 On May 29, 1997, appellant interposed the Motion for Reconsideration under consideration,
bringing to the attention of the Court facts and circumstances, such as the absence of a sign language
expert, which if true would warrant the setting aside of his judgment of conviction.
On February 10, 1998, the Court resolved[2] to grant appellants Urgent Omnibus Motion: (1) to
hold in abeyance consideration of his motion for reconsideration pending his medical
examination; (2) to allow a supplemental motion for reconsideration after his medical examination;
and (3) to submit him (appellant) for examination by a physician of the Supreme Court. Subsequently,
or on January 19, 1999, to be precise, appellant was allowed to be brought to the UP-PGH Medical
Center, with appropriate escorts, to undergo the necessary neurologic and otolaryngologic evaluation
and work-up.[3]
In compliance with the said resolution of the Court, Dr. Rosa Mendoza, Senior Chief Staff Officer
of the Supreme Court Clinic Services, submitted two (2) Memorandum Reports, dated July 29, 1998
and March 5, 1999, respectively, on the mental, neurologic and otolaryngologic examination and
evaluation of appellant.
On July 20, 1998, the appellant was examined, on the basis of which examination SC Medical
Services Psychologist III Beatriz O. Cruz came out with the following findings and general
observation, to wit:

GENERAL OBSERVATION AND TEST BEHAVIOR:

xxx

An encounter with this person revealed him to have an average physique and height,
with fair complexion and somewhat curly hair. Throughout the testing session he was in
a pensive mood. Doubt and an agitated appearance was written all over his face
particularly when he struggled to say something, but which ideas could not get
across.One security officer, Mr. Gutierrez, came to our aid and communicated to Mr.
Parazo through sign language to comprehend and answer the question being asked [what
he was guilty of]. When he could not understand it, we wrote the question in tagalog in
the paper and to our surprise he could not even read. However thru some efforts made he
was able to utter rep [rape].
Another inmate whom they call mayor [he is the leader of the group] and another close
friend of Mr. Parazo where (sic) called in to provide help to the examiner. And with
difficulties being experienced by the undersigned in giving instructions in gestures, he
was able to draw the geometric figures and a person, respectively. Hand tremor was
noticeable [Mr. Parazo is left handed]. With the help of mayor, an attempt was further
made by the examiner to show him the ink blot test, counting on the idea that the
examiner might get something out of his responses to the task just like in the previous
paper and pencil test. But our efforts proved futile at this time. No amount of gestures
could make him comprehend the instructions given. It was during this time that he was
able to verbalize dilam in high pitched, cracking voice which the undersigned took for di
alam [I dont know]. The examiner did not go further from this point hence, the
termination of test administration.
TESTS ADMINISTERED:
Bender Visual Motor Gestalt Test
Good enough Figure Drawing Test
TESTS RESULT & DISCUSSION:
The results of the paper and pencil test reveal that Mr. Parazos intelligence function
based on the Goodenough is gauged on the Mild to Moderate degree of Mental
Retardation with an estimated IQ of 60. His mental age on the other hand, is equivalent
to 7 years and 9 months.
Further, signs of regressive features and distortion of the gestalt figures are manifested
with strong indication of impulsive behavior. His inability to reproduce from memory
the same figures was noteworthy. His writing output is unsteady that gives an inkling of
difficulty in the motor area.
The above clinical findings are typical reproduction of a person with history of
neurological dysfunction as maybe true in the case of Mr. Parazo who is deaf. It cannot
be discounted also that his intellectual and psychological deficiencies are not only based
on organic brain pathology but primarily on the basis of mental retardation which
impedes the effective use of whatever abilities he does have and which renders him
psychologically incompetent to comprehend fully the significance of the acts he
commits.[4] (italics ours)
In connection therewith, there was presented the Memorandum Report of July 29, 1998, stating
thus:

Based on the foregoing, it appears that the problem of appellant Marlon Parazo is the
severe hearing defect or deafness. The presence of an organic disorder cannot be
determined because of the latters inability to communicate.However, some degree of
mental retardation was gathered with the use of Paper and Pencil Test. His mental age is
seven (7) years and nine (9) months. His Intelligence Quotient (IQ) is 60.
This mental retardation could be secondary to an inherent defect in the brain or
secondary to the sensory deprivation [deafness], which connotes a substantial limitation
in intellectual and adaptive functioning. (italics ours)
 Appellant was then examined at the UP-PGH Medical Center, and the Memorandum Report of Dr.
Rosa Mendoza, dated March 5, 1999, summarized the findings of the UP-PGH Medical Center as
follows:

Quoted hereunder are the report on the test conducted:

Ma. Luz S. Casimiro-Querubin, MD, DPBP, Psychiatrist, Department of Psychiatry and
Behavioral Medicine, College of Medicine and Philippine General Hospital, Manila in
her Psychiatric Assessment Report, stated that:
On the day of assessment, Mr. Parazo was seen sitting on the examining table. His hands
were cuffed in front of him.He was feeding himself a sandwich. He was appropriately
groomed. He wore the orange bilibid prison uniform with denim jeans and rubber
shoes. He appeared tired and fearful. His mood was generally anxious and his affect was
appropriate to the situation. When approached, Mr. Parazo would look down but would
glance at the examiner after a few seconds. He was unable to follow simple instructions
initially and was able to do so only after much coaxing from those around him and
repeated demonstrations of the task he was being asked to do. He was unable to
read. The only thing he could write is his name. Mr. Parazo was able to copy simple
patters (sic) but could not participate in any verbal assessment procedure. His thought
content, thought process and flow of ideas could not be determined because of his
inability to speak. (Underscoring supplied). He was able to maintain good eye
contact.The client remained calm during the assessment procedure. It was evident that
he felt insecure with the manipulative tasks he was presented with. Initially, Mr. Parazo
appeared resistant to the examiner but he eventually warmed.
Throughout the examination, Mr. Parazo sought for encouragement by looking at the
examiner after each and every task. He worked quietly, exerted obvious efforts to
perform well and was visibly careful in trying not to commit mistakes. It was only when
he was signaled that he could use both hands that Mr. Parazo did so. His behavior was
consistent throughout the period of the examination.
The above behavioral description strongly supports the fact that Mr. Marlon Parazo is
indeed hearing impaired and suffers from mental retardation. He is unable to
understand both written and spoken language, needs repetitive sign language
instructions and demonstration to understand the task he was being asked to do.
Meredith F. Castro, MA, Psychologist, PGH, Manila, on the other hand, supported the
assessment findings of Dra. Ma. Luz C. Querubin and reported as follows:
Psychological Evaluation Report Summary
 XXX

Measure
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children-Rev. (WISC-R), Performance Scale. (This
is a comprehensive test of intelligence that measures both verbal and non-verbal aspects
and is intended for children aged 6-16 years old and for adults suspected of mental
deficiency. It is composed of two scales that can be administered separately. Given the
examinees sensory impairment and absence of speech, this present assessment used only
the performance scale, which taps the non-verbal intelligence).
xxx

Performance Prorated Scale Score: 23

Performance IQ: 659
Mean Test-Age: 8 years, 5 months
Impressions
Given his sensory impairment and limited educational background, M.P. Fared poorly in
this intelligence test for children and has been assessed to be within mild mental
deficiency to borderline range of intellectual functioning.
Charlotte M. Chiong, M.D., Otology, Neurotology, Neurotologic Skull Base Surgery,
Diplomate, Philippine Board of Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, PGH certified
that:
I examined Mr. Marlon Parazo, 28-year-old death convict last February 3,
1999. Brainstem auditory evoked response audiometry was done and with 2000 click
stimuli no wave responses were generated in the left suggestive of profound hearing
loss in that ear. In the right ear there was a response 80 db click intensities suggestive
of a severe hearing loss. Puretone Audiometry was done and patient was also noted to
have bilateral profound hearing loss. Speech Testing could not be done due to severity of
hearing loss. From my evaluation Mr. Marlon Parazo has a severe disability and could
not possibly understand conversational speech without powerful amplification such as a
hearing aid. (Underscoring supplied)
For her part, Dr. Grace O. Orteza, MA, MD, FPNA, Section of Neurology, Department
of Medicine, UP-PGH, Manila, in her Assessment stated that XXX there are no
significant neurologic findings aside from the manifest deafness and muteness of
patient.
To corroborate the medical findings of the Medical Team from the Philippine General
Hospital, we conducted an on-the-spot gathering of vital informations on the physical
infirmities of Marlon Parazo to determine whether the same is congenital or acquired.
Mrs. Eufrocina Zenaida Francisco, the mother of Marlon admitted that her son was born
deaf and mute. Their day to day communications relied simply by a pat at the back, a tap
on the lap or sometimes by the very basic sign language that could best convey the
message to him. He never had any formal education. Medical intervention, according to
her, never crossed her mind because of their poverty. If food, which is a very basic need
is already a problem how much more with medications.
The Barangay Chairman of Caimito, Palayan City, Mr. Antonio Sebastian, on the other
hand, claims that he has known Marlon since childhood. In the locality he was branded
as Pipi because of his inability to communicate.Nothing significant was noted in his
childhood days. It was only when he was about his late teens that he was involved in
petty theft.
An interview with Mrs. Juliana Baltazar, a retired schoolteacher, likewise strengthened
the fact that Marlon was deaf and mute. Marlon, according to her, never actively
participated in class though his enthusiasm to learn was present.He never completed a
Grade I full school term, even on a sit in basis since he and his sister were forced to drop
from the class during the harvest season to earn a living.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, Field Office, Palayan City, on the
other hand added the information that since 1975 Marlon was a beneficiary of their
projects relative to Persons with Disability. During his early childhood, he was an active
participant of their project. As he grew older however, he did not anymore bother to visit
their office.
Based on the collateral informations (sic) gathered from persons who have known the
patient since childhood, together with the results of the diagnostic test at UP-PGH and
evidenced by the psychological report, it is now established that Marlon Parazo is
suffering from (1) Profound Hearing Loss, left ear; (2) Severe Hearing Loss, right ear;
(3) Mental Retardation, Mild.
The American Association of Mental Deficiency and the Fourth Edition of Diagnostic
and Statistical/Manual of Mental Disorder enumerated the Diagnostic Criteria
for Mental Retardation as follows:
1. Significantly sub-average intellectual functioning: an I.Q. of approximately 70 or
below on an individually administered I.Q. test.
2. Concurrent deficits or impairments in present adaptive functioning (i.e., the persons
effectiveness in meeting the standards expected for his or her age by his or her cultural
group) in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, home-
living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional
academic skills, work, leisure, health and safety).
3. Onset before age of 18.
xxx

During the tympanovactic examination, the intense sound given to ear of the patient that
is above the normal hearing threshold will elicit facial and neck contraction of the
muscle, which this patient (Marlon) did not manifest. Instead, he continued staring
blatantly [blankly] at the roof of the room.
For her part, Dra. Querubin elucidated that given the physical infirmities coupled with
mental retardation there is no way that Marlon can determine the propriety of his
actions. Perhaps, it would have been different if he had a formal education and given the
opportunity to communicate effectively through the sign language. He, however is in a
situation where due to immense poverty never had a chance to improve his lot.
In conclusion, as per Resolution of the Court En Banc, the undersigned [Rosa J.
Mendoza, M.D.] conducted hand in hand with Dr. Charlotte M. Chiong, in the medical
evaluation of Mr. Marlon Parazo, together with the panel of Medical Specialist of UP-
PGH, the S.C. Medical Team and the lawyer representative from the Office of the Court
Administrator, it is our unanimous opinion that Mr. Marlon Parazo is deaf and mute with
mental retardation mild.
The affidavits[5] of Rev. Fr. Roberto A. Olaguer, the National Bilibid Prisons Chaplain, and Rev.
Fr. Roy Rolando L. Cosca, S.J., Executive Director of Philippine Jesuit Prison Service, state that
appellant is a deaf-mute.The results of medical examinations conducted on appellant also indicate that
appellant is really a deaf-mute, a mental retardate, whose mental age is only seven (7) years and nine
(9) months, and with low IQ of 60 only.
Records on hand show that appellant was tried below without the benefit of a sign language
expert. The fact that he was helped and assisted by a person who has been known to him since 1983, as
noted by the trial court of origin and appearing on page 6 of the transcript of stenographic notes for
February 8, 1995, is of no moment, absent any clear showing that appellant was aided by a competent
sign language expert able to fully understand and interpret the actions and mutterings of appellant.
As held in People v. Crisologo[6]:

The absence of an interpreter in sign language who could have conveyed to the accused,
a deaf-mute, the full facts of the offense with which he was charged and who could also
have communicated the accuseds own version of the circumstances which led to his
implication in the crime, deprived the accused of a full and fair trial and a reasonable
opportunity to defend himself. Not even the accuseds final plea of not guilty can excuse
these inherently unjust circumstances.
The absence of a qualified interpreter in sign language and of any other means, whether
in writing or otherwise, to inform the accused of the charges against him denied the
accused his fundamental right to due process of law. The accuracy and fairness of the
factual process by which the guilt or innocence of the accused was determined was not
safeguarded. The accused could not be said to have enjoyed the right to be heard by
himself and counsel, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him in the proceedings where his life and liberty were at stake.
All the foregoing studiedly considered, the court is of the irresistible conclusion that movant richly
deserves a re-arraignment and re-trial, to the end that only upon proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
may he be consigned to the lethal injection chamber.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of this Court promulgated on May 14, 1997 is VACATED, the Joint
Decision rendered by Branch 27 of the Regional Trial Court of Nueva Ecija in Criminal Case Nos.
6167 and 6168 is SET ASIDE; and appellant is hereby GRANTED a RE-ARRAIGNMENT and RE-
TRIAL, with the assistance of counsel and a competent sign language expert, before the Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., on official business abroad.

[1] Rollo, pp. 106-118.

[2] Rollo, p. 159.

[3] Resolution dated January 19, 1999.

[4] Annex G of Memorandum Report dated July 29, 1998.

[5] Rollo, pp. 128-129.

[6] 150 SCRA 656.