CHAPTER 2: ELECTION LAW
Frivaldo was a naturalized American citizen and had not reacquired
IV. Candidacy
1. Qualifications/Eligibilities of Candidates
a. General Guiding Principles in Candidates’ Qualifications
i. Qualifications for Public Office are Continuing Requirements
- Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of
office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged (Frivaldo vs.
Comelec).
- The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that
the candidate was qualified (ibid).
Case: Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo vs. Comelec and the League of
Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, herein represented by its President,
Salvador Nee Estuye, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989.
Facts: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo (Frivaldo) was proclaimed governor-elect
of the province of Sorsogon on January 22, 1988, and assumed office in due
time. On October 27, 1988, the League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter,
represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of
Frivaldo’s election and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino
citizen, having been naturalized in the USA on January 20, 1983. In his
Answer, Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the USA but pleased
the special and affirmative defenses that (1) he had sought American
citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His
naturalization was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against
the unrelenting persecution by the Martial Law Dictator’s agents abroad,(2)
that he had returned to the Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in
the restoration of democracy, and (3) that the challenge to his title should be
dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have been filed
within ten days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
Upon the COMELEC’s denial of Frivaldo’s motion for a preliminary hearing
on his affirmative defenses, as well as his motion for reconsideration thereon,
he came to the SC in a petition for certiorari and prohibition to ask that the
said orders be set aside on the ground that they had been rendered with
grave abuse of discretion.
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In their Comment, the private respondents reiterated their assertion that
Philippine citizenship on the day of the election on January 18, 1988. He was
not, therefore, qualified to run for and be elected governor. The action was
not for quo warranto under Section 253 of the OEC, because the ultimate
purpose was to prevent Frivaldo from continuing as governor, his candidacy
and election being void ab initio because of his alienage.
In his reply, Frivaldo insisted that he was a citizen of the Philippines because
his naturalization as an American citizen was not “impressed” with
voluntariness. In support, he cited the Nottebohm Case, where a German
national’s naturalization in Liechtenstein was not recognized because it had
been obtained for reasons of convenience only. He said he could not have
repatriated himself before the 1988 elections because the Special Committee
on Naturalization created for the purpose by LOI No. 27C had not yet been
organized then. His oath in his certificate of candidacy that he was a natural-
born citizen should be a sufficient act of repatriation. Additionally, his active
participation in the 1987 congressional elections had divested him of
American citizenship under the laws of the USA, thus, restoring his Philippine
citizenship. He ended by reiterating his prayer for the rejection of the move to
disqualify him for being time-barred under Section 253 of the OEC.
Issue: Was Juan G. Frivaldo a Filipino citizen at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon?
Ruling: Juan G. Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen at the time of his election
on January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution states that all public officials and
employees owe the State and the Constitution “allegiance at all times” and
the specific requirement in Section 42 of the LGC that a candidate for local
elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified
voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the OEC
provides that a qualified voter, must be, among other qualifications, a citizen
of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under
Article V, Section of the Constitution.
Frivaldo, as admitted by him, and as evidenced by the certification from the
United States District Court, Northern District of California that he was
naturalized as citizen of the USA. Further, the Court rejected his contentions
based on the following grounds:
a. The Court rejected his contention that he was merely coerced to
embrace American citizenship. There were many other Filipinos in the
USA similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater
 risk than he, who did not find it necessary, nor do they claim to have
been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos.
b. The Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the international law
principle of effective nationality, which is clearly not applicable in this
case, since the said case involves a conflict between the nationality laws
of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the
case at bar; in fact, even the USA is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its
national. The sole question presented to us is w/n Frivaldo is a citizen of
the RP under our own laws, regardless of the nationality laws. It is also
worth noting that Nottebohm was invoking his naturalization in
Liechtenstein whereas in the present case, Frivaldo is rejecting his
naturalization in the USA.
c. If Frivaldo really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended
by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired
by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he
nevertheless claims he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of
a valid repatriation. He claims that by actively participating in the
elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American citizenship
under the laws of the the USA. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the USA as his adopted country. It
should be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American
citizenship, such forfeiture did not and could not have the effect of
automatically restoring his citizenship in the Philippines that he had
earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result of the
loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless
individual.
Further, Frivaldo’s’ contention that by simply filing his COC he had,
without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But
that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions – surely, Philippine
citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply
was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek
naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings.
d. Lastly, the argument that the petition filed with the COMELEC should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The private respondents are
seeking to prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of
governor because he is disqualified from doing so as a foreigner.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
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possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption
of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo’s
naturalization was discovered only eight months after his proclamation
and his title was challenged shortly thereafter.
The Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as a provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another
country. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does
not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office
and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone.
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified.
Hence, the petition was dismissed.
ii. Vice of ineligibility cannot be Cured by Election
- The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. A candidate who falsifies a
material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected, cannot serve; in both
cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of election laws. These facts
pertain to a candidate’s qualification for elective office, such as his citizenship
and residence. Similarly, the candidate’s status as a registered voter falls
under this classification as it is a legal requirement which must be reflected in
the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the candidate, if he or she wins, will
work for and represent the local government under which he or she is
running. Even the will of the people, as expressed through the ballot, cannot
cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed that the
candidate was qualified (Hayudini vs COMELEC).
- In the case of Aratea vs. COMELEC, which is a case for cancellation of
CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, a cancelled CoC void ab initio cannot give
rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Whether a CoC is
cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial, because the cancellation
on such ground means he was never a candidate from the very beginning,
his CoC being void ab initio. The SC then found that since the winning
mayoralty candidate’s CoC was void ab initio, he was never a candidate at all
and all his votes were considered stray votes, and thus, proclaimed the
second places, the only qualified candidate, who actually garnered the
highest number of votes, for the position of Mayor (ibid).
- In the case of Maquiling vs COMELEC, it has been declared that the
popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate. The ballot cannot
override the constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications
to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must
be met before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of votes,
even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
defect in the qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample
upon and rent asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election laws if
the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be
proclaimed worthy to occupy elective positions in our republic.
NOTE: The misrepresentation, however, by a person who falsely states in his
COC that he exercises a profession is cured by his subsequent election to
office. It is not the kind of false misrepresentation that may be ground for the
denial of due course or cancellation of the COC, as profession is not a
requirement in running for public office.
Case: Mayor Gamal S. Hayudini vs COMELEC and Mustapha J. Omar,
G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014.
Facts: On October 5, 2012, Hayudini filed his CoC for the position of
Municipal Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, in the May 13, 2013 National
and Local Elections held in the ARMM. On October 15, 2012, private
respondent Omar filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Hayudini’s
CoC. He asserted that Hayudini should be disqualified for making false
representation regarding his residence. He claimed that Hayudini declared in
his CoC that he is a resident of the Municipality of South Ubian when, in fact,
he resides in Zamboanga.
On November 30, 2012, Hayudini filed a Petition for Inclusion in the
Permanent List of Voters in Barangay Bintawlan, South Ubian before the
MCTC, which the said court granted on January 31, 2013, despite Ignacio
Aguilar Baki’s (Baki) opposition. Hence, Omar’s petition to cancel Hayudini’s
CoC was dismissed by the COMELEC’s First Division for lack of substantial
evidence that Hayudini committed false representation as to his residency.
Subsequently, oppositor Baki elevated the case to the Bongao RTC, Branch
5. The RTC, on March 8, 2013, reversed the MCTC ruling and ordered the
deletion of Hayudini’s name in Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters.
Thus, on March 26, 2013, Omar filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Cancel the CoC of Hayudini by virtue of a supervening event. Hayudini
appealed the March 8, 2013 RTC decision to the CA, but the same was
denied.
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On May 13, 2013, Hayudini won the mayoralty race in South Ubian, Tawi-
Tawi. He was proclaimed and, consequently, took his oath of office.
However, on June 20, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division granted Omar’s
second petition to cancel Hayudini’s CoC, and, consequently, directed to
constitute a Special Board of Canvassers for the purpose of proclaiming the
lawful winner for mayoralty position in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi during the
May 13, 2013 elections. Hayudini then filed a MR with the COMELEC En
Banc, arguing that its Second Division committed grave error when it gave
due course to a belatedly filed petition and treated the March 8, 2013 RTC
decision as a supervening event. The COMELEC En Banc denied the same.
Corollary thereto, the Hayudini’s proclamation was declared void and without
any legal force, and Salma A. Omar was proclaimed as the duly-elected
Mayor of South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, being the qualified candidate obtaining the
highest number of votes.
Hence, Hayudini filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition and
mainly argued that the (1) the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it failed to
outrightly dismiss Omar’s petition for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 2 and 4 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9532; and
(2) COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to cancel petitioner Hayudini’s
Certificate of Candidacy and declare his proclamation void.
Issues:
1. Did Omar’s petition failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 2 and 4 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9532?; and
2. Did Hayudini commit a false material representation which justifies the
cancellation of his CoC and the declaration of his proclamation void?
Ruling: (1) Yes, Omar’s petition failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 2 and 4 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9532.
Sections 2 and 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
Resolution No. 9523 state:
Section 2. Period to File Petition. — The Petition must be filed within five
(5) days from the last day for filing of certificate of candidacy; but not later
than twenty five (25) days from the time of filing of the certificate of candidacy
subject of the Petition. In case of a substitute candidate, the Petition must be
filed within five (5) days from the time the substitute candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
Section 4.Procedure to be observed. — Both parties shall observe the
following procedure:
1. The petitioner shall, before filing of the Petition, furnish a copy of the
Petition, through personal service to the respondent. In cases where
personal service is not feasible, or the respondent refuses to receive the
Petition, or the respondents’ whereabouts cannot be ascertained, the
petitioner shall execute an affidavit stating the reason or circumstances
therefor and resort to registered mail as a mode of service. The proof of
service or the affidavit shall be attached to the Petition to be filed;
xxxx
Here, Hayudini filed his CoC on October 5, 2012, which was also the last day
of filing of CoC for the May 13, 2013 elections. Omar, on the other hand, filed
the subject petition only on March 26, 2013. Under the COMELEC Rules, a
Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel CoC must be filed within five days
from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy, but not later than twenty-
five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition. Clearly,
Omar’s petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period. Likewise, he
failed to provide sufficient explanation as to why his petition was not served
personally to Hayudini.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned procedural missteps, the Court sustains
the COMELEC’s liberal treatment of Omar’s petition.
As a general rule, statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally
construed in order that the will of the people in the choice of public officers
may not be defeated by mere technical objections. Moreover, it is neither fair
nor just to keep in office, for an indefinite period, one whose right to it is
uncertain and under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately
cleared, not only for the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public
interest, which can only be achieved by brushing aside technicalities of
procedure that protract and delay the trial of an ordinary action. Also, in
exercising its powers and jurisdiction, as defined by its mandate to protect
the integrity of elections, the COMELEC must not be straitjacketed by
procedural rules in resolving election disputes.
Indeed, Omar had previously filed a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
Hayudini’s CoC on October 15, 2012. This was dismissed on January 31,
2013, or the same day the MCTC granted Hayudini’s petition to be included
in the list of voters. However, on March 8, 2013, the RTC reversed the MCTC
ruling and, consequently, ordered the deletion of Hayudini’s name in
Barangay Bintawlan’s permanent list of voters. Said deletion was already
final and executory under the law. Hayudini, however, still appealed the case
to the CA, which was subsequently denied. Notably, thereafter, he went to
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the CA again, this time to file a petition for certiorari. Hence, by virtue of the
finality of said RTC decision deleting his name from the voters’ list, Hayudini,
who had been previously qualified under the law to run for an elective
position, was then rendered ineligible. Had this final RTC finding been
existent before, the COMELEC First Division could have taken judicial notice
of it and issued a substantially different ruling.
Also, Omar’s petition for Hayudini’s false material representation is a valid
ground to cancel petitioner’s CoC under Section 78 of the OEC.
(2) Yes, Hayudini committed a false material representation which justified
the cancellation of his CoC and the declaration of his proclamation void.
Sections 74 and 78 read of the Omnibus Election Code explicitly state:
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. – The certificate of
candidacy shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for
the office stated therein and that he is eligible for said office; if for Member of
the Batasang Pambansa, the province, including its component cities, highly
urbanized city or district or sector which he seeks to represent; the political
party to which he belongs; civil status; his date of birth; residence; his post
office address for all election purposes; his profession or occupation; that he
will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto; that he will obey the laws, legal orders, and
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant to a foreign country; that the obligation
imposed by his oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and that the facts stated in the certificate of candidacy
are true to the best of his knowledge.
Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. – A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a
certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground
that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-
five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be
decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election.
The false representation mentioned in these provisions must pertain to a
material fact, not to a mere innocuous mistake. The false representation
must consist of a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.
A candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is elected,
cannot serve; in both cases, he or she can be prosecuted for violation of
election laws. These facts pertain to a candidate’s qualification for elective
office, such as his citizenship and residence. Similarly, the candidate’s status
as a registered voter falls under this classification as it is a legal requirement
which must be reflected in the CoC. The reason for this is obvious: the
candidate, if he or she wins, will work for and represent the local government
under which he or she is running. Even thewill of the people, as expressed
through the ballot, cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified.
Section 74 requires the candidate to state under oath in his CoC "that he is
eligible for said office." A candidate is eligible if he has a right to run for the
public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is not a
registered voter in the municipality where he intends to be elected, but still he
states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for
public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material
representation, a ground to support a petition under Section 78.
In this case, Hayudini was initially excluded by the ERB as a voter. On
November 30, 2012, the ERB issued a certificate confirming the disapproval
of Hayudini’s petition for registration. This is precisely the reason why he
needed to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of Voters in
Barangay Bintawlan before the MCTC. Thus, when he stated in his CoC that
"he is eligible for said office," Hayudini made a clear and material
misrepresentation as to his eligibility, because he was not, in fact, registered
as a voter in Barangay Bintawlan. As such, the cancellation of his CoC is in
order, and the declaration of his proclamation as void, is the legitimate
outcome of such cancellation.
WHEREFORE, the petition was dismissed.
iii. Qualifications of Candidates Specified in the Constitution Cannot be
Expanded by a Statute
- Under Section 3, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, no person
shall be a senator unless he is natural born citizen of the Philippines, and, on
the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read and
write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than
two years immediately preceding the day of the election. Accordingly, the
Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. The creation of
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first undergo a
mandatory drug test and be certified as drug free is unconstitutional (SJS vs.
DDB).
- Accordingly, Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that law
or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance
is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
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all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.
In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of
government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution (ibid).
Case: Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and
PDEA, GR No. 157870; Atty. Manuel J. Laserna Jr. vs Dangerous Drugs
Board and PDEA, GR No. 158633; and Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. vs
COMELEC, GR No. 161658, November 3, 2008
Facts: The core of consolidated cases dwells on the constitutionality of
Section 36 of Republic Act No. 9165, the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the
prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other personalities.
Among the consolidated petitions filed before the Supreme Court, is the
Petition for Certiorari filed by Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., as a senator of the
Republic of the Philippines and a candidate for re-election in the May 10,
2004 elections. In it, he seeks to nullify Section 36 (g) of Republic Act 9165,
which provides that “all candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test” and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003
which also provides that “(g) all candidates for public office xxx both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test” for being
unconstitutional. He invokes as legal basis for his petition is Section 3, Article
VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution, which states:
“No person shall be a senator unless he is natural born citizen of the
Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty-five years
of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the
Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day
of the election.”
According to him, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate, for, elected to, and be member of
the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring,
via RA No. 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among
other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional
qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug
free. He added that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing
the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
Issue: Did Section 36 (g) of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 expanded the qualifications for senatorial candidate, and, thus,
unconstitutional?
Ruling: Yes, Section 36 (g) of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution
No. 6486 expanded the qualifications for senatorial candidate, and, thus,
unconstitutional?
It is basic that law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The
Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield
obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes
must be observed. The legislative power remains limited in the sense that it
is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe
both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.
Here, Pimentel’s contention is well-taken. Thus, Section 36 (g) of RA
9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 should be declared as
unconstitutional.
The COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly
impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the
Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to
meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without
such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election
should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
Further, Section 36 (g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the
assailed COMELEC Resolution No. 6486, effectively enlarges the
qualification requirements enumerated in Section 3, Article VI of the
Constitution. As couched, said Section 36 (g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a
precondition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with
like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
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proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC completes the chain with the
proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Section 36 (g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the
Senate. Whether the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is
to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting
elected would be of little value is one cannot assume office for non-
compliance with the drug-testing requirement.
Therefore, Section 36 (g) of R.A. No. 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 were declared unconstitutional insofar as it expanded the qualifications
for senatorial candidate.
b. Constitutional and Statutory Qualifications of Candidates
i. Update on SK Qualifications: Section 10 of RA 10742
Section 10.Qualifications. – An official of the Sangguniang Kabataan, either
elective or appointee, must be a citizen of the Philippines, a qualified voter of
the Katipunan ng Kabataan, a resident of the barangay for not less than one
(1) year immediately preceding the day of the elections, at least eighteen
(18) years but not more than twenty-four (24) years of age on the day of the
elections, able to read and write Filipino, English, or the local dialect, must
not be related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to
any incumbent elected national official or to any incumbent elected regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official, in the locality where he or she
seeks to be elected, and must not have been convicted by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude. (R.A. No. 10742 also known as the
“Sangguniang Kabataan Reform Act of 2015”)
c. Citizenship
i. Who are Filipino Citizens - Sections 1-5, Article IV of the Constitution
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship.
Section 3. Philippine citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner
provided by law.
Section 4. Citizens of the Philippines who marry aliens shall retain their
citizenship unless by their act or omission, they are deemed, under the law,
to have renounced it.
Section 5. Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and
shall be dealt with by law.
Case: Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr. vs
COMELEC, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (aka FPJ) and Victorino X. Fornier,
G.R. No. 161434; Zoilo Antonio Velez vs Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (aka
FPJ), G.R. No. 161634; and Victorino X. Fornier vs COMELEC and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (aka FPJ), G.R. No. 161824, March 3, 2004.
Facts: On December 31, 2003, respondent FPJ filed his CoC for the position
of President of the Republic of the Philippines. In his CoC, FPJ represented
himself to be a natural-born citizen of the RP, his date of birth August 20,
1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Petitioner Fornier in G.R. NO. 161824 initiated on January 09, 2004 a petition
before the COMELEC to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel
his CoC upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his
CoC by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American,
and his fther, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo
Pou, a Spanish subject. He further asserted that even if Allan F. Poe was a
Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ,
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based this
allegation on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley, and, second,
even if no such prior marriage existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelley
only a year after the birth of respondent FPJ.
On January 03, 2004, the COMELEC dismissed Fornier’s petition. His MR
having been denied, he assailed the same before the Supreme Court
pursuant to Rule 64, in relation to Rule 64, of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The other petitions consolidated with the case were directly filed
with the Supreme Court, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
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Philippine Constitution, only the Supreme Court has original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Issues:
1.Was the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction properly invoked in the consolidated
petitions?; and
2. Did FPJ commit material misrepresentation when he claimed to be a
natural-born citizen in his certificate of candidacy?
Ruling: 1. As to G.R. No. 161824, the SC’s jurisdiction was properly invoked.
Section 78 of the OEC explicitly states that a verified petition seeking to deny
due course or to cancel a CoC may be filed by any person exclusively on the
ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. In consonance thereto, the COMELEC shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest
elections (Section 52, OEC).
The decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed
by the SC per Rule 64 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RRCP.
Also, Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution also states “Each
commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or
matter brought before it within 60 days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within 30 days from receipt of a copy thereof.”
In G.R. No. 161824, it is sufficiently clear that the petition was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by the SC.
As to G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634, the same were dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
In these cases, the petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and
urged the SC to take on the petitions they directly instituted before it, as a
case before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). The Constitutional
provision they cited reads:
“The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose”
However, the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, categorically speak
of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications o the “President” or “Vice-President” of the Philippines, and
not of “candidates” for President or VP. In such context, the election contest
can only contemplate a post-election scenario. The SC concluded that the
above constitutional provision cited by the petitioner would not include cases
directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the
presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Hence, G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
2. FPJ did not commit material misrepresentation for he is, indeed, a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.
FPJ, born on August 20, 1939, the applicable constitutional guideline
regarding his citizenship is that found under Section 1, Article III of the 1935
Philippine Constitution, which provides that the following are citizens of the
Philippines:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the
Philippine Islands.
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
The case of FPJ is grounded on the qualifications to run and be elected as a
President of the RP, as stated in Section 1, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
“No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years
of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least
ten years immediately preceding such election.”
The term “natural-born citizens,” is defined to include “those who are citizens
of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship.”
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939
during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of
acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis –
had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a
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person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa
vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the
1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather
Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the
record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been presented in evidence, his death
certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September
1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that
he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an
"uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16
September 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be
twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth
certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to
Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be
drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such
that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization"
that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo
Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent
FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.
Case: Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC and
Estrella C. Elamparo, G.R. No. 221697; and Mary Grace Natividad S.
Poe-Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, Francisco S. Tatad, Antonio
Contreras, and Amado D. Valdez, G.R. No. 221698-700, March 8, 2016.
Facts: Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found
abandoned as a newborn in the Parish Church of Jaro, Ilo-Ilo by a certain
Edgardo Militar on September 3, 1968. Parental care and custody over
petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar and his
wife. The relatives then reported and registered the child as a foundling with
the Civil Registrar of IloIlo. The child was then named Mary Grace Contreras
Militar.
Petitioner was then adopted by celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(aka Fernando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces). The
petitioner was given the name “Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” in
her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth. The trial court granted
their petition and ordered that petitioner’s name be changed from “Mary
Grace Natividad Contreras Militar” to “Mary Grace Natividad-Sonora Poe” on
May 13, 1974.
Although there were annotations placed in the child’s foundling certificate but
it was only in 2005 that Susan Roces found out that their lawyer failed to
secure a new Certificate of Live Birth with a Poe’s new name as well as the
name of the adoptive parents. Roces then submitted an affidavit and in 2006,
a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was released by
the Civil Registry of Ilo-Ilo.
At the age of 18, Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. Initially, the
petitioners was enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies the
U.P. but she chose to pursue her studies abroad and left for the USA in
1988. Poe graduated in 1991 from Boston College in Chestnuts Hill,
Massachusetts where she earned her B.A. degree in Political Studies. In
1988, she was issued a Philippine passport.
Thereafter, she married Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to the USA right after
the wedding. In 2001, she became a naturalized American citizen and
obtained US Passport that same year.
In April 2004, she came back to the Philippines in order to support her
father’s candidacy. In July 2004, she returned to the USA with her two
daughters. After knowing her father’s deteriorating condition, Poe returned in
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December 2004 and stayed until February 2005, after the death of his father,
to take care of funeral arrangements. As she wanted to be with her grieving
mother, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines.
On July 7, 2006, Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines pursuant
to RA No. 9225. On October 6, 2000, she was appointed as Chairperson of
the MTRCB. Before assuming her post, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the US before a notary public in Pasig City on
October 20, 2012. The following day, she submitted the Affidavit to the
Bureau of Immigration and took her oath as a chairperson of MTRCB. Poe
from then on, stopped using her American passport.
On October 2, 2012, Poe filed with the COMELEC her CoC for senator
saying that she was resident of the Philippines for a period of 6 years and 6
months before May 13, 2013. She was then proclaimed a senator on May 16,
2013.
On October 15, 2015, Poe filed her CoC for the Presidency for the May 2016
elections. She declared that she is a natural born citizen of the Philippines
and her residence in the Philippines up to the day before election would be
10 years and 11 months counted from May 24, 2005. Hence, petitions were
filed against Poe alleging the following: (1) she committed material
misrepresentations in her CoC when she stated that she is a resident of the
Philippines for at least 10 years, 11 months up to the day before May 9,
2016, and (2) that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen considering that
she is a foundling.
Issue: Is Petitioner Grace Poe a natural-born citizen of the Philippines?
Ruling: Yes, petitioner Grace Poe is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
First, there is a very high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos.
Grace Poe’s physical features are typical of Filipinos. As a matter of fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a municipality where the population of the
Filipinos is overwhelming such that there would be more than 99% chance
that a child born in such province is a Filipino is also a circumstantial
evidence of her parents’ nationality. That high probability and the evidence
on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd.
Second, by votes of 7-5, the SC pronounced and said that foundlings are
natural-born citizens. This is based on the finding that the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention manifests that the framers intended
foundlings to be covered by the enumeration. While the 1935 Constitution’s
enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which
would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity
in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, the Supreme Court resorted to
the determination of the framers intent with respect to foundlings. The SC
found no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right
to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of
special consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II,
Section 11 which provides that the "State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, Section 1
which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article
XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from
all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these provisions contradict an
intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their unfortunate
status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon
the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which
provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal
capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will
have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Third, the foundlings are automatically conferred with natural-born
citizenship as supported by treaties and the general principles of international
law. Adopting the legal principles from the 1930 Hague Conventions and the
1961 Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable consistent with
the jus sanguinis regime in the Philippine Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their
parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided, the
presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter
of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making.
We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls
itself civilized and a member of the community of nations.
Therefore, the petition was granted.
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Case: Rizalito Y. David vs. Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and Mary
Grace Poe-Llamanzares, G.R. No. 221538, September 20, 2016.
Facts: Petitioner David filed before the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure praying for the nullification of
the assailed November 17, 2015 Decision and December 3, 2015 Resolution
of the SET which dismissed his Petition for Quo Warranto, seeking to unseat
private respondent Grace Poe as senator for allegedly not being a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, and, therefore, not qualified to hold such office
under Article VI, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Grace Poe is a foundling whose biological parents are unknown. As an
infant, she was abandoned at the Parish Church of Iloilo. Edgardo Militar
found her outside the church on September 3, 1968 and he turned her over
to Mr. And Mrs. Emiliano Militar. Edgardo reported to the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar that the infant was found on September 6, 1968. She was
given the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar and the LCR issued
a Certificate of Live Birth/Foundling Certificate. Thereafter, Grace Poe was
adopted by Spouses FPJ and Jesusa Sonora Poe and her given name was
changed to “Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.”
She then grew and obtained a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from
Boston College, Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. On July 27, 1991, she married
Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, both an American and Filipino
National since birth. After their marriage ceremony, Grace Poe returned to
the USA with her husband and lived there until they got children. On October
18, 2001, she was naturalized and granted American citizenship and was
given a United States passport.
In 2005, Grace Poe and her family decided to return home to support her
grieving mother, Susan Roces. Following her return, the BIR issued to her a
Tax Identification Number. On July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines. On July 10, 2006, Senator Poe filed a
Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship through
R.A. No. 9225. She also filed applications for derivative citizenship on behalf
of her three children who were all below 18 years of age at that time. Both
her petition and applications were granted by the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation.
On October 6, 2010, President Benigno Aquino appointed Grace Poe as
Chairperson of the MTRCB. On October 20, 2010, Senator Poe executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of
American Citizenship, stating:
“I, MARY GRACE POE-LLAMANZARES, Filipino, of legal age, and presently
residing at No. 107 Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Quezon City, Philippines,
after having been duly sworn to in accordance with the law, do hereby
depose and sate that with this affidavit, I hereby expressly and voluntarily
renounce my United States nationality/American citizenship, together with all
rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity thereunto
pertaining. I make this renunciation intentionally, voluntarily, and of my own
free will, free of any duress or undue influence.”
On October 21, 2010, Grace Poe took her oath of office as MTRCB
Chairperson and assumed office on October 26, 2010. On July 12, 2011, she
executed an Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United
States in the presence of Vice-Consul. On this occasion, she also filled out
the Questionnaire Information for Determining Possible Loss of US
Citizenship. On December 9, 2011, Vice Consul Jason Galian executed a
Certificate of Loss of Nationality for her. The said certificate was approved by
the Overseas Citizen Service, Department of State on February 3, 2012.
Grace Poe then decided to run in the 2013 elections and, thereby, executed
a Certificate of Candidacy on September 27, 2012 and was submitted to the
COMELEC on October 2, 2012. She won and was declared as Senator-elect
on May 16, 2013.
Petitioner David, a losing candidate in the 2013 Senatorial Elections, filed
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal a Petition for Quo Warranto on August
6, 2015. He contested the election of Senator Poe for failing to comply with
the citizenship and residency requirements mandated by the 1987
Constitution. The SET promulgated its assailed resolution finding Grace Poe
to be a natural-born citizen, and, therefore, qualified to hold office as
Senator. His MR having been denied by the SET, he filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules on Civil Procedure before the Supreme
Court.
In his Petition, David asserted that Grace Poe is not a natural-born citizen
and, therefore, not qualified to sit as a Senator of the Republic of the
Philippines, chiefly on two grounds: (1) Grace Poe, as a foundling, whose
parents are unknown, fails to satisfy the jus sanguinis principle, that is, she
failed to establish her Filipino bloodline, which is supposedly the essence of
the Constitution’s determination of who are natural-born citizens of the
Philippines; and (2) Since she was never a natural-born citizen, she could
never leave reverted to natural-born status despite the performance of acts
that ostensibly comply with R.A. No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003.
Issues:
1. Does the Supreme Court have jurisdiction over decisions of the SET?;
2. Is Grace Poe a natural born citizen of the Philippines?; and
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3. If Grace Poe was a natural-born citizen, was she able to reacquire such
status?
Ruling: 1. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the decisions
rendered by the SET only if it is shown that the SET has committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of its jurisdiction.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that the
Senate and the House of Representative shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representative, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Exclusive, original jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the elective officials falling within the scope of their
powers is, thus, vested in these electoral tribunals. It is only before them that
post-election challenges against the election, returns, and qualifications of
Senators and Representatives (as well as of the President and Vice-
Presidents, in the case of the PET) may be initiated.
However, the above constitutional provision must be read in harmony to
Article VIII, Section 1’s express statement that “judicial power includes the
duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch of instrumentality of the
Government.”
Pertinently, to be considered as a grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of
discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive
duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercise in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion
is not enough, it must be grave.
As a rule, any final action taken by the HRET or SET on a matter within its
jurisdiction shall not be reviewed by the SC. However, in exceptional cases,
the Court may exercise judicial review in the exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction, i.e., upon a determination that the Tribunal’s decision or
resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion.
Hence, the Court reviews judgment of the HRET and SET not in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction, but it is limited to a determination of whether there
has been an error in jurisdiction, not an error in judgment.
2. Grace Poe is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
In an action for quo warranto, the burden of proof necessarily falls on the
party who brings the action and who alleges that the respondent is ineligible
for the office involved in the controversy. Further, the requisite quantum of
proof is substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
Here, the petitioner failed to present substantial evidence that would negate
the uncontroverted circumstance in favour of Grace Poe as a natural-born
Filipino citizen, i.e, that she was found as a newborn infant outside the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo on September 3, 1968. IN 1968, Iloilo, as did most – if
not all – Philippine provinces, had a predominantly Filipino population.
Private respondent is described as having “brown almond-shaped eyes, a
low nasal bridge, straight black hair, and an oval-shaped face.” She stands at
5 feet and 2 inches tall. Further, in 1968, there was no international airport in
Jaro, Iloilo. All these circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an
interference that her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a
Catholic Church is more or less consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968,
lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic environment, would have
behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, IloIlo precludes the
possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreign father, swiftly and
surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her
offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical
features attest to it.
The Constitution sustains a presumption that all foundlings found in the
Philippines are born to at least either a Filipino father or mother and are thus,
natural-born, unless there is substantial proof otherwise. Consistent with
Article IV, Section 1(2), any such countervailing proof must show that both-
not just one-of a foundling’s biological parents are not Filipino citizens.
Other than the anonymity of their biological parents, no substantial distinction
differentiates foundlings from children with known Filipino parents. They are
both entitled to the full extent of the state’s protection from the moment of
their birth. Foundlings’ misfortune in failing to identify the parents who
abandoned them – an inability arising from no fault of their own – cannot be
the foundation of a rule that reduces them to statelessness or, at best, as
inferior, second-class citizens who are not entitled to as much benefits and
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protection from the state as those who know their parents. Sustaining this
classification is not only inequitable; it is dehumanizing. It condemns those
who, from the very beginning of their lives, were abandoned to a life of
desolation and deprivation.
Hence, the presumption of her being a natural-born Filipino citizen stands.
3. Grace Poe, being a natural-born citizen, was able to reacquire such.
Republic Act No. 9225 made natural-born Filipinos’ status permanent and
immutable despite naturalization as citizens of other countries. To effect this,
Section 3 of RA No. 9225 provides:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. – Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the
Republic:
“I ____________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend
the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and
legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;
and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.”
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 3's implications are clear. Natural-born Philippine citizens who, after
Republic Act 9225 took effect, are naturalized in foreign countries "retain,"
that is, keep, their Philippine citizenship, although the effectivity of this
retention and the ability to exercise the rights and capacities attendant to this
status are subject to certain solemnities (i.e., oath of allegiance and other
requirements for specific rights and/or acts, as enumerated in Section 5). On
the other hand, those who became citizens of another country before the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 9225 "reacquire" their Philippine citizenship
and may exercise attendant rights and capacities, also upon compliance with
certain solemnities. Read in conjunction with Section 2's declaration of a
policy of immutability, this reacquisition is not a mere restoration that leaves
a vacuum in the intervening period. Rather, this reacquisition works to
restore natural-born status as though it was never lost at all.
The taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or reacquisition of
natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of civil and political
rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities." However, other
conditions must be met for the exercise of other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.- Those who retain or or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(5) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
a. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
b. are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers
in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish
to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following three
requirements:
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention
or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables
the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the
right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
Third, making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. This,
along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
makes one eligible for elective public office.
In this case, Grace Poe has complied with all of these requirements. First,
on July 7, 2006, she took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines. Second, on August 31, 2006, she became a registered voter of
Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Juan City. This evidences her compliance with
Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution. There is no need to comply with
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 since she was to vote within the
country. Lastly, on October 20, 2010, she executed an Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the USA and Renunciation of American
citizenship. This was complemented by her execution of an Oath/Affirmation
of Renunciation of Nationality of the USA before Vice-Consul Somer E.
Bessire-Briers on July 12, 2011, which was, in turn, followed by vice-consul
Jason Galian’s issuance of a Certificate of Loss of Nationality on December
9, 2011 and the approval of this certificate by the Overseas Citizen Service,
Department of State, on February 3, 2012.
Grace Poe has, therefore, not only fully reacquired natural-born citizenship,
she has also complied with all of the other requirements for eligibility to
elective public office, as stipulated in Republic Act No. 9225.
Therefore, the SET did not act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abused of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed decision and resolution. The petition was dismissed.
ii. Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship to Run for Public Office
1. “Twin Requirements” now “Three Requirements
- As ratiocinated in the case of David vs. SET and Mary Grace Poe-
Llamanzares, the taking the Oath of Allegiance effects the retention or
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. It also facilitates the enjoyment of
civil and political rights, "subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities." However, other conditions must be met for the exercise of
other faculties:
Sec. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.- Those who retain or or
re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
(6) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as "the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003" and other existing laws;
(7) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the
Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;
(8) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and its duly
constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office; Provided, That
they renounce their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that
oath;
(9) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice; and
(10) That the right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in
the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:
c. are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of
which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
d. are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers
in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.
Thus, natural-born Filipinos who have been naturalized elsewhere and wish
to run for elective public office must comply with all of the following three
requirements:
First, taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. This effects the retention
or reacquisition of one's status as a natural-born Filipino. This also enables
the enjoyment of full civil and political rights, subject to all attendant liabilities
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
and responsibilities under existing laws, provided the solemnities recited in
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 are satisfied.
Second, compliance with Article V, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution,
Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as the Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, and other existing laws. This is to facilitate the exercise of the
right of suffrage; that is, to allow for voting in elections.
Third, making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.This,
along with satisfying the other qualification requirements under relevant laws,
makes one eligible for elective public office.
As explained in Sobejana-Condon vs. Commission on Elections, this
required sworn renunciation is intended to complement Article XI, Section 18
of the Constitution in that “public officers and employees owe the State and
this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee
who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another during his tenure shall be dealt with by law.” It is also in view of this
that Section 5(5) similarly bars those who seek or occupy public office
elsewhere and/or who are serving in the armed forces of other countries from
being appointed or elected to public office in the Philippines.
2. Dual citizenship from Birth
- Dual citizenship arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the
different laws of two or more state, a person is simultaneously considered a
national by the said stats. For instance, such a situation may arise when a
person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of
jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso fact and without any voluntary act of his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states (Cordora vs COMELEC)
- Considering the citizenship clause, Article IV of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
1. Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
2. Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by
the laws of their fathers’ country such children are citizens of that
country;
3. Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter’s country the former
are considered citizens, unless by their act of omission they are deemed
to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may,
without performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above
cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship
(ibid).
- Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an
individual’s volition (ibid).
- The Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government Code
and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on
dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino citizen may,
without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the
conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state, the
Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: “x x x the
phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, x x x 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
x x x 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance.’ Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”
The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it
was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent Lopez filed her certificate of candidacy in
1992, such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship (Valles vs.
COMELEC).
Case: Gaudencio M. Cordora vs COMELE and Gustavo S. Tambunting,
G.R. No. 176947, February 19, 2009.
Facts: Petitioner Cordora filed a complaint affidavit before the COMELEC
Law Department, asserting that Tambunting made false assertions in his
Certificate of Candidacy with respect to his citizenship and residency.
Petitioner claimed that Tambunting was not eligible to run for local public
office as he is a naturalized American citizen, and due to such naturalization
caused him to lost his residency in the Philippines. Hence, he sought to
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
prosecute Tambunting for knowingly making untruthful statements in his
CoC.
On one hand, Tambunting maintained that he did not make any
misrepresentation in his CoC. To refute Cordora’s claim, he presented a
copy of his birth certificate which showed that he born of a Filipino mother
and an American father. He further denied that he was naturalized as an
American citizen The certificate of citizenship conferred by the US
government after Tambunting’s father petitioned him through INS Form 1-
130 (Petition for Relative) merely confirmed his citizenship which he acquired
at birth. Tambunting’s possession of an American passport did not mean that
he is not a Filipino citizen. He also took an oath of allegiance on November
18, 2003 pursuant to R.A. No. 9225, or the Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003.
He further stated that he has resided in the Philippines since birth and has
imbibed the Filipino culture, has spoken the Filipino language, and has been
educated in Filipino schools. He maintained that proof of his loyalty and
devotion to the Philippines was shown by his service as councilor of
Paranaque.
The COMELEC Law Department recommended the dismissal of Cordora’s
complaint because he failed to substantiate his charges against Tambunting.
The COMELEC En Banc affirmed the findings and the resolution of the
COMELEC Law Department. His MR having been denied, he filed a petition
for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Is Tambunting a naturalized American citizen or a dual citizen of the
Philippines and America?
Ruling: Tambunting is a dual citizen of the Philippines and America.
Tambunting does not deny that he is born of a Filipino mother and an
American father. Neither does he deny that he underwent the process
involved in INS Form 1-130 (Petition for Relative) because of his father’s
citizenship. Tambunting claims that because of his parents’ differing
citizenship, he is both Filipino and American by birth.
The SC ruled that Tambunting possesses dual citizenship. Because of the
circumstances of his birth, it was no longer necessary for Tambunting to
undergo the naturalization process to acquire American citizenship. The
process involved in INS Form I-130 only served to confirm the American
citizenship which Tambunting acquired at birth. The certification from the
Bureau of Immigration which Cordora presented contained two trips where
Tambunting claimed that he is an American. However, the same certification
showed nine other trips where Tambunting claimed that he is Filipino.
Clearly, Tambunting possessed dual citizenship prior to the filing of his
certificate of candidacy before the 2001 elections. The fact that Tambunting
had dual citizenship did not disqualify him from running for public office.
Thus, like any other natural-born Filipino, it is enough for a person with dual
citizenship who seeks public office to file his certificate of candidacy and
swear to the oath of allegiance contained therein.
Further, the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and
executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship in R.A. No. 9225 do not
apply to a natural-born Filipino who did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. In Sections 2 and 3 of R.A. No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with the
status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries
of origin even after their naturalization. Section 5(3) of R.A. No. 9225 states
that naturalized citizens who reacquire Filipino citizenship and desire to run
for elective public office in the Philippines shall “meet the qualifications for
holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath” aside from the oath of allegiance
prescribed in Section 3 of R.A. No. 9225.
Hence, the twin requirements do not apply to Tambunting for he is not a
naturalized citizen but a dual citizen from birth.
Petition was dismissed.
Case: Cirilo R. Valles vs. COMELEC and Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, G.R.
No. 137000, August 9, 2000.
Facts: Petitioner Valles filed a petition for disqualification before the
COMELEC against respondent Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for
governor of Davao Oriental. Petitioner claimed that Lopez is an Australian
citizen.
Respondent Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier, Terrace, Broome,
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and
native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In
1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia and came to settle in the
Philippines. On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a
Filipino citizen. Since then, she has continuously participated in the electoral
process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. In 1992, she ran for
and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her citizenship was questioned
by her opponent Gil Taojo in a petition for quo warranto, but the COMELEC
en banc dismissed the petition for lack of sufficient proof that she renounced
her Philippine citizenship.
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
In the 1995 local elections, Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental, and her citizenship was again put to question. Nonetheless, the
COMELEC reiterated its earlier decision upholding the Philippine citizenship
of the Lopez.
In May 1998 elections, Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
Oriental. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo
Valles. The COMELEC First Division dismissed the petition. The COMELEC
ruled that Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to run for a public
office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by
virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a Filipino citizen under the
1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby
making her also a Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth
Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on January
15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as certified to by the
Australian embassy in Manila; and (4) COMELEC earlier decisions declared
her to be a Filipino citizen duly qualified for the elective position of Davao
Oriental governor.
Valles’s MR having been denied, petitioner filed a petition before the SC
questioning the citizenship of Lopez. He claimed that Lopez is an Australian
citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts that:
1. In 1998, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of
Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien Certificate of
Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;
2. On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR); and
3. She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.
Valles claimed that due to the above circumstance, private respondent had
renounced her Filipino citizenship. He contended that in her application for
alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of resident, Lopez
expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia;
and said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and operated to
disqualify her to run for elective office.
Issue: Did Lopez renounce her Philippine citizenship or is she a dual citizen?
Ruling: Lopez did not renounce her Philippine citizenship for she is a dual
citizen.
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of the parets
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli
which determines nationality or citizenship on the basis of place of birth.
Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia; this was a year before the
1935 Constitution took effect. At that time, what served the Constitution of
the Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the US governed the
country. These were Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine
Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish
subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. Lopez’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born
on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidence by a
certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to
be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, Lopez is likewise a citizen
of the Philippines. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to
her losing her Philippine citizenship. At most, private respondent can also
claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual citizenship.
Further, under Commonwealth Act NO. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his
citizenship:
1. By naturalization of foreign country;
2. BY express renunciation of citizenship;
3. By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws
of a foreign country upon attaining 21 years of age or more;
4. By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign
country;
5. By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;
6. By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the
Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a plenary
pardon or amnesty has been granted; and
7. In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the
laws in force in her husband’s country, she acquires his nationality.
In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must
be express. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Lopez was a holder
of an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not
acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate
against her claim of Filipino citizenship. Her application for an alien certificate
of registration, and her holding of an Australian passport, were mere acts of
assertion of her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced the
same.
Lastly, the Court clarified “dual citizenship” as used in the Local Government
Code and reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
Constitution on dual allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence
of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a citizen of another state,
the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to
citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly pronounced: “x x x the
phrase ‘dual citizenship’ in R.A. No. 7160, x x x 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
x x x 20 must be understood as referring to ‘dual allegiance.’ Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.”
The fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not
automatically disqualify her from running for a public office. Furthermore, it
was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect
Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy, to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship. The filing of a
certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively
removing any disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that
he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under
oath, operates as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore,
when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992,
such fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship.
3. Dual Citizenship Obtained through Naturalization
- An oath is a solemn declaration, accompanied by a swearing to God or a
revered person or thing, that one’s statement is true or that one will be bound
to a promise. The person making the oath implicitly invites punishment if the
statement is untrue or the promise is broken. The legal effect of an oath is to
subject the person to penalties for perjury if the testimony is false.
Indeed, the solemn promise, and the risk of punishment attached to an oath
ensures truthfulness to the prospective public officer’s abandonment of his
adopted state and promise of absolute allegiance and loyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines.
To hold the oath to be a mere pro forma requirement is to say that it is only
for ceremonial purposes; it would also accommodate a mere qualified or
temporary allegiance from government officers when the Constitution and the
legislature clearly demand otherwise.
The fact that petitioner won the elections cannot cure the defect of her
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does not validate the
election of a disqualified candidate because the application of the
constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter of
popularity.
In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-
acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an authorized
public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.The rule applies to
all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-
requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office.
Stated differently, it is an additional qualification for elective office specific
only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Section 3 of
R.A. No. 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public
office. The petitioner's failure to comply therewith in accordance with the
exact tenor of the law, rendered ineffectual the Declaration of Renunciation
of Australian Citizenship she executed on September 18, 2006. As such, she
is yet to regain her political right to seek elective office. Unless she executes
a sworn renunciation of her Australian citizenship, she is ineligible to run for
and hold any elective office in the Philippines (Sobejana-Condon vs.
COMELEC).
Case: Teodora Sobejana-Condon vs. COMELEC, Luis M. Bautista,
Robelito V. Picar, and Wilma P. Pagaduan, G.R. NO. 198742, August 10,
2012.
Facts: Petitioner Condon was a natural-born Filipino citizen and became a
naturalized Australian citizen owing to her marriage to a certain Kevin
Thomas Condon. On December 2, 2005, she filed an application to re-
acquire Philippine citizenship before the RP Embassy in Canberra, Australia,
pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 9225. The application was approved and
petitioner took her oath of allegiance to the RP on December 05, 2005. On
September 18, 2006, the petitioner filed an unsworn Declaration of
Renunciation of Australian citizenship before the Department of Immigration
and Indigenous Affairs, Canberra, Australia, which in turn issued the Order
dated September 27, 2006 certifying that she has ceased to be an Australian
citizen.
In 2010 elections, petitioner ran for Vice-Mayoralty of Caba, La Union to
which she was proclaimed as the winning candidate. Soon thereafter, private
respondents filed separate petitions for quo warranto questioning petitioner’s
ineligibility before the RTC. They also sought petitioner’s disqualification from
holding her elective post on the ground that she is a dual citizen and that she
failed to execute a “personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer and oath” as
imposed by Section 5 (2) of RA No. 9225.
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
Petitioner denied being a dual citizen and averred that since September 27,
2006, she ceased to be an Australian citizen. She claimed that the
Declaration of Renunciation of Australian Citizenship she executed in
Australia sufficiently complied with Section 5 (2) of RA No. 9225, and that her
act of running for public office is a clear abandonment of her Australian
citizenship.
Both the RTC and COMELEC En Banc ruled that petitioner is not qualified to
run and hold for elective elective as she failed to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of her Australian citizenship. Thus, petitioner filed before the SC
a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Issue: Was petitioner a dual citizen at the time she ran for vice mayoralty in
2010 elections, thus, disqualified to run and hold such elective office?
Ruling: Yes, petitioner was a dual citizen at the time she ran for vice
mayoralty in 2010 elections, thus, disqualified to run and hold such elective
office.
Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this R.A. 9225
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities
and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and
existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make
a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.”
Here, petitioner’s renunciation is unsworn contrary to the plain mandate of
the above provision of RA No. 9225. As such, her Australian citizenship is
deemed not renounced, and, thus, she was a dual citizen at the time she
filed her CoC up to the present. Consequently, she is not qualified to run and
hold elective position in the Philippines.
In Jacot vs. Dal, the SC categorically pronounced that the intent of the
legislators was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225 to take their oath of allegiance to the RP, but also
to explicitly renounce their foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective
posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in the Philippine elections,
Filipinos must have only one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.
Therefore, being a dual citizen at the time she filed her CoC for 2010
Elections due to ineffective renunciation of her Australian citizenship,
petitioner is disqualified to run and hold the vice-mayoralty elective position.
Petition was dismissed.
4. Recantation of Oath of Renunciation
- The Supreme Court held that the use of foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as
to one’s nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship
regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation required to
qualify one to run for an elective position (Maquiling vs COMELEC).
- After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his American
citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the
requirements for eligibility to run for public office. By renouncing his foreign
citizenship, private respondent Arnado was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship (ibid).
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when, after
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport to
travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
November 2009. Then, the pivotal question to determine is whether he was
solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at the time he filed his certificate of
candidacy, thereby rendering him eligible to run for public office.
Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign citizenship, and 30
November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he used his US passport four
times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively and voluntarily
represented himself as an American, in effect declaring before immigration
authorities of both countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
rights and privileges granted by the United States of America.
The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.
Case: Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, Rommel Arnado y
Cagoco, and Linog G. Balua, G.R. No. 195469, April 16, 2013.
SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo
Facts: Private respondent Arnado is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
However, he lost his Filipino citizenship because of his subsequent
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Arnado applied for repatriation under R.A.
No. 9225 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in San Francisco,
USA and took his Oath of Allegiance to the Philippines on July 10, 2008, and,
on same date, it was approved. On April 3, 2009, Arnado again took his Oath
of Allegiance to the Philippines and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of
his US citizenship. On November 30, 2009, he filed his CoC for Mayor of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.
Respondent Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate filed a petition to
disqualify Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC on the ground that he recanted
his Oath of Renunciation of US citizenship when he consistently used his US
Passport from April 2009 to November 2009. Respondent Arnado did not
answer the petition until he was proclaimed winner of the 2010 elections.
Thereafter, he filed his comment to the petition and justified that his use of
US passport was due to the fact that he was not notified of the issuance
thereof on June 18, 2009 and 3 months after knowledge thereof, he used the
same. Petitioner Maquiling, another candidate for mayoralty and who
obtained the 2nd highest votes, intervened in the petition and raising the
qualification of Arnado to run for public office.
The COMELEC 1st Division disqualified Arnado, but the COMELEC En Banc
reversed the same.
Issue: Is the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign citizenship
amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made?
Ruling: Yes, the use of a foreign passport after renouncing foreign
citizenship amounts to undoing a renunciation earlier made.
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its
citizens. It likewise demands the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to
one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice
are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to
public office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving
of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided
allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
In the case, after reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado renounced his
American citizenship by executing an Affidavit of Renunciation, thus
completing the requirements for eligibility to run for public office. By
renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to be solely a Filipino
citizen, regardless of the effect of such renunciation under the laws of the
foreign country. However, this legal presumption does not operate
permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing the foreign
citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts showing his continued
possession of a foreign citizenship

Here, Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to attack when,
after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he continued to use his US passport
to travel in and out of the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on
30 November 2009.Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his
foreign citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his COC, he
used his US passport four times, actions that run counter to the affidavit of
renunciation he had earlier executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado
positively and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in effect
declaring before immigration authorities of both countries that he is an
American citizen, with all attendant rights and privileges granted by the
United States of America.

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be
professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It requires an
absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign country which
granted the citizenship.

While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine
citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of
another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position.

By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30 November 2009,

Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the rights and privileges of Filipino and
American citizenship. He was qualified to vote, but by the express
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, he was
not qualified to run for a local elective position.

SYS Bar Exam...PV Arroyo