Cigre Article 34 & 35 PDF

192
PROTECTION USING
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Joint Working Group

34/35.11
August 2001
PROTECTION USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
Protection using Telecommunications

Cigré Joint Working Group 34/35.11
- Final Report -
Regular members of JWG34/35.11:

Per Odd GJERDE (Convenor) (Norway)
Hermann SPIESS (Secretary) (Switzerland)
Alastair ADAMSON (United Kingdom)
Ken BEHRENDT (United States)
Michael CLAUS (Germany)
Alouis W. H. GEERLING (Netherlands)
José Angel GONZALES VIOSCA (Spain)
Christopher HUNTLEY (Canada)
Carlos SAMITIER OTERO (Spain)
Yoshizumi SERIZAWA (Japan)
Kent WIKSTROM (Sweden)
Corresponding members:
Ricardo de AZEVEDO DUTRA (Brazil)
Stephen HUGHES (Australia)
David C. SMITH (South Africa)
Comments and contributions received from:

Hervé HOUKE (France)
Trygve JORDAN (Norway)
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Contents
1 FOREWORD, SCOPE, OBJECTIVE ..............................................................................................................7
2 POWER SYSTEMS AND FAULT CLEARING .............................................................................................9

2.1 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS ..............................................................................................................................9
2.2 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM FAULTS AND CLEARING ........................................................................................12
2.2.1 Electric Power System Faults ................................................................................................................12
2.2.2 Fault Clearing .......................................................................................................................................13
2.3 WHY DOES PROTECTION NEED TELECOMMUNICATION? ..................................................................................15
2.4 INTRODUCTION TO POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION ...........................................................................................15
2.4.1 Fault clearing system.............................................................................................................................17
2.5 HOW IS TELECOMMUNICATION USED..............................................................................................................19
3 PROTECTION USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS .................................................................................21
3.1 LINE PROTECTION ...........................................................................................................................................21
3.1.1 Analog Comparison Schemes ................................................................................................................21
3.1.1.1 Current differential protection ........................................................................................................................... 22
3.1.1.2 Phase comparison protection ............................................................................................................................. 28
3.1.1.3 Charge comparison protection ........................................................................................................................... 31
3.1.2 State Comparison Schemes....................................................................................................................33
3.1.2.1 Intertripping Underreach Distance Protection ................................................................................................... 34
3.1.2.2 Permissive Underreach Distance Protection ...................................................................................................... 36
3.1.2.3 Permissive Overreach Distance Protection ........................................................................................................ 37
3.1.2.4 Accelerated Underreach Distance Protection..................................................................................................... 38
3.1.2.5 Blocking Overreach Distance Protection ........................................................................................................... 39
3.1.2.6 Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection ....................................................................................................... 40
3.2 BUSBAR PROTECTION ......................................................................................................................................42
3.2.1 Two-breaker busbar configuration........................................................................................................42
3.2.1.1 Normal fault clearing ......................................................................................................................................... 42
3.2.1.2 Breaker failure ................................................................................................................................................... 43
3.2.2 One- and a half breaker busbar configuration ......................................................................................43
3.2.2.2 Breaker failure ................................................................................................................................................... 45
3.2.3 Two zones / one breaker configuration..................................................................................................46
3.3 OTHER PROTECTION SCHEMES ........................................................................................................................47
3.3.1 Generator protection .............................................................................................................................47
3.3.2 Transformer protection..........................................................................................................................47
3.3.3 Reactor protection .................................................................................................................................48
3.4 SYSTEM PROTECTION ......................................................................................................................................48
3.4.1 Back-up protection ................................................................................................................................49
3.4.2 System-wide protection..........................................................................................................................53
4 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTION ....................................................................55
4.1 TELECOMMUNICATION CIRCUITS ....................................................................................................................56
4.1.1 Private and rented circuits ....................................................................................................................56
4.1.2 Analogue and digital circuits.................................................................................................................56
4.2 TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS .................................................................................................................57
4.3 TRANSMISSION MEDIA ....................................................................................................................................58
4.3.1 Pilot wires / Copper wires .....................................................................................................................58
4.3.2 Power Line Carrier (PLC).....................................................................................................................60
4.3.3 Microwave Radio...................................................................................................................................62
4.3.3.1 Multichannel radio............................................................................................................................................. 63
4.3.3.2 Single channel radio .......................................................................................................................................... 64
4.3.4 Optical fibres .........................................................................................................................................65
4.3.5 Satellites ................................................................................................................................................67
4.3.5.1 GEO - Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Satellites................................................................................................... 67
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4.3.5.2 MEO - Medium Earth Orbit Satellites ............................................................................................................... 68

4.3.5.3 LEO - Low Earth Orbit Satellites ...................................................................................................................... 68
4.4 MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUES AND DIGITAL HIERARCHIES ..............................................................................69
4.4.1 Multiplexing Techniques........................................................................................................................69
4.4.1.1 Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM).......................................................................................................... 69
4.4.1.2 Time Division Multiplexing (TDM) .................................................................................................................. 70
4.4.1.3 Code Division Multiplexing (CDM).................................................................................................................. 71
4.4.2 Digital Hierarchies................................................................................................................................72
4.4.2.1 PDH - Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy........................................................................................................... 72
4.4.2.2 SDH - Synchronous Digital Hierarchy .............................................................................................................. 73
4.5 NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES ..............................................................................................................................75
4.5.1 Transport Networks ...............................................................................................................................77
4.5.2 Service Networks ...................................................................................................................................78
4.5.2.1 Circuit Switched Networks (POTS, ISDN) ....................................................................................................... 79
4.5.2.2 Packet Switched Networks (X.25, Frame Relay)............................................................................................... 80
4.5.2.3 Cell Switched Networks (ATM) ........................................................................................................................ 80
4.5.2.4 Datagram Networks (IP)................................................................................................................................... 81
4.5.3 Local Area Networks .............................................................................................................................82
4.5.3.1 Topology............................................................................................................................................................ 83
4.5.3.2 Media Contention and Protocols........................................................................................................................ 84
4.5.3.3 Advanced topologies ......................................................................................................................................... 85
4.6 NETWORK DESIGN AND OPERATION ...............................................................................................................86
4.6.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................86
4.6.2 Technological considerations................................................................................................................88
4.6.2.1 PDH/SDH Networks.......................................................................................................................................... 88
4.6.2.2 ATM Networks.................................................................................................................................................. 89
4.6.2.3 IP Networks ....................................................................................................................................................... 91
5 TELEPROTECTION INTERFACES ............................................................................................................93
5.1 CONTACT INTERFACES ....................................................................................................................................93
5.2 ANALOG INTERFACES ......................................................................................................................................94
5.2.1 Pilot-wires (50/60Hz) ............................................................................................................................94
5.2.2 Voice frequency circuits (2-wire/4-wire) ...............................................................................................94
5.3 DIGITAL DATA INTERFACES.............................................................................................................................94
5.3.1 Electrical interfaces...............................................................................................................................94
5.3.2 Optical fibre interfaces ..........................................................................................................................95
5.3.3 LAN / Ethernet interfaces ......................................................................................................................96
6 PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS ......................................................................99
6.1 REQUIREMENTS ON TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM ........................................................................................99
6.1.1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................99
6.1.1.1 Terminology and General Requirements ......................................................................................................... 100
6.1.1.2 Definitions ....................................................................................................................................................... 103
6.1.2 Requirement from analog comparison protection ...............................................................................108
6.1.2.1 Time synchronization through GPS................................................................................................................. 108
6.1.2.2 Time synchronization through communication network.................................................................................. 108
6.1.3 Requirements from state comparison protection .................................................................................109
6.1.3.1 Propagation Time............................................................................................................................................. 109
6.1.4 Requirements from intertripping .........................................................................................................109
6.1.5 Requirements from system protection..................................................................................................110
6.2 REQUIREMENTS ON TELEPROTECTION ...........................................................................................................111
6.2.1 Requirements on interface compatibility .............................................................................................112
6.2.2 Functional requirements......................................................................................................................112
6.2.2.1 Analog comparison protection control and monitoring ................................................................................... 113
6.2.2.2 State comparison protection control and monitoring ....................................................................................... 113
6.2.2.3 Erroneous signal detection............................................................................................................................... 114
6.2.2.4 Loop-back and misconnect detection............................................................................................................... 114
6.2.2.5 Actions on alarm conditions ............................................................................................................................ 114
6.3 REQUIREMENTS ON PROTECTION ...................................................................................................................115
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6.3.1 Requirements on analog comparison protection .................................................................................115

6.3.1.1 Need for delay compensation .......................................................................................................................... 115
6.3.2 Requirements on state comparison protection.....................................................................................116
6.3.2.1 Interface co-ordination..................................................................................................................................... 116
6.3.2.2 Delay Compensation........................................................................................................................................ 116
6.3.3 Requirements on other protections......................................................................................................116
6.4 CONSIDERATIONS ON INTERFACES AND INSTALLATION PRACTICES ...............................................................116
7 PROTECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS AND DESIGN ..............................................................119
7.1 PROTECTION SCHEMES AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY ............................................119
7.2 DESIGN CHECKLIST .......................................................................................................................................124
7.2.1 Application ..........................................................................................................................................124
7.2.2 Interfaces .............................................................................................................................................124
7.2.3 Contractual..........................................................................................................................................125
8 FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED..........................................................................128
8.1 TRENDS IN COMMUNICATION ........................................................................................................................128
8.1.1 General Network Development............................................................................................................128
8.1.2 Transport Technologies.......................................................................................................................128
8.1.3 Networking Technologies ....................................................................................................................129
8.1.4 Service Access/Provisioning Technologies..........................................................................................129
8.1.5 Integration of Technologies.................................................................................................................129
8.1.6 New Technologies for QoS provision ..................................................................................................130
8.1.7 Intra- and inter-substation communication .........................................................................................131
8.1.7.1 Intra-substation communication....................................................................................................................... 131
8.1.7.2 Inter-substation communication....................................................................................................................... 132
8.2 TRENDS IN PROTECTION ................................................................................................................................134
8.2.1 Considerations on new protection philosophies ..................................................................................134
8.3 OPEN ISSUES AND PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED.................................................................................................137
8.3.1 Protection relay interoperability .........................................................................................................137
9 CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................................................139
ANNEX A1 TELEPROTECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS ............................................................141
ANNEX A2 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS ..............................................144
ANNEX A3 QUALITY OF SERVICE .............................................................................................................146

A3.1 INTRODUCTION TO QOS............................................................................................................................146
A3.2 QOS DEFINITION IN ATM NETWORKS.......................................................................................................147
A3.2.1 ATM Service Categories..................................................................................................................149
A3.2.2 ATM over SDH/SONET...................................................................................................................151
A3.2.3 Applications Summary.....................................................................................................................152
A3.3 QOS DEFINITION IN IP NETWORKS ............................................................................................................152
A3.4 IP TO ATM SERVICE MAPPING..................................................................................................................155
A3.5 QUALITY OF SERVICE STANDARDS ...........................................................................................................156
ANNEX A4 PROTECTION SYSTEM TIME SYNCHRONIZATION TECHNIQUES.............................157
A4.1 TIME SYNCHRONISATION FOR SIMULTANEOUS SAMPLING .........................................................................157
A4.1.1 Internal timing synchronization ......................................................................................................157
A4.1.2 External timing synchronization .....................................................................................................159
LIST OF FIGURES.................................................................................................................................................161
LIST OF TABLES...................................................................................................................................................163
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...................................................................................................................................................164
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ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................................................................166
INDEX ......................................................................................................................................................................169
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1 FOREWORD, SCOPE, OBJECTIVE

Deregulation in both the telecommunication and electric power industry, together with new
telecommunication network technologies and advances in numerical protection, has resulted in
the need to reconsider traditional methods of delivering teleprotection schemes and their
associated bearer services. Fibre-optic technology is commonly deployed in new
telecommunication networks for inter-station communication, and utility-owned and public
telecommunication networks from third parties are available for protection purposes. Trends in
substation automation move towards the use of bus- and LAN technologies within substations
and interchange of information in numerical form. Numerical protection has been state-of-the-art
for protection relaying for some years.
In September 1996, Cigre SC34 "Power System Protection and Local Control", and SC35
"Power System Communication and Telecontrol", decided to form the joint working group Cigré
JWG 34/35.11, with the following scope of work:
- Assess the state of development of advanced protection using inter-site communications

- Analyze the relevance and opportunities of newly released telecommunication
technologies (referring to the work of WG 35.07)
- Identify and promulgate opportunities for future advances in the joint discipline of
teleprotection
- Examine the need for, and if necessary compile, a lexicon of terminology to suit the new
environment
- Develop a new report to update the Technical Brochure Ref. No. 13, 1987.
JWG 34/35.11 met for a kick-off meeting in Oslo in September 1997. The working group agreed
that a new version of the former Technical Brochure "Protection systems using
telecommunication" (Ref. No. 13, 1987) should be produced. The document should create
awareness for the requirements, opportunities and risks of protection systems using
telecommunications, and guide protection and telecommunication engineers towards a common
understanding for the design and operation of reliable teleprotection schemes that meet
performance requirements in the most economical way.
This Technical Brochure has the following content:
Chapter 2 describes power systems from a teleprotection point of view, with focus on power
system faults, their reasons and characteristics, and fault clearing requirements. It continues
with the definition of fault clearing systems, protection systems, protection schemes, and ends
up with explanations why teleprotection is needed, and how protection can use
telecommunication to meet fault clearing requirements.
Chapter 3 describes protection relaying principles and protection schemes using

telecommunications, and deals - from a power system point of view - with various aspects
around the need of teleprotection, its benefits and adverse implications if the teleprotection
service would fail.
Chapter 4 gives an overview of telecommunication systems, with focus on capabilities and

limitations related to protection signal transmission. Problems and risks that may arise with
different types of telecommunication technologies are addressed, and functional and reliability
aspects are dealt with, both under normal conditions and - most important - under power system
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fault conditions.
Chapter 5 deals with interfaces. Requirements on interfaces between protection, teleprotection

and telecommunication devices are given.
Chapter 6 focuses on performance requirements on protection, teleprotection and

telecommunication functions.
Chapter 7 deals with protection system configuration and design. Compatibility issues between
protection schemes and telecom technologies are addressed to provide a guide for protection
and telecommunication specialists to design teleprotection systems that will meet fault clearing
requirements.
Chapter 8 gives an outlook on future trends and addresses some problems to be solved.
In Chapter 9 the document is summarized some conclusions are drawn.
Annexes A1 to A4 contain some related topics and additional information, which the JWG has
found valuable for the better understanding of the subject.
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2 POWER SYSTEMS AND FAULT CLEARING
2.1 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS

Electric power systems consist of three principal components: generating stations, transmission
systems, and distribution systems. Generating stations convert mechanical or thermal energy to
electric energy, typically in the form of 50 or 60 Hz alternating current. Transmission systems
transmit electric energy from the generating stations to the distribution system. To transmit
electric energy efficiently over long distances, transmission system power lines are typically
operated at 200 kV to 800 kV. The operating voltage of generators and distribution systems is
typically in the range of 2.4 kV to 25 kV. Electric power systems deliver electric energy to power
consuming equipment owned by residential, commercial, industrial, and governmental
customers. Consumer products typically operate at several hundred volts. Power transformers
are required to step the power system voltage up and down to connect various power system
segments having different system operating voltages.
Power lines designed to transmit electric energy, called transmission lines, are often networked
to improve service capability and reliability. This permits lines to be taken out of service for
planned maintenance, or forced out of service by fault clearing, without disrupting the delivery of
electric energy from the generating source to the customer. Branches of the network are
connected at nodes, called busbars or buses. Power systems are almost always three phase
systems, including conductors for 3 phases and ground wires. Throughout this report only single
line diagrams are shown. Some simple busbar configurations are shown in Figure 2.1-1 and
Figure 2.1-2.
Node in network
= busbar
Breakers
Generator and
transformer unit 1 Overhead
power line
Overhead
Generator and power line
transformer unit 2
Underground
or submarine
cable
Breakers
Figure 2.1-1: Single-line diagram of a typical power station
Nodes at different voltage levels are connected by transformers. These connection points,
transformers and other units are made within a limited geographical area, called a station.
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Configuration of a typical power generating station is shown on Figure 2.1-1, and Figure 2.1-2
shows a typical transformer station.
Node in network
= busbar
Breakers
Power
lines/cables
Transformer 1 Overhead
power line
Overhead
Transformer 2 power line
Load Underground
or submarine
cable
Breakers
Figure 2.1-2: Single line diagram of a typical transformer station
Power flows through all healthy transmission lines in the electric power system network as it
moves from generation sources to consuming equipment owned by customers. Electric power
system networks operated by more than one electric power utility are often tied together to form
a large grid that supports the transmission of power over a very large area, sometimes spanning
several countries. Figure 2.1-3 shows the routes of major power lines connected in the
Scandinavian power grid.
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TROMSØ
ALTA
ISLAND
NARVIK
REYKJAVIK
OFOTEN TORNEHAMN
FINNLAND
SVARTISEN PETÄJÄSKOSKI
PIRTTIKOSKI
LETSI
SCHWEDEN
AJAURE
PIKKARALA
TUNNSJØDAL GRUNDF.
LINN-
VASSELV.
VUOLIJOKI
STORFINNF. STORNORRFORS
TRONDHEIM ALAPITKÄ
JÄRP- HJÄLTA ALAJÄR VI
NEA STRÖMMEN
HUUTOKOSKI
NORWEGEN PETÄJÄVESI
KANGAS-
ALA TOIVILA
ULVILA
(132)
OLKILUOT O
HIKIÄ
HYVINKÄÄ
BERGEN LOVIISA
RJUKAN OSLO HELSINKI
INKOO
BORG-
VIK
EN-
KÖPING STOCKHOLM
HASLE
V
STAVANGER
LISTA KRISTIANSAND NORRKÖPING
DC
GÖTEBORG DC
NÄSSJÖ
OSKARS-
RING- HAMN
HALS
TJELE HELSING-
BORG
[04/ \ KARLSHAMN
MALMÖ
KøBEN-
KASSØ HAVN / 50 100 150 km
FLENSBURG
HAMBURG
DEUTSCHLAND
Figure 2.1-3: The Scandinavian Power Grid
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2.2 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM FAULTS AND CLEARING
2.2.1 Electric Power System Faults

Power system conductors energized to extremely high voltages in three phase systems must be
properly insulated from each other and from ground. This insulation is achieved by special
insulation materials covering each conductor and/or by air insulation. Air is a very inexpensive
insulator, but requires very large spacing. Special non-conducting materials typically insulate the
energized conductors in generators, transformers, capacitors, reactors and cables where
compact design is essential. Overhead power lines are insulated by air, except at the point they
are attached to the supporting poles and towers. Special insulators made of porcelain, glass, or
insulating plastic with special surface design and shape achieve the combination of strength
and electric insulation to make this attachment. Overhead line design principles are shown in
Figure 2.2-1 which also indicates possible arc fault tracks.
The three phase conductors
Phase - Ground fault

Ground wires
Insulator
Phase - Ground fault
Tower
Ground
Phase - Phase fault
Figure 2.2-1: Power line with examples of fault types and fault positions
All power system components are exposed to faults due to insulation breakdowns. The
Scandinavian power system shown in Figure 2.1-3, for instance, typically experiences
approximately 3000 faults per year.
Voltage stresses caused by lightning and switching transients, and contamination due to
polluted air are major sources of insulation breakdowns. Mechanical stresses caused by wind,
vibration, ice, and snow-loading are major sources of insulator and supporting structure damage
that also leads to insulation breakdown.
For power lines, most insulation breakdowns are in air between phases and/or phases and
ground. Most frequently, insulation breakdowns are along the surface of insulators due to
excessive voltage stresses. An example of insulator flashover is shown in Figure 2.2-2
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A flashover in air influences a few rather narrow ‘corridors'

where the air loses electrical insulation capabilities. The air
does not recover its insulation capability as long as the
current is flowing. Therefore it is very important to interrupt
the fault current as soon as possible to recover insulation
capability. When the current is interrupted, air recovers it’s
full insulation capability within a fraction of a second. If the
fault current is interrupted rather fast, normally no damage
is caused to conductors, insulators or towers. Then the
power line can be re-energized within a short time so it can
again carry power in the grid.
One of the most important design and operational criteria

for a power transmission system is that the power system
should withstand tripping of at least one power line (unit)
without any unnecessary interruption of consumers or
power producing units.
Wide area weather disturbances, like lightning storms,
severe wind storms, and ice storms, expose multiple
transmission lines to the risk of faults within the same time
period. Consequently, high speed tripping and fast re-
closing of tripped transmission lines may be very important
to avoid power system collapse due to two or more power
lines out of service at the same time.
Faults on power apparatus like breakers and units like

generators, transformers and cables are most probably
breakdowns and damage of special insulation materials.
This causes damage that must be repaired before the unit
can be re-energized to carry power. This may take a
considerable length of time, depending on the availability
of spare parts, and trained service personnel. Sometimes
units are completely destroyed and must be replaced
before normal operation can be achieved. Figure 2.2-2: Insulator flashover
Faults on both power lines and other power units can also
be caused by misoperation of earth switches and "forgotten" security ground connections.
Power system faults caused by weather, animals, high trees, humans, or equipment failure
disrupt normal power flow by diverting current through a short-circuited connection and
collapsing power system voltage. In addition to equipment damage, power system faults cause
transients that adversely affect sources of generation and customer loads. Consequently, faults
must be detected and isolated very quickly. Electric power system generators, transformers,
busbars, and power lines are therefore monitored by protective relays designed to detect power
system faults and operate isolating devices designed to interrupt damaging fault current.
2.2.2 Fault Clearing

Power system fault clearing requirements are very important design and operational criteria for
power systems. Faults can cause damage that requires expensive repair work or investments
for equipment replacement. Faults also cause severe operational disturbances. Generators
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accelerate, motors retard and severe voltage drops can easily result in tripping of complex
industrial plants. For the power system itself, severe disturbances can result in collapses and
blackout for regions, and, in severe cases, even for several countries. Today’s society does not
accept frequent severe disturbances and blackouts because of their heavy reliance on electric
power consuming devices for business activities, safety, lighting, heating, cooking,
communication and many other conveniences.
Therefore, to avoid severe disturbances and blackouts, sound protection practices are used to
provide rapid fault clearing. In some cases, formal requirements for fault clearing are provided to
assure consistent levels of reliability levels throughout the power system. Formal requirements
may be grouped in external requirements and utility requirements as already done in [3].
External requirements may encompass:

- Customer power quality and interruption requirements.
- Requirements from insurance companies who underwrite equipment failures.
- Legal requirements to meet ‘prudent utility practice and industry standards’ in case
primary equipment failures result in personal injury or property damage and legal actions
are taken against the utility by the parties incurring damage.
- International and national safety regulations, imposed by governmental and other
agencies.
- Requirements imposed by manufacturers of primary equipment in order to validate
equipment warranties.
- Requirements from occupational safety and hazard prevention.
Utility requirements
The power system must be designed and operated to avoid instability, loss of synchronism,
voltage collapse, undesired load shedding, and unacceptable frequency or voltage. Good
protection practices help meet these objectives by detecting and clearing faults rapidly. Rapid
fault clearing helps:
- Prevent severe power swings or system instability
- Minimize disruption of system power transfer capability
- Prevent unreliable services
- Limit or prevent equipment damage
It is very important to clear the fault within specified ‘limits’ to ensure that the healthy remainder
of the power system can continue to serve it’s customers with acceptable quality and reliability.
Requirements on protection
Protection performance requirements are issued to satisfy external and utility requirements.
These requirements specify how protective schemes must perform on specific contingencies to
fulfill external and utility requirements. They typically provide a balance between the conflicting
goals of dependability and security. Dependability goals require maximum sensitivity and fast
response time to detect and clear all faults quickly with very low probability of a failure to trip.
Security goals require maximum selectivity and slow response time to minimize the probability
of an unwanted trip on an unfaulted circuit. Security is an issue during fault conditions as well as
during normal, unfaulted conditions.
Simply stated, the implementation of these protection requirements should result in dependable
operation of only those relays protecting the faulted unit, and secure non-operation of the relays
during non-fault conditions and when faults occur on adjacent power system units. This balance
is met only through proper protection scheme design, proper relay and equipment selection,
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and proper connection and setting of these relays and equipment to achieve appropriate
sensitivity and coordination.
When protection schemes detect a fault on the equipment or line they protect, they signal
isolating devices, called circuit breakers, to open, isolating the faulty segment of the system,
and restoring normal system voltage and current flow in the power system.
Protection schemes command circuit breakers to isolate faults with no intentional time delay.
When the protection scheme and circuit breakers operate properly, the fault is isolated within
the required fault-clearing time. Protection applied on high voltage systems, where fault-clearing
times are most critical, typically detect faults and operate in about one to two cycles. Some
schemes operate in less than one cycle. Circuit breakers operate in one to three cycles. The
combination of high-speed protection schemes and fast circuit breakers can interrupt a fault in
about two cycles, although more common fault-clearing times range from three to six cycles.
2.3 WHY DOES PROTECTION NEED TELECOMMUNICATION?

Protection systems must meet sensitivity, time response, selectivity and reliability requirements
in order to meet fault clearing requirements. Fault clearing systems (see 2.4.1) for generators,
busses, transformers or other units within a substation can normally meet these requirements
without using telecommunication. Telecommunication may be needed for the protection of these
substation units only if a breaker is missing or fails to interrupt fault-currents.
Protection schemes for extremely high voltage transmission lines, however, very seldom meet
all these requirements without using telecommunications. Some protection schemes, such as
stand-alone step-distance schemes, provide very reliable and sensitive protection capable of
clearing all power system faults without using telecommunications, but time response and/or
selectivity requirements can only be met by using telecommunications. Telecommunications are
therefore needed to ensure that time response and selectivity requirements are met for all
power system fault conditions! Telecommunications is also essential for some types of
protection schemes, like analogue comparison schemes, to operate.
If telecommunication fails, backup protection schemes ensure that power system faults will be
cleared, but they may not be cleared within specified performance requirements. Then the
probability of uncontrollable power swings and partial or complete system blackout increases
significantly. Alternative methods for reducing the probability of fault-induced blackouts is to
build additional generating stations and transmission lines, or add redundant
telecommunications. In virtually all cases, it will be far less expensive to add redundant
telecommunications. Telecommunications is therefore vital to the reliability and economy of
modern electric power systems.
2.4 INTRODUCTION TO POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION

Power system protection schemes are designed to detect and clear faults, in accordance with
requirements on protection, as discussed in the previous sub-chapter, to:
- Minimize adverse affects on customer loads

- Minimize disruption of system power transfer capability
- Coordinate tripping with protective relays in other protection zones
- Prevent severe power swings or system instability
- Limit or prevent equipment damage
Power units and lines are protected in zones to coordinate fault detection and clearing. A
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protection zone is defined as all high voltage power system equipment (and all necessary
control, supervision and protection equipment) between two or more circuit breakers. Selective
fault clearing (selectivity) is to trip the breakers for the faulty zone, and not trip any additional
breakers for non-faulty zones. Five basic zones of protection are shown in Figure 2.4-1. These
zones of protection are identified as Generators (1), Transformers (2), Busses (3), Lines (4),
and Loads, such as Motors (5).
5 5
M M
2 Station C
Station A 3
3 Station B
1
2
G 4 4 1
1 G
2
4 4
G
3 3
Station D
4 4
Figure 2.4-1: Typical power system and its zones of protection
The boundaries of each zone of protection, as it applies to protective relays, are determined by
the location of the current transformers that provide the representation of primary system
currents to the protective relays. Other parameters, such as voltage, are also used by some
protective relays to perform their protection function, but the current transformer location
determines the protection zone boundary. Overlapping zones of protection is an established
protection concept represented by Figure 2.4-2. As shown, the current transformers are typically
located on opposite sides of the circuit breaker, or on one side and as close as possible to the
circuit breaker that is tripped to clear faults in the respective protection zones.
Protection zone boundaries for power units such as generators, transformers, busses, and
motors are typically within the same substation, permitting one relay to monitor currents at the
boundary of its protection zone. Likewise, the same relay can easily be connected to issue trip
signals to all circuit breakers at the boundary of its protection zone.
The boundary for line protection, however, is typically located at two different stations that may
be separated by a considerable distance. This separation makes it impossible for one relay to
sense currents at both ends of the line, or control breakers at both ends of the line. It is
therefore common practice to install at least one relay and circuit breaker at each end of the
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line. These relays may operate independently, or they may share information to improve their
operating speed, or they may require communication between them to operate.1
CT for Zone B
Zone A Zone B
CT for Zone A
a. CTs on opposite sides of breaker
CT for Zone B
Zone A Zone B
CT for Zone A
b. both CTs on same side of breaker
Figure 2.4-2: Overlapping protection zones established by current transformer location
2.4.1 Fault clearing system

A Fault Clearing System is defined in this report according to Figure 2.4-3. Fault currents must
be interrupted from both (all) sides. The fault clearing system therefore includes :
- Protection system
- Mechanisms of circuit breakers
Fault Clearing System includes one or more protection systems and the circuit breakers
required to clear (interrupt) a fault and isolate the faulted portion of the circuit.
Protection System includes a complete arrangement of protection equipment and other

devices required to achieve a specified function based on one protection principle. A protection
system is all embracing and includes protection functions as well as auxiliary power systems,
sensors for detecting measured quantities, controls and circuitry for closing/opening circuit
breakers, teleprotection and telecommunications for interchange of information between
protective functions and all necessary connections between these functions and units.
(Example: A phase comparison protection system, or a line current differential protection
system.)
Sensors include voltage transformers and current transformers that scale primary system
voltages and currents down to secondary values compatible with the protective device design.
The Teleprotection Function converts the signals and messages from the protection function
into signals and messages compatible with the telecommunication system, and vice versa. The
teleprotection function may be integrated with the protective device, or the telecommunication
equipment, or it may be in a stand-alone device.
The Telecommunication System provides a communication link between ends of a protected

1
Protection schemes that share information to improve operating speed are sometimes referred to as “non-unit” protection
schemes. Protection schemes that require communication to operate are sometimes referred to as “unit” protection schemes.
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circuit, permitting the exchange of information (analogue data and/or status) or transmission of
commands. In Figure 2.4-3, the telecommunication system may be dedicated point-to-point,
shared point-to-point, or a network.
High Voltage Equipment
Fault Clearing System
Protection System
Auxiliary power
Protection Control Mech-

Functions anism
Circuit Breaker
Sensors
Teleprotection
Function Protection
Scheme
Protection
Telecommunication
System
Zone
Teleprotection
Function
Sensors
Circuit Breaker
Protection Mech-
Functions Control anism
Auxiliary power
Figure 2.4-3: Fault clearing system
Protection Function(s) may be performed by multiple protective relays working together, or

more commonly in modern protection systems, by one or more multi-function protective relays.
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Protection functions in one station interchange information with protection functions in a remote
station via teleprotection and telecommunications. This sub-total functionality forms a
Protection Scheme.
2.5 HOW IS TELECOMMUNICATION USED

Telecommunication is essential for analog comparison protection schemes (see 3.1.1) to share
data between relays at each end of the protected line. Telecommunication is needed for direct
intertripping schemes to pass tripping commands from the protection and control scheme at one
line terminal to the power circuit breaker at the other line terminal. Telecommunication is used
with state comparison protection schemes (see 3.1.2) to reduce the overall tripping time for
faults on the protected line section.
Analog comparison protection schemes typically share data, such as line current magnitudes
and phase angles, to differentiate between power system faults within the protected zone or
outside the protected zone. Communication between relays at each line terminal is essential to
the operation of analog comparison protection schemes. State comparison protection schemes
share the logical status of relay elements to determine if the fault is internal or external. These
schemes are generally built by adding and interfacing communication to stand-alone relays to
improve tripping speed for faults in the end-zone areas not protected by direct tripping relays.
Schemes that use communication to improve tripping speed are referred to as communication
assisted schemes.
Telecommunication is also used for intertripping schemes that must communicate a trip
command to a remote substation circuit breaker to isolate a fault within the local station, block
and control schemes, and wide area protection schemes. All of these schemes are described in
greater detail in Chapter 3. Telecommunication systems used for protection are described in
Chapter 4.
Protection using telecommunication provides consistent relay tripping times in the order of 2 to 3
cycles for faults over the entire length of a protected transmission line. Stand-alone protection
schemes may take upwards of 20 to 30 cycles to trip both line terminals of a faulted line.
Protection schemes using telecommunication can thereby reduce the tripping and clearing time
for line faults by as much as 18 to 28 cycles compared with stand-alone protection schemes.
This reduced tripping time greatly reduces the affect of faults on generators, power transfer, and
customer loads, and reduces the damage to faulted and unfaulted equipment. The faster fault
clearing speeds are essential to the efficient and economic operation of modern power systems.
As described in this document, protective relays are interfaced with telecommunication systems
through the teleprotection function. The teleprotection function may be performed by a stand-
alone device, or it may be integrated with the protective relay or with the telecommunication
equipment. Interfaces between protection relays, teleprotection, and telecommunication
systems are described in Chapter 5.
The following chart is excerpted from the IEC 60834-1 standard to help show the relationship
between protection, teleprotection, and telecommunication.
From the teleprotection point of view, the relatively selective protection schemes shown in
Figure 2.5-1 are typically communication-aided state comparison schemes (see 3.1.2), and the
absolutely selective protection schemes in Figure 2.5-1 are typically communication dependent
analog comparison-schemes (see 3.1.1.).
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Figure 2.5-1: Fundamental terms on protection and teleprotection

(From IEC60834-1)
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3 PROTECTION USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
3.1 LINE PROTECTION
3.1.1 Analog Comparison Schemes

Analog comparison protection is based on the transmission and comparison of electrical
parameters such as primary currents (amplitude and/or phase) between the ends of a protected
line. Each end sends its registered values to each other and compares them with the remote
ones. When an internal fault occurs, the result of the comparison will be a differential value, so
that, if it is higher than a threshold, the relay will initiate the trip.
These systems are called analogue comparison protection systems because they exchange
analogue quantities such as amplitude and/or phase with the other ends. They are sometimes
also referred to as "unit protection" or "closed" schemes. The term “unit” refers to the clear
interdependence between the ends for operation and to the closed and absolutely selective
characteristic of this protection.
Obviously, the comparison must be made between magnitudes at the same instant, which
implies a transmission and comparison system as fast as possible. A delay must be provided for
the local signal to compensate for the transmission time of the remote value.
Unlike the time-grade protection such as distance and time overcurrent relays, the trip of the
analog comparison protection is instantaneous for every fault on the protected line.
It is applicable to any overhead line or cable at all voltage levels and for any type of system
neutral arrangement. It is particularly suitable where:
- Step distance relays (without acceleration schemes) have limitations, for example:
à Very short lines and cables due to their low impedance, which makes it difficult to
find an adequate setting to get a instantaneous trip for faults on the main part of the
line.
à Multi-terminal lines, since the intermediate infeeds modify the impedance seen by
the distance relays, which depends not only on the distance to the fault, but also on
the infeed from the remote terminals, making impossible an accurate measure of the
impedance.
- No potential transformers and only current transformers are installed at each end of the
line.
We can distinguish two types analog comparison protection systems: longitudinal current
differential protection and phase comparison protection. The current differential protection
compares the power frequency signals proportional to the primary power system currents
(amplitude and phase angle), while the phase comparison one is based on comparison of the
phase angle (or sign) between currents of each end of the protected line.
Since both of them use only current information, in comparison with the distance or other
system protections, analog comparison protections have the following advantages:
- Not responsive to system swings and out-of-step conditions

- Unaffected by inadvertent loss-of-potential (i.e., due to a blown potential fuse)
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- No mutual coupling problems from parallel lines. This may cause the line-to-ground fault
current reverses and flows into a weak source terminal, causing faulty directional
discrimination if other protection systems are used
- Not subject to transient problems associated with coupling capacitor potential devices
- With segregated current differential there are no problems of phase selection for single
pole auto-reclosing at simultaneous faults on different circuits and phases close to one
line end, because it operates only for faults between current transformers in each phase.
- Some relaying problems in EHV transmission lines due to applying series capacitors are
also overcome, e.g. voltage reversal, current inversion or phase imbalance.
When phase selection is required for single phase tripping, especially at simultaneous faults on
different circuits and phases or in a faulty line when handling heavily loaded EHV lines, the
phase-segregated technique is used. The analogue information is transmitted separately for
each phase.
In cases where the complete information about the polyphase conditions is not essential and
single-phase tripping is not needed, the non-segregated technique is used. It reduces the three-
phase system of currents to a single-phase one by means of a mixing device. The
communication link needs therefore to only accommodate the transmission of this single phase
information. Some mixing techniques are described in [1].
3.1.1.1 Current differential protection
Operating principles
As mentioned above the current differential protection is an absolutely selective protection
system for transmission lines, tripping instantaneously for faults in the protected zone defined by
the current transformers of each end of the line.
It is based in the principle of current comparison. The Figure 3.1-1 shows a basic scheme of the
differential protection. In each terminal, an evaluation circuit compares the sum of the local and
remote current values, i.e. the differential current, with an operation threshold value Iop. In
normal operation conditions or external faults, the current entering at one end is practically the
same as one leaving at the other end, so the differential current value is practically zero and the
protection will remain stable. For a fault on the protected power line the differential current value
will exceed the operation value and the protection will trip.
When very large currents flow through the protected zone for a fault external to the zone a
differential current appears due to the different ratio error and saturation characteristic of the
current transformers, which could exceed the operation level. Such a maloperation of the
protection is prevented by the stabilizing. The stabilizing characteristic uses a bias current,
which is usually proportional to the sum of the absolute values of the currents at each terminal,
i.e. |iA| + |iB|, in order to make the protection less sensitive for higher through currents. This
technique is also called percentage restraint.
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A IA IB
B
SA TX Telecommunication TX SA
system
iA iB
DEL DEL
iB iA
+ RX RX +
Id Id
TPF TPF
Id> Iop Id>Iop
SA = Signal adapter (filtering, mixing circuit, A/D conversion, etc.)

TX = Transmitter
RX = Receiver
Iop = Operation threshold according to stabilizing characteristic
DEL = Delay compensation
TPF = Teleprotection Function
Figure 3.1-1: Principle of differential protection
Figure 3.1-2 shows an example of percentage restraint characteristic with two slopes: the lower
slope ensures good sensitivity to resistive faults under heavy load conditions, while the higher
slope is used to improve relay stability against saturation of the current transformers and other
distortion effects under heavy through fault conditions.
The selection of the minimal operation current Is1 is based upon the magnitude of line
capacitance current and switching transients expected on the protected line. The capacitance of
the three conductors to earth and, except in single core cable, also between each other, makes
that under undisturbed conditions the current at both ends differs in angle and magnitude.
Particularly in cables, the capacitive charging current can attain significant values. Nevertheless,
usually the necessary rise of the Is1 does not involve an important loss of sensitivity.
Idiff
Idiff > k2xIbias - (k2-k1)Is2 + Is1
TRIP
slope k2
Idiff > k1xIbias + Is1

NO TRIP
Is1 slope k1
Is2
Ibias
Idiff = iA + iB
Ibias = |iA| + |iB|
Figure 3.1-2: Differential protection: Example of percentage restraint characteristic
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The differential principle may be applied to multi-terminal lines. The protection relies on the sum
of the inflowing currents, which are added geometrically. For this purpose, the measuring
circuits have to be so arranged that at each end of the line, the local current and the currents
from each of the others ends of the line are available for comparison. Generally, the most recent
designs allow up to three terminals applications.
For a multi-terminal system, the master/slave or centralized configuration is also used. In this
case, the current values are sent to a specific terminal for evaluation of the differential current.
This terminal will henceforth be noted as a master, while the terminal sending information about
currents will be denoted as a slave terminal. For a two-terminal system, the master/slave
configuration can, of course, also be used, but a master/master or distributed configuration,
where the current information is exchanged between both terminals and evaluated at both ends
is normally preferred, since this gives a shorter operating time than that in a master/slave
configuration. See Figure 3.1-4 and Figure 3.1-5 for more details about centralized and
distributed configurations.
The saturation of the current transformers for heavy through currents normally requires the
selection of a higher slope setting which involves a loss of sensitivity for internal faults. Recent
protections include some techniques to detect the saturation, so in only such conditions is the
protection desensitized increasing the restraint slope. To avoid the maloperation of the remote
protections, the terminal that detects the saturation includes a code in the message transmitted
to the other ends, so that all terminals increase the degree of stabilization.
Time delay compensation

As mentioned, the current values used in the differential protection must be taken at the same
instant at all ends of the power line for comparison, so a delay circuit is needed to compensate
the transmission time for the remote values. Classical designs incorporate an adjustable delay
for aligning the current values. However, when digital communication systems with automatic
route switch are used, the time delay can change and the protection must continuously adjust
the time alignment. For this purpose, digital devices incorporate different techniques in which
the messages of current values sent through the communication channel are tagged with the
sampling time. The principles of some synchronization techniques are described in more detail
in A4.1. An error in delay compensation results in a differential current that - according to Figure
3.1-2 - increases the risk of unwanted tripping. For more information see 6.1.2.2 and 6.3.1.1.
Additional functions
Generally, differential protections use intertrip functions, i.e. the sending of trip commands to the
remote ends. Intertrip commands are sent through the same communication channels used to
transmit the current values (switching the channel frequency to a specific intertrip frequency
when analogue links are used, or flagging the corresponding command bits in the out-going
data messages in digital links).
The intertrip function is activated either when the relay reaches a trip decision, or by closing an
external contact connected to an input of the relay.
The intertrip function can be used for:

- Breaker failure protection
- Stub protection: this is applied in switchyards with 1½ circuit breaker configuration.
Operating an input by external contact when the line isolator opens allows to protect the
line between the circuit breakers and the line isolator.
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Telecommunication systems used for differential protection
Differential protection systems using pilot wires for 50/60Hz signals

Pilot wires connect both ends electrically and establish a differential circuit where the secondary
quantities may be in the form of current signals or voltage signals, which are proportional to the
primary current. Accordingly, there are two basic methods of creating a differential circuit,
current balance or voltage balance. Figure 3.1-3 shows a basic scheme of a current balanced
system using three pilot wires.
ST
Pilot wires
MCT
MCT
TR TR
ST
Evaluation circuit Evaluation circuit
MCT = Mixing current transformer

TR = Transformer for tripping
ST = Transformer for stabilizing effect
Figure 3.1-3: Basic scheme of a current balanced system using three pilot wires
In this case, the three-phase system is converted into a single AC current in the mixing
transformer MCT (non-segregated).
One differential system for each power phase (segregated) of the protected circuit can also be
provided. If high resistance faults are expected or faults on which the value of earth fault current
is relatively low, a fourth measuring system for the zero sequence component can be
introduced. This however, increases the number of pilot wires and therefore the communication
cost of the comparison information.
In both methods, a replica of the vector difference is formed at each line end by means of a
transformer ST for the stabilizing effect and a replica of the vector sum of the currents flowing at
each end by means of a further transformer TR for the tripping effect. These values are
evaluated separately at each line end in a measuring module and a tripping command is issued
to the circuit-breaker when the fault current has exceeded a permanently adjusted threshold
value.
Where the voltage induced into the pilot cables during earth faults may exceed the rated values,
the protective relays should be isolated from the pilot wires by isolating transformers, which can
also be used to subdivide the total length of the pilot wires into two or three sections. This
prevents the equipment from being subjected to excessive longitudinal voltage due to
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interference. In any case, the grounding conditions should be considered.
The application of differential protection using pilot wires is restricted on lines up to 10-25 km
depending upon the scheme used. So for longer lines, modulation techniques over other
transmission media should be used. More details about differential protection using pilot wires
and their limitations can be found in [1] and in chapter 4.3.1.
Differential protection systems using modulation or coding techniques

Modulation or coding techniques that are compatible with analog and digital telecommunication
circuits are used to overcome some of the shortfalls experienced with direct pilot wire coupling.1
Typical techniques that are used:
- Frequency modulation (FM) for analog voice frequency (VF) channels.

The instantaneous current values at each terminal are transmitted as analogue
quantities to the other terminals in a voice frequency band (0.3 to 3.4 kHz) using
frequency modulation. Whatever transmission media for analogue voice channels may
be applied.
- Numerical coding for digital telecommunication systems
The instantaneous current values at each end of the power line are sampled, converted
to digital data and transmitted towards the other terminals through a digital
telecommunication system. Sample rates ranging from 12 to 60 samples per cycle have
been used.
Normally, the telecommunication system is shared with other services like voice,
telecontrol, etc. using Time Division Multiplexing techniques (see 4.4.1.2). The protection
system is connected to the PCM) multiplexer through standard interfaces. The most
commonly used electrical interfaces are those contained within the ITU-T or EIA
recommendation and are described in 5.3.1 and in [2].
- Dedicated optical fibres.
Direct optical fibre links between protection terminals are also used. A higher reliability is
achieved because intermediate devices are eliminated. However, when using dedicated
fibres over long distances, the cost can be prohibitive beyond 10-20 km. See 4.3.4 for
more information on optical fibres.
Multi-terminal configuration
Transmission line protection based on a current differential scheme detects zone faults by using
each terminal current and transmits the detection results of the zone fault to the other terminals.
There are two types of multi-terminal current differential protection configurations; centralized
and distributed configurations. As these configurations are applied to a single zone protection,
they may be also applied to multi-zone and wide-area protections.
1
Note on pilot-wire replacement:
The corrosion problems of buried copper wires, with the trend of telcos to replace copper-pair cables with fibre communication
links, have put pressure on utilities to consider alternate means of connecting their extensive infrastructure of pilot-wire relays; this
has created a market for specialized interface units which emulate these copper wires.
The accuracy requirements of such interfaces depend on the accuracy requirements of the relay settings, the main parameters of
concern are:
- The interfaces’ dynamic range. This should not limit on fault currents, whilst providing the required signal integrity during low
line-current conditions.
- The end-to-end propagation delay. Since a 10% fault current error would be caused by the 5 degrees phase error accruing
from 230µs on a 60Hz grid (280µs on a 50Hz grid), this delay is critical (this teleprotection application has the most stringent
delay requirements of all teleprotection applications).
- In practice, up to 1ms may be manageable for the protection of 2-ended lines, but 500us or less may be required for 3-ended
lines.
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Centralized configuration
Figure 3.1-4 shows an example of line protection for a five-terminal EHV line [7]. Each terminal
has a terminal unit that detects the current and transmits the data to the main unit terminal via a
communication channel. This configuration simplifies the unit of each terminal and
communication channel. Since the main unit has current data of all terminals, the fault locator
function can be easily implemented by using these data.
Figure 3.1-4: Centralized configuration
Distributed configuration
Figure 3.1-5 shows a distributed configuration of five-terminal current differential line protection
system. Each terminal has the current differential protection function as well as the signal
transmitting function that multiplexes current data at each terminal into one communication
signal. Master station A sends its own current data to slave station B. Slave stations B, C, D and
E multiplex their own current data over communication signal. Slave station E turns back this
signal toward slave station D. Now current data of all terminals are on the communication bus
and available for protection. In addition, this system contains sampling synchronization function
which enables the simultaneous sampling of current data at each terminal with high accuracy.
Many installations were conducted using a 1.544-Mbit/s fiber-optic communications channel for
HV double-circuit multi-terminal (up to ten terminals) or tapped lines [8]. In this network
configuration where current differential calculation is usually carried out at each terminal, a
centralized scheme where only master station conducts the calculation and sends the transfer
trip signal to all slave stations is also available.
Figure 3.1-5: Distributed configuration
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3.1.1.2 Phase comparison protection
Operating principles
Phase comparison protection is based on the comparison of the phase angle between currents
of each end of the protected power line. Under normal load conditions or in case of an external
fault, the angle measured between the local current and the current at the remote ends will be
small. If the angle is large, it is due to an internal fault.
The basic principle of all phase comparison systems is to measure the angle as above
mentioned. However, the method of doing so can differ from manufacturer to manufacturer. A
phase comparison system can be characterised by the following features:
- Comparison is made for each phase separately. A zero sequence circuit may also be
included => Segregated protection.
- The currents of the three phases are mixed into one quantity for comparison => Non-
segregated protection.
- The measurement is made twice every period => Full-wave phase comparison.
- The measurement is made once every period => Half-wave phase comparison.
- The phase angle signal is transmitted to the remote end only when a starter has picked
up.
- Measuring is carried out continuously and the signals are permanently transmitted.
- A phase comparison scheme can be designed for a blocking mode or for an unblocking
mode of operation, similar to a distance protection system using telecommunication.
The current which is used in the comparison is converted into a square wave signal, so that the
positive portion corresponds to the positive half-cycle and the zero portion corresponds to the
negative half cycle. The square wave from the remote terminal is compared with the local
square wave as shown in Figure 3.1-6.
A IA IB B
SA SQ TX Telecommunication TX SQ SA
system
DEL
iA iB DEL
∆ϕ>θ & & ∆ϕ>θ
RX RX
iB iA
TPF TPF
SA = Signal adapter (mixing circuit, filtering, etc.)

SQ = Squarer
TX = Transmitter
RX = Receiver
DEL = Delay compensation
∆ϕ = Coincidence angle
θ = Stabilizing angle
& = Logical AND
TPF = Teleprotection Function
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a) External fault or normal load b) Internal fault
IA IA
IB IB
iA iA
iB iB
iA & iB iA & iB
∆ϕ<θ ∆ϕ>θ
Half-wave phase comparison
Figure 3.1-6: Phase comparison operating principles
In normal line conditions, there is a (small) phase current difference between line ends due to:
- The capacitance of the power line
- Errors due to the equipment, e.g. current transformers, sequencer, filters, squarer, etc.
- The time delay due to the signal propagation time between the terminals
To prevent false trips, a critical angle is defined, commonly called stabilizing angle, which limits
the maximum phase difference between currents, which would correspond to a boundary
between tripping and stabilizing.
In a non-segregated phase comparison protection, the three currents are mixed into one
quantity by means of a composite sequence network. The half-wave system use starters,
normally based on overcurrent detectors, to determine whether a fault has occurred, to initiate
signal transmission to the remote end and to permit local tripping. In the full-wave system, the
comparison is made for each semi-period and normally is therefore faster than the half-wave
type. Phase comparison information is transmitted all the time to the remote equipment, and no
starter is required.
The comparison in the segregated protection system is similar to the non-segregated protection
but, the comparison is made separately for each phase. It is very suitable for single pole
reclosing when handling heavily loaded EHV lines and parallel circuits on the same towers.
Segregated protection is more sensitive for earth faults than non-segregated protection, but it is
more costly and the requirements on communication are higher.
More details about non-segregated and segregated techniques can be found in [1].
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Some recent designs use dynamic principles based on the variation of the instantaneous
current values in for example two periods, i.e. ∆i = i(t) - i(t-2T), so that the signal to compare is
the sign of this variation value ∆i. This principle, normally operating in combination with a
conventional phase comparison with starter, gives a higher sensitivity for high resistance ground
faults.
Time delay compensation

As described for differential protection system, time delay compensation must be also provided
in phase comparison protection in order that phase current values can be compared at the
same instant. Depending on the technology, the channel delay can be compensated either by
dynamic measuring techniques, or by a fixed delay setting in the protection relay. This later
case is only useful when there is no possibility for time delay variations.
Additional functions
A number of complementary functions may be included in the protection relay. Intertrip functions
are used to trip the remote breakers by means of sending a command through the same
communication channel used for comparison signals. An overcurrent criterion normally
supervises the remote trip to prevent tripping under normal conditions.
The same additional functions mentioned for current differential protection are also applicable
for phase comparison protection.
Telecommunication systems used for phase comparison protection
Non-phase-segregated technique
In a half-wave comparison scheme it is very common to use power line carrier as
communication medium, with the same carrier frequency used for both directions. The carrier is
amplitude modulated i.e. switched “on” during positive half-cycles, and “off” during negative half-
cycles, or vice-versa. This system operates as a blocking scheme. For an internal fault, if the
blocking signal from the other end is not received, the output of the comparator circuit sends a
trip command when the starters have picked up. This system might behave incorrectly in some
situations due to the noise generated during a fault, i.e. blocking the operation for internal faults
(=> delayed tripping) or deblocking for external faults (=> unwanted tripping).
In a full-wave comparison different frequencies for the two directions must be used. A FSK
(frequency shift keying) signal is used, which can be transferred over pilot wires, power line,
radio or fibre-optic link. The communication equipment continuously monitors itself and when a
fault occurs, the local signal is compared with the remote for both positive and negative half-
cycle in the protection relay.
Phase-segregated technique
In this case, the values of each phase are transmitted separately via independent channels.
Most recent phase comparison systems usually operate in segregated mode and use digital
communication systems. The square signals to compare are sampled and converted to digital
data, which are transmitted serially to the opposite terminal by the telecommunication system.
Data rates and electrical or optic interfaces are the same as those mentioned for differential
protection.
When starters are used to initiate the comparison, a sequence of “guard” bits is transmitted in
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normal state of operation, in order to monitor the channel availability and performance by the
receiver.
Some designs optionally include a modem to interconnect two terminals through a 4-wire audio
channel. In this case, a data rate of 9'600 or 19'200 bit/s may be used.
3.1.1.3 Charge comparison protection

Charge comparison is based on the principle of conservation of charge at a node. The charge
entering one line terminal must be approximately the same as the charge leaving the other line
terminal(s) of a healthy transmission line. This is also the principle from which Kirchoff’s Current
Law (the theoretical basis of current differential relaying) is derived.
To perform charge comparison, the waveform of each line terminal’s phase and residual current
is sampled every ½ millisecond. The half-cycle area under each wave is measured by
integrating current samples between zero-crossings. For each phase and ground, the resulting
ampere-second area (i.e., coulombs of charge) is stored in local memory, along with polarity
and start/finish time-tags. This storage operation occurs only if the magnitude exceeds 0.5
ampere r.m.s. equivalent and the half-cycle pulse width is equal to 6 ms or more.1
Every positive (negative 3Io) magnitude is also transmitted to the remote terminal, along with
phase identification and some timing information related to pulse width and queuing time (if any)
at the transmitting terminal. When the message is received at the remote terminal, it is
immediately assigned a received time-tag. A time interval is then subtracted from the received
time-tag. This interval represents the channel delay compensation (which does not have to be
precisely equal to the actual channel delay time) and the timing information contained in the
received message. The adjusted received time-tag (after subtraction) is then compared with the
local start and finish time-tags, looking for a “nest”, per Figure 3.1-7 (shown for an external
fault).
Remote current Actual channel

delay time
Time adjusted in
received message Channel delay
compensation
Time interval
subtracted
Local current
Start time-tag Finish time-tag Received time-tag

Adjusted received
time-tag
Figure 3.1-7: Operation of charge comparison, external fault
1
Magnitude is actually measured in terms of ampere-seconds (i.e., coulombs). However, all values are converted to amperes rms
equivalent, based on a perfect 60 Hz (or 50 Hz) sine wave, without offset.
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A nest is achieved when the adjusted received time-tag is greater than the local start time-tag
and smaller than the local finish time-tag, for a given half-cycle stored in memory.
When the nesting operation is successful, the local and remote current magnitudes (actually
charges converted to equivalent currents) are then added to create the scalar sum (sum of
absolute magnitudes). The scalar sum becomes the effective restraint quantity and the
arithmetic sum becomes the effective operate quantity, per the bias characteristic shown in
Figure 3.1-8.
BIAS LEVEL
(TRIP)
ARITHMETIC
SUM
(RESTRAINT)
SCALAR SUM
Figure 3.1-8: Bias characteristic of charge comparison
The bias level is an operate threshold which provides security in the presence of spurious
operate current due to line charging current, current transformer mismatch, analog-to-digital
conversion quantizing errors, etc. As shown in Figure 3.1-8, the bias level rises sharply after the
scalar sum reaches a high value. This provides security for unequal CT saturation during high
current external faults. At lower currents, the bias level has a slight upward slope. This takes
care of the relatively minor non-communications-related errors that increase with current level,
such as CT ratio errors.
The operating characteristic of charge comparison, when plotted on a polar diagram, is the
“ideal” rainbow-shape of Figure 3.1-9. Referring to Figure 3.1-7, if the adjusted received time-
tag nests with a local negative half-cycle, this is equivalent to the upper half of Figure 3.1-9. If
the adjusted received time-tag nests with a local positive half-cycle, then the arithmetic sum and
scalar sum are equal to each other, which describes a 45 degree line on the bias characteristic
(well above the bias threshold for all except very small values of current). This is equivalent to
the lower half of Figure 3.1-9.
IL IR
RESTRAINT
Protected
REGION OF IR
line
IL
Figure 3.1-9: Ideal polar diagram characteristic
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The bias level of charge comparison is significantly more sensitive than that of conventional
current differential relays for line protection. The conventional relay requires a gradually
increasing bias to take care of increasing spurious operate current for a given assumed error in
channel delay compensation (the biggest single source of spurious operate current). In contrast,
charge comparison introduces no additional communications-related error as the currents get
bigger, for a given error in channel delay compensation. Furthermore, for a given magnitude of
through current, no operate error current is introduced, at all, for increasing channel delay
compensation error (up to + 4 ms, at which point a total relay misoperation occurs – typical of a
digital system). The + 4 ms misoperation threshold for charge comparison is almost three times
the + 1.5 ms (approximately + 30 degrees on 60 Hz systems) misoperation threshold which is
typical of conventional current differential schemes with circular polar diagram characteristics.
Lit: [38]
3.1.2 State Comparison Schemes

State comparison protection schemes use communication channels to share logical status
information between protective relay schemes located at each end of a transmission line. This
shared information permits high speed tripping for faults occurring on 100 percent of the
protected line. The logical status information shared between the relay terminals typically relates
to the direction of the fault, so the information content is very basic and requires very little
communication bandwidth. Additional information may also be sent to provide additional control,
such as transfer tripping and reclose blocking.
For instance, breaker failure protection in ring bus and breaker and one-half bus configurations
must transfer trip the remote terminal breaker(s) to isolate the failed breaker. Refer to chapter
3.2.2.2 for Bus Bar Protection/Breaker Failure Protection for more information on this subject.
Overall, the communication requirements for state comparison protection schemes are
considerably less stringent than for analog comparison protection schemes. Communication
speed, or minimum delay, is always of utmost importance because the purpose for using
communication is to improve the tripping speed of the scheme. Also, variations in
communication speed are better tolerated in state comparison schemes than in the analog
comparison protection schemes discussed in an earlier section. Communication channel
security is essential to avoid false signals that could cause incorrect tripping, and
communication channel dependability is important to ensure that the proper signals are
communicated during power system faults, the most critical time during which the protection
schemes must perform their tasks flawlessly.
Comparing the direction to the fault at one terminal with the direction to the fault at the other
terminal permits each relay scheme to determine if the fault is within the protected line section,
requiring the scheme to trip, or external to the protected line section, requiring the scheme to
block tripping. Directional distance and/or directional overcurrent relays are typically used at
each line terminal to determine the fault direction. The relays used at each line terminal operate
independent of the relays at other line terminals; some may even be set to provide time delayed
tripping for faults outside the protected line section, hence the term “non-unit” protection, or
“open system” protection is sometimes given to these types of schemes.
If it were possible to set relays to see all faults on their protected line section, and to ignore
faults outside of their protected line section, then there would be no need for communication
schemes to assist the relays. However, distance and directional overcurrent relays cannot be
set to “see” faults within a precise electrical distance from their line terminal. They are imprecise
because of many factors, including voltage and current transformer errors, relay operating
tolerance, line impedance measurement errors and calculation tolerance, and source
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impedance variations. The primary relay elements used to detect line faults are therefore set to
see or reach either short of the remote line terminal (this is called under reaching), or to see or
reach past the remote line terminal (this is called over reaching).
Communication between line terminals at different electric power substations could be

accomplished by simply extending a number of wires between the substations. Connecting a
relay contact output from a relay scheme at one terminal to a relay scheme control input at the
other line terminal with a pair of copper wires provides the communication necessary for one
relay scheme to tell the other relay scheme that it has, or has not, seen a fault. Unfortunately,
connecting communication wires directly between substations is not that simple and can even
be hazardous. Voltage drop, induced voltages, and ground potential rise between substations
during a fault make direct metallic wire connection between relay schemes unreliable, insecure,
and hazardous.
Communication for state comparison protection schemes must therefore be designed to provide
safe, reliable, secure, and fast information transfer from one relay scheme to another. The
communication scheme must also be able to transmit information in both directions at the same
time. The amount of information required to transfer between relay schemes depends on the
relay scheme logic. The basic and most common state comparison protection schemes are
described in the following subsections. Their communication requirements are discussed within
these subsections. The order in which they are presented does not imply their priority, relative
importance, or usage. Other schemes and combinations of schemes may be designed to meet
specific protection needs, however, they are typically all based on the basic schemes described
in this document.
The terminology used to describe these state comparison protection schemes may differ from
utility to utility and country to country. State comparison schemes are basically defined
according to the impedance zone which sends the protection signal to the remote end of the
line. The following Table 3.1-1 shows the preferred CIGRE scheme names and alternate
scheme names used elsewhere. CIGRE scheme names will be used throughout this document.
CIGRE State Comparison Protection Scheme Alternate State Comparison Protection Scheme
Name Name
Intertripping underreach distance protection Direct underreach transfer tripping
Permissive underreach distance protection Permissive underreach transfer tripping
Permissive overreach distance protection Permissive overreach transfer tripping
Accelerated underreach distance protection Zone acceleration
Deblocking overreach distance protection Directional comparison unblocking
Blocking overreach distance protection Directional comparison blocking
Table 3.1-1: State Comparison Protection Schemes
3.1.2.1 Intertripping Underreach Distance Protection

The basic logic for a Intertripping Underreach Distance Protection scheme is shown in Figure
3.1-10. This scheme requires underreaching functions (RU) only, which are usually provided by
phase and ground distance relay elements. The scheme is usually applied with an active
channel that transmits a GUARD signal during quiescent, or unfaulted, conditions. The
transmitter is keyed to a TRIP signal when the associated underreaching relay element detects
a fault within its reach. The underreaching functions (RU) must overlap in reach to prevent a
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gap between the protection zones where faults would not be detected.
RU
RU
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
Teleprotection
Equipment
RU TX TX RU
RX RX
OR TRIP Bkr 1 TRIP Bkr 2 OR
Protection
Equipment
RU - underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote terminal

and must overlap in reach with RU at remote terminal
Figure 3.1-10: Intertripping Underreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic
For internal faults within the overlap zone, the underreaching functions at each end of the line
operate and trip their associated line breaker directly. At the same time, the RU function keys
its respective transmitter to send a direct transfer trip signal to the relay scheme at the remote
line terminal. Receipt of the trip signal from the remote line terminal also initiates line breaker
tripping.
This scheme provides high speed tripping at both line terminals for all faults within the protected
line section under most conditions. However, it will not provide tripping for faults beyond the
reach of one of the RU functions if the remote breaker is open or if the remote channel is
inoperative. If only one communications channel is used at each terminal, security may be
jeopardized because any erroneous output from the channel initiates an instantaneous breaker
trip. For this reason, this scheme is often applied with dual channels where both outputs must
provide a TRIP signal to initiate a breaker trip. Or a slight delay may be added to a single
channel output to ensure that the remote trip signal is valid before tripping the breaker.
Time-delayed overreaching back-up tripping functions that do not interface with the
communication scheme are usually added to trip the associated line breaker for faults beyond
the reach of the RU functions when the remote breaker is open, or when the communication
channel is inoperative.
This scheme may use virtually any communication media that is not adversely affected by
electrical interference from fault generated noise or by electrical phenomena, such as lightning,
that cause faults. Communication media that use a metallic path are particularly subject to this
type of interference, and must, therefore, be properly shielded, or otherwise designed to provide
an adequate communication signal during power system faults.
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3.1.2.2 Permissive Underreach Distance Protection

The Permissive Underreach Distance Protection scheme requires both overreaching (RO) and
underreaching (RU) relay functions at both line terminals. This scheme is similar to the
Intertripping Underreach Distance Protection scheme except that all communication assisted
tripping is supervised by overreaching relay elements having what is often called a zone 2
reach. The scheme is usually applied with an active channel that transmits a GUARD signal
during quiescent, or unfaulted, conditions. The transmitter is keyed to a TRIP signal when the
associated underreaching relay element detects a fault within its reach. The underreaching
functions (RU) must overlap in reach to prevent a gap between the protection zones where
faults would not be detected. Basic logic for the Permissive Underreach Distance Protection
scheme is shown in Figure 3.1-11. The relay functions and logic are easily performed with
modern multi-zone phase and ground protective relays. Distance type relay elements are most
often used for the underreaching functions (RU), and distance relay elements or directional
overcurrent relay elements are used for the overreaching functions (RO).
RO
RU
RU
RO
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
Teleprotection Equipment
Duplex Communication Link
RU TX TX RU
RX RX RO
RO
OR TRIP Bkr 1 TRIP Bkr 2 OR

& &
Protection Equipment
RU - underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote terminal

and must overlap in reach with RU at remote terminal
RO - overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end of line
Figure 3.1-11: Permissive Underreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic
When the underreaching relay elements detect a fault, they trip the local breaker directly and
key a TRIP signal to the remote line terminal. Unlike the Intertripping Underreach Distance
Protection Scheme, the Permissive Underreach Distance Protection Scheme supervises the
received trip signal with an overreaching relay element. Communication assisted tripping occurs
only if the overreaching relay element detects a fault during the time that a trip signal is received
from the remote line terminal via the communication channel.
Because the received communication signal is supervised by the output from an overreaching
relay element, there is less concern about a false signal causing an incorrect trip. This scheme
is therefore typically applied with a single duplex communication channel. This scheme may use
virtually any communication media that is not adversely affected by electrical interference from
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fault generated noise or by electrical phenomena, such as lightning, that cause faults.
Communication media that use a metallic path are particularly subject to this type of
interference, and must, therefore, be properly shielded, or otherwise designed to provide an
adequate communication signal during power system faults.
The overreaching (RO) relay elements often start a zone 2 timer to provide time delayed tripping
for faults outside the reach of the underreaching (RU) relays elements if the communication
channel is inoperative.
3.1.2.3 Permissive Overreach Distance Protection

The Permissive Overreach Distance Protection scheme requires only overreaching relay
functions. Phase distance functions are used almost exclusively for detection of multi-phase
faults, whereas ground distance functions or directional ground overcurrent functions can be
used for the detection of ground faults. The scheme is usually applied with an active duplex
communication channel that transmits a GUARD signal during quiescent, or unfaulted,
conditions. The transmitter is keyed to a TRIP signal when the associated overreaching relay
element detects a fault within its reach. Basic logic for the Permissive Overreach Distance
Protection scheme is shown in Figure 3.1-12.
RO
RO
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
RO TX TX RO
RX RX
& TRIP Bkr 1 TRIP Bkr 2 &
RO - overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end teminal
Figure 3.1-12: Permissive Overreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic
For a fault anywhere on the protected line, both of the RO functions operate and assert one of
the inputs to the logic AND (&) gate. At the same time, RO also keys the transmitter TRIP
signal. Receipt of the TRIP signal at each terminal, and an output from the RO function,
satisfies the logic AND (&) gate to produce a TRIP output to the breaker. For external faults, the
RO functions at only one end of the line will operate, so communication assisted breaker
tripping is not initiated at either terminal.
The scheme is very secure in that it does not trip for any external fault if the channel is
inoperative. Conversely, the scheme is lacking in dependability because it will not trip for any
internal faults if the channel is inoperative. The scheme also will not trip for any fault if the fault
is not detected at all terminals of the line. The scheme may not trip at high speed for close-in
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faults at the strong terminals because the fastest tripping time that can be expected is
dependent on the slowest function to operate for an internal fault. Some means must be used
to key the transmitter at an open breaker if tripping is to be initiated for faults seen at the other
terminals. Breaker auxiliary contact switch keying with echo logic is commonly used to provide
this requirement. Time-delayed back-up tripping can be provided because the scheme uses
overreaching functions. Because the GUARD signal is transmitted continuously, the channel
can be monitored on a continuous basis.
3.1.2.4 Accelerated Underreach Distance Protection

Basic logic for the Accelerated Underreach Distance Protection scheme is shown in Figure
3.1-13. This scheme requires the use of underreaching relay element functions (RU) that can be
extended in reach by the receipt of a TRIP signal from the relay scheme at the remote line
terminal. The RU functions must be set to overlap in reach to avoid a gap in their fault
detection. This generally requires the use of ground distance functions for the detection of
ground faults, whereas phase distance functions are used for the detection of multi-phase
faults. The scheme is often applied with an active communication channel that transmits a
GUARD signal during quiescent, unfaulted conditions, and is keyed to a TRIP signal when the
associated RU function detects a fault within its reach.
Extended RU RU
RU Extended RU
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
RU TX TX RU
RX RX
Extend RU Extend RU
TRIP Bkr 1 TRIP Bkr 2
RU - underreaching trip function, must be set to reach short of remote

terminal and must overlap in reach with RU at remote terminal.
It must be capable of being switched in reach.
Figure 3.1-13: Accelerated Underreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic
For an internal fault within the overlap zone of the RU functions, breaker tripping is initiated
directly at both line terminals and each communication channel is keyed to the TRIP signal.
Receipt of the TRIP signal extends (accelerates) the reach of the RU functions to beyond the
remote line terminal. This reach extension has no further affect because breaker tripping has
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already occurred at each line terminal. For an internal fault near one terminal, the RU function
at that terminal operates, tripping the breaker and keying its transmitter to the TRIP signal.
Receipt of the TRIP signal at the other terminal extends the reach of that terminal’s RU function,
which then detects the fault to initiate tripping. For external faults, none of the RU functions
operate, therefore tripping does not occur at either line terminal.
The scheme is more secure than the Direct Underreach Distance Protection scheme because it
does not trip directly on receipt of a trip signal. Conversely, it is slower than the Permissive
Underreach and Overreach Distance Protection schemes because it must wait for the extended
RU function to detect the fault before tripping. As mentioned before, it also requires a special
relay with zone extension capability.
3.1.2.5 Blocking Overreach Distance Protection

Basic logic for a Blocking Overreach Distance Protection scheme is shown in Figure 3.1-14. The
scheme requires overreaching tripping functions (RO) and blocking functions (B) as shown.
Distance functions are used almost exclusively for multi-phase fault protection, but either ground
distance functions or ground directional overcurrent functions are used for ground fault
detection. A quiescent, or OFF/ON, communications channel is typically used with this type of
scheme. The power line itself is often used as the communications medium because the
communication channel is not required when the fault is on the protected line. The
communication channel is only used to transmit a block trip signal when the fault is external to
the protected line. Audio tone over leased phone lines, microwave radio, and fibre-optic media
are also used. The transmitter is normally in the OFF state for quiescent conditions and is
keyed to the ON state by operation of any one of the blocking functions. Receipt of a signal
from the remote terminal applies the NOT or inverted input to BLOCK the trip output.
The overreaching tripping functions (RO) must be set to reach beyond the remote terminal of
the transmission line with margin so they will be able to detect a fault anywhere on the
transmission line. The blocking functions (B) are used to detect any fault not on the protected
line that the remote tripping functions are capable of detecting; so they must be set to reach
further behind the terminal than the tripping function at the remote terminal.
For a fault external to the protected line, one or more of the blocking functions operate to key its
respective transmitter to send a blocking signal to the remote terminal. Receipt of the blocking
signal blocks tripping in the event one of the tripping functions has operated for the remote fault.
The coordinating timer, TL1, is required to allow time for a blocking signal to be received from
the remote terminal. It is set to compensate for channel time, signal propagation time and for
any difference in operating time that might result if the remote blocking function is slower than
the local tripping function.
For a fault anywhere on the transmission line, one or more of the tripping functions (RO) at each
terminal will operate and apply an input to its respective AND gate (&). The blocking functions
will not operate for an internal fault, therefore neither transmitter is keyed, so that there is no
output from either receiver. The logic at each terminal produces an output that starts the TL1
timer. When the TL1 timer expires, the scheme produces an output to trip the breaker.
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RO
RO
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
B TX TX B
RO RX Simplex or Duplex RX RO
Communication Link
TL1 TL1
C & TRIP Bkr 1 TRIP Bkr 2 & C
0.0 0.0
RO - overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end of line
B - blocking function, must be set to reach beyond overreaching trip function at remote end of line
C - Coordinating time, required to allow time for blocking signal to be received
(set equal to channel time plus propogation time plus margin)
Figure 3.1-14: Blocking Overreach Distance Scheme Logic
The scheme is very dependable because it will operate for faults anywhere on the protected line
even if the communication channel is out of service. Conversely, it is less secure than
permissive schemes because it will trip for external faults within reach of the tripping functions
(RO) if the channel is out of service. This scheme does not require breaker auxiliary contact or
echo logic keying when the remote breaker is open to permit tripping for faults anywhere on the
line. It provides relatively fast tripping (dependent on coordinating time delay) for most source
and line conditions. However, it may not trip weak terminals of the transmission line, if fault
levels are below the sensitivity of the tripping relays.
If quiescent (OFF/ON) communication channels are used there is no way to monitor the channel
continuously because the channel is only keyed on during external faults. A communication
channel check-back scheme is often used to periodically key a momentary block signal to check
the channel status. Some check-back schemes echo a signal back to verify that the channel is
operational in both directions. Other schemes must receive a signal within a preset time period
to declare the channel in service.
The overreaching functions can be used to drive timers so that time-delayed back-up tripping
can be provided for faults within reach of the overreaching functions.
3.1.2.6 Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection

As mentioned in some previous sections, metallic communication paths adversely affected by
fault generated noise may not be suitable for some teleprotection schemes that rely on a signal
transmitted during a protected line fault. With power line carrier, for example, the communication
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signal may be attenuated by the fault, especially when the fault is close to a line terminal,
thereby disabling the communication channel. Multi-phase power line carrier coupling schemes
can be used to minimize this problem.
The Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection scheme includes logic specifically designed to
accommodate a loss of communication signal during the protected line fault. The Deblocking
Overreach Distance Protection scheme, like the Permissive Overreach Distance Protection
scheme, uses overreaching phase distance functions almost exclusively for multi-phase fault
detection, and ground distance or directional ground overcurrent functions for ground fault
detection. The logic requires the use of an active communication channel that transmits a
GUARD signal during quiescent, or unfaulted, conditions, and is keyed to a TRIP signal when
the associated overreaching relay element detects a fault within its reach. To overcome the loss
of signal caused by the internal line fault, deblocking logic permits a TRIP output if the loss of
signal occurs at nearly the same time the overreaching relay function(s) detect a fault. A
tripping period is controlled by a timer that is typically set between 150 and 300 milliseconds.
Basic logic for the Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection scheme is shown in Figure 3.1-15.
RO
RO
Bkr 1 Bkr 2
Protected Line
GUARD Frequency Shift Power Line GUARD
OR Carrier Communication Link OR
TRIP TRIP
} {
RO TX TX RO
RX RX
TRIP TRIP TRIP TRIP

& OR Bkr 1 Bkr 2 OR &
LOG T T LOG
0.0 0.0
& &
RO - overreaching trip function, must be set to reach beyond remote end teminal
LOG - Loss of GUARD detection from receiver, RX
T - deblocking time delay, typically set for 150 to 300 milliseconds.
Figure 3.1-15: Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic
If the signal loss is due to a fault on the protected line, at least one of the overreaching trip
functions (RO) will be picked up. Thus, tripping will be initiated when the deblocking output is
produced. If none of the permissive trip functions are picked up, the channel will lock itself out
150 - 300 milliseconds after the signal is lost and will stay locked out until the GUARD signal
returns for a pre-set amount of time. It is important to understand that this logic requires that the
loss of signal associated with the operation of an overreaching relay element must only be
caused by a fault on the protected line. Loss of signal due to external line faults will cause false
trips. Therefore, the Deblocking Overreach Distance Protection Scheme Logic is used almost
exclusively with power line carrier communication.
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3.2 BUSBAR PROTECTION

Very often fault clearing criteria for a power system specify that busbar faults must be cleared in
the order of 5 cycles, and that only a few feeders are allowed to be tripped.
This may be the maximum allowed disturbance for a power system, in order to maintain stability
of the remaining power system after fault clearing. Therefore phase to phase faults and phase
to ground faults should be cleared within 5 cycles.
Typical power system busbar configurations are shown on Figure 3.2-1, Figure 3.2-2, and
Figure 3.2-3. Busbar protection is typically based on differential current principles.
Busbar protections are mostly configured with zones, one or more zones for bus A and one or
more zones for bus B. The busbar protection very often includes breaker failure protection, time
delayed typically 5 to 9 power frequency cycles.
3.2.1 Two-breaker busbar configuration

Two-breaker power system busbar configuration is shown on Figure 3.2-1. With two current
transformers in each bay, busbar protection functions (measuring and trip actions) are
independent of isolator positions. Breaker failure protection is started from busbar protection,
line protection and transformer protection.
Bus A Bus B
BP-A BP-B
CB-A-L1 CB-B-L1
Id-A CBFP d CBFP Id-B
-A-L1 -B-L1
Notation :
Line 1
Bus-A is section A of the bus.
c
CB-A-L1 is circuit breaker A for line 1.
CB-A-L2 CB-B-L2 BP-A is bus protetion for bus zone A.

CBFP CBFP
-A-L2 -B-L2
CBFP-A-F1 is circuit breaker
failure protection for breaker A on
Line 2 feeder 1. Feeders may be lines,
transformers or any other feeder.
a b
Id-A is current differential protection for
bus zone A.
CB-A-T CB-B-T
CBFP CBFP
-A-T -B-T
Transf
c
Figure 3.2-1: Two breaker busbar configuration
3.2.1.1 Normal fault clearing

For improving dependability or security, combinations of protection systems may be applied.
The protection system has to detect faults and initiate actions on following faults:
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Fault location a (b) :

CBFP-A (CBFP-B) trips bus A (B), and the fault is cleared. There is no need for
telecommunication.
Fault location c :
This is a fault for line protection or transformer protection, see Chapter 3.1 and 3.3.2.
Fault location between CB and CT, exemplified with fault location d :

Busbar protection zone A trips bus A. But the fault is not yet cleared - there is still infeed from
bus B and Line 1. To obtain fast fault clearing, the breaker failure protection 'CBFP-A-L1' trips
breaker B on Line 1 and must initiate tripping of the remote breaker(s) on Line 1. This remote
tripping can be executed either by direct intertripping or by ’commanding’ or helping line
protection systems on Line 1 to trip the line at least at the remote end. Telecommunication is
needed. Automatic reclosing is not wanted on busbar faults, so if line protection executes the
tripping, it should be three phase without initiation of automatic reclosing.
Fault clearing time will normally exceed 5 cycles. As the current transformer and circuit breaker
are very close, this fault is very seldom. If the line protection is performed by distance relays,
transmitting a carrier signal to accelerate the 2nd zone of the line protection, at the remote line
end, would provide a good solution.
3.2.1.2 Breaker failure

The following fault clearing procedures apply in case of a breaker failure.
Fault location a (b):

For fault location a, if breaker CB-A-L1 is stuck, CBFP-A has to trip CB-B-L1 and initiate tripping
of remote breaker(s) on Line 1. This can only be done by means of telecommunication as
described in chapter 3.2.1.1 for fault location d.
Fault location c:
If breaker CB-A-L1 (CB-B-L1) is stuck, CBFP-A-L1 (CBFP-B-L1) has to trip bus A (B). There is
no need for telecommunication in this case.
Fault location between CB and CT, exemplified with fault location d :

The scenario is the same as described in 3.2.1.1.
3.2.2 One- and a half breaker busbar configuration

One- and a half breaker busbar configuration is shown on Figure 3.2-2. Busbar protection
functions (measuring and trip actions) are independent of isolator positions. Breaker failure
protection is started from busbar protection, line protection and transformer protection.
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Bus A Bus B
BP-A CB-L1-L2 BP-B Notation :

CB-A-L1 e f g CB-B-L2
Id-A CBFP h CBFP Id-B Bus-A is section A of the
-A-L1 -B-L1 bus.
Line 1 T1 is transformer 1.
Line 2
c c CB-A-L1 is circuit breaker
A for line 1.
CB-L3-L4
CB-A-L3 CB-B-L4 CB_L1-L2 is circuit breaker
CBFP CBFP between line 1 and line 2.
-A-L2 -B-L2
BP-A is bus protetion for

Line 3 Line 4 bus zone A.
a b CBFP-A-F1 is circuit
breaker failure protection
for breaker A on feeder 1.
CB-A-T1 CB-T1-T2 CB-B-T2 Feeders may be lines,
CBFP CBFP
-A-T1 -B-T2 transformers or any other
feeder.
T1 T2
Id-A is current differential
d d protection for bus zone A.
Figure 3.2-2: 1½ breaker busbar configuration

For improving dependability or security, combinations of protection systems may be applied.
The protection system has to detect faults and initiate actions on following faults :
Fault location a (b) :

CBFP-A (CBFP-B) trips Bus A (B), and the fault is cleared. There is no need for telecomm-
unication.
Fault location c and d :

This is a fault for line protection or transformer protection, see Chapters 3.1 and 3.3.2.
Fault location between CB and CT, exemplified with fault location e (h) :
Busbar protection zone A trips Bus A. But the fault is not yet cleared - there is still infeed from
bus B and Line 1.
To obtain fast fault clearing, the breaker failure protection 'CBFP-A-L1' trips breaker CB-L1-L2
and must initiate tripping of remote breaker(s) on Line 1. This remote tripping can be executed
either by direct intertripping of breakers, or by ’commanding’ or helping line protection systems
on Line 1 to trip the line at least at the remote end. Telecommunication is needed. Automatic
reclosing is not wanted on busbar faults, so if line protection execute the trip, it should be three
phase without initiation of automatic reclosing.
are very close, this type of fault is rare in practice.
If the line protection is performed by distance relays, transmitting a carrier signal to accelerate
the 2nd zone of the line protection, at the remote line end, would provide a good solution.
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Fault location f and g:

If current measurement for line protection of Line 1 and Line 2 crosses, this is a fault for line
protection or transformer protection. See ’Fault location c and d’ above.
3.2.2.2 Breaker failure

The following fault clearing procedures apply in case of a breaker failure.
Fault location a (b):

For fault location a, if breaker CB-A-L1 is stuck, CBFP-A-L1 has to trip CB-L1-L2 and initiate
tripping of remote breaker(s) on Line 1. This can only be done by means of telecommunication
as described in Chapter 3.2.1.1 for fault location d.
Fault location c :
If breaker CB-A-L1 (CB-B-L1) is stuck, CBFP-A (B) has to trip Bus A (B). There is no need for
telecommunication in this case.
If breaker CB-L1-L2 is stuck, the breaker failure protection of that breaker has to initiate tripping
of remote breaker(s) of Line 1 (2). This remote tripping can be executed either by direct
intertripping or by ’commanding’ or helping line protection systems on Line 1 (2) to trip the line
at least in the remote end. Telecommunication is needed. Automatic reclosing is not wanted on
busbar faults, so if line protection execute the trip, it should be three phase without initiation of
automatic reclosing.
are very close, this type of fault is rare in practice.
Fault location f or g :
If current measurement for line protection of Line 1 and Line 2 ’crosses’, this is similar to ’Fault
location c’ above.
Fault location between CB and CT, exemplified with fault location e or h :

The probability of this fault location in combination with stuck breakers is very low. Normally no
breaker failure protection is applied.
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3.2.3 Two zones / one breaker configuration

Bus A Bus B
BP-A BP-B
I-A-L1 I-B-L1
Id-A Id-B
Notation :
CB-L1
Line 1 Bus-A is section A of the bus.
c T1 is transformer 1.
CB-L1 is circuit breaker for line 1.

Coupler-A-B
CB-T1 is circuit breaker for transformer 1.
d Coupler is coupler between bus section A

and B.
a b I-A-L1 is isolator A for line 1.
Id-A is current differential protection for bus

CB-T1 zone A.
T1
Figure 3.2-3: Two protection zones / one breaker busbar configuration
Fault location a and b:

The busbar protection trips the bus, and the fault is cleared. If a line breaker fails, the second
zone of the line protection ( Z< ) at the opposite line end serves as back-up protection.
Fault location c:
Busbar protection zone A and/or B trips bus A and/or B dependent of isolator positions. But the
fault is on the line side of the breaker. Therefore, the fault is not cleared. To achieve fast fault
clearing, trip command from busbar protection - dependent of isolator position - must initiate
tripping of remote breaker(s) of Line 1(n). This remote tripping can be executed either by direct
intertripping or by ’commanding’ or helping line protection systems on Line 1(n) to trip the line at
least in the remote end. Telecommunication is needed. Automatic reclosing is not wanted on
busbar faults, so if line protection executes the trip, it should be three phase without initiation of
automatic reclosing. Fault clearing time will not necessarily exceed 5 cycles.
Fault location d:
The protection initiates a trip command, but the fault is not yet cleared. In order to clear the fault
busbar protection zone B is designed to trip bus B if receiving a signal from zone A for more
than 5 cycles.
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3.3 OTHER PROTECTION SCHEMES

The following protection schemes may require telecommunication for intertripping.
3.3.1 Generator protection

Generator and step-up transformer protection is normally designed to detect all faults and
abnormal conditions dangerous for generators and step-up transformers. If action is needed, a
stop signal is issued to the generator and a trip command is issued to a breaker interfacing the
power grid. Telecommunication is normally not needed.
As indicated on Figure 3.3-1, telecommunication is needed to trip a remote breaker if, for
instance, the breaker interfacing the power grid is stuck is stuck or has not been installed to
reduce capital expenditure.
Substation
Intertripping
(telecommunication)
Short or long
overhead
power line
Step-up
transformer
Transformer protection
&
Stop Generator protection
Generator
~
Figure 3.3-1: Generator protection
3.3.2 Transformer protection

The transformer protection normally consists of differential protection, overpressure protection
and residual current protection. Overcurrent and impedance protection are often used as back-
up protection. The absence of a circuit breaker on the high voltage side in order to economize
on circuit breakers requires an intertripping system to the adjacent station. In the event of an
internal fault a lock out signal is recommended in order to block the closing of the connected
circuit breakers.
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Lockout
Inter- Power line

Telecommunication tripping protection
system
Power line
protection
Transformer
protection
Trip
Trip
Figure 3.3-2: Transformer protection
3.3.3 Reactor protection

Reactors are used to regulate the network voltage. These reactors are placed on the high
voltage line to compensate capacitive generation.
Normally the reactors have no circuit breakers, hence the reactor protection must send a trip
and intertrip signal to the circuit breakers to both ends of the power line.
Telecommunication
system
Intertrip
Intertrip
Reactor Reactor
Reactor Reactor
protection protection
Figure 3.3-3: Reactor protection
3.4 SYSTEM PROTECTION

Figure 3.4-1 shows the relationship between protected zones/areas and operate times for
various protection schemes. Main protection systems operate to clear faults at the very
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beginning in power transmission lines, busbars, transformers, and so on. If faults cannot be
cleared by a main protection, however, successive operations are needed in the forms of
backup, multi-zone and/or system-wide protections.
Time after System stabilising

fault occurrence protection
Wide-area or
Remote backup system-wide
Local backup protection protection
protection
Main protection #2 Multi-zone
(Redundant or backup) protection
Main protection #1
Protected zones/area
Figure 3.4-1: Relationship between protected area and operate time with respect to protection
schemes
3.4.1 Back-up protection

Back-up protection [3] is a protection system that operates independently of specified
components in the fault clearing system. It may duplicate the main protection system or may
have the task to operate only when the main protection fails to operate or when the main
protection is temporarily out of service. Back-up protections are usually categorized into circuit
local back-up protections, substation local back-up protections, and remote back-up protections.
On EHV networks it is common practice to use duplicated line protections as circuit local back-
up protection; a main protection (#1) and another redundant main protection (#2), taking
account of maintenance or failures of one of the two main protections.
A substation local back-up protection including a circuit-breaker failure protection is energized

from instrument transformers located within the same substation as the corresponding main
protection and is not associated with the same primary circuit. For example, when a circuit
breaker failure occurs after a power line fault and a main protection operation, the breaker
failure protection trips all the circuit breakers connected to the same busbar in the substation, if
it is confirmed that the main protection has operated and the fault is not cleared.
A remote back-up protection is located in a substation remote from that substation in which the
corresponding main protection is located. The conventional remote back-up protections employ
distance relays and utilize local electrical data for operating in zone 2 or wider zones. Figure
3.4-2 shows a network protected by distance protections without telecommunications. The
distance protection uses current and voltage measured at one end of the power line. The
protection uses these measurements to decide if the fault lies within the zones of the distance
protection. A zone of the distance protection is open at the remote end. Zone-1 of the distance
protection covers only about 85% of the power line. Zone-2 of the distance protection at A
reaches beyond the remote terminal B. Zone-1 of the distance protections at B and zone-2 of
the distance protection at A both detect fault close to B on the power line from B to C. To obtain
rapid fault clearing, distance protections operate instantaneously when the fault occurs within
zone-1. To obtain selectivity we have to delay the tripping for faults within zones-2 and 3. This
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co-ordination delay is usually about 0.4 seconds.
Figure 3.4-2: Distance protection providing remote backup
Zone-2 of the distance protection at A must cover the entire power line from A to B. Zone-2 of
the distance protection at A must not reach beyond zone-1 of the distance protection at B.
Zone-2 of the distance protection at A backs up the distance protection at B. However, this is
true for only one part of the power line from B to C. Zone-3 of the distance protection at A
provides back-up for the rest of the power line from B to C. We have to delay the tripping from
zone-3 of the distance protection at A more than the tripping from zone-2 of the distance
protection at B, direction C.
Splitting protection for busbar using communication for multi-circuit multi-terminal line
For the configuration of double busbar and double circuit transmission lines, if a fault persists
due to a CB failure or main protection failure, separation of the busbar by using splitting
protection before remote back-up operation is effective to prevent interruption. However, for
multi-terminal lines the splitting protection is done by sequential tripping and the operation time
may not be coordinated with remote back-up operation. Figure 3.4-3 gives a sample application
for three-terminal transmission lines.
Figure 3.4-3: Splitting protection (BD) using telecommunications for multi-circuit and multi-
terminal line. Ry, CB and Td denote operating times of relay (30 ms) and CB (40
ms) and time delay for coordination, respectively.
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Splitting protections operate sequentially from (1) to (2), and then to (3). Therefore, it cannot be
coordinated with the operation time (340 ms) of remote back-up protection (zone 2 of distance
relay) of substation A, and remote back-up tripping occurs at the substation A end on both lines,
which results in the isolation of substation C. To prevent such isolation, splitting protection at
substation C performs transfer tripping of busbar CBs at substations A and B using
communication channels. Busbars at substations A and B are separated within 260 ms which
allows coordinating of the remote back-up protection. Lit.: [4].
Coordination time control using communication

For the configuration where long distance transmission lines adjoin short distance transmission
lines, coordination between remote back-up protections may not be achieved. Figure 3.4-4
gives an example where there is a long distance transmission line between substations A and B
and a short distance transmission line between substations B and C. If fault F1 occurs at the
busbar in substation B, zone 2 of distance relay of substation A may operate. Zone 2 of
substation A cannot be coordinated in the standard zone-2 time setting of 270 ms. In this case,
the time setting needs to be changed from 270 ms to 370 ms, which is equivalent to the
operation time of zone 3. However, there is another problem that remote back-up operation
(zone 2) of the substation B is delayed for the busbar fault F2 at substation B. In order to
accelerate the operate time, the splitting protection operation signal is sent from substation B to
substation A by a communication channel, and the operation time of zone 2 in substation A is
shortened to 270 ms. Lit.: [4].
Figure 3.4-4: Coordination time control using telecommunications.

Ry, CB and Td denote operating times of relay (30 ms) and CB (40 ms) and time
delay for coordination, respectively.
Wide-area current differential back-up protection

To cope with such complexity of coordinating operate times and reaches and obtaining
necessary selectivity in remote back-up protection employing distance relays, wide-area back-
up protection based on a current differential algorithm which utilize electrical data at remote
stations employing wide-area telecommunication networks among substations is proposed as
shown in Figure 3.4-5. The wide-area back-up protection system covering multi-zones consists
of central equipment (CE) and terminal equipment (TE) which are connected by
telecommunication networks. The terminal equipment samples all the currents from instrument
transformers installed at a busbar and at power transmission lines and power transformers
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connected to that busbar. The data are transmitted by the terminal equipment to the central
equipment through data communication channels. As this protection scheme has to be installed
for every busbar, one central equipment may cover two or more protected areas or busbars. For
the double-busbar and double-circuit configuration shown in the figure, the conventional back-
up protection firstly performs busbar splitting protection to prevent the interruption of a sound
circuit or isolation of transmission lines, which leads to longer operate time, wider outage area
or isolated transmission lines. When a fault occurs at F in the busbar in substation B, for
example, and if the busbar protection fails to operate, the conventional remote back-up
protections or distance relays of substation A and C operate in zone-2 after the bus-tie splitting
protection operates to prevent disruption of the sound circuits. The wide-area back-up
protection operates to minimize the outage area, which is the same as the main protection in
this case. Therefore, the operate time is 140 ms shorter than the conventional protection and
the outage area is smaller. Lit.: [6].
Figure 3.4-5: Wide-area current differential back-up protection employing telecommunications
The wide-area current differential protection system requires wide-area timing synchronization
for simultaneous current sampling. As some current differential multi-terminal line protections
employ centralized timing synchronization scheme in their telecommunication circuits, a similar
scheme may be applied to such wide-area protections. More terminals, however, lead to the
complexity of achieving total synchronization among the terminals using telecommunication
circuits. Satellite-based wide-area timing synchronization such as GPS may be an alternative
solution. Since back-up protections are initiated after a main protection operated, delays for
transmitting current data and tripping signals are not necessarily crucial, while timing
synchronization and data integrity and reliability are still important.
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Since this kind of wide-area protection system employing telecommunications can collect
various kinds of power system data simultaneously sampled throughout the area, further
sophisticated power system monitoring, control, protection, and restoration could be achieved.
3.4.2 System-wide protection

System stabilizing protection operates in a wider area than that for power line protections or in a
system-wide area to prevent power system disturbance. For example, when severe faults such
as double faults in a double-circuit transmission line occur, and even if main and back-up
protections operate properly, it may result in a power system disturbance such as overload,
power swing, abnormal frequency or voltage. Operations of such protection are load shedding,
generator shedding or system separation, which in many cases requires wide-area
telecommunications. Some adaptive protections, defined as a philosophy that permits and
makes adjustments to protection functions automatically for making the protection more attuned
to the prevailing power system conditions, require wide-area on-line telecommunication
channels [9].
A predictive out-of-step protection [10] operates for preventing total system collapse caused by
step-out between large-capacity generator groups due to a serious fault in the trunk power
transmission line as shown in Figure 3.4-6.
When a double-fault occurs along both circuits of a double-circuit line forming one route, the
substations at both ends of the line are disconnected and power transmission capability is
interrupted. If a successive fault occurs after reclosing, a slow cyclic power swing develops
between the western generator group and the bulk power system.
The same situation occurs in case of failure of a busbar protection to operate during a busbar
fault. Over time, the phase difference of the generator groups thus undergoes oscillating
divergence. If this condition is not corrected, an out-of-step situation will begin to occur in
various parts of the power system and may lead to total collapse of the power system. Taking
account of this characteristic of the power system, the western area can be isolated from the
bulk power system before an out-of-step situation occurs and then be operated independently.
This eliminates power swing between the generator groups of the two systems and restores
stability.
This separation of the western area is performed in a manner to preserve the power supply and
demand. The separation point is selected based on the power flow at pre-determined points for
separation before the fault. Adjustment of the supply/demand balance of each area after
separation is performed by governor control of the corresponding generator groups. The
western generator group, however, may under certain conditions becomes overloaded. In this
case, load shedding via under-frequency relays is relied upon to correct the unbalance. This
protection is accomplished by using on-line voltage data, or busbar voltage waveforms,
collected from the generator group by central equipment to predict step-out based on the
measured voltage phases and then issuing a system separation command. This system
consists of central equipment and RTUs, and requires sampling synchronization for the voltage
phase measurement. The telecommunication requirements from this protection are almost the
same as the wide-area current differential protection described above. The required overall
operating time is less than a few hundreds of milliseconds, where transmission time including
initiation and processing of frame-formatted cyclic data transmission (Tac in Figure A1-5) should
be less than several tens of milliseconds, and propagation delay requirement including media
and equipment delay be at most several milliseconds.
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Figure 3.4-6: A system-wide protection; predictive out-of-step protection
Another system stabilizing protection, which consists of central processing unit, fault detecting
unit, and transfer trip unit, operates for stabilizing power frequency or transient instability [11].
The central processing unit collects data on generated energy and load as controllable
quantities from power stations and substations, automatically recognizes electric power system
connections, performs calculations in advance to prepare for faults, and automatically
determines control quantity and objects for each pattern of separation. If a fault occurs, the
central processing unit sends a trip signal to the transfer trip unit based on the calculation
results.
The fault detecting unit detects a route disconnection fault in any of the EHV lines, and
calculates power flow through the main lines, frequency, and voltage drops, and transmits these
data to the central equipment. If faults occur, the transfer trip unit receives a transfer trip signal
from the central processing unit, and sheds the generators and/or loads as controllable
quantities based on the received information to stabilize the frequency of each separated part.
A means of high-speed multiplexed data transmission of large volume of information is essential

to a power stabilizing system that provides adaptive approach at high speed. A dedicated
transmission unit is used for the important information such as fault or route-off detection and
transfer trip signals to ensure high-speed and reliable transmissions, while relatively large
volumes of information that do not necessarily require high speed are transmitted by an
EMS/SCADA communication network. The overall operate time and transmission time
requirements are similar to the previous system stabilizing protection.
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4 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS FOR PROTECTION

The purpose of a telecommunication system in conjunction with protection systems is to transfer
a protection signal in due time from the protection equipment at one station to a similar
equipment at the remote station. A secure and dependable point-to-point communication is
normally required for this purpose. Possible transmission media are:
- Pilot wires / copper wires

- Power line carrier (PLC) links
- Microwave radio links
- Fibre optic links
- Satellite links
The telecommunication link should have a high degree of availability and should transmit the
protection signal as fast as necessary to the remote station with the highest possible reliability.
The actual requirements on transmission speed, dependability for wanted operation and
security against unwanted operation may vary for different protection schemes and line
configurations. Practical and economical reasons may define which type of transmission
medium has to be used.
All communication systems are subject in varying degrees to interference and noise of various
forms. These can corrupt the information arriving at the receiver, either by simulating a signal
when no such signal has been transmitted, or by delaying or blocking a true signal. In analog
systems, there are many ways in which transmission can be degraded. For example, the signal-
to-noise ratio may be poor, or the signal may suffer distortion or crosstalk from one user to
another, or the system may clip the input signal. In comparison, a digital system has the
parameters: bit rate, error rate, delay, and delay variation. Channel impairments may result in
bad messages, no messages, excessive message delay, excessive message delay variation
and/or excessive delay difference in the transmit and receive direction.
The quantity of information per unit time (bits per second) which a communication channel can
transfer depends on its bandwidth and on the received signal quality1 (normally expressed as
Signal-to-Noise Ratio, SNR).
The signal transfer delay introduced by the medium is normally low for terrestrial links, since in
most media the signals propagate typically at speeds between 60% and almost 100% of the
speed of light in vacuum. The propagation delay is for example about 3.3µs/km for open-wire
(e.g. Power Line Carrier) and microwave radio links, about 5µs/km for optical fibres and 5 ....
10µs/km for pilot wires. The significant part of the overall operating time of a teleprotection
system is normally introduced by the terminal equipment including their interfaces to the
protection, by intermediate repeater stations and network node devices with channel routing
functions. See also Figure A1-5 in ANNEX A1.
Transmission time delay, bandwidth and signal quality are important parameters when
considering the design of a telecommunication system used for protection. The criteria apply
equally for both analogue and digital communication systems. For digital systems it is however
1
The maximum information flow that a communication channel can transfer without errors is called its capacity. According to
Shannon's law the channel capacity is given by the formula C = B x ld(1 + SNR), with C = Capacity in bits/s, B = Channel
bandwidth in Hertz, ld = logarithm to the base of 2, and SNR = Signal-to-Noise Ratio of the received signal. The channel capacity
is a theoretical value that can only be approximated at the cost of excessive signal transfer delay due to infinite coding- and
decoding efforts. The formula also indicates that a bandwidth related data rate increase is compromized by the bandwidth related
SNR deterioration (=> the wider the bandwidth is, the more noise is captured).
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more convenient to use the data rate instead of the bandwidth and to express the transmission
quality in terms of bit errors (e.g. bit error rate, errored seconds etc.) rather than signal-to-noise
ratio.
4.1 TELECOMMUNICATION CIRCUITS

The term "circuit" may be used to characterize legal aspects or physical properties of a
communication service. Some examples of circuits are described below.
4.1.1 Private and rented circuits

Communication circuits may be utility owned or rented from third parties. Security, dependability
and availability of rented circuits do not always satisfy the requirements from protection. Some
typical threats and risks are:
- Rented circuits are beyond the control of the power utility

- Rented circuits may be re-routed for operational reasons. This can change the
transmission characteristic, e.g. the signal transfer delay, which may cause problems to
the protection function
- Signals may be injected into the circuit for routine tests or maintenance reasons which
may prevent protection from operating or may cause unwanted operation
- The medium (wires, fibres, radio etc.) and hence its associated typical risks may not be
known to the user
Circuit or service providers however may offer circuits or services with guaranteed performance,
which seem to be applicable to protection.
4.1.2 Analogue and digital circuits

All physical transmission media are analogue by nature. The distinction between analogue
circuits and digital circuits is defined solely by the communication equipment technology. The
term "analogue" or "digital" circuits thus mainly relates to the physical properties of the
communication interface, see also interfaces (a) and (b) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 in 9. If an
interface accommodates waveforms that vary continuously with time and amplitude, that
interface provides an analogue circuit. If an interface accommodates signals that may change
between few (normally 2 or 3) amplitudes at certain instants of time only, that interface provides
a digital circuit.
Analogue communication systems have enhanced protection systems for many years. Their
advantage is their efficient use of bandwidth, especially for the transmission of analogue signals
such as voice. Historically, analogue communication systems provided analogue circuits to the
user.
The situation has changed with the advances in digital electronics and signal processing, with
the development of bandwidth efficient digital modulation principles and with the breakthrough
in optical fibre technology. Due to the availability and the advances in digital communications, it
is increasingly being used for the protection of power systems. Digital communication systems
may provide both analogue circuits (e.g. for voice, telefax and modems) and digital circuits (for
data) to the user.
The relatively simple characterization of a digital communication system is an important

advantage over analog systems, where there are many parameters and ways in which a
transmission can be degraded.
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Important parameters for analogue circuits are the bandwidth, the frequency response ( =
attenuation and group delay) and the signal-to-noise ratio at the receiver input. Analogue
circuits are characterized by their “graceful degradation” under disturbed channel conditions, i.e.
the quality of the received signal deteriorates gradually with increasing disturbance and noise.
Important parameters for digital circuits are the bit rate, the data transfer delay and delay
variation (timing jitter) and the error rate of the received data. The impairments of the
communication medium, which may be quite severe, are hidden from the user. Error rates can
be bounded to very low values by placing regenerative repeaters at periodic intervals
(intermediate stations) along the physical medium.
Digital circuits are characterized by their “threshold behavior” under disturbed channel
conditions. Simply speaking, they are either very good or not available.
The protection of power systems normally imposes very stringent demands on the
communication system regarding its real-time properties. The signal transfer time and transfer
time variation is for example much more critical for protection signal transmission than for
general data or voice communication.
Voice frequency circuits

The term voice frequency (VF) circuit is used for analogue circuits that pass frequencies
between approximately 300 Hz and 3400 Hz and block frequencies outside this range.
Historically this frequency range has been defined for the transmission of speech signals.
Today, analogue voice frequency circuits are provided by both analogue and digital
telecommunication systems and may be used by voiceband modems for data transmission up
to approximately 33 kbit/s.
Voice frequency circuits may further be characterized according to the number of wires that are
required: 2-wire circuits employ the same wire pair for transmitting and receiving, whilst with 4-
wire circuits one wire pair is used for transmitting and the other wire pair is used for receiving.
4.2 TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS

The requirements from protection on communication have traditionally been met with simple
point-to-point links. The introduction of high capacity digital networks is therefore hardly justified
by its exclusive use for power system protection. The deployment of digital networks is primarily
motivated by the need for enhanced power network control and increasing data traffic in
distributed systems, and particularly by new telecom business opportunities in deregulated
markets. Protection may however technically and economically benefit from modern
communication networks if some inherent network problems and their impact on protection
operating performance are carefully analyzed. Finally, properly designed networks are a
prerequisite for the emerging wide-area protection systems that will require the exchange of
information between many sites rather than isolated point-to-point links.
Networks can enhance the availability of a protection system when the network inherent
redundancy and route diversity is exploited. Measures have however to be taken to ensure that
automatic re-routing is prevented from re-using the same bearer (e.g. the same fibre cable)
when attempting to re-direct a channel which has failed, thus destroying the diversity concept.
Pre-definition of a primary and an alternate path with ensured diversity and guaranteed signal
transfer delay is suggested.
Special attention has to be paid to networks where the protection information may pass through
network nodes with switching, routing and loop-back facilities, or when the protection signal
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shares an aggregate with other services. Switching, routing and multiplexing techniques bear a
certain risk that a transmitted signal is directed to a receiver which it was not originally intended
for (channel cross-over or signal loop-back).
The consequences of signal misdirections on protection are different for analog comparison and
state comparison protection schemes. For example, signal misdirection is typically less critical
for state comparison protection systems that are normally in the guard (non-operate) state, than
for analog comparison protection systems, which depend on continuous exchange of
information between line ends and may immediately trip the line if signals from the wrong
transmitter are received.1
In addition to inadvertent signal misdirection there exist some other network-related risks that
are new or have a different impact when compared to traditional ‘hard-wired’ point-to-point links,
for example:
- Automatic re-route to some non-defined alternate path with inadequate performance for
protection
- Automatic re-route to a pre-defined non-preemptible (dedicated) path
- Excessive outage time until re-route completed
- Different propagation time delays between the various paths selected
- Possibility of different go and return propagation time delays
- Protection circuits may be bumped at the expense of others when re-routing after a link
failure, unless prevented by adequate circuit priority rating mechanisms
- Channel may not revert back to its original path unless manually optimized, eg on a least
cost basis
- Unacceptable signal transfer delays due to queuing mechanisms in networks with
dynamic bandwidth allocation
- Availability may be less than expected due to the particular definition of "Available Time"
for telecom ISDN circuits according to ITU-T G.821
Power system protection performance may be unacceptably jeopardized unless appropriate

measures are taken regarding the control and management of the network, and unless the
protection system is designed to cope with typical network related risks.
More on networks is found in Chapters 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6.
4.3 TRANSMISSION MEDIA
4.3.1 Pilot wires / Copper wires

Pilot wires consist of a pair of metallic wires normally embedded in an aerial or underground
cable. They have historically been widely used for transmitting protection signals. Although the
1
State comparison schemes and command-based protection systems:
When an inadvertent channel mix-up or loop-back occurs in a command based protection system, normally only the guard signal
(‘do not trip’) is misdirected or looped back, as the system is normally in the guard state. A residual risk for a missed tripping or
unwanted tripping exists for the unlikely case when the channel-misdirection would coincide with protection operation.
Analog comparison schemes:

Signal misdirection is more critical for analog comparison schemes like current differential protection. A channel cross-over or
signal loop-back would simulate a differential signal, which may immediately produce an unwanted tripping. Should a channel
cross-over coincide with a line fault, an unwanted tripping for the wrong line may be produced. Terminal equipment addressing
with address validation times of less than the protection relay’s operating time is therefore a prerequisite. Any measure for
improving the security has however to be weighted against its adverse impact on dependability.
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tendency is to replace pilot wires by optical fibres which are free from electromagnetic
interference, their use may still be justified for economical reasons.
Pilot wire circuits may be utility owned or rented from telecommunication companies. Utility
owned pilot wires often follow the same route as power cables. Since pilot wires may be subject
to dangerous induced voltages during faults in the primary system, appropriate installation
precautions must be taken in order to prevent maloperation, hazards to personnel and damage
to equipment.
The electrical parameters of pilot wires such as signal attenuation and signal delay per unit
length depend on their mechanical parameters like wire diameter, insulation material and cable
construction, as well as on the signal frequency. Values for the attenuation coefficient between
0.5 dB/km and 3 dB/km in the audio frequency range are typical.
The signals, which are transmitted over pilot wires are historically sometimes DC signals or
signals at power frequency (50 or 60 Hz) e.g. from pilot wire differential relays. Transmission of
DC or AC signals at power frequency is hardly used any more due to the pronounced
susceptibility to interference from the primary system. Normally the information is modulated
onto a carrier which “shifts” the information from the power frequency range into the audio
frequency range for transmission. At the receiving end, the information signal can be separated
from the power frequency by means of filtering. This function is usually performed by means of
a teleprotection equipment operating over a 2- or 4-wire circuit.
2-wire circuits use the same pair of wires for transmitting and receiving. Transmit and receive
signals are normally separated by their respective frequencies. With 4-wire circuits, a pair of
wires is allocated to the transmitter and a pair of wires is allocated to the receiver. The same
frequency is normally used for transmitting and receiving.
A typical application for pilot wires is the transmission of binary on/off protection commands
using dedicated teleprotection equipment in conjunction with distance or directional comparison
relays. The protection command is modulated onto an audio frequency carrier somewhere in the
0.3 kHz to 3.4 kHz range, which makes the transmission less susceptible to power frequency
interference and high frequency noise. The teleprotection equipment may also multiplex several
commands from different relays onto the same wires.
Internet access and multimedia services had a tremendous impact on the development of new
high speed transmission principles for copper wires. High-speed modems would allow the use
of pilot wires for higher data rates, ranging from several tens of kbit/s for voiceband modems to
up to 10 Mbit/s over short distances for wideband (xDSL) modems. However, due to their
inherent high signal transfer delay (latency) and their sensitivity to channel disturbances, the
use of high-speed modems is not recommended for the transmission of protection signals.
Electromagnetic interference, power frequency harmonics and wideband noise produced by
faults in the power system are likely to block the modem receiver just in that moment when the
communication is truly needed.
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Summary
Advantages and disadvantages of Pilot Wires as related to protection signal transmission are:
Advantages Disadvantages
• High availability and reliability with MTBF • High sensitivity to induced voltages in the
in the order of 200’000 to 500’000 hours event of power line faults and lightning
• Wide deployment strokes
• Low cost, especially when also used for • Problems with potential barriers at the
other purposes station entrance
• Little interference from power lines if • Crosstalk between circuits in the same
separate routing is used cable deteriorates performance and
reduces link lengths
• Buried cables my be damaged or broken
by civil works
• Short to medium link lengths only, due to
the attenuation, bandwidth, crosstalk and
interference constraints
• High cost of new cables, e.g. when civil
works are required.
Table 4.3-1: Advantages and disadvantages of pilot wires
4.3.2 Power Line Carrier (PLC)

A PLC system uses the high voltage power line as a transmission medium. Both overhead lines
and buried high voltage cables can be used. Lines with mixed overhead line sections and cable
sections are also possible, but each case has to be carefully investigated.
PLC systems have been extensively used for more than 60 years on HV and EHV lines for the
transmission of voice, control data and protection signals. PLC links are entirely under the
control of the power utility. They normally provide the shortest and most direct connection
between line ends, power stations and substations and are in many cases justified by the
transmission of protection signals, where PLC links have proven to perform very effectively.
Continued operation has even been reported for power lines, which were broken down after an
earthquake. Due to their reliability PLC links are often the preferred back-up medium for
selected important channels of wideband communication systems. This is especially true for
protection signals.
The carrier frequency range which can be used by PLC systems is normally between 40 kHz
and 500 kHz. It is sometimes subject to national regulations to prevent interference with other
systems operating in the same frequency band.
The carrier frequency range between 40 kHz and 500 kHz is subdivided into slots of 4 kHz
bandwidth. A PLC link may typically use one to four such slots for transmitting and receiving,
depending on the number of channels and on the technology used.
Traditional Analogue PLC transmitters translate a voice frequency band of 4 kHz gross
bandwidth into one of the 4 kHz carrier frequency slots using single sideband (SSB) modulation.
The voice frequency baseband may contain speech, superimposed data and protection signals
which share the channel by means of frequency division multiplexing (FDM, see 4.4.1.1). During
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the transmission of protection commands the speech and data signals may be switched off such
that the maximum transmit power is available to the protection signal. This "boosting" of the
protection signals compensates the additional signal attenuation, which is introduced by the
fault on the protected power line when signalling over faulty lines. As voice and data are
interrupted during protection signalling, boosting is not recommended for the transmission of
persistent commands, as might be the case for reactor protection for example.
Emerging Digital PLC systems translate serial digital data into one or several 4 kHz slots at
carrier frequency range using bandwidth efficient digital modulation techniques, such as
quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) or multicarrier (MCM) modulation. The serial aggregate
data may accommodate digitized speech and digital data by time-division-multiplexing (TDM,
see 4.4.1.2). Protection command transmission is usually accomplished by means of a
dedicated subsystem in order to achieve the required dependability and minimum signal
transfer delays under faulty line conditions.
For both analogue and digital PLC systems the signal at carrier frequency is amplified to
typically 5 to 100 Watts output power (PEP, peak envelope power) and coupled to the power
line via an impedance matching device and a high voltage coupling capacitor. For optimum
transmission performance under faulty line conditions coupling onto two phases in “push-pull”
mode is normally preferred. Line traps in series to the power line prevent the carrier signals from
being shunted by the local busbar and prevent signal leakage to adjacent lines. Several PLC
terminals may share a common coupling equipment.
The propagation of the signal along a multi-conductor power line may be explained by the
combined transmission of independent modes whose number is equal to the number of non-
earthed conductors above ground. Each mode propagates with its specific attenuation and
velocity. The signal attenuation depends on the construction of the power line, the line condition
and on the carrier frequency used. It is typically in the range of 0.02 dB/km to 0.2 dB/km,
increasing with frequency.
The signal quality may be impaired by various noise sources.
Corona noise results from electric impulse discharges along the surface of the phase
conductors. Its spectrum extends well into the carrier frequency range. Corona noise is always
present on an energised line and is perceived as background noise in a PLC receiver. Its level
depends on the power system voltage and design, the climatic conditions and the altitude above
sea level. It normally does not constitute a problem to protection signal transmission since its
level is less than other channel impairments caused by line faults for example.
Isolator operation creates high frequency noise of high amplitudes which cause poor signal-to-
noise ratios in the PLC receiver. Its duration may last some seconds depending on the isolator
design. The signal quality degradation depends largely on the method of coupling and on the
characteristics of the equipment. The interference produced by isolator noise is most severe in
comparison with other noise sources. Because it occurs under healthy line conditions it may
cause unwanted operation of the protection system.
Operation of breakers produces disturbance similar to isolator operation. Its duration is

however limited to the operating period of the circuit breaker which is typically less than 20 ms.
During line faults the PLC channel is subject to strong transient noise at the onset of the line
fault until the arc has established, followed by an immediate increase in signal attenuation due
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to the short circuit of the faulty phase(s). During the interruption of the fault current, noise is
produced again by the operation of the circuit breakers.
Interference produced by power system faults occurs during the time when the protection is in
active operation. It may therefore prevent operation of the protection system.
Channel impairments during line faults are the primary reason why PLC links have so far been
restricted for two applications for protection signal transmission, where they have however
proven to perform most effectively:
- Transmission of binary status information in conjunction with distance protection or
directional comparison relays in state comparison protection schemes
- Transmission of phase comparison signals in conjunction with phase comparison relays
in analog comparison protection schemes.
Summary
Advantages and disadvantages of PLC links as related to protection signal transmission are:
• The overhead power line constitutes a • Channel is subject to increased

very reliable transmission medium disturbance during faults in the primary
• The power line is normally the shortest system
and "fastest" link between line ends, • Application for protection signal trans-
power stations and substations mission is limited to the transmission of
• PLC teleprotection links are normally binary commands and non-segregated
“hard-wired” point-to-point links with little phase comparison signals
risk of unwanted re-routing, switching or • Not applicable for current differential
tampering protection
• The equipment is situated at the power • The narrow bandwidth (few kHz)
station, giving easy access for control and constrains the number of signals that can
maintenance be transferred and the signal transfer time
• The medium (power line) and terminal • Limited frequency band available, limiting
equipment are under the full control of the the number of PLC links that can work in a
utility given network (frequency congestion)
• Very long distances of many hundred
kilometers may be covered without
intermediate repeaters.
• No earth potential rise problems since the
transmitter and receiver as well as
coupling equipment are normally situated
within the station earth network
Table 4.3-2: Advantages and disadvantages of power line carrier links
4.3.3 Microwave Radio

Microwave radio links have been extensively used by many electric power utilities mainly to
satisfy the increasing demand for more communication capacity. Until the introduction of fibre-
optic links they represented the only true wideband medium which could accommodate a large
number of voice channels. Another reason for selecting microwave radio links is their relative
immunity against electromagnetic interference produced by the high-voltage power network.
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From a legal point of view terrestrial microwave radio systems may be broadly categorized into
licensed radio and unlicensed radio systems:
Licensed radio systems operate in a "protected" frequency range that has been licensed to the
utility by national authorities. Licensed radio systems typically constitute point-to-point multi-
channel links that are used in the backbone of the communication network.
Unlicensed radio systems operate in an "unprotected" frequency range that is open to the
public. Unlicensed radio systems usually share a common frequency band and support point-to-
multipoint communication. Access to the shared medium (i.e. the common frequency band) is
accomplished either through TDMA (Time Division Multiplex Access) or CDMA (Code Division
Multiple Access), or a combination of the two, to prevent mutual interference between users.
See also chapters 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.1.3.1
4.3.3.1 Multichannel radio

Although the microwave equipment may be owned and operated by the power utility, the
frequency bands for its use have to be licensed from national authorities. The frequency bands
for microwave radio systems are typically between 400 MHz and 40 GHz.
In legacy analog microwave systems a number of voice baseband channels with 4 kHz
bandwidth each are combined onto a single aggregate signal by frequency division multiplexing
(FDM, see 4.4.1.1). One or several of the 4 kHz baseband channels may be used individually or
collectively for the transmission of protection signals.
Earlier analogue microwave systems used frequency modulation (FM) where the analogue
aggregate FDM signal varies the frequency of the emitted carrier. Analogue microwave systems
are mainly of historical interest since they have been gradually replaced by digital systems.
In digital microwave systems a number of digital data channels of typically 64 kbit/s each are
combined onto an aggregate data stream using time division multiplexing (TDM, see 4.4.1.2).
Analogue signals such as speech are converted into digital data prior to multiplexing. One or
several of the digital 64 kbit/s channels may be used either individually or collectively for the
transmission of protection signals.
In digital microwave systems frequency modulation has been replaced by phase shift keying
(PSK) modulation or combined phase-amplitude shift keying, which is also called quadrature
amplitude modulation (QAM), with 16-QAM being widely used today. Higher level QAM like 64-
QAM or 128-QAM provide a higher bandwidth efficiency, i.e. they allow to transmit more bits per
second in a given bandwidth, however at the expense of an increasing susceptibility against
interference and noise.
Licensed microwave radio links are normally point-to-point with maximum distances between 40
and 100 km. The distances that can be covered depend on the transmitter output power, on the
frequency band used, on atmospheric conditions, on the topography and on obstacles, which
may impede signal propagation or cause signal reflections. Signal reflections may lead to
multipath propagation which causes a certain additional attenuation or signal extinction when
the direct wave and the reflected wave are opposite in phase at the receiver.
Waves reflected by the ionized part of the atmosphere or by a changing refractive index due to
temperature or humidity variations have the same effect, but since the degree of reflection is
subject to a random process, the received signal varies statistically with time. This phenomenon
is called “fading” as the received signal can fade or disappear on a statistical basis.
1
TDMA and CDMA are general media access technologies that are for example typically used in point-to-multipoint radio systems
where many users share a common frequency band.
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These drawbacks can be overcome by careful link planning, by the positioning of intermediate
repeaters, by the selection of the transmitted power and by the antenna design.
Diversity is commonly used to improve the availability of microwave links by adding some
degree of redundancy. Space diversity is obtained if different antennas are located in different
positions on the antenna tower. Frequency diversity is used when the same signal is transmitted
using different frequencies. At the receiving side the signals coming from different antennas are
combined to achieve the best possible signal at the output, permitting to limit the outage time of
the link during the worst period of the year.
4.3.3.2 Single channel radio

Unlicensed radio systems normally constitute single-channel point-to-multipoint short-haul links
that can be set up on the fly at moderate cost. Single-channel point-to-multipoint microwave
radio links have been used at MV level with less stringent demand on signal transfer times.
Access to the common medium - i.e. the shared radio frequency band - is accomplished by
means of TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) or CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) to
prevent mutual interference between transmitters operating simultaneously, see also 4.4.1.3.
Successful operation of such systems has been reported from South Africa. Both intertripping
as well as differential protection signals are transferred over point-to-point TDMA-based single-
channel radio links between outstations, with typical signal propagation delays (outstation to
outstation) in the range of 14ms to 22ms1 at data rates of 19.2kbit/s and 64kbit/s.
The use of unlicensed spread spectrum radio for the transmission of state indication in a state
comparison scheme for a 138 kV line has been reported from the USA.
Summary
Advantages and disadvantages of microwave radio links as related to protection signal
transmission are:
• Wideband medium, with scalable capacity • Frequency bands constitute a limited

(number of channels) resource and may not be available as
• Little interference from the primary system desired
• No earth potential rise problems when the • Influence of atmospheric conditions such
transmitter and receiver are situated within as rain, fog, snowfall, sandstorms. Unless
the station earth network a high signal margin is provided, the link
may be temporarily lost due to fading
• Fast setting up, especially when towers
are existing or when roof top installations • Correlation / coincidence between poor
are possible, or when unlicensed radio weather conditions, line faults and poor
systems can be used link performance exists
• Problem of getting line-of-sight both for
single-hop and multi-hop links
• Multiple hops introduce extra cost, reduce
reliability and cause additional signal
transfer delays
1
Caution: It is most important to mention that the “upstream” and “downstream” time delays between masterstation and outstation
are different with certain types of TDMA equipment – this can lead to difficulties with differential protection systems: An additional
“dummy” outstation may have to be installed at the master-station site for the sole purpose of equalizing the go and return time
delays!
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• Microwave antenna towers are subject to

lightning strokes
• Potential barrier problems when the
transmitter and receiver are located
outside the station earth network
• Many channels are lost when a high
capacity microwave link fails
• Unequal upstream and downstream signal
propagation delays of certain TDMA or
CDMA radio systems may cause serious
problems for differential current protection
relays
Table 4.3-3: Advantages and disadvantages of radio links
4.3.4 Optical fibres

The deployment of optical fibres for signal transmission started in the seventies with a few short-
haul links and has made tremendous progress since then regarding fibre and terminal
equipment technology. The unique advantage of optical fibres is their immunity to
electromagnetic interference, their isolating quality and their extremely wide bandwidth, all
making the introduction of optical fibre links very attractive for electric power utilities.
Optical fibres are normally used in pairs, i.e. one fibre is used for transmitting and one for
receiving. Communication over one fibre in both directions is technically possible, for example
using time-shared multiplexing or wavelength division multiplexing (WDM, see chapter 4.4.1.1)
techniques. It has however been rarely used for long distance telecommunication systems so
far.
A number of optical fibres (10 … 50 … 100) are normally embedded in an underground or aerial
cable. The immunity against electromagnetic disturbance allows installing fibre-optic cables
along the same route as power cables. They may also be integrated into power cables or
ground wires of HV power lines. The latter design which is called OPGW (OPtical Ground Wire)
is preferably used by electric power utilities. Other popular techniques are the mounting of
ADSS (All Dielectric Self-Supporting) Cables along the towers, or the Helical Wrapping of a
fiberoptic cable around the ground wire or phase wire, which may be advantageous for
refurbishing existing lines. Lashed aerial cable techniques are also used whereby an all-
dielectric cable is lashed to a messenger (e.g. earth wire) by means of a tape or cords. In all
cases the mechanical strength of the towers has to be examined regarding the additional load
introduced by the optical cables, especially when extra loads due to snow and ice are to be
expected.
Care must be taken with ADSS and Helical Wrap cables to avoid surface erosion caused by
dry-band arcing in high field strength locations.
For long distance links, Multimode Step-Index fibres and multimode Graded Index fibres are of
historical interest only. They have been almost completely superseded by Single Mode fibres
which provide a very large bandwidth over a long distance.
The transmission properties of optical fibres are characterised by their attenuation per unit
length (dB/km) and by their chromatic dispersion (ps/nm∗km). Chromatic dispersion means that
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lightwaves of different wavelengths (= "colours") propagate with different velocities. An injected

light impulse, which is for technical and physical reasons composed of several wavelengths,
thus tends to “broaden” when it propagates. The impulse broadening limits the useful bandwidth
of the link because the individual impulses can no longer be discriminated by the receiver when
they overlap significantly. Using laser emitters with a narrow emission spectrum is therefore
mandatory for long-haul high bitrate links.
At 1300 nm optical fibres naturally exhibit minimum dispersion which introduces minimum pulse
distortion at high data rates. At 1550 nm the attenuation is lowest, however the dispersion is
higher than at 1300 nm. Special fibre designs called Dispersion Shifted Fibres minimize the
chromatic dispersion at 1550 nm, however at the expense of a higher attenuation due to
mechanical stress combined with certain penalties when used in WDM systems [12]. The
maximum length of an optical fibre link may therefore be either attenuation limited or dispersion
(bandwidth) limited which is an important system planning issue for high capacity long-haul
links. Very long distances can be overcome by means of optical boosters and amplifiers which
inject more light power into the fibre at the transmit side and amplify the received signal on an
optical basis at the receiving end.
Laser Diodes (LD) or Light Emitting Diodes (LED) may be used as optical transmitters. Laser
diodes are required for long repeater spans (up to about 100 to 200 kilometres, depending on
the bit rate) and high bitrates (up to some Gigabits per second), whereas LEDs are cost efficient
for shorter distances and lower data rates. The optical power injected by a LD into a single
mode fibre is in the order of 1 Milliwatt, that of an LED is around 10 to 20 Microwatts. The
emitted wavelength of both LDs and LEDs is in the infrared range at either around 850nm,
1300 nm or 1550 nm. Special optical transmit- and receive devices such as Optical Boosters
and Erbium Doped Fibre Amplifiers (EDFA) may be used for bridging extra long distances of
several hundred kilometers without intermediate repeater stations.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM) may be used to further exploit the huge transmission
capacity of optical fibres, or simply to use the same fibre for different communication systems by
“stacking” their optical transmitters onto the same fibre, each transmitter using a different
wavelength. More on the subject is found in chapter 4.4.1.1 and in [12].
As applied to protection signal transmission, either dedicated optical fibres from relay to relay
may be used, or the protection signal may be electrically or optically multiplexed with other
services, as shown in ANNEX A1, Figures A1-2 and A1-3. Whilst the installation of dedicated
optical fibre cables for the transmission of protection information would match the traditional
point-to-point approach and guarantee minimum signal transfer delays, it might not be easily
justified for cost reasons. However, the use of dedicated fibres is facilitated when the
incremental cost of extra fibres in a cable are low, or when “spare” fibres can be used. A more
economical means to achieve a certain isolation of the protection from other services and/or
systems is to perform the multiplexing at the optical level using WDM (Wavelength Division
Multiplexing), where only the optical fibre but not the terminal equipment is shared between
individual systems. More on the subject of WDM is found in chapter 4.4.1.1 and in [12].
Fibre optic communication systems are - with very few exceptions - realised as digital systems.
Since the optical fibre represents a wideband medium, a large number of channels and services
are usually combined into an aggregate by some form of time-division-multiplexing (TDM, see
Chapter 4.4.1.2). The aggregate digital bitstream finally modulates the optical transmitter (Laser
diode or LED) by switching it on and off in accordance with the data to be transmitted.
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Summary
Advantages and disadvantages of optical fibre links as related to protection signal transmission
are:
• Wideband medium, supports extremely • Many channels are lost when a high
high data rates capacity fiberoptic link fails
• Immune against electromagnetic • Repair is difficult when fibres are
interference from the primary system (at integrated into high voltage cables or
the optical level) OPGWs
• Immune against athmospheric interference • High installation cost when only moderate
• Perfect electrical isolation between link data rates are needed.
ends and between high-voltage euipment • Dedicated fibres for protection signal
and telecom equipment transmission may not be justified for cost
• No crosstalk between fibres reasons
• Normally extraordinarily low bit error rate • For long distances (> 200km) repeater
stations have to be used
• No earth potential rise problems
• Little influence by atmospheric conditions
• Fairly long repeaterless distances possible
(…..200km)
Table 4.3-4: Advantages and disadvantages of optical fibre links
4.3.5 Satellites
The race for satellite communication has been on ever since the announcement of pocket-sized
ground terminals to provide a truly global mobile telephone service. At present, there are many
different satellite systems that have been proposed to complement terrestrial communication
networks, all at varying developmental stages. Narrowband satellite systems which carry many
voice or low speed data channels - up to 9'600 bits per second - are more advanced in terms of
development than wideband systems supporting SDH and ATM (see Chapters 4.4.2.2, 4.5.1
and 4.6.2.2 on SDH and ATM). The reason is mainly due to new or more acute issues related to
creating broadband satellite links with QoS (Quality of Service) guarantees (ANNEX A3).
Projects have been launched worldwide to investigate the integration of terrestrial wideband
networks with satellite networks.
Satellites are usually classified according to the type of orbit they are in.
4.3.5.1 GEO - Geosynchronous Earth Orbit Satellites

GEO satellites are placed in the orbit such that their period of rotation exactly matches the
Earth’s rotation, i.e. they appear stationary from earth. Earth station antennas do therefore not
need to move once they have been properly aimed at a target satellite in the sky.
Today, the majority of satellites in orbit around the earth are positioned in GEO at 36’000 km
orbital height. It is at the precise distance of 36’000 km that a satellite can maintain an orbit with
a period of rotation exactly equal to 24 hours.
Due to the long distance of 36’000 km GEO satellites experience long up-down signal
propagation delays of about 250 ... 280 ms which normally excludes them from being used as a
communication medium for protection signal transmission, with perhaps few exceptions for
wide-area protection applications.
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4.3.5.2 MEO - Medium Earth Orbit Satellites

Technological innovations in space communications have led to new satellite system designs
over the past few years. MEO satellite systems have been proposed that will orbit at distances
of about 10’350 km. The lower distance as compared to GEO systems means improved signal
strength at the receiving antenna, which allows for smaller receiving terminals. The lower
distance also translates into less signal transmission delay of about 120 ms which leads to a
significant performance improvement for certain real-time applications such as voice
communication.
As applied to protection signal transmission the delay appears however still unacceptable for
most applications, with perhaps the exception of wide-area protection where requirements on
signal transfer times to remote locations that are distributed over a geographically widespread
area may be less stringent. Another problem is that signal interruptions of approximately 25
milliseconds duration are expected about every 2 hours when the signal is switched from one
satellite to the next: As the satellite descends towards the horizon, the traffic being serviced by
that satellite must be handed over to the satellite just ascending from the opposing horizon.
4.3.5.3 LEO - Low Earth Orbit Satellites

Proposed LEO satellite systems are divided into three categories: Little LEOs operating in the
800 MHz range, big LEOs operating in the 2 GHz or above range, and mega LEOs operating in
the 20 - 30 GHz range. The higher frequencies associated with mega LEOs translate into more
communication capacity and better performance for real-time applications. Present systems
support moderate data rates of up to 9’600 bit/s yet, with much higher data rates being targeted
for the near future. The orbital distance of LEO satellite systems is between 750 and 1500 km,
giving rise to signal up-down propagation delays of about 20 to 30 ms.
As applied to protection signal transmission the delay introduced by a single LEO satellite up-
down link may be acceptable for certain protection applications, provided that the extra delay
possibly introduced by relaying the signal between satellites plus the delay introduced by the
terrestrial section can be kept sufficiently low. It is noted that signal interruptions of 3 to 9
milliseconds duration are expected about every 8 to 12 minutes when the signal is switched
from one satellite to the next (roaming): as the satellite descends towards the horizon, the traffic
being serviced by that satellite must be handed over to the satellite just ascending from the
opposing horizon. Moreover, the signal propagation delay variation as the signals are routed
dynamically from satellite to satellite before reaching the terrestrial destination will require
further detailed investigation, before MEO and LEO satellite channels may eventually be used
for conveying protection signals.
LEO satellite systems may eventually become a communication alternative for certain protection
applications when signal transfer delay and reliability requirements are not very demanding.
Little experience seems to exist today in this area. There are still many open research issues
that need to be addressed before such systems can be used.
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Summary
Advantages and disadvantages of satellite links as related to protection signal transmission are:
• Coverage of geographically widely spread • High signal propagation delay

areas • Availability and reliability may not be
• Easy and fast deployment of ground adequate for protection
terminal stations • Subject to adverse atmospheric influence,
• Electrical isolation between terminals including lightning strokes and snow and
ice covering satellite dishes
• prohibitive costs for permanent
connections and/or high bandwidth
Table 4.3-5: Advantages and disadvantages of satellite links
4.4 MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUES AND DIGITAL HIERARCHIES
4.4.1 Multiplexing Techniques

Because of the installation cost of telecommunication systems, such as microwave radio or
optical fibre links, it is desirable to share the communication medium among multiple users or
multiple services. Multiplexing is the sharing of a communications medium through local
combining of signals at a common point. Multiplexing is thus a technique that is used to transmit
two or more signals over a shared medium. The reverse action of extracting the individual
signals from the aggregate at the receiving end is called demultiplexing.
Three basic types of multiplexing are commonly employed: frequency-division multiplexing
(FDM), time-division multiplexing (TDM) and code-division multiplexing (CDM).1
As there is a certain - although low - risk of accidental channel cross-over in multiplexed

systems, it is recommended that precautions are taken at the teleprotection side to prevent
unwanted operation of the protection. Robust synchronization procedures and/or terminal
equipment addressing2 may be used. The benefits of measures for improving the security have
however to be carefully balanced against their adverse influence on dependability.
4.4.1.1 Frequency Division Multiplexing (FDM)

With FDM, multiple channels or multiple services are combined onto a single aggregate by
frequency translating, or modulating, each of the individual signals onto a different carrier
frequency for transmission. The individual channels are thus separated in the aggregate by their
frequencies, i.e. each channel has its dedicated frequency slot. At the receiving end, the
reverse action of extracting the individual signals is accomplished by filtering. While each user's
1
Note on 'Multiplexing' and 'Multiple Access':
Both techniques deal with the sharing of a communication channel or a transmission medium among communication users. The
term 'multiplexing' is relevant for the sharing of a communication channel or medium through the local combining of signals at a
common point (signal aggregation or signal concentration). The three main multiplexing techniques are FDM, TDM, CDM.
'Multiple access' deals with the sharing of a common medium among terminal stations that are located at physically different
locations by mastering the medium access procedures. Similar to multiplexing, the three multiple access technologies are FDMA,
TDMA and CDMA respectively, which are widely used in radio communications.
2
Terminal addressing will also protect against protection maloperation when signals are (inadvertently) looped back for testing or
maintenance reasons.
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information signal may be either analog or digital, the combined FDM signal is inherently an
analog waveform. FDM is therefore primarily used with analogue transmission systems.
Wavelength Division Multiplexing (WDM)

With optical fibre systems, a special form of FDM called WDM (Wavelength Division
Multiplexing) is increasingly being introduced to further exploit the huge capacity of optical
fibres. Several transmission systems, each using a different wavelength or 'colour', may be
stacked onto the same fibre using WDM. In its simplest form, WDM uses different optical
windows for the multiplexing, e.g. the windows centred around 1300 nm and 1550 nm
wavelength. More sophisticated systems multiplex a number of optical channels (e.g. 4, 16, 32
or 64) within the same optical window centred around 1550 nm wavelength. As the spacing
between the different wavelengths becomes very narrow in this case, the technology is called
Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM). An in-depth treatment of WDM technology is
found in [12].
As WDM actually creates 'virtual fibres' it may also be employed for the de-coupling of
transmission systems from each other. Dedicated teleprotection links that operate quasi-isolated
from other telecom services could be realized using WDM for example: In Figure 4.4-1, system
1 consists of a protection relay with internal or external teleprotection function plus a fibre-optic
transmitter/receiver operating at wavelength λ1. System 2 could be any other fibre-optic
communication system operating at wavelength λ2 and carrying other services such as data and
voice. A failure or maloperation of System 2 should not adversely affect System 1, as the only
common parts of the two systems are the optical fibre and the passive optical wave-division
multiplexer / demultiplexer.
Although the isolation of the teleprotection from other services by means of WDM appears
attractive from an operational point of view, it may not be easily justified for cost reasons.
λ1 λ1
System 1 System 1
λ1+λ2
λ2 Optical fibre λ2
System 2 WDM WDM System 2
Figure 4.4-1: Principle of Wavelength Division Multiplexing for 2 wavelengths, 1
4.4.1.2 Time Division Multiplexing (TDM)

Multiplexing may also be conducted through the interleaving of time segments from different
signals onto a single shared transmission path. With TDM, multiple channels thus share the
common aggregate based on time. While TDM may be applied to either analog or digital
signals, in practice it is applied almost always to digital signals. The digital signals may be
interleaved bit-by-bit (bit interleaving), byte-by-byte (byte interleaving) or cell-based where data
is broken up into “cells” consisting of a number of bytes.
1
Figure 4.4-1 shows a simplex (i.e. unidirectional) communication for simplicity reasons. Full-duplex (i.e. bi-directional) operation
would require either a second fibre, or a 3rd and a 4th wavelength (λ3 and λ4 respectively) on the same fibre.
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Most modern telecommunication systems employ some form of TDM for transmission over long-
distance routes. The multiplexed signal may be sent 'directly' (called 'baseband' transmission)
over optical fibres, or it may be modulated onto a carrier signal for transmission over analogue
media, such as microwave radio or coaxial cables for example.
TDM can be split into various subclasses. The most important are Fixed TDM and Statistical
TDM.
Fixed TDM
In fixed TDM - sometimes also called synchronous TDM - each channel has its assigned
timeslot which sustains a fixed data rate and uses aggregate bandwidth irrespective of actual
user data being transmitted or not. The number of channels is normally equal to the number of
timeslots in a frame. Due to the fixed allocation of channels and timeslots, data can always be
transmitted. Buffering and flow control are not required. Continuous data flow at a fixed bit rate
without delay variations is ensured, a condition which is a prerequisite for protection signal
transmission.
Statistical TDM
Statistical - sometimes also called asynchronous TDM - multiplexers rely on the ‘bursty’ traffic
characteristics of certain information sources. Data may be transmitted in any timeslot as long
as there are free slots available. Relying on the statistics of the data, the number of channels or
the peak data rate which is supported by the statistical multiplexer may be larger than the total
number of timeslots or the aggregate data rate in a frame. Data buffering and flow control is
employed to store and withhold data until a free timeslot or free cells become available.
Buffering and flow control introduce extra delay as well as delay variations, and data may be
discarded in case of overload. Loss of information is normally not acceptable for protection
signal transmission. Statistical multiplexing has therefore to be avoided unless the required
quality of service is explicitly guaranteed.
A multiplexing technology which was originally intimately bound up with the emerging SDH
(Synchronous Digital Hierarchy, see 4.4.2.2) standards is ATM (Asynchronous Transfer Mode,
see also 4.5.2.3 and 4.6.2.2) which was conceived as a way in which arbitrary-bandwidth
communication channels could be provided within a multiplexing hierarchy consisting of a
defined set of fixed bandwidth channels. ATM multiplexers support both constant bit rate (CBR)
and variable bit rate (VBR) traffic, where CBR which basically emulates fixed TDM is a
prerequisite for today’s protection systems using telecommunication.
4.4.1.3 Code Division Multiplexing (CDM)

In CDM, several signals share a common medium (copper wires or radiowaves) using the same
frequency band simultaneously. Multiplexing of different channels is achieved by utilizing
different pseudorandom binary sequence codes that modulate a carrier. The process of
modulating the signal by the code sequence causes the power of the transmitted signal to be
spread over a larger bandwidth. Systems based on CDM are therefore sometimes also referred
to as 'Spread Spectrum' (SS) systems. The spreading of the spectrum enhances the noise
immunity of such systems.
CDM and in particular CDMA (code division multiple access) is mainly used with unlicensed
spread spectrum radio where many simultaneous users have to share the same frequency
band. CDM/SS techniques may also be used with wire-based systems to enhance the
transmission capacity and noise immunity. Its application for inter-substation communication
would however need to be further examined with respect to cost efficiency and transmission
performance.
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The use of unlicensed single channel CDMA/SS radio for the transmission of protection
commands for a 138 kV line has been reported from the USA. However, no practical
installations of CDM/SS technology for the transmission of protection signals over copper wires
have been reported. A final conclusion on CDM is not possible at the time of writing.
4.4.2 Digital Hierarchies

Digital transport systems form the backbone of modern telecommunication networks or wide-
area networks (WAN). As the demand for information transmission increased and levels of
traffic grew higher it became evident that larger number of channels need to be bundled in order
to avoid having to use excessively large number of individual physical links. Thus, it was
necessary to define further levels of multiplexing which are structured in Digital Hierarchies.
4.4.2.1 PDH - Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy
Multiplexing structure
Digital telecommunication systems have historically been based on the plesiochronous digital
hierarchy (PDH). PDH systems accommodate "almost synchronous" channels in multiples of 64
kbit/s. The base rate of 64 kbit/s represents the digital equivalent of an analogue telephone
channel using traditional, uncompressed PCM speech coding techniques. The PDH hierarchy
levels and transmission rates are given in Table 4.4-1 below.
Hierarchical level Europe North America Japan

0 64 kbit/s 64 kbit/s1 64 kbit/s1
1 2’048 kbit/s 1’544 kbit/s 1’544 kbit/s
Table 4.4-1: PDH - Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy levels
When multiplexing a number of digital signals with the same nominal bitrate they are likely to
have been created by different pieces of equipment each generating a slightly different bitrate
due to their independent internal clocks. A technique called “bit stuffing” is used for bringing the
individual signals up to the same rate prior to multiplexing. Dummy bits or justification bits are
inserted at the transmit side and discarded by the demultiplexer at the receiving end, leaving the
original signal. The same problem with rate alignment occurs at every level of the multiplexing
hierarchy. The process of multiplexing “almost synchronous” signals is called “plesiochronous”,
from Greek. The use of plesiochronous operation throughout the hierarchy has led to the
adoption of the term “Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy”.
Plesiochronous operation does not allow extracting and inserting individual channels from the
aggregate without prior demultiplexing and subsequent re-multiplexing, leaving towers of
multiplexers. With the exception of vendor specific solutions, network management and
performance monitoring throughout the hierarchy is not adequately supported with PDH
systems either, as PDH systems have developed over time with insufficient provision for
standardized management. These disadvantages have - amongst others - finally led to the
definition of a new digital transmission hierarchy: the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy.
1
Some (legacy) systems may provide only 56 kbit/s to the user.
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4.4.2.2 SDH - Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
Multiplexing structure
The rapid growth of digital networks and the convergence of telephone and high-speed data
networks have enforced the development of new standards, which would facilitate the
deployment of complex networks with new services and comprehensive network management
options. Proposals in ITU-T for a Broadband Integrated Services Digital Network (B-ISDN)
opened the door for a new synchronous multiplexing standard that would better support
switched broadband services. The new standard appeared first as SONET (Synchronous
Optical Network) in the United States. Initially, the objective of the SONET standard was to
establish a North American standard that would permit interworking of equipment from multiple
vendors (1985 …1987). Subsequently, the ITU-T (former CCITT) was approached with the goal
of migrating this proposal to a worldwide standard. Despite the considerable difficulties arising
from the historical differences between the North American and European digital hierarchies,
this goal was achieved with the adoption of the SDH (Synchronous Digital Hierarchy) standards
(1988). In synchronous networks, all multiplexing functions operate synchronously using clocks
derived from a common source.
SDH embraces most of SONET and is an international standard, but is often mistakenly
regarded an European standard, because most of its suppliers carry only the European PDH bit
rates specified by ETSI (European Telecommunication Standards Institute).
While there are commonalities between SDH and SONET, particularly at the higher rates, there
are significant differences at the lower multiplexing levels, in order to accommodate the
requirement of interworking the differing regional digital hierarchies. Through an appropriate
choice of options, a subset of SDH is compatible with a subset of SONET; therefore, traffic
interworking is possible. Interworking for alarms and performance management is however
generally not possible between SDH and SONET systems.
The ITU-T recommendations define a number of basic transmission rates within the SDH and
SONET, see table below, with further levels proposed for study.
SDH SONET
Max. number of
Synchronous Synchronous
Optical simultaneous voice
Transport Aggregate Rate Transport Signal Aggregate Rate
Carrier level channels
Module level level
(informative)
OC-1 STS-1 51.840 Mbit/s 783
STM-1 155.520 Mbit/s OC-3 STS-3 155.520 Mbit/s 2'349
STM-4 622.080 Mbit/s OC-12 STS-12 622.080 Mbit/s 9'396
STM-16 2’488.320 Mbit/s OC-48 STS-48 2’488.320 Mbit/s 37'584
STM-64 9’953.280 Mbit/s OC-192 STS-192 9’953.280 Mbit/s 150'336
Table 4.4-2: SDH - Synchronous Digital Hierarchy levels
The recommendations also define a multiplexing structure whereby an STM-N (Synchronous

Transport Module level N) or STS-N (Synchronous Transport Signal level N) aggregate can
carry a number of lower bitrate signals as payload, in order to facilitate the transport of legacy
PDH tributaries.
SDH / SONET are expected to dominate transmission for decades to come, as the multiplexing
structure has been designed to carry not only current services but also emerging ones using
ATM and/or IP framing structures for example.
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Although SONET and SDH were conceived originally for optical fibre transmission, SDH radio
systems exist at rates compatible with both SONET and SDH.
SDH/SONET network topologies and network resilience

A synchronous network will be more reliable than PDH due to both the increased reliability of
individual elements, and the more resilient structure of the whole network. SDH will allow
development of network topologies which will be able to achieve 'network protection', that is to
survive failures in the network by reconfiguring and maintaining service by alternate means.
Network protection can be accomplished by the use of cross-connect functionality to achieve
restoration, or through the use of self-healing ring architectures.
Two main types of synchronous ring architectures have been defined:

- The Dedicated Protection Ring - This is a dedicated path switched ring which sends
traffic both ways around the ring, and uses a protection switch mechanism to select the
alternate signal at the receive end upon failure detection.
- The Shared Protection Ring - This is a shared switched ring which is able to provide
'shared' protection capacity which is reserved all the way around the ring. In the event of
a failure, protection switches operate on both sides of the failure to route traffic through
the reserved spare capacity.
The ability to share protection capacity in shared protection rings can in many instances offer a
significant capacity advantage over dedicated protection rings. This means, in economic terms,
less equipment, lower cost and less operation efforts. However, this is at the expense of a
slower restoration time than a path switched ring.
Protection switching in a ring topology can be either "uni-directional" or "bi-directional". Uni-

directional means that only the faulted path is reverted along the ring by selecting the healthy
fibre at the receiving end, whilst the non-faulted path follows the original route.
With bi-directional protection both the go and return path are switched to follow the opposite
direction along the ring.
It is noted that only bi-directional protection will maintain equal signal propagation delays for the
go and return path, whilst uni-directional protection may introduce unequal propagation delays
that may cause severe difficulties for current differential protection relays!
The synchronous ring structure, with its inherent resilience, is a powerful building block from
which survivable networks can be built:
A typical power system control network has a radial (star) topology, with point-to-point links
connecting a central control station with associated substations. SDH/SONET network
implementations may connect the substations in rings. The logical star connection is achieved
by configuring the channels within the SDH/SONET network in order to provide the required
logical point-to-point links. In case of a path interruption, signal flow may be reversed along the
ring such that communication is sustained.
More about SDH network design and -operation is found in chapter 4.6.2.1 of this document.
SDH/SONET for power system protection

Since SDH/SONET networks provide a set of fixed bandwidth channels with a deterministic
transmission characteristic, they are well suited for applications that rely on the transmission of
a sustained fixed data rate and short signal transfer times, as needed by differential current
protection for example. As SDH/SONET signals follow a fixed physical path through the
network, SDH/SONET channels will exhibit a fixed transmission delay with low delay variations
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or "jitter" unless paths are re-routed automatically or manually due to network failures. Transmit
and receive directions may however still experience different signal propagation times when the
physical route does not follow the same path. Provisions to accommodate the non-equal signal
transfer times have to be built into the protection relay in this case, see also Chapter 6.3.1.1.
In conclusion, transport networks based on SDH/SONET technology can be designed to meet

the stringent requirements of legacy and future protection systems regarding signal transfer
times and error characteristics. Propagation velocity of the light pulses in optical fibres is around
200 km/ms, signal transfer delays between ports of an SDH/SONET node are typically well
below 1ms, and networks are designed to produce very low error rates (<< 10-6) under normal
operating conditions. Issues that are more critical to the operation of the protection scheme are
related to network management and network security, e.g., the impact of path re-routing on
transmission time variation and on circuit availability. These are however primarily matters of
network planning and network operation.
More about the subject on wideband transport technologies and networks can be found in [13]
and [2].
4.5 NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES

A Telecommunication Network is a set of communication and switching devices that work in a
collaborating way to provide a telecommunication service on access points distributed over a
wide area.
Depending on the geographical extension of the network, it can be classified into three groups:
- Local-Area Network (LAN). The users are geographically close together in the same
building or area.
- Metropolitan-Area Network (MAN). The users are located in a campus or a city that do
not cover a wide extension.
- Wide-Area Network (WAN). The users are located far apart over a region or one or
several countries. Network components are connected by means of communication
equipment. The largest WAN in operation today is the Internet which give service to
hundreds of million users all over the world.
WAN is the more complex type. LAN and MAN are simplifications of the general principles
included in WAN. Therefore, the following introduction to the general concepts of the networks
technologies will be focused on WAN.
Although the main network components are communication equipment and switching nodes,
which are the hardware devices of the network, software components that perform the
algorithms are the elements that define the final service performance.
Networking algorithms work in a distributed way in order to achieve a global service

performance. Nevertheless, the actual implementation of these algorithms is local so that every
switch performs its own task in a way that is collaborating with the task performed by the other
network components.
In order to achieve the best cost performance ratio, and so get a cost-effective approach,
networks are designed following a non-regular architecture. Although there are no general rules
that can apply to the architectural design, as it depends on the geographical distribution of the
users and on the type of services offered by the network, a network can be formed by two main
parts or layers: the transport network and the service network.
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S E R V IC E
ACCESS
P O IN T S
S E R V IC E
LAY ER
TRA NS PO RT
LAY ER
Figure 4.5-1: Network Architecture
The transport layer takes care of the communication between geographically separated sites
providing the transport service for the telecommunication service network and so connecting the
different parts of the whole service network.
Depending on the geographical distribution, the transport layer could form a mesh of channels
connecting different sites, or be reduced to the actual links that connect the switching nodes of
the service network.
The service layer performs all the necessary functions to offer the final service to the user. It is
formed by switching nodes connected by means of dedicated links or throug channels of the
transport network.
Service networks can be classified according to the technology on which they are implemented.
They can also be classified by the service they provide; nevertheless, this classification has
became obsolete due to fact that modern networks are designed to integrate a wide variety of
services.
Service networks could be structured, depending on the size and geographical distribution, in
access and core networks. The access network connects end-users to the closest core node
whereas the core network performs transit functions in order to set-up a connection between
access nodes thus establishing the final end-to-end connection.
Figure 4.5-2 shows the main components of a complete network. It can be seen that transport
functions are placed in the bottom layer as they provide the basic interconnection functionality
to the upper functions, the networking layer. This layer is formed by a set of functions that are
responsible for the delivering of the final service to the end user.
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NETWORK SERVICES
SIGNALLING
ADDRESSING
NETWORKING
SWITCHING
ROUTING
TRANSPORT
PDH/SDH
PHYSICAL MEDIA
Figure 4.5-2: Network components
There are four main functions included in the networking layer:
- Switching. A set of hardware and software components whose function is to establish

connections throughout a node.
- Routing. An algorithm and the related protocol whose function is to route calls or user’s
information that allow a call or the user’s information to be routed to its final destination.
- Addressing. A set of rules that allow unique and well-known identification to be
assigned to every user in the network.
- Signalling. A protocol that allows call-control and auxiliary information to be
interchanged among the nodes of the service network. Signalling services are used by
the other components of the networking layer in order to carry out a collaborating task
and achieve a global performance of the network service.
It is important to comment that these components should interact among themselves to offer the
final networking service so that every node of the service network has to be able to support
those functions and work in a collaborating way so that a global performance could be
achieved.
4.5.1 Transport Networks

Transport Networks are basically formed by communication links connecting different sites and
Cross-Connect equipment that establish fix connections across the nodes. These connections
allow information flows to be transported through several stations to the final destination.
These connections are established from the Management Centre and so cannot be controlled
by the final user. These permanent connections are usually devoted to link nodes of the service
network, though, they can also be used to interconnect any other device when networking
functionality is not required.
Out of the analogue transmission systems, which can form transport networks by means of
analogue transit connections, two main digital transport technologies, PDH and SDH can be
distinguished.
Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy PDH was the base of the former digital networks. PDH is a
mature technology that has been relegated, in modern networks, to access functions. It is based
on the Time Division Multiplexing TDM technique. This technique divides the capacity of a
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channel in equal shares among its users by assigning a part of the time to every user.
Synchronous Digital Hierarchy SDH is the newest transport technology. It is used for high
capacity transport applications, being the transport technology in which the Broadband ISDN (B-
ISDN) is based. See also chapter 4.4.2.
4.5.2 Service Networks

Service networks provide the final service to the user. The service that is offered by the
transport layer is used to interconnect the nodes that form the service network.
In 1978, the ISO (International Standards Organization) started the works to define an open
communication architecture. After ten years of works, the OSI (Open System Interconnection)
model was released. The OSI model defines a generic architecture for data communication
networks that due to its global and wide perspective is normally used to explain the operation of
communication networks.
Two types of systems have been defined in the OSI reference model: End-Systems and
Intermediate Systems.
An End-System is a terminal equipment that delivers the final service to the user. An
Intermediate System is a network device, which does not directly support users but forwards
received data towards the final destination. Intermediate systems do not need to understand the
information being sent between the users, but need to understand and possibly modify the
information added by the network to provide the communication.
End Systems may be directly connected, but more normally rely on the service provided by one
or more Intermediate Systems. Examples of intermediate systems are routers or network
switches.
The communications process between End systems and Intermediate systems is usually
defined in terms of the seven layers OSI reference model. In this reference model, shown on
Figure 4.5-3, intermediate systems handle only protocol information at and below the network
layer, whereas end systems use protocols at all the layers of the reference model.
Application Programs Application Programs
7 Application Layer Application Layer 7

6 Presentation Layer Presentation Layer 6
5 Session Layer Session Layer 5
4 Transport Layer Transport Layer 4
3 Network Layer 3 3 Network Layer 3
2 Data Link Layer 2 2 Data Link Layer 2
1 Physical Layer 1 1 Physical Layer 1
Medium Medium
Figure 4.5-3: Seven layer OSI model
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Every layer has a well-defined functionality and provides a service to the upper layer in the
model. The functions carried out by every one of the OSI model layers are:
1. Physical layer. The responsibility of the physical layer is to transmit unstructured bits of
information across a link. It deals with the physical aspects such as the shape of connector,
pin assignment, etc.
2. Data link layer. The responsibility of the data link layer is to transmit the information across a
link. It deals with error detection and correction, information alignment and addressing when
several system are reachable as in LANs or multipoint links.
3. Network Layer. The responsibility of the network layer is to enable the communication
between any pair of end system in the network. The network layer deals with the route
calculation function, congestion control, etc.
4. Transport layer. The responsibility of the transport layer is to establish a reliable
communication stream between a pair of End systems. It deals with the detection and
correction of the errors introduced by the network layer, such as packet lost or duplicated,
reordering of out-of-order information, etc.
5. Session layer. The responsibility of the session layer is to co-ordinate the way data are
transferred throughout the communication provided by the transport layer.
6. Presentation layer. The responsibility of the presentation layer is to adapt, when necessary,
the different internal data representation format used by the End system that are transferring
information.
7. Application layer. The responsibility of the application layer is to deliver the communication
service to the application that is using the service provided by the network.
Service networks can be implemented by using different technologies. Every technology in

general could be more suitable to offer some services. Since the design of modern network is
focused towards service integration, only those technologies that can be able to offer service
integration are being considered for future designs. Nevertheless, we are going to mention not
only future trends but also existing technologies owing to their capabilities to support the related
applications.
4.5.2.1 Circuit Switched Networks (POTS, ISDN)

Circuit switched networks are connection oriented networks. The establishment of a connection
requires a call set-up that chooses a path in the network in which the necessary resources to
support the connection are reserved.
Resources are allocated to a connection whilst this connection is maintained, even though they
were not used. Only when the connection is released will the resources be liberated.
Circuit switched networks can be based on analogue transport technology, on digital transport,
whether PDH or SDH, or on a mixed configuration. Due to the fact that a circuit of constant bit-
rate, usually 64 kbit/s, is used to support the connection, a deterministic delay performance is
achieved in the final service offered. On the other hand, since every connection established in
the network is based on the use of 64 kbit/s channels, when a connection is used for the
transmission of information with a lower bit-rate poor resource efficiency is obtained, unless
sub-multiplexing techniques are applied.
Narrow-Band ISDN is the ITU-T standard for Digital Circuit Switched Networks. Switched and
permanent connections can be established. The integration of services is limited to connection-
oriented constant bit-rate service types.
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4.5.2.2 Packet Switched Networks (X.25, Frame Relay)

Packet switched networks are connection-oriented networks. The establishment of a connection
requires a call set-up that chooses a path in the network in which the necessary resources to
support the connection are reserved. The difference with Circuit Switched Networks is that
network resources are shared by the users, that is to say, resources are only used when
needed. Thanks to this, a 64 kbit/s channel can be shared by several connections of lower bit-
rates.
This mechanism allows resource optimisation to be achieved at network level but, on the other
hand, a non-deterministic delay is obtained for every virtual connection due to the effect of
statistical multiplexing used in the network.
This type of networks offers packet-oriented services. It is not possible to obtain constant bit-
rate services due to the intrinsic non-deterministic delay of its transmission mode. They are
mainly used to interconnect computers as they offer data communication services.
X.25 and Frame-Relay networks are examples of this type of networks. They provide data
packet communication service primary used for LAN or Mainframe interconnections and data
network implementation.
4.5.2.3 Cell Switched Networks (ATM)

Asynchronous Transfer Mode is a very efficient switching technology that has been adopted by
the ITU-T as the base for the Broadband ISDN (B-ISDN) network.
B-ISDN is a connection-oriented network. Thanks to the use of ATM, any type of service such
as packet-oriented, circuit-oriented, constant bit-rate, variable bit-rate or even connectionless
can be integrated on the same network.
In ATM networks, the information is carried in cells. The cells follow the pre-established path in
the network. Cells are generated depending on the amount of information the user wants to
transmit. Resource optimisation is achieved as cells are generated only when some information
has to be transmitted, so that the network capacity is shared by the users, the total amount of
bandwidth required being lower due to the statistical multiplexing gain.
One of the new concepts introduced by ATM is the flexible bandwidth and QoS service
allocation, (see A3.2). It is possible for every user to set requirements on bandwidth, total End-
to-End delay and delay variation. Thanks to this, connections with fixed bandwidth and bounded
delay and delay variation can be defined in an ATM network. This possibility is used to offer the
Circuit Emulation Service (CES), [14]. The performance of a circuit emulated by an ATM
network is comparable to that experienced with current TDM technology.
CES offers structured DS1/E1 Nx64 kbit/s (Fractional DS1/E1, where a selected subset of the
32 channels from the entire frame are transmitted, i.e. N = 1…32) services as well as
unstructured DS1/E1 (2'048 kbit/s gross data rate, transparent bit-by-bit transmission)
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CBR
DTE IWF IWF DTE

ATM
Figure 4.5-4: Reference model of the Circuit Emulation Service (CES)
Figure 4.5-4 shows the reference model of the CES. We can distinguish three main
components: The Data Terminal Equipment (DTE), the Internet-Working Function (IWF) and the
ATM network. The DTEs are the actual users of the service, a protection relay or a
teleprotection equipment providing 64 kbit/s or N times 64 kbit/s for instance. The IWF provides
the conversion of the bit-stream generated by the users into cells and the reconstruction of the
original bit-stream at the reception side including timing recovery and jitter removal. This
function is usually embedded in the ATM access device. Finally, the ATM network should
provide a Constant Bit-Rate (CBR) virtual channel that should have been dimensioned with the
fixed bandwidth required to carry the bit-stream provided by the users.
When Nx64 kbit/s working mode is selected, cross-connect (DXC, Digital Cross-Connect)
functionality can also be provided, thereby being possible to deliver every single 64 kbit/s
channel to different locations in a similar way as PDH cross-connect devices do.
Since the CES has to offer quality performance similar to a PDH/SDH connection, it has to fulfil
the requirement of the related standards. Therefore, a CES has to comply with ANSI T1.403
and ITU-T G.824 for jitter and wander performance of digital networks that are based on the
1544kbit/s hierarchy, and ITU-T G.823 for networks that are based on the 2048 kbit/s digital
hierarchy, see also Table 4.4-1. Other facilities related with the data format and structure such
as framing, alarm transmission, loops, etc, should comply with the relevant standards already
applied to PDH/SDH connections.
The Bit Error Rate (BER) of the emulated channel should comply with the ITU-T G.826
recommendation for E1 (2048 kbit/s) and the ANSI T1.510-1994 for DS1 (1544 kbit/s), or ITU-T
G.821 for lower bit rates, e.g. 64 kbit/s.
CES could find a direct application to connect existing protection relays or digital teleprotection
equipment to ATM networks without the need of a specific implementation or external
adaptation devices. Nevertheless, no practical experience of using this approach has been
reported until the moment of writing this document.
4.5.2.4 Datagram Networks (IP)

The traditional network concept we have discussed so far is based on the circuit-switched
approach. Each connection is associated to a circuit that has resources allocated for its
exclusive use along a path. There is no uncertainty about the bandwidth or delay along this path
so the Quality of Service in terms of bandwidth and delay can be guaranteed.
Datagram networks have introduced a very different mode of operation. Network resources
(bandwidth, buffers, etc.) are statistically shared among their users. This presents many
advantages for computer communication applications, since data traffic tends to be bursty so
that resource reservation would lead to low utilisation levels. In datagram networks, data
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packets are delivered to the Network without any resource allocation, and the network exerts its
“best effort” to serve the packets.
Two different working modes can be distinguished in data networks, “Hop-by-Hop” control, used
in Virtual Circuit Networks and “End-to-End” control used in Datagram Network.
In the first approach, a connection is set up in the network, so that every intermediate system
involved in this connection change its internal state. Every node takes care of every packet and
guarantees its transmission towards its destination. This scheme suffers from a side effect
known as “fate-sharing”: The End-to-End connection depends on the state of all the
intermediate systems involved in this connection. If any of those systems fails, the connection
will be lost.
In the datagram approach, the End-to-End connection does not depend on the state of any one
of the intermediate systems of the network. If one of the intermediate systems fails, the
information will be routed using another path so that the final users will not be aware of this
change. This scheme increases the overall availability of the network with this effect being more
important for bigger networks.
In the End-to-End scheme, the responsibilities are shared between the network and its users.
The Network is responsible for the routing whereas the users are responsible for the control of
the communication. Thanks to this approach, the Datagram networks present an unmatchable
resilience level as well as the best resource optimisation. These characteristics make them
suitable for mission-critical applications such as most of the applications that can be found in
the Power Utility Control Network environment.
Datagram networks using IP (Internet Protocol) cannot assure the QoS as the network presents
a non-deterministic transmission delay. Then it cannot be applied to delay sensitive applications
such as teleprotection, unless some specific Quality of Service mechanisms were added in
order to guarantee bandwidth and/or delay. Refer to chapter A3.3 in ANNEX A3.
The great flexibility of this type of networks makes them suitable for service integration.
Although they cannot intrinsically offer a constant bit-rate service, thanks to a new application
protocol that has been defined (Real-time protocol) it is possible to eliminate the delay variation
at the application level. However this comes at the expense of an additional delay that may not
be acceptable for protection.
4.5.3 Local Area Networks

The Local Area Network (LAN), is by far the most common type of data network. As the name
suggests, a LAN serves a local area (typically the area of a floor or a building). Typical
installations are in industrial plants including substations, office buildings, college or university
campuses, etc. In these locations, it is feasible for the owning organisation to install high quality,
high-speed communication links inter-connecting nodes. Typical data transmission speeds
ranges from 10 to 1000 Megabits per second.
In summary, a LAN is a communication network that can be characterised by the following facts:
- It is local. Geographically limited to one or several buildings

- It has multiple systems attached to a shared medium
- It offers high total bandwidth that is shared by the users
- Limited number of users (hundreds)
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- Low delay and low error rate

- Intrinsic Broadcast capabilities
The following characteristics differentiate existing LAN technologies:
- Topology: The way network devices are connected. Straight-line bus, ring, and star are
the most common arrangements.
- Protocols and media contention: The rules and encoding specifications for data
interchange and for the administration of the shared medium.
- Physical media: Devices can be connected by twisted-pair cable, coaxial cable, fibre or
wireless.
4.5.3.1 Topology
As shown in Figure 4.5-5, there are three basic topologies used in LANs:
- Bus topology. All devices are connected to a central cable, called the bus or backbone.
Bus networks are relatively inexpensive and easy to install for small networks.
- Ring topology. All devices are connected to one another in the shape of a closed loop,
so that each device is connected directly to two other devices, one on either side of it.
Ring topologies are relatively expensive and difficult to install and maintain, but they
offer higher bandwidth than bus topology and can span large distances.
- Star Topology. All devices are connected to a central hub. Star networks are relatively
easy to install and manage, but bottlenecks can occur because all data must pass
through the hub.
S ta r
R in g
B us
Figure 4.5-5: LAN Topologies
The market trend in terms of topology is going towards the star topology since both hubs and
switches have enough capacity to cope with all the traffic that can be generated in a LAN. Star
topology has been adopted to support internal substation communication in the new UCA
architecture.
Bus topology is a cost-effective solution for small LANs but due to the fact that is less reliable
than star topology, it is not recommended for substation applications.
Although ring topology is conceptually the best approach, its lack of flexibility and scalability has
put it aside of the main innovative applications though still maintains a considerable market
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share.
4.5.3.2 Media Contention and Protocols

LANs are based on the use of a shared medium to connect all the users. In this environment,
only one user can transmit at a time. Some mechanism must therefore exist to allocate
bandwidth among users in such a way that:
- Each user gets a fair share of the bandwidth
- Each user gains access to the medium within a reasonable amount of time
- The bandwidth used for arbitration be minimized.
The two most popular bandwidth arbitration mechanisms used on LANs are token schemes and
contention schemes.
In a token scheme, a user can send a piece of information when it has the token. The token is
circulated from user to user.
In a contention scheme, every user can send at will when it sees the channel in idle condition.
When two or more users transmit at the same time a “collision” occurs. This situation is resolved
by means of contention mechanisms that have a probabilistically fair behavior.
The CSMA/CD (Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection) working principle which
is used by the Ethernet LANs has proved to be the most efficient and flexible contention
scheme able to adapt to different speeds and physical media.
Every different aspect of LAN networks, from physical specifications to protocols, has been
developed by the IEEE 802 committee and later adopted by international standardization
bodies. Protocols involved in the data interchange in LANs are confined to the OSI data link
layer. Figure 4.5-6 shows the protocol stack of the Ethernet LAN and its relation with the OSI 7
layers reference model. The 100 Mbit/s Ethernet protocol stack has been shown since this is the
standard adopted for the internal substation communication.
OSI IEEE
7- Layer CSMA/CD
reference Model
Model
Application
Higher Layers
Presentation
Logical Link Control
Session LLC
Media Access Control
Transport MAC
RS
Network
Media Independent
Data Link Interface MII
Physical
Physical Media
100 Mbit/s
Figure 4.5-6: LAN protocol layering
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The definition of an intermediate media independent interface simplifies the adaptation to

different physical media. The most relevant physical interfaces used in the substation
environment are:
- 100BASE-TX that uses a 2 pairs UTP (Unshielded Twisted Pairs) category 5 cable in a
point-to-point arrangement (Star topology)
- 100BASE-FX that uses an optical fibre (2 strands) in a point-to-point arrangement (Star
topology)
4.5.3.3 Advanced topologies

LANs offer a set of advantages that make them very attractive for local communication
provision. They are a cost-effective solution that can carry any type of network protocol, even
work without network layer protocol, providing high bandwidth to the users.
Due to this, it is very appealing to extend its range of application. Nevertheless, this is not
always possible since LANs have also certain limitations:
- The number of users that can be connected in a LAN segment is limited.
- The geographical expansion of a LAN is limited.
- The amount of traffic that can be carried is limited.
To overcome these limitations, devices like repeaters, bridges and Ethernet switches have been
designed. They allow several LANs to be interconnected thereby becoming a single LAN from
the point of view of the users without the above mentioned limitations.
The typical functionality of the devices that allow LAN topology expansion is:
- Repeater. A network device used to regenerate or replicate a signal. Repeaters are

used to regenerate the signal distorted by the physical media. A repeater can relay
messages between subnetworks that use different protocols or cable types. A repeater
cannot do any kind of intelligent routing performed by other devices like Switches,
Bridges or routers.
- Hub. A common connection point for devices in a LAN. It is the centre of a LAN with star
topology. A hub contains multiple ports. When a packet arrives at one port, it is copied to
the other ports so that all segments of the LAN can see all packets.
- Bridge. A device which connects two or more LANs. The two LANs being connected
can be alike or dissimilar. For example, a bridge can connect an Ethernet with a Token-
Ring network.
There are several type of bridges, the most common being the “learning bridges”. This
type of bridge is able to learn where every user is placed and forward the packets to the
port where the final user is connected. When they are connected in a meshed network
with some loops on it, a very simple routing scheme, the spanning tree algorithm, allows
loops to be avoided and therefore packets are forwarded to the final destination using
the shortest path. It has to be mentioned that this very simple routing scheme function is
carried out by the Data Link Layer without any kind of relation with the routing protocols
that can be included in the network layer to cross the WAN. Thanks to the Data Link
Layer Routing the information is forward to the final user inside our own network but it
cannot be used to reach users of other networks.
- Ethernet Switch (Switched Hub). This is a device with a similar functionality to a
Bridge but with much more capacity and a wider range of extra functions. Most Ethernet
switches support the Virtual LAN functionality defined in the IEEE 802.1Q standard. One
of the most relevant functions included in this specification is the virtual LAN definition,
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that is to say, a group of users connected in any physical LAN segment can be logically
associated so that they work as if they were connected in a single LAN segment with
broadcast functionality. Between different Virtual LAN segments attached to the same
device, bridging functionality is provided.
Most of the off-the-shelf LAN access/control devices include Hub, Bridging and Switching
functions. These devices allow the network manager to define several virtual LANs that share
the same physical infrastructure and set when hub-, bridging- or switching functions have to be
used in order to optimize the LAN performance. When the LAN serves a site of a Wide Area
Network, routing functionality can also be included in most of these devices, being then possible
to forward packets to any other site of the same Wide Area Network.
4.6 NETWORK DESIGN AND OPERATION
4.6.1 Introduction
Protection devices that operate over the same power line or subsystem require communication
to improve their protection capabilities. The telecommunication service supporting protection
communication should comply with a set of tough requirements.
The main requirements that are considered in the definition of a Telecommunication service for
Protection can be expressed with three concepts: Transmission time, Dependability and
Security.
Transmission time is the time required by a signal to propagate along the path that provides
communication between the protection devices. This delay corresponds to the addition of the
delays introduced by every component of the path, that is, the propagation delay of every link
involved in the path and the transit delay of every cross-connect or switch that establish the
communication path. Refer also to ANNEX A1, Figure A1-5.
IEC 60834-1 states that the propagation delay introduced by the communication circuit should
be less than 5 milliseconds, see Figure A1-5 in ANNEX A1. This delay is the addition of the
delays introduced by every link or node involved in the communication path. It should be
highlighted that those networks that introduce a variable delay in the information, such as IP
datagram or ATM networks, should be engineered to assure the maximum delay instead of the
typical engineering approach that works with the mean delay of the information.
In order to design the network architecture, any possible communication path used to transport
protection information should be analysed in order to verify if it complies with the End-to-End
delay required by the protection scheme that is going to use this path.
Some protection schemes, such as Differential Current Protection, require a symmetrical delay
for the go- and return direction in the communication path. This requirement should be
considered in the design of the network in order to avoid the use of asymmetrical paths as they
present different propagation delay in each direction.
Security performance of a protection scheme is generally related to the Bit Error Rate (BER) of
the channel that communicates the protection systems. It is assumed that the design of the links
used for any type of application is carried out in accordance to the ITU-T recommendations and
so the expected performance in terms of BER will be always in the working limits under normal
operating conditions.
Dependability is related to the BER and the signal propagation delay of the channel. Assuming
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that the digital path supporting the protection communication complies with the ITU-T standards
for the Quality of Service of digital connections the dependability will depend on the
performance of the protocol used by the protection communication device (i.e. teleprotection
function).
Availability of a communication path can be defined as the ability of this path to perform its
required function at any instant of time within a given time interval, assuming that the external
resources, if required, are provided. It can be expressed as:
MUT
A=
MDT + MUT
Where MDT is the Mean Down Time and MUT is the Mean Up Time.
In general, it is widely accepted that the availability objective for a Telecommunication Service
for protection should reach the 99,99%. This availability level, as can be seen from the above-
mentioned expression, is quite difficult to achieve with a single link so that a back-up link should
be considered.
When a network implements the communication path, other protection measures can be
included in order to improve the availability of the service without devoting several links for
every protection device. Among these protection measures such as recovery or self-healing
mechanisms are the more relevant issues to be considered. When these protection procedures
are implemented in a network, other functional components such as routing and addressing
should also be analyzed in order to prevent collateral effects that could affect the protection
service performance.
Out of the above mentioned concepts directly related with the protection service, there are other
requirements at the network level that should also be studied as they can influence the
protection service operation.
Service isolation and service prioritization facility is another important issue to be considered
in the design of a network for protection communication:
Modern digital networks are used to integrate different types of services. This is a common
practice in transport networks as the aggregation of different traffic services allows a more
efficient use of high capacity links such as fibre-optic cables or microwave radio links.
Integration of services implies that different users are sharing the network resources. Under
these conditions, the network should provide mechanisms in order to guarantee the isolation
among different users. By providing this, every user has a guarantee of use of their assigned
resources and so it can expect a guaranteed level of availability.
On the other hand, networks integrating mission-critical services should provide a priority
mechanism that allows the implementation of different availability levels. The priority mechanism
should guarantee that in case of lack of resources due to an outage situation or network
congestion, the service with a higher priority will always be able to use the remaining network
resources and so maintain the expected service availability.
Network Security is a very important aspect to be considered in the design of a network that
offers communication service to protection applications:
Network Security includes different aspects that all together provide the necessary means for
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secure and reliable operation of the network. The goal of the security functions is to assure that
any other user of the network cannot interfere with, by any means, the proper operation of the
protection system. That is to say, the network should withstand any security attack coming from
any other user of the network whether on purpose or by mistake.
The security aspects of the Network Management Centre are standardized by the ITU-T and the
ISO. The operational details are discussed later in this chapter.
Among others, it should be mentioned the implementation of checking procedures to assure

that the parties connected by a path belong to the same “type of user” such as protection
devices of the same electrical subsystem, etc. This procedure could prevent a wrong
establishment of connections. The control of misconnection or misinsertion of information due to
a failure in any network component is also a relevant functionality.
4.6.2 Technological considerations

The design of a network that supports teleprotection service should be carried out taking into
account the specific requirement of the protection scheme. The solution adopted will depend on
the networking technology that supports this service. Different technologies are analyzed in
order to identify advantages and specific considerations that should be considered in the
design.
4.6.2.1 PDH/SDH Networks

Transport Networks are used to transfer signal between different access points. These networks
are based on permanent dedicated circuits multiplexed over higher capacity communication
trunks.
PDH and SDH are the basic technologies used in transport networks, see also Chapter 4.4.2.
Both technologies are based on the Time Division Multiplexing technique, see 4.4.1.2. Thanks
to this, they present a deterministic and relatively low transmission delay. Apart from changing
signal transfer delays due to route switching, their use for most of the protection schemes do not
pose any problem as the transmission delay is low in comparison with most of the protection
requirements.
The use of a fixed connection established over a PDH or SDH network for the communication of
two protection devices does not present any type of drawback as the incremental delay
compared with a direct link is very low. On the other hand, as we have seen before, in order to
achieve the availability level requested for this type of service we have to implement some type
of recovery mechanism in the network that allows the use of an alternative path when the main
path fails. See also 4.4.2.2 on network resilience of SDH networks.
The BER of a digital connection established in a PDH/SDH network is normally very low and so
it will not have any effect on the Security and Dependability of the protection scheme that uses
this path. Nevertheless, the quality of the path can be affected by the synchronization of the
network or may be adversely affected by a power system fault due to EMI (Electromagnetic
Interference).
The implementation of a good network synchronization plan is very important to achieve the
transmission quality levels expected in this type of networks. A poor synchronization scheme
will lead to signal slips that produce error bursts that increment the BER of the digital path
leading to a poor transmission quality or loss of signal. This effect can disturb the proper
protection scheme operation. It can be relevant for Current Differential Protection schemes
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since a slip can be seen as a sudden phase change in an analogue signal.
SDH transport networks uses a pointer mechanism to indicate the phase of the information
inside the main information frame. Changes in phase leads to pointer adjustments that if
mishandled can produce sudden phase changes in the transported signals that have a similar
effect to the above mentioned slips.
The implementation of recovery or Self-Healing mechanism in a PDH network is based on

proprietary solutions. A careful analysis of these algorithms should be carried out in order to find
out if it is possible to control the routing of the alternative path and so limit its length. A sudden
increment in the number of hops of a path will present a considerable increase in the total delay
of the transport path. Uncontrolled changes in delay can disturb the proper operation of certain
types of protection schemes such as Differential Current Protection. In any case it should be
analysed that any of the main or back-up path do not present an End-to-End propagation delay
greater than 5 …8 ms or whatever the particular protection relay can tolerate.
Recovery mechanisms in SDH network are fully standardised. There are two basic mechanisms
that could be applied to improve the overall availability of the transport Network, the Multiplexer
Section Protection and the Path Protection.
Multiplexer Section Protection is a straightforward method that protects the connection between
two nodes by adding back-up links. In order to achieve a full coverage in the protection both
links should use physically diverse routes.
Path Protection Mechanism protects the End-to-End connection of the final users over the
transport network. This method has proved to be very efficient in small ring configurations, but it
presents a serious drawback for certain types of protection schemes such as Current
Differential due to the fact that the back-up path can be configured with an asymmetrical layout
that leads to an asymmetrical delay. This effect together with a possible sudden change in delay
due to a different back-up path length will drive to erroneous protection actuation.
Both methods present a poor bandwidth utilisation as the amount of traffic that should be
protected requires the same back-up capacity reserved in the network even though not all of
them will fail at the same time.
More about SDH network resilience is found in Chapter 4.4.2.2.
PDH/SDH presents intrinsic service isolation and security. Due to the fact that these networks
are based on the TDM technique and no signalling is available in a transport network, it is not
possible for a user to attack another connection. The only point in which security measures
should be considered is in the Control Centre.
4.6.2.2 ATM Networks

ATM technology, which is based on statistical multiplexing technique, is a very efficient
connection-oriented switching technology that can also offer a transport service with a
guaranteed QoS (Quality of Service). Among the parameters that specify the quality of a
connection are the End-to-End delay and the BER.
ATM technology is an appealing solution for protection communications as long as it is possible

for a user to specify the overall QoS requirements.
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The BER in an ATM link depends only on the characteristics of the physical media used as no
error detection or correction techniques are applied to the user data ( = payload). Nevertheless,
the BER could be considered as negligible due to the wide use of highly reliable links, mainly
based on fibre-optics.
However, the BER experienced by the protection service will be affected by the Cell Loss Rate
CLR (a QoS parameter, see A3.2 in ANNEX A1), which depends on the scheduling, and Call
Admission Control (CAC) algorithms used in the network.
The use of ATM networks to communicate protection devices requires a careful analysis of the
End-to-End delay of the service. The performance of an ATM connection in terms of delay
depends on the cell scheduling policy in the switches as well as on the Call Admission Control
algorithms implemented in the network. It is important to find out if the scheduling algorithms of
the switches are able to isolate protection information from the rest of the traffic of the network,
so that the possible interference among different traffic flows that could drive to an uncontrolled
End-to-End delay can be prevented.
Network topology should be designed taking into account the availability of low-delay
communication paths between protection devices. Routing algorithms should also be analyzed
in order to find out if they implement QoS routing. This facility is a necessary piece to guarantee
an End-to-End bounded delay.
The availability of the protection communication service can be improved if the network
implements some recovery mechanism that can use the spare capacity of the network.
Recovery mechanisms are under standardization process in the ATM-Forum. The great
advantage of ATM networks is that they can choose the back-up route in function of the QoS
requested by the service user. Thanks to this, the back-up path will always comply with the
requested End-to-End delay. The design of the network should take into account that in order to
protect the communication path used by the protection service the network must have some
spare capacity, and the topology design must include some physically disjointed routes with low
transmission delay.
Synchronization is not a critical issue in ATM networks. As they work in asynchronous mode,
the synchronization is carried out at link level and no synchronization plan is needed for the
whole ATM network. Nevertheless, the transport of Constant Bit Rate (CBR) signals and the
interconnection of PDH/SDH network throughout ATM network using the Circuit Emulation
Service (CES) requires a clock synchronization plan to be deployed.
Due to the fact that ATM networks are based on statistical multiplexing, the emulation of a
transmission circuit will require the following aspects to be taken into account:
- Total end-to-end delay has to be limited

- Jitter and wander have to be limited according to transmission standards
- Clocking facilities have to be provided to support the network synchronization plan
The two former requirements are achieved by the proper ATM service specification whereas the
last one is not under the control of the ATM network.
Jitter and wander reduction as well as clocking facilities will have to be provided by the Inter-
Networking Function (IWF), see Figure 4.5-4.
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Two clocking modes can be used:
- Synchronous mode in which timing is supplied by the IWF

- Asynchronous mode in which timing is supplied by the user (DTE)
Since the ATM network cannot transmit timing information suitable for network synchronization,
the IWF has to include the clock recovery functions. There are two methods to recover clock
information: the Synchronous Residual Time Stamp (SRTP) and the Adaptive Clock.
SRTP requires a common reference clock to be available at every access point of the ATM
network providing a transport service, whereas the adaptive method does not require any
external clock. Due to this fact, some wander may be introduced by the adaptive method
thereby not being recommended to use it in emulation of circuits that support the
communication of analog comparison protection devices.
The ATM Forum and the ITU-T have standardized this service. In the network design phase, the
synchronization plan should be carefully analyzed; taken into account that ATM network should
not be used to transport timing references and therefore, a network-wide reference clock will
have to be provided.
ATM networks present intrinsic service isolation. Every different service integrated in an ATM
network is based on a Virtual network; this network is formed by a set of Virtual Paths (VP).
Cells belonging to a VP cannot be delivered by any means to another VP.
Flow isolation in the same virtual network is also an intrinsic characteristic of ATM networks.
Cells belonging to a due flow are identified by a particular Virtual Connection Identifier. These
cells cannot be delivered by any means to another connection.
Security aspects in ATM networks should be considered in the design phase in order to
guaranteed the integrity of the Protection information transported by the network. Despite the
tremendous complexity involved, the signalling network can be used to perform a malicious
attack disturbing the proper operation of any service if no counterpart measures are
implemented. The ATM Forum is defining a common framework of security in ATM networks.
This work will produce a set of standards that will improve the security and offer robust
protection to any external security attacks.
4.6.2.3 IP Networks
IP networks are packet switched networks that work in Datagram mode. The End-to-End
connection does not depend on the state of any one of the intermediate systems of the network.
If one of the intermediate systems fail, the information will be routed using another path so that
the final users will not be aware of this change. This scheme dramatically increases the overall
availability of the network, however at the expense of a non-deterministic delay.
Due to the fact that IP networks are based on statistical multiplexing and network access
techniques, they present a non-deterministic delay.
The quality of service, in terms of delay and packet loss, depends not only on the network
working principles but also on the offered traffic load. In the actual network implementations, the
End-to-End delay is not guaranteed. Nevertheless, if the network has been properly engineered
and includes a priority scheme, the delay experienced by the information with higher priority can
be limited to an acceptable value. In this way, the protection information flow is isolated from the
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rest of the users and is not affected by traffic overloads.
The IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force, an international institution developing standards for
the internet) is working on the standardization of a new signaling protocol - RSVP - that will
allow the implementation of real-time services over IP networks. This new facility will open the
possibility of offering services with guaranteed End-to-End bounded delays.
IP networks present an intrinsic survivability. As far as a path exist between the users the
communication will be maintained. There is no need for any specific recovery mechanism but
the network should be designed with some spare capacity in order to maintain all the services in
operation in the event of an outage situation.
IP networks do not provide any type of synchronization of the flows that are being transported.
Applications that require this functionality should use specific synchronization protocols such as
Real-Time Protocol (RTP) that is embedded into the application and provides the timing
recovery functionality. The application of such type of protocols for delay sensitive protection
schemes should be very carefully analyzed in order to find out if the resolution and precision of
this type of protocols fulfil the operational requirement of this type of protection scheme.
An IP network presents intrinsic service isolation. In general, every application that uses the
network services, such as protection, is associated to a port number of an IP address. The IP
address range could identify the service whereas the port number identifies the flow. If the
addressing scheme of the private IP network has been properly defined and static IP address
allocation is implemented every service is unequivocally identified by a fixed IP address range.
In this situation, there is little risk that information belonging to a due application could be
delivered to another application in the network.
IP networks present an intrinsic network security due to its working mode. In a Datagram
network, it is not possible for a user to know the physical path that will be used by the
information. In fact, every datagram can follow a different path in the network so no specific
measures are needed to prevent security attacks at network level.
Although the network is intrinsically secure, the applications using the network are not protected
at all. It should be analyzed if some security measures have to be taken into account in the
network design to protect certain types of critical applications such as the one that supports
protection service.
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5 TELEPROTECTION INTERFACES
Four types of interfaces are commonly used for protection relaying:
- Contact based interfaces
- Analogue interfaces
- Electrical serial data interfaces
- Optical fibre interfaces
In the near future, Ethernet interfaces will likely be introduced. not only for intra-station
communication using LANs, but also for inter-station communication across a WAN.
The type of interface depends strongly on whether the teleprotection device is a separate
equipment or whether it is an integrated function of the protection relay. Little has been done in
the standardization area in respect of surge protection of copper-based Ethernet/LAN circuits
that operate in the electromagnetic hostile environment of power stations and substations, as
this technology has mainly been deployed in the office environment.
Interface co-ordination has to be ensured regarding:

- Type of interface (applicable standard)
- Data rate (digital) or bandwidth (analog)
- Signals to be used
- Signal flow direction
- Electrical insulation requirements
- EMC requirements
- Cable screening and signal ground connections
- Connector design and pin/signal allocation
And in particular for digital circuits:
- Clock provisioning for synchronous operation
- Low level data formats (asynchronous data format, synchronous operation)
- Data flow control
Unless all interface parameters are properly co-ordinated between devices, proper operation of
the protection scheme cannot be expected. The checklist in chapter 7.2.2 may serve as a
guideline.
5.1 CONTACT INTERFACES

This is an interface of type (a) in Figure A1-1 to A1-5 in ANNEX A1.
Contact interfaces are typically used to connect protection relays to teleprotection equipment in
traditional state comparison or intertripping schemes. The sender closes a contact to initiate
operation and applies the station battery voltage (110VDC to 250VDC) or an auxiliary voltage to
the receiving input circuit (typically a relay coil, opto-coupler or transistor input).
Contact based protection relays/schemes have so far been the only ones which are inter-
operable and support multi-vendor platforms. For example, distance relays of different
manufacturers have been used to protect power lines using simple contact interfaces between
the protective relay and the teleprotection equipment. The advantage of the contact interface is
its simplicity and robustness. Its disadvantage is that its application is limited to binary trip/do
not trip command transmission, and the need for a separate teleprotection equipment external
to the protection relay.
EMC and insulation requirements for contact interfaces are found in [27].
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5.2 ANALOG INTERFACES
5.2.1 Pilot-wires (50/60Hz)

This is an interface of type (a) in Figure A1-1 to A1-5 in ANNEX A1.
The connection is copper wires (2, 3 or 4) to the pilot-wire terminals on the pilot-wire relay. The
signals are 50 or 60 Hz sinusoids, with transients during fault conditions. The levels and
impedances do not conform to any standards, being proprietary to the various vendors of pilot-
wire relays. Peak voltages of 20 to 150 volts are typical. The pilot-wire interface must withstand
fast transient surges as well as longitudinal induced voltages at power frequency. Insulation
voltages of 5kVrms to 10kVrms at power frequency are typically required.
As this type of interface won't be used for new designs, it is unlikely that standards will ever be
developed for pilot-wire interfaces.
5.2.2 Voice frequency circuits (2-wire/4-wire)

This is an interface of type (b) in Figure A1-1 to A1-5 in ANNEX A1.
The connection is copper wire pairs to the VF (Voice Frequency) terminals on the teleprotection
equipment. The signals comprise typically the sum of several 300 to 3400 Hz sinusoidal tones,
each being (usually) frequency-modulated with the information being conveyed. The impedance
is normally 600 Ohms balanced.
The signal levels should be set as high as possible without overload or causing near-end
crosstalk, generally 0 to –10 dBm (1mW to 0.1mW) per tone. When using rented circuits,
maximum permitted levels may be subject to national regulations or to requirements from the
circuit provider.
EMC and insulation requirements are defined in IEC 60834-1 [27].
5.3 DIGITAL DATA INTERFACES
5.3.1 Electrical interfaces

When the teleprotection function is integrated in the protection relay, the interface circuit to the
telecommunication system is normally accomplished by means of a serial data interface of type
(b) in the Figures of ANNEX A1. The serial interfaces shall comply with international standards
for data communication. They have however to be enhanced with surge protective circuits to
prevent damage.
Commonly used interface types are shown in Table 5.3-1. An in-depth treatment of these
interfaces regarding their application to protection is found in [2]. With the exception of the
G.703 interface, serial interfaces are normally not electrically isolated from ground or from each
other in case of multiple interface circuits. A special design to provide electrical isolation from
ground and between interface circuits may be requested, as these circuits are installed in the
electromagnetic hostile environment of power stations and substations with inherent risks of
ground loops and strong EMI, in particular during fault incidents.
EMC and insulation requirements are found in [27], [28].
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Data rate Electrical

ITU-T EIA Operating mode
(typical) isolation
Not part of the
standard;
V.24/V.28 RS 232c/d/e up to 38.4kbit/s Electrical isolation
requires special
design
asynchronous
Not part of the
standard;
RS 422a
V.11 up to 38.4kbit/s Electrical isolation
requires special
design
Not part of the
standard;
------ RS 485 up to 38.4kbit/s Electrical isolation
requires special
design
Not part of the
standard;
------ RS232c/d/e up to 38.4kbit/s Electrical isolation
requires special
design
Not part of the
up to 64kbit/s
standard;
synchronous
RS 422a or
V.11/X.24 Electrical isolation
n*64kbit/s
requires special
(n=1...32)
design
Not part of the
up to 64kbit/s
standard;
or
RS 485 Electrical isolation
n*64kbit/s
requires special
(n=1...32)
design
G.703 n*64kbit/s;
----- yes
co-directional n=1…32
Table 5.3-1: Serial data interfaces
5.3.2 Optical fibre interfaces

Optical fibre interfaces are normally of type (b) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 in ANNEX A1. Optical
fibres provide perfect electrical isolation between units and are immune against electromagnetic
interference. Standards exist for optical fibre connectors and optical fibres, and also for the
interfaces to optical LANs and high capacity SDH communication systems, see for example
chapter 4.4.2.2. However, due to the lack of standards for protocols and low level data formats
in the area of low-speed fibre-optic communication, optical fibre interfaces for interface (b) in
ANNEX A1 have so far all been proprietary.1
Optical fibre interfaces may be used for:
- Direct fibre connections between protective relays
- Fibre connections between the protective relay and the telecommunication system
(typically a multiplexer)
- Fibre connections between the teleprotection equipment and the telecommunication
system
Electro-optical (E/O) converters may be required as intermediate devices between proprietary

optical fibre interfaces and serial electrical interfaces in a multi-vendor environment. The
development of integrated substation control and protection schemes has accelerated the need
1
The IEEE is presently (2000) developing a standard for nx64kbit/s relay-to-multiplexer communication.
The German VDE is presently (2000) developing a DIN/VDE standard for protection relay communication protocols.
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to find suitable methods of providing noise immune methods of interconnecting services and
providing power supplies to the interface converter units within the substation environment.
Many electro-optical converters and DC power filters are available and offer advanced solutions
to the well-known problems experienced by protection and telecommunication engineers. The
majority of the units are proprietary and are only compliant when used in conjunction with the
approved proprietary protection solutions.
It is essential that the convergence of Substation control and Protection philosophies address
the need to have common international standards for protocols and interfaces to meet the
needs of standard substation network build.
5.3.3 LAN / Ethernet interfaces

Local Area Networks are increasingly deployed in HV substation for intra-station
communication. They have become a widely used technology for the implementation of the
communications required by the local substation control and other auxiliary functions. With the
advent of the new UCA (Utility Communications Architecture), being standardized by IEC
61850, new and more advanced functions have been added to this local communication
interface being not only used for local control but also to support telecontrol and protection
communications. Furthermore, its field of applications has been extended from the
communication room or the control building to the bay level and switchyard.
Although there are several LAN technologies as explained in Chapter 4.5.3, Ethernet is
predominantly being used in the substation environment. Ethernet, which was developed in the
1970s, was the technological basis for IEEE 802.3 specification, which was initially released in
1980. The differences between Ethernet and IEEE 802.3 LANs are subtle. Ethernet provides
services corresponding to Layers 1 and 2 of the OSI reference model (see Figure 4.5-3 and
Figure 4.5-6), while IEEE 802.3 specifies Layer 1 and the Medium Access (MAC) portion of the
Data Link Layer (Layer 2), but does not define a logical link control protocol (LLC). Today, the
term "Ethernet" is often used to refer to all carrier sense multiple access/collision detection
(CSMA/CD) LANs that generally conform to Ethernet specifications, including IEEE 802.3.
The following paragraphs and Table 5.3-2 depict the most common physical interfaces used to
implement LAN in substations.
10Base2 - 10 Mbit/s Thin Coaxial Ethernet interface

This interface uses a thin and flexible coaxial cable that can be directly plugged into the
Ethernet interface of the device or computer using a BNC type connector. The coaxial cable has
to be laid from one computer to the next thereby interconnecting every device of the LAN. The
distance between terminals can range from 0.5 m to 185 m.
The flexibility and low cost of the thin coaxial system has made it a popular solution for
networking clusters of computers. However, thin coaxial is limited to 10 Mbit/s and can pose
some grounding problems due to the earth current in the shield of the coaxial cable. It is
therefore not advisable to use it between buildings of the same substation or at the bay level in
substations.
10BaseT - 10 Mbit/s Twisted-Pair Ethernet

The 10BaseT interface operates over two pairs of wires, one pair is used for receive data
signals and the other pair is used for transmit data signals. The two wires of each pair must be
twisted together for the entire length of the segment. The two pairs are connected by means of
an eight-pin RJ-45 type connector. This interface is a point to point interface intended for star
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topology and requires the use of a Hub equipped with a port for every device connected to the
LAN. The length of the cable from the attached device to the Hub can range up to 100 m.
Due to non-compliance with EMC requirements and test severity levels that have been
developed for protection relay I/O circuits, like the Fast Transient Test for example, the 10BaseT
interface should only be used with care for protection relaying, or when EMC requirements have
been agreed between user and manufacturer.
10BaseFL. - 10 Mbit/s Fibre Optic Media Ethernet

The 10BaseFL interface is a point to point connection that provides complete electrical isolation.
As in the previous case, a Hub (see 4.5.3.3) is required to interconnect every device to the LAN
segment. While Ethernet interfaces used in metallic media segments has protection circuit
designed for medium level electrical hazards, fibre optical interface provides total immunity from
electrical discharges including the effect of lightning strikes and ground current that can be
found in substations and specially in connection between different buildings of the same
substation. Another advantage of this type of interface is the distance it can span ranging up to
200 m from the host to the Hub.
The interconnection with the optical fibre requires a specific Media Attachment Unit (MAU) that
can be build into the Ethernet card or externally provided. In the latter case, the external unit is
connected to the Ethernet interface using the Attachment Unit Interface (AUI) which is based on
a 15 pin connector and can range up to 15 m.
100BaseTX - 100 Mbit/s Twisted-Pair Ethernet

The 100BaseTX interface operates over two pairs of wires, one pair is used for receive data
signals and the other pair is used for transmit data signals. The most popular wiring used today
is the Unshielded Twisted-Pair (UTP) cable though shielded twisted-pair cable can also be
used. The two wires of each pair must be twisted together for the entire length of the segment.
The two pairs are connected by means of an eight-pin RJ-45 type connector. This interface is a
point to point interface intended for star topology and requires the use of a Hub (see 4.5.3.3)
equipped with a port for every device connected to the LAN. The length of the cable from the
attached device to the Hub can range up to 100 m when a specific UTP Category 5 cable is
used.
As for previous similar metallic interfaces, this type of interface should only be use for wiring
inside a building.
Due to non-compliance with EMC tests and test severity levels that have been developed for
protection relay I/O circuits, the 100BaseTX interface should only be used with care for
protection relaying, or when more moderate EMC requirements have been agreed between
user and manufacturer.
100BaseFX - 100 Mbit/s Fibre Optic Media Ethernet

The 100BaseFX interface is a point to point connection that provides complete electrical
isolation and immunity to EMI. As in the previous case, a Hub (see 4.5.3.3) is required to
interconnect every device to the LAN segment. This interface uses two fibres, one for reception
and other for transmission. The fibres are connected to the device using SC, ST or FDDI type
fibre-optic connector.
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IEEE802.3
Ethernet
10Base2 10BaseT 10BaseFL 100BaseTX 100BaseFX
Data rate
10 10 10 10 100 100
(Mbit/s)
100
Max. segment
500 185 100 100 (UTP category 100
length (m)
5 cable)
Unshielded Unshielded
50-Ohm coax 50-Ohm coax Optical fibre Optical fibre
Medium twisted-pair twisted-pair
(thick) (thin) pair pair
wire wire
Topology Bus Bus Star / Hub Star /Hub Star / Hub Star / Hub
Table 5.3-2: Common physical LAN interfaces
Warning:
LANs with Bus/Star/Hub topologies exhibit the risk of "single point-of -failures", unless
appropriate precautions like redundant LANs or some other form of protection against single
point-of-failures are implemented.
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6 PERFORMANCE AND RELIABILITY REQUIREMENTS
6.1 REQUIREMENTS ON TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEM
6.1.1 Introduction
When setting up performance requirements, it is important to relate the same to a defined
reference point or interface. The boundary between protection, teleprotection and
telecommunication is not always well understood, particularly when some of the functions (e.g.,
teleprotection) are integrated into the protection relay or into the telecommunication terminal
equipment. It is therefore important that a common understanding be achieved. The figures in
ANNEX A1 should facilitate this.
The arrangement of teleprotection schemes and their various interfaces will depend on whether
the teleprotection is an integrated part of or separate from the protection equipment. The
principal interfaces are referred to in Figures A1-1 to A1-4 in ANNEX A1.
In an integrated arrangement the interface between the protection equipment and the
teleprotection equipment will invariably be within the same equipment case or cubicle.
Furthermore, the two parts will have been designed as one, so that interface levels, impedance
matching etc. and other specialized requirements will be a function of the design and not a
function of the external environment. As a result of this internal interface some of the
requirements stated in this document will not apply to this category of equipment. However, the
requirements of the interface between the telecommunication system and the teleprotection
equipment / -function will, in most instances, still be applicable.
In the separated arrangement, the teleprotection will most likely be physically divorced from the
protection equipment , and, since it will not have been designed as a complete unit, all the
requirements in this document apply.
Correspondingly, the teleprotection equipment and the telecommunication equipment may form
an integrated arrangement. In this case some of the requirements concerning interface (a) in
Figures A1-1 to A1-5 (ANNEX A1) are still applicable.
Other interfaces, not shown in the Figure in ANNEX A1, exist between the sensors (current and
voltage transformers) and the protection equipment, as well as between the protection
equipment and the tripping circuit of the breaker. Since the requirements in this paragraph apply
mainly to the telecommunication and teleprotection functions, performance requirements
associated with these interfaces are not defined. However, when overall performance has to be
evaluated, it may be necessary to set up or simulate the power frequency quantities in a
suitable test environment.
Table 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2 summarize basic requirements from protection and may serve as a
guideline for assessing teleprotection systems. Particular systems are then dealt with in more
detail in the following paragraphs. Obviously, requirements are different depending on which
interface (a) or (b) in ANNEX A1 is considered.
Actual requirements depend on many factors, such as line voltage level, protection system
design, utility practice, degree of redundancy, power grid stability, etc. It is therefore neither
possible nor practical to establish fixed requirements that would cover all cases. The figures in
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Table 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2 merely permit the comparison of various systems and highlight
some critical issues that need to be addressed when designing a protection system using
telecommunications.
The requirements in Table 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2 focus on digital systems. In numerical relays,
the teleprotection equipment - which caters for the data integrity - may be integrated as a
function into the protection relay. This is mainly the case for analog comparison protection
relays. Interface (a) is then not directly accessible for the user since it is relay internal. Thus,
interface (b) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 in ANNEX A1 is of particular interest in the context of this
document. Requirements for the more traditional interface (a) are also given in the table, as
these are relevant for dedicated teleprotection equipment, or when the teleprotection function is
integrated into the telecommunication terminal equipment. Where possible, references to
existing standards are made.
6.1.1.1 Terminology and General Requirements

The basic requirements are summarized in Table 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2. Terms and specific
requirements related to these tables are explained below in some detail. Definitions are found in
Chapter 6.1.1.2.
Propagation time
Signal propagation time across a telecommunication network is one of the most critical
parameters, as it should be kept to a minimum to ensure that a circuit can be tripped as quickly
as possible. Protection may therefore specify a maximum acceptable value measured at
reference point (b), see the figures in ANNEX A1. Validation of the actual value may be
performed for each link as part of the commissioning tests. The delay should also be measured
with the circuit manually switched to its alternate route(s).
Propagation time symmetry (differential delay)

Propagation time symmetry - i.e. equal propagation times for transmit- and receive direction - is
normally not required for state comparison schemes and command-based protection systems.
However, propagation time symmetry between transmit- and receive paths is likely to be a
critical issue for differential protection systems which measure the round trip delay and assume
that the one-way delay is half of this value. If transmit and receive paths have different delays,
this assumption is not valid. Non-equal propagation times may be caused by transmit and
receive signals being switched to different paths through the network, or by data buffering and
queuing in network nodes or traffic (over)load.
Particular attention has to be paid to ring topologies where the signal may be sent in the
opposite direction around the ring in case of a communication network fault. This may lead to
unacceptable differential delays which must be prevented, for example by ensuring that
independent switching of transmit and receive paths is disabled.
Maximum allowable values for differential delays depend on the particular protection /
teleprotection equipment design and should not be exceeded by the telecommunication system
(measured at interfaces (b), see ANNEX A1).
Propagation time variation

While propagation time variation - i.e. static or transient changes in propagation time - is
normally not an issue for state comparison schemes or command-based protection systems, it
is crucial for current differential protection where synchronous samples of the power frequency
waveform need to be compared at each end of the protected line.
Static changes in propagation time may arise due to signals being re-routed to different paths
through the network. Dynamic propagation time variation (jitter) may be the result of data
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buffering and queuing in network nodes or traffic (over)load.

GPS based time stamping or samples indexing may be efficient solutions to overcome the
problems due to propagation time variation for current differential protection, as this would
ensure that synchronous pairs of samples are compared at each line end.
Maximum allowable values for propagation time variation depend on the particular protection /
teleprotection design and should not be exceeded by the telecommunication system (measured
at interfaces (b), ANNEX A1).
Availability
Availability figures are not explicitly included in Table 6.1-1 and Table 6.1-2, as the definition of
availability (or available time) according to ITU-T G.821 has little relevance for protection, or at
least needs a closer examination.
As defined in ITU-T G.821, a period of unavailable time begins when the bit error rate in each
second exceeds 10-3 for ten consecutive seconds and terminates when the bit error rate in each
second drops below 10-3 for ten consecutive seconds.
Whilst a period of ten or more seconds during which a communication link is unavailable may be
acceptable for non time-sensitive data or voice communication as messages may be repeated,
it is not accepted for protection, because protection operation represents an emergency case
where communication has to be unconditionally available. High-end protection systems are
therefore normally designed as redundant systems. Nevertheless, the definition according to
ITU-T G.821 suggests that a teleprotection system should remain operational up to bit error
rates of 10-3, although performance may start to degrade at error rates that exceed 10-5.
Re-routing
Re-routing - and in particular automatic re-routing - is a salient feature of modern
communication networks. It requires however special consideration if this function is applied to
protection channels.
For example, it is recommended that the BER and the delay at which a telecom network initiates
a changeover be co-ordinated with the teleprotection dependability characteristic. There may be
an unacceptable break in service of typically some tens of milliseconds if changeover is initiated
due to a disturbed channel that is coincident with a power system fault. In many cases, there
would be a good chance of signaling over the disturbed channel and successfully tripping the
circuit, if a hasty route switching can be inhibited.
As there is a real possibility - for example when re-routing is based on an equal delay or least
cost strategy - that automatic re-routing could end up in transporting both Main 1 and Main 2
protection over the same bearer (e.g. same fibre cable or same radio link), special measures
have to be taken to ensure that this eventuality cannot arise, e.g. by pre-defining two paths
(main and alternate) with appropriate diversity and known signal transfer delays.
Data integrity
Although a telecommunication system is designed to produce low error rates (< 10-6) under
normal operating conditions (measured at interface (b) in ANNEX A1), there may always be
certain exceptional conditions that produce excessive error rates. Examples are fading
microwave links, link failures, synchronization failures, bit slips or equipment defects. Error rates
may then accept any value up to 50% before the corrupt data is eventually blocked by the
telecommunication system. This requires that an error detection system be included in the
teleprotection receive function in order to keep the residual error rate sufficiently low to prevent
maloperation of the protection. Formats and protocols in accordance with IEC 60870-5-1 may
be used.
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Channel squelching
Although communication protocols for protection signal transmission (= teleprotection protocols)
usually provide a high resilience against transmission errors, it is advisable that
telecommunication receive circuits are muted or clamped to a predefined state (normally "all
ones") when the error rate becomes excessive for an extended period. High error rates of up to
50% may for example be found in conjunction with a link failure, or data may be inverted due to
an equipment failure. Data muting or clamping may be accomplished at the receive side of
interfaces (b) or (a) in Figures A1-1 to A1-4 in ANNEX A1.
Terminal equipment addressing

Protection systems should incorporate some form of terminal equipment addressing in order to
prevent maloperation when communication links are looped back or when a signal should be
routed to the wrong terminal. Terminal addressing is of particular importance for differential
current protection, as a misdirected signal would simulate a differential current, which would
immediately trip the line. Address validation time should therefore be shorter than the protection
relay’s signal processing/decision time.
The address validation time is less critical for state comparison or command-based protection
systems, as temporary signal misdirection would normally only exchange guard signals between
teleprotection terminal units, thus not producing unwanted tripping.
The addressing facility is normally implemented in the teleprotection function (Figures A1-1 to
A1-4 in ANNEX A1).
Network management and configuration

Apart from precautions against random errors in the received data or against problems related
to automatic re-routing, appropriate security measures to protect from inadvertent human-made
errors need to be installed at the network management level. Password protection or channel
locking may be used for that purpose. For example, in the case of Main 1 and Main 2 circuits
being conveyed via the same network, it has to be ensured that there is no possibility of the
circuits following the same route and causing a single contingency to simultaneously fail all the
teleprotection associated with a particular line.
Synchronization
When analogue voice-frequency (VF) bearer services or asynchronous digital circuits are used,
synchronization of network with the teleprotection signaling devices is not fundamental to the
effective operation of the service.
When synchronous digital services are required the need for secure and stable synchronization
is imperative.
In most configurations the teleprotection signaling device is provided as a Data Terminating
Equipment (DTE). For the majority of schemes the bearer network is controlled from a master
clock source, and all DTEs slave the timing from the master. On few other applications the
DTEs may be required to take on the role of “master clock”.
As the number of digital teleprotection bearer services increase, the need to ensure that the
network providing the connectivity for these services is part of a well defined and secure
synchronized network, becomes an essential part of the power utilities strategy.
It is important that the telecommunications engineer and the protection engineer have a clear
understanding of their equipment and its needs. Too often the service fails due to a lack of clear
and knowledgeable decisions made at the interface.
The difficulties likely to be encountered by synchronization problems are well documented in
[30]. This document should be considered as essential reading as part of this report.
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Quality of Service (QoS) Parameters

Today's teleprotection systems normally rely on channels that provide a deterministic signal
transfer delay and sustain a constant bit rate (CBR) over time. PDH and SDH networks (see
4.4.2) using static multiplexing techniques comply with this requirement. The situation is
however totally different when transmission technologies that employ statistical multiplexing
(ATM), bandwidth-on-demand or "best effort" techniques (IP) are used. The impact of delay and
delay variations on the performance of the protection scheme has to be analyzed with care in
these cases, before these technologies can be considered for protection signal transmission
purposes.
A set of QoS parameters which confine for example minimum and maximum cell transfer delay
(CTD) and cell delay variation (CDV) have been defined for ATM, see ANNEX A3. Similar
efforts are under way to improve the real-time behavior of IP based communication. It is
however not yet clear how far ATM and in particular IP based networks can meet the most
stringent requirements for protection signal transmission, as the efforts in the ATM/IP-area
regarding real-time performance improvements focus on multimedia service integration for
public telecommunication networks, where signal transfer times are less critical and delays up to
200 ms are accepted in most cases.
6.1.1.2 Definitions
The following definitions are related to Table 6.1-1, Table 6.1-2 and the Figures in ANNEX A1.
More terms are explained in Chapter 6.1.1.1.
Telecommunication system - telecommunication link

System composed of telecommunication equipment and the associated physical link required to
transmit information signals over a distance (IEC 60834-1, [27]).
Teleprotection equipment - teleprotection function

Equipment specially designed to be used in conjunction with a protection system. The
teleprotection equipment, which is connected to a telecommunication link between both ends of
the protected circuit, transforms the information given by the protection equipment into a form
suitable for transmission.
The functionality of the teleprotection equipment may be integrated as a function (algorithm) in
modern numeric protective relays or in the telecommunication equipment.
Teleprotection system
System composed of teleprotection equipment and an associated telecommunication system
between the ends of a protected circuit (IEC 60834-1, [27])
Propagation time
The time elapsed between the instant of application to a telecommunication system (link,
network), under stated conditions, of a specific value of the transmitted signal and the instant
when the received signal assumes the corresponding value at the input of the teleprotection
receiver (Signal transfer delay between interfaces (b) to (b) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5).
Propagation time symmetry

A measure for the similarity of the propagation time in transmit- and receive direction.
Sometimes also referred to as differential delay.
Propagation time variation

The change in propagation time with time. Sometimes referred to as "jitter" or "wander".
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Propagation time may be measured and quoted if interfaces (b) in Figures A1-1 to A1-4 are
accessible.
Transmission time
The transmission time of a teleprotection system is the time elapsed between the instant of
change of state at the teleprotection transmit input and the instant of the corresponding change
of state at the teleprotection receive output (Interfaces (a) in Figures A1-1 to A1-4), excluding
propagation time. ([27], [28]).
The nominal transmission time T0 is the transmission time measured under disturbance-
free transmission conditions.
The maximum actual transmission time Tac is the maximum transmission time
encountered under disturbed transmission conditions for a defined dependability and
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) or bit error rate (BER).
Overall operating time of a teleprotection system / Teleprotection operating time

The overall operating time TA of a teleprotection system is the time elapsed between the
instant of change of state at the teleprotection transmit input and the instant of the
corresponding change of state at the teleprotection receive output (Interfaces (a) in
Figures A1-1 to A1-5), including propagation time and additional delay due to
interference and/or noise [27], [28].
Transmission time (T0, Tac) and teleprotection operating time (TA) may be measured and quoted
if interfaces (a) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 are accessible.
Protection operating time

The protection operating time TB is the time interval between the instant a specific set of values
of the input energizing quantities is applied under specific conditions at the input of the
protection system, including sensors or current and/or voltage transformers, and the instant
when the protection relay output circuits are operated [28].
Bandwidth
Analogue systems: The width of the frequency range used by the communication channel,
expressed in Hertz (Hz).
Digital systems: Sometimes used as a synonym for data rate.
Data rate
A measure for the information per unit time transferred across a certain reference point /
interface of a system, including any overhead. Normally expressed in bits per second.
Dependability
Dependability relates to the ability to issue and receive a valid signal (command or message) in
due time in the presence of interference and/or noise when a corresponding signal has been
transmitted [27], [28].1
For practical reasons the probability of a missing signal is normally measured. The reference
1
Dependability as defined for teleprotection does not necessarily have the same meaning to the operation of the scheme. For
example with blocking schemes, a missing blocking command is likely to occur in the presence of an external fault condition and
may cause unwanted tripping (=> lack of security of the protection scheme).
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point for the measurement is interface (a) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 (ANNEX A1).
A poor dependability gives rise to a failure to trip or a delayed trip in an intertripping (direct
tripping) or permissive tripping scheme. A poor dependability in a analog comparison protection
scheme may give rise to a failure to trip or a delayed trip, or may produce unwanted tripping.
Security
Security relates to the ability to prevent interference and noise from generating an unwanted
signal (command or message) at the receiving end when no corresponding signal has been
transmitted, [27], [28].1
For practical reasons the probability of an unwanted signal is normally measured. The reference
point for the measurement is interface (a) in Figures A1-1 to A1-5 (ANNEX A1).
With permissive tripping schemes, the risk of an unwanted tripping action due to inadequate
security of the teleprotection function is generally low, while in intertripping (direct tripping)
schemes each unwanted command will lead to an unwanted tripping action. A poor security in
an analog comparison protection scheme will typically produce unwanted tripping.
Data integrity
Data integrity relates to the probability that received data - that have passed certain error
detecting and/or error correcting procedures - are correct. Data integrity can be expressed as
residual error probability and may be categorized in classes, where each class is characterized
by its upper bound of residual error rates (IEC 60870-5-1). Data integrity is improved by using
protocols that detect, reject or discard data that have been corrupted due to bit errors
introduced by the telecommunication channel.
1
Security as defined for teleprotection does not necessarily have the same meaning to the operation of the scheme. For example
with blocking schemes, an unwanted command may lead, depending upon its duration, either to a delayed trip or to a failure to trip
(=> lack of dependability of the protection scheme).
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Interface (b) to (b) in Fig. A1-1 to A1-5 Interface (a) to (a) in Fig. A1-1 to A1-5 General
Recovery
Propagation Bandwidth Overall Impact of misconnection; Time (non-
Propagation Propagation Bit Error Rate 1; 2 1, 3
Time or Operating Time Dependability Security Data Integrity Need for terminal redundant
Time Time Variation (BER)
Symmetry Data Rate 1 TA 1 addressing systems) and
Availability
Misconnection critical when
Low 4
Critical; present during fault
Blocking < 10-5 normal;
Not critical to Depending on Low to Medium; occurrence. Risk of non-
Overreach Critical; Analog: < 10-4 during High;
the operation of Not required co-ordination medium; IEC 60870-2-1 selective tripping.
Distance (< 10ms) < 3kHz power system IEC 60834-1
the scheme times IEC 60834-1 Class I2 Address validation time less
Protection Digital: fault
(< 25ms) critical, since system
< 10kbit/s
normally in guard state
Low 4
present during fault
Permissive < 10-5 normal;
Not critical to Medium; occurrence. Risk of delayed
Underreach Critical; Analog: < 10-4 during Critical; Medium to high; Medium;
the operation of Not required IEC 60870-2-1 tripping.
Distance (< 10ms) < 3kHz power system (< 25.. 30ms) IEC 60834-1 IEC 60834-1
the scheme Class I2 Address validation time less
critical, since system
< 10kbit/s
Low 4
Permissive < 10-5 normal;
Not critical to Medium to Medium; occurrence. Risk of delayed
Overreach Critical; Analog: < 10-4 during Critical; High;
the operation of Not required high; IEC 60870-2-1 tripping.
Distance (< 10ms) < 3kHz power system (< 25.. 30ms) IEC 60834-1
the scheme IEC 60834-1 Class I2 Address validation time less
< 10kbit/s
Low 4
Accelerated < 10-5 normal;
Not critical to Medium; occurrence. Risk of missed
Underreach Critical; Analog: < 10-4 during Critical; High; Medium;
the operation of Not required IEC 60870-2-1 tripping.
STATE COMPARISON PROTECTION

Distance (< 10ms) < 3kHz power system (< 25.. 30ms) IEC 60834-1 IEC 60834-1
the scheme Class I2 Address validation time less
< 10kbit/s
Low 4 present during fault
Direct < 10-5 normal; occurrence. Risk of not
Not critical to High;
Intertripping Less critical; Analog: < 10-4 during Less critical; High; High; tripping and of tripping the
the operation of Not required IEC 60870-2-1
Command (< 30 ms) < 3kHz power system (< 50ms) IEC 60834-1 IEC 60834-1 wrong line.
the scheme Class I3
Schemes Digital: fault Address validation time less
< 10kbit/s critical, since system
Recovery time: After a random communication failure less critical for command-based
non-unit protection schemes, as the system is normally in the guard state.
Availability: The overall system design must ensure that proper operation is not adversely
affected by the fault occurrence (electromagnetic interference)
Table 6.1-1: Requirements from protection on telecommunication and teleprotection: State Comparison Schemes.
For terms and definitions refer to Chapters 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2.
1
Transmission time, bandwidth, dependability and security are interrelated. One can for example improve one quantity at the expense of another. For example, for a fixed bandwidth, security can be improved at the
expense of transmission time and/or dependability. The particular choice depends on the actual system requirements and on practical limitations.
2
The interdependence between dependability and communication quality parameters (SNR or BER) is explained in IEC 60834-1. The figures suggest that for a BER of <10-6 the teleprotection shall not suffer a noticeable
dependability deterioriation. For a BER of 10-6 to 10-3 the teleprotection shall still be able to perform its function, although a certain loss in dependability is to be expected.
3
The interdependence between security and communication quality parameters (SNR or BER) is explained in IEC 60834-1. The figures suggest that the teleprotection shall guarantee a stated security against unwanted
operation irrespective of the actual BER or SNR (worst case scenario).
4
Although the requirement on bandwidth or data rate is low for command based protection schemes, a channel with 64 kbit/s capacity (or a multiple thereof) may be requested in digital systems for standardization reasons.
Interface (b) to (b) in Fig. A1-1 to A1-5 Interface (a) to (a) in Fig. A1-1 to A1-5 General
Recovery
Propagation Bandwidth Overall Impact of misconnection; Time (non-
Propagation Propagation Bit Error Rate 1; 2 1; 3
Time or Operating Time Dependability Security Data Integrity Need for terminal redundant
Time Time Variation (BER)
Symmetry Data Rate 1 TA 1 addressing systems) and
Availability
Critical for Low to
Less than 1/2 Critical;
systems medium;
Phase < 10-5 normal; period of the Risk of unwanted tripping;
based on High
Comparison Critical; Critical; < 10-4 during power High; Medium;
loop round- Analog: IEC 60870-2-1
w/o time (< 10ms) (< 0.3ms) power system frequency for IEC 60834-2 IEC 60834-2 Address validation time
trip delay < 3kHz Class I3
stamp fault high end needs to be shorter than
measure- Digital:
protection relay decision time
ment < 10kbit/s
Low to
medium;
Phase < 10-5 normal; period of the Risk of unwanted tripping;
High
Comparison Critical; Less critical; < 10-4 during power High; Medium;
Less critical Analog: IEC 60870-2-1
with time (< 10ms) (< 10ms) power system frequency for IEC 60834-2 IEC 60834-2 Address validation time
< 3kHz Class I3
stamp fault high end needs to be shorter than
Digital:
< 10kbit/s
Critical for Typically
Longitudinal systems 64kbit/s
< 10-6 normal; period of the Risk of unwanted tripping;
Current based on Medium to High
Critical; Critical; < 10-5 during power High;
Differential loop round- n*64kbit/s high; IEC 60870-2-1
(< 10ms) (< 0.1ms) power system frequency for IEC 60834-2 Address validation time
w/o time trip delay for multi- IEC 60834-2 Class I3
fault high end needs to be shorter than
stamp measure- terminal
ment lines
64kbit/s
Longitudinal typical.
< 10-6 normal; period of the Risk of unwanted tripping;
Current Medium to High
Critical; Less critical; < 10-5 during power High;
Differential Less critical n*64kbit/s high; IEC 60870-2-1
ANALOG COMPARISON PROTECTION

(< 10ms)4 (< 10ms) power system frequency for IEC 60834-2 Address validation time
with time for multi- IEC 60834-2 Class I3
fault high end needs to be shorter than
stamp terminal
lines
Critical;
< 10-6 normal; Risk of unwanted tripping;
Charge Less critical; Less critical; 7.2kbit/s to < 10-5 during Medium to
Less critical 1 to 1.5 cycles High High
Comparison (< 30ms) (< 4ms) 64kbit/s power system high Address validation time
fault needs to be shorter than
Depending on backup scheme, recovery time after a random communication failure
may be critical for analog comparison protection schemes, as most of these rely on
continuous transmission of information.
Availability: The overall system design must ensure that proper operation is not
adversely affected by the fault occurrence (electromagnetic interference)
relay decision time
Table 6.1-2: Requirements from protection on telecommunication and teleprotection: Analog Comparison Schemes.
For terms and definitions refer to Chapters 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2.
1
Transmission time, bandwidth, dependability and security are interrelated. One can for example improve one quantity at the expense of another. For example, for a fixed bandwidth, security can be improved at the
expense of transmission time and/or dependability. The particular choice depends on the actual system requirements and on practical limitations.
2
The relationship between dependability and communication quality parameters (SNR or BER) is explained in IEC 60834-2. It is suggested that for a BER of less than 10-6 the teleprotection shall not suffer a noticeable
dependability deterioration. For a BER of 10-6 to 10-3 the teleprotection may still be able to perform its function, although a loss in dependability is to be expected.
3
The relationship between security and communication quality parameters (SNR or BER) is explained in IEC 60834-2. The figures suggest that the teleprotection shall guarantee a stated security against unwanted
operation irrespective of the actual BER or SNR (worst case scenario).
4
For pilot wire replacement a propagation time of less than 1ms is required.
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
6.1.2 Requirement from analog comparison protection

General requirements of analog comparison protection schemes are listed in Table 6.1-2.
When setting demands on the communication system from line current differential protection
using a digital telecommunications network, we must consider the two basic forms of protection
systems:
- Protection using GPS systems to time tag the current values.

- Protection using the communication network for time synchronization between the
measuring points
These two types of protection system place differing demands on the communication network.
6.1.2.1 Time synchronization through GPS
Overall operating time

For a high-end protection, the overall operating time TA for a teleprotection system should be
less than 1/2 of a power frequency period. Any longer delay will adversely affect the total
operating time and fast fault clearing time of the protection.
Data integrity
The protocol used for teleprotection must detect errors before any unwanted functions occur.
Security against unwanted operation must normally be given priority over dependability.
Route switching
A protection using GPS as time base is not affected by the number and frequency of route
switching operations. However, the requirement of a maximum acceptable transmission time
must always be fulfilled to guarantee the stated performance for the protection.

A protection using GPS as time base is not affected if propagation times in the transmit and
receive direction are not the same, provided that the maximum propagation time is bounded
within useful limits.
6.1.2.2 Time synchronization through communication network
Overall operating time

For a high-end protection, the overall operating time TA for a teleprotection system should be
less than 1/2 of a power frequency period. Any longer delay will adversely affect the total
operating time and fast fault clearing time of the protection.
Data integrity
The protocol used for teleprotection must detect errors before any unwanted functions occur.
Security against unwanted operation must normally be given priority over dependability.
Route switching
A protection using the communication system for time synchronization can not allow too many
or too frequent route switching operations. The maximum number or frequency of route-
switches depends both on manufacturer's algorithm for time synchronization and on how much
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the transmitting and receiving times will change due to a route switch.
If the frequency of route switching is high but the change in propagation times is very little, then
the protection will not be affected at all.
A fixed, dedicated connection would of course eliminate this problem.

A protection using the communication system for time synchronization can tolerate some
difference between transmit and receive propagation times. Traditional current differential relays
normally assume equal transmit and receive propagation times, as the round-trip time is
normally measured and divided by 2. Any difference in the actual times will automatically end up
in a differential current and will directly affect both dependability and security. An example on
how security is affected is given below.
If the minimum allowed differential current limit is set to 20% of rated current, and this limit is
used up to 100% of rated current before the we start to stabilize for current through the line, we
can allow up to 1.2 ms difference between transmit and receive times, because
receive time = 4.2 ms, transmit time = 3 ms

à differential time = 1.2 ms, and average time = 3.6 ms
This gives a time difference for the comparison of the current vectors of 0.6ms = 10.8 degrees
in a 50 Hz system, resulting in a differential current of sin(10.8) = 0.19*Irated.
To obtain a protection with high sensitivity the difference in receive and transmit time must be 5
to 10 times less than given in the example above. This results in a maximum time difference
between the transmit and receive direction of around 0.1 - 0.25 ms only.
6.1.3 Requirements from state comparison protection

General requirements of state comparison protection schemes are listed in Table 6.1-1.
6.1.3.1 Propagation Time

Permissive and deblocking type state comparison protection schemes typically do not have any
minimum or maximum time delay requirements; they simply wait for the tripping signal to arrive
before issuing a tripping signal to the breaker for an internal line fault. One exception to this is
that if the permissive tripping signal arrives too soon, it may be rejected by the relay as an
erroneous signal caused by power system fault generated noise. The protective relay must
make this determination by comparing the signal arrival time to the fault detection time.
Blocking schemes, on the other hand, include a coordination delay timer setting to compensate
for communication signal latency. This timer is set based on the longest expected blocking
signal delay. Signal delays greater than the timer setting will cause the relay to incorrectly trip
the line breaker for an external line fault. The teleprotection function should measure
communication signal delay and alarm if the delay is above a predetermined percentage of the
blocking timer setting.
6.1.4 Requirements from intertripping

General requirements from intertripping are listed in Table 6.1-1.
Intertripping schemes typically have rather high demands on both dependability and security,
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and may compromise on maximum permissible operating times.

Requirements on propagation time depends on the overall operating time requirement which is
typically in the order of one power system cycle. Dependable operation minimizes the risk of
personal hazards and/or damage to power system components. Security requirements against
unwanted tripping are mainly driven from an economical aspect and reliable customer service
point of view.
6.1.5 Requirements from system protection

To carry out load or generation shedding, system separation, or overload protection for severe
power system faults, wide-area protections such as system stabilizing protection collect power
system data such as power flows, currents, voltages, main protection operations, that is, upward
information transmitted from terminal units installed at power apparatus to a central processing
unit (CPU), and transmit commands (downward information) based on the calculation by the
CPU. As this protection is secondary or subsequent to main protections, the requirements on
telecommunications are of the same level as main protections except for overall operate times,
transmission times and data rates. Overall operate times mostly required for recent
sophisticated wide-area protections are 150 to 300 ms. Generally, dedicated transmissions are
used for important information such as fault or route-off detection and transfer trip signals to
ensure high-speed and reliable transmissions, while relatively large volumes of information that
do not necessarily require high speed are transmitted by an EMS/SCADA communication
network. For example, frame-formatted cyclic digital transmission, HDLC or EMS/SCADA
communications with transmission speeds of 1200 or 2400 bit/s are usually applied for upward
information transmissions. High-speed multiplexed digital transmissions or dedicated transfer
trip signal transmissions are used for the downward information transmission. Transmission
delays of 30 to 50 ms are assigned. Sophisticated system stabilizing protections such as
predictive out-of-step protection which make use of numerical or microprocessor-based relays
and utilize sampling synchronization technique require the same level of telecommunication
system as numerical current differential teleprotection systems, especially with respect to
propagation time and propagation time symmetry. Most system stabilizing protections are
configured in reliable double redundant systems.
Requirements such as BER and unavailability other than time constraints and data rates are
based on and similar to the present power line teleprotection requirements. The BER
requirement taken to satisfy field data for teleprotection unavailability, due to microwave
channel disturbances, should be of the order of 10-5. The system unavailability requirement is
significantly related to the sum of sustainable equipment availabilities for a microwave
teleprotection system, but the availability of protective relay still does not match the system
availability model. Double redundancy is indispensable when considering maintenance of
teleprotection systems, particularly at EHV levels.
From both network viewpoints of power systems and telecommunications, wide-area or network
protections will increasingly become more important in future complex and enlarged power
systems to meet the customers‘ demands of cost reduction and higher reliability. FACTS, for
example, is taken into account for stabilizing and optimizing the large interconnected power
systems of the future. As these system are situated in the grey zone between protection and
control, the possibility of such centralized or decentralized protection or control systems would
form what is likely to be a large secondary control system. Therefore, requirements and
evaluations with regard to network aspects would be needed. For example, as most protection
systems are constructed in a redundant manner, when there are two network protection
systems, A and B, that are overlapping with each other on one component, c, if each of the
corresponding redundant components of network protection systems A and B is out of service,
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and if the critical common component c gets into failure, both protection systems are required,
possibly leading to a more extensive outage. Therefore, such cross dependability and security
checks among network protection and control systems for complex power systems will become
significantly important. A procedure to avoid the inappropriate overlapping of telecommunication
channels is also needed for power system stabilizing protection systems as shown in Figure
6.1-1. A failure on the overlapped link may result in a halt or failure of the protection system
operation.
Figure 6.1-1: Inappropriate overlaping of relay communication links in a double redundant

protection system
6.2 REQUIREMENTS ON TELEPROTECTION

The teleprotection function constitutes the interface between a protection function and a
telecommunication system. The teleprotection function converts the signals and messages from
the protection function into signals and messages compatible with the telecommunication
system, and vice versa. For instance, a protection device may have a contact output and a dc
voltage driven control input, and the telecommunication system may require a modulated audio-
tone signal. The teleprotection function must convert the protection device output contact to one
or more specific audio-tone transmitted frequencies, and also convert the received audio-tone
frequency(ies) to a control voltage recognized by the protection device control input. In modern
digital protection devices, the teleprotection function must convert a digital word representing
the value of a sampled analog value to a series of light pulses compatible with an optical
communication system. The teleprotection function may be built into the protection device, or it
may be a device, separate from both the protection device and telecommunication system, or it
may be built into the telecommunication system.
Both the protection function and telecommunication system place requirements on the
teleprotection function, which are summarized as follows:
- Present a compatible interface, suitable for the application and environment
- Control transmitted signals/messages and monitor received signals/messages to:
à Guarantee the required signal/message integrity
à Supervise the availability of the telecommunication circuit
à Reject signals/messages that are not destined for the local protection device
à Raise an alarm in case of abnormal conditions and take appropriate action
Refer to IEC60834-1 [27] and IEC60834-2 [28] for more information about requirements on
teleprotection functions.
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6.2.1 Requirements on interface compatibility

The interface between protection function and teleprotection function, and between
teleprotection function and telecommunication systems must pass signals and messages with
minimal delay, attenuation, and disruption. To do this, the mated devices and systems must
have compatible interfaces, and the interfaces must be suitable for the application and
environment in which they are installed. Compatibility is usually guaranteed by using an
interface that meets a recognized standard. The International Standards Organization (ISO)
Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Reference Model (see Chapter 4.5.2) describes a digital
network communication architecture physical layer that can be related to the teleprotection
interface. In this model, the communication network physical layer is responsible for transmitting
raw bits over a communication channel. The physical layer design must ensure that when one
side sends a 1 bit, it is received by the other side as a 1 bit, not as a 0 bit. The design issues
include:
- electrical or optical signal characteristics
- electrical or optical connectivity
- physical and mechanical characteristics
- procedural rules
Questions that must be addressed include:

- how many volts should be used to represent a 1 and how many for a 0
- the time duration of each bit
- whether transmission may proceed simultaneously in both directions
- how is the initial connection established and how is it disconnected when both sides are
finished
- and how many pins the network connector has and what each pin does.
Standard interfaces that address these issues should be used, where applicable and whenever
possible. However, standards do not exist for all interfaces or leave room for mutual agreement
between manufacturer and user, in which case the interface must be completely specified to
ensure compatibility.
6.2.2 Functional requirements

The following statements focus on digital systems, however, similar considerations apply to
legacy analog teleprotection systems.
Digital communication systems for analog comparison and state comparison protection
functions carry messages between digital protective relays at each end of a power line. The
relays continuously transmit and receive new messages as the relays continuously monitor
power system parameters, watching for abnormal conditions that may require them to act swiftly
and securely to interrupt and isolate the cause of the power system abnormality. The messages
contain data that are critical to the proper operation of the relays. Each message includes a
“frame” that may include a destination address, data formatting information, and error checking.
Message timing may also be critical. Any data, framing, or timing errors introduced in the digital
communication system can, and probably will cause relay misoperation if not detected and
rejected or corrected. Most digital relays that send and receive digital messages therefore
include message error checking schemes to verify that each received message is accurate and
valid before using the data contained in the message.
Bad messages may be the result of a single transient noise burst caused by an internal
communication system problem, or by an external condition like lightning, or power system
electrical switching transient. Bad messages may also be the result of signal attenuation caused
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by the declining health of communication circuits or equipment. Bad messages can also be
good messages sent to the wrong location by faulty communication switching equipment, or
intentionally misrouted, such as in a loop-back condition performed during communication circuit
testing. No matter what the cause, the digital protective relay or associated digital
communication system interface must detect and reject or correct bad messages (including
misrouted good messages) to prevent misoperation. It is common practice to alarm or
annunciate a communication problem to alert the appropriate communication system
maintenance personnel about existing or impending communication system problems. Some
relays log communication errors to help diagnose the nature and cause of communication
system problems. At the very least, the relay should provide a time-delayed output to alarm for
the continuous receipt of bad messages or complete loss of messages. In addition, modern
digital relays can perform other logic functions to modify their performance, or the performance
of the communication system when a problem occurs.
While it is important that the teleprotection function and telecommunication system send and
receive messages between protective relays as reliably and securely as possible, it is also
important that these functions not resend old messages and data that error checking
determined were not correctly received at the remote terminal. The teleprotection and
telecommunication systems should continue to send only the newest messages and data, and
discard old messages and data. Resending old messages may delay proper protection scheme
operation, or cause protection scheme misoperation and incorrect breaker tripping.
6.2.2.1 Analog comparison protection control and monitoring

Analog comparison protection schemes for digital communication circuits generally require
protocols with error check procedures to avoid unwanted operations due to errors in the
messages. Error checking may include parity check, check sum, and cyclic redundancy check
(CRC) sequence. In addition, other checks can be included to increase the security:
- Checking the length of the received messages
- Checking the time tag sequence of two consecutive messages
- Detecting changes in the delay time above a tolerance setting
When a message error is detected, the message is rejected and the protection is reset. Below a
predetermined message error rate, the protection remains stable but the operating time is
delayed due to the loss of messages. If the percentage of messages rejected exceeds a value,
e.g. 25%, during a defined period of time, the operating time becomes intolerable and the
protection is blocked until the message error rate decreases to acceptable values.
On blocking, a “channel failure” alarm is raised by the relay and sent to indicate a failure in the
communication channel. If the protection uses only one channel, the “protection function failure”
alarm is also raised. Some protection systems have a redundant channel through a different
communication path so the channel with a better performance is selected. In case of failure in
both channels, both channels and protection alarms are raised.
6.2.2.2 State comparison protection control and monitoring

State comparison protection schemes designed for digital communication circuits generally
include protocols with error checking to detect bad messages that can cause protection scheme
relay misoperation. Because each bit in a state comparison protection scheme’s message may
have a different function, and therefore a different priority, some schemes apply additional
security measures for each individual bit. For instance, a bit used to communicate a permissive
transfer trip does not need the same security as a bit used to communicate a direct,
unsupervised transfer trip. The protective relay scheme may therefore require that two or three
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consecutive messages be received with the direct transfer trip bit asserted before taking action
to perform the direct transfer trip output. This is analogous to using a time delayed output in an
analog scheme to improve the security of an output.
Likewise, if a bad message is detected, the protective relay should reject and ignore the bad
message, and may assume the status of each bit in the expected message based on
predefined criteria. For instance, the relay may be programmed to assume the bit should be in
one of three states if the message is bad:
- a logical zero (0)
- a logical one (1)
- or it should retain the status the bit had in the last good message.
For additional security, the relay may require that several good messages be received after one
or more bad messages to ensure that the communication system has returned to a satisfactory
performance level before using the bits in the new messages.
6.2.2.3 Erroneous signal detection

Protective relays may detect erroneous permissive, deblocking, or blocking signals based on
signals arriving too soon after power system fault detection. Proper permissive, deblocking, and
blocking signals always incur some delay due to natural latencies in the relays and
telecommunication system. Premature signals can be generated by power system fault noise
induced on the communication system. While the teleprotection device may have filtering to
reject noise and pass only valid signals, filtering can be compromised by unique noise patterns.
6.2.2.4 Loop-back and misconnect detection

The telecommunication service provider commonly checks telecommunication circuits by
performing a loop-back test. During the loop back test, the signal sent by a relay, intended for
the relay at the remote terminal, is returned to the originating relay. State comparison protection
schemes can operate incorrectly when a power system fault occurs while the
telecommunication circuit is in a loop-back configuration. The teleprotection device and/or relay
should detect the communication circuit loop-back configuration and disable communication
assisted tripping until proper communication circuit connectivity is restored. The relay and/or
teleprotection device should also alarm during this condition to alert the appropriate operating,
maintenance, or telecommunication service personnel.
6.2.2.5 Actions on alarm conditions

Digital protective relays or communication schemes typically do not alarm on a single bad
message, but should alarm on a string of consecutive bad messages that could indicate a
permanent communication system failure. However, because individual bad messages, or small
groups of bad messages may indicate an impending communication system failure, the digital
protective relay or communication system should log the occurrence of bad messages, and
track the performance of the communication system over time by comparing the number of bad
messages to the number of good messages over a period of time. If the percentage of bad
messages exceeds a predefined threshold appropriate for that communication system, the relay
or communication system should alarm or annunciate the problem to alert communication
system maintenance personnel.
In addition to alarming, digital protective relays may also take additional action when
communication system problems persist. For instance, the protection scheme could:
- force the communication system to switch communication paths or activate a redundant
communication channel.
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- change relay settings to compensate for the loss of communication-aided high-speed

protection. For instance, a state comparison protection scheme may enable Remote-
End-Just-Opened logic, or Zone 1 Extension logic that provide faster (but less secure)
tripping without communication assistance.
- block the protection scheme from operating.
- trip to take the protected system out of service to preclude the possibility of a fault
occurring without high speed protection in service. This would only be done in extreme
circumstances where time delayed tripping cannot be tolerated under any
circumstances.
In most cases, however, where communication assisted high-speed protection is required and
critical to power system stability, a second protection scheme with its own independent
communication scheme is used to ensure high speed protection for the loss of one
communication scheme. Most state comparison protection schemes, such as zone distance
relay schemes can provide stand-alone protection with high-speed tripping for faults on the
majority (but not all) of the protected line segment, which reduces the reliance on
communication-assisted tripping. Most analog comparison protection schemes are installed with
supplemental step distance schemes, which provide secure, but slower, tripping without
communication.
6.3 REQUIREMENTS ON PROTECTION
6.3.1 Requirements on analog comparison protection
6.3.1.1 Need for delay compensation

Comparison of measured quantities from differential protection relays must be based on pairs of
samples that were taken at the same instant of time. As the samples are transferred to the
opposite end for comparison, the delay which is introduced by the telecommunication link has to
be taken care of by the protection end device that performs the comparison. Commonly used
methods to accomplish time synchronization between the samples to be compared have been
described in chapters A4.1 and 6.1.2 of this document. The most popular being:
- Propagation delay estimation based on measurements, e.g. round-trip propagation delay

measurement
- Time tagging of samples, where each sample carries its unique time tag with it, either
received as a time stamp from an external source such as GPS, or as an index derived
from the relative sample position with respect to the power frequency zero-crossings.
The second method employing time tagging is preferred, as the comparison of the respective
samples then does neither depend on equal signal propagation times for the 'go' and 'return'
direction (propagation time symmetry), nor on stringent limitations for signal propagation time
variations. See also chapters 6.1.1.1 and 6.1.1.2 for explanations and definitions.
As propagation time symmetry may be jeopardized when communication channels are re-routed
upon a failure in the communication network, or because signal propagation times may vary
with time due to signal buffering and queuing in the network, time tagging is a prerequisite for
protection using general communication networks, unless the network has been explicitly
engineered to comply with the timing requirements that are imposed by the protection relay.
Refer for example to Chapters 4.2, 4.6 and 6.1.
In conclusion, whatever method for time synchronization is chosen, the protection relay - when
used in conjunction with modern telecom networks - will have to cope with:
- Static propagation times
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- Propagation differential times between ‘go’ and ‘return’ direction

- Dynamic propagation time variations
6.3.2 Requirements on state comparison protection
6.3.2.1 Interface co-ordination

The interface between protection and teleprotection devices must be coordinated to minimize
delay, attenuation, and signal disruption. Likewise, the same coordination must be made
between the teleprotection device and the telecommunication system. Physical connection and
electrical and/or optical compatibility must also exist at each of these interfaces.
6.3.2.2 Delay Compensation

Most state comparison protection schemes tolerate communication delay and delay variation
very well. Blocking Overreach Distance Protection schemes, however, require a coordination
delay timer setting based on the expected communication signal delay. Communication delays
greater than the timer setting can cause a protection maloperation for an external fault.
Conversely, unnecessary tripping delay occurs when the actual communication signal delay is
significantly less than the timer setting. The protective relay should measure the communication
signal delay and adjust the timer to minimize the time the relay waits before issuing a tripping
signal for an internal line fault, yet assuring adequate time to receive a blocking signal for an
external line fault.
6.3.3 Requirements on other protections

Apart from interface co-ordination no special requirements apply.
6.4 CONSIDERATIONS ON INTERFACES AND INSTALLATION PRACTICES

The design of protection and telecommunications devices to operate in an electrical hostile
environment, complying with pre-defined standards for quality of service RFI (radio frequency
interference) and EMC (electromagnetic compatibility), requires a consistent approach in the
methods used to provision, install and deliver the telecommunications service, to the
teleprotection signalling device.
Many problems are caused by bad installation practices and by using inappropriate
telecommunication services for the required teleprotection signalling function.
This chapter attempts to capture a number of critical issues, and highlight the areas that may be
the source of service failure if adequate standards of installation are not implemented.
Fundamentally the protection requires a telecommunications bearer service that will provide
perfect performance during electrical network faults. This may only be two or three times per
year and requiring the allocated circuit traffic capacity for no more than a few seconds. The
protection engineer also expects the telecommunications bearer service to be monitored and
managed by the circuit provider. On the whole this can not be achieved.
As the monitoring of the bearer services provided must, by default, be a task performed by the
teleprotection function/device, manufactures and protection engineers require to develop alarm
strategies that are more in keeping with the bearer services provided and the needs of the
scheme.
To achieve this requirement teleprotection signaling devices and bearer circuits require to be
procured that will guarantee quality of service before, during and after any incident. The circuit
shall be designed to provide a secure and resilient service that will continue to function, within
specified limits, before, during and after an electrical fault or network disturbance. The total
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connectivity, including local connections and local power requirements, must not compromise
the ability of the teleprotection function to perform its task.
When designing and provisioning the required network bearer service the following should be
considered:
- Is the bearer service immune to electrical disturbance?
- Can the bearer service provide the required operating characteristics?
- Can the bearer service provide the managed resilience and diverse routing in
compliance with service needs?
- Does the teleprotection function raise an alarm if the bearer service does not comply
with pre-defined characteristics?
- Assuming that we can provide immune external bearer services, how do we ensure that
we do not compromise the ability of the protection service to function by poor local
installation practices?
It is imperative that the methods used to interconnect and power the teleprotection signalling
device and the bearer service addresses the needs to comply with standards for EMC, RFI, rise
of earth potential and other electrical disturbances. If this is done the security and integrity of the
service will not be compromised
The existing arrangements developed over a number of years were introduced at the time
teleprotection signaling schemes were reliant on physical copper connections and / or voice
frequency bearer services.
The PTO (Public Telephone Operator) Bearer Service Providers, have over the last 20 years
significantly revised their networks and the services available on them. Copper with DC
connectivity is no longer available and the analogue network infrastructure, used to deliver voice
frequency services, has now been replaced by new digital network infrastructures. Most voice
frequency services are now derived from digital technologies.
Methods used to deliver the bearer service to the teleprotection device within the substation
have evolved rather than been developed to meet the changing needs of the service. Protection
services have become more sophisticated and in turn demands more from the bearer service
provided. The migration of service provision from pure analogue services to analogue derived
digital services has already caused problems with Differential Delay for analog comparison
Protection schemes. Guaranteed and consistent circuit parameters can no longer be assumed
on networks delivered by public service providers. Network and local considerations must be
addressed and understood.
In the typical electrical hostile environment found in substations it is necessary to ensure that
the equipments are compliant and the methods used to house, power and interconnect these
services will not compromise the effective operation of bearer or teleprotection device.
If consideration is given to the above likely risks, existing configurations can be made secure
and should provide trouble free service. Future developments and operational strategies should
however identify the best methods that are now available to minimize the likelihood of
teleprotection failure.
Proposals are now being developed that use the increased availability of optical fibre service
provisions and interface devices.
If external services can be provided over alternatively routed fibre and interfaced with
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appropriate service equipments housed in EMC / RFI cubicles, the likelihood of bearer service
failure, during an electrical disturbance, will be greatly reduced.
If power requirements are designed to include appropriate filters and surge arrestors and if
cables are run in appropriate fashion, the interference experience by noise on DC power
supplies to equipment will be insignificant.
The connection from the delivered bearer service to the teleprotection device must consider the
local environmental risks and adopt the most appropriate interface. This connection from EMC /
RFI cubicle to teleprotection device may be best achieved by using Optical Fibre cable and the
appropriate converter units at each end.
When copper cable is being used best practice for screening and route choice, to reduce the
impact of induced voltage, may provide acceptable results.
A comprehensive treatment of EMC including practical design-, cabling- and installation guides
is found in [37] and in the IEC standards below.
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 5:

IEC 61000-5-1:
Installation and mitigation guidelines - Section 1: General considerations - Basic EMC Publication
Electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) - Part 5:
IEC 61000-5-2:
Installation and mitigation guidelines - Section 2: Earthing and cabling
Table 6.4-1: IEC publications for EMC and installation
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7 PROTECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS AND DESIGN
7.1 PROTECTION SCHEMES AND TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS COMPATIBILITY

The following tables provide combinations of protection scheme and telecommunication system
technologies with comments regarding the acceptability of listed combinations. The tables are
intended as an aid to protection engineers and telecommunication service providers in the
selection of appropriate combinations of protection scheme and telecommunication system
technologies.
All of the tables list protection schemes outlined in Chapter 2.4.1, Protection Using Tele-
communication, condensed into basic groups according to their general communication
requirements, as outlined in Chapter 6 of this document.
In general, all state comparison and intertripping schemes require less communication
bandwidth and are virtually immune to communication delay variations. Communication system
bandwidth and delay variation requirements for analog comparison protection schemes, on the
other hand, vary widely and must be segregated to identify their differences. Notations are
made, where appropriate, to explain unique conditions that impact the protection scheme and
telecommunication technology selection.
Three tables are used to segregate the telecommunication technologies into the basic types of
communication service outlined in ANNEX A1:
- Media for Dedicated Point-to-Point Service (Table 7.1-1)
- Multiplexing Technologies for Shared Point-to-Point Service (Table 7.1-2)
- Network Technologies (Table 7.1-3).
In general, the characteristics of dedicated point-to-point service are determined by the installed
media, which have a wide range of bandwidth and delay characteristics. Multiplexed point-to-
point service is also heavily influenced by the installed media, however, the media selected for
these systems generally have wide bandwidth capability. The overall performance is therefore
most significantly influenced by the multiplexing technique. Consideration must also be given to
the affect that intermediate drops, repeaters, communication “load”, and multiplexing steps will
have on the overall end-to-end performance, especially delay characteristics. Network systems
are comprised of communication branches, taps, and loops, where the physical media may be
different on different parts of the network. Like multiplexed point-to-point systems, the media
selected for network systems generally have wide bandwidth capability. Network system
performance is therefore most significantly influenced by network transfer protocol.
Consideration must also be given to the affect of network configuration, network communication
loading, and operational switching.
The following three tables present the expected protection scheme performance using individual
communication technologies. It must be stressed that protection systems rely on end-to-end
communication performance. Evaluation of end-to-end performance on telecommunication
systems that include a mix of media, multiplexing technologies, and network technologies must
consider the worst case sum of all technologies used in the communication path. The best
performance can therefore be expected from simple, direct, homogeneous communication
systems. The performance of complex networked communication systems may be very difficult -
if not impossible - to predict. Experimental field trials may provide the best indication of
expected communication system performance.
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Unlice
nsed Optical
Licensed Radio
Metallic wire pairs Power Line Carrier Radio fibre
(Microwave)
(see 4.3.1) (see 4.3.2) (see (see
(see 4.3.3.1)
4.3.3.2 4.3.4)
)
Voice
Protection
Pilot wires Frequency Analog Digital
Scheme Analog Digital Digital Digital
(see 4.3.1) Circuits (SSB) (QAM, MCM)
ê
(see 4.1.2)
All State
Comparison
(1), (2) OK OK (6) OK OK (8) OK
Schemes
(see 3.1.2)
Direct
intertripping (1) OK OK (6) OK OK (8) OK
(see3.2.1.2)
Digital Current
Not (3), up to
Differential (1) (3) Not applicable (3) (3), (8) OK
recommended 19.2kbit/s
(see 3.1.1)
Analog current
Not
differential OK OK (8) (3) (3) (3), (8) (3)
recommended
(see 3.1.1)
Pilot wire
relays Not
OK Not used Not used Not used (4) (4) (4)
(50/60Hz) used
(see 3.1.1)
Phase Not
Comparison (3), (5) (3), (5) (3), (5) recommended (3) (3) (3), (8) (3)
(see 3.1.1.2) (8)
Charge Not
Comparison (3) OK OK recommended OK OK (8) OK
(see 3.1.1.3) (8)
Table 7.1-1: Protection Schemes vs. Media
Notes:
(1) Possible using audio tone communication.
(2) Direct Transfer Trip is possible using d.c. voltage scheme, typically applied with ac current differential protection scheme.
(3) OK if communication channel delay is kept within the relay’s delay compensation adjustment range
(4) Possible, if delay can be kept below 1ms
(5) Analogue non-segregated Phase Comparison only
(6) OK with (analog) sub-system for teleprotection command transmission, see 4.3.2
(7) OK for command-based systems
(8) Might be possible, however not recommended for reliability reasons. No applications in HV grids reported
Protection schemes are described in Chapter 2.4.1.

Media are described in Chapter 4.3.
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Protection Frequency Division Wavelength Division Code Division

Fixed TDM Statistical TDM
Scheme Multiplexing Multiplexing Multiplexing
(see 4.4.1.2) (see 4.4.1.2)
ê (see 4.4.1.1) (see 4.4.1.1) (see 4.4.1.3)
All State
Comparison
OK OK OK (2) (3)
Schemes
(see 3.1.2)
Direct
intertripping OK OK OK (2) (3)
(see3.2.1.2)
Digital Current
Differential OK OK (1) (1), (2) (3)
(see 3.1.1)
Analog Current
Differential OK OK (1) (1), (2) (3)
(see 3.1.1)
Pilot wire relays
Not Not
(50/60Hz) Not used OK (4)
recommended recommended
(see 3.1.1)
Phase
Comparison OK OK (1) (1), (2) (3)
(see 3.1.1.2)
Charge
Comparison OK OK (1) (1), (2) (3)
(see 3.1.1.3)
Table 7.1-2: Protection Schemes vs. Multiplexing Techniques
Notes:
(1) OK if communication channel delay is kept within the relay’s delay compensation adjustment range.
(2) Dynamically allocated bandwidth is not recommended unless one has full control over delay
(3) No practical installations using Code Division Multiplexing for protection have been reported yet.
(4) Possible, if delay can be kept below 1ms

Multiplexing techniques are described in Chapter 4.4.
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Transport Networks Service Networks

(see 4.5.1) (see 4.5.2)
SDH / Packet switched
Protection PDH Cell switched Datagram Circuit switched
SONET (X.25, Frame
Scheme (see (i.e. ATM) (IP) (POTS, ISDN)
(see Relay)
ê 4.4.2.1) (see 4.5.2.3) (see 4.5.2.4) (see 4.5.2.1)
4.4.2.2) (see 4.5.2.2)
All State
Comparison Not recommended Not recommended Not recommended
OK OK (1)
Schemes (2), (4) (3) (4)
(see 3.1.2)
Direct Intertripping Not recommended Not recommended Not recommended
OK OK (1)
(see3.2.1.2) (2) (3) (4)
Digital Current
Not recommended Not recommended Not possible
Differential (7) (5), (7) (1)
(2), (6) (3) (4)
(see 3.1.1)
Analog current
Not possible Not recommended Not possible
differential (7) (5), (7) (1), (7)
(8) (3) (8)
(see 3.1.1)
Pilot wire relays
OK OK Not possible Not recommended Not possible
(50/60Hz) (1), (9)
(9) (9) (2) (3) (4), (8)
(see 3.1.1)
Analog:
Not possible Not possible
Phase Comparison Not recommended
(7) (5), (7) (1), (7) Digital: Analog: (4), (8)
(see 3.1.1.2) (3)
Not recommended Digital: (4)
(2), (6)
Charge Comparison Not recommended Not recommended Not recommended
(7) (5), (7) (1), (7)
(see 3.1.1.3) (2), (6) (3) (4)
Table 7.1-3: Protection Schemes vs. Network Technologies
Notes:
(1) No experience yet, but no obvious reason why it will not work with proper network design and ATM QoS guarantees, see
ANNEX A3.
(2) Might be applicable in future WAN with proper network design with QoS guarantees. Today (1999), QoS standards are
still evolving.
(3) Not recommended unless the circuit is permanently established. Call setup is too slow or may be rejected. Connection
may not be under the control of the service user or may be released inadvertently.
(4) Delay is non-deterministic and may be excessive under heavy traffic load
(5) OK, if requirement for propagation time symmetry is met, or protection terminals compensate for delay asymmetry
(6) Protection devices may have to cope with significant propagation time and propagation time variation
(7) OK if propagation time is within the relay's compensation range and delay variation is limited, see chapter 6, Table 6.1-2
(8) Transparent transmission of analogue signals is not supported
(9) If propagation time of less than 1ms end-to-end is guaranteed by the network

Networks are described in Chapter 4.5.
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Table 7.1-4 broadly summarizes communication technologies and highlights some critical
issues that have to be addressed even when a properly designed communication
link/system/network is assumed.
Type of Critical issue Advantage for Disadvantage / Risk / Remedy

communication protection Warning
- ensures minimum
Dedicated point-to- propagation time
cost - single point-of-failure - introduce redundancy
point link - independent and
deterministic
- single point-of-failure - introduce redundancy
Multiplexed PDH - deterministic
propagation time - use terminal
circuits (point-to-point) behavior
- channel crossover addressing
- time stamping in
- propagation time protection relay
- Network resilience
variation due to re- - proper telecom
SDH / ATM based - deterministic
propagation time routing network design and
telecom networks behavior with QoS
system engineering
guarantees
- channel crossover - use terminal
addressing
- propagation time
- time stamping in
variation
protection relay
- Network resilience - non deterministic
IP based WANs propagation time - proper network
behavior
design and system
- missing QoS
engineering
guarantees
- mainly for intra- - propagation time - time stamping in
substation control & variation protection relay
Ethernet/IP based
propagation time monitoring - EMC if copper - proper network
LANs
- little experience for based LAN design and system
protection - single point of failure engineering
Table 7.1-4: Configuration summary
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7.2 DESIGN CHECKLIST
7.2.1 Application
1. Are protection and communication scheme compatible? (Refer to tables in chapter 7.1)
q What protection schemes are needed?
q What communication schemes are available?
q Are redundant protection and/or communication schemes required?
2. Does the selected teleprotection scheme provide the required performance? (Refer to
chapter 6)
q Teleprotection operating time (refer to Figure A1-5)
q Dependability
q Security
q Addressing
q Availability during power system fault conditions (EMC/RFI)
q Telecommunication outage recovery time (sometimes referred to as 'protection
switching time')
3. Redundant system evaluation?

q Probability of telecommunication common mode failures
- Power supplies and power source
- Clocking scheme / architecture
- Independent circuit routing
- Telecom equipment and media
7.2.2 Interfaces
(see Table 7.2-1)
q Type of interface
q Electrical / optical parameters
- Connectivity
- Electrical (voltages)
- Optical (power budget)
q Physical / mechanical
- Connectors
- Pins / pinout
q Power requirements
- Converters
q Cabling
- Shielding / grounding
- Type of cable / wire
- Cable length
- Who supplies
q Environment
- EMC
- Distance
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7.2.3 Contractual
q Performance monitoring
q Reporting
- Communication system
- Protection
q Guarantees
q Network policy
- Priorities
- Who decides
- Disaster recovery plan
q Technical support
- Hot line
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Table 7.2-1 Part 1: Contact Interfaces and Analogue Interfaces
Type of interface1 Electrical / optical parameters Mechanical / cabling / other
Mechanical contact Wiring, Wire diameters

Wetting voltage
contact position max. leakage
output Current rating (make, carry, Type of terminals / wire termination
Solid state contact (N/O, N/C) current
break)
(Transistor, SCR)
Signal flow directions
Relay coil EMC standards
Max. voltage
ON/OFF threshold voltage /
Contact interface
input Optocoupler input Pick-up time Electrical isolation
current
Interface (a) in ANNEX A1

Load current
Transistor input
Impedance Bandwidth / Frequency Wiring, wire diameters

2-wire
Transmit level spectrum
output Type of terminals / wire termination
Isolation voltage Frequency restrictions?
4-wire Insulation resistance Level restrictions?
circuit
2-wire EMC standards
Impedance
Bandwidth / Frequency Crosstalk
input Receive level Electrical isolation
spectrum (Near-end, far-end)
Isolation/Insulation
4-wire
Analog voice frequency

Interface (b) in ANNEX A1
Shielding
Voltage
Current Wiring, wire diameters
n-wire
output Signal dynamic range
(n = 2,3,4)
Impedance Type of terminals / wire termination
Insulation / Isolation
Voltage
Current EMC generic standards
Pilot wire n-wire
Pilot wire circuit

Signal dynamic range
input (n = 2,3,4)? Electrical isolation
Impedance
Interface (a) in ANNEX A1

Insulation / Isolation
1
Type of interface (a) or (b) refers to the definition in the Figures A1-1 to A1-4 in ANNEX A1.
Table 7.2-1 Part 2: Digital Serial Interfaces and Optical Fibre Interfaces
Type of interface1 Electrical / optical parameters Mechanical / cabling / other
Data format?
(e.g. Start, Stop,
Asynchronous Parity, Number of
RS232 operation bits) Connector type
Data rate and tolerance (male / female ….)
V24./V.28 Data flow control? Connector pin-out
Device DTE or DCE
Do data pattern
designation? Which signals of the standard are
RS 422 restrictions apply? (e.g.
0/1 density) being used?
Digital circuit
RS 485 Synchronous Clock provisioning: Signal flow directions
(electrical) operation
Clock master / EMC standards
Serial interface
slave?
Electrical isolation

Device DTE or DCE Clock vs. data
V.11/X.24 Data rate?
designation? phasing
Synchronous Grounding and cable shielding
Do pattern restrictions operation
Contra-directional? apply? (e.g. o/1 density)
G.703
Co-directional? (preferred)
Optical wavelength
Fibre bandwidth
Multimode fibre
(MHz * km)?
Spectral width of light
Optical power
output source (LED, LASER) Connector type, Standard
launched into fibre?
Single mode fibre Optical signalling speed Fibre type, Standard
(pulse rate)
Number of fibres needed
Fibre bandwidth
Multimode fibre Optical wavelength
(MHz * km)? Compatibility between F/O
Min. / Max. optical transceiver and fibre
input Optical signalling speed
Optical fibre interfaces

receive level?

(pulse rate)
Single mode fibre
Table 7.2-1: Checklist for Interface co-ordination between protection / teleprotection / telecommunication devices
1
Type of interface (a) or (b) refers to the definitions in the Figures A1-1 to A1-4 in ANNEX A1.
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
8 FUTURE TRENDS AND PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
8.1 TRENDS IN COMMUNICATION
8.1.1 General Network Development

Traditional Teleprotection systems were designed for use on transmission mediums with very
limited capacity. Teleprotection applications were limited both in terms of capacity and speed.
Special communication networks were often designed to accommodate the peculiar
requirements of Teleprotection.
Two main factors have changed the traditional ‘legacy approach’:
- New transmission technologies, particularly in fibre, now provide abundant capacity for
any utility application. Commercial transmission solutions already provide capacity in
excess of 100 Gbit/s. Experimental work indicates that viable solutions with 10 times this
capacity will be available soon. The ‘theoretical’ limit is still another order of magnitude
above today’s experimental level.
- Integration of services is a main development in the telecommunications industry. This
requires unified transport, switching and service-access systems. For this integration to
take place mechanisms to guarantee a certain level of Quality is required. Quality of
Service (QoS) -provisioning is now becoming an integral part of the network allowing any
service to be connected/maintained with a guaranteed QoS-profile.
These new telecommunications and data -communications technologies will mean that utilities
may be able to buy standard, off-the-shelf telecommunications products or even outsource their
communications needs. Within the Communications/Protection area of the utilities, the focus is
expected to shift from communication network design to a more facility managed approach.
8.1.2 Transport Technologies

The ITU-T defined standard Synchronous Digital Hierarchy (SDH) or the similar (but by no
means identical) North American standard SONET has evolved to a level of maturity where it’s
stability is no longer questioned. SDH offers bit-rates from about 155 Mbit/s (STM-1) to 10
Gbit/s (STM-64). This technology allows traffic to be switched and routed through a network.
High levels of availability may be achieved by exploring a certain (planned) degree of
redundancy in the network topology. Through the Network Management, critical services may
be allocated spare paths/containers in the network to give a desired degree of resilience. Thus
a certain Quality of Service (QoS) may be planned for each individual application. For services
transported over an SDH network, any desired Bit Error Rate (BER) in combination with
Availability can in theory be reached depending on the resilience (and cost) of the network.
The switching of a container through new network paths is highly undesirable for differential
protection applications in that the receive and transmit paths may have different routes and thus
different time-delays. Several solutions are being proposed to overcome this, such as adapting
the differential protection schemes to independent reference clocks or to use ‘channel locking’
to fix the paths of the containers that hold the teleprotection information on a permanent basis.
Dense Wavelength Division Multiplexing (DWDM) is a technology that is increasingly used in

high capacity transport systems, utilizing, to a greater extent, the potential available bandwidth
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in the fibre and exploring optical technology to switch individual bandwidth-slots in each node of
the network.
8.1.3 Networking Technologies

Several networking technologies have evolved over the last few years. Of these, Asynchronous
Transfer Mode (ATM) is expected to become a dominant technology. At present it offers many
advantages to traditional networking and switching technologies:
- A possibility of integrating all services through an ubiquitous multiplexing and switching

architecture.
- A possibility to give each service an individual QoS-profile at call-set-up or path-set-up.
- An efficient and fast switching architecture.
It has been shown that an ATM network may easily maintain and exceed the IEC Integrity level
3. Therefore security and, with a proper network topology, availability requirements may be met
with ATM networks.
Both absolute time delay and time delay variations are QoS-parameters that can be specified at
call-set-up in an ATM-network - provided the ATM-nodes are designed for this. In practice this
means that the Teleprotection messages are switched into high priority queues where no or little
other traffic may be waiting, and that the interface access is sufficiently fast ( > 2 Mbit/s).
However, the achieved time-domain granularity may not be sufficient in some networks to give
the desired QoS-profile, unless special considerations are made.
Several techniques may be employed to get around the time delay problems. They will need
careful validation before they can be considered to be mature.
8.1.4 Service Access/Provisioning Technologies

Internet Protocol technology (IP) will by many be associated with the global Internet that
happens to be based on a set of protocols with the same name. The global Internet has a
reputation for low performance. However, networks based on IP technology are exceptionally
reliable when the network has been designed and dimensioned properly.
Of special interest to the utility-applications is the fact that existing IP-Networks have been
designed for the transmission of ‘delay-insensitive’ data. Such best effort technologies are not
sufficient for power-utility applications. However, triggered by the onset of applications such as
‘multimedia’, new promising protocol-suits are emerging such as IPv6 (Latest Internet Protocol),
RVSP (Resource Reservation Protocol) and RTP/RTCP (Real Time Protocol / associated
Control Protocol). These new protocols will allow integration of diverse services with QoS-
specific profiles for each application. Although security and dependability can be secured with
the new protocols, transmission time is still a critical issue at present. It is still not clear whether
this will be resolved with sufficient granularity on the IP-platform.
8.1.5 Integration of Technologies

The division of the three technologies into three network levels above (transport, networking
and service access) will not always be the case:
- ATM solutions are being implemented where the ATM technology accounts for a fair
portion of the transport mechanism, only the lowest layer (multiplex section and
downwards) is left to SDH components
- ATM has through its Adaptation Layers provisions for direct access to services
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- IP is used as a networking technology especially for data-networks
A set of other and more detailed scenarios could be given. This, however, is outside the scope
of this brochure.
Essential for all these technologies is a Network Management system. Most systems on the
market today are Element Management systems strongly coupled to a particular vendors
equipment. There are some generic management platforms in existence today, but these
generally require substantial work to be developed and maintained in a specific network
environment consisting of multi-vendor equipment. Partly because of the complexity of the
network management system, unifying and simplifying the network technologies and limiting the
number of different equipment in a network is clearly an important task in smaller networks.
Three Network Management technologies are under development at present:
- OSI-Management/Telecommunication Management Network (TMN)

- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)
- Web-based Management
TMN is the only approach that gives a complete management view at present. The other two
platforms may also be suited for a network view but this requires some extra (often) network-
specific development. It will still take time before any of the platforms have reached a stage
where they can provide a multivendor/multitechnology network view without proprietary
development.
8.1.6 New Technologies for QoS provision

A number of new networking architectures and technologies offering an easier and more
accurate way of QoS implementation are currently under development. Most of them are
basically focused on video and TV broadcast service delivery.
Amongst the latest developments, Dynamic Time-slot Multiplexing (DTM) and Dynamic Packet
Transport (DPT) are the approaches that can better suit the QoS requirements of
Teleprotection.
Both technologies are based on the same working principle, the transport of IP packets over
SDH/Sonet networks, being the main differences between them the actual implementation and
the scalability limit. In both cases the bandwidth allocated to transport a flow of IP packets can
change dynamically during the life of the flow. Although these technologies are currently
focused towards MAN applications, there is no reason that prevents its application in a WAN. It
can be noticed that whilst DPT is more focused towards IP transport, DTM seams to be a more
generic approach that will be able to transport virtually any type of traffic.
The development of these technologies has not been fully completed although some field
installations are offering basic services and a comprehensive range of equipment has been
announced.
The process to consider these technologies a candidate for service provision will require a
standardization process to be successfully accomplished. None of the main standardization
bodies, the ITU-T (International Telecommunication Union), the IEC (International
Electrotechnical Commission) or the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force), have already
accepted to start-up such a process.
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8.1.7 Intra- and inter-substation communication

Computer networks are being introduced in power systems for intra- and inter- substation and
control centre communications using local and wide area networks. Since numerical relays are
increasingly introduced and they consist of microprocessors and digital devices, computer
communications can be inherently applied for protective relay communications within and
between substations. Various attempts and practices for substation integrated or coordinated
protection, control and data acquisition are being performed.
8.1.7.1 Intra-substation communication

Figure 8.1-1 shows an example for a basic configuration of intra-substation communications
network [22].
The IEEE 802.4 Token Bus technology using optical star couplers is employed for coordinated
substation digital protection and control systems. As the cycle time of a token in such LANs is
normally not constant, the LAN system can maintain a constant cycle time by sending variable
length dummy data from its main station for achieving synchronized sampling of current and
voltage at the data acquisition and control units.
The IEEE 802.3 Ethernet technology is used for the intra-substation control communications.
Figure 8.1-1: Local and wide area networks for protection
Figure 8.1-2 shows a concept of an integrated substation and the relationship between
applications from the Utility Communications Architecture (UCA) proposed by EPRI [23]. UCA
provides integrated utilities computer communication protocols which enable a wide variety of
utility information and control systems to share data seamlessly including real-time
communications among corporate headquarters, power plants, control centres, substations,
distribution automation equipment, and customer sites. Since UCA covers not only SCADA
systems, RTUs and substation automation devices, but also microprocessor-based intelligent
electronics devices (IED) including numerical relays, protective relay communications are also
accommodated by such networks.
The siginificant work in the UCA proposal is to identify how equipment should interoperate, and
how IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices) publish and subscribe to each other's information.
Substation devices and functions are represented as standardized object models in GOMSFE
(Generic Object Models for Substation and Feeder Equipment) in the UCA proposal. Modeling
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provides a way to standardize information exchange between other models and devices.
As the IEEE 802.3 Ethernet technology is proposed for protection communications, its dynamic
performance has been evaluated by simulating the LAN traffic that would be generated by a
particularly severe incident in a typical substation. Under the reasonable assumption that
messages generated by a power system fault are spread over 1 millisecond, it was found that
[24], [29]:
- A 10 Mbit/s shared hub Ethernet network has limited performance, as it can deliver less
than 20 messages in 4ms.
- Three types of LANs (10 Mbit/s switched hub, 100 Mbit/s shared hub, and 100 Mbit/s
switched hub) all can deliver 100 messages within 4 ms if messages are spread over 1
ms.
This intra-substation communication project is co-ordinated with IEC activities to establish a

process bus standard where a serial unidirectional point-to-point link using Ethernet is employed
as an interim step (see also Chapter 8.3.1).
EMS Substation Engineering

SCADA Controller Workstation
Digital
Communications
Equipment
Relays Meters Oscillography
Diagnostics
Sensors
Figure 8.1-2: Integrated substation applications dealt in UCA architecture
These intra-substation networks can be used for transmitting protection signals among
protective relays inside a substation and for supervising and controlling protective relays. As
supervisory and control information can be also transmitted to other substations or control
centres using wide-area networks (WAN) connected to the intra-substation networks (LAN), the
issue is whether one can use the substation LAN for communicating between protection relays
in different substations or not.
8.1.7.2 Inter-substation communication

Between the LAN and the WAN a Gateway is normally needed for protocol conversion as
shown in Figure 8.1-3, because the protocols and network technologies (Chapter 4.5) utilized
with the LAN and WAN are typically not the same. Although the delay depends on the message
length and transmission speed of the WAN, one can broadly say that the main delays are
introduced by the substation LANs (random delay for accessing the shared medium), the
receiving Gateway (WAN-LAN protocol conversion) and by the propagation delay that is
introduced by the WAN.
In general, networking protocols and the data traffic they support can be characterized as being
either connection-oriented or connectionless.
With a connectionless protocol, no interaction between the terminals takes place prior to the
exchange of data, and no fixed path through the network is set up. Data packets are routed
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through the network individually on a hop-per-hop basis. Connection-less thus also means that
data packets that belong to the same message may follow different routes with different signal
propagation delays through the network, and that the message transfer delay is determined by
the slowest packet. As data packets may not arrive in the same sequence as they have been
sent, they have to be re-assembled in the correct order at the receiving end. Because of its non-
deterministic latency characteristic, connection-less type of communication has so far not been
utilized for the transmission of protection signals across a WAN.
With a connection-oriented protocol between two network terminals, the source and destination
terminals interact with one another prior to the transport of data in order to set up and secure a
fixed connection between them. All data packets or cells will follow the same route once the
path has been established. A connection may be requested by the terminals through a
standardized signalling protocol or dial-up procedure (e.g. PSTN or ISDN), or a permanent
connection may be established by the network operator on a contractual basis (leased lines), or
the network may provide a fixed and permanent connection by design ('hard-wired' circuits).
Since WANs that are based on PDH and SDH technology (see Chapters 4.4.2, 4.6.2.1) provide
a set of permanent communication channels with fixed bandwidths and minimum signal transfer
delays, they are today the first choice in the selection of network technologies for the fast and
reliable transmission of protection signals.
More on the subject of WANs and telecommunication networks is found in Section 4 of this
document.
In conclusion, LANs and Gateways can introduce substantial and unpredictable time delays
which may not comply with the total available time budget for protection signal transmission.
Considering the stringent requirements for bounded signal propagation times (upper limits,
propagation time variation and -symmetry) and Quality of Service guarantees, it seems more
advisable to link protection relays directly via PDH or SDH channels (and perhaps ATM with the
most stringent AAL Class 1), thus bypassing the LAN and the Gateway by using a deterministic
serial data link to access the WAN.
A very careful bandwidth and latency study would need to be performed in any case.
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Figure 8.1-3: Substation LANs connected by a WAN
8.2 TRENDS IN PROTECTION
8.2.1 Considerations on new protection philosophies

Recent developments in Information Technology and powerful solutions in (distributed) real-time
processing are already applied in Process Automation. By using these technologies in HV
substations for protection and control, there can be opportunities for the development of new
protection philosophies in HV networks.
Because of the emerging competitive market in the utility area, cost-saving aspects will be
become more and more a key issue. Future protection schemes should be reliable, more
intelligent and above all cheaper. Therefore, the use of new information technology and data
processing will be necessary.
Protection Systems
In the present situation HV networks are protected by schemes and philosophies that are mainly
based on the following technologies:
- Analog comparison protection
- State comparison protection
- Teleprotection
Today, most applied protection schemes only use limited communication facilities (point to point
connections via analog links or sometimes digital 64 kbit/s channels).
The relays used in present schemes mostly get only information on bay level. The connections
to the transformers and HV devices in that bay are hard wired.
In the future, the use of communication networks enables the possibility to collect real-time
information from a much wider area than only from a substation bay. Summarized can be
stated:
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Today: - Analog comparison protection with point-to-point communication of analogue

quantities
- State comparison protection with point-to-point communication of binary state
indication signals
Future: - Analog comparison-, state comparison- and new wide-area protection systems
- LAN technology in substations to interconnect all equipment inside substations
- WAN based on SDH/ATM technology with enhanced real-time IP to interconnect
substations with high speed communication
- Integration of protection and control in one device with separate functions program
modules
- Voltage, current, active and reactive power flow values available as real-time
information on LAN level in a substation and on WAN level in HV networks
Challenge: - To do more and to use more intelligent protection solutions based on advanced
real-time (<5ms delay times) communication possibilities on LAN level in
substations and on WAN level in a HV network
Comparable developments in Substation Automation

In the area of Substation Automation there is a trend (EPRI with UCA2 architecture) for applying
fast LAN Technology to interconnect all the protection, control and HV equipment in the
substation. The data-communication is assumed to have a high transmission speed and low
latency. This concept can also be used in future protection schemes.
The following Figure 8.2-1 represents a substation LAN which is connected to all the relevant
equipment within the substation. The circle represents a LAN connected to the various
substation devices (dotted lines). The square boxes represent integrated protection and control
units.
LAN
P/C
P/C
P/C
Figure 8.2-1: Substation with LAN configuration
It is assumed that in substations, equipped which such a LAN, all the relevant information for
protection and control is available on the LAN and can be used by all protection and control
devices. This means that every relay can protect not only one bay, but it can perform protection
calculations with information from all other bays within the entire substation. Relays can even
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send trip commands to the other circuit breakers of the various bays via the LAN connection. In
this situation, distributed processing of protection functions and distributed redundancy will be
possible in a substation. Therefore, separate redundant hardware modules for every single bay
can be avoided. The amount of hardware may even be reduced to two or three dedicated
devices that protect the entire substation and connected lines and transformers. In such a
system, substantial cost-savings in protection schemes will be obtained.
Developments in high-voltage networks

As mentioned before there is a future trend for building substations with LAN communications.
When this is realised in several substations, these can be interconnected by a WAN with high
transmission speed and high performance to suit the protection schemes. The following Figure
8.2-2 represents a WAN.
WAN
LAN - A LAN - B
LAN - C LAN - D
Figure 8.2-2: HV (sub)network with WAN
In Figure 8.2-2 a high-voltage (sub-)network consists of various substation LAN's which are
interconnected by a WAN. In such a system, all information is available on every
protection/control device within this WAN network. Depending on the possibilities of the relays,
distributed processing of protection functions for analog comparison-, state comparison,
intertripping and wide-area protection can be carried out.
This communication structure creates new opportunities for future protection schemes on
network level. In the telecommunication industry, path protection and re-routing is an integrated
function. May be in the HV environment future protection can also co-operate with network
management like in the telecommunications discipline, because a lot of real time information is
available that can be used for fault clearing and automatic re-routing. This means that in every
substation bay information of all other bays in the network is available, so it may be used for
more advanced protection functionality and even for re-routing, because the information about
network topology and traffic load is also available.
Possibilities of (wide) area protection

In case of a failure in a HV network which is equipped with a area protection the following
options will become feasible:
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- intelligent fault clearing based on more available information;

- complicated HV failures can be (re)evaluated at network level;
- redundant and secured (2 out of 3) calculation for critical issues;
- trip signals can be send to the most effective breakers;
- load effects caused by fault clearing, can be estimated on HV network level;
- automatic and fast network restoration facilities;
- smart load scheduling based on active- and reactive power balance;
- adaptive protection systems will be possible.
Application examples
For the various options mentioned in chapter 5 a few examples of area protection functionality
can be described:
- Petersen earthed HV-networks mostly include overhead lines and to some extent
cables. In case of an earth fault in the cable part, a persisting earthing fault condition is
not acceptable. In that situation a distributed area protection can determine the fault
location fast and accurately and trip the faulty cable.
- Cross-country fault clearing can be better carried out by a second protection level, also
by an area protection. The first protection level trips the fault selective or if not, only one
of the two faults places. Because of the complexity of a cross-country failure, the fault
clearing can be more selective with the second protection level and if necessary, a
remaining earth fault can be tripped. Apart from that, the determination of the fault, that
has to be cleared (the first fault) can be based on the network topology.
- A future reactive power protection could be build by processing voltage on HV busses
and reactive power flows in HV- (sub-) networks. A smart load scheduling application in
combination with reactive power protection can be used to minimise the number of
customers that will be switched off.
Conclusion
Application of LAN in substations in combination with a HV network WAN, with SDH, ATM and
real-time Internet Protocol communication challenges the design of future protection systems.
The existence of an information WAN on HV network level is the main advantage. This gives the
possibility of creating distributed processing and inherent redundancy. This means that the
number of protection devices, including wiring to the HV components, can be reduced without
loss of availability, dependability and security of the system, if the stringent real-time
requirements can be met by the proposed concept.
8.3 OPEN ISSUES AND PROBLEMS TO BE SOLVED
8.3.1 Protection relay interoperability

Protection relay interoperability relates to the ability of protection relays from different
manufacturers to perform a stated function in a collaborating way.
As for today, interoperability has only be possible between protection relays in state comparison
protection schemes (see Chapter 3.1.2) that use simple contact interfaces (see Chapter 5.1) for
exchanging binary state information between the local protection relay and the relay at the
remote end. The reason for this favorable situation can be attributed to the fact that the
communication between relays is reduced to the simple exchange of "Trip" or "Do not trip"
commands, and that the protection relays can perform their impedance/distance algorithms at
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each line end independently from each other even when proprietary algorithms are used. Thus
only a minimum of co-ordination - if any - between relays is needed.
The situation is however less satisfactory for analog comparison protection schemes like current
differential protection, or for state comparison protection schemes when the teleprotection
function is integrated in the protection relay. Main reasons for incompatibility are proprietary
protection algorithms and/or proprietary communication protocols due to missing standards or
due to the choice of different options from existing standards.
The standards to be developed for protection relay interoperability would have to encompass at
least Layers 1 to 4 in the OSI reference model (Figure 4.5-3) when networking functionality shall
be included in the (tele-)protection device. True interoperability between protection relays would
require to develop standards for all layers of the OSI reference model, including the Application
Layer. Whether interoperability of protection relays from different vendors would justify the
development of a full set of complex standards is questionable. Nevertheless, it is becoming
clear that for future designs consideration should also be given to emerging standards in related
areas of utility communication, and that existing standards should be applied whenever possible
and economically justified.
Some ongoing - and for future teleprotection possibly relevant - standardization activities are:
- IEC TC57: Communication Networks and Systems in Substations.

Presently developing IEC 61850 and companion standards, with one objective being to
incorporate the UCA 2.0 (Universal Communication Architecture, Revision 2) proposal
from EPRI.
- IEC TC57: Communication Networks and Systems in Substations.
FDIS (Final Draft International Standard) of IEC 60870-5-104, specifying the transport of
teleoperation data (IEC 60870-5-101) using TCP/IP.
- IEEE PES/PSRC: Presently developing a proposal for N x 64 kbit/s optical fibre
interfaces between a teleprotection device and a multiplexer equipment.
- IEEE PES: Published a trial use recommended practice (IEEE P1379) for data
communication that recommends both DNP (Distributed Network Protocol) from the DNP
User Group Technical Committee and IEC 60870-5 protocols as originally developed for
SCADA/EMS systems. May be considered to be used for teleprotection.
- DIN/VDE (Germany): Currently developing a national standard dealing with
communication protocols and data formats for protective relaying, with focus on layers 1
and 2 of the OSI reference model.
As for today, protection systems using telecommunication are still some distance away from
"plug-and-play" solutions, particularly for analog comparison schemes. This is one of the areas
where forthcoming standardization may show promise.
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9 CONCLUSIONS
The Telecommunications evolution and the IT revolution has resulted in the need to reconsider
tried and tested methods of delivering teleprotection schemes and their associated bearer
services. The roll out of new communication network technologies presents possible
opportunities for cost efficient and advanced solutions for teleprotection systems. Wider
bandwidths offer scope for the transmission of higher speed data for improved protection
functionality and potentially better reliability, combined with rich analytical information.
New network technologies can provide improvements in security, availability and resilience, as
modern networks are configurable from a centralized network management system and support
automatic re-routing in case of single link failures. Service availability may therefore be better
than for legacy network technologies or simple point-to-point configurations, and proper network
design can ensure that the risk of single point of failures is reduced.
Network technologies that permit delivery of messages to multiple locations, or collection of data
from multiple locations will be essential for novel schemes such as wide area protection or
system wide protection, stabilizing protection and centralized protection. The continued
development of transport modes that can offer this type of service must be recognized and
suitable design concepts considered.
Optical fibre offers the best solution in an electrical hostile environment and is generally
accepted as the most appropriate communication medium for developing service network
platforms for the Electricity Supply Industry.
New communication network technologies have however also brought up new problems and
new challenges to protection, mostly related to the non-deterministic signal transfer time
behavior. Propagation time, its variation and symmetry are all critical characteristics that require
careful consideration with respect to teleprotection requirements. The inherent problems
associated with latency and signal transfer delay variation of “bandwidth on demand” or "best
effort" techniques may be overcome with the availability of higher bandwidths in the core and
access network, together with controlled Quality of Service mechanisms. Quality of Service
guarantees and sufficiently low network latency may however only be available at significant
additional cost.
Measures to overcome problems related to signal transfer time variations introduced by the
communication network can also be taken in the protection relay, e.g. by time stamping of
measured quantities (samples). It is however obvious that some legacy protection and
teleprotection equipment may not work with, or be able to take advantage of new Telecom / IT
network technologies, because they have been designed for deterministic (with respect to
bandwidth and latency) communication channels.
The economic effectiveness of high capacity service connections with performance guarantees
will always be subject to business justification. Protection is a niche application that has specific
characteristic requirements associated with the bearer services provided by the core business
Telecommunications infrastructure or by the Public Telephone Operator (PTO). Bearer services
for Teleprotection often represent less than 0.001% of network services provided by third party
Telecom Service Providers. It is becoming clear that the Electricity Supply Industry cannot drive
the development of products and standards in the Telecommunications Industry.
The unique requirements for stringent signal propagation delays, delay variation and delay
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symmetry are not common or even similar to any other customers needs. Future Telecom / IT
platforms and services offered by third party network service providers may not be able to
provide circuits that are compliant with existing and legacy teleprotection requirements.
Protection engineers must understand the changes that will be introduced by third party
providers, and develop solutions that are compatible with the new platforms being offered. If
these changes can not be accommodated, the Electricity Supply Industry will require to develop
its own Network for operational needs that can guarantee the long term availability of compliant
and resilient bearer services for the teleprotection and other mission-critical services needs.
Many utilities are already developing their own networks that are dedicated to their operational
needs using optical fibre infrastructure solutions. With an optical fibre infrastructure in place, the
availability of high capacity bandwidth at no additional cost is now implicit. Larger bandwidths
(more information within the acceptable delay) may open the door for new and improved
protection schemes such as multi terminal line protection, selectivity improvement for double
circuit lines and wide-area protection, to name a few.
The cost effectiveness and operational advantages of ensuring continued support of legacy
teleprotection services and the ability to accommodate new schemes on a compliant and
managed network are as yet unproven. Organizational changes that demand outsourcing and
facility management of assets may jeopardize the integrity and security of the
telecommunications platform that provides the essential elements of the electrical power
systems protection schemes.
The combined understanding of Electricity Supply Industry manufactures and the industries'
Protection / Telecommunication Engineers is needed to ensure that risks are minimized and the
most appropriate solutions are adopted.
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ANNEX A1 TELEPROTECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS
(a) (b) (b) (a)
Protection Teleprotection Teleprotection Protection

equipment equipment equipment equipment
or or Telecommunication system or or
function function function function
Telecommunication system
Teleprotection system
Figure A1-1: General teleprotection system configuration
(a) (b) (b) (a)

Dedicated medium or dedicated link
or or or or
(i.e. non-shared)
Figure A1-2: Teleprotection connected via dedicated medium or dedicated link (non-shared)
(a) (b) (b) (a)

or or Multiplexer Multiplexer or or
Other functions / services Other functions / services
Figure A1-3: Teleprotection connected via multiplexed communication system (shared medium)
(a) (b) (b) (a)

equipment equipment Telecommunication network equipment equipment
or or or or or
Protection Teleprotection WAN Teleprotection Protection
Figure A1-4: Teleprotection connected via telecommunication network
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Legend to Figures A1-1 to A1-4:
Protection equipment; Performs the protection function, excluding communication.

Protection function: Synonym for protection relay.
Teleprotection equipment; Converts the information from the protection equipment (relay) into a signal suitable for
Teleprotection function: reliable transmission over a telecommunication link /system/network. Includes all functions
that are necessary to obtain the desired dependability, security, and data integrity.
Performs intermediate function between protection and telecommunication. May also
multiplex signals from several protection equipments/functions, status indications etc. onto
a single telecommunication channel.
Typical layouts:
• Separate equipment for command-based state comparison protection schemes.
Interfaces (a) and (b) are accessible.
• May be integrated into the protection equipment, particularly for analog comparison
protection schemes. Interface (b) is accessible. Interface (a) is equipment internal and
normally not accessible.
• May be integrated into telecom terminal equipment. Interface (a) is accessible.
Interface (b) is equipment internal and normally not accessible.
Telecommunication system; System composed of telecommunication equipment and the associated physical link /
Telecommunication link: medium required to transmit information signals across a distance
Dedicated medium; A medium / link / circuit / channel that carries only the teleprotection service.
Dedicated link:
Multiplexer: A device which combines several signals or services onto a common medium for
transmission
Telecommunication network: A set of communication and switching devices that work in a collaborating way to provide a
telecommunication service between access points distributed over a wide area
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Fault inception Fault clearing

TC
42 - 210 ms
Fault clearing time for a protection system
TB
12 - 130 ms
Protection operating time
TA
2 - 70 ms
Teleprotection operating time
(a) (Overall operating time for a teleprotection system) (a)
Propagation
time
(b) (b)
Telecommuni-
Protection Tele- cation system Teleprotection receive function Protection Circuit breaker
equipment protection (-circuit / -link / equipment
transmit -network)
function 1)
Fault Time for

recognition initiating Propa-
time transmit gation
action time 2)
Selection Additional Operating
Relay
and decision delay due to time
decision
time, incl. disturbance time including
0 - 5ms
O/P circuits arcing time
10 - 30ms 1 - 5ms 1…10…40ms 0…10…30ms

3) 0 - 20ms 30 - 80ms
4)
To
2 - 45ms
Nominal transmission time
(propagation time not included)
Tac
2 - 65 ms
Maximum actual transmission time
under disturbed channel conditions for a defined
dependability and signal to noise ratio or BER.
Tpac
12 - 125 ms
Maximum actual protection operating time time
under disturbed channel conditions for a defined
dependability and signal to noise ratio or BER.
Notes:
1) Including the physical medium (cable, fibre) and the telecommunication intermediate- and terminal equipment
2) 0 ms applies when interface (b) is connected back to back. The propagation delay depends on the route length and on the number and type
of intermediate and terminal equipment involved.
5 ms may be difficult to achieve for networks. However, network latency will normally be offset by short times in the teleprotection receive
function (typ. 2 … 10 ms) for digital systems operating at 64 kbit/s or higher, such that the requirement for the overall operating time can be
met. See note 3)
3) Typical values for analog (narrowband) teleprotection systems are in the range 10 to 30 ms
Typical values for digital (wideband) teleprotection systems operating at 64kbit/s or higher are in the range 2 to 10 ms
4) 0 ms can apply to intertripping (direct tripping equipment)
2 to 10 ms are typical for state comparison protection relays (time for phase selection and O/P circuits operation)
10 to 30 ms are typical for unit protection relays (time for signal comparison and O/P circuits operation)
Figure A1-5: Typical operating times for protection systems incorporating teleprotection
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ANNEX A2 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS
Summary of transmission characteristics of various media and telecommunication systems. All values are approximate.
Propagation time Routing recovery Bit Error
Propagation time Propagation time Channel crossover Bandwidth or
symmetry Add / Drop time time / Network Rate
(from interfaces (b) to (b) in ANNEX A1) variation probability Capacity
(Differential delay) restoration time (typical)
< 1ms Not applicable low Not few kHz;
Pilot Wires Signal propagation time 5-10µs/km << 1ms Not applicable
if the same route (Pt-Pt links) (human error) applicable << 64 kbit/s
Power Line Carrier links Signal propagation time on HV line 3.3µs/km Not applicable low 4 … 8kHz;
<< 1ms < 1ms Not applicable < 10-3
(High Voltage Lines) (+ ~1.5ms for each PLC terminal equipment) (Pt-Pt links) (human error) < 64kbit/s1
Signal propagation time in air 3.3µs/km < 1ms Not applicable low
Microwave Links. << 1ms Not applicable < 10-3 > 64kbit/s
(+ ~1…2ms for each terminal equipment) if the same route (Pt-Pt links) (human error)
< 1ms low
Fibre Optic Cables Signal propagation time in fibre cable ~5µs/km << 1ms Not applicable Not applicable < 10-6 > 64kbit/s
if the same route (human error)
Signal round trip time 250-280ms
GEO Satellites No data available No data available Not applicable No data available No data available < 10-3 > 64kbit/s
(up + down)
Signal round trip time ~100ms -3
MEO Satellites No data available No data available Not applicable No data available No data available < 10 > 64kbit/s
(up + down)
Signal round trip time 10…30ms
LEO Satellites >> 1ms >> 1ms Not applicable No data available No data available < 10-3 > 64kbit/s
(up + down)
Signal propagation time in cable ~5µs/km exists
PCM cable links < 1ms < 0.1ms Not applicable Not applicable < 10-6 > 64kbit/s
+ max. 0.6ms per 64kbit/s to 2Mbit/s Multiplexer (Sync. failure)
Signal propagation time in cable 5µs/km
+ max. 0.6ms per 64 kbit/s to 2Mbit/s Mux exists
PDH networks < 1ms < 1ms ~0.6ms ~15min < 10-6 > 64kbit/s
+ 15µs per 2/8 Mbit/s Mux (Sync. failure)
+ 1µs per repeater
Signal propagation time in cable ~5µs/km ~ 1ms for single
< 1ms with < 120µs per
+ 35µs for 2Mbit/s port to STM1 link failure; exists
SDH networks < 3ms typical bidirectional ADM or < 10-6 > 64kbit/s
+ 40µs STM1 aggregate depending on (Sync. failure)
protection repeater
+ 110µs STM1 to 2 Mbit/s port system vendor
Signal propagation time in cable ~5µs/km
+ 1 ms processing time ATM Edge Mux
+ 6 ms packetization delay for 64kbit data
< 3ms cell delay
+ 0.5ms for each ATM core switch same as SDH if Cell misinsertion
variation (CDV) for (Similar to
ATM networks Note: Normally, the QoS parameter for Maximum No data available SDH is transport ratio (CMR) < 1/day < 10-6 > 64kbit/s
QoS class1 (ITU-T SDH)
Cell Transfer Delay (MaxCTD) will be defined. layer (ITU-T I.356)
I.356)
E.g., ITU-T I.356 suggests an upper bound on the
CTD of 400ms for an international ATM
connection.
Non-deterministic; Critical; exists > 64kbit/s
IP networks No guarantee Not applicable Not applicable < 10-5
No guarantee No guarantee (Routing error) on demand
5…. 15ms shared hub / 1… 2ms switched hub Few ms; exists
Ethernet 10MB LAN No data available Not applicable Not applicable < 10-5 > 64kbit/s
+ 6 ….12ms WAN time No guarantee (addressing error)
1….. 3ms shared hub / < 1ms switched hub Few ms; exists -5
Ethernet 100MB LAN No data available Not applicable Not applicable < 10 > 64kbit/s
+ 6 …12ms WAN time No guarantee (addressing error)
1
For voice and data only. For protection signal transmission, the capacity is sufficient for binary protection commands (state comparison schemes) or for non-segregated phase comparison applications
(unit schemes).
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
ANNEX A3 QUALITY OF SERVICE
A3.1 INTRODUCTION TO QOS

Quality of Service becomes a hot topic for power network protection when the
telecommunication service is rented from a service provider rather than using dedicated links
that are under the control of the service user. Transmission media and circuits are typically
unknown to the service user in this case, and traditional planning methods may no longer apply.
Quality of Service is something that is often talked about as an important user requirement, but
in the past little has been done in the standards area to give users any real influence over the
QoS they may be able to obtain for the services they require. Typically, service characteristics
are fixed when systems are built or when communications services are subscribed to, after
which there is not much that users can do. OSI network and transport layer protocols allow
limited signaling of QoS requirements, but in practice, they offer little more than the ability to
choose throughput classes when X.25 is used.
However, this situation is changing. Real-time applications can differ enormously in their
requirements for throughput and transit delay. Power network protection has extremely stringent
requirements for delivery within known time-windows, and will often need to use the same
communication network as other traffic. Therefore, the demand is growing for power utility users
to be able to state or negotiate the QoS they need.
Much of the work on the dynamic treatment of QoS is still at the research stage. QoS
mechanisms are being developed for time-critical communications, the Internet, multi-media
communications and so on. ITU-T and ISO/IEC are attempting to help in all this by developing
some common concepts and terminology (so that not everything is called a QoS parameter),
and by providing a central place where QoS methods and mechanisms can be published.
In the following paragraphs, a general introduction into the concept of QoS is given, followed by
a more detailed discussion regarding its application for ATM, where the concept of QoS has
been consistently adopted from the beginning.
QoS Parameters
In the common case, everything related to the desired quality of the traffic can be referred to as
Quality of Service parameters. One may distinguish between user-level QoS, application-level
QoS, system level QoS and at even lower levels. Parameters considered here relate to the
network.
Services may be broadly categorized in a qualitative manner into the following service classes
or service categories:
- Deterministic
Typical use is for "hard" real-time applications
- Statistical
Typical use is for "soft" real-time applications
- Best effort
Everything else, no guarantees are made
This crude approximation will probably not be sufficient in many cases. Thus, the following
quantitative QoS parameters may be specified:
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- Throughput can be based both on average data rate and/or peak data rate. The ratio of
peak rate and average rate of data streams is known as burstiness.
- Reliability relates to a certain probability of data loss which can be tolerated
- Delay can be specified based on an absolute or probabilistic bound.
- Delay variation or Jitter is the (short-term) variation in delay a message experiences.
Parameters are static if they are valid for the entire duration of the connection. If they can be
changed while a transmission is in progress, they are said to be dynamic.
A3.2 QOS DEFINITION IN ATM NETWORKS

As the concept of QoS has been thoroughly adopted for the specification of ATM layer services,
the ATM QoS concept is discussed in some detail below and follows [26].
ATM service classes

The two main bodies that establish ATM specifications are the ATM-Forum and the ITU-T. A
unified approach to the definition of ATM services in the ATM Forum and in ITU-T is presented
in the Table below. The ATM-Forum uses Service Categories instead of ATM Tranfer
Capabilities and QoS classes as defined by the ITU-T. Since different names are adopted to
define concepts that are very similar in purpose, the differences are more apparent than real.
The close relationships that have been established between the two bodies give a further
chance to harmonize their documents in the course of their parallel development.
An ATM Service Category (ATM Forum name) or ATM Transfer Capability (ITU-T name) is
intended to represent a class of ATM connections that have homogeneous characteristics in
terms of traffic pattern, QoS requirements and possible use of control mechanisms, making it
suitable for a given type of network resource allocation. The ATM-Forum has split the Service
Categories into real-time traffic (CBR and rt-VBR) and non-real-time traffic (nrt-VBR, ABR and
UBR). In the ITU-T, real-time and non-real-time are included in the QoS classes rather than in
the ATM Transfer Capabilities. The ATM-Forum on the other hand permits the use of the ITU-T
QoS classes, thus the differences are more apparent than real.
A first classification of these services/capabilities may be seen from a network resource

allocation viewpoint. We can identify:
- A category based on a constant (maximum) bandwidth allocation. This is called
Constant Bit Rate (CBR) in the ATM Forum and Deterministic Bit Rate (DBR) in ITU-T.
- A category based on a statistical (average) bandwidth allocation. This corresponds to
the ATM Forum Variable Bit Rate (VBR) and ITU-T Statistical Bit Rate (SBR). The ATM
Forum further divides VBR into real-time (rt-VBR) and non-real-time (nrt-VBR),
depending on the QoS requirements.
- A category based on "elastic" bandwidth allocation, where the amount of reserved
resources varies with time, depending on network availability. This is the Available Bit
Rate (ABR). The same name is used both in the ATM Forum and in ITU-T.
- A category considered only in the ATM Forum is the Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR). No
explicit resource allocation is performed; neither bandwidth nor QoS objectives are
specified.
In the rest of this document, the service categories are addressed based on the ATM Forum
"Traffic Management Specification" only.
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Correlation of ATM Forum and ITU-T ATM services:
ATM Forum TM 4.0: ITU-T I.371:

Traffic characteristics,
Application examples
ATM SERVICE ATM TRANSFER Purpose
CATEGORY CAPABILITY
- Real-time / time-delay
- Videoconferencing
sensitive data with QoS
Constant Bit Rate Deterministic Bit Rate - Telephony
guarantees
(CBR) (DBR) - Audio/Video Distribution
- Low cell delay variation
- Teleprotection
- Circuit emulation
- Voice communication
with bandwidth
- Bursty real-time data
compression and silence
- Efficient use of network
suppression
Real-Time Variable Bit Rate resources for delay
(for further study) - Interactive compressed
(rt-VBR) sensitive data
video
- Statistical multiplexing
- LAN interconnection
- SCADA / EMS
- Future teleprotection?
- Response-time critical
- Bursty non-real-time data
transaction processing
Non-Real-Time Variable Bit - Efficient use of network
Statistical Bit Rate applications (e.g.,
Rate resources for delay
(SBR) banking transactions)
(nrt-VBR) variation insensitive data
- Multimedia E-mail
- Statistical multiplexing
- No teleprotection
- LAN interconnection
- Dynamic bandwidth
- LAN emulation
- Flow control with
Available Bit Rate Available Bit Rate - TCP/IP
feedback
(ABR) (ABR) - E-Mail
- Network resource
- File transfer
exploitation
- No teleprotection
- Best effort delivery, no
- E-Mail
guarantees
- File transfer
Unspecified Bit Rate - Applications with vague
(no equivalent) - Messaging
(UBR) throughput and delay
- TCP/IP
requirements
- No teleprotection
- Low cost
Traffic Parameters
A source traffic parameter describes an inherent characteristic of a source. The following
parameters are considered for the purpose of defining the Service Categories :
- Peak Cell Rate (PCR)
- Sustainable Cell Rate (SCR)
- Maximum Burst Size (MBS) and Burst Tolerance (BT)
- Minimum Cell Rate (MCR)
- Cell Delay Variation Tolerance (CDVT)
- QoS Parameters
The traffic contract defines how the network should react when parameters that characterize the
traffic are exceeded. A traffic contract may be established either when the network user first
subscribes to a network service, or dynamically via user interface signaling or network
management negotiation.
QoS Parameters
The QoS parameters selected to correspond to a network performance objective may be
negotiated between the end-systems and the network, e.g., via signalling procedures, or can be
taken as default. One or more values of the QoS parameters may be offered on a per
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connection basis:
- Peak-to-peak Cell Delay Variation (CDV)
- Maximum Cell Transfer Delay (maxCTD)
- Cell Loss Ratio (CLR)
A number of additional QoS parameters have been identified, but their negotiation is not
foreseen but are assigned at call set-up, e.g.:
- Cell Error Ratio (CER)
- Severely Errored Cell Block Ratio (SECBR)
- Cell Misinsertion Rate (CMR).
A3.2.1 ATM Service Categories
Constant Bit Rate (CBR)

The CBR service category is used by connections that request a fixed (static) amount of
bandwidth, characterized by a Peak Cell Rate (PCR) value that is continuously available during
the connection lifetime. The source may emit cells at or below the PCR at any time, and for any
duration.
Thus, the only traffic parameter specified for the CBR service category is the Peak Cell Rate
(PCR).
The CBR service category is intended for real-time applications, i.e., those requiring tightly
constrained Cell Transfer Delay (CTD) and Cell Delay Variation (CDV). It would be appropriate
for protection signal transmission, provided that the signal propagation time requirements (see
ANNEX A1) that are influenced by the CTD and CDV parameters can be met.
The basic commitment made by the network is that once the connection is established, the
negotiated QoS is assured to all cells conforming to the relevant conformance tests. It is the end
station's responsibility to send only traffic that is compliant with the contract (PCR). The network
checks the traffic against the contract, and noncompliant cells are discarded.
Real-Time Variable Bit Rate (rt-VBR)

Like CBR, VBR is a reserved bandwidth service. The real-time VBR service category is
intended for time-sensitive applications, (i.e., those requiring tightly constrained delay and delay
variation such as voice and video). Sources are expected to transmit at a rate which varies with
time. Equivalently, the source can be described as "bursty".
Traffic parameters are Peak Cell Rate (PCR), Sustainable Cell Rate (SCR) and Maximum Burst
Size (MBS).
Cells which are delayed beyond the value specified by CTD are assumed to be of significantly
less value to the application. Real-time VBR service may support statistical multiplexing of real-
time sources.
Rt-VBR may be a candidate to be studied for future teleprotection implementations, as

protection systems typically need little communication capacity during the guard state and
request significant communication capacity in the operate state.
Non-Real-Time Variable Bit Rate (nrt-VBR)

The non-real time VBR service category is intended for applications which have bursty traffic
characteristics and do not have tight constraints on delay and delay variation.
As for rt-VBR, traffic parameters are PCR, SCR and MBS.
For those cells which are transferred within the traffic contract, the application expects a low
Cell Loss Ratio (CLR). For all cells, it expects a bound on the Cell Transfer Delay (CTD). Non-
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real time VBR service may support statistical multiplexing of connections.
Since the transmission of protection signals is extremely time sensitive, non-real-time VBR is
not applicable for teleprotection.
Available Bit Rate (ABR)

The Available Bit Rate (ABR) is a service category intended for sources having the ability to
reduce or increase their information rate if the network requires them to do so.
ABR service can be seen as a mix of reserved and non-reserved bandwidth service.
Periodically, a connection polls the network and, based upon the feedback it receives, adjusts
its transmission rate. Polling is done by Resource Management (RM) cells sent by the source
and looped back at the destination so that the network elements and the destination can provide
feedback information.
It is recognized that there are many applications having vague requirements for throughput.
They can be expressed as ranges of acceptable values, e.g., a maximum and a minimum,
rather than as an average value (that is typical for the VBR category).
Traffic parameters, which the end system may specify, are therefore a maximum required
bandwidth and a minimum usable bandwidth. These are designated as the Peak Cell Rate
(PCR) and the Minimum Cell Rate (MCR), respectively. The MCR may be specified as zero.
Although no specific QoS parameter is negotiated with the ABR, it is expected that an end-
system that adapts its traffic in accordance with the feedback will experience a low Cell Loss
Ratio (CLR) and obtain a fair share of the available bandwidth according to a network specific
allocation policy. Cell Delay Variation (CDV) is not controlled in this service, although admitted
cells are not delayed unnecessarily.
Since ABR service is not (as specified at present) intended to support real-time applications and
as no specific QoS parameters are negotiated, the ABR service category is not applicable to
protection signal transmission.
Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR)

The Unspecified Bit Rate (UBR) service category is a "best effort" service intended for non-
critical applications, which do not require tightly constrained delay and delay variation, nor a
specified quality of service. UBR sources are expected to transmit non-continuous bursts of
cells. UBR service supports a high degree of statistical multiplexing among sources.
As UBR service does not specify traffic related service guarantees, it is not applicable for
protection signal transmission.
The Table below summarizes Service Category Attributes and QoS Guarantees.
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QoS Parameters (Guarantees)

ATM Service Traffic Use of
Category Parameters Delay and Feedback
ê ê Min. Cell Loss Control
Delay Variance Bandwidth
(CLR)
(maxCTD, CDV)
CBR PCR, CDVT YES YES YES NO
PCR, SCR, MBS,

rt-VBR YES YES YES NO
CDVT
PRC, SCR, MBS,
nrt-VBR YES NO YES NO
CDVT
PCR, MCR, CDVT
ABR (+ traffic behavior YES NO YES YES
parameters)
UBR PCR, CDVT NO NO NO NO
A3.2.2 ATM over SDH/SONET

ATM may use various technologies as its transport vehicle (physical layer). Frequently,
SDH/SONET transport systems will be used. Errors introduced by the transport system as well
as other impairments will have a negative impact on the QoS. The Table below shows some
sources of degradation for the ATM QoS parameters.
QoS Parameters
CMR maxCTD
CER CLR CDV
Cell Maximum
Cell Error Cell Loss Cell Delay
Misinsertion Cell Transfer
Ratio Ratio Variation
Ratio Delay
Propagation
X
Link / network /
Time
parameters
Propagation
Time X X
medium
Variation
Bit Errors /
X X X
Media Errors
Switch
X X X
Architecture
ATM specific
Buffer
X X X
Capacity
Traffic Load /
X X X X
Resource
(except CBR) (except CBR) (except CBR) (except CBR)
Allocation
Number of
X X X X X
Nodes / Hops
network
General
design
Network /
Hardware X
Failures
The following Table shows the expected impact of QoS parameters onto general
communication performance parameters at interface (b) in the Figures in ANNEX A1, and their
possible adverse impact onto the (tele)protection function. It is noted that the table is
speculative as little experience yet exists with protection signal transmission over ATM.
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Communication performance
(Tele-)Protection parameters
parameters
BER Transmission
Jitter Dependability Security
Bit Error Rate Time
CER
X X X X
Cell Error Ratio
CLR
X X X
ATM QoS parameters
Cell Loss Ratio

CMR
Cell
X X X X
Misinsertion
Ratio
maxCTD
Maximum Cell (X) X
Transfer Delay
CDV
Cell Delay X (X) (X)
Variation
A3.2.3 Applications Summary

The Table below is an attempt to sum up the indications outlined in this section as related to
typical power utility applications. It is not intended to create a restrictive correspondence
between the identified application areas and ATM-layer services, and should therefore not be
taken restrictively.
Application areas for ATM service categories:
APPLICATION AREA
CBR rt-VBR nrt-VBR ABR UBR
ê
Critical Data, not delay

fair fair optimum fair not suitable
sensitive
Critical Data, delay
good good not suitable not suitable not suitable
sensitive
Circuit Emulation optimum good not suitable not suitable not suitable
LAN Interconnect
fair fair good optimum good
LAN Emulation
State Comparison
Protection Signal good fair…optimum ? not suitable not suitable not suitable
Transmission
Analog Comparison
Protection Signal good fair…optimum ? not suitable not suitable not suitable
Transmission
The ratings (optimum - good - fair - not suitable) refer to the efficiency/cost advantages the use
of ATM may have for the stated application areas. The ratings given for protection signal
transmission are speculative and apply subject to the condition that native ATM interfaces are
available and that the requirements for the end-to-end signal propagation time can be fulfilled
(see Figure A1-5).
A3.3 QOS DEFINITION IN IP NETWORKS

Although IP networks have been traditionally considered as best-effort networks, the new QoS
architecture has widened their applications. The Internet Engineering Task Force IETF has
defined two models for providing QoS: the Integrated Services (Int-serv) and the Differentiated
Services (Diff-serv).
The Integrated Services model is based on the resource reservation paradigm. Before data
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are transmitted, the applications must set-up a path and reserve the resources. This working
principle resembles the one used in circuit switched networks therefore being adequate for non-
elastic applications such as voice telephony, or Protection communication in the future. The
complete implementation of this architecture requires QoS aware applications or the addition of
Gateways between the legacy applications and the Integrated Services core since the network
has to be informed about the profile of the traffic offered and the QoS requirements of the user.
Differentiated Services is based on the definition of different classes of services. The packets
are marketed differently depending on the service class their application/flow belongs to.
Therefore, Differentiated Services is essentially an evolution of the static-priority scheme.
Whereas Int-serv architecture guarantee and End-to-End QoS, that is to say, application-to-
application, the Diff-serv architecture guarantees the QoS only in its own domain.
Differentiated Services is an evolving architecture and in fact, still an immature technology

under discussion by different working groups of the IETF.
The provision of QoS for the Teleprotection application is a must, since both the bandwidth and
the delay of the virtual channel established throughout the network to support the protection
relay communication has to be guaranteed in a deterministic way.
Existing protection relays do not include IP Ethernet interface; therefore, we have to focus on
the new and evolving technologies. In this field, the new Utility Communication Architecture
UCA is the most relevant example. The UCA architecture is based on the use of standard
protocol stacks. Two tracks with different profiles have been defined including both the ISO and
the TCP/IP approaches.
Data interchange with devices in real-time networking environments is accomplished by adding

the following specific components:
- Generic Object Models for Substation and Feeder Equipment, (GOMSFE) which defines
a set of object models for use across a broad range of typical utility devices;
- Generic Object Oriented Substation Event, (GOOSE) which allows a device to broadcast
status information on the local segment;
- Common Application Service Models, (CASM) which defines a standardized set of
abstract services supporting the UCA object models, as well as the methods of mapping
the services to the Manufacturing Message Services (MMS).
None of these application elements have been designed to specify their QoS requirements to
the network. Therefore, the provision of Teleprotection service will require static QoS
requirements that will have to be introduced in the Network Management Centre.
Three classes of services could be identified in IP QoS networks: Guaranteed Service,

Controlled Load and Best-Effort.
The first one is used to support those applications that are non-tolerant to uncontrolled delays
and/or losses. The second is used to support elastic applications, that is to say, applications
that can control the traffic flow that they are offering to the network and therefore can tolerate
some changes in delay and throughput, whereas that the third one is used by those applications
that do not require QoS.
Teleprotection service is associated with the Guaranteed Service class. Nevertheless, special
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care has to be taken to verify that the network is providing deterministic guarantees. To achieve
this, the network architecture requires a set of components to be provided.
The principle of QoS assurance is based on an interaction between the user and the network.
This interaction is expressed by means of a Traffic Contract or agreement that includes the
commitments of both parties.
The total delay has two parts: a fixed delay caused by the transmission delay of the path and a
queuing delay caused by the intermediate nodes. The fixed delay depends only on the chosen
path and is not determined by the QoS mechanism but by the setup mechanism. The queuing
delay is determined and controlled by the QoS mechanism provided by the network. The
queuing delay is primarily a function of two parameters the token bucket size and the data rate.
These two values are under the application control, and therefore, the application can estimate
the delay and if it is larger than required, the bucket size and the rate can be modified to
achieve a lower delay.
The end-to-end QoS is based on an assured bandwidth provided by the network that, when
used by a shaped flow, produces a delay bound service with no queuing loss. This service
scheme can only control the maximal queuing delay without providing any kind of control on the
jitter since the delay will change from the transmission delay of the path to the transmission
delay plus the queuing delay.
The traffic profile is specified by means of the Traffic Specification or TSpec whereas that the
QoS requirements are specified by means of the Service Request Specification or RSpec. Both
specifications form the two parts of the Traffic Contract.
TSpec defines the flow’s traffic pattern allowed in terms of the average packet rate, maximum
burst rate and size, and the packet size. It has to be considered that these parameters define
the maximum allowed not the actual traffic profile. Excess traffic could be directly discarded or
transmitted as Best-effort depending on the traffic policy of the network.
RSpec specifies the QoS a flow requires. That is to say, the bounded maximum End-to-End
delay expressed in this case by means of the bandwidth reservation required by the flow
defined by means of TSpec. The network should reserve enough resources to guarantee that
no losses due to network congestion will ever occur. A detailed specification of the QoS
parameters including formats and range of values can be found in the RFC 2212 “Specification
for Guaranteed Quality of Service”. The same document also describes internal network
architecture to achieve end-to-end QoS.
TSpec and RSpec are calculated by a QoS reservation algorithm embedded in the application.
The algorithm takes into account the actual QoS requirement and the propagation delay of the
path to carry out the calculation of the TSpec and RSpec parameters That once accepted by the
admission control will be delivered to the network elements.
Other QoS aspects such as service availability are not defined in the Traffic Contract. They
have to be achieved by means of the proper network design.
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Parameter Units Range

Bucket depth “b” Bytes/sec 1 to 40 Tbytes/sec
Bucket rate “r” Bytes/sec 1 to 40 Tbytes/sec
Peak rate “p” Bytes/sec 1 to 40 Tbytes/sec
Minimum policed unit “m”
Datagrams shorter than m are Bytes m<M
accounted as length m
Maximum datagram size “M” Bytes M<=MTU
Table 8.3-1: TSpec Parameters
Parameter Units Range

1 to 40 Tbytes/sec
Transmission rate “R” Byte/sec
R>r
Slack term “s”
Difference between the desired delay µsec 0 to 232-1µsec
and the delay obtained using “R”
Table 8.3-2: RSpec Parameters
Although IP networks can offer deterministic guarantees to those flows that require it, only the
maximum end-to-end delay can be controlled. The difference between the propagation delay
and the bounded delay that includes the queuing delay cannot be controlled, thereby obtaining
a considerable delay jitter that can impair the global quality of the virtual connection. This jitter
could be increased by the imprecision of the queue schedulers in the packet switches. That is to
say, the algorithm that controls the process of packet switching can only offer the calculated
performance for infinitesimal short packets. The longer the packets the bigger the imprecision in
the delay control. It has to be considered that the packet length of any other flow switched in the
same node will affect the delay jitter of our flow. Due to this, the use of IP networks to support
Teleprotection services should be limited to well-controlled domains in which all the above
mentioned factor fall into our control.
ATM technology, which is based on a short and fix packet length called cell, can be envisioned
as feasible solution to support the Teleprotection service since it can guarantee and effectively
control both the delay and the delay variation.
The combination of IP technology that offers cost-effective access interfaces and the ATM
technology that offers network wide reliable delay control might probably be one future
approach to support the Teleprotection service in the broadband environment.
Lit:. [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], [36].
A3.4 IP TO ATM SERVICE MAPPING

The service offered to the final user of the network, which could be defined by the service class
and its QoS parameters, should not be affected by the network implementation. That is to say,
services classes, traffic descriptors and QoS parameters of a QoS IP network have to be
maintained even thought ATM backbones or any IP over ATM architecture had been chosen to
implement the network.
In order to achieve this goal, the devices that interconnect the IP and the ATM subnetworks
have to include, among others, the capability of translating every service aspect as well as QoS
parameters in order to assure an end-to-end QoS.
Due to the different service definition in both networks the services are mapped according to the
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following association:
- Guaranteed Service à CBR or rtVBR

- Controlled Load à nrtVBR or ABR (with a minimum cell rate)
- Best Effort à UBR or ABR
The details of service mapping as well as the QoS and traffic parameters could be found in the
RFC 2381. “Interoperation of Controlled-Load Service and Guaranteed Service with ATM”, [36].
Traffic and QoS parameters are defined in the IP environment in terms of bytes/s whereas that
in ATM are defined in cells/s. The corresponding mathematical transformations that takes into
account overhead introduced by the different size of IP and ATM headers can be found in RFC
2381, [36]. Since these functions are included in the standards, they are always included in the
Gateways that interconnect IP and ATM networks.
A3.5 QUALITY OF SERVICE STANDARDS
ITU-T RECOMMENDATION
ISO/IEC
No. TITLE EQUIVALENT
Terms and definitions related to quality of service and network performance

E.800 none
including dependability
General quality of service parameters for communication via public data
X.140 none
networks
X.641 Information technology - Quality of Service - Framework 13236
Information technology - Quality of Service – Guide to methods and
X.642 mechanisms 13243
(presently at the stage of draft)
General aspects of quality of service and network performance in digital
I.350 none
networks, including ISDNs
I.356 B-ISDN ATM layer cell transfer performance none
I.371 Traffic Control and Congestion Control in B-ISDN none

Types and general characteristics of ATM equipment
I.731 none
(Paragraph 7: Generic performance requirements)
B-ISDN User Part - Support of additional traffic parameters for Sustainable
Q.2723.1 none
Cell Rate and Quality of Service
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ANNEX A4 PROTECTION SYSTEM TIME SYNCHRONIZATION

TECHNIQUES
A4.1 TIME SYNCHRONISATION FOR SIMULTANEOUS SAMPLING

Two principal teleprotection functions for microprocessor-based current differential line
protection, in which protection relays are comparing data with the same tag of time, is to provide
the timing synchronization for the simultaneous sampling of current waveforms at all remote
terminals of the line and the current data transmissions among the terminals. There are two
ways to achieve timing synchronization; internal timing synchronization using its own
teleprotection signaling channel and external timing synchronization using external timing
source such as GPS as shown in Figure 8.3-1.
Figure 8.3-1: Two ways of timing synchronization for current differential teleprotection
A4.1.1 Internal timing synchronization

The internal timing synchronization scheme between two terminals is implemented in the
transmission or teleprotection equipment, and timing synchronization signals are transmitted in
the teleprotection channel to self-adjust the internal clocks of the terminals by sending a
message back and forth between the terminals. There are basically two types of message
transmissions including timing pulses between master (or reference) and slave (or
synchronizing) terminals: round-trip and mutual (or two-way) transmission methods. However,
many variations exist for implementation.
In the round-trip transmission method shown in Figure 8.3-2(a), a reference timing pulse at the
master terminal is transmitted to the slave terminal. The transmitted reference pulse is returned
to the master terminal. The returned reference pulse is delayed by round-trip transmission
through the outgoing and incoming transmission lines (δ1 and δ2). Transmission delay is
measured at the master terminal, and the data is transmitted to the slave node. The slave node
executes delay compensation corresponding to a half of the round-trip delay, (δ1 + δ2)/2 to
achieve timing synchronization.
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In the mutual or two-way transmission method, both terminals mutually transmit reference
pulses. Each terminal measures the time difference between the transmission of its own pulse
and the reception of the opposite terminal's pulse; TM at the master terminal and TS at the
slave terminal. TM is transmitted to the slave terminal which executes delay compensation
corresponding to a half of the difference between the two delays, (TM - TS)/2. The delay
compensation is initiated upon reception of the master node's pulse by the slave terminal. A
synchronization error of a few microseconds between two PDH-based synchronization devices
was experimentally obtained in multi- (four or five) repeater microwave.
Figure 8.3-2: Two-types of timing pulse transmission methods
Figure 8.3-3 shows another implementation. A terminal acts as the reference clock for the
system. A numbered message is sent from the synchronizing terminal at time tA1. It is received
at time tB1’ at the reference terminal and returned back at time tB2. It is received at the
synchronizing terminal at time tA2’. The times tB1’ and tB2 are sent with the next message to the
synchronizing terminal. The difference ∆t between the clocks in the synchronizing and the
reference terminal can now be calculated by the synchronizing terminal as
t A1 + t A2' t B1' + t B 2
∆t = −
2 2
The clock in the synchronizing terminal can now be adjusted by a fraction of ∆t until ∆t becomes
zero. The synchronizing and reference terminal clocks are synchronized and the samples of
current can be compared at the same sampling instant. Since the clocks are crystal controlled,
they maintain synchronism for long times of transmission interruptions [16].
Figure 8.3-3: Implementation of round-trip transmission method
Another implementation is shown in Figure 8.3-4. In this case the terminals also use the same
data polling technique as described above for the measurement of the channel delay time.
Every terminal calculates the time delay δ with regard to the other ones as
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(t A2' − t A1 ) − (t B 2 − t B1' )
δ ≡ δ1 = δ 2 =
2
With the measurement of the time delay, the local sampling timing can be adjusted as
t AB 2 = t A2 − δ .
Figure 8.3-4: Another implementation of round-trip transmission method
Although this method can achieve synchronization between the terminals, an asynchronous
operation where the internal clocks of the terminals don’t need to be synchronized can be also
performed. The sampling time of the received current vector values from the remote terminal
can be measured as tAB2. Since the current samples have not been taken at the same sampling
instant, a vector transformation in software is required to rotate the remote vector by an angle
corresponding to the time tAB2 - tA2, and then to compare with the local value sampled at tA2.
These procedures assume the same time delay δ in both directions, so in communication
systems where both directions can be switched via different routes (SDH and ATM networks)
the difference in time delay for data transfer in both directions will introduce an error in the
determination of the differential current [15], [5]. Requirements on differential time delay and
solutions are discussed in chapter 6.
A4.1.2 External timing synchronization

Internal terminal-to-terminal basis synchronization may not be available for wide-area
applications, because the multiple-link synchronization mechanism is hard to be implemented in
conventional telecommunication or teleprotection equipment. External time synchronous signal
may be effective for that purpose. This eliminates the timing synchronization function from the
telecommunication system used for teleprotection signaling channels, which makes the
telecommunication system design much easier.
There are many ways to provide precise timing signals externally. Form the viewpoint of
technological maturity and the ease of availability, the satellite-based Global Positioning System
(GPS) is a solution [17], [18]. Other satellites such as the Russian GLONASS (Global
Navigation Satellite System) are also candidates for the wide-area time dissemination.
Synchronization with GPS satellite signals is the preferred technique at the present time. Global
Positioning System using on-board atomic clocks (cesium or rubidium) consists of 24 satellites
in 12-hour orbits at an altitude of 20,183 km. There are six orbits used with 4 satellites in each
orbit. Using the transmissions from these satellites, positions of objects can be determined with
an accuracy of 10 meters in three dimensions, and in the common-view time transmission
provided by these satellites, 1-pulse-per-second (1-pps) signals at any location in the world with
an accuracy of about 1 µs (basic time synchronization accuracy is ±20 ns) are available when
159 / 172
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decoded by appropriate receiver clocks. Synchronous phasor measurement technique using

GPS has been developed to measure power system phasors, transmit the data with time-tags,
and then record or analyze them in real time [19]. The technique can be used for teleprotection
signaling and wide-area adaptive protections. Prudent considerations should be taken with
regard to unavailability and/or precision degradation due to intentional or unintentional radio
interference, satellite and/or receiver failures and so on. Recently, however, highly accurate but
low-cost timing sources which is usually synchronized with the GPS clock and maintains a
microsecond-order accuracy for several days even when the GPS signal is lost are being
developed.
A variety of alternatives exist for time synchronization using a terrestrial signal from a central
location. AM radio broadcasts are least expensive, but their accuracy is limited to a few
milliseconds. An access to reference time server using UNIX-based NTP (network time
protocol) via TCP/IP networks or Internet is less accurate. Utilities can use their own private
telecommunication channels such as microwave or fiber-optic circuits where the solution may
approach 1 µs, and custom or dedicated fiber-optic links may achieve better accuracy.
In terms of future use by utilities of broadband digital communications, SDH networks, which are
presently master-slave frequency synchronous networks, appear promising for a terrestrial time
synchronous system. Terrestrial SDH-based time synchronous system of which accuracy is
comparable with GPS is under study in several organizations [20], [21]. Current SDH networks
are equipped with clock supplies to synchronize its operation clock frequency all over the
network, making it easy to handle multiplexing and demultiplexing of digital signals. In order to
time-synchronize frequency-synchronized networks of this type, externally additive time
synchronizing equipment which transmits time signals to adjacent nodes, measures round-trip
or two-way delays between the nodes, and compensates the two-way differential delay, was
proposed as shown in Figure 8.3-5, [21]. To transmit a time signal, especially reference timing
pulse in SDH networks, undefined bytes in the SDH frame overhead are used. In the system
auxiliary time synchronizing equipment (TSE) is attached to existing SDH transmission
equipment and clock supply equipment (CSE). In these systems frequency synchronization is
conducted by CSEs which usually have a digital processing phase locked loop, and phase or
time synchronization is carried out by TSE. Experimental results indicated that an accuracy of
about 1 µs can be achieved.
GPS Time Transfer Terrestrial Time Transfer

using digital (SDH) networks
Clock Data
GPS satellites Master station
M CSE-M
TSE-M
Slave
S S stations SDH
Time
signal
CSE-S
Slave
GPS stations
receivers TSE-S
S Time S S
signal SDH
Time
Power Control and Protection System signal
SDH: SDH Transmission Equipment (existing)
CSE: Clock Supply Equipment (existing)
TSE: Time Synchronous Equipment
M: Master, S: Slave
Figure 8.3-5: GPS and an SDH-based master-slave time transfer network
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE 2.1-1: SINGLE-LINE DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL POWER STATION ........................................................................9
FIGURE 2.1-2: SINGLE LINE DIAGRAM OF A TYPICAL TRANSFORMER STATION ..........................................................10
FIGURE 2.1-3: THE SCANDINAVIAN POWER GRID .....................................................................................................11
FIGURE 2.2-1: POWER LINE WITH EXAMPLES OF FAULT TYPES AND FAULT POSITIONS ..............................................12
FIGURE 2.4-1: TYPICAL POWER SYSTEM AND ITS ZONES OF PROTECTION ..................................................................16
FIGURE 2.4-2: OVERLAPPING PROTECTION ZONES ESTABLISHED BY CURRENT TRANSFORMER LOCATION ................17
FIGURE 2.4-3: FAULT CLEARING SYSTEM ..................................................................................................................18
FIGURE 2.5-1: FUNDAMENTAL TERMS ON PROTECTION AND TELEPROTECTION (FROM IEC60834-1) .......................20
FIGURE 3.1-1: PRINCIPLE OF DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION..........................................................................................23
FIGURE 3.1-2: DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION: EXAMPLE OF PERCENTAGE RESTRAINT CHARACTERISTIC .....................23
FIGURE 3.1-3: BASIC SCHEME OF A CURRENT BALANCED SYSTEM USING THREE PILOT WIRES ..................................25
FIGURE 3.1-4: CENTRALIZED CONFIGURATION .........................................................................................................27
FIGURE 3.1-5: DISTRIBUTED CONFIGURATION ..........................................................................................................27
FIGURE 3.1-6: PHASE COMPARISON OPERATING PRINCIPLES .....................................................................................29
FIGURE 3.1-7: OPERATION OF CHARGE COMPARISON, EXTERNAL FAULT ..................................................................31
FIGURE 3.1-8: BIAS CHARACTERISTIC OF CHARGE COMPARISON...............................................................................32
FIGURE 3.1-9: IDEAL POLAR DIAGRAM CHARACTERISTIC ..........................................................................................32
FIGURE 3.1-10:INTERTRIPPING UNDERREACH DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEME LOGIC.............................................35
FIGURE 3.1-11:PERMISSIVE UNDERREACH DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEME LOGIC .................................................36
FIGURE 3.1-12:PERMISSIVE OVERREACH DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEME LOGIC ....................................................37
FIGURE 3.1-13:ACCELERATED UNDERREACH DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEME LOGIC .............................................38
FIGURE 3.1-14:BLOCKING OVERREACH DISTANCE SCHEME LOGIC ...........................................................................40
FIGURE 3.1-15:DEBLOCKING OVERREACH DISTANCE PROTECTION SCHEME LOGIC .................................................41
FIGURE 3.2-1: TWO BREAKER BUSBAR CONFIGURATION ...........................................................................................42
FIGURE 3.2-2: 1½ BREAKER BUSBAR CONFIGURATION .............................................................................................44
FIGURE 3.2-3: TWO PROTECTION ZONES / ONE BREAKER BUSBAR CONFIGURATION ..................................................46
FIGURE 3.3-1: GENERATOR PROTECTION ..................................................................................................................47
FIGURE 3.3-2: TRANSFORMER PROTECTION ..............................................................................................................48
FIGURE 3.3-3: REACTOR PROTECTION .......................................................................................................................48
FIGURE 3.4-1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROTECTED AREA AND OPERATE TIME WITH RESPECT TO PROTECTION
SCHEMES 49
FIGURE 3.4-2: DISTANCE PROTECTION PROVIDING REMOTE BACKUP ........................................................................50
FIGURE 3.4-3: SPLITTING PROTECTION (BD) USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS FOR MULTI-CIRCUIT AND MULTI-
TERMINAL LINE. RY, CB AND TD DENOTE OPERATING TIMES OF RELAY (30 MS) AND CB (40 ............................50
FIGURE 3.4-4: COORDINATION TIME CONTROL USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS. RY, CB AND TD DENOTE OPERATING
TIMES OF RELAY (30 MS) AND CB (40 MS) AND TIME DELAY FOR COORDINATION, RESPECTIVELY. ....................51
FIGURE 3.4-5: WIDE-AREA CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL BACK-UP PROTECTION EMPLOYING TELECOMMUNICATIONS ....52
FIGURE 3.4-6: A SYSTEM-WIDE PROTECTION; PREDICTIVE OUT-OF-STEP PROTECTION .............................................54
FIGURE 4.4-1: PRINCIPLE OF WAVELENGTH DIVISION MULTIPLEXING FOR 2 WAVELENGTHS, ................................70
FIGURE 4.5-1: NETWORK ARCHITECTURE.................................................................................................................76
FIGURE 4.5-2: NETWORK COMPONENTS ....................................................................................................................77
FIGURE 4.5-3: SEVEN LAYER OSI MODEL .................................................................................................................78
FIGURE 4.5-4: REFERENCE MODEL OF THE CIRCUIT EMULATION SERVICE (CES).....................................................81
FIGURE 4.5-5: LAN TOPOLOGIES .............................................................................................................................83
FIGURE 4.5-6: LAN PROTOCOL LAYERING ................................................................................................................84
FIGURE 6.1-1: INAPPROPRIATE OVERLAPING OF RELAY COMMUNICATION LINKS IN A DOUBLE REDUNDANT
PROTECTION SYSTEM .........................................................................................................................................111
FIGURE 8.1-1: LOCAL AND WIDE AREA NETWORKS FOR PROTECTION .....................................................................131
FIGURE 8.1-2: INTEGRATED SUBSTATION APPLICATIONS DEALT IN UCA ARCHITECTURE.......................................132
FIGURE 8.1-3: SUBSTATION LANS CONNECTED BY A WAN ...................................................................................134
FIGURE 8.2-1: SUBSTATION WITH LAN CONFIGURATION .......................................................................................135
FIGURE 8.2-2: HV (SUB)NETWORK WITH WAN......................................................................................................136
FIGURE 8.3-1: TWO WAYS OF TIMING SYNCHRONIZATION FOR CURRENT DIFFERENTIAL TELEPROTECTION ............157
FIGURE 8.3-2: TWO-TYPES OF TIMING PULSE TRANSMISSION METHODS ..................................................................158
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CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
FIGURE 8.3-3: IMPLEMENTATION OF ROUND-TRIP TRANSMISSION METHOD ............................................................158

FIGURE 8.3-4: ANOTHER IMPLEMENTATION OF ROUND-TRIP TRANSMISSION METHOD ............................................159
FIGURE 8.3-5: GPS AND AN SDH-BASED MASTER-SLAVE TIME TRANSFER NETWORK ............................................160
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LIST OF TABLES
TABLE 3.1-1: STATE COMPARISON PROTECTION SCHEMES .....................................................................................34
TABLE 4.3-1: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF PILOT WIRES .......................................................................60
TABLE 4.3-2: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF POWER LINE CARRIER LINKS................................................62
TABLE 4.3-3: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF RADIO LINKS .......................................................................65
TABLE 4.3-4: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF OPTICAL FIBRE LINKS ..........................................................67
TABLE 4.3-5: ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF SATELLITE LINKS.................................................................69
TABLE 4.4-1: PDH - PLESIOCHRONOUS DIGITAL HIERARCHY LEVELS ....................................................................72
TABLE 4.4-2: SDH - SYNCHRONOUS DIGITAL HIERARCHY LEVELS ........................................................................73
TABLE 5.3-1: SERIAL DATA INTERFACES .................................................................................................................95
TABLE 5.3-2: COMMON PHYSICAL LAN INTERFACES ..............................................................................................98
TABLE 6.1-1: REQUIREMENTS FROM PROTECTION ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND TELEPROTECTION: STATE
COMPARISON SCHEMES. FOR TERMS AND DEFINITIONS REFER TO CHAPTERS 6.1.1.1 AND 6.1.1.2. ...................106
TABLE 6.1-2: REQUIREMENTS FROM PROTECTION ON TELECOMMUNICATION AND TELEPROTECTION: ANALOG
COMPARISON SCHEMES. FOR TERMS AND DEFINITIONS REFER TO CHAPTERS 6.1.1.1 AND 6.1.1.2. ...................107
TABLE 6.4-1: IEC PUBLICATIONS FOR EMC AND INSTALLATION ..........................................................................118
TABLE 7.1-1: PROTECTION SCHEMES VS. MEDIA...................................................................................................120
TABLE 7.1-2: PROTECTION SCHEMES VS. MULTIPLEXING TECHNIQUES ................................................................121
TABLE 7.1-3: PROTECTION SCHEMES VS. NETWORK TECHNOLOGIES ....................................................................122
TABLE 7.1-4: CONFIGURATION SUMMARY .............................................................................................................123
TABLE 7.2-1: CHECKLIST FOR INTERFACE CO-ORDINATION BETWEEN PROTECTION / TELEPROTECTION /
TELECOMMUNICATION DEVICES ........................................................................................................................127
TABLE 8.3-1: TSPEC PARAMETERS ........................................................................................................................155
TABLE 8.3-2: RSPEC PARAMETERS ........................................................................................................................155
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
[1] CIGRE SC34 WG34-35.05, "Protection systems using telecommunications”, TB 13,
1987.
[2] CIGRE SC34 WG34.05, "Application of wide-band communication circuits to protection -
prospects and benefits”, TB 84, 1991.
[3] CIGRE SC34 WG34.01, "Reliable Fault Clearance and Back-up Protection", TB 140,
April 1999.
[4] T. Nagasawa and et al., "Present Situation and Experiences of Back-up Protection in
Japanese EHV Networks", CIGRE SC34, South Africa, 1997.
[5] Y. Serizawa, et al., “Wide-band communication requirements for differential
teleprotection signaling” 600-03, CIGRE Symposium Helsinki 1995.
[6] Y. Serizawa, et al., "Wide-Area Current Differential Backup Protection Employing
Broadband Communications and Time Transfer Systems", IEEE PES 1998 Winter
Meeting, PE-203-PWRD-0-11-1997, Tampa, 1998.
[7] T. Nagasawa, et al., "Present Status and Experiences in Grouping of Protection
Functions in Integrated Systems", 1999 CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, 108, Florence, Italy,
October 1999.
[8] J. Kobayashi, et al., "The State of the Art of Multi-circuit and Multi-terminal Overhead
Transmission Line Protection Systems Associated with Telecommunication Systems",
CIGRE, Paris, 34-203, 1990.
[9] CIGRE SC34 WG34.02, "Adaptive Protections and Control", 1995.
[10] Y. Ohura, et al., "A Predictive Out-of-Step Protection System Based on Observation of
the Phase Difference between Substations", IEEE Trans. Power Delivery, Vol. 5, No. 4,
1990.
[11] M. Tsukada, et al., "New Stabilizing Protection Systems with an Adaptive Control
Approach", 34-204, CIGRE SC34 Colloquium, Stockholm, 1995.
[12] "Wavelength Division Multiplexing for Electricity Utilities"; TB 131 to be published.
[13] CIGRE SC35 WG35.07, "Power System Communications in the High Speed
Environment", TB 107, December 1996.
[14] ATM Forum af-saa-0032.000, “Circuit Emulation Service Interoperability Specification”,
September 1995.
[15] C.G.A Koreman et al., "Requirements for SDH networks due to protection signalling”
400-02, Cigré Symposium Helsinki 1995.
[16] T. Einarsson et al., "Experiences of current differential protections for multi-terminal
power lines using multiplexed data transmission systems” 34-203, Cigré Session 1994.
[17] W. Lewandowski and C. Thomas, "GPS Time Transfer", Proc. IEEE, Vol. 79, No. 7,
1991.
[18] R. E. Wilson, "Use of Precise Time and Frequency in Power Systems", Proc. IEEE, Vol.
79, No. 7, 1991.
[19] IEEE Std 1344-1995, "IEEE Standard for Synchrophasors for Power Systems", IEEE
Power Engineering Society, 1996.
[20] M. Kihara and A. Imaoka, "System configuration for standardizing SDH-based time and
frequency transfer", European Frequency and Time Forum, No.418, pp. 465-470, 1996.
[21] Y. Serizawa et al., "SDH-Based Time Synchronous System for Power System
Communications", IEEE Trans. Power Delivery, Vol. 13, No.1, Jan. 1998.
[22] K. Yanagihashi et al., "Applications of co-ordinated control, protection and operation
support system in EHV substations", CIGRE SC34, Paris, 1996.
[23] "Utility Communication Architecture: Substation Integrated Protection, Control and Data
Acquisition: Requirements Specification", RP3599-01, EPRI, 1996.
[24] J. T. Tengdin, et al., "LAN Congestion Scenario and Performance Evaluation", IEEE
164 / 172
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
PES Winter Meeting, New York, 1999.

[25] M. Tsukiyama et al., "Reliability of new digital type current differential carrier relaying
system via microwave channel", CIGRE SC34/35 Colloquium, Tokyo, 1983.
[26] "ATM Service Categories: The Benefits to the User", The ATM Forum, White Paper
EMAC, 1997.
[27] IEC 60834-1, Second edition 1999-10, "Teleprotection equipment of power systems -
Performance and testing. Part 1: Command systems
[28] IEC 60834-2, First edition 1993-06, "Performance and testing of teleprotection
equipment of Power Systems - Part 2: Analogue comparison systems
[29] IEC 6061850-5, 1st CD February 1999, "Communication Networks and Systems in
Substations - Part 5: Communication Requirements for Functions and Device Models"
[30] CIGRE 1996: WG34/35.03; "Experience in the use of digital communication links for
Protection"
[31] R. Braden, D. Clark, S. Shenker, "Integrated Services in the Internet Architecture: an
Overview", RFC 1633, June 1994
[32] S. Blake, D. Black, M. Carlson, E. Davis, Z. Wang, W. Weiss, "An Architecture for
Differentiated Services", RFC 2475, Dec. 1998
[33] S. Shenker, C. Partridge, R. Guerin, "Specification of Guaranteed Quality of Service",
RFC 2212, Sept. 1997
[34] S. Shenker, J. Wroclawski, "General Characterization Parameters for Integrated Service
Network Elements", RFC 2215, September 1997
[35] S. Keshav, "An Engineering Approach to Computer Networking", Addison-Wesley
[36] M. Garret, M. Borden, "Interoperation of Controlled-Load Service and Guaranteed
Service with ATM", RFC 2381, August 1998
[37] Sten Benda, “Interference-free Electronics – Electromagnetic Compatibility”, ISBN 91-
44-00454-0 Studentlitteratur
[38] L. J. Ernst, W. L. Hinman, D. H. Quam, and J. S. Thorp, “Charge Comparison Protection
of Transmission Lines – Relaying Concepts”, presented at the IEEE Power Engineering
Society Winter Meeting, January 1992.
165 / 172
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
ABBREVIATIONS
AAL ATM Adaptation Layer

ABR Available Bit Rate
ADSS All Dielectric Self-Supporting (Cable)
AM Amplitude Modulation
ANSI American National Standards Institute
ATM Asynchronous Transfer Mode
AUI Attachment Unit Interface
BER Bit Error Rate
BFP Braker Failure Protection
B-ISDN Broadband Integrated Services Digital Network
bit/s bits per second
CAC Call Admission Control
CASM Common Application Service Model
CB Circuit Breaker
CBR Constant Bit Rate
CDM Code Division Multiplex
CDMA Code Division Multiple Access
CDT Cell Transfer Delay
CDV Cell Delay Variation
CDVT Cell Delay Variation Tolerance
CER Cell Error Ratio
CES Circuit Emulation Service
CLR Cell Loss Ratio
CMR Cell Misinsertion Ratio
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSMA/CD Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection
CT Current Transformer
CVT Capacitive Voltage Transformer
dB Decibel
DCE Data Circuit terminating Equipment
DCS Digital Clock Supply
Diff-serv Differentiated services
DSL Digital Subscriber Loop
DTE Data Terminal Equipment
DTT Direct Transfer Trip
DWDM Dense Wavelength Division Multiplex
DXC Digital Cross-Connect (Multiplexer)
EDFA Erbium-Doped Fibre Amplifier
EHV Extra High Voltage
EIA Electrical Industries Association
EMC Electro-Magnetic Compatibility
EMI Electro-Magnetic Interference
EMS Energy Management System
EPRI Electrical Power Research Institute
FDDI Fibre Distributed Data Interface
FDM Frequency Division Multiplex
FDMA Frequency Division Multiple Access
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FM Frequency Modulation
FR Frame Relay
GEO Geosynchronous Earth Orbit (Satellite)
GI Graded Index (optical fibres)
GLONASS Global Navigation Satellite System
GOMSFE Generic Object Models for Substation and Feeder Equipment
GOOSE Generic Object Oriented Substation Event
GPS Global Positioning System
GSM Global System Mobile
HV High Voltage
Hz Hertz
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IED Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force
Int-serv Integrated services
IP Internet Protocol
ISDN Integrated Services Digital Network
ISO International Standards Organization
ITU International Telecommunications Union
kbit/s kilobits per second
LAN Local Area Network
LD Laser Diode
LED Light Emitting Diode
LEO Low Earth Orbit (Satellite)
MAN Metropolitan Area Network
MAU Media Attachment Unit
Mbit/s Megabits per second
MBS Maximum Burst Size
MCM Multi-Carrier Modulation
MCR Minimum Cell Rate
MDT Mean Down Time
MEO Medium Earth Orbit (Satellite)
MM Multi-Mode (optical fibres)
MMS Manufacturing Message Services
MODEM Modulator - Demodulator
MUT Mean Up Time
NTP Network Time Protocol
OPGW Optical Ground Wire
OSI Open Systems Interconnection
PCM Pulse Code Modulation
PCR Peak Cell Rate
PDH Plesiochronous Digital Hierarchy
PEP Peak Envelope Power
PES Power Engineering Society (of IEEE)
PLC Power Line Carrier (equipment)
POTS Plain Old Telephone Service (System)
PSK Phase Shift Keying
PTO Public Telephone Operator
QAM Quadrature Amplitude Modulation
QoS Quality of Service
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RFC Request For Comment

RFI Radio Frequency Interference
RSpec Service Request Specification
RSVP Resource Reservation Protocol
RTCP Real Time Control Protocol
RTP Real Time Protocol
RTU Remote Terminal Unit
SCADA Substation Control and Data Acquisition
SCR Sustainable Cell Rate
SDH Synchronous Digital Hierarchy
SM Single-Mode (optical fibres)
SNMP Simple Network Management Protocol
SNR Signal-to-Noise Ratio
SOH Section Overhead
SONET Synchronous Optical Network
SS Spread Spectrum
SSB Single-Side-Band
STM(-N) Synchronous Transport Module (- level N)
TCP Transmission Control Protocol
TDM Time Division Multiplex
TDMA Time Division Multiple Access
TE Terminal Equipment
TMN Telecommunication Network Management
TSpec Traffic Specification
UBR Unspecified Bit Rate
UCA Utility Communication Architecture
UDP User Data Protocol
UTP Unshielded Twisted Pair
VAC Voltage Alternating Current
VBR Variable Bit Rate
VBR-nrt Variable Bit Rate - non real-time
VBR-rt Variable Bit Rate - real-time
VC Virtual Container
VDC Voltage Direct Current
VF Voice Frequency
VP Virtual Path
WAN Wide Area Network
WDM Wavelength Division Multiplex
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INDEX
2 D
2-wire circuit .....................................................57, 59 data integrity..........................................................101
definition ...........................................................105
4
datagram ..................................................................82
4-wire circuit .....................................................57, 59 datagram networks...................................................81
deblocking .........................................................30, 41
A deblocking overreach distance protection ...............41
accelerated underreach distance protection .............38 dedicated protection ring
adaptive protections.................................................53 SDH/SONET.......................................................74
addressing............................................77, 87, 92, 106 delay ......................................... See propagation time
of terminal equipment .................................69, 102 delay compensationSee propagation time
analog comparison protection..................................21 compensation
analogue circuits......................................................57 dependability ...............................................33, 55, 86
analogue communication systems ...........................56 definition ...........................................................104
ATM67, 71, 80, 86, 89, 103, 129, 133, 137, 146, 147, differential delay...... See propagation time symmetry
151, 152, 155 differential protection ........................................47, 58
ATM networks ........................................................89 digital circuits ..........................................................57
attenuation ...............................................................59 digital communication systems ...............................56
auto-reclosing ..........................................................22 digital hierarchies
availability .................................................58, 87, 101 PDH, SDH...........................................................72
directional distance relay.........................................33
B directional overcurrent relay....................................33
back-up protection......... 35, 38, 40, 46, 47, 49, 51, 52 diversity...................................................................57
bandwidth ................................................................55 space, frequency..................................................64
definition ...........................................................104 DWDM
bit error rate Dense Wavelength Division Multiplex ...............70
impact om availability.......................................101 E
blocking overreach distance protection ...................39
boosting ...................................................................61 echo logic ................................................................38
bridge.......................................................................85 EDFA
erbium doped fibre amplifier...............................66
C electric power system ................................................9
carrier frequency range............................................60 EMC
CDM Electromagnetic Compatibility............................93
code division multiplex .......................................71 installation practice ...........................................117
CDMA requirements on interfaces ..................................93
code division multiple access..............................64 error detection........................................................101
cell switched networks ............................................80 Ethernet ...........................................................96, 131
centralized timing synchronization..........................52 external timing synchronization ............................159
channel cross-over ...................................................58 F
checklist
system design ....................................................124 fading.......................................................................63
chromatic dispersion fault clearing............................................................13
optical fibres........................................................65 fault clearing system................................................17
circuit.......................................................................56 FDM
circuit switched networks ........................................79 frequency division multiplex...............................69
clock provisioning .................................................102 frequency division multiplex...............................60
contact interface ......................................................93 fibre-optic cables .....................................................65
coordinating timer ...................................................39 frequency modulation........................................26, 63
current differential protection21, 22, 74, 100, 101, FSK
157 frequency shift keying.........................................30
full-wave phase comparison ....................................30
169 / 172
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
G CDM - Code Division Multiplex ........................71

FDM - Frequency Division Multiplex.....60, 63, 69
Gateway.................................................132, 153, 156
fixed, synchronous, PDH, SDH ........................103
generator shedding...................................................53
PDH, SDH...........................................................88
ground potential rise ................................................34
plesiochronous ....................................................72
H statistical, asynchronous..........................80, 89, 91
synchronous ........................................................73
half-wave phase comparison ...................................30
TDM - Time Division Multiplex.......61, 63, 66, 70
hub.....................................................................85, 97
WDM - Wavelength Division Multiplex.65, 66, 70
I multiplexing, demultiplexing...................................69
multi-terminal lines .....................................24, 26, 50
installation .............................................................116
interface ...................................................99, 112, 126 N
contact .................................................................93
network layers .........................................................75
EMC....................................................................94
network resilience
fibre-optic............................................................95 SDH/SONET.......................................................74
LAN / Ethernet..............................................85, 93 network security ................................................87, 89
protection / telecommunication... 26, 30, 56, 93, 99
network synchronization..........................................88
serial....................................................................94
networks
VF - voice frequency...........................................94
general...........................................................57, 75
interference26, 35, 36, 38, 39, 55, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
PDH, SDH...........................................................88
64, 65, 67, 88, 90, 95, 104, 105, 116, 160 risks .....................................................................58
internal timing synchronization .............................157 noise .................................................. See interference
interoperability
non-segregated protection........................................22
of protection relays............................................137
intertripping underreach distance protection ...........34 O
intra-substation networks.......................................132
OPGW
IP networks..............................................................91
optical ground wire .............................................65
ITU-T ......................................................................73
optical fibre interface...............................................95
J optical fibres ............................................................65
optical transmitters ..................................................66
jitter ............................ See propagation time variation
OSI reference model................................................78
L over reaching ...........................................................34
overall operating time..............................................55
LAN definition ...........................................................104
local area network ...........................75, 82, 96, 132
topologies............................................................83 P
LD
packet switched networks..................................80, 91
laser diode ...........................................................66
path protection.........................................................89
LED
PCM
light emitting diode .............................................66 pulse code modulation...................................26, 72
line traps ..................................................................61 PDH.................................................................88, 133
load shedding...........................................................53
plesiochronous digital hierarchy ...................72, 77
lock out signal .........................................................47
PDH/SDH networks ................................................88
loop-back.................................................................57
peak envelope power ...............................................61
M percentage restraint..................................................22
performance monitoring ........................................112
maloperation................ 22, 59, 70, 101, 102, 105, 113 performance requirements
MCM on telecommunication / teleprotection106, 107,
multicarrier modulation.......................................61 108
microwave radio ......................................................62 permissive overreach distance protection................37
modem permissive underreach distance protection..............36
high speed ...........................................................59 phase comparison
modulation.........................................................26, 59 segregated, non-segregated .................................29
multiplexer...............................................................95 phase comparison protection .............................21, 28
multiplexer section protection .................................89 phase-segregated protection ....................................22
multiplexing.....................................................59, 119 pilot wires ..........................................................25, 58
170 / 172
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
interface...............................................................94 64, 67, 68, 71, 74, 75, 80, 82, 86, 89, 90, 91, 92,
pilot-wire relay ........................................................94 100, 101, 103, 104, 108, 115, 119, 128, 129,
PLC 133
analog, digital......................................................60 maloperation..............................................106, 107
channel impairments ...........................................61 multiplexing ........................................................69
coupling...............................................................61 network related............................................58, 133
modes, propagation modes..................................61 PLC related .........................................................62
power line carrier ................................................60 rented circuits......................................................56
reliability .............................................................60 re-routing.....................................................58, 101
plesiochronous.........................................................72 security related ..................................................105
power line carrier...............................................40, 41 signal crossover...................................................58
power system faults .................................................12 signal loopback ...........................58, 102, 113, 119
predictive out-of-step protection .............................53
S
propagation time29, 39, 53, 55, 58, 67, 68, 75, 86, 88,
89, 100, 104, 106, 107, 110, 115, 132, 144, 149, satellites ...................................................................67
152 saturation ...........................................................22, 24
compensation ........................ 24, 30, 115, 157, 158 SDH.................................................................88, 133
definition ...........................................................103 synchronous digital hierarchy .......................73, 78
difference ..........................................................133 security ........................................................33, 55, 86
symmetry74, 75, 86, 89, 100, 106, 107, 108, 109, definition ...........................................................105
115 self-healing
variation ...................... 68, 100, 101, 106, 107, 115 SDH/SONET.......................................................89
propagation time symmetry.....................................58 serial interface .........................................................94
definition ...........................................................103 service networks ......................................................78
propagation time variation........... 75, 81, 90, 100, 155 shared protection ring
definition ...........................................................103 SDH/SONET.......................................................74
protection signal quality ...........................................................55
communication dependent ..................................19 signal transfer delay.................................................55
communication-aided..........................................19 slips..........................................................................88
protection function SNR
introduction .........................................................18 signal-to-noise ratio.............................................55
protection operating time SONET
definition ...........................................................104 synchronous optical network...............................73
protection scheme....................................................19 splitting protection...................................................50
analog comparison ........................................19, 21 spread spectrum.......................................................71
state comparison............................................19, 33 squelching..............................................................102
protection switching stabilizing angle.......................................................29
SDH/SONET.......................................................74 stabilizing protection ...............................................53
protection system.....................................................17 standardization.......................................................138
PSK starters .....................................................................29
phase shift keying................................................63 state comparison protection .....................................33
statistical multiplexing.............................................71
Q
ATM....................................................................89
QAM synchronization......................................................102
quadrature amplitude modulation..................61, 63 synchronous transport module.................................73
system-wide protection............................................49
R
T
Radio
licensed, unlicensed ............................................63 TDM
reactor protection.....................................................48 fixed, synchronous ..............................................71
repeater ....................................................................85 statistical, asynchronous......................................71
requirements time division multiplex .................................61, 70
from wide-area protection.................................110 TDMA
re-routing .................................................................57 time division multiplex access ............................64
time coordination ..............................................101 telecommunication system
risks (for protection) definition ...........................................................103
delay related21, 29, 33, 52, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, introduction, purpose...........................................17
171 / 172
CIGRE JWG 34/35.11
usage of ...............................................................19 U
teleprotection equipment / function
under reaching .........................................................34
definition ...........................................................103
teleprotection function V
introduction, purpose ..........................................17
virtual paths .............................................................91
teleprotection system
voice frequency circuit ............................................57
definition ...........................................................103
voiceband modem....................................................57
time coordination.....................................................51
voice-frequency interface ........................................94
time delay variation .................................................30
time stamping ........................................................101 W
times
operating times..................................................143 WDM
timing synchronization for simultaneous sampling Wavelength Division Multiplex ..............65, 66, 70
..........................................................................157 wide-area current differential protection .................52
transformer protection .............................................47 wide-area protection ..........................................51, 57
transmission time.....................................86, 106, 107 requirements on telecommunication .................110
definition ...........................................................104 wide-area timing synchronization............................52
maximum actual................................................104 Z
nominal .............................................................104
transport networks .............................................77, 88 zone ..... 15, 22, 35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 51, 115
172 / 172
Le CIGRÉ a apporté le plus grand soin à la réalisation de cette brochure thématique numérique afin de vous
fournir une information complète et fiable.
Cependant, le CIGRÉ ne pourra en aucun cas être tenu responsable des préjudices ou dommages de quelque
nature que ce soit pouvant résulter d’une mauvaise utilisation des informations contenues dans cette brochure.
Publié par le CIGRÉ

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192

Joint Working Group

Protection using Telecommunications

Regular members of JWG34/35.11:

Comments and contributions received from:

2 POWER SYSTEMS AND FAULT CLEARING .............................................................................................9

4.3.5.2 MEO - Medium Earth Orbit Satellites ............................................................................................................... 68

6.3.1 Requirements on analog comparison protection .................................................................................115

ANNEX A1 TELEPROTECTION SYSTEM CONFIGURATIONS ............................................................141

ANNEX A2 TELECOMMUNICATION SYSTEMS CHARACTERISTICS ..............................................144

ANNEX A3 QUALITY OF SERVICE .............................................................................................................146

1 FOREWORD, SCOPE, OBJECTIVE

- Assess the state of development of advanced protection using inter-site communications

This Technical Brochure has the following content:

Chapter 3 describes protection relaying principles and protection schemes using

Chapter 4 gives an overview of telecommunication systems, with focus on capabilities and

Chapter 5 deals with interfaces. Requirements on interfaces between protection, teleprotection

Chapter 6 focuses on performance requirements on protection, teleprotection and

In Chapter 9 the document is summarized some conclusions are drawn.

2 POWER SYSTEMS AND FAULT CLEARING

2.1 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS

Figure 2.1-1: Single-line diagram of a typical power station

Figure 2.1-2: Single line diagram of a typical transformer station

LISTA KRISTIANSAND NORRKÖPING

Figure 2.1-3: The Scandinavian Power Grid

2.2 ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM FAULTS AND CLEARING

2.2.1 Electric Power System Faults

The three phase conductors

Phase - Ground fault

A flashover in air influences a few rather narrow ‘corridors'

One of the most important design and operational criteria

Faults on power apparatus like breakers and units like

2.2.2 Fault Clearing

External requirements may encompass:

2.3 WHY DOES PROTECTION NEED TELECOMMUNICATION?

2.4 INTRODUCTION TO POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION

- Minimize adverse affects on customer loads

Figure 2.4-1: Typical power system and its zones of protection

2.4.1 Fault clearing system

Protection System includes a complete arrangement of protection equipment and other

The Telecommunication System provides a communication link between ends of a protected

High Voltage Equipment

Fault Clearing System

Protection Control Mech-

Figure 2.4-3: Fault clearing system

Protection Function(s) may be performed by multiple protective relays working together, or

2.5 HOW IS TELECOMMUNICATION USED

Figure 2.5-1: Fundamental terms on protection and teleprotection

3 PROTECTION USING TELECOMMUNICATIONS

3.1 LINE PROTECTION

3.1.1 Analog Comparison Schemes

- Not responsive to system swings and out-of-step conditions

3.1.1.1 Current differential protection

SA = Signal adapter (filtering, mixing circuit, A/D conversion, etc.)

Figure 3.1-1: Principle of differential protection

Idiff > k2xIbias - (k2-k1)Is2 + Is1

Idiff > k1xIbias + Is1

Ibias = |iA| + |iB|

Figure 3.1-2: Differential protection: Example of percentage restraint characteristic

Time delay compensation

The intertrip function can be used for:

Telecommunication systems used for differential protection

Differential protection systems using pilot wires for 50/60Hz signals