Design history
classical Greece to the present day. Three levels
Victor Margolin is the
editor of Propaganda: the
art of persuasion, WWII,
and the author of other
books on the history of
design. He has taught a
course in graphic design
history at Columbia College
in Chicago where he is an
administrator. He is
presently researching the
functional European
graphics of the the 1920s
and early 1930s.
Author's address:
349 Custer,
Evanston,
Illinois 60202
©Victor Margolin 1979
The visual rhetoric of propaganda
Victor Margolin
Columbia College, Chicago
On March 13 1933 in Nazi Germany Adolf Hitler
established the Ministry of Propaganda and Popu­
lar Enlightenment under the direction of Dr Joseph
Goebbels. This was the first time anywhere that
the conduct of propaganda had been elevated to
the ministerial level. Within a short time after his
appointment, Goebbels had consolidated control
of a vast communications empire that included
film, radio, newspapers, publishing, exhibitions,
posters and many other media. For a period of ten
years, until the German armour began to crack
after Stalingrad, virtually all public communication
in Germany was under government control.
The German propaganda ministry was the result
of Hitler's early recognition that propaganda was
essential for securing and maintaining power in the
modern state. He began to reflect on its potential
after the Munich beer hall putsch in 1924, while
sitting in Landsberg Prison where he wrote Mein
Kampf Hitler's experience as controller of propa­
ganda for the Nazi party in its early days had made
him keenly aware that propaganda and political or­
ganization were closely allied. He wrote in Mein
Kampf:
'The first task of propaganda is to win men for the
coming organization ; that of organization is to get
men for carrying on propaganda. The second task
of propaganda is to upset existing conditions by
Information Design Journal 1:2 (1979), 107–122. DOI 10.1075/idj.l.2.05mar
ISSN 0142-5471 / Ε-ISSN 1569-979X © John Benjamins Publishing Company
This paper reviews the history of propaganda from
of political propaganda are proposed — myth,
ideology and action — and their interaction des-
cribed. The prevalence of propaganda techniques
is identified in numerous regimes — both war­
time and peace-time, and both totalitarian and
democratic.
means of the new doctrine, that of organization is
to fight for power, in order through it to secure
final success for the doctrine'.
Hitler was not the first to recognize the close tie
between propaganda and power but no one before
him had implemented a system of propaganda dif­
fusion at the highest level which aimed at nothing
less than total control of the individual's psyche.
The word "propaganda" comes from the Latin
propagare, which means "to extend or enlarge". It
was first used by the Roman Catholic Church in
1622, during the reign of Pope Gregory XV, in the
title of the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide (Con­
gregation for the Propagation of the Faith), a com­
mittee of cardinals responsible for the supervision
of church missions abroad.
Propaganda, which reflects the growing techno­
logy of power in the modern state, has become in­
creasingly pragmatic. From its original connota­
tion of spreading a doctrine, it eventually came to
mean changing beliefs by persuasion and finally to
connote the pure and simple manipulation of be­
haviour. The latest connotation derives from the
fact that power rather than ideology has become
the end of modern politics.
Modern political propaganda, which dates from
World War I, operates on three levels: myth, ideo­
logy and action. Myth is that which motivates men
107
 In the sacred myth, God's will is the ultimate
rationale for world order. The tradition of secular
myth, on the other hand, was begun by the Roman
emperors as an expedient means of justifying polit-
ical ambition. A modern example of the secular
myth is Hitler's manifestation of his celestial origin
in an early scene of Leni Riefenstahl's film "Tri-
umph of the Will" where he descends from Valhal-
la in his personal plane and steps onto the Nurem-
berg airstrip as if he were a modern god.
Myth, whether it is sacred or secular, embodies
the eternal verities of the world order. Ideology,
which mediates between myth and action, is the
justification of political intent that responds to
changing situations. If there is a solid mythic foun-
dation, ideology can be shifted according to per-
ceived political needs. In 1939, after the Russians
and Germans signed their pact, both were perceived
as barbarians according to American ideology. In
this political cartoon,figure2, an ape was shown
carrying the Nazi and Soviet flags. Following Ger-
many's invasion of Russia in June 1941 and Russ-
ia's joining the Allied fold, the Allies shifted their

above to act from the deepest part of their being. It is

Figure 1 : American artist the core of their belief and the foundation of their
Thomas Hart Benton's vision of society.
image of World War II.
Myth represents the world as it ought to be. The
Judaeo-Christian myth embodies an ideal world
where justice and righteousness prevail. The repre-
sentatives of this ideal world — Jesus Christ, Moses,
other saints and prophets — exemplify the will of
God for man. The underpinning of this myth is the
power of God. Though the myth's content is the
realm of the spirit, it has not been immune to ec-
clesiastical ambitions. Images of the saints were at
times intended to inspire allegiance to the church
and its political aims as well as to God.
The Judaeo-Christian myth underlay American
propaganda in the last two world wars. American
propagandists portrayed these as holy wars in
right which the forces of darkness opposed those of jus-
Figure 2: an American
tice and righteousness. A World War II painting by
comment on the 1939
Russo-German Pact. Thomas Hart Benton, figure 1, showed Christ on
the cross being attacked by the Nazis.
108
 portrayal of the Russians from foes to friends. An
American cartoon,figure3, showed Cordell Hull,
then Secretary of State, painting a rosy picture of
Stalin for an incredulous observer who says, "What,
he has no horns?". This was in the transition period
period of American-Soviet relations. As the war
progressed, the American image of Russia became
increasingly positive. It reached its apotheosis in
propaganda such as this,figure4, which celebrated
the Russians' heroic defense of Stalingrad. The
ideological shift from Russia as barbarian to Russia
as hero was possible because it did not alter the
fundamental convictions of Americans that they
were taking the side of justice and righteousness in
the European holy war.
Axis propagandists, whose own myths identified
them as the guardians of Europe's cultural tradition,
portrayed the Americans as cultural barbarians. A
World War II poster by the Italian Fascist artist,
Gino Boccasile, figure 5, used a racial stereotype,
the image of a black American soldier, as the epit-
below
ome of cultural barbarism. The soldier is making
Figure 3: 'What, has he no
horns?', following the off with the Venus de Milo, a symbol of Europe's
German invasion of Russia cultural ideal, which he has debased to a value of

above right
Figure 4 : American poster
celebrating the Russian
defence of Stalingrad

right
Figure 5: Italian World War
II poster by Gino Boccasile

109
Figure 6: an American call
to arms recollecting Pearl
Harbour

110
 two dollars. The Nazis held up Europe's cathedrals,
victims of Allied bombings, as symbols of a Euro-
pean spiritual tradition that was being destroyed
by the American barbarians.
The third level of propaganda, the directive to ac-
tion, can be stated simply and clearly when the
mythic foundation is solid and the ideological
groundwork has been laid. An American World
War II poster, figure 6, "Avenge December 7", and
a Soviet poster from the late Sixties, figure 7, "He-
ro of the Socialist Competition, Let the Five-Year
Plan be Outstanding", are good examples.
In propaganda diffusion the complex interplay
right
Figure 7: Russian poster of
the Sixties promoting the
Five Year Plan
of myth, ideology and action has been shaped by
rapid developments in mass communications. Prop-
aganda strategies, carried out with coordinated
media campaigns use myth and ideology to rein-
force directives to action for specific purposes. The
powerful propaganda apparatuses which are now
part of modern states throughout the world are the
results of war and revolution earlier in this century
but their antecedents go back hundreds of years.
In classical Greece, centuries before the inven-
tion of printing and the spreading of ideas through
the written word, oratory was a primary means of
public persuasion. Aristotle's Rhetoric was the
111
 first handbook of oratorical techniques. For Aris-
totle, the major task of rhetoric was political per-
suasion although in his day rhetoric was predomi-
nantly used in the lawcourts. The purpose of rhet-
oric was to persuade the speaker's audience to ac-
cept his point of view. This presupposed an appeal
to the audience's capacity to evaluate an argument,
an approach assiduously avoided by modern prop-
agandists.
In the shift from Athenian democracy to Roman
imperialism, the mythic foundation of political
power was laid. The Greek gods resided on Mt
Olympus. They might come down to mingle with
earthly mortals but they always remained above
them. Roman emperors neutralized the distinction
between god and man. Roman gods became more
human and emperors more godly. Since the emper-
or was on the level of the deities, his actions could
not be questioned.
Without the means of printing images or text,
the primary means of propaganda dissemination in
left
Figure 8 : 'Hail Caesar',
A D 57
right
Figure 9 : Quisling's head 
a war-time Norwegian
stamp
112
Roman times was coinage. The emperor, who con-
trolled the treasury, could put an idealized portrait
of himself on the Roman coins,figure8. Since no
one else could mint coins, effective counter-propa-
ganda was impossible. A similar technique was
used by the Nazis in World War II to legitimize the
new puppet governments in Western Europe,
where portraits of Quisling in Norway, figure 9,
and Petain in France appeared on postage stamps
shortly after the occupation of those countries.
These stamps not only announced the new leaders
but they made clear that they were powerful
enough to control the printing of stamps.
The elevation of the Roman rulers to godly
heights was the beginning of secular mythology.
Parallel to the growth of the secular myth was that
of the sacred myth, whose iconography — espec-
ially images of Christ and the Christian saints —
was particularly strong before the secular tradition
of oil painting began to develop and before the
spread of new social and political ideas was facili-
above above
Figure 10: Paul Revere's Figure 11 : American anti-Vietnam war poster
depiction of the 1770
Boston Massacre below
below Figure 13: France betrayed by Laval, as seen by
Figure 12: 'Liberty leading the People', Eugene Delacroix, 1830 the Russian Kukriniski artists

113
 tated by the development of printing technology.
The invention of movable type in the 15th cen-
tury and its combination with woodcut illustration
tions made possible the spread of political propa-
ganda in books, pamphlets, newspapers and broad-
sides. In 17th century America at least one Colo-
nial governor forbade the private ownership of
printing presses in his colony for fear they would
be used for political agitation. As the movement
for American independence grew, the political car-
toon, printed from woodblocks in newspapers and
on broadsides, attacked King George and united
the colonies in opposition to British rule. Benja-
min Franklin's "Join or Die", said to be the first
political cartoon in America, pictured the colonies
as parts of a snake which, if not joined together,
would wither and die. Another visual propaganda
technique used for political agitation before the
War of Independence was the documentation of
enemy atrocities. Paul Revere's engraving of 1770,
figure 10, showed the British soldiers gunning
down the American patriots in the Boston Mass-
acre. The documentation technique became more
powerful after the invention of photography when
actual atrocities, could be shown. An American
poster opposing the Viet Nam war,figure11, was
a photograph of dead Vietnamese with a simple
comment superimposed: "Question. And babies?
Answer. And babies".
The American War of Independence and the
French Revolution were the two great political
events of the 18th century. The first was a revolt
against a colonial oppressor, the second against an
aging monarchy that was stifling the birth of dem-
ocracy. The propaganda of both revolutions used
allegory to represent visually the spirit of liberty
and the forces of oppression. Delacroix' painting
"Liberty Leading the People", figure 12, dated
1830, conveyed the spirit of the French Revolu-
tion more than forty years after it occurred. The
allegorical figure of Liberty, through continued
wide usage by Delacroix and others, became a sym-
bol of the French Republic. It was still in use in a
World War II Russian cartoon by the Kukriniksi,
114
figure 13, which showed Hitler about to stifle a
captive Liberty with Pierre Laval's smiling face on
his foot.
Following the French Revolution, the spirit of
Liberty was paralleled by the imperial ambitions
of Napoleon Bonaparte who revived the myth of
secular power. Jacque-Louis David's enormous
painting, "Le Sacre", of 1805, portrayed Napoleon
as a new embodiment of the imperial myth. The
painting shows Napoleon's coronation. Napoleon,
already crowned, is crowning his empress in the
presence of the Pope. The oil painting, in Napo-
leon's day, with its magnitude and permanence,
was a potent propaganda medium. It could portray
the ideal image of a political leader just as Roman
goldsmiths in earlier times made coins with ideal-
ized portraits of the emperors.
The invention of lithography at the end of the
18th century and the subsequent introduction of
high speed printing presses facilitated wider dissem-
ination of political propaganda. In the 1830s, Hon-
ore Daumier used lithography for his biting attacks
on King Louis-Phillipe in the pages of La Carica-
ture and Le Charivari. These drawings were the
forerunners of John Heartfield's photomontages
which attacked the Nazi regime in the late 1920s
and early 1930s.
The Russian Revolution and World War I ended
the intuitive and sporadic stage of propaganda use.
Before these two momentous events, there was a
growing awareness of propaganda's potential to
change beliefs although no government or political
group had as yet established a wide-ranging central-
ized coordination of propaganda activities. The
pressures of modern revolution and warfare
changed this. Lenin immediately instituted an in-
tensive propaganda campaign to gain support for
the Bolsheviks. In England mobilisation for World
War I was directed by the Department of Enemy
Propaganda, known as Crewe House. In the United
States the Creel Committee mobilised, among
others, executives of the burgeoning advertising in-
dustry to engage the American people in the war
effort.
Figure 14: an American
World War I poster

115
 These activities were the beginning of large-scale duction of television and later the international
propaganda campaigns that used mass communica- communications satellite. Today modern nations
tions to reach vast numbers of people. Until radio have complex mass communication systems which,
came into use after World War I, propaganda was in some cases, are entirely under government con-
spread primarily through printed materials — post- trol.
ers, pamphlets, newspapers — as well as primitive Prior to the Russian Revolution and World War I
below silent films and, of course, public speeches. By the the propaganda image was mainly symbolic or
Figures 15 and 16: James early thirties, the industrial countries, for the most ideal. But major conflicts required the urgent and
Montgomery Flagg's part, had national radio networks and had perfect- rapid mobilization of masses of people and propa-
celebrated World War I
recruiting poster with its
ed the sound film which became an important ganda had to do more than just change beliefs. The
anti-Vietnam war propaganda tool on both sides in World War II. symbolic and allegorical images that preceded
descendant The post- World War II period witnessed the intro- these conflicts could dramatize an ideal but could

116
 not strike deeply enough to quickly affect the be-
haviour of the masses. Only by appealing to the
basic instincts of fear or anger could the public be
effectively aroused. The American World War I
poster, figure 14, "Beat Back the Hun", showed a
vicious German soldier with blood dripping from
his mouth and hand.
The appeal to basic emotions rather than intellec-
tual convictions began to characterize modern
propaganda. World War I was a period of transition
in which many allegorical images continued to be
used even though they were indirect representa-
above
tions of abstract qualities and did not, for the
Figure 17: French World most part, have the power to evoke the allegiance
War I war bonds poster
and loyalty which the modern state began to de-
mand. A British World War I poster by Bernard
Partridge, the Punch cartoonist, was intended to
rally England behind an allegorical image of Just-
ice. The poster was similar to, though less forceful
than, Delacroix' earlier portrayal of Liberty. The
American counterpart was Howard Chandler Chris-
ty's ethereal muse leading the army to battle.
Propaganda is a form of rhetoric which uses
images in an exaggerated way. Once a propaganda
image is articulated, it becomes part of a common
vocabulary and can be appropriated by anyone.
There has been a fascinating transmigration of
images in propaganda usage. Sometimes a propa-

above
Figure 18: typical Red
Army poster of World
War II

right
Figure 19: El Lissitzky's
Constructivist Red Army
poster of 1919, 'Beat the
Whites with the Red wedge'

117
 below
Figure 20: 'Adolf Hitler is victory'

above
Figure 21 : Hitler leading the masses - to Valhalla?

below
Figure 22: 'a kindly man who loved children'

118
 gandist changes the meaning of a prior image by
using it in a new way. James Montgomery Flagg's
poster "I want You for the US Army", figure 15,
epitomized America's readiness to fight in World
War I. Flagg's image, with a tear in it and a skele-
ton looking out from behind the tear, was used for
an anti-Viet Nam war poster in the 1970s, figure
16, expressing a meaning that was the opposite of
Flagg's intention.
Belligerents, whether nations or political parties,
try to destroy the propaganda images of their op-
ponents. Both the French government in a World
War I poster promoting Libery Bonds,figure17,
and Red Army propagandists in the Russian Civil
War showed the imperial eagle, an allegory for the
German nation, succumbing to their superior
strength.
Propaganda, as Hitler noted, has to move the
masses. Picasso's "Guernica", the artist's response
left
Figure 23: the sanctifying
of an emblem, from a
German drawing
right
Figure 24: T h e cross was
not heavy enough' by John
Heartfield
to the Fascist bombings of Guernica during the
Spanish Civil War, or El Lissitzky's constructivist
Red Army poster of 1919, figure 19, "Beat the
Whites with the Red Wedge", were political state-
ments by avant-garde artists. Because they were ex-
pressed in new languages understood by few, they
could move the intellectuals but could never influ-
ence the masses in the way Hitler knew was neces-
sary. Russians were more likely to have been affec-
ted by the tough portrayal of battling Red Army
soldiers, figure 18, than by Lissitzky's cool ab-
straction.
The formation of an effective propaganda appar-
atus by Lenin was the first attempt to integrate
propaganda into the political machinery of the
modern state. What Lenin had begun during the
Civil War and continued thereafter until his death,
Stalin carried on after him. Before the winds of
war began to blow in the East, Stalin continued to
119

below left
Figure 25: 'The new Long
March', a recent Chinese
bill board
below right
Figure 26: illustration from
an IBM publication for
employees
equate the ideology of class struggle with the exer-
cise of power by a ruling elite. A 1932 poster by
Viktor Deni portrayed Russia's relation with Ger-
many in class terms. The Russian worker rising up
to destroy the German capitalist was a continua-
tion of the international propaganda inaugurated
by Lenin. But, when Germany invaded Russia in
1941, Marxist-Leninist ideology was not strong
enough to mobilize the still emerging Soviet nation.
Stalin, therefore, reverted to the deep roots of
Russian nationalism, invoking past military heros
such as General Kutuzov who led the rout of Na-
poleon from Moscow in 1812.
The effectiveness of early Bolshevik propaganda
was not lost on Adolf Hitler, nor was the success
of the democratic governments in mobilizing their
citizenry for World War I. In Mein Kampf, Hitler
commended the Allied leaders for their portrayal
of the Germans as menacing fiends because he felt
that grim images prepared the Allied soldiers for
the German soldier at his worst. More important
than Hitler's recognition of propaganda's efficacy
in war was his understanding that the same tech-
niques could be used in peacetime. "If", he said in
Mein Kampf, "...the object is to gather a whole
nation within its circle of influence, there cannot
be enough attention paid to avoidance of too high
a level of intellectuality..." Goebbels was a master
at coining meaningless slogans. "Hitler ist der Sieg"
(Hitler is Victory), on a poster which showed Hit-
ler in the majestic pose of a Renaissance prince,
was intended to enforce a mindless approbation of
Nazi power, figure 20.
Hitler, more than any political leader before him,
succeeded in creating a political myth that substan-
tiated his aspirations to global hegemony. He drew
on Nordic mythology, the glory of prior empires
and an almost mystical allegiance of many German
people to strong leadership. Germany had been
humiliated by the terms of its World War I defeat.
Hitler promised to restore the nation to a position
of power and influence. To inspire loyalty, he had
to be godly, but also a comrade; distant as well as
close. The portrayal of these contradictory quali-
ties was no mean feat but Nazi propagandists man-
aged it. Paintings showed Hitler leading the Ger-
man masses towards Valhalla,figure21, or, as in
the famous portrait by Hubert Lanziger, as a
knight in shining armour. Other images showed
Hitler as a comrade in arms, talking with the troops
at the front, or as a kindly man who loved chil-
dren, figure 22.
The annual Nuremberg rallies replaced the reli-
gious service as the opportunity for the individual

120
Figures 27 and 28:
Republican and Democrat
election posters in 1976
to submerge himself in a greater glory. The swas-
tika, an ancient Hindu symbol for the wheel of life,
became the identity mark for the Nazi regime. Its
continual exposure on Nazi paraphenalia and prop-
aganda severed it from its original meaning and
identified it with the Nazis. Swastikas were every-
where in the Third Reich ; on banners, flags and
publications. Coupled with the swastika was the
salute with three fingers pressed together. This ges-
ture was remarkably like Christ's gesture of peace
portrayed in paintings by Fra Angelico and others,
figure 23.
Propagandists who opposed Hitler, particularly
John Heartfield, a member of the German Com-
munist Party, attacked the Nazi myth while Hitler
was still constructing it. Two brilliant photomon-
tages by Heartfield showed Nazi leaders turning
the Austrian and Christian crosses into swastikas
by sawing pieces off in the first instance and tack-
ing pieces on in the second, figure 24. The caption
under the photomontage which showed a hefty
official tacking pieces onto Christ's cross was "The
cross is not heavy enough".
American propaganda in World War II, though it
retained the old-fashioned symbol of Uncle Sam,
was based mainly on fear, national pride and the
perception of the war as a struggle of good and evil
forces. The British, more stoic and less inclined to
national breast beating, did not need images of sub-
human fiends to mobilize them. The daily reality
of war was sufficient.
It is noteworthy that the techniques of propa-
ganda have been refined in the heat of battle. With
the end of each war, they have been available for
peacetime use. Hitler was well aware of this. When
he came to power in 1933, he applied every poss-
121
 ible propaganda technique to building what he One of the consequences of the Twentieth Cen-
hoped would be an eternally impregnable political tury's political upheavals and rapid technological
fortress. In Russia, too, when the Civil War ended, development is the inextricable meshing of propa-
the Communists continued to develop their propa- ganda and political power. With the technology of
ganda machinery. persuasion so highly developed, it becomes the in-
The extensive knowledge of propaganda which dividual's responsibility to withstand it. The gra-
developed in the West as the result of a major revo- phic designer must question the ends of image
lution and two world wars was absorbed by Mao making to ensure that images disseminated within
Tse Tung when the People's Republic of China was a system of persuasion do not manipulate an audi-
founded in 1949. The Long March soon became ence for undesirable ends. For the audience, it is
part of the Maoist myth. The March signified en- essential to question the authenticity of public in-
durance and the ability to move forward against formation and develop a consciousness that will
great odds. It was the basis for the Great Leap For- enable them to resist manipulation by these means.
ward in 1958-60, which attempted to bring China Propaganda today is too successful. It is up to
into the Twentieth Century overnight. The ideo- those enlightened individuals in the communica-
logical basis for Mao's programmes was his little tions professions to make public communication a
red book which was studied assiduously through- meaningful dialogue between the public and its
out the country. Teng Hsiao-p'ing, well aware that leadership rather than a one-way manipulation of
he could not immediately eradicate the Maoist behavior that characterizes much of what we
myth, undertook the delicate task of building alle- erroneously call "communication".
giance for his modernization programme by calling
it the New Long March, retaining the attributes of
the myth that Mao had forged. A billboard, figure
25, that promotes the New Long March is interest-
ing to compare with a booklet produced in the
United States by the IBM Company for its employ-
ees, figure 26. The Chinese poster depicts a flying
horse leading a group of smiling workers towards
the year 2000. It is a vision of collective success
while the IBM booklet shows economic develop-
ment as an intense competition in which there is
only one winner.
Propaganda is endemic to all modern states.
Even in countries where political leaders are elect-
ed by public vote, mass communications are used
by a new breed of propagandist, the media consult-
ant, to manufacture an image for the candidate.
This image shaped with a craftsman's concern, is
intended to give the voter a surface impression but
not to reveal what the candidate stands for. Look-
ing at these two posters from the 1976 presidential
election,figures27 and 28, there is no way to dis-
tinguish between Ford and Carter except on the
basis of looks. The slogans are as meaningless as
those created by Goebbels for Hitler.
122