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BARTHOLOWW COUNTY ) CAUSE NO. 03D02-1702—PL-000970
KRISTEN S. BROWN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
-vs—
)
)
CITY OF COLUMBUS, INDIANA, )
POLICE DEPARTMENT )
Defendant. )
On December ‘18, 2019, the parties submitted a Stipulation of Facts and a Stipulated
Designation of Evidence. In this Order, the Court is not going to restate the facts the parties have
alreadystipulated to.
1. The Indiana Access to Public Records Act (the “APRA”) is codified at LC. § 5—
14-3-1 to -10. The APRA "is intended to ensure Hoosiers have broad access to most government
recbrds.” Evansville Courier & Press v. Vanderburgh Co. Health Department, 17 N.E.3d 922, 928
(Ind. 2014).
(c)This subsection does not apply to a private university police department, which
isgoverned instead by subsection (d). An agency shall maintain a daily log or
record that lists suspected crimes, accidents, or complaints, and the following
information shall be made available for inspection and copying:
(1) The time, substance, and location of all complaints or requests for
assistance received by the agency.
(2) The time and nature of the agency’s response to all complaints or
requests for assistance.
The information required in this subsection shall be made available for inspection
and cppying in compliance with this chapter. The record containing the information
must be created not later than twenty-four (24) hours afier the suspected crime,
accident, or complaint has been reported to the agency.
4. The Court finds that the information CPD initially provided to Brown pursuant t0
her public records request in the Public Incident Report contained insufficient “information” to
meet the requirements of Indiana Code 5-14-3-5(c)(3)(C) and (D). Nothing in the Public Incident
Report contains a description of the factual circumstances surrounding the incident underlying
CPD case number 16-06274. Merely listing “Criminal Mischief/Vandalism” and “Domestic
Disturbance” does not provide any factual circumstances. There was no general description of any
injuries, property, or weapons involved. The only reference to any injuries, property, or weapons
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involved was “other weapon," which is an insufficient description; nor was there any description
5. The Court thus agrees with the Public Access Counselor that the CPD provided
“insufficient detail” to Brown in response to her public records request. In this regard, the Court
notes that the Indiana Court of Appeals, in Anderson v. Huntington County Board 0f
éommissioners, 983 N.E.2d 613, 61 8 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), stated that courts “should give
6. The Court agrees with the. CPD that “investigatory records of law enforcement
agencies” arc not required to be disclosed under Section 5-14—3—4(b)(1) 0f the APRA. However,
in this case, Plaintifi‘ Brown did not request CPD'S investigatory records. Rather, she specifically
sought the information required to be maintained and disclosed under Section 5-14—3—5(c) of the
APRA. Section 5-14-3-5(c) is an exception to the requirement that law enforcement investigatory
7. Because Brown did not request CPD’s investigatory records under Section 5-14-
3-4(b), the burden is not 011 Brown to prove that CPD’s denial ofher access to the information was
“arbitrary and capricious” under Section 9(g) ofthe APRA, LC. § 5-14-3-9(g).
8. The information sought by Brown existed at the time of her request This was
revealed at the November 7, 2017, hearing, and confirmed when CPD produced the Investigation
Report and Reporting Officer Narrative following the Court’s December 11, 2017, Order. CPD's
denial that such information existed was, at worst, a dishonest statement, and at best, an inacc-uratc
one. Either way, the information existed and should have been provided to Brown when she
requested it, or, at the very latest, afier the Public Access Counselor’s recommendation. (Exh. 1E).
9. The Court thus finds that CPD's reSponse to Brown’s public records request
violated the APRA.
denied the right t0 inspect or copy a public record by a public agency may file an action in the
circuit or superior court of'the county in which the denial occurred to compel the public agency t0
permit the person to inspect and copy the public record.” That is what Brown did when she filed
the Complaint in this Court. However, during the pendency of this lawsuit, Brovm obtained the
information pursuant to the Court’s December 11, 2017, Order. Therefbre, an Order compelling
11. Section 9(i) of the APRA states: “[I]n any action filed under this section, a court
shall award reasonable attomey’s fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses of litigation to
the prevailing party if: (1) the plaintifi‘substantially prevails.":I.C. § 5-14-3-9(i) (emphasis added)?
Section 9(i) of the APRA aiso requires that, in order to recover attorney's fees; the plaintiff must
obtain an opinion fiom the Public Access Counselor before filing suit in court. (“[T]hc plaintiff is
not eligible for the awarding of attorney’s fees, court costs, and other reasonable expenses if the
plaintiff filed the action without first seeking and receiving an informal inquiry response or
12. The word “shall" means that an award of attorney’s fees, court costs, and
reasonable expenses to a party who obtains an opinion fi'om the Public Access Counselor and
Lottery Comm ’n, 739 N.E.2d 144, 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000) (“the award of attorney fees is no
longer discretionary, but mandatory, when the requirements of the statute are otherwise met”). In
ShepherdProps. C0. v. Int’l Union ofPaz'nters &Allied flades, Dist. Council 91, 972 N.E.2d 845,
852 (Ind. 2012), the Indiana Supreme Court stated that the APRA “mandates an award of
attorney’s fees to a plaintifi‘ who ‘substantially prevails’ if that party has first sought an advisory
opinion fi'om the public access counselor,” and that the attomey—fee provision “must be ‘liberally
construed to implement’ the policy of full access to public records and transparency of govemment
13. The term “prevailing party” means, “A party in whose favor a judgment is
8th ed. P.
rendered, regardless of the amount of damages awarded.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 1154
(West, 2004). The word “substantially” is not a term of limitation in this context. See UnitedStates
‘v. Bd. oanty. Comm ’rs ofHamilton Cntyfl, No. 1:02-CV—00107, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEMS 17663,
at *12 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2005) (stating, “to ‘substantially prevail’ a party would need to obtain 4
a somewhat lesser degree of relief than if they were to ‘prcvail’.”); Dixie Fuel Co. v. Callahan,
136 F. Supp. 2d 659 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (party substantially prevails where lawsuit is “reasonably
necessary to obtain the requested information” and had a “some causative effect upon the release
of that information.”).
14. Brown is entitled to recover her attorney’s fees in this matter because (a) she
obtained an opinion fiom the Public Access Counselor before filing suit; and (b) she substantially
prevailed inasmuch as she obtained the information she sought in her public records request and
15. Brown also seeks the $100 civil penalty under Section 9.5(h) ofthe APRA, I.C. §
(h) In an action under this section, a court may impose the following civil penalties:
(1) Not more than one hundred dollars ($100) for the first violation.
16. Pursuant to Indiana Code 5-14-3-9.5 the Court, exercising its discretion, finds the
imposition of the $100 civil penalty is not appropriate in this matter because the Court finds that
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CPD did not intentionally violate the APRA. How many facts and circumstances need to be
disclosed in a given case is open to interpretation and disagreement. While the Court disagrees
with CPD’s interpretation of Indiana Code 5-14-3—5(c)(3), the Court does not find this
interpretation by CPD was made in bad faith or intentionally done to violate the law. In the Court’s
December 11, 2017 Order, the Court fashioned a remedy to try to comply with the spirit of and the
2. Pursuant to Indiana Code 5-14-3—9(i), because the Court finds that Brown has
“substantially prevailed” in her action, CPD shall pay Brown’s reasonable attorney’s
fees, court costs, and expenses incurred in litigating this matter. The parties are ordered
to confer and' attempt to agee-upon the amount of Brown’s reasonable attorney’s fees,
court costs, and expenses. If the parties are unable to agree upon the amounts, Brown
shall file a petition for fees in this Court no later than sixty (60) days fiom the date of
3. Pursuant to Indiana Code 5—14—3—9.5, CPD is not assessed a $100 civil penalty.
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oz
SO ORDERED 0n this Z 2 day ofJune, 2019.