BP617376

THE POWER OF EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN
MADRASSAHS, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY
Badar Jalil
Roll No. BP617376
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for B.Ed. (1.5 year) program in Teacher
Education at Secondary Teacher Education Department
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
ALLAMA IQBAL OPEN UNIVERSITY ISLAMABAD
April-2019
© Badar Jalil, 2019
Faculty of Education
Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad
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THE POWER OF EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN:
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the education system in Pakistan, and the impact of the
country’s schools—specifically its madrassahs—on its security and development. With
the world becoming increasingly globalized, the failing education systems in one
nation can negatively impact its own development as well as international security;
however, a modernized education system can inspire youths to advance themselves and
their communities towards a more peaceful and prosperous life. The duty to improve
education is particularly critical in Pakistan, as the country has one of the world’s
largest youth populations combined with one of the highest illiteracy rates, ensuring
depressing future employment prospects in an already violent and sectarian state.
Education is a crossroads at which Pakistan’s inherent struggle with
modernization is best exemplified. Like many religious states, Pakistan has a difficult
time balancing its commitment to historical traditions with its need to progress beyond its
current stagnation. This security threat is particularly prominent in the nation’s
madrassahs, religious seminaries whose curricula are outdated and inadequate, leaving
most students unprepared and unqualified for any career outside the religious field.
iii
Further, in rare instances, madrassahs have contributed towards the
radicalization of its students, most famously in the Red Mosque protest. Though an
anomaly, the security impacts of such extremism are more immediate and dangerous
to Pakistan.
Unless the management and curriculum of madrassahs improves, its graduates
will continue to suffer from unemployment, lack of marketable skills, and a pervasive
frustration with their world, which may push them towards intolerance, militancy,
and, possibly, acts of terrorism rooted in religious radicalization. This threat reinforces
the necessity in modernizing Pakistan’s education system so that as its massive youth
population ages, its students will be able to participate in a modern society in order to
advance, not limit, the country’s development and security.
iv
To my Beloved parents,
Without whom prayers I’m nothing
v
CONTENTS
COPYRIGHT ii
ABSTRACT iii
DEDICATION v
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORY OF PAKISTAN AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 4
CHAPTER 2
THE MADRASSAH SYSTEM AND ITS IMPACT ON INDIVIDUALS AND
COMMUNITIES 24
CHAPTER 3
MADRASSAHS, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY 50
CHAPTER 4
REFORMING MADRASSAHS: HOW AND WHO? 75
CONCLUSION 97
BIBLIOGRAPHY 100
vi
INTRODUCTION
Formerly part of British India, Pakistan became independent in 1947 as a
homeland for Muslims. It is the only post-colonial country besides Israel to be created on
the basis of religious identity, and, as such, Islam infiltrates most aspects of civilian life,
including education.1 While Pakistan faces many security risks, its failing education
system is one of the most significant threats to its long-term development. Impediments
to the education process include poorly trained teachers, inadequate facilities (lack of
desks, bathrooms, heat, running water, ceilings, etc.), a politicized curriculum, outdated
textbooks breeding intolerance in an already divisive society, poor community
investment, and widespread corruption.2
These problems would be alarming in any nation, but the development risks
are particularly overwhelming in Pakistan, since more than 50 percent of Pakistan’s
population of 190 million is younger than twenty-four—one of the largest youth
populations in the world. 3 Further, the number of youths in comparison to adults is
expected to rise in the coming years. Unless the current education system is reformed,
the vast majority of this population will face increasingly depressing employment
prospects and be unable to participate in a modern and more globalized world.
1
Saleem H. Ali, Islam and Education: Conflict and Conformity in Pakistan's Madrassahs (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009), 17.
2
Robert M. Hathaway, ed., Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future (Washington,
DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 2.
3
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Pakistan,” March 4, 2014, accessed March
8, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.
1
In addition to limiting its development, Pakistan’s massive youth population has
also negatively impacted the country’s security. A nation facing such bleak economic
prospects is precisely the environment in which criminal and terrorist groups are able to
thrive, thanks to the large number of frustrated and uneducated possible recruits tempted
by such groups’ illusion of power. With the world becoming increasingly connected,
Pakistan’s development failures can directly impact the security of the world if these
recruits later commit acts of violence.
The primary school system most often cited for exacerbating Pakistan’s security
problems is the nation’s madrassahs.4 Due to their emphasis on religious studies, these
Islamic seminaries often leave graduates unprepared for advancement in society outside
of the religious sect. Some madrassahs have focused so exclusively on Islamic
fundamentalism that they have inspired and executed violent protests. The impact such
extremist behavior has had on its local communities has caused many, especially in the
Western world, to consider madrasssahs “incubators for violent extremism.”5 This
stereotype is enforced by incriminating graduates such as Mullah Umar, a Taliban
leader who received an honorary degree from the well-known Dur-ul-Uloom Haqqania
4
In my research I found many alternate spellings of madrassahs (i.e. madrasa, madrassa,
madresa madrassah), but for the purpose of this paper, madrassah (singular) and madrassahs (plural) will
be employed. This is the most common form of the Arabic translation and best conveys its correct
pronunciation. That being said, in direct quotations, others’ spelling of madrassah will be preserved.
5
Thomas H. Kean et al., The 9/11 Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 367.
2
madrassah.6 That being said, the majority of madrassahs teach a moderate form of
Islam, and discourage religious extremism and violent jihad.7
This thesis seeks to answer the following research question: What is the role of
Islamic madrassahs in Pakistan in preparing students for participation in a modern
economy and society, and how can reforming their management and curriculum reduce
religious extremism, promote personal and national development, and contribute to the
overall security of Pakistan and its surrounding region? The first two chapters will
provide an overview of Pakistan’s history and its education system—focusing on
madrassahs—to explain how it evolved into its present configuration and culture.
Chapter 3 will analyze the relationship between madrassahs, development and security
in Pakistan by exploring some of threats influencing Pakistan’s national and international
affairs. My final chapter will summarize the principal findings and recommendations of
the thesis, and offer some concluding thoughts on the way forward.
Inherent in this investigation is a concern for values at the level of the individuals,
society, and the wider international community: developing human potential; promoting
social and economic development; and advancing international peace and security. This
thesis will promote the transformative power of education as a means to accomplish these
ideals.
6
Ali, Islam and Education, 34.
7
Hathaway, Education in Pakistan, 4.
3
CHAPTER 1
THE HISTORY OF PAKISTAN AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
In 2012, Malala Yousafzai, who at the time was only fifteen years old, was on
her way to school when a member of the Taliban stopped her school bus and shot Malala
in the head.8 Malala was targeted in part due to her very public campaign urging the
expansion and betterment of education in Pakistan, specifically for young females. Her
attempted murder quickly generated worldwide attention, but Malala’s story is but one of
countless accounts of the injustice and obstacles Pakistani children endure every day for
striving to attain the education promised to them in their nation’s constitution. Now an
international activist, Malala has escaped the limitations of Pakistan’s weak education
system, yet millions of students remain at risk in Pakistan simply for pursuing an
education they hope will help them achieve career and personal growth—if they are able
to make it to graduation.
Pakistan was created in 1947 as a homeland for Muslims; decades later, Islam
remains a vital aspect of the state’s identity. Since its independence, Pakistan has done
little to invest in its education and, as a result, its educational system is unprepared to
meet contemporary needs. In fact, even the nation’s most technological advancement—it
is one of the few countries to possess nuclear weapons—can almost exclusively be
attributed to assistance from states like China, rather than Pakistan’s own investment in
science and technology.9 Regardless, Pakistan boasts that its possession of weapons of
8
Malala Yousafzai, I Am Malala: The Girl Who Stood Up for Education and was Shot by
the Taliban (New York: Little, Brown, 2013).
9
4
mass destruction demonstrates its advancement in relation to the rest of the Middle East
in combining Islam and innovation.10
To improve its educational structure, Pakistan will fight an uphill battle. Despite
its failing system, Pakistan invested just over two percent of its GDP on its education
system in 2012; only seven identified countries in the world were known to spend
less.11 This extremely low investment is standard for Pakistan, meaning multiple
generations of students have suffered and will continue to suffer from one of the worst
educational system outside of Africa.
Unsurprisingly, Pakistan has abysmally low literacy rates. Just over half of its
total population is literate, and only 40 percent of women are able to read and write.12
This means the majority of Pakistan’s population is incapable of contributing to its
jobs and opportunities that require even the most basic education. Even more troubling,
illiteracy is predicted to grow in the coming years, making Pakistan one of the only
countries in the world in which illiteracy is increasing.13
Complicating its development is the fact that throughout its history, Pakistan has
struggled to reach consensus on an innate component of its identity. Some of its citizens
interpret Islam as a progressive religion, one that advocates social equality and
10
Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 80.
11
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Pakistan,” March 4, 2014, accessed
March 8, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.
12
Ibid.
13
Rebecca Winthrop and Corinne Graff, “Beyond Madrasas: Assessing the Links Between
Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” Center for Universal Education at Brookings, no. 2 (June 2010): 1,
accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/
pakistan%20education%20winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf.
5
technological advancements. On the other hand, its religious fundamentalists disapprove
of capitalism and any Western influence in society, endorsing instead the institution of
sharia (Islamic) law in all aspects of life.
Pakistan’s inability to reconcile these two perspectives has stagnated its
development. It is in a constant conflict whether to glorify its past at the expense of a
more prosperous future, or else invest in development and risk losing its religious
ideals. This problem is exposed most evidently in Pakistan’s education system,
specifically its madrassahs.
To demonstrate how the nation’s education system became so desperately
inadequate, a brief history of the nation and its leaders will be outlined.
Historical Overview of Pakistan and its Education System
Post-Independence
Pakistan was declared independent in August 1947; split from British India, it was
created as a homeland for the Muslim community of the region. However, despite being
declared a safe haven for Muslims, Pakistan immediately faced conflicts between the
many religious sects practicing in the new state. Pakistan’s first governor-general
Mohammad Ali Jinnah understood that to be a modern state, Pakistan would have to be
tolerant of religious differences, as well as socially progressive.14 Though before
Pakistan became independent, he was very vocal about the differences between Muslims
and India’s Hindu population, upon becoming governor-general he spoke passionately
about uniting all religious groups into one cohesive state. In 1948 he died deeply
14
Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 28.
6
disappointed in the vast difference between his vision for Pakistan and how the state
operated in reality.
Contributing to this disparity was the sheer volume of people flooding into the
new state—an estimated six to eight million refugees—who all had different ideas of how
the country should operate.15 Many of these refugees were low-skilled, which made it
difficult for them to assimilate into Pakistan’s workforce. But perhaps the most
significant divide was in the different ways groups practiced Islam. Rather than being
united that they had together escaped a Hindu majority, groups concentrated more on the
differences between the forms of Islam they practiced. This caused Pakistan’s residents to
identify more with their local community than they did with the Pakistani state. To this
day Pakistan struggles to find consensus between different religious groups when
creating public policy.
Following independence and leading into the 1970s, Pakistan’s education
system imitated that of other South Asian countries—namely, public education was the
primary means to attain an education and the curriculum of these schools prepared
students for future employment with the government, who was the largest employer in
the nation.16 Considered functional at the start of independence, the education system
crumbled over the following decades due in part to corrupt leaders, lack of funds for
social services, civil and proxy wars, and an increased emphasis on religious extremism.
15
Ibid., 43.
16
Shahid Javed Burki, “Educating the Pakistani Masses,” in Education Reform in Pakistan:
Building for the Future, ed. Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars, 2005), 19.
7
Cold War
One leader who had an especially significant impact on Pakistan’s education
culture was General Ayub Khan, who staged a successful military coup in 1958. Upon
seizing power, he employed several means to expand his control of the state, like
charging over 3,000 politicians as corrupt, thus insulating his control.17 While publicly
Khan advocated for Pakistan’s Islamic identity, his loyalty to Islam perhaps spoke more
to his political ambition rather than his personal faith. After India chose to align with the
Soviet Union during the Cold War, it worked to Pakistan’s advantage to proactively
discount atheism—commonly associated with communism—so that Pakistan could
appeal to the United States as an ally.18 Therefore when it worked to Khan’s advantage,
he endorsed a religious ideal, but on fronts that could curtail his power, he resisted the
influence of the religious elite. As such, he extended power over many religious schools
at the expense of the instructors of the madrassahs, called ulamas.
Khan was the first military official to become president, and his presidency
started a common trend in Pakistan of hosting military generals in senior
government positions. Generally, these leaders emphasized military power rather
than national development. Khan was but the first of many military officials-turned-
politicians to exploit Pakistan’s loyalty to Islam as a means to increase his power.
The 1970 election revealed high polarization between East and West Pakistan, and
within a year the nation was embroiled in a civil war that resulted in the partition of
17
18
Ibid.
8
the country, with East Pakistan becoming what is now Bangladesh.19 Following
partition, Gen. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who won the West Pakistan election, took power. He
inherited a nation that had just lost over half of its population, and was humiliated by the
losses its military had endured and the lack of support it had received from international
allies.20 The loss of East Pakistan also hurt Pakistan’s overall social diversity. Rather
than making Pakistan a more united, homogeneous nation, the loss of the Bengalis
weakened Pakistan’s culture by making it less secular. Its emphasis on Islam as a
common identity led to the radicalization of many sects of the Islamic faith. To this day,
Pakistan struggles to overcome the sectarianism that violently divides its nation.
In fact, at various times since 1971, secessionist movements have arisen in
Pakistan’s other provinces including: North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) which
borders Afghanistan, Sindh which borders India, and Baluchistan which is close to both
Afghanistan and Iran.21 These ethno-linguistic groups have often been as equally
frustrated with the state as the Bengalis were before partition. This suggests that even
after partition provinces identified more with their community—or even neighboring
countries—than they did with Pakistan. In many ways partition formalized a division in
Pakistan’s religious groups that still exists half a century later.
In order to establish and maintain a new identity for Pakistan after losing half of
its population, Bhutto needed the support of the religious elite. Under his leadership, a
19
Ibid., 29.
20
21
Ibid., 91.
9
measure was passed that would equate religious degrees with those from government
schools. The highest degree of the Deobandi wifaq, the largest madrassah branch, was
determined to be equivalent to a Masters in Islamic Studies earned from a government
university, as long as students passed a Bachelors level English course.22 Bhutto also
nationalized private schools, since he believed they perpetuated elitism and he wanted
equal opportunity for all Pakistanis regardless of where they attended school.23 These
measures aimed to increase employability for madrassah graduates, and for Bhutto to
show his allegiance and commitment to advancement of religious scholars. They also
demonstrated the state’s commitment to influencing the madrassah system, during and
after students’ studies, so that students across Pakistan could contribute to a competitive
workforce.
Though this major reform was intended to advance educational opportunities for
students, it delivered a huge shock to the existing system, which was further aggravated
by Bhutto’s ongoing conflict with the country’s religious forces. Despite measures he
took to recruit their support, the religious elites were suspicious of Bhutto’s socialist
policies, and sought to discredit his authority. The battle between Bhutto and the
Islamists largely occurred at Pakistan’s schools, with both the government and the
Islamists working to recruit students to their respective side.24 Students formed groups in
22
23
Burki, “Educating the Pakistani Masses,” 22.
24
Ibid., 22.
10
support of the influence of both parties, and such political mobilization led to a
decreased emphasis on academic achievement.
It was also Bhutto who initiated Pakistan’s nuclear program—or, as he called it,
the “Islamic bomb.”25 India was already working on a nuclear weapon of its own, and
Bhutto wanted to ensure Pakistan’s hostile neighbor did not enjoy a unilateral advantage
of possessing this powerful technology. Bhutto felt that successfully building a nuclear
weapon would demonstrate a nation could be Islamic yet still technologically competitive
against Western nations.
Pakistan’s nuclear program is an example of Pakistan’s willingness to invest in
military strength at the expense of its social programs. Reforming the country’s education
system could have organically produce scientists and engineers; however, in its haste to
obtain nuclear weapons, Pakistan sacrificed its long-term potential for the short-term
solution of receiving instructions and equipment from China and investing heavily in
nuclear technology at the expense of social programs.
When Bhutto was overthrown and later hung by General Zia-ul Huq in 1977, the
Zia regime continued with Bhutto’s efforts to make Pakistan a nuclear power.26 Zia also
continued Bhutto’s nationalization of education, though on a much broader scale than
his predecessor. Part of his so-called “Islamization” campaign was a means to gain
legitimacy in Pakistan after overthrowing a democratically elected Bhutto. The nation's
religious leaders were initially accepting of Zia, especially since they disapproved of
25
Ali Riaz, Faithful Education: Madrassahs in South Asia (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2008), 104.
26
Ibid.
11
Bhutto's fondness for alcohol and other habits that caused them to question his loyalty to
Islam.27 To gain further credibility in the eyes of the religious elite, Zia immediately set
in place measures that would further Islamize aspects of society, including education.
Meanwhile, Zia reinstituted the army to a powerful role in the government.28 This indicated
early in his regime that despite wanting to recruit support from the religious elites, the
former army chief was also interested in expanding Pakistan’s military branch.
But Zia is perhaps best remembered for the role he played when the Soviet Union
invaded Afghanistan—an event that forever changed the landscape of Pakistan. To
combat the threat of communism, forces within Pakistan and abroad (including the
United States) facilitated the rise of jihadist organizations that encouraged Pakistanis to
join proxy wars in Afghanistan.29 Zia warned citizens that the war in Afghanistan was a
battle for Islam, and that a lost war in Afghanistan would lead to a Soviet invasion of
Pakistan. In doing so, he effectively endorsed the recruitment of Muslim warriors, called
mujahedeen, to fight the Soviets under the guise of protecting their religious faith and
land. Pakistan—along with the United States and Saudi Arabia—funded this endeavor,
but left the formal recruitment of soldiers to extremist organizations, which established
close ties between members of the Pakistani government and leaders of extremists
organizations.30
27
28
29
Masooda Bano, The Rational Believer (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012), 180.
30
Ibid.
12
This also led to a surge of new madrassahs, which were already on the rise given
Zia’s Islamization program.31 As religious seminaries, madrassahs were seen as ideal
venues to train already religiously inspired students into mujahedeen fighters.32 The
madrassahs functioning as recruiting centers were built in historically violent regions,
so some of those who were trained and educated in these centers quickly became pro-
military resistance fighters.
Saudi Arabia was largely responsible for funding these madrassahs, which it did
so generously so that it could implement Wahhabism, an extremely conservative
interpretation of Islam that the Saudis practice, into the madrassahs it helped build.33
The introduction of Wahhabism contributed to the extremism that remains ingrained in
Pakistan today; before the Soviet invasion, Pakistan’s Islam was considered more
moderate. From the late 1970s on, Pakistan’s major religious sects—Sunni and Shia—
grew further insulated from each other as tensions between and within these groups grew
increasingly violent in nature.
Post-Cold War
Following the Cold War, Pakistan underwent multiple transitions of power,
though no leader was able to complete a full term before being overthrown. Called “the
31
Stephen Lyon, Iain R. Edgar, and Ali Khan, eds, Shaping a Nation: an Examination of
Education in Pakistan (London: Oxford University Press, 2010), 99-100.
32
Kaitlyn Garman, “Education in Pakistan: Reforming the Curriculum of Madrassahs to
Advance Development and Security” (Washington: Georgetown University, 2012), 3. I have done
research on development and security in Pakistan throughout my studies at Georgetown University. Most
recently, I wrote a paper on madrassahs in Pakistan for Dr. Joe Smaldone’s Fall 2012 course “Security
and Development: The Nettlesome Nexus.” Pieces of research from that paper will be used throughout
this thesis.
33
13
age of democracy,” political turnout actually decreased with each election from 1988
(50 percent) to 2002 (25-30 percent).34 In general, the governments of this confusing
and unpredictable stage were concerned more with maintaining their power than
developing the nation over which they ruled. As a result, the country’s leaders invested
heavily in the nation’s military in the hopes of maintaining their short-term power,
despite recognizing they were underinvesting in the country’s long-term development.
During this time, social services deteriorated, and education in particular suffered.
Meanwhile, by 1994, the Taliban had taken over the government in Afghanistan,
and Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was quick to recognize the Taliban as an
official government.35 This rash decision ultimately ended up hurting Pakistan’s
international reputation when the Taliban, in turn, endorsed the extreme tactics of al
Qaeda. At the time of the September 11th terrorist attacks, Pakistan appeared on an
irreversible path towards permanent instability that resorted to militarization and
extremism rather than peace and diplomacy. Its weak social and economic systems were
failing, while sectarian violence and domestic terrorism were on the increase. Education
was—and is still—one of the few areas in which the government had an opportunity to
counteract the influence of militancy and instability, and yet the potential for progress
went largely unexplored.
34
35
14
Post September 11th
After September 11th, when international aid poured into Pakistan, President
Pervez Musharraf attempted the most dramatic reform of the nation’s schools in the
country’s history. He accepted the major demands of the United States at the time, which
included providing intelligence to the United States, allowing United States troops to use
Pakistani territory to transport military equipment into Afghanistan, and, most
importantly, severing all ties to the Taliban.36 These were major concessions and in
making them, Pakistan acknowledged it needed to change how it operated if it wanted to
avoid the trap neighboring Afghanistan fell into by hosting terrorists that negatively
affected security at an international level.
In addition to the military and intelligence concessions to which Pakistan agreed,
it also affirmed it would employ major reforms in its education system. Although none of
the nineteen hijackers were educated in Islamic institutions, after September 11th it was
quickly decided that one of the main battlefields against terrorism would need to occur in
schools, specifically in madrassahs.37
Musharraf was quick to agree to the post-September 11th demands of America,
but Pakistan’s loyalty remained tenuous at best. For all his efforts to reform education
and create a more secular society in Pakistan, Musharraf quickly realized this effort
was often in direct contradiction to popular opinion in Pakistan, as most citizens
prefered religion playing a part in everyday life.
36
37
Riaz, Faithful Education, 20.
15
Clearly, reforming education has presented a complex dilemma for Pakistani leaders.
To modernize society, they needed to reform curricula of schools, yet to do so alienated the
population they needed to maintain power. This was especially true of leaders who come to
power following a military coup, as was sometimes the case.38 In order to build political
legitimacy and generate popular support, military leaders often aligned with powerful
religious elites so their regime would be associated with Islam—an effective strategy when
approximately 96 percent of the country is Muslim. Regardless of these efforts, the
government still had a difficult time implementing reforms in education, particularly in the
country’s madrassahs, without alienating religious scholars. Furthermore, even if leaders
were serious about investing in modernization, few stayed in power long enough to institute
the major changes needed to make reform effective.
The Present Education System in Pakistan
Of all Pakistan’s pressing security concerns, its educational system—or lack
thereof—is regularly cited as one of the most significant impediments preventing the
country from developing towards its full potential. Even with the post-September 11th
surge in funding to Pakistani schools, the country is still fighting to reach the level of
education its neighbors already enjoy. Pakistan’s primary-age enrollment hovers around
50 percent.39 In comparison, Bangladesh—which used to be East Pakistan—has reached
75 percent and India is at 77 percent.40 Due to its low enrollment and high dropout rate,
38
Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, 7. Pakistan has seen four successful military coups: Ayub Khan in
1958, Yahya Khan in 1969, Zia ul-Huq in 1977, and Pervez Musharraf in 1999.
39
40
Hathaway, Education Reform in Pakistan, 4.
16
Pakistan has equally low literacy rates—only 54 percent of the country (and only 40
percent of women) are literate. 41 Those Pakistanis who are unable to read and write
have a very difficult time finding employment. The lack of a qualified workforce
continues to stunt Pakistan’s development, and will continue to do so as its youth bulge
grows in size. Despite this, Pakistan has historically spent just two percent of its GDP on
improving its schools.
The children who are enrolled in school usually are exposed to inadequate
facilities and antiquated textbooks. Regarding government schools in Pakistan, Ahsan
Saleem stated:
Sixteen percent of schools are without a building, which itself could be as little
as just one single bare room; 55 percent are without a boundary wall, perhaps at
the edge of farmland (with stray animals wandering around) or in an urban
shanty town, the premises serving as a thoroughfare; 79 percent are without
electricity, which means that—in the severe heat that characterizes most of
Pakistan— children often prefer to sit under a tree rather than in over-like rooms;
44 percent are without water and 60 percent are without a washroom, so that both
teachers and students, especially females, must break from classes for
considerable periods, in order to attend school.42
These terrible conditions distract from students’ concentration and often expose
them to dangerous conditions that could negatively impact their health or safety. As a
result, the very institutions that strive to prepare students for employment after graduation
often dissuade students from continuing with their studies.
41
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Pakistan,” March 4, 2014, accessed March
8, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.
42
Ahsan Saleem, “Against the Tide; Role of the Citizens Foundation in Pakistani Education,” in
Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future, ed. Robert M. Hathaway (Washington,
17
Types of Schools
Pakistan has three education systems: government schools (estimated 150,000
schools that enroll an estimated 16 million students); secular private schools (35,000
schools that enroll approximately 6 million students); and madrassahs (12 to 15,000
schools that host approximately 2 million students).43 Though there are exceptions, the
three school options are generally attended by different social classes. Impoverished
families in rural areas send their children to madrassahs, government schools are
attended by the lower- to middle- class, and the elite of the country can afford to send
their children to private school.
As previously mentioned, the madrassahs are Islamic seminaries that train
students almost exclusively in religious education. At madrassahs, students learn how to
read, memorize, and preach the Quran correctly. Often, madrassahs offer free food and
boarding to its students. 44 This provides many families with the opportunity to send their
children away to be educated—an expense they could not afford should the madrassahs not
generously cover it. That being said, in madrassahs that board children and emphasize a
more radical form of Islam, students can quickly become radicalized due to the insulated
nature of their studies. In rare instances, madrassah students have gone on
43
Ali, Islam and Education, 25. These estimations differ depending on the source, but the
numbers listed are the one most often cited by reputable scholars.
44
Ibid., 15. A part-time, non-residential school that focuses on Quran memorization and is
sometimes referred to in Pakistan as a maktab to distinguish from madrassahs, which educate students full
time and at various grade levels. However, since these schools often share teachers and mosques, for the
purposes of this paper, they will both be referred to as the more encompassing madrassah school system.
18
to commit acts of sectarian violence or terrorism. More details on the madrassah
system, the primary interest of this thesis, can be found in Chapter 2.
Students at government schools are educated in subjects outside of religious
studies, though they still follow the National Curriculum which glorifies militarization
and Islamization in subjects like Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies.45 These subjects
tend to emphasize a pro-military, anti-India ideology and over the course of a student’s
career may increase the likelihood they’ll be aggressive and intolerant in their later
professions. Since government schools educate an overwhelming majority of students in
Pakistan, many reforms have focused on these schools, though the success of such
reforms has been debatable.
The private schools in Pakistan speak directly to the growing emphasis on behalf
of wealthier Pakistanis to send their children to superior schools. A relatively recent
phenomenon, these schools are run by private funds, which means they are able to
educate students independent of the government curriculum which is relatively outdated
and biased. The growth of private schools—between 1983 and 2000 the population
attending private schools grew tenfold—indicates both communities’ lack of confidence
in the government and madrassah schools, and to the effort of communities to ensure the
demand for quality education can be met.46 Students who attend private schools are
taught a more Western style of education, and also have opportunity to study abroad for
45
Tariq Rahman, “Reason for Rage: Reflections on the Education System of Pakistan with
Special Reference to English,” in Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future, ed. Robert M.
Hathaway (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 93-94.
46
19
higher education. They are also more likely to have a balanced male/female enrollment
ratio, which challenges the assumption Pakistani parents refuse to send their daughters to
coed schools.47 While private institutions are not obligated to follow the National
Curriculum, they do need to implement Pakistan Studies, Urdu, and Islamic Studies,
which means students are still exposed to pro-military, anti-Western lessons to a certain
extent.48
Unfortunately, private schools are usually only accessible to the elite of
Pakistan, due to their high price of tuition. There are private schools that deliberately
aim to include less wealthy students, but these are considered inferior to those that
impose high tuition costs on the entire student body.49
Students who graduate from private institutions generally rise towards inclusion
in “the establishment of Pakistan,” which hosts senior government and military
officials.50 Given their wealthy background and Western style of education, they
approach the world very differently than graduates from madrassahs, the most
successful of which become imams (leaders of mosques), ulamas (instructors at
madrassahs), or advisers in Islamic political parties. The conflict between these two
groups of leaders explains the difficulty in reforming madrassahs.
47
Ishrat Husain, “Education, Employment and Economic Development in Pakistan,” in
Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future, ed. Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, DC:
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 38.
48
Rahman, “Reason for Rage,” 93-94.
49
50
20
One of the most troubling aspects of the education system is the level of
corruption and lack of oversight in the existing schools. Perhaps the best example of this
can be seen in Pakistan’s “ghost schools” that exist only on paper. The government
makes a lot of political appointees to schools to make sure their constituents are
employed, which helps their long-term popularity while in office. Sometimes these
political appointees have no qualifications to teach or oversee schools, and face no
consequences for doing a poor job, as there is little oversight once they are appointed. As
a result, some teachers and administrators show up to school only to collect a paycheck,
rather than to teach the nation’s youth.51 It is difficult in Pakistan to establish exact
statistics, but some studies have found thousands of these ghost schools throughout
Pakistan’s four districts. In 2010, Rebecca Winthrop and Corrine Graff explored this
phenomenon and found that there was little accountability in schools as noted below:
. . . during surprise visits to 30 government schools, 12 of them were closed, most

commonly because teachers did not come to work. Within the remaining 17
schools that were open, one third of all teachers were absent and several more
were present but too indifferent, overwhelmed or incompetent to actually teach
any lessons.52
This lack of accountability for educating the youth of Pakistan does little to
increase and maintain enrollment rates, and must quickly be addressed if Pakistan hopes
to improve its alarmingly low literacy and enrollment rates.
51
Saleem, “Against the Tide,” 73.
52
accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/6/
21
Higher Education and Beyond
In addition to low enrollment at the primary level, Pakistan’s dropout rates
increase with each successive school year, making the percentage to reach college-age
very small. As a result, higher education in Pakistan is extremely low. Even those who
are qualified education-wise are usually unable to afford the cost of attending a
university, especially since the very few esteemed universities in the country are
private institutions. Less than half a million students enroll in university programs—an
incredibly small number for the seventh most populous country in the world. In
comparison, South Korea, which has a population one third that of Pakistan, has more
than five times the number of students enrolled at the university level.53
This poor education system leaves students unprepared and unqualified for a
modern workforce. Foreign companies have little motivation to invest in Pakistan—
which is precisely what Pakistan needs to accelerate its development—due to its high
illiteracy and low-skilled labor. If Pakistan wants to compete on an international scale, as
its neighbor India has successfully done in the information technology realm, it needs to
quickly modernize its education system so that the next generation of graduates can
achieve this mission, rather than contributing to future stagnation and insecurity. Pakistan
has very few major natural resources, so it is only investments in its people that will
contribute towards a more stable and prosperous nation.
53
Salman Shah, “Challenges in the Education Sector in Pakistan,” in Education Reform
in Pakistan: Building for the Future, ed. Robert M. Hathaway (Washington, DC: Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2005), 51.
22
Conclusion
Currently the fear persists that unless changes are made soon and implemented
as the growing youth population transitions through school, Pakistan could increasingly
become an exporter of recruits to extremists and terrorists groups. Such groups hurt
Pakistan’s development and security by exacerbating sectarian divides and organizing
violent acts against perceived anti-Islamic targets. This threat appears more likely at
schools in which religion, the issue dividing Pakistan’s extremist groups, is the primary
concentration.
Despite the numerous challenges Pakistan faces in fixing its school system, the
extremely high number of young civilians in Pakistan could work to the country’s
advantage. If educated properly, this huge volume of students could stimulate Pakistan’s
economy by filling advanced positions within its government and private sector. These
individuals will seek guidance from Pakistan’s religious leaders, so in order to ensure
such guidance is tolerant in nature, Pakistan must first reform the education of those who
will be providing moral and social guidance to their communities. This reform must then
originate in madrassahs, the institutions responsible for training the next generation of
religious scholars. The next chapter will focus on Pakistan’s madrassahs and the current
limitations that prevent its students from helping Pakistan’s overall development.
23
CHAPTER 2
THE MADRASSAH SCHOOL SYSTEM AND ITS IMPAT ON

INDIVIDUALS AND COMMUNITIES
Since the eleventh-century, madrassahs have provided a venue in which a
country can educate and train its next generation of religious leaders. Despite its
emphasis on religious training, the word madrassah has no religious connotation.
Madrassah translates quite literally as “lesson” or “centre of learning,” suggesting that
since its origin the institution was meant to be an academic institution that inspired
curiosity and study.1 Over time, the term has evolved to describe Islamic seminaries that
educate students from elementary to the university-level about the Quran and the sayings
of the Prophet Muhammad. 2
It is important to note that madrassahs are not a collective entity. Each madrassah
is unique to the area in which it has developed, the leaders that run the school, the
textbooks it utilizes, the amount of funding it receives, and the students that attend.
However, this chapter will provide a collective overview of the madrassahs in Pakistan in
order to show how the school system impacts Pakistan’s security and development.
Emphasis will be placed on the location and makeup of the madrassahs, its five Islamic
boards, past attempted reforms to its curriculum, and the dangers that originate when
madrassahs radicalize its students.
1
2
Riaz, Faithful Education, 2. In Pakistan specifically, madrassahs usually refer to schools that
educate through tenth grade. Higher education is called darul uloom, and the university level is called
jamia. For the purpose of this paper, madrassah will be used to encompass Islamic seminaries for all ages
in order to provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of religious study on Pakistan’s security and
development.
24
The Prevalence of Madrassahs
The number of students enrolled in madrassahs has been widely contested.
Contributing to the difficulty in determining an exact statistic is the lack of a centralized
database monitoring the country’s schools combined with outdated local records. 3 In local
databases, madrassahs that are registered may no longer be in operation, or be a
significantly different population than the one stated in government records.
More to the point, an unknown mass of madrassahs do not register with the
government, making them nearly impossible to oversee. Madrassahs that chose not to
register do not have to report their finances, nor are they obligated to implement the
curriculum recommendations mandated by the three major attempted reforms in the
country’s history. There is no way for the government to hold these schools accountable
for the teachers they hire, the students they admit, or the education the students receive.
A madrassah that chooses not to register is able to create its own individualized
curriculum—unapproved for children by any formal authority—and may put its students
at risk for learning incorrect, bised, or possibly radical information.4
That being said, there are over 15,000 registered madrassahs in Pakistan, and
typically each school hosts about a hundred students.5 An equal number of madrassahs
are thought to be unregistered. Most estimates then count the number of students
3
C. Christine Fair, The Madrassah Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in
Pakistan (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 51.
4
Garman, “Education in Pakistan,” 7.
5
Christopher Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education,” in
Education Reform in Pakistan: Building for the Future, ed. Robert M. Hathaway (Washington,
25
enrolled in madrassahs as two to three million students. This is a huge increase from the
time of Pakistan’s independence when the state had only 137 madrassahs.6 Despite the
fast growth of these schools, the number of madrassahs still lags far behind the portion
of Pakistan’s youth educated in its government and private schools, which are estimated
to cover 73 percent and 26 percent of students, respectively.7
The small population of madrassahs does not negate its impact on Pakistan’s
security and development. If madrassah students are indoctrinated with an exclusionary
worldview while studying in a pro-military culture, these graduates will be more likely
to contribute to social unrest than graduates from the more moderate school systems.
Further, it is a security risk to have radicalized religious scholars influencing government
officials, indoctrinating the next generation, or becoming so frustrated by their
impoverished state that they are susceptible to recruitment into terrorist or criminal
organizations.
Madrassahs’ Study Body
A common stereotype of madrassahs is that they host only poor students living in
rural areas. Indeed, the largest portion of students—over 43 percent—come from the
poorest households which make annual incomes of less than $865.8 However, this single
statistic doesn’t reflect the full picture of enrollment in the Islamic seminaries. In reality,
12 percent of students come from the wealthiest households, and 27 percent from
6
7
Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, 29.
8
Ibid., 30.
26
households considered well-off, so even families that can afford what is widely
considered better education still elect to send at least one of their children to a
madrassah.
In fact, only 27 percent of households send all their children to madrassahs. Over
half have at least one child in government school and 28 percent have a child enrolled in
private school.9 While some parents elect to send children to madrassahs because they
can only afford so many tuitions, some deliberately send children to madrassash so that
the family will have at least one religious scholar. The perceived benefit of this is that, in
addition to ensuring their child will be a good Muslim, some believe becoming an
Islamic scholar protects both the scholar and the scholar’s family. This assumption is
based in a quote within the Quran stating that if a student reaches the hafiz level of
religious study, on judgment day he will be welcomed into heaven and can “take ten
people with him” and that his parents “will have crowns on their head on the judgment
day.”10 Families who subscribe to this belief may elect to send one child to a madrassah,
even though they could afford private school tuition.
Madrassahs are widely believed to exist only in the rural areas of Pakistan, where
education options for lower-class families are extremely limited. Though enrollment is more
prevalent in rural areas, there are many madrassahs in Pakistan’s major cities, including its
capital Islamabad, which is considered its most developed city. While the madrassahs have a
smaller presence in Islamabad than government and private schools,
9
Ibid., 33-34.
10
Bano, The Rational Believer, 105.
27
they are built alongside mosques, whose prime commercial location gives them
power and influence in the region.11
The madrassahs that frequent Islamabad are almost exclusively boarding schools,
so that students who live far away from the city can still attend.12 Most students board at
city madrassahs, and, as a result, the vast majority their students spend all their time at
the madrassah they attend. This gives their school immense influence over students’
behaviors and attitudes during their formative years, making it even more critical students
are taught a tolerant and modernized worldview.
Sects of Islam and their Madrassahs
Within Islam, there is an ongoing debate between the nations’ orthodox and
moderate groups about the true form of Islam and whether a nation can adhere to
their interpretation of faith while also cultivating a modern economy that will
stimulate the nation’s development.
The debate is not, however, between only moderates and orthodox. There are
numerous veins of Islam operating within Pakistan. Most prominent are the differences
between the two main sects of Islam: Sunnis and Shias. These two religious communities
differ most significantly over whom they believe was the rightful successor of the
Prophet Mohammad. The Shias believe Muhammad should have been succeeded by his
11
12
Ibid., 59.
28
nephew and son-in-law Ali Ibn-e-Abi Talib, while the Sunnis accept the authority and
succession of the first three caliphs (Islamic rulers) following the death of Muhammad.13
Be they Sunni or Shia, most madrassashs associate with one of five educational
boards, or wifaqs, which oversee madrassahs in their respective faith.14 The wifaqs are
responsible for creating a curriculum, administering examinations, issuing graduation
certificates, and overseeing some financial aspects of their madrassahs. Of those schools
registered with the five boards, the vast majority are Deobandi (70 percent). Barelvi
represents the next largest sect, followed by Jamaat-i-Islami, Ahl-i-Hadith, and Shia. The
most divisive conflict in Pakistan right now is between these various interpretations of
Islam, and, as an extension, how Pakistan as a state should practice its founding religion.
The battleground for this ongoing debate is in the country’s religious schools, and the
five branches on the madrassah board seek to ingrain in their students a deep allegiance
to their respective faiths. Often, a consequence is students becoming increasingly
intolerant of other religious sects, and this discrimination continues to divide Pakistan’s
Islamic identity.
The Deobandis are the largest group of madrassahs in Pakistan, and also the
most militant. The school of thought was created as an alternate to existing beliefs, and,
as such, defined itself in opposition of both Shia and Sunni groups.15 Their mission is to
13
Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 9, accessed February 17, 2014, http://csis.org/files/
publication/120709_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf.
14
Candland, “Pakistan’s Recent Experience in Reforming Islamic Education,” 154.
15
Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 11, accessed February 17, 2014, http://csis.org/files/
29
have Pakistan practice the strict interpretation of Islam they follow. Their schools are
known to teach antiquated concepts like that the sun revolves around the earth; they also
emphasize to their students the necessity in memorizing the entire Quran.16 In the 1990s,
several Deobandi madrassahs were known to educate Taliban leaders, and were also
accused of providing aid to Taliban operating in Afghanistan.17 While it is certainly
troubling that the largest population of madrassahs is overseen by the most militant
wifaq, some Deobandi schools are considered the most elite in the country.
The Barelvis are another Sunni sub-sect. They have the largest number of
followers, though fewer mosques and madrassahs than Deoband’s. Barelvi groups also
have a historically tense relationship with the Deobandis; especially in Karachi there
has been sectarian violence between the two groups due to the intent of both to expand
the scope of control over the city’s mosques.18 That being said, Barelvis are generally
considered a more moderate branch. Radical action by this group has been directed
mostly in response to the Deobands, rather than against the Shia communities.
The Ahl-e-Hadith sub-sect is considered the most puritanical of the religious
groups in Pakistan.19 They believe present-day Islam should closely imitate Islam as it
was practiced during the time of the Prophet. Because of this, this sect is often associated
with Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi beliefs. Its strict interpretation of Islam prompted this
16
17
18
19
30
group to appeal mostly to those well off enough abide by its rigid faith, and its
preference for quality over quantity has limited its growth.20 Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a
political party accused of plotting and executing the 2008 attacks in Mumbia, belongs to
the Ahl-e-Hadith group.21 LeT oversees many madrassahs, and these schools would
typically be expected to teach anti-India propaganda that is central to LeT’s mission of
claiming all Muslim land.
The last Sunni board is the Jamaat-i-Islami, who, since independence, has
worked closely with the state.22 These madrassahs tend to incorporate politics and
history courses into their curriculum, and produce scholars who are hyper-critical of
Western practices. They also control numerous militant groups who operate in Kashmir,
and, like the Deobandis, are thought to have ties with al Qaeda.
Shias are the minority group, though at 20 percent of Pakistan’s population they
represent the second-largest Shia population in the world.23 Despite their minority status,
Shias have maintained control over a significant portion of central and Southern Punjab,
as well as regions of the Sindh province.24 Their madrassahs have historically sustained
direct funding lines with the Iranian government, which has led to sources of tension
between the Shias and Sunni Pakistani government. Domestic terrorism in Pakistan can
20
Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 12, accessed February 17, 2014,
http://csis.org/files/ publication/120709_Mufti_ReligionMilitancy_Web.pdf.
21
22
23
24
Ibid., 38.
31
usually be attributed to the ongoing tension between Sunni and Shia, though following
the elimination of most of its militant groups by the government or anti-Shia groups,
Shia political groups have limited influence.25
Whatever the branch of faith a Pakistani practices, their faith is a central
component of their daily life. Especially since most Pakistanis have very limited
affiliation with the state, they turn to their religious sect for a sense of community and a
source of identity. In practice, this loyalty to a particular sect can end up highlighting the
differences between the sects, rather than uniting all groups under the umbrella of Islam.
The clash between these sects is seen in many day-to-day functions of
madrassahs. For example, when hiring teachers, madrassahs will only hire graduates
from their respective board of Islam. Additionally, a lot of madrassahs have started to
incorporate in their curriculum a subject dedicated to defending their branch of Islam
against the other boards.26 Radd (refutation) also teaches students to counter arguments
of Western notions, and has been considered by many yet another factor contributing to
the growing sectarianism in Pakistan.
Despite the links between some madrassah boards and religious extremists, it is
important to note that the majority of madrassahs exist exclusively to provide religious
instruction to their students. Only a small minority of these schools have ulterior motives
of radicalizing their students for political gain. In a country like Pakistan that struggles to
provide social services for its people, madrassahs have helped many communities by
25
26
Ibid., 56.
32
feeding and boarding the region’s youth, and providing them with a means to
education that they might not otherwise have been able to afford. The madrassahs also
provide students with a venue to attain social standing, especially since religious
expertise is a respectable way students can develop an identity and generate respect
within their community.
Past Madrassah Reform
The 1962 Reforms
Since its inception, Pakistan has tried three times to undertake major renovations
in the madrassah school system. The first reforms occurred in 1962 under General Ayub
Khan. In 1961, a committee was formed to analyze the current curriculum and make
recommendations concerning how best to reform the system so that graduates would be
more employable. The resulting report was released in 1962. Notable alterations
included: introducing courses like mathematics into the curriculum, instructing in Urdu at
the primary levels and Arabic and/or English at the higher levels of study, and testing
graduates in five exams including Euclidean mathematics.27
The second part of the reform strategy was to control the level of funding
madrassahs received. Khan sought to strengthen the role of state institutions at the
expense of traditional community leaders like the ulama, who he thought opposed his
regime and thus limited his power. One way he limited religious scholars’ influence was
to restrict who could fund madrassahs.28
27
Riaz, Faithful Education, 194-195.
28
Ibid., 191.
33
The funding portion of reform was moderately successful, but the recommended
changes to the curriculum exposed a core conflict that would derail the 1962 reforms and
all the reforms that followed. To alter the madrassah curriculum meant, in a way,
reforming the nation's practice of Islam, which is sacred to the vast majority of
Pakistanis. Since madrassahs produce the next generation of religious scholars,
government changes to the schools that contradicted what the ulamas viewed as
instrumental in training their successors had social implications far beyond making
modifications to a curriculum. Many disagreed with the government's interpretation of
Islam, and, as a result, rejected the proposals of the 1962 report.29
The 1979 Reforms
The second round of attempted reforms occurred in 1979 under the regime of
General Zia-ul Huq, and were far more extensive than the 1962 reforms. As previously
noted, Zia was responsible for the Islamization of Pakistan. Under his regime, the nation
became far more sectarian and Islam infiltrated more aspects of life than it had under
past rulers. Unsurprisingly, Zia was very interested in the country's madrassahs.
The reason for the 1979 reform was almost identical to the one in 1962: the
madrassahs were failing to provide adequately employment opportunities outside of the
religious sect, and thus it was decided the system should undergo modernization. The
recommendations were very similar, as well—again reinforcing the necessity of
29
Ibid., 196.
34
introducing more modern subjects into the curriculum, including:
. . . Urdu, arithmetic, and general science at the primary level; English, general
mathematics, and Pakistan studies at the secondary levels; political science,
political economy, and English as optional subjects at the baccalaureate and
master’s level; and comparative religious sciences as a mandatory subject at the
master’s level. The committee proposed an autonomous National Institute of
Madrassahs to compile and revise madrassah curricula, supervise these
institutions, administer standardized tests, and award diplomas to the students.
The proposed national institute, the committee recommended, was to have an
equal number of members from all four subsects within the madrasah education
system, and representatives from the government.30
The Report of 1979 sought to create a curriculum that all the different sects of
Islam would accept. That being said, the boards ultimately saw the compromise of their
beliefs as a loss, because their students would no longer be ideal representatives of
their branch after being taught a hybrid faith. 31
Though the results of the 1962 and 1979 reports were similar, there was a
significant difference in the composition of the 1979 committee that authored the later
report. This committee included numerous ulamas, who worked alongside government
officials in constructing the proposed reform. The 1962 committee, however, did not
include ulamas nor did it consult with them about which reforms they would support. As
a result, the ulamas were originally more open to the 1979 report, as they felt they had
significant input in the process. However, while they were invited to participate in the
committee, they were not a majority voice on the committee and the committee was led
by a government official, so some ulamas still resented the government's authority in
30
Ibid., 199.
31
Muhammad Qasim Zaman, “Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrassahs
in British India and Pakistan,” in Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Magnus
Marsden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 95.
35
dictating the final report.32 It didn’t take long after the release of the report for many
ulamas to issue reservations about the proposed reforms; others boycotted it completely.
The 1979 reforms occurred at the same time as the Iranian Revolution and the
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The fact that Iran’s mullahs were successful in
overthrowing the Iranian shah, and thus inserting religious figures in powerful political
roles in a nearby country, convinced many Pakistani madrassahs that their schools did
not need to modernize to be influential in the region.33 Many completely disregarded
implementing the reforms, convinced, more than ever, that religious education was more
important to Pakistan than the curriculum endorsed in the 1979 reforms. Such
tumultuous regional events had a profound impact on Pakistan, and complicated the
madrassah reform process greatly. In fact, these events led to the expansion of a more
extreme curriculum in madrassah, making the schools more threatening to development
just as the state sought to reform them.
During this time Pakistan became the battleground for an international Sunni
versus Shia war. Iran was helping the country's Shias generate support, while countries
like Saudi Arabia were funding Sunni militant groups, often through madrassahs. In
competition for the funding being offered by Saudi Arabia, some schools attempted to
increase their focus on Wahhabism to ensure they would receive more funding than other
madrassahs.34 Slowly, schools evolved from being primarily intellectual and religious
32
33
Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, xii.
34
Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan,” 337.
36
institutions to political ones, as more students became involved in the religious
revolutions occurring outside their borders.
The Iranian Revolution served as a huge inspiration to Pakistan’s minority Shia
population, who, seeing the successful Shia revolution in Iran, grew emboldened in their
aspiration for political power. The number of Shias in the country began to increase, as
many moderates in the country shifted their allegiance to Shia due to its opposition to
Zia’s aggressive Islamization campaign.35 Zia, a Sunni, saw the rise in Shia activism as
a threat to his regime, especially following the 5 July 1980 demonstration in Islamabad
where 25,000 Shias violently protested the zakat36 law put in place as part of Zia’s
Islamization campaign.37
The zakat funds allowed the government to increase funding to schools like
madrassahs since they often cater to the underprivileged. In 1984 alone over nine
percent of the zakat fund was distributed to 2,273 madrassahs.38 Zia's hope was that
through these donations the madrassahs would become dependent on the state for their
finances and, upon graduation, employment. While some madrassahs eagerly accepted
the contributions to their struggling schools, other resented the government oversight
and the obligations to the Zia regime that accompanied the zakat funds. They no longer
wanted to be dependent on the government for what they viewed as bribes to expand
35
Ibid., 341.
36
Ali, Islam and Education, 100-101. Zakat is a religious tax that Muslims are obligated to pay at
the rate of at least 2.5 percent of their savings. The money is automatically deducted from Muslims’ banks
and governments are mandated to distribute collected zakat to people and services in need.
37
38
Ibid., 332.
37
government oversight of religious schools. The reliance on zakat funds, others believed,
had caused voluntary contributions to madrassahs to sharply decline, resulting in an
overall loss of income for schools.39 The Shias decided to actively reject the zakat funds,
which they believed were contradictory to their faith. Despite wanting to limit the Shia’s
influence, Zia had to relent to the 1980 protests of the Shia, as they effectively shut down
Pakistan’s capital city.
The victory of being exempt from paying zakat to the government inspired many
independents in the country to declare themselves Shias. In retribution, Zia funneled
more zakat funds into the nation’s Sunni-controlled madrassahs. The madrassahs
became a venue in which Zia could resist the Shia influence, and thus these madrassahs
became increasingly anti-Shia. Since Zia actively encouraged this behavior in order to
resist the rise in Shias, it is no wonder that the school system became a place in which
students grew intolerant of Shias, which led to a more sectarian and aggressive society.
For the short-term goal of limiting Shia influence, Zia created a school system that,
even today, remains entrenched in perpetuating an exclusionary worldview, rather than
an accepting and tolerant environment for students.
As previously reported, Zia, in an attempt to recruit the support of the nation’s
ulamas, decided some madrassah degrees would be considered equal to degrees from
government schools. This movement correlated to the 1979 reforms, for though Zia
wanted to increase employability for madrassah graduates, he wanted to make sure that
as professionals the graduates had skills useful in the workplace.
39
Ibid., 339.
38
Under the assumption they could study Islam and still graduate qualified to work
in the government, the number of madrassah graduates skyrocketed. Between 1960 and
1980, over 5,000 ulamas had been trained; following the equivalency certificates in 1981-
1985, over 6,000 ulamas graduated—that’s 1,000 more graduates in a quarter of the
time.40
Though this initiative was intended to provide madrassah graduates with more
authority, many new ulama graduates became less interested in the traditional study of
Islam, and more concentrated on religious ideology as a means to influence the
government. As such, some opened their own madrassahs so that they could funnel more
graduates into the government or increasingly powerful political parties.41
In the late 1980s, the country began its “decade of democracy.” However, rather
than economic prosperity and social equality, the decade produced poorer economic
conditions and economic stagnation. The recession reduced employment opportunities,
and many madrassah graduates who assumed they would secure a job within the
government went unemployed. The curriculum many of the new madrassahs
implemented left their students unqualified to beat out top students from government or
private schools for the few positions available in the government, and it also left them
unqualified for traditional ulama positions, which they theoretically could have secured if
they had followed traditional madrassah curricula. Rather than making students qualified
40
S.V.R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and
the Ulama in Society in Politics” in Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives, ed.
Magnus Marsden (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 333.
41
Ibid., 334.
39
for both religious and government work, the 1979 reforms had made students unqualified
for either.
With no opportunities in government or in religious posts, many new madrassah
graduates focused their efforts on pursing their political agendas.42 They abandoned
established political parties to form more extreme, militant ones. They also opened their
own, more ideologically-minded madrassahs at an accelerated rate, thanks in part to the
increase in zakat funds given to some madrassahs. While the more established
madrassahs largely maintained their traditional curriculums, the madrassahs that were
built during this time—especially those close to Afghanistan—were overseen by low-
ranking ulama who replaced traditional curricula with those that endorsed militarization.
The goal of these madrassahs was to train students to become political activists, which
they saw as more influential than a traditional ulama.
Post September 11th, it is clear how this radical momentum leading into the 1990s
produced in Pakistan an environment similar to that in Afghanistan which provided Osama
bin Laden protection and opportunity in planning the September 11th attacks.
The 2001 Reforms
The most recent reforms occurred in 2001 and were overseen by General Pervez
Musharraf, who wanted to reenergize madrassah reforms that had largely fell to the
wayside during the Cold War.
In his first speech as president, Musharraf addressed the sectarian dimensions in
Pakistan directly when he said, “I have great respect for the Ulama and expect them to
42
Ibid., 336.
40
come forth and present Islam in its true light. I urge them to curb elements which are
exploiting religion for vested interests and bringing a bad name to our faith.”43 This
speech occurred in October 1999, indicating Pakistan’s government was aware of the
dangers of extremism in the nation’s schools two years before the September 11th
terrorist attacks.
On 18 August 2001, the government passed the Pakistan Madrassah Education
(Establishment and Affiliation of Model Deeni Madrassahs) Board Ordinance 2001—
less than a month before al Qaeda used planes as bombs in the most destructive terrorist
attack on the United States to date. 44 The ordinance encouraged madrassahs to introduce
subjects like Mathematics, Computer Science, and Economics into their curriculums.
This shows Pakistan was already aware of the dangers its madrassahs could pose on its
security, and was attempting to make necessary changes before the Western world turned
its attentions to education in Pakistan as a national security matter.
Following September 11th, there was a surge of attention and funding directed
towards Pakistan and its schools. The 2001 ordinance proposed before September 11th
quickly expanded in its scope and objectives. The most significant change of this reform
was to demand all madrassahs to register with the Pakistan Madrassah Education
Board, and that failure to do so would result in heavy fines or the school’s closure.45
Another measure sought to eliminate all foreign donations to madrassahs. As previously
43
44
45
Ibid., 202.
41
mentioned, many madrassahs received large contributions from nations like Saudi
Arabia, and then were susceptible to their version of Islam. While in its past reforms,
Pakistan sought to address funding for madrassahs, the need for more dramatic action
became apparent following September 11th, especially since so many of the hijackers
were raised and educated in Saudi Arabia.
The results of the 2001 reforms are still largely unknown. Students who entered
the system in 2001 are still in school or else recent graduates, so it will be a couple of
years before the consequences of the reforms are realized. However, the consensus is
that, like the 1962 and 1979 reform, progress has been limited.46 To increase the low
impacts of the 2001 reforms, Pakistan has already introduced a revised national
curriculum in 2006 that attempted to remedy long-understood concerns of the
curricula.47 The new curriculum endorsed creative thinking and critical thinking skills, a
much needed change from madrassahs’ tendency to enforce memorization instead of
analysis. Despite the hope surrounding the additional 2006 curriculum, implementation
was delayed over seven years, and the 2013-2014 academic year will be the first with
new textbooks.
In the meantime, in 2009, Pakistan issued a new National Education Policy that
sought to increase the state’s investment in education from two percent of its GDP to
46
Ibid., 208.
47
Madiha Afzal, “The Education-Militancy Connection,” Brookings Institution, August 5, 2013,
accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/05-education-
militancy-pakistan-afzal.
42
seven percent.48 This demonstrates an acknowledgement on behalf of Pakistan that it
needs to invest far more in its education system so that schools become a place that
moderate rather than exacerbate students’ radical behavior and intolerant worldviews.
That being said, in 2012 Pakistan spent just 2.1 percent of its GDP on education—
showing it still has far to go before reaching the intended seven percent. This does little
to convince the population of Pakistan that its government is committed to increasing
employment opportunities for the population, which may increase communities’
grievances towards the state.
Review of the Reforms’ Success
Many studies have been conducted to test the attitudes and behaviors of
madrassah students in comparison to their government and private school counterparts.
One recent study found students who attend madrassahs are significantly more likely to
exhibit pro-military tendencies than their school-age equivalents in government schools.
In a survey that asked whether Pakistan should fight a war with India for control of
Kashmir, 64 percent of students taught in English replied “no”. This percentage went
down slightly for those educated in Urdu, with 59 percent disapproving of an open war
with neighboring India. However, 59 percent of students in madrassahs surveyed
favored military intervention.49
48
accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2010/
6/pakistan%20education%20winthrop/06_pakistan_education_winthrop.pdf.
49
43
The study also revealed a higher level of intolerance in madrassah schools than in
government schools. When asked whether members of the Ahmadiyya sect should be
shown tolerance in the work place, 82 percent of madrassah students said “no” while 46
percent of Urdu-language schools and 65 percent of English-speaking schools thought
tolerance should be shown. Madrassah students exposed similar levels of intolerance for
women equality. This study thus revealed a contrast in attitudes both between madrassah
and government students, and between government schools that instruct in Urdu versus
English. In all examples, madrassah students proved to be more pro-military and more
intolerant than the other school surveyed. These results suggests madrassah students
would be more likely to resist movements that seek greater social cohesion, and that they
would be more prone to favor military intervention in situations where two religious sects
conflicted. This is discouraging given the influence madrassah students will eventually
have in providing moral and religious guidance to the students of government schools.
As it currently stands, these future religious scholars appear poised to promote
intolerance rather than peace and diplomacy.
If the above is true, madrassahs are, in some ways, producing students more
ignorant than when they arrived—which is directly counter to the purpose of education.
In his book on madrassahs in Pakistan, Ali Riaz stated:
Education, as the etymology of the word suggests, is to lead someone away from
ignorance, a passage from nature to culture, and therefore is a cultural program
rather than a conceptual tool in understanding the process of learning. Not so
clearly implicit is this meaning of education are two related issues: knowledge
and power, and Michael Foucault reminded us that knowledge is one of the
manifestations of the presence of power. Thus modes of the selection,
classification, distribution, transmission, and evaluation of educational knowledge
in a society are manifestations of power relationships within that society and
44
means of social control. Control over knowledge goes further: it provides an
unchallenged legitimation for certain hegemonic versions of truth, and it allows
the presentation of specific forms of consciousness, beliefs, attitudes, values,
and practices as natural, universal, or even eternal.50
The “control over knowledge” statement is particularly noteworthy in Pakistan,
seeing as all three of Pakistan’s reforms were instituted by military rulers. As previously
stated, there was a delicate balance Pakistan's military regimes sought to maintain
between trying to appease the nation's religious scholars in order to maintain support of
the larger public—who connect religion with their national identity—and implementing
their own agenda even if it contradicted the wishes of the ulama. Perhaps the best
example of this can be seen in their attempted madrassah reforms. Each general was
driven by the hope of improving education for Pakistan's youth, but was also interested
in limiting the power of the religious elite, which, especially in 1962 and 1979, prompted
the ulamas to reject the proposed reforms. Without the support of the scholars who
would have to implement the reforms in their schools, the reforms had little chance of
success.
The three reports also expose the inconsistencies in Pakistan surrounding an ideal
religious studies curriculum. The ulamas believe madrassahs exist exclusively to educate
their students on the purest form of Islam, as they interpret it to be. Even after September
11th, some ulama oppose introducing non-religious subjects, as such subjects are seen as
mere distractions from providing students a full-time religious curriculum that will
produce influential religious scholars. Changes to the curriculum, some argue, will
change a system that is already functional, given the number of influential religious
50
45
scholars it has produced that have benefitted their local communities. Others question the
logic in limiting a students’ career path—from a very early age—to the religious sect, and
whether the curriculum should be expanded to teach more modern concepts that can not
be learned in the Quran.
This core issue of madrassah reform brings up a central issue in the nation's
political and social structure: who should be in charge of reforming schools? Though
most Pakistanis identify more with their community than with national identity,
Pakistan's government is ultimately responsible for its people's well-being. If the state
feels strongly that the madrassahs are limiting the development of the students who
attend, and, as a result, it is hurting the development of the country at large, should they
have the authority to make changes that would expand job prospects for these
students? Or, is it the right of the student and their families, assuming they have a choice
in school venue, to decide religious training is more important than more secular
opportunities in the future?
Radicalization in Madrassahs
Since September 11th, Western governments have pegged madrassahs as
“incubators for violent extremism.”51 This suspicion is not completely without merit; in
fact, many of the senior Taliban leaders were educated in the madrassahs of Pakistan.
Further, on an international level, one British national who is thought to have trained in a
Pakistani madrassah helped execute the 2005 London subway terrorist bombings.52
51
Kean et al., The 9/11 Report, 367.
52
46
Although the vast majority of madrassahs exist solely for religious instruction, there have
been several instances of schools that indoctrinate their students with anti-Western, pro-
Islamic fundamentalist messages, which puts the students at risk for seeking out or being
recruited into terrorist groups. It is these schools that present the largest risk to Pakistan’s
security.
Even functioning madrassahs are at risk for radicalization. Perhaps the most
famous example of this occurred in 2007 at the Red Mosque in Pakistan’s capital
Islamabad. For 25 years, the Red Mosque had peacefully carried out its usual religious
functions, preaching its sermons to local families, traders and even some government
officials who worked blocks away from the mosque.53 Families within Islamabad sent
many children to the Red Mosque for religious education. Its female madrassah school
had over 3,000 students, and was considered the most prestigious of the Deobandi
schools.54
The Ghazi brothers who led the mosque—Maulana Abdul Aziz and Maulana Abdul
Rashid—both had a devoutly religious upbringing, and became further radicalized after the
assassination of their father in 1998.55 Maulana Abdul Rashid in particular was effective in
inciting religious fervor due to his passionate speeches on moral reform.
Under the leadership of these brothers, over time the curriculum of the Red
Mosque became more radicalized, and its students became more proactive in spreading
53
Bano, The Rational Believer, 1-2.
54
Ibid., 184.
55
47
their new beliefs outside of the madrassah. Capitalizing on their students increasing
fervor, the Red Mosque’s leaders encouraged the girls to organize an armed revolt
to impose sharia law.
Despite the proximity of the mosque to government and military sites, the protests
were initially ignored by Pakistan, and, as a result, the students grew increasingly bold in
their tactics. Within months, the community surrounding the madrassah had spiraled into
chaos: the students burned Western products, staged violent protests, and even tortured an
alleged brothel-owner. Still, the state remained passive, and even the governing board of
madrassahs resisted weighing in on the matter until the school became so violent that
they decided to expel it from their board. After seven months of increasingly violent
protest, the state finally intervened in July 2007. In the resulting standoff, over a hundred
students and officers lost their lives.
It is important to note that the Red Mosque revolt was not universally condemned;
on the contrary, there were many sympathizers within Pakistan who publicly came out in
support of the leadership of the Red Mosque.56 Shortly after the revolt, another
madrassah-based armed resistance movement emerged in the Swat Valley, the same
place Malala Yousafzai would be shot less than a decade later. This indicates that there is
some level of support or at least tolerance in some areas of Pakistan for youths acting out
violently allegedly in the name of Islam.
To be sure, the vast majority of madrassahs are peaceful and studious centers
that have never committed acts of terrors. Numerous studies fail to prove a correlation
56
48
between education and terrorism, and, in fact, terrorist organizations—especially
sophisticated ones like al Qaeda—are usually comprised of well-educated individuals.57
However, cases like the Red Mosque show how a prestigious educational center can spiral
into violence under the direction of radical ulama in a short period of time. As such, these
institutions must, at minimum, be closely monitored, and, ideally, be further modernized to
protect communities from revolts like the one Islamabad endured in 2007.
Conclusion
The extremist behavior exhibited during the Red Mosque—of young girls
barricading themselves in their madrassah knowing they would likely die during the
protest—shows the influence and danger schools can inflict on their students and their
communities. Pakistan must prioritize future effort to ensure such incidences are the
exception, rather than the norm. The following chapter will highlight some of the largest
security threats impacting Pakistan, and why such threats limit development of the
country’s madrassahs.
57
Fair, The Madrassah Challenge, 5. Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey examined the background
of seventy-nine terrorists involved in large-scale attacks like 9/11, the 1993 World Trade Center bombing,
and the London bombings in July 2005. They found little to no involvement of terrorists with madrassah
backgrounds, and also noted the masterminds behind these attacks all had obtained university degrees.
49
CHAPTER 3
Pakistan is facing its most serious security crisis in years, with mounting tension
between its government, the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI); a
struggling economy; a massive youth population; high illiteracy and high unemployment;
a growing nuclear arsenal at the expense of services for the civilian population;
collaboration with powerful extremist organizations; and widespread corruption. These
security threats trickle down to the state’s schools, where there have been several
incidences of attacks on students, teachers, and school communities.
While the Taliban’s attempted assassination of teenager Malala Yousafzai in
2012 received widespread international attention, it was by no means an isolated
incident. In 2007, over a hundred people died at the Red Mosque madrassah following
months of violent protests by radicalized female students. In December 2011, police
located over 30 madrassah students who had been chained in a basement for over month
while the Pakistani Taliban attempted to indoctrinate them so they’d join a violent jihad
in Afghanistan.1 Recently, in January 2014, a teenaged named Aitzaz Hassan tackled a
suicide bomber outside his school so that none of his classmates would be killed.2 There
1
Ambreen Agha, “Pakistan: Education Leading Into Darkness Analysis,” South Asia Terrorism
Portal, October 1, 2012, accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.eurasiareview.com/01102012-pakistan-
education-leading-into-darkness-analysis.
2
Sara C. Nelson, “‘Bomb Hero’ Schoolboy Aitzaz Hassan To Have Pakistani School &
Stadium Named After Him,” Huffington Post, January 15, 2014, accessed February 13, 2014,
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2014/01/15/bomb-hero-schoolboy-aitzaz-hassan-pakistani-school-
stadium-_n_4600439.html.
50
have also been countless schools shut down by extremist groups like the Taliban, and
drone attacks on madrassahs have resulted in the deaths of many students.
Violent acts like these dissuade students from enrolling in school or staying long
enough to be properly educated, which is one of the reasons why Pakistan has been
unsuccessful in increasing school enrollment, and, by extension, its literacy rate. As a
result, its enormous youth population is entering the workforce with little educational or
vocational skills, which ultimately hurts Pakistan’s overall development as it strives to
improve its economic prospects. In extreme cases, graduates with poor career
opportunities join the same extremist groups that made them afraid to attend school in the
first place, creating a vicious cycle that hurts Pakistan’s security and development with
each new generation.
While government and private schools have flawed curricula, no category of
school in Pakistan is as limited in its studies as madrassahs. Pertaining to these religious
seminaries, there are two different, though interrelated, security threats that constrict
Pakistan’s development. First is the outdated and limited nature of most madrassah
curricula that limit students’ ability to pursue non-religious careers in an increasingly
modernized world. The second threat is the perceived link between a minority of
madrassahs and extremist groups, which can lead to violence and instability in the
region.
The first problem impacts the millions of youth educated in madrassahs and hurts
Pakistan’s overall development, but doesn’t pose a direct security threat to communities
surrounding the Islamic seminaries. On the other hand, instances like the Red Mosque
51
protests show the dangers that can occur once madrassahs become radicalized. The
impacts radicalized madrassashs have on the security of Pakistan are more immediately
dangerous and must be explored. This chapter seeks to illuminate the relationship
between madrassahs, security, and development and anticipate how the current security
risks in Pakistan could impact the nation’s future.
Security Threats
Extremist Groups and Sectarian Conflicts
As discussed in previous chapters, Pakistan remains entangled in an ongoing
debate concerning whether the country can modernize while still remaining faithful to
Islamic tradition. The conflicting opinions regarding if—and how—to do this can be
seen in the number of radical groups operating within Pakistan, all of which have
different ideas about how Pakistan should function.
The pervading frustration and hopelessness that is a consequence of widespread
unemployment and poverty often facilitates the rise of such groups, who are able to
thrive in weak states due to the lack of government oversight and the acceptance or
indifference of the local population. Though there are numerous organizations operating
within Pakistan, the most dangerous were divided into five broad categories by scholar
Ashley J. Tellis when testifying before Congress in 2008.3
3
Laub, Zachary, “Meet Pakistan’s Next Gen Terrorists,” DefenseOne, November 19, 2013,
accessed March 14, 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2013/11/meet-pakistans-next-gen-
terrorists/74150/?oref=govexec_today_nl?oref=d-interstitial-continue.
52
The first category is sectarian groups within Pakistan that resort to violence, most
prevalently in the ongoing division between Sunni and Shia faiths. The different
branches of these groups and their impact on the region were outlined in Chapter 2.
There are also Anti-Indian groups whose primary aim is to fight the influence of
neighboring India. These groups are seen as proxies to the Pakistani military and ISI who
oversee foreign intelligence and can not act against the country in an official capacity
without risking another war. Though most of these groups are concentrated on the
Kashmir dispute, LeT has become so powerful in the region they have begun broadening
the scope of their mission to include acts against the West.
The Afghan Taliban, another group, is believed to operate in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), a region of the country that is largely unmonitored
by Pakistan’s government. A group that works closely and sometimes overlaps with the
Afghan Taliban is the Pakistani Taliban, also known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).
The Pakistani Taliban is believed to have planned the 2007 assassination of Benazir
Bhutto in December, indicating their motives are often political. In fact, in 2013 they
declared war against Pakistan, saying the state was “un-Islamic”.4 In addition to their
campaign against the state, the Pakistani Taliban is intent on limiting education within
Pakistan, particularly for females. This goal was part of a larger campaign in the Swat
Valley, led by Mullah Qazi Fazlullah in the late 2000s. Fazlullah and his followers
exploited the low literacy in Swat Valley and the widespread reliance on the radio for
news to recruit loyal followers through a radio broadcast. The overwhelmingly number
4
Ibid.
53
of followers gained from this movement allowed the Taliban to have autonomy over
much of the region. The state and local authorities did not intercede to protect citizens,
even though Fazlullah actively denounced the government as infidels and executed
Pakistani citizens daily for what he perceived as un-Islamic acts. This pervasive chaos
culminated in their attempted assassination of Malala Yousafzai.
A large number of the militants in the Pakistani Taliban were educated in
Deobandi madrassahs, and the group still works closely with madrassahs that share the
goal of establishing an Islamic state in Pakistan based in sharia law.5 The TTPs have a
student movement and excel at exploiting local grievances for collective unity. In such
cases, students are recruited from the Deobandi madrassahs at which many in TTP
studied.
The final major group is al Qaeda. Pakistan’s largely unmonitored FATA region
allowed al Qaeda to form bases within Pakistan, where many sought refused after the
United States’ occupation of Afghanistan in 2001. This is one of the reasons many
within and outside Pakistan had doubts that no one in the country knew about Osama bin
Laden’s compound in Abbottabad.
These five types of organizations tend to operate on a local level, which means
they understand and are able to exploit local grievances and sectarianism. To reiterate an
earlier point, Pakistanis tend to identify more with their communities than with their
state, so these groups can be perceived a more legitimate and direct source of authority
5
Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 42-43, accessed February 17, 2014, http://csis.org/files/
54
than the officials leaders of nation. This has allowed these groups to expand their power
with little fear of retribution from the state. Such boldness has led to an increase of
violence in Pakistan, with groups justifying their attacks as jihad. In 2011, for example,
there were 139 sectarian attacks resulting in 397 deaths. 6 The number of sectarian
attacks increased 53 percent in 2012, resulting in the death of 563 people. These
casualties can initiate more grievances, and more deeply ingrained sectarianism.
Some of these groups aspire to execute attacks on Western nations, and some
have already trained militants to fulfill these aims. For example, in 2010 Faisal Shahzad
attempted to ignite a bomb in Times Square, New York. Investigations into this
attempted attack revealed that Shahzad, a United States citizen, was trained in Pakistan.7
Shahzad had prayed at the Red Mosque and was affected by the military intervention in
the madrassah students’ protests. Wanting to avenge this perceived grievance, Shahzad
radicalized through online sites before traveling to Pakistan for bomb training. If
Shahzad was able to travel from the United States to Pakistan and receive training from
a terrorist group, it is reasonable to assume many within Pakistan can also connect with
groups to receive similar training, assuming they have they have the ambition and the
necessary contacts.
6
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Trends in Militancy across South Asia: A
Region on the Brink (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2013), 8, accessed February 17,
2014, http://csis.org/files/publication/130408_Sanderson_TrendsMilitancySouthAsia_Web.pdf.
7
Stephen Tankel, “Terrorism Out of Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
May 27, 2010, accessed February 12, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/05/27/terrorism-out-
of-pakistan/3jsj.
55
A minority of students who attend madrassahs are thought to have such contacts.
Most estimates suggest that approximately 15 percent of madrassahs have some sort of
affiliation with extremist groups, though it’s difficult to know for sure, since the exact
number of madrassahs remains unknown.8 Given the higher concentration of madrassahs in
rural areas and the lack of government oversight in these regions, it is schools located in
remote regions that are regarded as more susceptible to radicalization. However, the Red
Mosque raid shows that radicalization could also occur in Pakistan’s most developed city
blocks away from its parliament building.
Even if madrassah students don’t later join extremist groups, they may still carry
with them the exclusionary worldview acquired by many during their religious studies.
These students may be intolerant of those with different backgrounds, which would
make it difficult for them to thrive in a modernized, more diverse society.
The practice of jihad
Within Islam, there is a belief that one of the duties of being a true Muslim requires
the practice of jihad, which translates to “striving for a worthy and ennobling cause”.9
However, the interpretation and application of this term has been widely contested, due to its
past manipulation by some terrorist groups in order to convince their followers to execute
decidedly anti-Islamic acts, including September 11th. The violent
8
P.W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad,” Brookings
Institution, November 1, 2001, accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/ media/research/
files/papers/2001/11/pakistan%20singer/20020103.pdf.
9
Mariam Mufti, Religion and Militancy in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2012), 10, accessed February 17, 2014, http://csis.org/files/
56
expression of jihad significantly increased during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
in the 1980s when the government of Pakistan endorsed fighting against the Soviet
influence in Afghanistan as a holy war for Islam. Once the Soviets retreated from
Afghanistan, Kashmir became the more prominent battleground to practice jihad.
Some groups argue that jihad is a physical struggle to combat any non-
believers.10 Under this logic, violent crimes are permitted and even celebrated for
achieving the ultimate goal of being a true Muslim—despite the lack of consensus at the
strategic level over how to achieve this goal.
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the more moderate interpretation of
jihad as an internal struggle to practice Islam in all aspects of life. These Muslims reject
violent crimes as anti-Islamic and a false interpretation of jihad.
The conflict concerning this Islamic duty is another example of the larger
argument occurring in Pakistan and beyond concerning how to interpret and practice
Islam in a modern world. How students are taught to interpret jihad in madrassahs will
influence how they approach this religious duty throughout their life. Students taught to
associate jihad as a physical act will likely emerge from school with a more militarized
perception of this religious obligation. Alternatively, students taught to disassociate jihad
with violence will be less likely to reconcile hurting others with being a true Muslim.
Incompetence of the government, ISI, and military
Pakistan’s security limitations date back to its independence when millions
were killed trying to immigrate into Pakistan, but perhaps the most glaring example of
10
57
Pakistan’s incompetence in securing its nation occurred in May 2011. This was when it
was revealed to the world that Osama bin Laden, the most wanted terrorist in the world,
had been living in a major military city and went undetected by Pakistan until the United
States executed a raid of his compound that, until its conclusion, also went undetected by
Pakistan. Missing the opportunity to capture the world’s most wanted man in the six
years he resided in Abbottabad became Pakistan's greatest humiliation since its 1971
partition.11
Despite the huge investments Pakistan has made in its military arsenal following
September 11th, bin Laden’s compound exposed Pakistan’s inability to track major
terrorists in both its rural regions and its most developed cities—or else revealed the
country was aware of bin Laden’s residence, but was complicit in protecting him from
discovery. While the former is a problem that can eventually be improved through
continued training and counterterrorism aid, the latter would be much more detrimental
to Pakistan’s long term security. If the ISI or army were aware of bin Laden’s location
and deliberately kept it hidden, it suggests senior officials are more closely aligned with
al Qaeda than with the Western nations that invested billions in Pakistan following
September 11th.
It doesn’t help Pakistan’s case that it historically has supported some extremist
groups that publicly supported bin Laden’s mission. Pakistan was one of the few
countries to acknowledge the Taliban as a legitimate government in Afghanistan. The
11
Stephen Tankel, “Unpacking the Abbotabad Commission Report,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, July 16, 2013, accessed February 5, 2014, http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/
07/16/unpacking-abbotabad-commission-report/gfsr.
58
Taliban, in turn, supported al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan, where Osama bin Laden
maintained a base for al Qaeda’s recruitment and training. Given Pakistan’s support of
the Taliban and its proximity to Afghanistan, bin Laden considered Pakistan a source for
potential recruits.12 In outlining bin Laden’s strong alliance with Pakistan before
September 11th, Stephen Philip Cohen stated:
[Osama bin Laden] maintained close ties with the Pakistan army and intelligence,
had equally close ties with the ulema and religious parties, established training
camps in Afghanistan for Pakistani citizens who were fighting in both
Afghanistan and Kashmir—as well as Islamic causes elsewhere—and cultivated
the Pakistani press, and through it Pakistani public opinion. Osama was portrayed
as an Islamic Robin Hood, a man of faith and action, and even Western-oriented
Pakistani opinion was open to such an appeal. When American attacks on al
Qaeda bases in 1998 killed a number of Pakistanis training in Afghanistan and in
a few cases in Pakistani territory itself, many educated Pakistanis, as well as the
Islamists, thought Osama was justified in defying an anti-Islamic America.13
Even after September 11th, bin Laden was supported by many in Pakistan. In her
memoirs, Malala Yousafzai wrote, “Some of our religious people saw Osama bin Laden
as a hero. In the bazaar you could buy posters of him on a white horse and boxes of
sweets with his picture on them. These clerics said 9/11 was revenge on the Americans
for what they had been doing to other people around the world.”14
Given the history between bin Laden and Pakistan, it is unsurprising that the bin
Laden raid called into question Pakistan’s commitment to cooperation with the United
States in the War on Terrorism. President Barack Obama’s decision to deliberately hide
the planned raid in Abbottabad revealed the United States’ lack of trust in Pakistan before
12
13
Ibid.
14
Yousafzai, I Am Malala, 86.
59
the raid. Further, after bin Laden’s death, Western officials continued to express
suspicion of Pakistan’s ignorance of his presence in Pakistan.15 Three years after the
raid, Pakistan’s international relations continue to be negatively impacted by its perceived
duplicity in the War on Terrorism.
Disregarding for a moment the possible complicity with bin Laden’s hideout,
the incompetence of the military, police, ISI, and government to detect such a
recognizable target raises great concern about Pakistan’s capacity to secure itself from
other violent extremists. It seems unlikely Pakistan at this time is capable of discovering
and persecuting seasoned terrorists who will continue to hurt the overall security of
Pakistan and its people.
Nuclear Weapons
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon program began under Gen. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who
wanted to match India’s military capabilities.16 Possession of nuclear weapons, he
believed, would ensure India could not overpower Pakistan in the disputed Kashmir
region. When the first deployable nuclear bomb was completed around 1990, the
sophisticated technology became a rare source of national pride. By acquiring nuclear
weapons, many felt they could be competitive against regional or Western powers.
15
Charles Hoskinson, “Leon Panetta Sparks New Osama Controversy,” POLITICO, January 30,
2012, accessed February 10, 2014, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/72145.html. In January
2012, Former United States Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta stated that, though he does not have any
hard evidence, it was his personal view that “someone, somewhere” in Pakistan was supporting Osama
bin Laden’s refuge in Pakistan in the years following the 9/ 11 terrorist attacks. This statement exposes the
senior-level distrust between Pakistan and the United States.
16
60
That being said, Pakistan had to rely on more powerful nations such as China to
acquire the technology necessary to build a nuclear bomb, rather than investing in its own
people in order to cultivate engineers and scientists who could increase military strength
internally. The nuclear program represents another example of Pakistan’s tendency to
rely on more powerful nations to advance its development rather than investing in the
human potential in its own large population.
Long before he saw his nuclear program complete, Bhutto was overthrown by
Gen. Zia ul-Huq in a military coup in 1977, and eventually executed. The downfall of
the nuclear program’s initiator exemplifies the security risks of Pakistan possessing
nuclear weapons. Between its first national election in 1970 and September 11th, Bhutto
was the only elected leader to complete a full term in office—until his execution in his
second term.17 There have been four successful military coups in Pakistan since its
independence—the latest in 2000—enforcing how vulnerable the government is to
upheaval.18 It also demonstrates the tendency of the military to facilitate a coup
whenever they believe the president is not fulfilling his responsibilities.
Thus far, military coups have generally continued the status quo, but as the
country’s youth bubble ages, it is possible that in the future a military coup could institute a
radicalized regime—one that would be in possession of a substantial nuclear arsenal. There is
also a risk of extremist groups within Pakistan stealing nuclear technology from the
government. Even Pakistan admits such a scenario is a possibility. In its draft
17
Ibid., 59.
18
Lyon et al., Shaping a Nation, 264. The four military coups occurred in 1958, 1969, 1977,
and 2000.
61
National Security Policy, Pakistan admitted the use of weapons of mass destruction by a
non-state armed group “cannot be ruled out.”19
Notwithstanding its pattern for coups, the “fact that Pakistan has four times
followed a cycle of military intervention, military government, military misrule, a return
to civilian government, civilian floundering, and renewed intervention, does not mean
that the future must look like the past.”20 In fact, despite its history with religious
extremism, terrorism, and military dictatorship, Pakistan’s leadership has largely escaped
extremism in its top leadership positions. One of the reasons for this is its political elite
has historically been well-educated.
While struggling to integrate all of the traditional aspects of democracy in its
state—equality for women is particularly lagging—Pakistan has thus far escaped
religious fundamentalism at its senior levels of government. This is no small achievement
in a state driven by its religious identity. Moving forward, Pakistani leadership can
improve its security and development if it revolutionizes its investments in education
modernization as a long-term pursuit rather than relying on nuclear weapons to protect its
borders. This becomes increasingly necessary given the likelihood that Pakistan could be
taken over by an extremist group increases as more youth are educated in militarized,
intolerant schools that both endorse and encourage radical behavior.
19
Shaheen, Arshad and Aamir Ilyas Rana. “National Security Policy draft: ‘Use of chemical,
biological weapons cannot be ruled out,’” Express Tribune (Karachi), February 26, 2014, accessed March
17, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/676210/national-security-policy-draft-use-of-chemical-biological-
weapons-cannot-be-ruled-out/.
20
62
Relations with India
Pakistan and India have been engaged in a hostile relationship since Pakistan’s
creation when it was partitioned off from British India. At the time of both nations’
independence they were unable to resolve the ownership of shared Kashmir. The tension
over this issue has since led to three wars, and continues to be a point of conflict today.21
While the two nations have not engaged in war since both acquired nuclear weapons,
there have been major near-misses in 1987, 1990, 2002, and 2008.22 Pakistan resents
India’s presence in Kashmir, which Pakistan feels should be official Pakistan territory
given the high concentration of Muslims who live in the disputed land. For its part, India
views Pakistan as a threat to international security, citing risks like “religious
fundamentalism, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction in possession of a failed state, a
military dictatorship masquerading behind a pale democratic façade,” among others.23
Even when the two governments are cooperating, both India and Pakistan remain
at risk for domestic terrorism from radical groups on either side of their border. Groups
within Pakistan committed major acts of terrorism within India as recently as 2008,
when Pakistan’s LeT set off coordinated bombs across India. Over 100 people lost their
lives, and the two nations narrowly avoided another war.
Since then, extremist groups have expanded their influence in India. Recently
Minister of State for India R.P.N Singh told the Indian parliament that groups like LeT
21
Ibid., 6.
22
Ibid., 12.
23
Ibid., 2.
63
and the Indian Mujahideen (IM) continue to send arms into Indian territory to use in
future attacks.24 This persistent threat negatively impacts Pakistan and India’s already
tense relationship, yet Pakistan has done little to dilute the power of these group within
Pakistan. In fact, though the state did impose a formal ban on the group in 2002, LeT
members enjoy close relationships with members of the armed forces and, as such, have
been able to increase their capabilities within Pakistan without threat of retribution from
the state. The overall popularity of groups like the LeT has further dissuaded Pakistan’s
government from taking dramatic measures to limit their strength. This is another
example of why it is crucial to limit the radicalization of youths in order to decrease the
likelihood they will provide extremist groups with the personnel needed to further
expand their scope of influence.
Combating this threat, however, will require an immediate and complete upheaval of
the country’s national curriculum, as anti-India propaganda begins early in a student’s
education. Textbooks depict Indians in an extremely negative light, even accusing them of
conspiring with the Hindus of Bengal to initiate the breakup of East and West Pakistan. For
example, in class five, textbooks state, “India is our traditional enemy and we should always
keep ourselves ready to defend our beloved country from Indian aggression.”25 These texts
glorify war and endorse a negative view of neighboring India,
24
“India continues to face threat from LeT, IM,” Business Standard, February 11, 2014,
accessed February 11, 2014, http://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/india-continues-
to-face-threat-from-let-im-114021101311_1.html.
25
Raza Rumi, “What are we teaching our children?” Express Tribune (Karachi), May 8, 2011,
accessed February 10, 2014, http://tribune.com.pk/story/163868/what-are-we-teaching-our-children/.
64
so it is no surprise Pakistanis continue to maintain an intolerance of Indians long after
they graduate from school.
While it is logical that Pakistan would wish to secure its borders against a nuclear-
armed neighbor, investing heavily in military strength at the expense of social programs
endangers its security rather than assuring it. After all, Pakistan has one of the largest
militaries in the world, but is ranked number 13 on the Foreign Policy’s 2013 Index of
Failed States.26 Despite its large investments in the military, its security score actually
worsened from 2012.
Meanwhile, the gap between Pakistan’s economy and India’s continues to
widen. While Pakistan struggles to stimulate its economy—now with significantly less
aid than was given following September 11th—India’s markets continue to grow thanks
to Western reliance on India’s IT and software ventures. Fortunately, Pakistan’s
telecommunications sector is quickly growing and may help close the gap between the
two economies.27 Yet many in Pakistan worry India’s influence in South Asia will
become increasingly prominent over the next decade, and that this fear would encourage
radical groups to use increasingly violent means to slow India’s inertia towards global
prominence.
26
“The 2013 Failed State Index,” Foreign Policy Fund for Peace, June 24, 2013, accessed
March 11, 2014, http://ffp.statesindex.org/rankings. A Failed State, in the Foreign Policy’s index, is
categorized by twelve primary social, economic, and political indicators, including demographic
pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight and brain drain, uneven economic
development, economic decline, state legitimacy, public services, human rights, security apparatus,
factionalized elites, and external intervention.
27
Moeed Yusuf, “Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy,”
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, no. 14 (October 2008): 6, accessed March
12, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/pakistan%20yusuf/10_
pakistan_yusuf.pdf.
65
Radicalization in Madrassahs
In the previous chapter, the consequences of the 1979 reforms were outlined,
including the possibility of some madrassah students to graduate with a more militant,
intolerant perspective on ideology and religion. To a much lesser degree, the possibility
still exists today for students in madrassahs to become radicalized by extremist lessons,
instructors, fellow students, or existing grievances. In the worst case of madrassah
radicalization, the following occurs:
Hatred is permissible, jihad allows the murder of innocent civilians including

other Muslim men, women, and children, and the new heroes are terrorists.
Martyrdom through suicide attacks is also extolled. Many of the radical
religious schools also include weapons and physical training in their regimen, as
well as weekly lessons on political speechmaking (where anti-American rhetoric
is memorized). The students are uneducated, young, dependent on the schools,
and cut off from contact with their parents for years at a time, and thus highly
susceptible to being programmed towards violence.28
To reiterate an earlier point, this is the rare exception, but when it does occur, it
creates an alarming experience for the students exposed to such extremism.
Though typically such extremism is restricted to the rural areas of Pakistan, there
have been cases of radicalization in the nation’s cities at the highest levels of education—
the country’s universities. Some universities in the country have evolved from purely
academic centers into breeding grounds for radicalization. Punjab University, once
considered the premier learning institute in the country, currently hosts a large population
of Jama’at-i-Islami and its student group IJT, which is composed of university students. 29
28
P.W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad,”
Brookings Institution, November 1, 2001, accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/
media/research/files/papers/2001/11/pakistan%20singer/20020103.pdf.
29
66
These radical groups use the campus as a venue to air their grievances, inundating the
population with propaganda and sometimes even using bombs and AK-47s to
terrorize students. Like the Red Mosque, this once-prestigious institution has evolved
into a security threat for its students and surrounding community, and serves as
another case study of students entering a school to attain an education and instead
emerging militarized and radicalized.
On the other hand, reformed madrassahs that produce promising scholars can
help stimulate the country’s development. Already Pakistan has seen the rise of
madrassah graduates in powerful positions in government. For example, in the 2002
general elections, approximately 25 percent of elected members of Parliament and 35
members of the Senate were either madrassah graduates or managers.30 In their position
of authority, such religious scholars can change the narrative that madrassah graduates
are unemployable, and also serve as role models for current madrassah students. These
successful graduates could also take action to reform madrassahs for they would know
how to coordinate with the ulamas to institute realist reform.
Of course, most madrassah attendees and graduates don’t end up elected to office.
A significant portion struggle to find employment or never graduate from school, and it is
often these individuals that are more susceptible to radicalization. Though Pakistan has
attempted reforms to decrease the likelihood of student radicalization, when it does occur
it poses a security risk to the state, and thus is worthy of study.
30
67
Radicalized youth tend to have a distrust of government, frustration with foreign
policy, and, often, a sense of isolation that contributes to an identity crisis.31 The dangers of
the region and the recent surge in American drone strikes have increased the number of
grievances against the United States and Western culture. Many students, for example, justify
their anger towards the West by citing instances like the 2006 United States drone strike on a
madrassah in Bajour that killed 80 children.32 Further, when President George W. Bush used
the word “crusade” to describe the War on Terror, it inspired many Muslims to interpret such
language literally as a clash between Christians and Muslims. 33 Many in Pakistan perceive
these instances as grave injustices, and—more then lack of education or poverty—this
inspires them to take action against a perceived wrong.
Overwhelmingly, these individuals are young (the average age of new recruit to al
Qaeda is 25 year) and male.34 These young men are frustrated and angry by their
circumstances, often without families who would provide a disincentive to joining
dangerous groups. Alternatively, radicalized youth may have learned their beliefs
through their families who chose to deliberately send their children to notoriously radical
madrassahs because the intolerant curriculum aligns with their families’ beliefs.35 Some
of these madrassahs are connected to radial groups that are able to capitalize on students’
31
Jamie Bartlett, Jonathan Birdwell, and Michael King, “The Edge of Violence: a
Radical Approach to Extremism” (London: Demos, 2010), 10.
32
33
34
Rachel Briggs, Catherine Fieschi, and Hannah Lownsbrough, “Bringing it Home:
Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism” (London: Demos, 2006), 47.
35
68
intolerant perception of society and present them with means to act out against a
perceived enemy. 36
In addition to negatively impacting regional communities, the expansion of
radicalized youth can affect the security of the entire world. Contributing to this is the
surge of immigration to Europe since the 1990s, with Great Britain in particular hosting a
large population of Pakistanis.37 These immigrants are predominantly low-skilled and
confined to the ghettos of London, further exacerbating their grievances. Despite this,
there were few cases of domestic terrorism, until 2005 with the July 7th bombings in
London, which left over fifty people dead and seven hundred injured.38 Though all four
bombers were British citizens, two were of Pakistani origin and one of them is thought to
have attended a Pakistani madrassah in 2004 to 2005. However, he spent the remainder
of his education in English public schools, which incidentally is where he met the
mastermind behind the July 7th bombings.39 This shows that the four bombers’
radicalization, even the one who attended a madrassah, most likely occurred in England,
which suggests that it is not madrassahs per se that produce terrorists, but instead
students pre-disposed to radicalization who actively seek out a madrassah education. The
events of July 7th are particularly frightening given it was home-grown radicalization
36
Jamie Bartlett et al., “The Edge of Violence, 11.
37
Robert S. Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 4 (July/August 2005):
122.
38
39
Ibid.
69
in one of the world’s most advanced countries that prompted individuals to commit
terrorism.
Radicalization in Pakistan has contributed to international terrorism beyond the
events of July 7th. In fact, a recent study surveyed 21 major international terrorist acts
since 2004, and realized over half of the plotters trained with or received guidance from
al Qaeda allies in Pakistan.40 This shows the urgency in educating Pakistan’s growing
youth population in order to improve security both within and beyond Pakistan. While
education is only one means to accomplish this goal, schools are still the best chance the
Pakistan state has to intervene early enough in students’ lives to prevent future acts of
terror. This is especially true in madrassahs as they already have a curriculum enforcing
deep allegiance to Islam, which could exacerbate grievances their students possess
entering the school.
Madrassahs’ Impact on Security and Development
United States Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote a confidential memo
asking, “Are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day
than the madrassahs and radical clerics are recruiting, training and deploying against
us?”41 The question shows the connection between Pakistan’s development and
international security, and the role madrassahs play in this complicated dynamic.
40
Education and Militancy in Pakistan,” Center for Universal Education at Brookings, no. 2 (June 2010):
8, accessed March 9, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ research/files/papers/2010/6/
41
70
But do madrassahs actually produce terrorists? Since 9/11, countless media
accounts have suggested there was a direct link between madrassahs and terrorism.
While specific case studies speak to such a relationship, the reality is far more
complicated than many sources indicate. In fact, many studies that have been conducted
contradict the common narrative that madrassahs are pumping out terrorists. One 2004
study by scholar C. Christine Fair, who surveyed 140 families who had lost a family
member to militancy in Kashmir or Afghanistan, found that less than a quarter of those
militants who died were educated in a madrassah—the same proportion who were
recruited from public schools.42 Rather than at schools, the vast majority were recruited
through personal friends or through a mosque. Fair’s findings were consistent with case
studies conducted by other experts including Peter Bergen, who found only a few
examples of international terrorists that received an education in Pakistan’s religious
seminaries.43
However, while the examples of madrassah graduates executing international
terrorist attacks is rare, Fair found a prevalence of suicide bombers with connections to
madrassahs. Fair believed a lot of these students may have entered the madrassahs
already possessing an intolerant view of the world, and been sent to madrassahs by
families because the schools echoed their faith.44
42
43
Ali, Islam and Education, 13-14. In 2005, Peter Bergen and Swati Pandey released an op-ed
studying the backgrounds of seventy-five militants who executed terrorist attacks against Western
targets. Of the seventy-five, nine attended madrassahs. Notably absent from this study, however, was
the inclusion of sectarian violence, which is a constant security threat in Pakistan.
44
71
Further, it is worth noting that even if madrassah students pursued joining a
terrorist group, these groups often have very competitive recruitment processes, and
many who seek membership are ultimately refused. This is especially true during times
of high unemployment—a relatively constant state in Pakistan—when the recruitment
pool is larger and contains better-educated radicals.45 Remember that madrassahs rarely
teach modern subjects like computer science and engineering, and it is a background in
these fields that would appeal to terrorist groups hoping to execute increasingly
sophisticated attacks. Though there are certainly cases of madrassah students
committing acts of terrorism—especially those involving suicide bombs—most students
would be unable to contribute a unique skill set that would motivate extremist groups to
invest the time and resources in training them.
So while the short-term threat posed by radicalized madrassah students ultimately
remains relatively low, the greater threat appears to be the long-term security threat that
will impact Pakistan when one of the world’s largest youth population begins to enter the
workforce. Despite attempted reform, most madrassah graduates still have a limited
understanding of secular academic fields, and a learned intolerance of other religious
groups. A smaller but still dangerous group of graduates will have a radicalized
worldview, causing them to be susceptible to recruitment by violent groups who continue
to hurt the advancement of Pakistan, most likely through suicide bombings. Education is
Pakistan’s best opportunity to intervene early enough in a child’s life to deter them from
this path.
45
Ibid., 72.
72
Conclusion
The issues facing Pakistan are overwhelmingly challenging to both regional and
international security, including its sectarianism, tolerance of extremist groups, history of
military coups, and hostile relations with neighboring India. As long as Pakistan feels
uncertain about its own security, it will continue to funnel its aid into its military rather
than on civilian programs that would benefit its long-term development.
Concurrently, Pakistan has one of the largest youth populations in the world, but
its schools remain, at best, antiquated, and, at worst, radicalized. The hopelessness of its
school system is exacerbated by its poor hope for growth—it is in the Top 15 in the
Failed State Index and has engaged in three wars with its neighbor in recent decades.
The result of a poorly educated Pakistan is an ignorant, potentially violent population
containing an excess of possible recruits for extremist organizations, who can tempt
unemployed and angry youth with the illusion of power. 46
In addition to the above security threats, Pakistan is constantly at risk of falling
deeper into the poverty cycle symptomatic of many weak states. Such risks include
increased risk of civil wars, vulnerability to natural disasters, and spread of infectious
diseases.47 Pakistan is a ticking time bomb—perhaps literally, as it has one of the fastest
growing nuclear arsenals in the world.48
46
Susan E. Rice, Corinne Graff, and Carlos Pascual, eds., Confronting Poverty:
Weak States and U.S. National Security (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009), 45.
47
Ibid., vii.
48
Bruce Riedel, interview by The Browser, “Five Books on Pakistan,” February 9, 2011, accessed
February 13, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2011/02/09-pakistan-books-riedel.
73
How Pakistan develops in the coming decades will have a huge impact on
international security. Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities mixed with its domestic terrorist
groups and widespread Islamic extremism make it perhaps the most dangerous
developing nation in the world. Given its strategic importance, it is increasingly
important to reform Pakistan’s madrassah system to reduce, where possible,
radicalization and militarization. Madrassahs are largely limited to sectarian violence,
but to prevent them from expanding their portfolio to international terrorism, reforms
must be conducted immediately.
The need to educate Pakistan’s youth is imperative; in an estimated two decades
over half of the population—an estimated 132 million people—will be under the age of
18.49 This enormous youth bubble creates a perfect storm for Pakistan’s future: to
educate this population would mean increased literacy rates and economic prosperity
once the students enter the workforce, but to ignore the education crisis would all but
sentence millions to a life of poverty and uncertainty. The answer should be simple.
Pakistan must invest in its education system to encourage its long-term development and
security. The next chapter will explore different ways Pakistan can accomplish this
urgent objective.
49
74
CHAPTER 4
REFORMING MADRASSAHS: HOW AND WHO?
Chapter 3 explored the link between improving education in Pakistan and its
regional and international security. This chapter will highlight the major flaws within
the madrassah curriculum: the disregard for subjects outside of Islam; lessons that
minimize critical thinking and analysis; outdated textbooks that encourage a
militarized and intolerant worldview; and lack of vocational training that could
broaden students’ career pursuits. The chapter will also recommend ways Pakistan can
reform its curriculum so that children being educated in madrassahs obtain skills to
facilitate Pakistan’s development towards “economic dynamism, an informed and
active democracy, and a coterie of informed professionals willing and able to live and
serve around the world.”1 Many of these methods have been attempted in Pakistan’s
past three major reforms, but efforts must be reenergized. This is especially important
more than ten years since September 11th. With external aide to Pakistan on a
significant decline, schools are increasingly dependent on the state, which historically
has spent less of its GDP on education than almost any other county in the world.
Important to note is that while some reforms suggest amending the curricula of
madrassahs to better prepare students for future opportunity, madrassahs should never
be so reformed that their core academic emphasis—the study of Islam—is neglected.
In many ways, Islam uniquely created Pakistan as the first homeland for Muslims and
1
Joel I. Klein and Condoleeza Rice, chairs, “U.S. Education Reform and National Security,”
Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force Report, no. 68 (March 2012): xi, accessed
March 16, 2014, http://www.cfr.org/united-states/us-education-reform-national-security/p27618.
75
religion will always be a key source of identity of its people. As a result, religious
education will continue to be desired by the Pakistanis, and madrassahs have
historically served this need by training the next generation of religious leaders. The
goal is to suggest reforms that maintain Pakistan’s religious identity while still
allowing its students to excel in a modern world in order to advance Pakistan’s long-
term development.
The reforms of 1962, 1979, and 2001 had limited success because they failed to
alter the inherent flaw within Pakistan’s schools. Reforming curricula and training
teachers, while improvements to the current structure, can only go so far. The
Pakistani population suffers from deeply entrenched intolerant views of different
religious sects, and, more often than not, schools tend to exacerbate these tensions with
their outdated and biased textbooks. Ultimately, the only way Pakistan can
successfully update its madrassahs is if its government, religious scholars, students,
and communities all work together to endorse and enforce proposed changes for
generations to come.
Expand Curricular Focus Outside of Islam
Some madrassahs operate under the assumption that any knowledge beyond
that which helps students understand the Quran and religious study is unnecessary. 2 Islam
instructs that the Quran does not only offer moral guidance on how to imitate the life of
the Prophet Mohammad, but also ideal educational guidance for the mind and soul.
Religious scholars believe strongly that madrassah studies should be dedicated
2
Lyon et al., Shaping a Nation, 57.
76
exclusively to the study of the Quran for the purpose of producing faithful adherents to
Islam who will become the best possible future religious leaders. Thus the more time
spent studying the Quran, the more likely the student will attain spiritual excellence.
Underlying this belief is the assumption that the study of sciences like
astronomy or medicine could, in addition from distracting from religious expertise,
possibly contradict religious lessons, and subsequently cause students to question
the religious lessons they are given. To minimize this danger, many madrassahs
have disregarded secular subjects, and focus entirely on religious study.
Unlike other school systems that offer a variety of degrees, in madrassahs all
students study Islam beginning at a very early age. This means madrassah students, at
the start of their academic career, have confined their career options to those in the
religious field. As a result, students graduating from madrassahs have limited
marketable skills compared to graduates of government or private schools who
studied subjects that cater more towards options of employability. This hurts
Pakistan’s overall development, because the over two million students receiving their
education through madrassahs will be unable to participate in career fields that
stimulate economic advancement.
To be sure, if a child aspires to be a religious leader, it is goal worth pursuing.
But if a student follows this career path out of default, because his or her education did
not provide a background in math or social sciences, the madrassah system could be
rightfully accused of hurting Pakistan’s development. A career should not be chosen
for a child; children should have the right to explore the area of study of their choice.
77
Typically a child would not realize this field until later in life—or at all, if madrassah
students are denied exploration of academic fields outside of religious study.3
As the 1962 and 1979 reforms have proven, the ulamas will not cooperate with
the government reforms if they feel it is undermining their ability to offer students
expertise in their faith in order to create the next generation of religious scholars. Any
proposed reforms should not change the inherent purpose of a madrassah education,
but rather should seek a compromise between excelling in religious studies and also
teaching subjects and skill sets that would allow a student to participate in a modern
workforce if they ultimately discover a passion outside of Islam.
To the ulama, the best way students can contribute to society is by pursuing a
career in Islam. As such, the government should recognize madrassahs deserve the
autonomy to emphasize religious studies. Meanwhile, the ulama need to offer some
alternative courses that would allow students the opportunity to obtain a foundation
in secular fields that ultimately offer more career opportunities.
Recently, madrassahs have worked with government and private schools to
help form a special type of school that merges curricula of religious and government
schools so that students receive both types of studies. One such school is Iqra Rozatul
Itfal Trust (IRIT), private schools that incorporate madrassah curricula.4 The
madrassah IRIT schools are divided into four levels of studies. The first two are
considered pre-primary; it is not until the third level that a madrassah IRIT student
3
Garman, “Education in Pakistan,” 10-11.
4
78
learns to read and write Arabic. The fourth is the level considered most important in
madrassah studies, in which each student must memorize the entire Quran. Once this
feat is accomplished—usually by the time a student is twelve years old—the student
enters the “school phase” of their studies, during which time students are responsible
for learning the entire government curriculum up to grade five in a single year.5 They
then continue with the government curriculum until graduation when, should they
pass all their exams, they would receive matriculation certifications—similar to a high
school diploma—that they can use to apply to jobs or to higher education.
The IRIT schools are still early in their implementation and the effectiveness of
the curriculum for students over the long-term will need to be studied for many years.
Despite this, the schools demonstrate a proactive and essential strategy to integrating
religious studies with worldly subjects.
Under the current IRIT system, perhaps the largest obstacle for students is
learning and retaining five government grades in a single year of study. The
assumption is that after memorizing the Quran, students will be able to easily grasp
large quantities of information in a shorter period of time. It is also possible, however,
that the huge emphasis of memorization in their early years of education will limit their
critical thinking skills and thus hinder their success in the government portion of the
curriculum. A possible improvement would be to integrate the government curriculum
earlier into the school system, preferably in grades one and two, so that students are
5
Ibid., 19-20.
79
able to learn both fields as they progress through their education. That being said, scholar
C. Christine Fair reported that at the IRIT school she toured in Lahore, 100 percent of
students passed their matriculation exams, which suggests students are able to gain a
solid grasp of both religious and worldly subjects by the time they graduate. 6
In order to promote Pakistan’s long-term development, madrassahs must all
incorporate similar curriculum plans as the IRIT schools have attempted in order to
combine the best of the current model with a curriculum more applicable for a
modernizing world. While training religious scholars is important—after all, 96
percent of Pakistanis are Muslim7— it is vital that madrassah students have the
ability to explore other academic subjects, especially early in their education process.
This will help ensure that madrassah students develop an educational foundation
enabling them to pursue non-religious careers, while still remaining true to their faith.
Teach Critical Thinking and Analysis Skills
In madrassahs, students usually learn through memorization, particularly
during the stage in their studies when they are required to memorize and recite the
entire Quran.8 This emphasis on memorization reduces the analysis and critical
thinking that goes into conceptual learning. Further contributing to the lack of critical
thinking in the years it takes to accomplish this task is the fact the Quran is in Arabic, a
6
Ibid., 20.
7
Central Intelligence Agency, “The World Factbook: Pakistan,” March 4, 2014, accessed
March 8, 2014, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/pk.html.
8
Bano, The Rational Believer, 104. This overwhelming task is a lifelong obligation. If a
student achieves hafiz and later forgets any of it, it is assumed this person—and their parents—will be
punished by Allah.
80
language many students don’t speak.9 As such, memorization does not itself lead to
understanding of the Quran. In a system that minimizes analysis and critical thinking,
schools could unintentionally be producing students unprepared to contribute to a
modern and more globalized world. In rare instances, such blind faith in the Quran
may encourage students to join radicalized groups who commit violent jihad in the
name of their faith.
Further, since the Quran is considered a divine text, most schools fail to put the
text in historical context or else discuss early debates surrounding its
standardization.10 A stimulating discussion about the Quran as literature would
encourage students to trust in the divinity of the text while also providing them with
the understanding of how to interpret its context to apply to the present day. This skill
becomes necessary given the ongoing debate in Pakistan about the role of true Islam in
a modern world. The speed of technology and digital communications ensures the
world will be a far different place for madrassah graduates than the one in which their
teachers were educated. As such, ulamas—or other qualified teachers—should provide
students with the skills needed to interpret their faith to remain applicable in an ever-
changing world. Students should be taught to search for additional truths, rather than
accept lessons at a literal level. By limiting the study of fields outside religion and
minimizing critical analysis within the classroom, madrassahs may unintentionally be
restraining students’ curiosity and limiting their learning process.
9
Ibid., 104-105.
10
Abdul Basit, ed., The Global Muslim Community at a Crossroads: Understanding
Religious Beliefs, Practices, and Infighting to End the Conflict (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2012), 99.
81
Offer English Language Studies
Pakistan is an extremely diverse country, hosting dozens of ethnic groups,
many of which speak different languages. In fact, Pakistan has six major languages
(Punjabi, Pashto, Sindhi, Siraiki, Urdu, and Balochi) and about 60 minor ones11. Urdu
is the language used in most madrassahs’ lessons and examinations; however, the
Quran must be memorized in Arabic, a language which most students don’t speak.
Unlike in government and private schools, English—considered the global
language of media, politics, and technology—is rarely taught in madrassahs,
depriving most graduates of the competency to obtain a job in careers that require an
understanding in English.12 Learning English could empower students to pursue a
wider scope of career opportunities and be better equipped to excel in an increasingly
digital world.
In addition to being unable to compete with Pakistan’s elite, non-English
speakers are usually also computer illiterate, yet another handicap to pursuing
professional jobs that require a basic comprehension of digital technologies. Unable to
fulfill employment advertisements explicitly requesting fluent English speakers, most
graduates of madrassahs are constrained to pursue jobs as religious instructors. This
creates a cycle of poor education since, having never learned it themselves, the next
generation of teachers will be unable to teach English to their students.
11
Rahman, “Reason for Rage,” 87.
12
82
Increase Education Opportunities for Women
While illiteracy across Pakistan is low, it is depressingly so for the women of
the country. If Pakistan wants to stimulate its development, one of its primary areas of
investment should be female education, so that it no longer has a population in which
almost half are unable to participate in a modern economy.
In madrassahs, female enrollment has historically been much lower than male
enrollment. One reason for this is most madrassahs separate their boys and girls, and
if funding levels are low, it is the girls’ school that gets cut. This is due largely to the
lack of career prospects for females in the religious sector, and the rejection of the
idea women could offer religious guidance to men.
However in the 1970’s a large number madrassahs for females were opened,
and today in many areas the number of female madrassah students is catching up with
that of male enrollment.13 This is promising for Pakistan’s development, given that
studies have found female madrassah students have a higher pass rate than male
students.14 Despite this, the most senior classes are generally still taught by men, since
few women instructors teach long enough to master the most developed texts before
getting married.15
This suggests the primary motivation in female religious education is to prepare
women to be more desirable wives who can raise devout children. Currently most
13
14
Ibid., 128.
15
Ibid., 135.
83
women abandon their studies and career as soon as they are responsible for caring for a
family. Despite most women eventually leaving academics and the workforce, the
increase of female attendance in schools remains beneficial to Pakistan. Exposure to
lessons and boarding school (possibly in a city) will broaden a women’s understanding
of the world, and hopefully encourage her to seek a spouse who sees her as his equal
and, ideally, accepts her continued academic or professional pursuits.
However, an education still remains a huge obstacle for many females in
Pakistan. This was especially true during the Taliban occupation of Swat Valley, when
it became increasingly dangerous for girls to attend school. The campaign to limit
women’s access to education was a deliberate technique by the Taliban to ensure half
of the population remained illiterate and socially immobile. Also during the Taliban
occupation, the Quran was loosely interpreted to severely limit women’s influence in
local communities, and to this day prejudices against women remain. Even women
who are able to graduate from madrassahs face immense obstacles gaining
employment, especially since girls are not allowed to become ulamas.16
The slow progress of women’s advancement in Pakistan is not surprising; after
all, many countries in the world, including Western states, discriminate against women
in direct or indirect ways. However, Pakistan has already achieved what many
developed nations have not yet: its first female prime minister in 1988. Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto was active in promoting women’s rights, chairing the Muslims Women
16
84
Parliamentarians in 1995 and creating an Islamabad Declaration that sought to
eliminate discriminatory legislation, increase female literacy, and protect women
rights in Pakistan.17 Bhutto’s administration also strongly opposed the country’s
madrassahs, which they linked to sectarian violence.18 However, in 1996 Bhutto was
removed from office before she could fully implement her recommended changes to
madrassahs, which included required registration and audits in addition to curriculum
reform.19 In fact, her efforts to force madrassahs to register with the government
ultimately led to a surge in unregistered madrassahs.20
It is tragic that increased discrimination like that seen during the Taliban
occupation in Swat Valley followed Bhutto’s non-consecutive terms, rather than a
growing emphasis on female education. Her emphasis on gender equality, progressive
social programs, and stronger international relations were rare in their long-term
perspective. Sadly, Bhutto, after returning to Pakistan from nine years in exile to seek
reelection, was assassinated in a bombing that left many besides the progressive leader
dead. Yet many youth in Pakistan today, including Malala Yousafzai, cite Bhutto’s
legacy as inspiration for pursuing an education despite all the obstacles women in
Pakistan face. But in order to have more females in higher office, Pakistan must invest
17
Anita M. Weiss, “Islamic Influences on Sociolegal Conditions of Pakistani Women,” in
Islam and Society in Pakistan: Anthropological Perspectives, ed. Magnus Marsden (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2010), 63.
18
19
20
85
in keeping women in school and ensuring the curriculum they are taught is conducive
to ensuring future career prospects.
Integrate Vocational Training
Madrassahs serve to teach their students how to be devout Muslims and how
to best adhere to the ways of the Prophet Mohammad. Some madrassahs, however,
pursue this agenda so attentively they neglect to present their students the means to
imitate the Prophet in ways other than becoming a religious scholars.
Vocational training would offer students skills to pursue careers that would
allow them to spread their understanding of Islam outside of madrassahs while also
benefiting their communities. In the best case scenario, madrassahs would incorporate
vocational training as part of their curriculum requirements. Yet even those schools
who do not want training to interfere with studies could offer vocational training to
students as an extracurricular. This would be particularly effective at madrassahs that
board students, because the training would provide students a productive way to
expand their resumes outside of their studies. This program could also help improve
Pakistan’s low labor participation rates.
Such training could include medical professionals or disaster relief agents—the
latter desperately needed in a country still recovering from the devastating 2005
earthquake, not to mention the frequent incidences of sectarian violence. For students
interested in leaving the religious realm, agricultural, industrial, or telecommunication
apprenticeships could be instituted. The emphasis of these trainings would be focus on
community development while simultaneously developing professional skills for the
86
students. India was able successfully to integrate vocational training in their schools
and has since become a preferred trading country in matters of computer software—a
powerful forte given the world’s increasing reliance on computer technology.21
The institution of vocational training could also be a way for Pakistan to
improve its long-term economic prospects, by emphasizing fields in which Pakistan
can grow. Currently, there is a conflict between the fields in which Pakistan invests
and those fields demanded by the needs of the state. Fields like digital
communications, information technology, and engineering would help Pakistan’s
international competitiveness much more than its universities’ current focus on arts
and humanities.22
This problem is not unique to Pakistan; many countries around the world
struggle to keep pace with the changing landscape of how the world communicates
and does business. But by investing its resources in essential skills, Pakistan’s students
would improve career prospects all while contributing to Pakistan’s growing
competitiveness in fields that will stimulate its long-term development. Pakistan has
one of the fastest growing telecommunications sector in the world, and vocational
training in this field would be an effective means to keep the momentum behind this
trend growing.23
21
22
Husain, “Education, Employment and Economic Development in Pakistan,” 40.
23
Moeed Yusuf, “Prospects of Youth Radicalization in Pakistan: Implications for U.S. Policy,”
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, no. 14 (October 2008): 6, accessed March 12,
2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2008/10/pakistan%20yusuf/10_
87
Madrassahs would be a perfect experimental system in which to institute
vocational training, since their smaller population would allow the country to better
monitor the execution of the program. Further, the emphasis of religion in these
schools would allow the religious leaders to discuss how to merge professional
training with religious study, before the compromised plan is instituted in the country’s
government schools on a broader scale.
Boost Funding for Education
Pakistani senior officials have claimed that since 2001 terrorism has cost the
county $80 billion and the loss the 70,000 citizens.24 While investments in the military
are necessary to protect Pakistan and its citizens from further losses, rather than
investing in defense and hoping development follows, Pakistan must invest more
proportionately in its social programs that will strengthen the country’s development.
Pakistan should substantially increase its spending on education from two percent of its
GDP to at least four percent.
This is all the more pressing given Pakistan’s youth bubble. As this growing
population enters the workforce, they could either be radicalized ticking time bombs
or educated professionals stimulating Pakistan’s economy. Education is a powerful
tool to change the momentum more towards accomplished professionals who are able
to participate in a modern economy.
pakistan_yusuf.pdf.
24
Jaan Haider, “Lawmakers Want Strategy to Eliminate Terrorism,” Pakistan Today, March 6,
2014, accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2014/03/06/national/lawmakers-
want-strategy-to-eliminate-terrorism/.
88
Increased state funding to education would show schools like madrassahs that
the state is serious about improving students’ economic prospects. It would also have
the benefit of lowering the reliance of madrassahs on foreign governments like Saudi
Arabia for funding.
Endorse a Tolerant Worldview
Many reforms have assumed that focusing on public school reform was
essential, for better-equipped public schools would encourage parents to send their
children to public schools rather than religious institutions. Yet this assumption
overlooks the fact that many parents deliberately send at least one of their children to
madrassahs precisely because they focus on religious education. It is not just the free
food and shelter that make madrassahs an attractive education option for families.
Often, it is the desirability of a religious education that is the primary motive. 25
Some elite madrassahs—especially those with respected ulamas—can attract
the brightest and wealthiest students in their region. It can take a full year to get
admitted into these schools because they attract a large number of stable donors and
thus can be more selective with acceptance rates.26 For example, the historically
influential Dur-ul-Uloom Haqania madrassah—whose alumni includes many senior
25
26
Ibid., 80.
89
Afghani Taliban leaders—receives over 15,000 applications every year for only
400 open spots.27
In fact, while poorer students make up a higher percentage of the student
body of madrassahs than at other kinds of schools, madrassahs actually have a
higher proportion of wealthier students (12 percent) than the percentage in public
schools.28 And often families that do not send their children to madrassahs will hire
a religious scholar or send their child to a mosque in addition to their regular studies
so that children gain a deeper understanding of Islam.29
To summarize, the Western notion that improving Pakistan’s public schools
will solve the madrassah problem is invalid. Students and their families will still wish
to attend madrassahs even if Pakistan reforms its public school systems. Knowing
this, Pakistan can not ignore madrassah reform in favor of investing in the more
popular public school system. Pakistan must improve all of its education systems so
students in each kind of institution are able to earn worthwhile degrees that make
them competitive in Pakistan’s work force.
A study conducted by Pakistan’s National Commission for Justice and Peace
(NCJP) studied 22 textbooks and discovered that “hate content” in textbooks used in
27
P.W. Singer, “Pakistan’s Madrassahs: Ensuring a System of Education Not Jihad,” Brookings
Institution, November 1, 2001, accessed March 12, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/
files/papers/2001/11/pakistan%20singer/20020103.pdf.
28
29
Ibid., 16.
90
the country’s Punjab Province had increased from “45 lines in 2009 to 122 in 2012.”30
The problem, however, is not merely that textbooks are outdated and biased. Over the
long-term, the more glaring security concern is that early in students’ lives they are not
taught how to be tolerant humans as well as scholars capable of thinking for
themselves.
Pakistan can take advantage of lower-class students attending madrassahs by
ensuring that once these students begin their studies at religious seminaries they are
taught how to deal with grievances in a peaceful manner. Intervening early in a child’s
life can hopefully reduce teenage and adult aggression. Madrassahs can have the
positive influence needed in a child’s earliest years to provide quality education that
will have, “a strong influence on the ability of students to manage their anger
impulses that are likely to be more pronounced in conflict zones.”31
The hope in reforming the madrassah curriculum to be more tolerant and
understanding of other faiths is:
. . . that a religious curriculum embodying a more accommodating view of

differences and competing ideologies will bring about a change in the psyche of
those who are taught this curriculum. The values of tolerance, harmony, global
citizenry, compassion, respect for life, and respect for human dignity can be
inculcated through a religious framework that is consistent with Islam’s
teachings.32
30
Ambreen Agha, “Pakistan: Education Leading Into Darkness Analysis,” South Asia
Terrorism Portal, October 1, 2012, accessed March 17, 2014, http://www.eurasiareview.com/01102012-
pakistan-education-leading-into-darkness-analysis.
31
32
Farzana Hassan Shahid, “The Role of Pakistan’s Madrassahs in the Alleged Growth of
Intolerance in Pakistani Society” (PhD diss., University of Phoenix, 2010), 15, accessed March
13, 2014, http://search.proquest.com/docview/734727943.
91
More than any other issue in Pakistan, the country is divided about religion.
Citizens of all ages identify with their religion before any other attribute, including
nationality. A recent study by Raheem ul Haque in Lahore found 88 percent of youth
in an elite school identified themselves primarily by their religion, and 50 percent
believed their national identity was determined by the faith they practiced.33 Given
this fact, the best investment Pakistan can make is improving its religious schools.
Eventually it is these students that will become the next generation of religious
scholars for the country, and it is important they preach a more tolerant
understanding of religion.
Utilize Modern Technology to Expand Students’ Scope of Knowledge
In the modern society, anyone with a computer and an internet connection can
access infinite sources of information with a simple Google search. These impressive
technologies can, however, conflict with some interpretations of how to apply the Quran
to modern day life. Many branches of Islam strive to imitate the life of the Prophet in
every possible means; some consider it a sacred act of worship to use an acacia twig for
brushing one’s teeth to follow the Prophet’s daily hygienic patterns.34 One can imagine
how difficult it is reconciling such an obligation to a world in which new technologies are
developing at a rapid pace, constantly changing the ways humans
33
Raheem ul Haque, Raheem, “Youth Radicalization in Pakistan,” USIP Peace Brief, no. 167
(February 2014): 2, accessed March 13, 2014, http://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/PB%20167_
Youth_Radicalization_in_Pakistan.pdf.
34
92
live and communicate. Some madrassahs opt to ignore the technological age
altogether by prohibiting students from watching TV, using computers, or listening
to the radio.35 Yet isolating students from external influence deprives them of
technologies that can provide them with the world’s best education resources without
ever leaving their communities.
However, in reforming madrassahs, it is not enough to provide a school with
computers. Not only will most instructors be unable to teach students how to utilize
such technology without training, but an internet connection can produce as many
security threats as it does development benefits. After all, computers can be used for
self-radicalization, which can make students vulnerable to recruitment by internet-
based terrorist groups. Some groups like al Qaeda are known to be highly active on
social media as a way of connecting with youth around the world.
Nevertheless, computer training would be an ideal time to teach students how
to distinguish reliable media from those of radical groups attempting to recruit
followers. In teaching madrassah students how to use computers to access secular
subjects, trained professionals can deglamorize extremist groups, and educate
students how to see through such groups’ propaganda.
Value Aspects
In 2009, Georgetown University scholar Maureen Bessingpas wrote, “As
humans we have the obligation and opportunity to change the environments in which
35
93
the poor and weak are exploited and to effect unfortunately accepted patterns of
societal behavior to allow the weak to thrive; the answer is education.”36 The study
of human life values explores which values enhance individual freedom, and it would
be impossible to dissociate personal freedom from access to education, for education
facilitates humans realizing and reaching their full potential. In determining how to
advance long-term stability, nations like Pakistan must strive to distribute education
equally across the country so every child has a chance to advance in society based on
personal passions and strengths.
Madrassahs often neglect subjects outside of Islam, which limits career
opportunities for its graduates. In a nation like Pakistan, a nuclear-armed country on
the brink of failure, neglecting an entire segment of the student population from
entering the career force is detrimental to the country’s development. While
madrassahs should continue to teach Islam, there are many ways of expanding
students’ opportunities outside of the religious realm in ways that would benefit the
entire region.
A nation like Pakistan must have the wisdom to educate its youth so that future
generations will be raised with hopes and dreams of success, rather than resentment
and fear about their desperate situation. At a time of groundbreaking innovation, it
should be easier than in the past to use technology to create a curriculum that can be
disseminated nation-wide so no matter a person's ethnicity, gender, or location, they
36
Maureen Bessingpas, “Reforming Primary Education in Pakistan in the Interest of U.S.
National Security” (master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2009), 8, accessed December 2,
2013, http://hdl.handle.net/10822/553251.
94
have equal access to knowledge needed to form a more stable society.
Conclusion
Ultimately the above reforms, while an improvement to the current structure,
can only go so far in ensuring Pakistan’s security and development. The hope is such
reforms will improve some of the destructive tendencies in Pakistan, including
intolerance of other different cultures, hostility towards neighboring India, and reliance
on violence to promote political agendas. After all, it is not madrassahs that pose
security risks, though they may expose them. The true security risks are the outdated
curricula that limit students’ development, the pro-military culture that cheered in the
streets when the nation developed nuclear weapons, the sectarian communities that
participated in domestic terrorism against other branches of their own faith, and the
young Taliban solider who felt so empowered through his extremism that he willingly
shot a teenage girl in her head. A higher percentage of GDP spent on education reform
and valuable alterations to curricula can help accelerate the madrassah reform, but
ultimately it needs to be a decision made by Pakistanis to prioritize peace over
violence, acceptance over intolerance, and education over ignorance.
In regards to the Taliban’s power in Swat Valley, Malala Yousafzai’s father said,
“If people volunteered in the same way to construct schools or roads to even clear the
river of plastic wrappers, by God, Pakistan would become a paradise within a year
. . . The only charity they know is to give to mosque and madrasa.”37 The youth of
37
Yousafzai, I Am Malala, 117.
95
Pakistan make up over half of its population, so if its students adopt this philosophy,
the majority of the nation would be working towards this much needed change.
Madrassah graduates, if properly educated, can become the initiators of this change
by inspiring their religious communities into becoming a more tolerant and peaceful
society.
96
CONCLUSION
On 12 July 2013 in a speech before the United Nations, Malala Yousafzai
encouraged the world that to combat illiteracy and terrorism, everyone must “pick up
our books and our pens, they are the most powerful weapons. One child, one teacher,
one book and one pen can change the world. Education is the only solution.” Malala,
along with all the other students in Pakistan seeking education, serve as an
inspiration about the possibilities and power an education can provide.
Further studies will need to be conducted on Pakistan’s schools to better
understand the relationship between education and conflict. It remains to be
determined the extent to which madrassahs induce militancy, or if it is the general
failing state of Pakistan is destroying the education system. Regardless, the education
system remains one of the most influential investments the Pakistani state can make
in securing a more prosperous future.
Since its independence, Islam has provided Pakistan’s people a voice in
expressing their hope for their country. To countless Pakistanis, their faith is one of the
few sources of community and comfort that help to ease the frustration and
hopelessness felt in such depressing living conditions. In the absence of a responsive
and effective state government, the concept a God who can offer a prosperous afterlife
has increased significance. The sectarianism that has traumatized many of Islam’s
followers shows how Islam can sharply divide its followers—and yet, the hope
remains that the shared beliefs of all faiths can equally serve as a uniting force.
97
As training grounds for the next generation of religious scholars, madrassahs
remain the best venue in which to pursue such consensus among faiths, and promote
tolerance in future generations. The urgency to modernize madrassahs in order to
enable this vision becomes all the more pressing given over half of Pakistan’s
population is under the age of 24. This massive youth population could serve as either
a strategic asset to quickly producing a highly skilled workforce—or inevitable
security risks resulting from of millions of frustrated and impoverished youths living
in desperate conditions within a failing state.
To ensure the option of extraordinary possibility occurs, Pakistan must invest in
its schools to increase literacy and enrollment. Some have argued that Pakistan should
focus its resources on modernizing its government and private schools, as they educate
the overwhelming majority of school-age children in the country. This thought neglects
the threat posed by the few remaining radicalized madrassahs that could continue to
offer free room and board to students unable to travel to government schools. Further,
alienating madrassahs will further isolate their students from their peers and reduce
their career opportunities. Madrassahs must feel they are a part of the national
movement to improve schools so that the two million students who attend them do not
have yet another reason to resent the state.
But simply sending children to a classroom is not enough—for if a classroom is
a place that promotes hate, prejudice, or extremism, students could ultimately become
a threat to their country’s security, especially in a nation like Pakistan that is known to
be a safe haven for terrorist organizations. Pakistan will have leaders who are qualified
98
to meet the future challenges our global community will face only when its children
grow up learning how to read and write, to debate and persuade, to question and
explore. In clearer terms: a great education system enhances a country’s development
and security, while poor or little education hurts both. Pakistan must work to reform its
madrassahs so that the two million students currently enrolled in these Islamic
seminaries are exposed to lessons in English, social sciences, mathematics, tolerance,
and critical thinking. With assistance placed in the right educational initiatives, there is
reason to hope its future generations could develop Pakistan into a valuable and
prominent player on the world stage.
The core reason Pakistan sought independence following World War II was to
provide a homeland for all the Muslims who needed a safe haven from religious
persecution. Pakistan was created to welcome all Islamic sects within its borders so
that its followers could live a life full of promise and without fear. To achieve its
original mission, Pakistan must now, more than ever, form a united and enlightened
state. The battleground and sanctuary to accomplish this admirable goal is in the
nation’s schools. Pakistan must improve and enhance its access to and quality of
education in order to empower its youth population to work towards a more secure and
developed state. This investment will enrich the possibilities of Pakistan and only then
will Pakistan know peace.
99
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THE POWER OF EDUCATION IN PAKISTAN

MADRASSAHS, DEVELOPMENT, AND SECURITY

Pakistan: Madrassahs, Development. And Security submitted by me in partial fulfillment of B.Ed.

or any other university or institution.

country’s schools—specifically its madrassahs—on its security and development. With

depressing future employment prospects in an already violent and sectarian state.

Education is a crossroads at which Pakistan’s inherent struggle with

current stagnation. This security threat is particularly prominent in the nation’s

Unless the management and curriculum of madrassahs improves, its graduates

advance, not limit, the country’s development and security.

Formerly part of British India, Pakistan became independent in 1947 as a

textbooks breeding intolerance in an already divisive society, poor community

investment, and widespread corruption.2

are particularly overwhelming in Pakistan, since more than 50 percent of Pakistan’s

population of 190 million is younger than twenty-four—one of the largest youth

populations in the world. 3 Further, the number of youths in comparison to adults is

prospects and be unable to participate in a modern and more globalized world.

recruits later commit acts of violence.

of the religious sect. Some madrassahs have focused so exclusively on Islamic

Western world, to consider madrasssahs “incubators for violent extremism.”5 This

stereotype is enforced by incriminating graduates such as Mullah Umar, a Taliban

Islam, and discourage religious extremism and violent jihad.7

Islamic madrassahs in Pakistan in preparing students for participation in a modern

provide an overview of Pakistan’s history and its education system—focusing on

in Pakistan by exploring some of threats influencing Pakistan’s national and international

THE HISTORY OF PAKISTAN AND ITS EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM

is one of the few countries to possess nuclear weapons—can almost exclusively be

in combining Islam and innovation.10

educational system outside of Africa.

This means the majority of Pakistan’s population is incapable of contributing to its

countries in the world in which illiteracy is increasing.13

sharia (Islamic) law in all aspects of life.

Pakistan’s inability to reconcile these two perspectives has stagnated its

development. It is in a constant conflict whether to glorify its past at the expense of a

ideals. This problem is exposed most evidently in Pakistan’s education system,

specifically its madrassahs.

To demonstrate how the nation’s education system became so desperately

Historical Overview of Pakistan and its Education System

tolerant of religious differences, as well as socially progressive.14 Though before

and India’s Hindu population, upon becoming governor-general he spoke passionately

creating public policy.

Following independence and leading into the 1970s, Pakistan’s education

One leader who had an especially significant impact on Pakistan’s education

discount atheism—commonly associated with communism—so that Pakistan could

at the expense of the instructors of the madrassahs, called ulamas.

started a common trend in Pakistan of hosting military generals in senior

government positions. Generally, these leaders emphasized military power rather

politicians to exploit Pakistan’s loyalty to Islam as a means to increase his power.

weakened Pakistan’s culture by making it less secular. Its emphasis on Islam as a

In fact, at various times since 1971, secessionist movements have arisen in

Pakistan’s other provinces including: North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) which

Pakistan’s religious groups that still exists half a century later.

determined to be equivalent to a Masters in Islamic Studies earned from a government

decreased emphasis on academic achievement.

against Western nations.

Pakistan’s nuclear program is an example of Pakistan’s willingness to invest in

nuclear technology at the expense of social programs.

continued Bhutto’s nationalization of education, though on a much broader scale than

legitimacy in Pakistan after overthrowing a democratically elected Bhutto. The nation's

invaded Afghanistan—an event that forever changed the landscape of Pakistan. To

Zia’s Islamization program.31 As religious seminaries, madrassahs were seen as ideal

madrassahs functioning as recruiting centers were built in historically violent regions,

military resistance fighters.