Editores: Andreas MÜLLER y Peter SCHABER

The Routledge Handbook of the Ethics of Consent. Londres y New York: Routledge.

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE ETHICS OF CONSENT

Daniel Lee
[pp. 9-20]

Consent in Antiquity

 “consent played a relatively minor role [en la ética de la antigüedad]. Indeed,

ethics in Antiquity, understood as the practical science of the good, operated on
the cardinal principle that notions of value and virtue could not be determined
simply by the human will, or even the concord of human wills, but only by
something beyond human powers – whether in the divine or in nature”. (p. 9) La
noción de consentimiento no jugó un papel importante en la ética de la
antigüedad. Se daba gran papel a los poderes de la divinidad o de la
naturaleza; no se piensa voluntad humana como autónoma

 Hipócrates introdujo la noción de consentimiento informado en la relación

médico-paciente. Hipócrates

 “Plato (c.429–c.347 B.C.E.), to take another well-known example, formulated a

theory of political obligation based on a strict notion of ‘tacit’ consent in the Crito,
a dialogue depicting the final days of the condemned Socrates. Given the
opportunity to escape, Socrates refuses and quietly accepts his fate. Socrates’
reasoning relies on the principle that ‘when one has come to an agreement that is
just with someone . . .one should fulfill it’, including agreements that bind
individuals under the obligation to obey the law. Socrates, Plato conjectures,
voluntarily entered into such an agreement, not by any formal oath or express
contract, but simply by enjoying without complaint the many advantages of living
in Athens”. (p. 9) En el Critón, Platón presenta la idea de un consentimiento
tácito realizado por Sócrates a la obediencia de la ley, en tanto que ha gozado
de sus beneficios

 “Cicero (104–43 B.C.E.), specifies ‘consent’ as one of the hallmarks defining a

well-ordered society. This shift in the evaluation of consent occurs, I argue, for a
very practical reason – to facilitate commerce and exchange between the diverse
peoples of Antiquity, where, in the absence of shared customs and values, consent
between parties engaging in some commercial transaction, hoping to reach a
bargain, becomes the only reliable marker to validate a binding obligation”. (p.
10) Cicerón específica al consenso como central para definir a una sociedad
bien ordenada. Esto va de la mano con un contexto donde el comercio y los
intercambios entre diferentes culturas dependía del consenso mutuo

 “despite the elevation of the importance and practical value of consent, it made
little difference to various categories of persons in Antiquity, such as women,
minors, and especially slaves, whose legal status effectively handicapped their
ability to express consent without some form of representation or legal fiction” [/]
“So, while the principle of consent may have been theoretically recognized in the
 ancient world, it misses one key element that is vital to the appraisal of consent in
modernity – that is, a genuine respect for the moral autonomy and equality of
individuals as consenting agents.”. (pp. 10-11) Aunque en la antigüedad la
noción de consentimiento fue ganando importancia -sobre todo en contexto
romano para negociaciones-, no existía la noción de autonomía moral e
igualdad entre individuos. Había quienes no tenían autonomía para dar
consentimiento

Consent in medieval thought

 “while norms of collective or communal consent were central to medieval thought

and practice, it is inaccurate to treat the Middle Ages as wholly antagonistic to
individual consent. We can observe this in the feudal contract, so central to the
socioeconomic organization and land distribution of medieval Europe. What is so
exceptional about the solemn, quasi-ritualistic feudal oath binding a lord to his
vassal was its intimately personal nature: The exchange of rights and duties
between lord and vassal was an unmediated transaction, requiring the formal
expression of consent between individuals”. (p. 11) Aunque el consentimiento
como acción comunal fue importante en edad media, hay también
importancia de consentimiento individual en el orden feudal, entre señor y
vasallo

 In “Gratian’s Decretum”, individual consent becomes central to the law of

marriage. Citing Isidore of Seville, Gratian declares that only ‘consent makes
marriage’”. “And Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologiae, one of the great
documents of Scholastic theology and philosophy, evinces a genuine concern for
the authenticity of individual consent when he identifies consent as a capacity
exclusive to the rational nature of man”. (p. 11) En Graciano y Tomás de
Aquino, consentimiento es importante para matrimonio y como capacidad
racional natural

 “Some of the most important contributions to medieval theories of consent are to

be found in theories concerning the ecclesiastical government of the medieval
Church. Officially, the Church was classified as a monarchy, with supreme
authority vested in the Pope, as Christ’s sole representative on earth. The extreme
version of this theory appeared in the 1302 Bull o Boniface VIII, Unam Sanctam,
which outlined the so-called ‘hierocratic’ theory of Papal plenitude of power”. (p.
12)
o “The most important theorist of consent in this controversy was Marsilius
of Padua, whose critique, developed in his treatise Defensor Pacis,
involved a careful appeal to the anti-clerical notion that coercive powers
of temporal government are derived entirely from popular consent”.
“Marsilius developed a theory that positioned communal consent as the
foundation for political legitimacy in medieval constitutional thought. For
this reason, commentators have sometimes seen Marsilius as a key
progenitor of the modern social contract tradition”. (p. 12) Frente a
versiones medievales que depositaban poder absoluto en el Papa,
aparecen posturas como la de Marsilio de Padua, quien defiende idea
de poder extraído de consentimiento popular. Algunos lo consideran
predecesor de teorías modernas de contrato
  Nicolás de Cusa: “the binding force of every law consists in . . . consent”. “it
should be the aim of the ruler to establish laws by agreement . . . of the council”
and “decide each matter by consent”. (citado en p. 13) Nicolás de Cusa sobre
consentimiento

Consent in modern thought

 En la Reforma Protestante, “the appeal to common consent was a typical

formulation used in designing a Reformed model of ecclesiastical government
such as in Hooker and Calvin. Nor was this exclusive strictly to Protestant thought,
as Jesuit theorists, such as Vitoria, Suarez, and Parsons, would locate the origins
of authority in a voluntary consensual act transferring natural rights of individuals
to government authorities”. (p. 13) En Reforma Protestante y en teóricos
jesuitas, el consentimiento fue un tema importante para considerar el poder
de la autoridad

 Para Hobbes, “consent not only acknowledged the natural equality of individuals
but also made possible the sovereign state. Consent performs a critically important
function in Hobbes’ theory. Not only is it the conduit through which naturally free
and equal, rights-holding men in nature knit themselves together as a Hobbesian
state, or ‘commonwealth’, for reasons of rational self-interest, it is also the means
by which individuals tie themselves under a general bond of obligation owed to
an absolute sovereign authority who is thereby authorized to act on their behalf
for the sake of preserving peace”. (p. 15) Hobbes: consentimiento se da en
natural igualdad de individuos y hace posible la construcción de un estado
soberano pacífico

 “Hobbes explicitly insists that the authorizing consent necessary to create a

sovereign state must originate from each individual who is to be subject to that
state. It is precisely this Hobbesian insistence upon the individual consent of
naturally free and equal, rights-bearing men that – for many commentators –
places Hobbes at the beginning of the modern liberal tradition of political
philosophy”. (p. 16) Hobbes: énfasis novedoso en el consentimiento de surge,
específicamente, de cada individuo. Inaugura tradición liberal moderna

 En Hobbes hay una comprensión muy abierta del consentimiento voluntario: el

consentimiento puede ser manifestado explícitamente, pero también se considera
que puede inferirse del silencio, o de las consecuencias de las acciones realizadas.
En Hobbes, se considera que consentimiento puede darse de diversas
maneras, a veces dudosas si pensamos real papel jugado de voluntad. Incluso,
Hobbes considera cómo la sumisión al otro a través del miedo puede
manifestar un consentimiento para no sufrir otros mayores daños. Esto,
claramente, no se aplica a consentimiento sexual
o “For Hobbes, actions speak far louder than words when it comes to
consent and they reveal the deliberative chain of reasoning that pushes
one’s will to act. So, he argues, submission to another, even submission
secured through fear, threats, or sheer coerción so as to ‘avoid the present
stroke of death’ or some other perceived harm, always counts as a valid
form of consent resulting from rational calculation”. (p. 16)
  Ojo: en Hobbes, no puedo consentir que se me impida defenderme con uso de la
fuerza frente al uso de la fuerza contra mí. Esto aparece también en Locke. En
Hobbes y Locke: no consentir que se use la fuerza contra mí: puedo
defenderme

 La construcción de un Estado puede darse, para Locke, solo por consentimiento

individual, “which, as Locke famously argues, can take the form of a ‘tacit
consent’ simply when one ‘hath Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the
Dominions of any Government’”. (p. 17) Locke: Estado se da por
consentimiento individual, y consentimiento puede ser tácito

WHAT IS CONSENT?
Hubert Schnüriger
[pp. 21-31]

 “Two main positions can be distinguished. What may be called the Mental View
takes the term ‘consent’ to refer to a particular mental state or mental action of the
consenting agent. According to this understanding, consent is given foro interno.
In contrast, the second main position, often called the Performative View,
conceives of consent as a public act. There is no consent without communication
according to this position. Thus, consent is given foro externo”. (p. 21) Dos
acercamientos al tema del consentimiento: Perspectiva Mental:
consentimiento como estado mental / Perspectiva Performativa:
consentimiento como acto público

 “the consent-giver must be competent. She must have the mental capacities to
understand what she is doing. Furthermore, she must be informed and, finally, she
must consent voluntarily. If one of these conditions is not met, the agent cannot
validly consent”. (p. 22) La persona que da consentimiento debe: estar en
capacidad de comprender lo que está haciendo; estar suficientemente
informada; poder ejercer su voluntad

 “even though consent in the sense of valid consent necessarily changes the deontic
landscape since it releases an agent from a duty owed to the consenting agent, it
is an open question whether that means that the consented-to action is permitted,
all things considered. The fact that the consent-giver releases the other agent from
a duty owed to her does not necessarily imply that there cannot be other
considerations making the performance of the act in question wrong, all things
considered. As it is sometimes put, an agent performing a consented-to action does
not wrong the consenting agent, but it is an open question whether he nevertheless
commits a wrong”. (p. 22) Aunque una persona consienta que otra realice un
acto, tal consentimiento no evita necesariamente que la acción genere algún
mal.

The Mental View

 Autores que defienden esta postura: Hurd 1996; Alexander 1996; 2014; Dressler
1998; Husak 2006. “According to the Mental View, the term ‘consent’ refers to a
particular mental state”. “This view also figures as ‘the Subjective’ or as ‘the
Attitudinal View’”. (p. 22) Perspectiva Mental, Subjetiva o Actitudinal del
consentimiento: es estado mental

 “A first suggestion analyses consent in terms of desire. Arguably, this suggestion

is in line with conceptions that, referring to the etymological roots of ‘consent’ in
the Latin verb consentire, take ‘consent’ to mean ‘being of a like mind’ or to be
‘concurring in mind and spirit’. However, these latter conceptions seem quite
narrow. Proponents of what may be called a desire-conception usually agree that
consent can be given with a broad spectrum of attitudes towards the act in
question, ranging from an unconditional welcoming state of mind as it fulfils the
consent-giver’s deepest wishes, over plain indifference, to all kinds of aversions”.
(p. 22) Análisis del consentimiento desde el deseo: se considera raíz
etimológica de “consentimiento” (concordancia de sentimiento con espíritu).
Pero se considera cómo el consentimiento puede darse en una amplia
variedad de sentimientos (goce, indiferencia, aversión).
o Con: junto, todo. Sentir: percibir sensaciones, tener sentido común.

 “Critics of the desire-conception of consent object that it fails to do justice to

situations in which an agent desires something without consenting to it: A person
may desire to have sexual intercourse with another person without giving her
consent to it as the other person may be [/] married or because the former believes
in celibacy before marriage”. (pp. 22-23)
o “These examples are supposed to show that giving or withholding consent
cannot be reconstructed as a desire because it implies an active element. It
must be under the agent’s control. Consent must, according to this
objection, be understood as an exercise of the will and, that way, as a
choice”. (p. 23) Crítica a concepción del consentimiento en vínculo al
deseo: puedo desear algo y sin embargo no dar mi consentimiento. Es
mejor pensar a consentimiento como un ejercicio de la voluntad, como
agencia

 “Heidi Hurd famously contends that the consent-giver consents to another’s action
by choosing it. She takes that to imply that the consent-giver intends the other’s
action. This immediately raises the question of how one can intend another’s
action. Hurd tackles this problem by maintaining that intending another’s action
is to intend a state of affairs in which this action occurs. Intending others’ actions
is ‘[. . .] to intend to allow or enable those actions by means of some act or
omission of one’s own’”. (p. 23) Hurd: al dar consentimiento, se elige la acción
de otra persona; se tiene la intención de la acción del otro: de que esa acción
ocurra

 “The Mental View does not deny that consent is normally signaled or
communicated as doing so gives evidence that the agent consents. Yet it insists
that consent must be distinguished from its communication”. (p. 23) Perspectiva
mental distingue entre el hecho del consentimiento y la comunicación de tal
consentimiento
 o Por ejemplo, un extranjero que quiere tener sexo pero no puede comunicar
su consentimiento por no compartir lenguaje; o una persona con
discapacidad que no puede expresar su consentimiento. En este sentido,
no se violaría derecho de persona si se realiza acción y hay consentimiento
mental, aunque no ha sido expresado.
o No sé si es está explicando bien la idea, pero suena completamente
absurdo.

 “A second line of argument in favor of the Mental View tries to systematically

justify why the communication of consent does not form part of the concept of
consent itself. It does so by emphasizing the pivotal role consent plays in
contemporary ethics. The requirement of consent, it is commonly said, expresses
the normative relevance of the individuals’ own stances on acts or practices that
concern them. Proponents of the Mental View contend that the prominent role
consent plays reflects the value of autonomy”. (p. 24)
o Hurd: “If autonomy resides in the ability to will the alteration of moral
rights and duties, and if consent is normatively significant precisely
because it constitutes an expression of autonomy, then it must be the case
that to consent is to exercise the will. That is, it must be the case that
consent constitutes a subjective mental state”. (citado en p. 24)
o Argumento de Perspectiva Mental: la comunicación del
consentimiento no es parte del concepto mismo de consentimiento,
porque el consentimiento refleja la autonomía, la que es un estado
mental que se expresa

The Performative View

 “the Performative View is not committed to holding that consent must necessarily
be given in a verbal way. Nodding, handing over the key to someone who has
asked whether he can use one’s bicycle or taking a seat in the hairdresser’s chair
can all count as instances of consent. Crucially, both verbal as well as non-verbal
forms of consent presuppose implicit or explicit rules that determine what public
behavior counts as a token of consent. They presuppose conventions”. (p. 25)
Perspectiva Performativa: el consentimiento se da de forma verbal y no
verbal. Y se da al interior de convenciones sociales que interpretan palabras
y actos como dar consentimiento

 “What may be called a strictly conventionalist or narrow understanding of the

Performative View takes consent to occur when an agent behaves in a way that
conventionally counts as an act token of consent no matter whether she believes
she is consenting”. (p. 25)
o “The Hybrid View of consent is supposed to combine this narrow
understanding of the Performative View with the Mental View by holding
that consent occurs only when a conventional act token of consent is
performed with the respective mental state”. (p. 25) Noción
convencionalista del consentimiento: este ocurre cuando el
comportamiento va de mano con prácticas sociales que indican
consentimiento. Esto debe ir de mano con estado mental que, en
efecto, consiente. (Perspectiva híbrida).
  “What the Mental View conceives of as a difference between consent and its
public communication, the Performative View takes to be a difference between
the intention to consent and an actual occurrence of consent”. (p. 26) Perspectiva
Mental diferencia: consentimiento / comunicación del consentimiento.
Perspectiva Performativa diferencia: intensión a consentir / acto de consentir

 “Arguably, the most natural reason why the Performative View may seem nearly
self-evident to its defenders consists in the genuinely intersubjective character of
consent. In addition, it has been emphasized that the agent to whose action the
consent is given is normally not just passively reacting to the consent-giver’s
consent. At least in paradigmatic cases, he actively seeks the other’s consent, as
he would commit a wrong without having it. He asks for the other’s consent in
order to get her permission and he must be able to rely on her consent”. (p. 27)
Carácter intersubjetivo del consentimiento: consentimiento no se da a sujeto
pasivo, sino por lo general a sujeto que activamente busca consentimiento del
otro

THE NORMATIVE FORCE OF CONSENT

Heidi M. Hurd
[pp. 44-54]

 “To be an autonomous moral agent is to have the ability to create and dispel rights
and duties. To respect persons as autonomous is thus to recognize them as the
givers and takers of permissions and obligations—it is to conceive of them as very
powerful moral magicians”. (p. 44) Agente moral autónomo: tener la habilidad
de crear y ejercer derechos y deberes: ser un mago moral

 “the most interesting (and in my view, the most compelling) analyses of the
normative force of consent presuppose a deontological morality in which at least
some obligations are categorical”. Se examinará diferentes formas en las que el
consentimiento puede alterar obligaciones morales para quien da el
consentimiento y quien lo recibe. “on some accounts, consent adds obligations
and is thus liberty-limiting, while, on other accounts, consent subtracts
obligations, and is thus liberty-enhancing”. (p. 44) El consentimiento tiene
fuerza normativa, porque puede alterar ciertas obligaciones morales para las
personas que interactúan. A veces, el consentimiento altera obligaciones
morales otorgando más libertad, y otras veces restringe las libertades

Concepciones del consentimiento que limitan la libertad

 Una forma de entender el consentimiento: como el acto con el que la persona que
da consentimiento renuncia a ciertas libertades y no puede quejarse por daño
realizado por quien obtuvo el consentimiento.
o “On this view, consent is rights-constricting rather than rights-expanding.
It curtails one’s own later actions by creating an exclusionary reason that
bars one from acting on first-order reasons for asserting rights to redress.
It constitutes the creation of an obligation not to seek repair or pursue
 punitive action, even if what one thereafter suffers indeed counts as an
injustice”. (p. 45)
o “on this view consent is simply a species of promising. To consent to
another’s action is to promise him that one will not seek redress for any
complaints to which his action gives rise. It is a promise to hold him
morally and legally harmless in the event that a harm happens”. (p. 45)
o Pero: “The act itself is made no more right than it was prior to one’s
consent; it doesnot, in Peter Schaber’s words, change the deontic
properties of the act itself”. (p. 46) Algunos entienden el consentimiento
hacienda énfasis no en la libertad que gana la persona a la que
consiente, sino la libertad que pierde quien da consentimiento. Se pone
énfasis en la renuncia al derecho a reclamar por un daño. Pero aun
así, podríamos calificar al acto mismo consentido como injusto

 Otra forma de entender el consentimiento: como una renuncia al derecho a

reclamar por el daño, en tanto que se ha cometido acciones que ya no dan derecho
a reclamar
o “We can also imagine a case in which no actual consent is given, but in
which another is culpably induced to believe that consent is present. When
she relies on her false belief, it is tempting to say that the burden of her
mistake should lie with the one who culpably induced it. In short, others
should be entitled to rely on the notion that ‘yes’ means ‘yes’, and anyone
who insists otherwise, ex post, is estopped from complaint”. (p. 47)
o Algunos entienden el consentimiento como renuncia a reclamo por
acción realizada. Mi acción (que me pone en situación de peligro) sería
la otorgación de consentimiento que me quita derecho a reclamar

Concepciones del consentimiento que quitan obligaciones a otros (les dan libertad)

 Consentimiento comprendido como transformación de permisos morales. Según

esta comprensión, el consentimiento “removes the only existing moral barrier to
an action, and thus effectively makes an action right when it would otherwise be
wrong. […] for example, consent can, by itself, turn a battery into a handshake; a
sexual assault into a kiss; a trespass into a dinner party; a theft into a gift; and the
commercial appropriation of a name and likeness into a biography. Moral magic”.
(p. 48) Consentimiento como transformador de los permisos morales: se
transforma lo condenable en aceptable (magia moral).

 “In many cases, however, consent is not morally transformative by itself. It does
not make all the difference between an act being wrong or right, lamentable or
laudable. It is not morally cleansing. By removing a particular obligation, it gives
another a permission to do an act that remains, in some sense, morally
condemnable. When consent operates in this second manner, it grants another “a
right to do wrong”. It conveys a “stained permission”, for the act done remains,
on [/] some basis, morally objectionable”. (pp. 48-49) Pero consentimiento, en
muchos casos, no elimina el hecho de que la acción consentida es mala
moralmente. Consentimiento como un permiso manchado: se consiente a
hacer el mal (sigue siendo el mal)
 WHEN IS CONSENT REQUIRED?
Terrance McConnell
[pp. 75-84]

 “Consent involves giving permission, and that implies that the person giving
permission has authority over the matter (see Koch, this volume, Chapter 3 ). The
thesis of this chapter is that whenever P 2 is morally required to get P 1 ’s consent,
it is because P 1 has a right over the matter in question”. (p. 76) El consentimiento
es dar un permiso. Para dar consentimiento, se tiene que tener un derecho
sobre el asunto que es permitido/consentido. No puedo dar consentimiento si
no tengo un derecho sobre el bien afectado

RAPE AS NON-CONSENSUAL SEX

Tatjana Hörnle
[pp. 235-246]

 “For centuries, the line between rightful and wrongful sexual conduct was not
drawn by examining consent. Moral and legal assessments depended on marital
status and the nature of the sexual act (‘normal intercourse’ versus ‘acts against
nature’, often with references to religious laws). Sexual activities were considered
wrongful if they disregarded fathers’ and husbands’ rights to control the chastity
of females. The description of rape as a violent appropriation of women belonging
to others can be traced back to Medieval laws, 1 that is to epochs when most
persons would have found the idea of sexual autonomy (particularly for women)
bizarre”. (p. 235) Por siglos, el criterio moral para considerar si hay daño
sexual no era la presencia de consentimiento, sino otros elementos como el
estatus marital, la naturaleza del acto sexual. Desde Edad Media hay noción
de violación como el apropiarse de la propiedad de otro (mujer no autónoma)

 “Many legal definitions of sexual assault and rape still require coercion, typically
by force or threats […]. Under the coercion-based model, offenders must resort to
violence or threats of violence to subjugate victims”. (p. 237) Muchas
legislaciones se basan en un modelo de coerción para definir el asalto sexual:
hace falta coerción o uso de fuerza

 “Recent reforms of criminal law show a trend towards the consent-based model.
European legal bodies such as the Council of Europe promote a consent-based
approach. 5 In Germany, after controversial public debates, the parliament
changed the law on sexual offenses in 2016: since then coercion is no longer a
necessary condition for sexual assaults and lack of consent has become the central
notion”. (p. 237) Muchas reformar recientes han apuntado a considerar
crímenes de agresión sexual desde un modelo de falta de consentimiento, en
vez del modelo de coerción

 Hay una corriente que entiende el consentimiento como un estado mental, pero
esto resulta problemático en términos legales, porque la ley debe concentrarse en
hechos y comportamientos; cómo probar estado mental que dio consentimiento.
Podría un agresor justificarse diciendo que no hubo, en víctima, expresión de
 negación, pero se pudo interpretar que estado mental reflejaba consentimiento.
Contra comprensión de consentimiento como estado mental, desde derecho

 “If one defines consent as an act of communication, the next question arises –
namely: what kind of communication is required? Two options are discussed: an
affirmative consent model (‘only yes means yes’) and a veto model (‘no means
no’). The first claims that affirmation must be expressed. According to the
narrower veto approach, blame is in order if the actor has ignored an expression
of refusal. Under both models, communication can take different forms: words,
gestures, active participation in the sexual activities. The difference between the
two approaches becomes relevant if a person remains silent, passive, and
submissive before and during the sexual encounter. Proponents of an affirmative
consent model will point to lack of expressed consent, while, according to a veto-
based model, silence is not per se sufficient to label the other person’s conduct as
wrongful”. (p. 238) Si el consentimiento no es un estado mental, sino un acto
comunicativo, ¿qué tipo de comunicación es necesaria para que exista
consentimiento. Hay modelo afirmativo (solo sí significa sí) y modelo del veto
(no es no). Si hay un caso donde víctima permanece en silencio y sumisión,
estos modelos son problemáticos

 “One source of objections against the affirmative consent approach is

uncertainties concerning the content of rules. When and how often must consent
be expressed? What constitutes [/] ‘a sexual act’? Consent is required at the
beginning, once the threshold into sexuality has been crossed but it will not be
sufficient to express general willingness ‘to have sex now’. Because this can mean
rather different acts, it will be necessary to repeat consent once the next stage is
reached, which leads to a threshold problem. The more demanding rules are, the
more one has to expect confusion about what must be done. A “no means no”
model makes compliance easier because the rule is simple: listen to a veto
expressed by the other person and stop”. (pp. 238-39) Se cuestiona modelo
afirmativo al considerar que no siempre está claro en qué situación una
persona debe dar consentimiento.