People v. Comadre (G.R. No.

153559)
Complex Crime

Facts: At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert

Agbanlog, JimmyWabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were
having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father, Jaime
Agbanlog. Jaime was seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the
conversation of the companions of his son. As the drinking session went on, Robert
and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo
Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions
looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace.
Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school. The object,
which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the
house. Robert Agbanlog and his companions were hit by shrapnel and slumped
unconscious on the floor. They were all rushed to the hospital for medical
treatment. However, Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital for wounds
sustained which the grenade explosion inflicted. Robert’s companions sustained
shrapnel injuries. The appellants were arrested the following day but denied any
participation in the incident, claimed they were elsewhere when the incident
occurred and that they had no animosity towards the victims whatsoever.

The trial rendered a judgment finding accused Antonio Comadre, George

Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to suffer
the imposable penalty of death;

ISSUE:

Whether or not the complex crime of complex crime of Murder with

Multiple Attempted Murder can be appreciated in the case.

HELD:

Yes. Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means of
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period.

The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively

constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component
criminal offenses should be considered only as a single crime in law on which a
single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a single criminal
impulse which shows his lesser degree of perversity.
Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to
be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of modifying
circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this
case. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most
serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore, correctly imposed the
death penalty.

Antonio Comadre was found guilty of the crime committed while the other
two accused Gegorio and Danilo was acquitted.

G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987

WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS, respondents.

FACTS:

In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned

by the president with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again.
In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then
Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation
of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the
issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in
convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because the estafa charges
against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is

necessary before Torres can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of
the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence.

HELD:

The SC Held that:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a
conditional pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial
scrutiny.

2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon,

and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a purely
executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial
for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of
the Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts to proceed under Section
 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of
guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by
final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for
the violation of his conditional pardon.

3. Because due process is not semper et unique judicial process, and because
the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due
process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who
is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department
has two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the RPC
which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a
convict who “having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is not
subject to judicial scrutiny.

The Petition was dismissed.