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1) TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915. April 24, 1985
Doctrine:
The publication of presidential issuances "of a public
nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement
of due process. It is a rule of law that before a
person may be bound by law, he must first be
officially and specifically informed of its contents.
Facts:
The petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel
respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette various
presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementation and administrative orders.
The respondents contend that the publication in the
Official Gazette is not a requirement for the
effectivity of the laws where the laws provide for their
own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since
the presidential issuances in question contain
special provisions as to the date that they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity based on Article 2
of the Civil Code.
The interpretation of the respondent is in accord with
the Court’s construction of said article. In a long line
of decisions, the Court has ruled that publication in
the Official Gazette is necessary in cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for an effectivity
date - for the date of publication is material in
determining its date of effectivity which is the 15 th
day following its publication - but not when the law
itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Issue:
Whether there is still a need for publication of the
presidential decrees with specified dates of
effectivity.
Held:
Yes, there is still a need for publication. Article 2
does not preclude the requirement of publication in
the Officila Gazette, even if the law itself provides for
the date of its effectivity. Section 1 of CA 638
provides that: Section 1. There shall be published in
the Official Gazette [1] all important legislative acts
and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress
of the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4]
such documents or classes of documents as may be
required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal
effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to
give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish
or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not
even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth
Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional
right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality.
The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded
from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a
public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees
that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their
violation or otherwise impose a burden or the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances
which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders
need not be published on the assumption that they
have been circularized to all concerned.
It is needless to add that the publication of
presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of
general applicability" is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential
issuances of general application, which have not
been published, shall have no force and effect.
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2) TAÑADA VS. TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986
Facts:
1. In the first Tanada case the petitioners were
invoking due process in demanding the disclosure of
a number of presidential decrees which they claimed
had not been published as required by law, which is
Art. 2 of the Civil Code. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not
so when it was "otherwise provided," as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In
the decision of the case on April 24, 1985, the Court
affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of
these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents
to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have
no binding force and effect.
2. Petitioners are now moving for a others, and indeed especially, the legislative
reconsideration/clarification of the aforementioned
decision.
Issue: 1. Whether or not the clause “UNLESS IT IS
OTHERWISE PROVIDED” solely refers to the
fifteen-day period and not to the requirement of
publication.
2. Whether or not the word “LAWS” refer to all laws
or only to those of general application.
3. Where should publication of said laws be made?
Held:
1. The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date, without its
previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the
legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or
extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the
original decision, is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its
publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after
such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided. "
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause
publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due
process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern
the legislature could validly provide that a law be
effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not
unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not
because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence.
It must be noted at this point the conclusive
presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been
published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember
that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the
right of the people to information on matters of public
concern," and this certainly applies to, among
enactments of the government.
2. The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not
only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general
albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly.
Thus, all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days
after publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature. Covered by this rule are:
a. Presidential decrees and executive orders
promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are
validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution;
b. Administrative rules and regulations, if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation;
c. Charter of a city;
d. Circulars issued by the Monetary Board if
meant to “fill in the details” of the Central Bank Act
which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required for the following:
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a. Interpretative regulations and those
merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the
public;
b. Letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties;
c. Municipal ordinances, which are covered
by the Local Government Code.
3. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at
all since its purpose is to inform the public of the
contents of the laws, and publication is to be made
in the Official Gazette as decided upon in the first
Tanada case, however, the Court made this
pronouncement:
There is much to be said of the view that the
publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited
readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function
of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider
readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not
the one required or authorized by existing law. As far
as we know, no amendment has been made of
Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has
not pointed to such a law, and we have no
information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has
not yet been published.
At any rate, the Court is not called upon to
rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function.
That function belongs to the legislature. Our task
is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived
and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed
procedure. Consequently, we have no
choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the
Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in
the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a
requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from
such publication or after a different period provided
by the legislature.
3) PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and
SERVICES CORPORATION v THE HON.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON
G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001
Doctrine:
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed
by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties
Facts:
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation is a domestic corporation
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private
respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay
placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for
private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00
each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa
and Cedric P. Leyson.
After the execution of their respective work
contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia
on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-
Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of
petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were
allegedly made to sign a second contract on
February 4, 1985 which changed some of the
provisions of their original contract resulting in the
reduction of some of their benefits and privileges. On
April 1, 1985, their foreign employer allegedly forced
them to sign a third contract which increased their
work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a week
without any corresponding increase in their basic
monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third
contract, the services of private respondents were
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terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated
to the Philippines.
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private
respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the
return of their placement fees and for the payment of
their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case
before the POEA against petitioner Philsa and its
foreign principal, Al-Hejailan.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA
Hearing Officer. On the aspects of the case involving
money claims arising from the employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a
decision dated August 31, 1988, ordering
respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT
AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay
complainants, jointly and severally with its principal
Al – Hejailan. Almost simultaneous with the
promulgation of August 31, 1988 decision of the
POEA on private respondents money claim, POEA
issued separate Order dated August 29, 1988
resolving the recruitment violation aspect of private
respondents’ complaint. In this order, POEA found
petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and
one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from
salaries of workers.
From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which was subsequently denied.
After the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. However, public respondent Secretary
of Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the
assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held
liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1983, which enumerated
the allowable fees which may be collected from
applicants, is void for lack of publication.
Issue: Whether or not POEA Memorandum Circular
No. 11 Series of 1983 is void for lack of publication?
Held: Yes, the said memorandum circular is void for
lack of publication.
In Tañada vs. Tuvera, the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those
of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which
shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same
are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution: Administrative
rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal
in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-
called letter of instructions issued by the
administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties."
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
must likewise be declared ineffective as the same
was never published or filed with the National
Administrative Register. POEA Memorandum Order
No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable
schedule of placement and documentation fees for
private employment agencies or authority holders.
Under the said Order, the maximum amount which
may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was
apparently issued in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code.
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under
consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its
purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation. Considering that
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983
has not as yet been published or filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same is
ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however
that the imposition of administrative sanctions on
petitioner was based not on the questioned
administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article
34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of
the Labor Code were never cited, much less
discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of
the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment.
In fact, the said Orders were consistent in
mentioning that petitioner's violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the
basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that
petitioner was held liable under the said provisions
of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the
Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid
schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Considering that, as, previously
discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of
1983 embodying such a schedule of fees never took
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effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the
administrative sanctions against petitioner
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues
that the questioned administrative circular is not
among those requiring publication contemplated by
Tañada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a
specific group of persons and not to the general
public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument. The fact
that the said circular is addressed only to a specified
group, namely private employment agencies or
authority holders, does not take it away from the
ambit of our ruling in Tañada vs. Tuvera. In the case
of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres,
the administrative circulars questioned therein were
addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the
recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the
Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper
publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or
implemented.
Our pronouncement in Tañada vs. Tuvera is clear
and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations
must be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant to a valid
delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative
regulations, those merely internal in nature, or those
so-called letters of instructions issued by
administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the
performance of their duties. Administrative Circular
No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall
under any of these exceptions.
4) Unciano Paramedical College c CA
G.R. No. 100335, April 7, 1993
Doctrine:
Settled is the rule that when a doctrine of this Court
is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine is applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof Thus, the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the
trial court with grave abuse of discretion.
Facts:
On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena
Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers,
Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes,
respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court,
National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a
petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against
petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc.,
Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha
Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, they
alleged therein that:
1. On July 1989, the above-named
students initiated a petition proposing to the school
authorities the organization of a student council in
the school. They solicited support of their petition
from the studentry by asking the students to endorse
the same with their signatures. They were able to
get at least 180 signatures.
2. On August 18, 1989, the students were
summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were
admonished not to proceed with the proposal
because, according to her, the school does not allow
and had never allowed such an organization.
3. On October 28, 1989, in compliance
with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing,
the above-named students met with Dean Vitug and
Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be
barred from enrollment for the second semester
because the school does not allow their students to
put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to
get their Honorable Dismissal.
4. On November 6, 1989, the students
again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that
they were no longer allowed to enroll because they
are allegedly members of the National Union of
Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League
of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student
organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug
addicts.' The students asked for proof of these
accusations but were not given any.
5. On 29 November 1989, the students
were informed that the President had unilaterally
refused to allow them to enroll and it was up to their
parents to request or appeal to the school officials to
change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and
Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school officials
to request that their children be allowed to enroll .
Dr. Moral informed them that the Board of Trustees
will have to decide on these requests.
6. On 11 December 1989, the students
were informed that the Board of Trustees had
refused to grant the parents' request."
The trial court issued a temporary restraining order
effective May 17, 1990, enjoining petitioner school
from not enrolling private respondents in its College
of Nursing and setting the hearing for the issuance
of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990.
Petitioners filed an opposition but the RTC still
ordered the school to allow the students to enroll.
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC
and based its the ruling in the recent case of Ariel
Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, , May 20,
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1990, the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled
its decision in Alcuaz and declared thus:
“The contract between the school and the student is
not an ordinary contract. It is imbued with public
interest, considering the high priority given by the
Constitution to education and the grant to the State
of supervisory and regulatory powers over all
educational institutions. When a student registers in
a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the
entire school year
'Every student has the right to enroll in any school,
college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided,
that except in the case of academic delinquency and
violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is
presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the entire
period he is expected to his complete his course
without prejudice to his right to transfer.'
Hence the instant appeal.
Issue: If the Ariel Non Doctrine should be applied
retroactively to govern and invalidate the legal
effects of the incidents that took place prior to its
adoption and which incidents were proper and valid
under the ALCUAZ doctrine prevailing at the time
said incident took place.
Held: No, the Non doctrine should not be applied to
the instant case. Under the then prevailing Alcuaz
doctrine which was promulgated on May 2, 1988, the
contract between them and private respondents was
validly terminated upon the end of the first semester
of school year 1989-1990.
Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non,
et al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was
promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when
the termination of the contract between them had
long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who
relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof. Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction was issued by the trial court with grave
abuse of discretion.
The ruling in the Non case should not be given a
retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case,
which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners
and other schools similarly situated who relied on
the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2,
1988, which recognized the termination of contract
theory.
The contract between the parties was validly
terminated upon the end of the first semester of
school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is
the status quo. The trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction which ordered petitioners to
allow private respondents "to enroll for the first
semester of school year 1990-1190." 16 Guided by
the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore
the status quo but will go a step backward, then
restore the condition preceding the status quo.
Private respondents do not possess any clear legal
right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not
obliged legally to re-admit them.
5) Cui v Arellano University
G.R. No. L-15127; May 30, 1961
Facts:
Plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the
defendant university from the school year 1948-
1949. He finished his law studies in the defendant
university up to and including the first semester of
the fourth year. During all the time he was studying
law in the defendant university, he was awarded
scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the
end of each semester and when his scholarship
grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of
tuition fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and
refunded to him by the latter from the first semester
up to and including the first semester of his last year
in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total of
P1,033.87. However, before defendant awarded to
plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he
was made to sign the following contract covenant
and agreement which provides that in consideration
of the scholarship granted to him by the University,
he waives his right to transfer to another school
without having refunded to the University
(defendant) the equivalent of his scholarship cash.
For the last semester of his law studies,
plaintiff enrolled in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University and graduated therefrom. After
graduating in law he applied to take the bar
examination. Plaintiff then petitioned the defendant
university to issue to him the needed transcripts.
However, the defendant refused until after he had
paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded
to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid
to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant
in this case.
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Issue: Whether or not the said provision of the
contract is valid.
Held: No, the stipulation in question is contrary to
public policy and, hence, null and void. The
practice of awarding scholarships to attract students
and keep them in school is not a good custom nor
has it received some kind of social and practical
confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. The University of the Philippines
which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free
scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. The
same goes for leading colleges and universities of
the United States after which our educational
practices or policies are patterned. In these
institutions scholarships are granted not to attract
and to keep brilliant students in school for their
propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted
students in whom society has an established interest
or a first lien.
6) People vs Jabinal
55 SCRA 607
Facts:
On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be
in possession of a revolver without the requisite
license or permit. He claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or
permit, he had appointments as Secret Agent from
the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as
Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial
Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry
the said firearm. The accused further contended that
in view of his appointments, he was entitled to
acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s
decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People
vs. Lucero.
The trial court found the accused criminally liable for
illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the
ground that the rulings in Macarandang* and in
Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs.
Mapa**.
The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the appellant should be
acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’s
rulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.
Held: The appellant was acquitted.
Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in
themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of
what the law means; this is the reason why Article 8
of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial
decisions applying and interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The
interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court
constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date
the law was originally passed, since the court’s
construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus
construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule
supported by numerous authorities is a restatement
of the legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim
obtinet”—the interpretation placed upon the written
law by a competent court has the force of law. The
doctrine laid down in Lucero and in Macarandang
was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of
the land, at the time appellant was found in
possession of the firearm and when he was
arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine
was overruled in Mapa case in 1967,but when a
doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a
different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be
applied prospectively, and should not apply to
parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted
on the faith thereof.
Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm
pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in
Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no
criminal liability would attach to his possession of
said firearm, the appellant should be absolved. The
appellant may not be punished for an act which at
the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
*The accused were acquitted for through their
appointment as confidential/secret agent they were
deemed to be “peace officers”. Peace officers had
the privilege of carrying firearms without license.
**Mapa was convicted although he was a
secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that thelaw
did not explicitly provide that secret/confidential
agents are among those who are exempted from
acquiring a license to carry a firearm.
7) Van Dorn vs. Romillio
139 SCRA 139
Doctrine:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
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provided they are valid according to their national
law
Facts:
Petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States. They
were married in Hongkong in 1972. After the
marriage, they established their residence in the
Philippines. They begot two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. The
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in
1982 and petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn. In 1983, private
respondent filed suit against petitioner alleging the
petitioner’s business in Ermita (the Galeon Shop) is
a conjugal property of the parties and prayed that
private respondent be declared with right to manage
said property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgement in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court. The Court
below denied the motion to dismiss since the
property involved is located in the Philippines so that
the Divorce Decree had no bearing in this case. The
denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.
Issue: Whether the foreign divorce on the parties
has affected the alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
Held: It is true that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police
and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national
law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private
respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner.
He would have no standing to sue in the case below
as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision
of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his
right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under
our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be
obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should
not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.
9) ANDO vs. DFA
EDELINA T. ANDO v. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS
G.R. No. 195432; August 27, 2014
FACTS:
Petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese
National. After one year, Yuichiro Kobayashi
obtained and was granted a divorce in Japan. Said
Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. Believing in
good faith that said divorce capacitated her to
remarry and that by such she reverted to her single
status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando. In the
meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken.
Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her
Philippine passport to indicate her surname with her
husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the
Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot
be issued to her until she can prove by competent
court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise
declared.
Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner filed with
the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief praying that
her marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y.
Ando must be honored, considered and declared
valid, until otherwise declared by a competent court.
Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is
and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y
Tungol.’
RTC dismissed the Petition for want of cause and
action for not complying with the requirements set
forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining
a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of
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absolute divorce in our country, thus not entitled to
the reliefs prayed for. Petitioner’s allegation that
since no judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage
with Ando was rendered does not make the same
valid because such declaration under Article 40 of
the Family Code is applicable only in case of re-
marriage. Petitioner moved for Reconsideration but
was denied. Hence, this Petition for Review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a Petition for Declaratory
Relief is the proper remedy to compel the DFA to
issue a new passport to petitioner under her
second husband’s name.
2. Whether or not petitioner’s second marriage is
valid.
HELD:
1. With respect to her prayer to compel the DFA
to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed
a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC.
She should have first appealed before the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate
entreaty was to question the DFA’s refusal to
issue a passport to her under her second
husband’s name. The IRR of R.A. 8239 provides
that before a married woman may obtain a
passport under the name of her spouse, she
needed to present the following: (1) the original
or certified true copy of her marriage contract
and one photocopy thereof; (2) a Certificate of
Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling
Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated
by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that
has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce
is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that
she would not be issued a Philippine passport
under her second husband’s name. Should her
application for a passport be denied, the
remedies available to her are provided in
Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus: “Any
person who feels aggrieved as a result of the
application of this Act of the implementing rules
and regulations issued by the Secretary shall
have the right to appeal to the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial
review may be had to the Courts in due course.”
She should have filed an appeal with the
Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of
her application for a passport, after having
complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239.
2. With respect to her prayer for the recognition
of her second marriage as valid, petitioner
should have filed, instead, a petition for the
judicial recognition of her foreign divorce
from her first husband.
While it has been ruled that a petition for the
authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory
relief,we are still unable to grant the prayer of
petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to
be insufficient proof or evidence presented on
record of both the national law of her first
husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the
divorce decree under that national law. Hence,
any declaration as to the validity of the divorce
can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce
decree and the national law of her alien spouse,
in an action instituted in the proper forum.
9) QUITA vs. CA
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998
Facts: Fe Quita and Arturo Padlan, both Filipinos,
were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941, but
not blessed with any children. Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, USA, submitting as
evidence their agreement to live separately from
each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. A decree of divorce was granted on July
23, 1954. After 3 weeks, Fe married Felix Tupaz in
San Francisco, but eventually ended into a divorce.
For the third time, she married again in USA.
April 16, 1972, Arturo died leaving no will. August 31,
1972, Lino Javier Inciong filed with RTC QC a
petition for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the
Philippine Trust Company. Blandina Dandan,
surviving spouse of Arturo, and their children
opposed the petition. Later, Ruperto Padlan,
claiming to be the sole surviving brother of deceased
Arturo, intervened. October, 7, 1987, Fe moved fot
the immediate declaration of heirs of deceased
Arturo and distribution of his estate.
The trial court disregarded the divorce between Fe
and Arturo, and expressed the view that their
marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
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Issues: Whether or not Blandina’s marriage to Arturo
was void ab initio.
Whether or not Fe can be declared the primary
beneficiary of Arturo’s estate.
Held: No, Blandina’s marriage to Arturo was valid,
thus, Fe cannot be declared a beneficiary to Arturo’s
estate.
At the time Fe obtained a divorce decree against
Arturo in San Francisco, she was already an alien
and no longer a Filipino citizen. Hence, the divorce
decree is valid in the Philippines, since it is
considered valid in Fe’s national law, which is the
USA law.
10) AZNAR VS. GARCIA
7 SCRA 95
Facts:
CIF of Davao directed the executor to reimburse
Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid
by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy,
and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the
residue of the property to be enjoyed during her
lifetime, and in case of death without issue, ½ of said
residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C
Borton, etc, in accordance with the provisions of the
will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. Helen
Christensen Garcia filed an opposition, as it deprives
her of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child,
she having been declared by the Court as one. The
court ruled that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen
of the United States of America and of the State of
California at the time of his death and he was
domiciled in the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine Law shall
govern the administration of the will of Edward
Christensen.
Held: The Court ruled that the Philippine Law shall
govern the testamentary disposition of Edward
Christensen.
Article 16 of the Civil Code provides that the national
law shall govern intestate and testamentary
successions. National law refers to the private law of
the state of which the decedent is a citizen, in the
case at bar, the private law of the State of California.
Article 94 of the Civil Code of State of California
refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar.
11) Bayot v CA
2008
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
G.R. No. 155635
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT,
petitioner, vs.VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,
respondent.
FACTS:
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979
in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong
City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA. On November
27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave
birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From
then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship
seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in
1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican
Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of
the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca
personally appeared, while Vicente was duly
represented by counsel.
DECISION OF COURTS:
(1) Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Dominican
Republic - ordering the dissolution of the couple's
marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix. On March
21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
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Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. On June
8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter
alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce.
(2) RTC: denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application
for support pendente lite
Following the denial of his motion for reconsideration
of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
(3) CA: issued the desired TRO.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino
citizen at the time the divorce judgment was
rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22,
1996; and
(2) Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if
so, what are its consequent legal effects?
RULING:
(1) Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of
This Case. When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca,
She Was not a Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet
Recognized as One. From the foregoing disquisition,
it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status
of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino
citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
(2) The Divorce is valid. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to
each other.
As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the
marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x
x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."
The Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v.
Recio that a foreign divorce can be recognized here,
provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and
as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.
Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly
an American citizen when she secured the divorce
and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of
the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here,
sufficient.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero
of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition
will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate
the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an
American citizen on February 22, 1996.
In determining whether or not a divorce secured
abroad would come within the pale of the country's
policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's
underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion
to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with
the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of
nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.
Bayot vs CA (G.R. No. 155635, November 7,
2008)
Principle: Consequent to the dissolution of the
marriage, husband could no longer be subject to a
husband’s obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to wife. The
Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. As to the issue of back
support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered
by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action
for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for
the support of Alix can be proved as well as the
earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The
trial court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if
any, considering that support includes provisions
until the child concerned shall have finished her
education.
Facts: Vicente and Rebecca were married in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong
City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate identified
Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American
citizen born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar
Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.
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Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine
Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and
Rebecca’s marital relationship seemed to have
soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated
divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. The
Dominican court issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,
ordering the dissolution of the couple’s marriage and
“leaving them to remarry after completing the legal
requirements,” but giving them joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same
court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97, settling
the couple’s property relations pursuant to an
Agreement they executed. Said agreement
specifically stated that the “conjugal property which
they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of
the real property and all the improvements and
personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia
Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.”
Rebecca executed an Affidavit of
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an
American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente
have been living separately; and that she is carrying
a child not of Vicente. She filed petition before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente’s alleged
psychological incapacity. In it, Rebecca also sought
the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains
with application for support pendente lite for her and
Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to
pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter
alia, the grounds of lack of cause of action and that
the petition is barred by the prior judgment of
divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and
moved for the allowance of her application for
support pendente lite. To the motion to dismiss,
Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her
Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the DOJ, and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.
Vicente and Rebecca commenced several criminal
complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente
filed adultery and perjury complaints against
Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged
Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
RTC denied Vicente’s motion to dismiss
and granting Rebecca’s application for support
pendente lite; repsondent (Vicente) is hereby
ordered to remit the amount of Php 220,000.00 a
month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition. RTC
further declared that as to the grant of support
pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere
allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not
operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.
Following the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the above RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The
CA issued the desired TRO. The appellate court
granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. Rebecca moved but was
denied reconsideration. Thus, Rebecca petition for
certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635. Pending
resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 (declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente’s alleged psychological incapacity with
application of support pendente lite), and set aside
incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the
case. To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted
Vicente’s motion to dismiss Rebecca seasonably
filed a motion for reconsideration of the above
Decision, but this recourse was denied in the equally
assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution. Hence, Rebecca’s
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45,
docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
Issue: Whether the judgment of divorce is valid and,
if so, what are its consequent legal effects?
Held: SC find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above
elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later
recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented
herself in public documents as an American citizen.
At the very least, she chose, before, during, and
shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to
govern her marital relationship. Second, she
secured personally said divorce as an American
citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees.
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was
bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the
property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement
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executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree
No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and
duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce
secured by Rebecca was valid.
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata
effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum
between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of
matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca
are no longer husband and wife to each other.
Consequent to the dissolution of the
marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband’s obligation under the Civil Code. He
cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe
respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly
clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. One thing is clear from a
perusal of Rebecca’s underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicente’s motion to dismiss and Rebecca’s
opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence
attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of
action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit
which presupposes the existence of a marriage. To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of
action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain. With the valid foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified.
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal
obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not
clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been
insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for
declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years
old. Hence, the issue of back support, which
allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is
best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the
support of Alix can be proved as well as the earning
capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial
court can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any,
considering that support includes provisions until the
child concerned shall have finished her education.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the
Court no longer need to delve into the issue
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca’s
right to support pendente lite. As it were, her
entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the
tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094
for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of
Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed
any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the
claim for support pendente lite.
12) BELLIS vs. BELLIS
20 SCRA 358
Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas,
United States. He had 5 legitimate children with his
first wife, 3 legitimate children with hi second wife,
and had 3 illegitimate children. On August 5, 1952,
Amos Bellis executed a will in the Philippines. July 8,
1958, Amos died.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and
Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they
were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children of Amos Bellis, and therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased. Under the Laws of Texas,
there are no forced heirs of legitimes.
Issue: Which law must apply – Texas Law or
Philippine Law?
Held: The decedent’s national law, which is the
Texas law, governs the order of succession, the
amount of successional rights, the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of the will and the capacity to
succeed.
It is not disputed that the decedent was both a
national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time
of his death.
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A provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with
Philippine Law and not with his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should
govern.
Since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will
and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas Law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos
Bellis.
of all shares of stock of several mining companies
and to his brother and sister the same amount. To
his children, he gave a legacy of only P6,000 each.
Magdalena, his wife, and her 2 children opposed the
validity of the testamentary provisions contending
that the will deprived them of their legitime.
Magdalena alleged that the trial court erred in
recognizing the Reno divorce secured by the testator
from his Filipino wife Magdalena, and that divorce
should be declared a nullity in this jurisdiction.
According to the laws of the State of Nevada, no
right to share in the inheritance in favor of a divorced
wife. The divorce was granted to the testator on May
20, 1922.
Issue: Whether Philippine laws or the law of the
State of Nevada should apply.
Held: The testator died in 1944, thus, the old Civil
Code governs. The old Civil Code provides that
successional rights to personal property are to be
earned by the national law of the person whose
succession is in question.
The foreign law, specifically Section 9905, compiled
Newada Laws, was introduced as evidence. That
law can be taken judicial notice by the Court, without
proof of such law having been offered at the hearing
of the project of partition.
According to Article 10 of the Old Civil Code, the
validity of testamentary dispositions are governed by
the national law of the testator, and it has been
decided without dispute that the national law of the
testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows
a testator to dispose of all his property according to
his will.
13) LLORENTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000
Facts:
Lorenzo (enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from
March 10, 1927 – Septermber 30, 1957) and Paula
were married on February 22, 1937. Before the
outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo went back to
the US while Paula stayed in the conjugal home at
Camarines Sur. On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo
was naturalized as an American citizen. He visited
the Philippines and discovered that his wife, Paula
was pregnant and was living in with his brother
Ceferino.
On November 1, 1951, Lorenzo filed for divorce with
the Superior Court of the State of California and was
granted.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia in
Manila and begot 3 children. On March 13, 1981,
Lorenzo executed a notarized Last Will and
Testament. On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed a
petition with the RTC for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament, moving that Alicia be
appointed as Special Administratrix of his estate, but
was denied because Lorenzo was still alive. On
January 24, 1984, trial court admitted the will to
probate. On June 11, 1985, Lorenzo died. On
September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court
a petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate in her favor, contending that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse and that the
testamentary provisions in Lorenzo’s will encroached
on her legitime and ½ share in the conjugal property.
Issue: Whether or not Paula is entitled to inherit from
Lorenzo’s estate.
Held: Foreign law should apply. Lorenzo’s divorce
decree with Paula is recognized as valid.
Foreign laws must be alleged and proved. Our
courts do not take judicial notice of them.
The fact is Lorenzo became an American citizen
long before and at the time of 1) his divorce from
Paula; 2) marriage to Alicia; 3) execution of his will;
and 4) death. Issues arising from these incidents are
governed by foreign law.
Both RTC and CA decisions in hastily applying
Philippine law are erroneous. Here’s why:
1) Aliens may obtain divorces abroad provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, LORENZO’s divorce from PAULA was valid
and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of
comity.
2) LORENZO’s will is valid. Article 17 The
forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other
public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed. In this case,
whether the will was executed in accordance with
the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
The trial court should not that Congress did not
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intend to extend the same succession (system of
legitime) to foreign nationals.
Llorente vs CA
GR 124371 November 23, 2000
Lessons Applicable: Divorce
Laws Applicable: Art. 15, Art. 17, Art. 26 FC
FACTS:
Alicia( 2nd wife) ß Lorenzo N. Llorente --- Paula (1ST
wife) --- Ceferino Llorente (brother)
Crisologo Llorente(son)
 Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted
serviceman of the United States Navy from
March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957
 February 22, 1937: Lorenzo and Paula
Llorente were married before a parish priest,
Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur
 Before the outbreak of the Pacific War,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home
 November 30, 1943: Lorenzo was
admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization
 1945: When Lorenzo was granted an
accrued leave to visit his wife and he visited
the Philippines, He discovered that his wife
Paula was pregnant and was “living in” and
having an adulterous relationship with his
brother, Ceferino Llorente
 December 4, 1945: Paula gave birth to a
boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of
Nabua as Crisologo Llorente with the
certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the father’s name
was left blank
 Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live
with her
 February 2, 1946: the couple drew and
signed a written agreement which was
witnessed by Paula’s father and stepmother
to the effect that
1. all the family allowances allotted by the United
States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other
obligations for Paula’s daily maintenance and
support would be suspended
2. they would dissolve their marital union in
accordance with judicial proceedings
3. they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during
their marital life; and
4. Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her
adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her
fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo
peacefully.
 November 16, 1951: Lorenzo returned and
filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of
San Diego
 December 4, 1952: the divorce decree
became final
 January 16, 1958: Lorenzo married Alicia
F. Llorente in Manila and lived together as
husband and wife and bore 3 children: Raul,
Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente
 March 13, 1981: Lorenzo executed a Last
Will and Testament where he bequeathed all
his property to Alicia and their three children
 December 14, 1983: Lorenzo filed with the
RTC, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the
probate and allowance of his last will and
testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia
be appointed Special Administratrix of his
estate
 January 18, 1984: RTC denied the motion
for the reason that the Lorenzo was still alive
 January 24, 1984: RTC admitted finding
that the will was duly executedthe will to
probate
 June 11, 1985: before the proceedings
could be terminated, Lorenzo died
 RTC on the petition for letters of
administration filed by Paula over Lorenzo’s
estate contending that she was the surviving
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spouse and WITHOUT terminating the testate
proceedings filed by Alicia, gave due course
to Paula’s petition
o divorce decree granted to the late
Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato at Manila is void
 Paula T. Llorente: 1/3 estate
and ½ conjugal estate
 illegitimate children, Raul,
Luz and Beverly: 1/3 estate
 RTC denied Alicia’s motion for
reconsideration but modified that Raul and
Luz Llorente are not children “legitimate or
otherwise” of Lorenzo since they were not
legally adopted by him thus, Beverly Llorente
as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo,
entitles her to 1/3 of the estate and one-third
(1/3) of the free portion of the estate
 CA: Affirmed with modification
ISSUE: W/N the divorce is valid and proven
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED. REVERSES the
decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce
granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente
by the Superior Court of the State of California in
and for the County of San Diego, made final on
December 4, 1952. REMANDS the cases to the
court of origin for determination of the intrinsic
validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and
determination of the parties’ successional rights
allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the
trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch
to settle the estate of the deceased within the
framework of the Rules of Court.
 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:
o nationality principle in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces, the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality
o Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their
national law
 Quita v. Court of Appeals:
o once proven that NO longer a Filipino citizen
when he obtained the divorce, the ruling in Van Dorn
would become applicable
 Divorce of Lorenzo H. Llorente from his
first wife Paula was valid and recognized in
this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now,
the effects of this divorce (as to the
succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the
trial court.
 The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his
property to his second wife and children by
her is glaringly shown in the will he executed.
We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since
he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws
on “family rights and duties, status, condition
and legal capacity.
 Whether the will is intrinsically valid and
who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best
proved by foreign law which must be pleaded
and proved.
 Whether the will was executed in
accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In
fact, the will was duly probated.
14) ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, Petitioner, v.
CANDELARIA GUERSEY- DALAYGON,
Respondent. June 8, 2006
SUMMARY: Respondent Candelaria filed an
action to annul order of Trial Court in Spec.
proceeding no. 9625 obtained by Petitioner
Ancheta (administrator of the estate).
Respondent alleged extrinsic fraud on the part of
Petitioner for failing to submit in evidence the
laws of Maryland which govern the will of Sps.
Audrey and Ancheta. The said action of the
petitioner resulted to the reduction of
Respondent’s share in the estate. The Court
ruled in favour of Respondent, saying that
petitioner was remiss in his duties as
administrator for failing to follow the express
terms of Aubrey’s will.
FACTS:
There are two wills involved in this case.
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1. Audrey’s will, through which she bequeathed
her entire estate to husband Richard upon death
on July 29, 1979. The will was admitted to
probate in Maryland, U.S. It was also admitted to
probate here in the Philippines. PH Court
appointed petitioner Ancheta as ancillary
administrator.
2. Richard’s will, through which he bequeathed his
entire estate to respondent Candelaria, save for
his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors,
Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle. The will was
probated both in Maryland and the Philippines.
Atty. Quasha or any member of Quasha Law
offices was appointed ancillary administrator.
Sps. Richard and Audrey were American citizens
who resided in the Philippines. They left an
adopted daughter named Kyle. When Audrey died,
Richard married respondent Candeleria in 1981. He
had 2 children with his second wife.
There are also two spec pro cases involved:
Spec. Pr. 9625: (Important! The ruling in
this case is the one being annulled)
Petitioner Ancheta as administrator filed an
inventory of Audrey’s estate (conjugal share
in real property in Forbes, current account,
shares of Stock in A/G interiors). In 1987,
petitioner filed in a motion to declare Richard
and Kyle as heirs of Audrey. He also filed for
a project of partition of Audrey’s estate. The
motion and project of partition was granted
and approved by the trial court. The trial
court also issued an Order, directing the
Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel TCT
No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to
issue a new title in the joint names of the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey ( undivided
interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest);
directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc.
to transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W.
Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle;
and directing the Citibank to release the
amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary
administrator for distribution to the heirs.
Spec. Pr. 888: (Important also since it is
in this case where the respondent found
out that her share of the estate was
reduced) The ancillary administrator in
Richard’s will filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in
the Makati property was allocated to
respondent, while 3/5 thereof were allocated
to Richards three children. Respondent
opposed on the ground that under the law of
the State of Maryland, a legacy passes to
the legatee the entire interest of the testator
in the property subject of the legacy. She
argued that since Richard left his entire
estate to her, then his entire undivided
interest in Makati property in Aubrey’s will
should be likewise be awarded to her. The
Trial Court adjudicated Richard’s entire
undivided interest in the Makati property to
respondent.
Respondent Candelaria filed with the (CA) an
amended complaint for the annulment of the trial
courts orders in Special Proceeding No. 9625. She
contended that Petitioner wilfully breached his
fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws of the
State of Maryland on the distribution of Audrey’s
estate in accordance with her will. Petitioner
contended that he acted in good faith in submitting
the project of partition before the trial court in Special
Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no knowledge of
the State of Maryland. Petitioner also alleged that
the orders sought to be annulled are already final
and executory, and cannot be set aside.
CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial
courts in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was
denied by the CA. Petitioner now comes to this court
for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not orders in Sp.
Proceeding no. 9625 are already final and
binding
2. Whether or not Petitioner
committed fraud in the
performance of his duties as
administrator in obtaining orders
in Spec. Pro no. 9625
ARGUMENT OF THE PARTIES:
Petitioner: He reiterates that he acted in good faith
in performing his duties as an ancillary administrator.
He maintains that at the time of the filing of the
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project of partition, he was not aware of the relevant
laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition
was made in accordance with Philippine laws.
Petitioner also contends that respondent’s cause of
action had already prescribed because as early as
1984, respondent was already well aware of the
terms of Audrey’s will, the complaint was filed only in
1993.
Respondent: She argues that petitioners breach of
his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of
Aubrey’s estate amounted to extrinsic fraud.
According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound
to follow the express terms of Aubrey’s will, and his
denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot
stand because petitioner is a senior partner in a
prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the
relevant laws. As to prescription, she argued that
she had no opportunity to question petitioner’s acts
since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No.
9625, and it was only after Atty. Ancheta filed the
project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888,
reducing her inheritance in the estate of Richard that
she was prompted to seek another counsel to
protect her interest.
RULING:
1. The order is not yet final and
binding.
A decree of distribution of the estate of a
deceased person vests the title to the
land of the estate in the distributees,
which, if erroneous may be corrected by
a timely appeal. Once it becomes final,
its binding effect is like any other
judgment in rem.However, in
exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set
aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.
The petition for annulment of the order
in Spec. 9625 was filed before the CA in
1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The applicable
law is B.P. 129 which provides that an
annulment of judgment may be based
on the ground that a judgment is void for
want of jurisdiction or that the judgment
was obtained by extrinsic fraud. For
fraud to become a basis for annulment
of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or
actual, and must be brought within four
years from the discovery thereof.
Records bear the fact that the filing of
the project of partition of Richard’s
estate (Special Proceeding No. M-888)
were all done in 1991. Respondent
cannot be faulted for letting the assailed
orders to lapse into finality since it was
only through Special Proceeding No. M-
888 that she came to comprehend the
ramifications of petitioner’s acts. Since
the action for annulment was filed in
1993, clearly, the same has not yet
prescribed.
2. The petitioner’s action amounted to
extrinsic fraud.
In one case, the Court ruled that there is
extrinsic fraud within the meaning of
Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it
is one the effect of which prevents a
party from hearing a trial, or real
contest, or from presenting all of his
case to the court, or where it operates
upon matters, not pertaining to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in
which it was procured so that there is
not a fair submission of the controversy.
In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to
any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
in the litigation which is committed
outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party has been prevented
from exhibiting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him
by his opponent. The overriding
consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme
of the prevailing litigant prevented a
party from having his day in court. As
administrator, he occupies a position of
the highest trust and confidence, and he
is required to exercise reasonable
diligence and act in entire good faith in
the performance of that trust.
Petitioner’s failure to proficiently
manage the distribution of Audrey’s
estate according to the terms of her will
and as dictated by the applicable law
amounted to extrinsic fraud.
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It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey
was an American citizen domiciled in
Maryland, U.S.A. During the reprobate
of her will in Special Proceeding No.
9625, it was shown, among others, that
at the time of Audrey’s death, she was
residing in the Philippines but is
domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. Being a
foreign national, the intrinsic validity of
Audrey’s will, especially with regard as
to who are her heirs, is governed by her
national law, as provided in Article 16 of
the Civil Code -
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal
property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
intestate and testamentary succession, both
with respect to the order of succession
and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the
nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may
be found.
Further, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on
Allowance of Will Proved Outside the Philippines
and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:
SEC. 4. Estate, how administered. When a
will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of
administration with the will annexed, and
such letters testamentary or of
administration, shall extend to all the estate
of the testator in the Philippines. Such
estate, after the payment of just debts
and expenses of administration, shall be
disposed of according to such will, so far
as such will may operate upon it; and the
residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is
provided by law in cases of estates in the
Philippines belonging to persons who are
inhabitants of another state or country.
Petitioner was duty-bound to introduce
in evidence the pertinent law of the
State of Maryland. He admitted that he
failed to introduce in evidence the law
of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the
presumption that such law is the same
as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. The obvious result was that
there was no fair submission of the
case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.
As asserted by respondent, petitioner is
a senior partner in a prestigious law
firm, with a big legal staff and a large
library. He had all the legal resources to
determine the applicable law. It was
incumbent upon him to exercise his
functions as ancillary administrator with
reasonable diligence, and to discharge
the trust reposed on him faithfully.
Unfortunately, petitioner failed to
perform his fiduciary duties. The CA
aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in
his responsibilities as ancillary
administrator of Audrey’s estate. The
CA likewise observed that the
distribution made by petitioner was
prompted by his concern over Kyle,
whom petitioner believed should equally
benefit from the Makati property.
II. HUMAN RELATIONS
15) DIAZ VS ENCANTO
Diaz v Encanto et al. (G.R. No. 171303)
Date: January 20, 2016
Ponente: Justice Leonardo-de Castro
Facts:
Petitioner Diaz has been a professor in UP since
1963. In 1988, she applied for sabbatical leave with
pay for one year. The Chair of the Broadcast
Department initially recommended to CMC Dean
Encanto that Diaz’s sabbatical application be
granted. Thereafter, Encanto referred Diaz’s
sabbatical application to the Secretary of U.P.,
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recommending its denial. Encanto also requested
the her salary be withheld effective July 1, 1988 until
further notice since her sabbatical application has
not yet been approved and that she did not teach
that semester.
On July 4, 1988, it was recommended that Diaz be
granted a leave without pay in order to enable the
CMC to hire a substitute. The next day, the U.P.’s
Secretary referred to the Vice-President for
Academic Affairs, the fact of denial of such
sabbatical request, for his own recommendation to
the U.P. President. On July 8, 1988, Abad returned
the Reference Slip indicating therein that Diaz had
promised him to put down in writing the historical
backdrop to the latest denial of her sabbatical leave,
but she did not do so. On Diaz’s request to teach for
that semester, the Vice Chancellor for Academic
Affairs and the HRDO Director instructed Encanto
that until Prof. Diaz officially reports for duty,
accomplishes the Certificate of Report for Duty, and
the Dean of CMC confirms her date of actual report
for duty, she is considered absent without official
leave.
On November 8, 1988, Abad, issued a Memorandum
to Diaz to confirm as valid Encanto’s reason of
shortage of teaching staff in denying her sabbatical.
Later, he also informed Diaz of her lack of service
during the first semester of AY 1988-89, hence she
is not entitled to be paid. While Diaz was able to
teach during the second semester of AY 1988-89,
she was not able to claim her salaries for her refusal
to submit the Report for Duty Form.
Diaz instituted a complaint against U.P., Abueva,
Encanto, Tabujara and Abad with the Pasig RTC
praying that the latter be adjudged, jointly and
severally to pay her damages. She claimed, among
others, that
They conspired together as joint tortfeasors, in not
paying her salaries from July 1, 1988 in the first
semester of academic year 1988-89, for the entire
period when her sabbatical application was left
unresolved, as well as the salaries she earned from
teaching in the second semester from November
1988 to May 1989. She likewise claimed moral and
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. The RTC
held that Diaz was entitled to a sabbatical leave and
that they delay in the resolution of her application
was unreasonable and unconscionable but the CA
reversed it on appeal, ruling that there was neither
negligence nor bad faith in denying her application
and withholding her salaries.
Issue: Whether or not the respondents acted in bad
faith when they resolved Diaz’s application for leave
thus entitling her to damages
Ruling: No, they did not act in bad faith. Diaz’s
complaint for recovery of damages before the RTC
was based on the alleged bad faith of the
respondents in denying her application for sabbatical
leave vis-à-vis Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Xxxxx Article 19 of the Civil Code “prescribes a
‘primordial limitation on all rights’ by setting certain
standards that must be observed in the exercise
thereof.” Abuse of right under Article 19 exists when
the following elements are present: (1) there is a
legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith;
(3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
xxxxx
The Ombudsman and all three courts, starting from
the RTC to this Court, have already established that
a sabbatical leave is not a right and therefore
petitioner Diaz cannot demand its grant. It does not
matter that there was only one reason for the denial
of her application, as the approving authorities found
that such reason was enough. Moreover, not only
the Court of Appeals but also the Ombudsman, and
this Court, have ruled that the respondents did not
act in bad faith when petitioner Diaz’s sabbatical
leave application was denied. Those three separate
rulings verily must be given great weight in the case
at bar.
The Court does not find any reason to disregard
those findings, especially when our own perusal of
the evidence showed no traces of bad faith or malice
in the respondents’ denial of petitioner Diaz’s
application for sabbatical leave. They processed her
application in accordance with their usual procedure
– with more leeway, in fact, since petitioner Diaz was
given the chance to support her application when
she was asked to submit a historical background;
and the denial was based on the recommendation of
respondent Encanto, who was in the best position to
know whether petitioner Diaz’s application should be
granted or not.
xxxxx
Nevertheless, on the question of whether or not
there was bad faith int he delay of the resolution of
petitioner Diaz’s sabbatical leave application, the
Court still rules in the negative. “It is an elementary
rule in this jurisdiction that good faith is presumed
and that the burden of proving bad faith rests upon
the party alleging the same.” Petitioner Diaz has
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failed to prove bad faith on the part of the
respondents. There is nothing in the records to show
that the respondents purposely delayed the
resolution of her application to prejudice and injure
her. She has not even shown that the delay of six
months in resolving a sabbatical leave application
has never happened prior to her case. On the
contrary, any delay that occurred was due to the fact
that petitioner Diaz’s application for sabbatical leave
did not follow the usual procedure; hence, the
processing of said application took time.
xxxxx
Given that the respondents have not abused their
rights, they should not be held liable for any
damages sustained by petitioner Diaz. “The law
affords no remedy for damages resulting from an act
which does not amount to a legal wrong. Situations
like this have been appropriately denominated
damnum absque injuria. Similarly, the Court cannot
grant petitioner Diaz’s claim for attorney’s fees as no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.
“Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate or to
incur expenses to protect his rights, still attorney’s
fees may not be awarded where there is no sufficient
showing of bad faith in a party’s persistence in a
case other than an erroneous conviction of the
righteousness of his cause.
16) Albenson Enterprises Corporation vs. CA
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
FACTS:
Petitioner Albenson Enterprises delivered to
Guaranteed Industries, located at 3267 V. Mapa St.
Sta.Mesa, Manila, mild steel plates. As part
payment, Albenson was given a check drawn
against the account of E.L. Woodworks. However,
when the check was presented for payment, it was
dishonored because of lack of funds. This led
Albenson to trace the origin. This led them to a
certain Eugenio Baltao. They made afterwards an
extrajudicial demand to private respondent Baltao.
But he denied that he signed on the check because
Guaranteed Industries was already inexistent. This
led Albenson to file a criminal complaint for violation
of BP 22. However, it was later found out that his
namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, his son, was the one
who manages E.L. Woodworks located on the
ground floor of the Baltao Building. Nevertheless,
Assistant Fiscal Sumaway filed the information. But
Provincial Fiscal Castro instructed the trial fiscal to
dismiss the information. Because of the unjust filing
of the criminal complaint, Baltao filed a complaint for
damages against Albenson Enterprises. The trial
court ruled in favor of Baltao. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the lower court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the criminal
complaint by Albenson Enterprises constituted
an abuse of right?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
Under Article 19 of the Civil Code, the following are
the requisites for abuse of right: (1) There is a legal
right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3)
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.
Article 20 speaks of the general sanction for all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for
their own sanction. Article 21 deals with acts contra
bonus mores, and has the following elements: 1)
There is an act which is legal; 2) but which is
contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or
public policy; 3) and it is done with intent to injure. A
closer look at the said articles and it can be revealed
that Articles 19 and 21 share a common element:
that the act is intentional. Article 20, however, does
not distinguish. It is dependent on the circumstances
of the case. By applying these to the case at hand, it
cannot be said that Albenson Enterprises was
abusing the rights of Baltao. The trial court and the
appellate court made a mistake of lumping the three
articles and used them as bases for the award of
damages in a civil complaint filed against the
petitioners. Albenson was prompted by its natural
instinct and right to file a criminal complaint because
it was not able to collect the payment of the mild
steel plates it had delivered. It had every right to
exhaust all legal remedies to collect its unpaid credit.
18) BARONS MARKETING VS. CA
G.R. No. 126486, February 9, 1998
FACTS
Private respondent Phelps Dodge, Phil. Appointed
petitioner Barons Marketing Corp as one of its
dealers of electrical wires and cables. As such,
petitioner was given by private respondent 60 days
credit for its purchases reckoned from the date of
delivery. During the period December 1986 to
August 1987, defendant purchased on credit from
plaintiff various electrical wires and cables in the
total amount of P4,102,438.3. Of this amount,
P300,000 was paid leaving a balance of
P3,802,748.2. Respondent wrote petitioner
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demanding payment of its unpaid obligation. In
response, petitioner requests to pay the amount in
monthly installments of P500,000 plus 1% interest.
Said offer was rejected by respondent. Thereafter,
private respondent filed a complaint before the Pasig
RTC against petitioner for recovery of P3,802,748.2,
including interest with 25% attorney’s fees,
exemplary damages of P100,000 and cost of
litigation. In its answer, petitioner admitted the
purchase made but disputed the amount. Petitioner
likewise interposed a counterclaim on the ground of
abuse of rights since it suffered injury to its
reputation.
The trial court rendered its decision in favor of
private respondent, which decision was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is
guilty of abuse of rights or whether private
respondent intended to prejudice or injure
petitioner when it rejected petitioner’s offer and
filed the action for collection.
HELD: No. It is an elementary rule in jurisdiction
that good faith is presumed and that the burden of
proving bad faith rests upon the party alleging the
same. In the case at bar, petitioner has failed to
prove bad faith on the part of private respondent.
Private respondent was driven by legitimate reasons
for rejecting petitioner’s offer and instituting the
action for collection before the trial court. As pointed
out by private respondent. The corporation had its
own “cash position to protect in order to pay its own
obligations”. Clearly, this would be inimical to the
interests of any enterprise, especially profit-oriented
one like private respondent. It is plain to see that
this is a case of an exercise of rights, not an abuse
thereof. As such, private respondent has not acted
in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy as to violate Article 21 of the Civil Code.
CALIFORNIA CLOTHING, INC. vs. QUIÑONES
G.R. No. 175822 (October 23, 2013)
Respondent, Shirley G. Quiñones, a
ticketing agent of Cebu Pacific Air, bought a pair of
black jeans worth P2,098.00 from Guess USA
Boutique. While she was on her way to Mercury
Drug Store, a Guess employee approached her and
said that she failed to pay for the black jeans.
Nevertheless, she presented an official receipt and
suggested that they should talk about the matter in
the Cebu Pacific Office located within the mall. While
they were in the office, the Guess employees
allegedly humiliated her in front of the clients of
Cebu Pacific, repeatedly demanded payment and
even searched the respondent’s wallet to check how
much money she had. Another argument ensued
and after that, respondent went home. The Guess
employees submitted two letters to the Director of
Cebu Pacific narrating the incident but the said
letters were not received.
Respondent filed a complaint for damages
against the petitioners, California Clothing, Inc.,
Excelsis Villagonzalo, Imelda Hawayon and Michelle
S. Ybañez, alleging that due to the incident, she
suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights, mental
anguish, fright, serious apprehension, besmirched
reputation, moral shock and humiliation. She
demanded payment for moral, nominal, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses.
Petitioners stated that they approached the
respondent to clarify whether or not payment was
made and that they approached and talked to the
respondent in a gentle and polite manner. They
sought payment for moral and exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses as
counterclaim.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed both the
complaint and counterclaim stating that the
petitioners acted in good faith and the respondent
was the one who put herself in that situation by
inviting the Guess employees to the Cebu Pacific
Office to discuss about the issue of payment.
However, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the Regional Trial Court decision stating that
there was preponderance of evidence showing the
petitioners acted in bad faith but, Hawayon and
Villagonzalo were absolved from liability due to good
faith. Since petitioners acted in bad faith, respondent
was entitled to damages and attorney’s fees.
A. Legal Issue
Whether or not petitioners acted in bad faith
which resulted to the Court of Appeals awarding
moral damages and attorney’s fees to respondent,
Shirley G. Quiñones.
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B. Ruling
Yes, petitioners acted in bad faith and the
award for moral damages and attorney’s fees to
respondent was proper. The Supreme Court affirmed
the Court of Appeals’ decision. The principle of
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the Civil Code is
present in the case. Respondent complained when
petitioners embarrassed her and insisted that she
did not pay for the black jeans despite the issuance
of an official receipt in her favor.
The court cited the case of Carpio vs.
Valmonte in which the elements of abuse of rights
were enumerated. “The elements of abuse of rights
are as follows: (1) there is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent
of prejudicing or injuring another.” The elements
stated are complete in the present case. First,
petitioners continued to insist that there was no
payment made when respondent already presented
the black jeans with the original receipt. Second,
they accused the respondent that not only did she
fail to pay for the black jeans but she intentionally
stole it and quickly left the shop. Third, the letters
sent to the respondent’s employer was not only
intended to ask for assistance in collection of the
payment but also to ruin the respondent’s reputation.
The exercise of rights is subject to
limitations. Thus, it must be in accordance with the
purpose of its establishment and not abused.
Respondent was awarded P50,000.00 as
moral damages and P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees.
1.) R5) RELLOSA vs. PELLOSIS
G.R. No. 138964 August 9, 2001.
FACTS:
Respondents were lessees of a parcel of land,
owned by one Marta Reyes, located at Malate,
Manila. Respondents had built their houses on the
land which, over the years, underwent continuous
improvements. After the demise of Marta, the land
was inherited by her son Victor Reyes. Sometime in
1986, Victor informed respondents that, for being
lessees of the land for more than twenty (20) years,
they would have a right of first refusal to buy the
land. Sometime in the early part of 1989, without the
knowledge of respondents, the land occupied by
them was sold to petitioner Cynthia Ortega who was
able to ultimately secure title to the property in her
name.
On 31 May 1989, respondents filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Manila a suit for the
"Declaration of Nullity of the Sale," made in favor of
petitioner Cynthia Ortega predicated upon their right
of first refusal.
The Office of the Building Official issued a resolution
ordering the demolition of the houses of
respondents. The following day Cynthia Ortega,
together with her father and co-petitioner, Vicente
Rellosa, hired workers to commence the demolition
of respondents' houses. Due to the timely
intervention of a mobile unit of the Western Police
District, the intended demolition did not take place
following talks between petitioner Rellosa and
counsel who pleaded that the demolition be
suspended since the order sought to be
implemented was not yet final and executory. On 11
December 1989, respondents filed their appeal
contesting the order of the Office of the Building
Official. On 12 December 1989, petitioners once
again hired workers and proceeded with the
demolition of respondents' houses.
Respondents filed Civil Case before the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, praying that petitioners be
ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages, as
well as attorney’s fees, for the untimely demolition of
the houses.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents
and instead ordered them to pay petitioners moral
damages.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
trial court and ordered petitioners to pay
respondents of moral damages, exemplary damages
and Attorney's fees.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a premature
demolition
RULING: The Court upheld the decision of the Court
of Appeals that there was a premature demolition.
Hence, the petitioners should pay damages to the
lessees.
A right is a power, privilege, or immunity guaranteed
under a constitution, statute or decisional law, or
recognized as a result of long usage, constitutive of
a legally enforceable claim of one person against
another.
The exercise of these rights is not without limitations.
The abuse of rights rule established in Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person to act with
justice, to give everyone his due; and to observe
honesty and good faith. When a right is exercised in
a manner which discards these norms resulting in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed for
which the actor can be held accountable.
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At the time petitioners implemented the order of
demolition, barely five days after respondents
received a copy thereof, the same was not yet final
and executory. The law provided for a fifteen-day
appeal period in favor of a party aggrieved by an
adverse ruling of the Office of the Building Official
but by the precipitate action of petitioners in
demolishing the houses of respondents (prior to the
expiration of the period to appeal), the latter were
effectively deprived of this recourse. The fact that
the order of demolition was later affirmed by the
Department of Public Works and Highways was of
no moment. The action of petitioners up to the point
where they were able to secure an order of
demolition was not condemnable but implementing
the order unmindful of the right of respondents to
contest the ruling was a different matter and could
only be held utterly indefensible.
26) NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.
PHILIPP BROTHERS OCEANIC, INC.
G.R. No. 126204, November 20, 2001
FACTS:
On May 14, 1987, the National Power Corporation
(NAPOCOR) issued invitations to bid for the supply
and delivery of 120,000 metric tons of imported coal
for its Batangas Coal-Fired Thermal Power Plant in
Calaca, Batangas. The Philipp Brothers Oceanic,
Inc. (PHIBRO) prequalified and was allowed to
participate as one of the bidders. After the public
bidding was conducted, PHIBRO's bid was
accepted. NAPOCOR's acceptance was conveyed
in a letter dated July 8, 1987, which was received by
PHIBRO on July 15, 1987.
On July 10, 1987, PHIBRO sent word to NAPOCOR
that industrial disputes might soon plague Australia,
the shipment's point of origin, which could seriously
hamper PHIBRO's ability to supply the needed coal.
From July 23 to July 31, 1987, PHIBRO again
apprised NAPOCOR of the situation in Australia,
particularly informing the latter that the ship owners
therein are not willing to load cargo unless a "strike-
free" clause is incorporated in the charter party or
the contract of carriage. In order to hasten the
transfer of coal, PHIBRO proposed to NAPOCOR
that they equally share the burden of a "strike-free"
clause. NAPOCOR refused.
On August 6, 1987, PHIBRO received from
NAPOCOR a confirmed and workable letter of credit.
Instead of delivering the coal on or before the
thirtieth day after receipt of the Letter of Credit, as
agreed upon by the parties in the July contract,
PHIBRO effected its first shipment only on
November 17, 1987.
Consequently, in October 1987, NAPOCOR once
more advertised for the delivery of coal to its Calaca
thermal plant. PHIBRO participated anew in this
subsequent bidding. On November 24, 1987,
NAPOCOR disapproved PHIBRO's application for
pre-qualification to bid for not meeting the minimum
requirements. Upon further inquiry, PHIBRO found
that the real reason for the disapproval was its
purported failure to satisfy NAPOCOR's demand for
damages due to the delay in the delivery of the first
coal shipment.
This prompted PHIBRO to file an action for damages
with application for injunction against NAPOCOR
with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Makati City.
In its complaint, PHIBRO alleged that NAPOCOR's
act of disqualifying it in the October 1987 bidding
and in all subsequent biddings was tainted with
malice and bad faith.
ISSUE: Whether or not NAPOCOR abused its right
or acted unjustly in disqualifying PHIBRO from the
public bidding.
RULING: No. NAPOCOR was not bound under any
contract to approve PHIBRO's pre-qualification
requirements. In fact, NAPOCOR had expressly
reserved its right to reject bids as provided in its
Instruction to Bidders found in the "Post-Qualification
Documents/Specifications for the Supply and
Delivery of Coal for the Batangas Coal-Fired
Thermal Power Plant I.
20) Carpio vs. Valmonte
G.R. No. 151866, September 9, 2004
FACTS:
Respondent Leonora Valmonte is a wedding
coordinator. Michelle del Rosario and Jon Sierra
engaged her services for their church wedding. At
about 4:30 p.m. on that day, Valmonte went to the
Manila Hotel where the bride and her family were
billeted. When she arrived, several persons were
already there. Among those present was petitioner
Soledad Carpio, an aunt of the bride who was
preparing to dress up for the occasion.
After reporting to the bride, Valmonte went out of the
suite. She proceeded to the Maynila Restaurant
where the reception was to be held. She paid the
suppliers, gave the meal allowance to the band, and
went back to the suite. Upon entering the suite,
Valmonte noticed the people staring at her. It was at
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this juncture that petitioner allegedly uttered the
following words to Valmonte: "Ikaw lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto, nasaan ang dala mong bag?
Saan ka pumunta? Ikaw lang and lumabas ng
kwarto, ikaw ang kumuha." Petitioner then ordered
one of the ladies to search Valmonte’s bag. It turned
out that after Valmonte left the room to attend to her
duties, petitioner discovered that the pieces of
jewelry which she placed inside the comfort room in
a paper bag were lost.
The bags and personal belongings of all the people
inside the room were searched. Valmonte was
allegedly bodily searched, interrogated and trailed by
a security guard throughout the evening. Later,
police officers arrived and interviewed all persons
who had access to the suite and fingerprinted them
including Valmonte. During all the time Valmonte
was being interrogated by the police officers,
petitioner kept on saying the words "Siya lang ang
lumabas ng kwarto." Valmonte’s car which was
parked at the hotel premises was also searched but
the search yielded nothing.
After a futile attempt for a formal apology, Valmonte
filed a suit for damages against Carpio.
The trial court rendered dismissed Valmonte’s
complaint for damages. It ruled that when petitioner
sought investigation for the loss of her jewelry, she
was merely exercising her right and if damage
results from a person exercising his legal right, it is
damnum absque injuria.
The CA reversed, holding that petitioner’s verbal
assault upon Valmonte was done with malice and in
bad faith since it was made in the presence of many
people without any solid proof except petitioner’s
suspicion. Such unfounded accusation entitles
Valmonte to an award of moral damages for she was
publicly humiliated, deeply insulted, and
embarrassed.
ISSUE: Should Valmonte be entitled to
Damages?
HELD: Yes. The victim of a wrongful act or omission,
whether done willfully or negligently, is not left
without any remedy or recourse to obtain relief for
the damage or injury he sustained. Incorporated into
our civil law are not only principles of equity but also
universal moral precepts which are designed to
indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain
of good conscience and which are meant to serve as
guides for human conduct. First of these
fundamental precepts is the principle commonly
known as "abuse of rights" under Article 19 of the
Civil Code. It provides that "Every person must, in
the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due
and observe honesty and good faith." One is not
allowed to exercise his right in a manner which
would cause unnecessary prejudice to another or if
he would thereby offend morals or good customs.
In the case at bar, petitioner’s verbal reproach
against respondent was certainly uncalled for
considering that by her own account nobody knew
that she brought such kind and amount of jewelry
inside the paper bag. This being the case, she had
no right to attack respondent with her innuendos
which were not merely inquisitive but outrightly
accusatory. By openly accusing respondent as the
only person who went out of the room before the
loss of the jewelry in the presence of all the guests
therein, and ordering that she be immediately bodily
searched, petitioner virtually branded respondent as
the thief. True, petitioner had the right to ascertain
the identity of the malefactor, but to malign
respondent without an iota of proof that she was the
one who actually stole the jewelry is an act which, by
any standard or principle of law is impermissible.
Petitioner had willfully caused injury to respondent in
a manner which is contrary to morals and good
customs. Her firmness and resolve to find her
missing jewelry cannot justify her acts toward
respondent. She did not act with justice and good
faith for apparently, she had no other purpose in
mind but to prejudice respondent. Certainly,
petitioner transgressed the provisions of Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 for which she should be held
accountable.
Arnel P. Bacarra
ARDIENTE VS PASTORFIDE
FACTS
[Herein petitioner] Joyce V. Ardiente and
her husband Dr. Roberto S. Ardiente are owners of a
housing unit at Emily Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de
Oro City. On June 2, 1994, Joyce Ardiente entered
into a Memorandum of selling, transferring and
conveying in favor of [respondent] Ma. Theresa
Pastorfide all their rights and interests in the housing
unit at Emily Homes in consideration of P70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a
stipulation: “That the water and power bill of the
subject property shall be for the account of the
Second Party (Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective
June 1, 1994." For four (4) years, Ma. Theresa's use
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of the water connection in the name of Joyce
Ardiente was never questioned nor perturbed ) until
on March 12, 1999, without notice, the water
connection of Ma. Theresa was cut off. Proceeding
to the office of the Cagayan de Oro Water District
(COWD) to complain, a certain Mrs. Madjos told Ma.
Theresa that she was delinquent for three (3)
months corresponding to the months of December
1998, January 1999, and February 1999. Ma.
Theresa argued that the due date of her payment
was March 18, 1999 yet. Mrs. Madjos later told her
that it was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the
water line was cut off. On March 15, 1999, Ma.
Theresa paid the delinquent bills. On the same date,
through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the
COWD to explain who authorized the cutting of the
water line. , COWD, through the general manager,
[respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr., answered the
letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it
was at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water
line was cut off. Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma.
Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed a
complaint for damages against petitioner, COWD
and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner and the private
respondent acted in bad faith and therefore liable for
damages.
RULING: YES.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to
ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to
cause the transfer of the former's account with
COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy
to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water
supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.15
Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party
will attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm
was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent
spouses’ water supply without warning or informing
the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her
request for disconnection was based on the advise
of COWD personnel and that her intention was just
to compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with
their agreement that petitioner's account with COWD
be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such
was petitioner's only intention, then she should have
advised respondent spouses before or immediately
after submitting her request for disconnection, telling
them that her request was simply to force them to
comply with their obligation under their
Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What
made matters worse is the fact that COWD
undertook the disconnection also without prior notice
and even failed to reconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide’s water supply despite payment of their
arrears. There was clearly an abuse of right on the
part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are
guilty of bad faith.
Yes. The court ruled that the principle of abuse of
rights under Section 19 of the Civil Code was
violated. It provides that "every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of
his duties, act with justice, give everyone his
due, and observe honesty and good faith."
A right, although it is legal for being recognized by
law as such, may nevertheless become the source
of illegality (Globe Mackay and Radio Corporation v
CA), when it is exercised in a manner that does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
the same causes damage to another. The person
exercising an abuse of right is thus liable for
damages caused to another. The herein petitioner is
liable for damages by ordering the cutting of the
water supply of the respondent without giving notice
about such intention. The COWD and Gonzalez are
likewise liable for damages by disconnecting the
water supply without prior notice and for their
subsequent neglect of reconnecting the water supply
even when the respondent already paid the
delinquent account.
20 / Garcia v Salvador
GR No. 168512 March 20, 2007
Ynarez-Santiago, J
Ranida Salvador worked as a trainee in the
accounting department of Limay Bulk Handling
Terminal. As a prerequisite for regular employment,
she underwent a medical exam at the Community
Diagnostic Center (CDC). Garcia, a medical
technologies conducted the HBs Ag (Hepatitis B
Surface Antigen) test and issued the test result
26
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indicating that Ranida was “HBs Ag: Reactive.” The
result bore the name and signature of Garcia as
examiner and the rubber stamp signature of Bu
Castro as pathologist.
When Ranida submitted the result to company
physician Dr. Sto. Domingo, the latter told her that
the result indicated that she is suffering from
Hepatitis B, a liver disease. Based on the the
doctor’s medical report, the company terminated
Ranida’s employment for failing the physical exam.
When she informed her father Ramon, he suffered a
heard attack and was confined at Bataan Doctors
Hospital. During her father’s confinement, she had
another HBs Ag test at the same hospital. The result
indicated that she is non-reactive. She informed Sto.
Domingo but was told that the test by the CDC was
more reliable because it used the Mirco-Elisa
Method.
She went back to CDC for confirmatory testing and
the Anti-HBs test conducted on her had a Negative
result. She also had another test at the hospital
using the Micro-Elisa Method and the result
indicated that she was non-reactive.
She submitted both results to the Executive Officer
of the company who requested her to undergo
another similar test before her re-employment would
be considered. The CDC conducted another test
which indicated a Negative result. The Med-Tech
OIC of CDC issued a certification correcting the
initial result and explaining that the examining med
tech Garcia interpreted the delayed reaction as
positive or negative.
The company rehired Ranida. She then filed a
complaint for damages against Garcia and an
unknown pathologist of CDC. She claimed that
because of the erroneous interpretation of the
results of the examination, she lost her job and
suffered serious mental anxiety, trauma, sleepless
nights, while Ramon was hospitalized and lost
business opportunities. In an amended complaint,
she named Castro as the pathologist.
Garcia denied the allegations of gross negligence
and incompetence and reiterated the scientific
explanation for the “false positive” result of the first
HBs Ag tests in a letter to the respondents.
Castro claimed that as pathologist, he rarely went to
CDC and only when a case was referred to him; that
he did not examine Ranida; and that the test results
bore only his rubber-stamp signature.
RTC dismissed the complaint because the
respondent failed to present sufficient evidence to
prove the liability of Garcia and Castro. CA reversed
the RTC’s ruling and found Garcial liable for
damages for negligently issuing an erroneous HBs
Ag result. The appellate court exonerated Castro for
lack of participation.
ISSUE: Whether Castro has been negligent in
issuing the test result and thus liable for damages
HELD
YES.
Negligence is the failure to observe for the protection
of the interest of another person that degree of care,
precaution and vigilance which the circumstance
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers
injury. For health care providers, the test of the
existence of negligence is: did the health care
provider either fail to do something which a
reasonably prudent health care provider would have
done, or that he or she did something that a
reasonably prudent health care provider would not
have done; and that failure or action caused injury to
the patient; if yes, then he is guilty of negligence.
Thus, the elements of actionable conduct are: 1)
duty, 2) breach, 3) injury, and 4) proximate
causation.
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All the elements are present in the case at bar.
Owners and operators of clinical laboratories have
the duty to comply with statutes, as well as rules and
regulations, purposely promulgated to protect and
promote the health of the people by preventing the
operation of substandard, improperly managed and
inadequately supported clinical laboratories and by
improving the quality of performance of clinical
laboratory examinations. Their business is
impressed with public interest, as such, high
standards of performance are expected from them.
In fine, violation of a statutory duty is negligence.
Where the law imposes upon a person the duty to do
something, his omission or non-performance will
render him liable to whoever may be injured thereby.
From provisions RA 4688, otherwise known as the
The Clinical Laboratory Law, it is clear that a clinical
laboratory must be administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician authorized by the
Sec. of Health, like a pathologist who is specially
trained in methods of laboratory medicine; that the
medical technologist must be under the supervision
of the pathologist or licensed physician; and that the
results of any examination may be released only to
the requesting physician or his authorized
representative upon the direction of the laboratory
pathologist.
These rules are intended for the protection of the
public by preventing performance of substandard
clinical examinations by laboratories whose
personnel are not properly supervised. The public
demands no less than an effective and efficient
performance of clinical laboratory examinations
through compliance with the quality standards set by
laws and regulations.
We find that petitioner Garcia failed to comply with
these standards.
First: CDC is not administered, directed and
supervised by a licensed physician as required by
law.
Second: Garcia conducted the HBs Ag test of
respondent Ranida without the supervision of
defendant-appellee Castro.
Third: The HBs Ag test result was released to
Ranida without the authorization of defendant-
appellee Castro.
Garcia may not have intended to cause the
consequence which followed after the release of the
test result. However, his failure to comply with the
laws and rules promulgated and issued for the
protection of public safety and interest is failure to
observe that care which a reasonably prudent health
care provider would observe. Thus, his act or
omission constitutes a breach of duty.
Indubitably, Ranida suffered injury as a direct
consequence of Garcia’s failure to comply with the
mandate of the laws and rules aforequoted. She was
terminated from the service for failing the physical
examination; suffered anxiety because of the
diagnosis; and was compelled to undergo several
more tests. All these could have been avoided had
the proper safeguards been scrupulously followed in
conducting the clinical examination and releasing the
clinical report.
Art. 20, NCC provides the legal basis for the award
of damages to a party who suffers damage
whenever one commits an act in violation of some
legal provision. This was incorporated by the Code
Commission to provide relief to a person who suffers
damages because another has violated some legal
provision.
22) MERALCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39019, January 22, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) is a
public utility corporation providing electric power for
the consumption of the general public in Metro
Manila. Petitioner Pedro Yambao is a bill collector of
MERALCO.
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Private respondents Isaac Chaves and Juana O.
Chaves, husband and wife, filed the complaint for
damages, together with their children, Isaac Chaves
Jr. and Rosendo Chaves. Isaac Sr. And Isaac Jr. and
Rosendo were members of the Philippine Bar; Isaac
Sr. And Isaac Jr. were practicing lawyers and
Rosendo was a legal officer at the Agricultural
Productivity Commission. Juana O. Chaves was a
public school teacher.
Private respondents became the customer of
petitioner MERALCO in the year 1953. At or about
the end of March, 1965, petitioner Yambao went to
the residence of private respondents and presented
two overdue bills, one for January 11 to February 9,
1965, for the sum of P7.90, and the other for
February 9 to March 10, 1965, for the sum of P7.20.
On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chaves went to the main
office of petitioner but paid only one bill, for January
11 to February 9, 1965, leaving the other bill unpaid.
Thereafter, on April 21, 1965, petitioner caused the
electric service in private respondent’s residence to
be discontinued and the power line cut off. On the
following day, Rosendo went to petitioner’s main
office and paid the unpaid bill. The power line was
restored at about 7:00 pm on the same day.
Private respondents filed an action for recovery of
damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded
feelings and hurt pride by reason of the
disconnection of their electric service by the
petitioner.
The CFI ordered rendered decision in favor of
private respondent, ordering petitioner to pay private
respondent moral damages, exemplary damages
and attorney’s fees.
The Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the trial court’s
decision. Respondent Court stressed the importance
and necessity of 48 hour advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be effected.
ISSUE: Whether advance written notification
before the disconnection of service may be
effected?
RULING: Yes. Petitioner being a public Utility having
monopoly of the supply of electrical power in Metro
Manila and some nearby municipalities. Being such,
the State may regulate the conditions under which
the manner by which a public utility such as
MERALCO may effect a disconnection of service to
delinquent customer. Among others, a prior written
notice to the customer is required before
disconnection of service. Failure to give such prior
notice amounts to a tort.
23) Custudio vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 116100. February 9, 1996.
FACTS:
Herein private respondents owned a parcel of land
wherein a two-storey apartment building was
constituted therein, for this, tenants then were
occupying the latter building. Such property was
surrounded by other immovables (houses) owned by
herein petitioners, Custidio and Santos. Before
reaching the property of the private respondents
from the P. Burgos St. there were two passage ways
in between the said other immovable, but however,
they were only narrow paths.
After sometimes, the petitioners constructed adobe
fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by
defendants Santoses along their property which is
also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato
constructed her adobe fence and even extended
said fence in such a way that the entire passageway
was enclosed. As a result, the tenants left the
apartment because there was no longer a
permanent access -ingress and engress to the
public street.
The private respondents filed an action for the grant
of an easement of right of way. The trial court
ordered the petitioner to give plaintiff permanent
access — ingress and egress, to the public street
and that in turn, the private respondent will pay a
sum of Php 8000 to the petitioner as an indemnity
for the permanent use of the passageway. On
appeal by the private respondent to the CA, the
latter Court affirmed the decision of the lower court
as to give a right of way to the private respondents
and awarded the latter actual, moral and exemplary
damages. For this, petitioner appealed to the SC
questioning the award of damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is
proper?
RULING: No. A reading of the decision of the Court
of Appeals will show that the award of damages was
based solely on the fact that the original plaintiff,
Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of
unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the
leased premises by reason of the closure of the
passageway. However, the mere fact that the plaintiff
suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of
damages, there must be both a right of action for a
legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage
resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without
damage, or damage without wrong, does not
constitute a cause of action, since damages are
merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
29
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caused by a breach or wrong. There is a material
distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the
illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss,
hurt, or harm which results from the injury, and
damages are the recompense or compensation
awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can
be damage without injury in those instances in which
the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a
legal duty. These situations are often called damnum
absque injuria. In order that a plaintiff may maintain
an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a
breach of duty which the defendant owed to the
plaintiff — a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and
legal responsibility by the person causing it.
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there
was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have
violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that
the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21
of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that
the following requisites concur: (1) The defendant
should have acted in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy; (2) The acts
should be willful; and (3) There was damage or
injury to the plaintiff. The act of petitioners in
constructing a fence within their lot is a valid
exercise of their right as owners, hence not contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and
dispose of a thing, without other limitations than
those established by law. It is within the right of
petitioners, as owners, to enclose and fence their
property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that
“(e)very owner may enclose or fence his land or
tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead
hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon.”
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot
was not subject to any servitudes. There was no
easement of way existing in favor of private
respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact
that private respondents had no existing right over
the said passageway is confirmed by the very
decision of the trial court granting a compulsory right
of way in their favor after payment of just
compensation. It was only that decision which gave
private respondents the right to use the said
passageway after payment of the compensation and
imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to
interfere in the exercise of said right.
24) GASHEM vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 97336. February 19, 1993.
FACTS:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial
court a complaint for damages against the petitioner
for the alleged violation of their agreement to get
married. She alleges in said complaint that: she is 22
years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good
moral character and reputation duly respected in her
community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an
Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments,
Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student
taking a medical course at the Lyceum Northwestern
Colleges in Dagupan City; that the plaintiff is an
employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette, Fernandez
Avenue, Dagupan City and that the parties
happened to know each other when the Manager of
the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johnny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff; the latter
courted and proposed to marry her; she accepted
his love on the condition that they would get married;
they therefore agreed to get married after the end of
the school semester, which was in October of that
year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure
their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20
August 1987, the petitioner forced her to live with
him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin
before she began living with him; as a result of this
live-in relationship, plaintiff became pregnant, but
defendant gave her some medicine to abort the
foetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her
until he told her that he could not do so because he
was already married to a girl in Bacolod City. Private
respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the
petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not
less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual
expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and
remedies as may be just and equitable.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, petitioner claimed
that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor
forced her to live in his apartment; he did not
maltreat her, but only told her to stop coming to his
place because he discovered that she had deceived
him by stealing his money and passport.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying
Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision
favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was
thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees.
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings
and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private
respondent were lovers, (b) private respondent is not
30
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a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who
readily submits to sexual advances, (c) petitioner,
through machinations, deceit and false pretenses,
promised to marry private respondent, (d) because
of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed
herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her
parents — in accordance with Filipino customs and
traditions — made some preparations for the
wedding that was to be held at the end of October
1987 by looking for pigs and chickens, inviting
friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f)
petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry her and
(g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and
who has abused Philippine hospitality, have
offended our sense of morality, good customs,
culture and traditions.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court's ruling.
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the
instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
RULING: It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21
is not applicable because he had not committed any
moral wrong or injury or violated any good custom or
public policy; he has not professed love or proposed
marriage to the private respondent; and he has
never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for
liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions and
culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a
foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian
Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and
Christian ways. He stresses that even if he had
made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to
fulfill the same is excusable or tolerable because of
his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the
Muslim Code which purportedly allows a Muslim to
take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis
thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
possess good moral character. Moreover, his
controversial "common law wife" is now his legal
wife as their marriage had been solemnized in civil
ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his
unlawful cohabitation with the private respondent,
petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be
pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the private
respondent should also be faulted for consenting to
an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates
that even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he
had professed his love to the private respondent and
had also promised to marry her, such acts would not
be actionable in view of the special circumstances of
the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to
marry per se is not an actionable wrong. Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the New Civil
Code the provisions that would have made it so. The
reason therefor is set forth in the report of the
Senate Committee on the Proposed Civil Code, from
which We quote:
"The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That
breach of promise to marry is not actionable has
been definitely decided in the case of De Jesus vs.
Syquia. The history of breach of promise suits in the
United States and in England has shown that no
other action lends itself more readily to abuse by
designing women and unscrupulous men. It is this
experience which has led to the abolition of rights of
action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many of
the American states .."
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a
provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand
the concept of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
Article 2176, of the Civil Code, which defines a
quasi-delict thus:
"Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence,
if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter." is
limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes
the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict,
known in Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana,
is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-
American or common law concept. Torts is much
broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not
only negligence, but intentional criminal acts as well
such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and
deceit.
In the general scheme of the Philippine legal system
envisioned by the Commission responsible for
drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts with certain exceptions, are to be
governed by the Revised Penal Code while
negligent acts or omissions are to be covered by
Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In between these
opposite spectrums are injurious acts which, in the
absence of Article 21, would have been beyond
redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is even
postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of
the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the
scope of the law on civil wrongs; it has become
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much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-
American law on torts.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article
21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a
man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate
cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter
becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself
unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in
reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive
device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of
the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It
is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it
was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry
plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and
womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and
deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's
parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage." In short,
the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not
because of lust but because of moral seduction —
the kind illustrated by the Code Commission in its
example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not
be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal
Code because the private respondent was above
eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the
seduction.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's
alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for
argument's sake, that he did promise to marry the
private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at
fault. According to him, both parties are in pari
delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil
Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra vs.
Marcos, the private respondent cannot recover
damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as
far as stating that if the private respondent had
"sustained any injury or damage in their relationship,
it is primarily because of her own doing."
These statements reveal the true character and
motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a
condescending, if not sarcastic, regard for the
private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble
birth, inferior educational background, poverty and,
as perceived by him, dishonorable employment.
Obviously then, from the very beginning, he was not
at all moved by good faith and an honest motive.
Marrying with a woman so circumstanced could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his
profession of love and promise to marry were empty
words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile
and deceive the poor woman into believing that
indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he
wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of
marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's
concept of morality and so brazenly defied the
traditional respect Filipinos have for their women. It
can even be said that the petitioner committed such
deplorable acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of
the Civil Code which directs every person to act with
justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty
and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of
our laws, customs and traditions. The pari delicto
rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the
private respondent may not have been impelled by
the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to
the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent
that she had qualms of conscience about the entire
episode for as soon as she found out that the
petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she
left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a
similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal
fault." At most, it could be conceded that she is
merely in delicto.
We should stress, however, that while We find for
the private respondent, let it not be said that this
Court condones the deplorable behavior of her
parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together
in the same room in their house after giving approval
to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to
protect the honor of their daughters and infuse upon
them the higher values of morality and dignity.
27) Frenzel vs. Catito
G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfred Fritz Frenzel is an Australian citizen
of German descent who was married to Teresita
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Santos, a Filipino citizen. He works as a pilot for
New Guinea Airlines. On the other hand, private
respondent Ederlina P. Catito was married to Klaus
Muller, a German national. She worked as a
masseuse in the King’s Cross nightclub in Sydney,
Australia. The two met when Alfred went on a
vacation in Sydney. They met again and this time,
Alfred was able to convince Ederlina to stop working
and to go back to the Philippines. When she
returned to the Philippines, she was given money by
Alfred to put up a beauty salon. Later on, he also
gave money to her to be able to purchase a house
and lot in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City.
But since he was aware that aliens were prohibited
to purchase lands, he agreed to have Ederlina as
the sole vendee. Later also, they opened two bank
accounts with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking
Corporation in Kowloon, Hong Kong. Also, there
were subsequent purchases of other real and
personal properties. These were made on the
anticipation on the part of Alfred that he and Ederlina
will get married soon. However, this failed to
materialize because of the fact that Ederlina was still
married to Klaus. Ederlina failed to secure a divorce
from Klaus. This exasperated Alfred and eventually
their relationship started to fade. Later on, Alfred
filed a complaint before the RTC of Davao City for
recovery of real and personal properties. He
demanded from Ederlina that she return all the
money that were used to purchase the properties
and also the properties which were bought,
especially the house and lot and three other lots.
However, the complaint of Alfred was dismissed by
the RTC. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the RTC in toto.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfred is entitled to
recover the said properties?
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.
The contention of petitioner Frenzel that to bar him
from recovering the properties would be in violation
of Article 22 of the Civil Code on unjust enrichment
did not hold water. It must be remembered that a
contract which violates the Constitution and the laws
is void and vests no rights and creates no
obligations. It does not produce any legal effect. His
reliance on Article 22 is misplaced because in this
case, the action is proscribed by the Constitution or
the parties are in pari delicto. This is founded on the
general principles of public policy. It must be
remembered that Alfred knew all along that he was
disqualified from purchasing lands. His contention
that he entered into the transaction because he was
expecting that he and Ederlina will get married in the
future is not a valid one. He also knew that he
cannot get married to Ederlina because he still had a
valid existing marriage with Teresita Santos.
28) REYES vs. LIM
G.R. No. 134241, August 11, 2003
FACTS:
Petitoner Reyes and private respondent Lim entered
into a Contract to sell a parcel of land located in F.B.
Harrison, St. The parties stipulated that Lim shall
pay a down payment of P10 Million of the P28
Million purchase price. On one hand, Reyes shall
ensure that the lessee of the property, Harrison
Lumber, shall have vacated the lot upon payment of
the balance.
The day to consummate the contract arrived
however Harrison Lumber has still not vacated the
land. Worse, Lim found out that Reyes had already
sold the lot to Line One Food Corporation.
Aggrieved, Lim filed an action for specific
performance and nullification of the subsequent
contract of sale plus damages. The trial court and
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Lim.
Hence, the present petition. Reyes primarily
contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC
Decision when it was based on equity. Petitioner
argues that it is Rule 57 to 61 of the Rules on Civil
Procedure which should be applied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contention of
petitioner is tenable.
RULING: According to the Supreme Court, the case
involves an issue left unanswerable due to silence or
insufficiency of the law and the rules of court. At this
instance, Article 9 of the Civil Code expressly
mandates the Court to make a ruling despite the
silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. This
calls for equity which fills open spaces in the law.
Before rescission of the contract can be had, the
parties must be restored to their status quo ante.
This was ordered by the Court.
To rule otherwise would improve Reyes to the
detriment of Lim contrary to Article 22 of the Civil
Code which provides that “no person shall unjustly
enrich himself at the expense of another.” Article 22
applies to substantive as well as procedural
remedies.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
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30) ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES,
ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
FACTS:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00
o'clock in the morning, in the municipality of Jose
Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy
Padilla, Filomeno Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly
Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales,
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo
Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John Doe alias
Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating
and mutually helping one another, and acting without
any authority of law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, by means of threats,
force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public
Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and by subsequently forcibly
opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the
furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares
and merchandise, to the damage and prejudice of
the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the
amount of P30,000.00 in concept of actual or
compensatory and moral damages, and further the
sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took
advantage of their public positions: Roy Padilla,
being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest
of the accused being policemen, except Ricardo
Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban,
Camarines Norte, and that it was committed with
evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
rendered a decision finding the accused guilty.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction
to the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court decision but with
modification
hence this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the respondent court
committed a reversible error in requiring the
petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants
after acquitting them from the criminal charge.
HELD:
The extinction of the civil action by reason of
acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to
civil liability ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98;
Virata v. Ochoa, 81 SCRA 472). In other words, the
civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal
of the accused is the civil liability arising from the act
as a crime.
Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other
cases, the person entitled to the civil action may
institute it in the Jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be
liable for restitution of the thing and reparation or
indemnity for the damage suffered.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of
the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might
arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is
based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil.
286) as only preponderance of evidence is required
in civil cases; where the court expressly declares
that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558;
People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the
felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief
committed by certain relatives who thereby incur
only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal
Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise
from or is not based upon the criminal act of which
the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).
Article 29 of the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a
bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is
based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so
declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision
whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision
in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal
action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment
of acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal
liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil
liability unless there is clear showing that the act
from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
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A separate civil action may be warranted where Homicide against Antonio Daluraya, the purported
additional facts have to be established or more driver of the vehicle.
evidence must be adduced or where the criminal
case has been fully terminated and a separate Daluraya was charged in an Information for a
complaint would be just as efficacious or even more criminal case of Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
expedient than a timely remand to the trial court Homicide in connection with the death of Marina
where the criminal action was decided for further Oliva ( no separate civil action)
hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The
offended party may, of course, choose to file a
After presentation of evidence by the prosecution,
separate action. These do not exist in this case.
Considering moreover the delays suffered by the Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss
case in the trial, appellate, and review stages, it (demurrer) asserting, inter alia, that he was not
would be unjust to the complainants in this case to positively identified by any of the prosecution
require at this time a separate civil action to be filed. witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the victim, and that there was no clear and competent
respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding evidence of how the incident transpired.
damages despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of MeTC: granted Daluraya’s demurrer and case was
the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. MeTC found
petition for lack of merit. that:
SO ORDERED.
· Marla merely testified on the damages
Daluraya v Marina Oliva
sustained by her family but she failed to identify
Trial
Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle that hit her
mother;
SUMMARY: Daluraya was charged in an Information
· Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the
for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in
driver of the said vehicle;
connection with the death of Marina Oliva. The
· Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy
MeTC dismissed case for insufficiency of evidence
results; and
stating Daluraya was indeed the driver. RTC
· PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the
affirmed but CA reversed. SC held that Daluraya's
incident, likewise declared that he did not
acquittal was based on the fact that "the act or
witness the same.
omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist" in view of the failure of the prosecution to
MR denied.
sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil
RTC: affirmed MeTC
liability should be deemed as non-existent by the
nature of such acquittal.
CA: reversed RTC decision. CA held that the
MeTC's Order showed that Daluraya's acquittal was
DOCTRINE: the civil action based on delict may be
based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As such,
judgment in the criminal action that the act or
Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. MR
omission from which the civil liability may arise did
denied
not exist or where the accused did not commit the
acts or omission imputed to him.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in finding
Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva's death
FACTS:. despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of
Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan insufficiency of evidence? (N)
Vanette, ran her over. She was rushed to the
hospital but eventually died, prompting her daughter, HELD: No
herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a
criminal case for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two

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kinds of acquittal recognized by our law and their
concomitant effects on the civil liability of the
accused, as follows:
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused.
1. an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has
been found to be not the perpetrator of any act
or omission cannot and can never be held liable
for such act or omission. There being no
delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of the
question, and the civil action, if any, which may
be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court. 2.
which the civil liability may arise did not
exist, given that the prosecution was not
able to establish that he was the author of
the crime imputed against him.
Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the
MeTC declared that "the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details
and they did not sufficiently establish that the
accused precisely committed the crime charged
against him."
Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of
the MeTC's Order acquitting Daluraya, said court
reiterated and firmly clarified that "the prosecution
was not able to establish that the accused was the
driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina
Oliva" and that "there is no competent evidence on
hand which proves that the accused was the person
responsible for the death of Marina Oliva."

2. an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on Records disclose that Daluraya's acquittal was
the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if based on the fact that "the act or omission from
the guilt of the accused has not been which the civil liability may arise did not exist" in view
satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently
civil liability which may be proved by establish that he was the author of the crime
preponderance of evidence only. ascribed against him. Consequently,his civil liability
should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of
such acquittal.
In Dayap v Sendiong
Dispositive: Petition Granted. CA reversed
the civil action based on delict may be
deemed extinguished if there is a finding on
the final judgment in the criminal action that
the act or omission from which the civil
liability may arise did not exist or where the
accused did not commit the acts or omission
imputed to him.

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the

accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence
on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist.

A punctilious examination of the MeTC's

Order, which the RTC sustained, will show
that Daluraya's acquittal was based on the
conclusion that the act or omission from

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Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
III. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
Article 36, NCC
JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI vs. PEOPLE AND
SHIRLEY TISMO-CAPILI.
G.R. No. 183805 July 3, 2013
Facts: In September 1999, James Capili married
Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in
December 1999, he married another woman named
Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration
of nullity of the second marriage between Capili and
Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case
against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case,
the action filed by Karla Medina was granted and
Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by
reason of the subsisting marriage between Medina
and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to
dismiss in the bigamy case. He alleged that since
the second marriage was already declared void ab
initio (at the very beginning) that marriage never took
place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak
of.
The prosecutor filed a motion stating, among others,
that the issues raised in the civil case (declaration of
nullity) are not similar or intimately related to the
issue in the bigamy case and that the resolution of
the issues in said civil case would not determine
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed
the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to
the trial court.
Issue: WON the accused may still be charged with
the crime of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage?
Held: Yes. The subsequent judicial declaration of
the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime
had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioner’s assertion would only delay the
prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his
previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of
that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal
case.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until
declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this
case, even if petitioner eventually obtained a
declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio,
the point is, both the first and the second marriage
were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
32) RICARDO QUIAMBAO vs. HON. ADRIANO
OSORIO
G.R. No. L-48157, March 16, 1988
FACTS:
In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein
private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero,
Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against
herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal,it was alleged that
private respondents were the legitimate possessors
of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12,
Bca 2039 of the Longos Estate situated at Barrio
Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement
to Sell No. 3482 executed in their favor by the former
Land Tenure Administration ; that under cover of
darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by force,
intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400
sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts "staka"
over said portion and thereafter began the
construction of a house thereon;
After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion
to dismiss. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue
involved in the case was the recovery of physical
possession, the court had jurisdiction to try and hear
the case.
Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the
then Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for
certiorari with injunction against public respondent
Judge and private respondents, praying for the
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Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering
respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the
ejectment case until after the resolution of said
petition
Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, maintaining that the administrative case did
not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the
question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case
which involved merely the question of possession.
Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent
Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-
1576 alleging the pendency of an administrative
case between the same parties on the same subject
matter and praying that the petition for certiorari be
granted, the ejectment complaint be dismissed and
the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide
the matter exclusively.
ISSUE:
whether or not the administrative case between the
private parties involving the lot subject matter of the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question
which would operate as a bar to said ejectment
case.
HELD:
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that
which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case
and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.The doctrine of prejudicial question comes
into play generally in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are pending and the issues involved
in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil
case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus,
the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case
is alleged in the criminal case to cause the
suspension of the latter pending final determination
of the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as
provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being
respectively civil and administrative in character, it is
obvious that technically, there is no prejudicial
question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is
the intimate correlation between said two [2]
proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of
private respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution
of the pending administrative case. For while it may
be true that private respondents had prior
possession of the lot in question, at the time of the
institution of the ejectment case, such right of
possession had been terminated, or at the very
least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land
Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed in their
favor. Whether or not private respondents can
continue to exercise their right of possession is but a
necessary, logical consequence of the issue
involved in the pending administrative case assailing
the validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to
Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed
portion to petitioner. If the cancellation of the
Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to
petitioner are voided, then private respondents
would have every right to eject petitioner from the
disputed area. Otherwise, private respondent's light
of possession is lost and so would their right to eject
petitioner from said portion.
Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more
prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to
hold the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until
after a determination of the administrative case.
Indeed, logic and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence,
dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo
trial notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's
right of possession being upheld in the pending
administrative case is to needlessly require not only
the parties but the court as well to expend time,
effort and money in what may turn out to be a sheer
exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:
The court in which an action is pending may, in the
exercise of a sound discretion, upon proper
application for a stay of that action, hold the action in
abeyance to abide the outcome of another pending
in another court, especially where the parties and
the issues are the same, for there is power inherent
in every court to control the disposition of causes on
its dockets with economy of time and effort for itself,
for counsel, and for litigants. Where the rights parties
to the second action cannot be properly determined
until the questions raised in the first action are
settled the second action should be stayed.
While this rule is properly applicable to instances
involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the
instant case of the same considerations of Identity of
parties and issues, economy of time and effort for
the court, the counsels and the parties as well as the
need to resolve the parties' right of possession
before the ejectment case may be properly
determined, justifies the rule's analogous application
to the case at bar.
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in
the nature of a prejudicial question to an
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Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
administrative case, We see no reason why the
reverse may not be so considered in the proper
case, such as in the petition at bar.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered
DISMISSED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
33) ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO
JACALAN vs. HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ,
HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS.
FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR. and ROSITA TAGHOY
TIGOL
G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995
FACTS:
the above-named accused [herein petitioners
Isabelo Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan],
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, without the knowledge and consent of
the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the said owner by
occupying or possessing a portion of her real
property, Lot No. 3635-B. whereon they constructed
their respective residential houses against the will of
Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have
deprived the latter of the use of a portion of her land,
to her damage and prejudice because despite
repeated demands the said accused failed and
refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the
premises above-mentioned.
Petitioners moved for the suspension of their
arraignment on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The
case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2247-L and
entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus
Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and Rosita T. Tigol, et al.,"
concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that
case, petitioners seek a declaration of the nullity of
TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of
the lot in question among them and private
respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and
Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed in 1990 by
petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when
the criminal case for squatting was filed against
them.
the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and
proceeded with their arraignment. Petitioners,
therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the
charge.
petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their
motion was denied by the court in its order dated
September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-
B, which was pending, in Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a
prejudicial question justifying suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal case against petitioners.
HELD:
We hold that it is.
A prejudicial question is a question which is based
on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. To justify suspension of the criminal action,
it must appear not only that the civil case involves
facts intimately related to those upon which the
criminal prosecution is based but also that the
decision of the issue or issues raised in the civil case
would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. 2 Rule 111, §5 provides:
Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two
(2) essential elements of a prejudicial questions are:
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or
intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue
determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
In the criminal case, the question is whether
petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to
them but to private respondent and against the
latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges
that "without the knowledge and consent of the
owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took
possession of a portion of "her property" by building
their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use
of portion of her land to her damage and prejudice.
Now the ownership of the land in question, known as
Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT
No. 13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now
pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City.
The resolution, therefore, of this question would
necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal
liability for squatting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and
respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 012489 until the
question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has
been resolved with finality and thereafter proceed
with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is
decided and terminated adversely against
petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal
case.
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Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
SO ORDERED.
34) BELTRAN VS. PEOPLE
334 SCRA 106
FACTS:
Petitioner Maynardo Beltran and Charmaiene Felix
were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.
After 24 years of marriage and four children,
petitioner filed, in the RTC of Quezon City, Br. 87, a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. In her Answer to said petition,
petitioner’s wife alleged that it was petitioner who
abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. She then
filed a criminal case for concubinage against
petitioner and his paramour before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Makati, Br. 61. Petitioner, in order to
forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed
a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the
Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal
case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil
case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a
prejudicial question to the determination of the
criminal case. Judge Alden Cervantes denied the
motion, so was with a Motion for Reconsideration.
Petitioner then went to the RTC of Makati, on
certiorari , questioning the Orders issued by Judge
Cervantes. The RTC denied the petition also a
Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Does the declaration of nullity of marriage a
prejudicial question in a criminal case for
concubinage?
HELD:
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid conflicting decisions. It has two
(2) essential elements: a) the civil action involves an
issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised
in the criminal action; and b) the resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed.
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of
petitioner’s marriage is not a prejudicial question to
the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to
cause the suspension of the latter pending the final
determination of the civil case, it must appear not
only that the said civil case involves the same facts
upon which the criminal prosecution would be
based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
In DOMINGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS ( 226 SCRA
572) , the SC ruled that the import of Article 40 of the
Family Code is that for purposes of remarriage, the
only legally acceptable bases for declaring a
previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable.
So, that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like
the herein petitioner need not present a final
judgment declaring his marriage void for he can
adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of
his marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his
marriage other than proof of a final judgment
declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner’s argument that he could be
acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his
marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state
that even a subsequent pronouncement that his
marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of LANDICHO VS.
RELOVA ( 22 SCRA 731), cited in DONATO VS.
LUNA (160 SCRA 441), where the SC held that: “xxx
Assuming that the first marriage was null and void
on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would
not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that
parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there
is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists for all intents and purposes.
Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his
wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not
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Atty. Viviana Martin-Paguirigan
erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a
civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a
prejudicial question in a criminal case of
concubinage
35) SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA
T. PAHANG vs. HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL,
Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch
56, Mandaue City, DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional
Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN
BANK and TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 148595, July 12, 2004
FACTS:
the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang,
received a short-term loan of one million five
hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the
respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company.
The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable
Promissory Note and was, likewise, secured by a
real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered .
As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest
and the penalties due thereon, the respondent
foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially.
As a consequence, the mortgaged property was sold
at public auction to the respondent bank as the
highest bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by
Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the respondent and was
registered with the Register of Deeds.
the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-
year redemption period of the property would expire
on January 27, 1999. Instead of redeeming the
property, the petitioners filed, a complaint for
annulment of extrajudicial sale against the
respondent bank and the Sheriff.
After the expiration of the one-year redemption
period, the respondent consolidated its ownership
over the foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No.
44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its
name. On July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a
Petition for Writ of Possession.
ISSUE:
whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 for annulment of
extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the
petition of the respondent bank for the issuance of a
writ of possession in LRC Case No.
HELD:
The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.
A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending and there exists in the
former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is
resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of
the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners
for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action
and the respondent’s petition for the issuance of a
writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-
021410, TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land
registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial
question can arise from the existence of the two
actions.
It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition
and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession, after the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption, is summary in nature.The trial court is
mandated to issue a writ of possession upon a
finding of the lapse of the statutory period for
redemption without the redemptioner having
redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued
that the trial court abused its discretion when it
merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the
said writ of possession.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of
the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Cost against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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