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Midwest Political Science Association
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Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes

Author(s): David Austen-Smith
Source: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 799-833
Published by: Midwest Political Science Association
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Informationand Influence:Lobbyingfor Agendas
and Votes*
David Austen-Smith,Universityof Rochester
Thispaperexplorestheextentandcharacter ofinterestgroupinfluence on legislative

policyin a modelof decisionmakingunderincomplete information. A committee may
proposean alternative to a givenstatusquo underclosed rule.Policiesare relatedto
consequences withex anteuncertainty. An interest groupis ableto acquirepolicy-relevant
informationat a priceandhas access to legislatorsat boththeagenda-setting stageandthe
votestage.Lobbying is modeledas a gameofstrategic information transmission.Theprice
ofinformation is itselfa privatedatumto thegroup,andlegislators cannotobservewhether
thegroupelectsto becomeinformed. If the groupis informed, thenits information is
likewiseprivate.Amongtheresultsare thatnotall informed lobbyistschooseto tryto
influence
theagendadirectly; thattherecan coexistinfluentiallobbyingat bothstagesof
theprocess;andthatwhileinformative agendastagelobbying is generically the
influential,
sameis nottrueofvotingstagelobbying.
1. Introduction
Interestgroupsare typicallyseen to influence policyin two ways:
through thegivingofcampaigncontributions andthrough thedistribution
ofspecialistinformation. Although logicallydistinct,thesetwoactivities
are surelyrelatedempirically.The basicpremiseofthe"access' viewof
campaigncontributions, in particular,
is thatgroupsmakecontributions
to securetheattention oftherelevantlegislator. Despitesuchinterrela-
tionships,thispaperis concernedexclusively withtheroleofgroupsas
sourcesofpolicy-relevant information. In thiscontext,lobbying is strate-
gicinformation transmission.
Policyis a meansto an endand notan endin itself.Legislatorscare
aboutpolicyonlyinsofaras theycareaboutitsconsequences.Suchcon-
sequencesmaybe purely"political"(e.g., How are reelectionchances
affected?),or theymaybe technical(e.g., How willa revisedClean Air
Act hurtemployment in the car industry?). If thereis no uncertainty
abouthowpoliciesmap intoconsequences,thenthereis no issue here.
However,suchomniscience is rare,and decisionmakersare frequently
*Thefirst
versionofthispaperwas writtenwhileI was VisitingProfessor
ofEconom-
ics andPoliticalScienceat theUniversity
ofIowa. I amgratefultoTimFeddersenandthe
anonymous referees formanyusefulcomments on earlierversionsofthepieceandto NSF
forfinancialsupport.All remaining
errorsare myresponsibility.
AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 1993, Pp. 799-833

C 1993by theUniversity
ofTexas Press,P.O. Box 7819,Austin,TX 78713
8oo David Austen-Smith
choosingpolicieswithoutcompleteinformation on theirconsequences,
in whichcase, information becomesvaluable,and thosewhopossess it
are accordingly in a positionto influence policy.
In an important seriesofpapers,Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987,1989,
1990)studya legislativedecision-making processin whicha committee
is informed aboutthe consequencesof policydecisionsrelativeto the
majority of theHouse. Theirfocusis on theHouse's selectionofrules
forconsideration ofcommittee proposalsto changethestatusquo, espe-
cially:Whenwilla majoritarian House agreeto a closedrulethatsurren-
dersmonopolyagenda-setting powerto a minority committee? Loosely
speaking,theansweris whentheexpectedinformational gainsundera
closedruleoutweightheexpecteddistribution losses fromthatrule.In
effect, thedistributional loss is a pricepaid by the House in exchange
forthecommittee revealingmoreinformation abouttheconsequencesof
policy.For manydecisions,however,thedegreeofinformational asym-
metry betweencommittee membersand thelegislative bodyas a whole
is negligible.Instead,itis interest groupswhopossesstherelevantinfor-
mation(Rothenberg1989; Hansen 1991). Unlike legislators,interest
groupsorlobbyists haveno legislative decision-making rights.Butnever-
thelesstheycan,as observedabove,influence policythrough thespecial-
istinformation theyofferlegislators.
In whatfollows,I buildon the basic Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987)
modelby,interalia, introducing a lobbyistin additionto thecommittee
and theHouse. Legislativedecisionmakingis by closedrule,and only
thelobbyist may(butdoes notnecessarily) possesstechnical information
abouttheconsequencesof selectinganygivenpolicy.All theagents-
legislators and lobbyist-havepreferences overconsequencesthat,with
theirbeliefsabouttherelationship betweenpoliciesand consequences,
inducepreferences overpoliciesperse. Becausepreferences overconse-
quencesareprimitive, "influence"occursonlythrough changingbeliefs.
Andtheextentto whichanyinformation offered to alterbeliefsis effec-
tivedependson thecredibility ofthelobbyist tothelegislator inquestion.
Such credibility is endogenousto the modeland dependspartlyupon
how closelythelobbyist'spreferences overconsequencesreflectthose
ofthelegislator beinglobbied,andon howconfident is thelegislator
that
thelobbyistis in factinformed.
An important issue hereconcernsidentifying thecircumstances un-
derwhicha lobbyist choosestolobbythecommittee attheagenda-setting
stage,or to lobbythe House at the subsequentvotingstage,or both.
Clearly,thecharacterof theinformation thatmightbe transmitted and
thenatureoftheinfluence thatmight be exertedis likelytodiffer between
thesestages.Amongthe resultspresentedbelow are, first,thatthere
LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8oi
existcircumstances underwhichinfluential lobbyingcan take place at

bothstagesof theprocess,butthatthe structure of theinformationof-
feredat each stageis distinct;second,thatagendastagelobbying can be
evenwhentheHouse's mostpreferred
influential policyconsequencelies
betweenthoseofthecommittee andthoseofthelobbyist;andthird,that
moreinformation can be offered here,whereitis occasionallyuncertain
whether thelobbyistis informed or not,thanis possiblein theGilligan
and Krehbielenvironment wherethecommittee is knownto possess in-
formation surely.
The plan of the paperis as follows.Section2 developsthe model
and section3 reviewstwo benchmark cases againstwhichto juxtapose
the resultspresentedin section4. Section5 containssome numerical
examplesto illustratetheresults,and section6 is a briefconclusion.All
formalproofsare confined to an appendix.
2. Model
Agents and Decision Sequence
Thereis an exogenouslygivenstatusquo policy,s E R. Changes
fromthestatusquo are governedby a closedrulewherebya committee
has the sole legislativerightto proposean alternative policy,following
whichthelegislature as a wholevoteson whether to acceptthecommit-
tee's proposalor to retainthestatusquo. Assumethatthecommittee is
a unitaryactor,C, and thatthereis a pivotalvoterinthelegislature as a
whole(theHouse),H. BothC andH haveprimitive preferences overthe
consequencesof policydecisionsthat,ex ante, are knownonlywith
uncertainty. In additionto C and H, thereis a thirdinterested party,a
lobbyistL, who has no legislative decision-making rightsbuthas access
to boththecommittee and theHouse. Moreover,relativeto bothC and
H, L mightbe betterinformed aboutthe consequencesof legislation.
Consequently, lobbyingin thismodelis strategic information transmis-
sion,in whichL seeksto persuadeC or H to behavein certainwaysby
providing information aboutthe consequencesof theirlegislativedeci-
sions(Austen-Smith and Wright 1992).The sequenceofeventsanddeci-
sionsdetailedbelowis summarized in Figure1.
Threecentralaspectsof themodelare, first, thatonlythelobbyist
L has theopportunity to acquireinformation abouthowpoliciesmapinto
consequences;second,thatifL does acquiresuchinformation, it is pri-
vateinformation to L; and third,whether L has acquiredinformation is
itselfprivateinformation to L. However,withrespectto thislastpoint,
I assume,on theone hand,thatifL choosesto lobbysomelegislative
actorj E {C, H}, thenL can costlesslyprovetoj thatL has acquiredthe
802 David Austen-Smith
Figure 1
Naturechooses Naturechoosest; C chooses L observest

priceof L privately observes proposal,b iffL has acquired
p
information, t iffL has acquired info.;andL chooses
info. whether to lobbyH
L privatelyobservesp L chooseswhetherL chooseswhetherH votes

andchooseswhether to lobbyC to acquire over{b, s}
to acquireinfo.;L's info.at p; L's
decisionis private decisionis private
information (but not what thatinformation is); but, on the otherhand, L

has no way of crediblydemonstrating thatL has not acquired data. For
example, given that informationacquisition is costly, L can prove to j
that L has acquired data by submittingthe appropriateaccounts. But
while documentationcan establish some fact or other, the absence of
documentationdoes not prove the case one way or the other.'
To model the featureslisted above, at the startof the game Nature
is assumed to pick a price at which the lobbyist is able to purchase
information. Let p E [0, 1] denote thisprice and assume p - U[0, 1] with
thisdistributionbeingcommonknowledgeamong{C, H, L}. Once Nature
has selected p randomlyfromthe uniformdistributionon [0, 1], p is
revealed privatelyto L, who then chooses whetherto acquire informa-
tion. The technologygoverninghow policies map into consequences is
assumed to be
y= b - t, (1)
where y E R is a consequence, b E R is a policy decision, and t - U
[0, 1] is an ex ante unknownparameteruncorrelatedwithp (see Gilligan
and Krehbiel 1987 fora discussion of this specification).Let T = [0, 1].
Assume that if L elects to acquire informationat price p, then Nature
'See Okuno-Fujiwara, andSuzumura(1990)fora discussionofthediffi-

Postlewaite,
cultyof showingthatone does not knowsomething. A contemporaryexampleis thatifa
country thatthecountry
toverify
conductsa nuclearweaponstestthenitis trivial possesses
However,theabsenceofsuchtestsdoesnotestablish
a nuclearcapability. a corresponding
absenceofsuchcapability.
LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 803
privately revealsthetruevalue of t E T to L.2 Moreover,as remarked

above,L's decisionon whetherto acquireinformation at pricep is not
observablebyC orbyH. Havingbecomeinformed ornot,L thenchooses
whether to lobbyC at the agenda-setting stage.3LobbyistL's decision
on whether to lobbyis commonknowledge.
In the model,lobbyingitselfis modeledas a cheap-talkspeech
(Crawford and Sobel 1982;Farrell1988;Austen-Smith 1990,1993):it is
no moredifficult fora lobbyistto tell the truthabout the value of t
thanit is forhimor herto dissemble.In otherwords,althoughL can
unequivocally proveto thelegislator thatL is informed whenL has ac-
quiredinformation on t, L cannotsimilarly provethathe or she has
observedany particular value of t. And so, sinceL is knownto have
preferences overconsequences,legislators willtakeaccountofthestrate-
gicincentives forinformed to dissemble.Afterhearing
lobbyists whatthe
lobbyisthasto say,ifanything, thecommittee thenchoosesan alternative
proposalto thestatusquo.
Once thealternative is fixed,L maychoose to acquireinformation
at the pricep if he or she has not alreadydone so. Havingmade this
decision(again,privateinformation to L), L maylobbyH or notat all
(evidently,giventhattheagendais set at thisstage,thereis no further
incentive forL to lobbyC). Again,L's lobbying is strategic
information
transmission and modeledas a cheap-talkspeech. Finally,the House
votes on whetherto accept the committee's proposalor to retainthe
statusquo, andthegameendswithall agentsreceiving theirpayoffs from
theHouse's policydecision.
Preferences
Each agentj E {C, H, L} has preferences
overconsequencesgiven
by
Uj(y)= -(Xj-y)2; xjC.
ycR, (2)
Thesepreferences are commonknowledge, and it is assumedthatxc >
XH 0. No restriction
is placedon therelativelocationofL's idealpoint
at thisstage.AndifL has becomeinformed at pricep > 0, L's netpayoff
is UL( ) -
P.
2jt is worth
noting thatL learnsthetruevalueoftis considerably
thattheassumption
stronger thannecessary.Makingtheassumption theexposition.
facilitates
3Assuming thatL cannotlobbyH, orbothC andH together, at thisstage,is substan-
(FarrellandGibbons1989)andwillbe discussedfurther
tivelyrestrictive intheconcluding
section.Formally relaxing theassumption to subsequent
is deferred work.
Givenequations(1) and(2),j's inducedpreferences

overpoliciesare
givenby
uj(b) E[Uj(b - t)] = -(xj + E[t] -
-var[t|I], b E R,tE T;
wheretheexpectations are conditional
on all theinformation thatj pos-
sesses. It followsimmediately fromequation(3) that,forallj, thehigher
is therealizedvalueoft,thelargerisj's mostpreferred policy.In particu-
lar,forinformed L's mostpreferred
lobbyists, policydecisionis strictly
increasing in L's typet.
Strategies
ConsiderL's decisions:L has to decidewhen,if at all, to collect
information;who to lobbyand at whatstage;and finally, whatto say to
L does electto lobby.It is convenient
thelegislators to describethesein
acquisition strategyis a map:
sequence: L's agenda stage information
5a[0 1] x R >{O,1}, (4)
where5a(P, s) = 1 (respectively, 0) meansthatifthepriceofinformation
is p and the statusquo is s, thenL acquires(respectively, does not
acquire)theinformation on t. The restrictionto a purestrategy hereis
withoutloss of generality. If 5a(P, s) = 0, thenL will not lobbythe
committee. To see this,recalltheassumption thatifL lobbieslegislator
j E {C, H} thenL can provewithout costwhether L is informed,
butnot
whether L is uninformed. Therefore, ifL does notacquiretheinforma-
tion,activelylobbying a legislator is equivalentto notlobbyingat all. So
without loss of generality,assumeL activelylobbiesa legislator onlyif
L is informed.
Let Ua(.) = 1, sO L knowsthevalueof t surely.Thenitis naturalto
combinethedecisionon whether to lobbyC withthesubsequentchoice
of whatto say to C ifC is lobbied. So L's agenda stage lobbyingstrategy
is a map:
Xa:TX RMc U (5)
whereMj is an arbitrary
uncountable messagespace and + denotesthe
decisionnotto lobbythelegislatoractively.4
(In thisnotation,
then,an
4Excluding mixedstrategieshereisjustified
byCrawford andSobel(1982,Theorem1),
whodemonstrate ina gameofthisformareessentially
thatallequilibria "partition"equilib-
intointervals
ria: the set T is partitioned and all typesin a givenintervaluse thesame
signaling strategy.Allowing formixedstrategies, therefore,simplymeansthatthereneed
be no out-of-equilibrium beliefsto specify.Andin thepresentcontext, theissueis purely
technical.
lobbyist's message is identically"+"; underthe verifiability

uninformed
onlyinformed
assumption, lobbyistscan crediblysendmessagesin Mj.)
For example, Xa(t', s) = m means thatL, havingacquired theinformation
thatthetruevalue of t is t' and giventhestatusquo s, activelylobbies
C by makinga speech ("sending a message") m E Mc; similarly,
Xa(t", s) = + means thatifL learns thatthe truevalue of t is t" and the
statusquo is s, thenL choosesnotto lobbyC at thisstageofthegame
(andtherefore mimicsthebehaviorofa lobbyist whochosenottobecome
informed). IfL lobbiessomelegislative agentj, thenthisfactis common
knowledge, butthemessageL givestoj is privateinformation to L and
j. In otherwords,ifL lobbiesC, forinstance,thenH can see whetherC
is lobbiedbutcannotobservethelobbyingmessageitself.5 To save on
notation later,letZj (Mj U 4),j = C, H.
Afteranylobbying takesplace at theagenda-setting stage,thecom-
mitteechoosesan alternative to thestatusquo. The committee's strategy
is specified below. Giventhecommittee's decision,if8a( ) = 0, L may
againchooseto acquireinformation at thepricep originallyrevealedby
Nature; L's votingstage informationacquisition strategyis a map:
8v: [0, 1] x R2 fo, 1}, (6)
where8v(p, b, s) = 1 meansthat,givena priceof information p, the
committee'sproposalb anda statusquo s, L choosesto acquireinforma-
for6j*) = 0. Once again,if68je)
tionon thevalue of t; and conversely
= Ua(-) = 0, then L will not lobby H. So, assuming8a( ) + 68(J) > 0,
defineL's votingstage lobbyingstrategyas a map:
XV:Tx 1R2
_>ZH, (7)
where,forexample,ifm E MH thenXA(t',b, s) = mmeansthat,having
observeda truevalueoft equal to t', a committeeproposalofb, andthe
statusquo s, L makesa cheap-talkspeechto H abouthowto vote.
The descriptionofC's strategyand ofH's strategy is morestraight-
forward, sinceeach has onlyone decisionto make.Considerthecommit-
tee's strategy:C cannotobservewhatthe price of information is or
whether L chooses to acquireinformation at thatprice.All thatC can
5Strictly, "Not lobby" is itselfa message,and in theanalysisto followit willbe

treatedas such.However,itis convenient to distinguishthedecisionnotto lobbya legisla-
tordirectly fromactivelobbyingmessages(i.e., speechesgivendirectly to legislators).
Similarly,lobbying strategiesdependon therealizedvalueofp. However,sinceall agents'
inducedpreferences overbillsare independent ofp, it is straightforward
to showthatin
equilibrium information aboutp is decision-irrelevant
forthecommittee (save withrespect
toestimating thelikelihoodthatL is informed
perse). Consequently, theformal dependence
oflobbying strategieson p is suppressedthroughout.
8o6 David Austen-Smith
observepriorto makinganyproposalis themessage,ifany,thatL sends

to C itself.Hence, C's proposalstrategy
is a map:
?r:ZcX HR->HR. (8)
For example,ur(m, s) = b saysthatthecommittee, havingbeenlobbied
by L and havingheardthe messagem E Mc, proposesb E R as an
to thegivenstatusquo s E R. Similarly,
alternative -r(?,s) = b' means
thatC proposesb' as an alternative to s, giventhatL lobbiedno one.
Again,therestrictionto a purestrategyhereis withoutloss ofgenerality.
The House can observewhetherL lobbies,whatL says onlyifL
lobbiesH, andwhatproposalthecommittee in place ofthestatus
offers
quo. Hence, H's votingstrategyis a map:
V: ({C} U O X ZH x R'2> [0, 1], (9)
where,forexample,ifm E MH thenv(C, m,b, s) = r saysthatH votes
fortheproposalb withprobability r E [0, 1], giventhat(i) L lobbiedC
stage;(ii) L lobbiedH at thevotingstageand made
at theagenda-setting
a speechm E MH; and (iii) thecommittee's proposalis b and thestatus
quo is s.
EquilibriumConcept
The basic notionis sequentialequilibrium: a listof strategies cr*
((a*, A*,
a*, A*),
v r*,v*) and a set of beliefsji (lc 1H) suchthat,
looselyspeaking,at everydecisionnode (bothreachedand unreached)
everyagent'sstrategy maximizesthatagent'sexpectedpayoffs, and ex-
pectations arederivedfromplayers'strategies andthepriorsusingBayes
Rulewherethisis defined.A formaldefinition is givenin theappendix.
In thepresentcontext,thereare multiplesequentialequilibria,due
largelyto lobbyingstrategies beingcheap-talk.Some of theseequilibria
are essentiallyidenticalin thattheydiffer onlyin a labelingconvention,
and I shallignoresuch differences. More important is thatthereexists
an equilibrium in whichthelobbyistneveracquiresinformation-even
at zero cost-and no lobbyingtakesplace. Such an equilibrium is sup-
portedbypoolinglobbying conditional
strategies on L acquiring informa-
tion(Farrell1988).Witha poolingstrategy, all lobbyist types(i.e., what-
everthevalueoft thatL learnsis thetruth) sendthesamemessage,and,
therefore, thelistenercan infernothing.Hence, themessageis wholly
uninformative, in whichcase, thereis no incentiveforthelobbyistto
purchaseinformation inthefirst place.Thiskindofuninformative equilib-
riumspecifiestheleast amountof information and influence thatmight
be observed.Ofmoreinterest is theoppositeextreme.Consequently, in
whatfollowsI shallonlyconsiderthemostinformative availableequilib-
ria. Thereare twojustifications forthisselection.The first,as already

observed,is thatit is usefulto identify howmuchinformation transmis-
sionand influence therecan be in anygiveninstitution; and thesecond
is that,in thepresentcontextof risk-averse agentsand uniform priors,
all agentsex antestrictly preferthatthemostinformative equilibrium is
playedratherthanany other(Crawford and Sobel 1982;Austen-Smith
1993).Wherethereis no ambiguity, I shallreferto an "equilibrium o*
takingthespecification ofbeliefspias understood.
It is important to notethatin equilibrium thepriceat whichL will
choose to acquireinformation is endogenous.This followssimplybe-
causetheexpectedpayoff toL fromlobbying depends,interalia,on what
C choosesto do ifC is notlobbied,and exactlywhatC choosesto do in
thisinstancedependsin turnon C's inference regarding whether L did
notlobbybecause L has no information, or because L has information
butchoosesnotto lobbyat theagenda-setting stage.
A lobbying strategy,Xa or X1,is informative ifandonlyif,on hearing
L's message,therelevantlistener'sposterior beliefsaboutthevalueoft
aredistinct fromhisor herpriorbeliefs.A lobbying strategyis influential
ifandonly therelevantlistener'ssubsequent
if decision(whatalternative
to proposein the case of C, or how to vote in the case of H) is not
constantin the messagessentunderthe strategy. Influential strategies
are necessarily informative,butinformative strategiesneednotbe influ-
ential.In particular,becauselisteners arerisk-averse, messagesgivenvia
an informative strategyaffectthelistener'sexpectedutility fromtaking
any actionbut do not alterthe choice of actionitselfrelativeto what
wouldbe chosenpriorto hearingthemessages.On theotherhand,mes-
sagessentunderan influential strategy affectboththelistener'sexpected
utility and his or herchoiceofaction.
An actionis said to be elicitedby a lobbyingstrategy ifthereis a
messagesentunderthe strategy thatinducesthe listenerto take that
action.Clearly,the maximumnumberof actions(votes) thata voting
stagelobbying strategy,X1,might elicitis two,andthemaximum number
of actions(proposals)thatan agendastagelobbyingstrategy, Xa, might
elicitis infinite.Supposethereexisttwodistinct equilibriacrand cr'such
that(Xa X,) are used in crand (X', XQ)are used in cr'.ThenXa (respec-
tively,Xv)is at least as influential as Aa (respectively, XM)ifand onlyif
at least as manyactionsare elicitedby Xa (respectively, Xv)as by Xa
(respectively, Xv
DEFINITION.An equilibrium ifand onlyifthe
cr* is mostinfluential
agendastagelobbying strategy,*, usedintheequilibriumis at least
as theagendastagelobbying
as influential usedinanyother
strategy
8o8 David Austen-Smith
available equilibrium,and, given X*, the votingstage lobbying

strategy,Xk,is at least as influential
as the votingstagelobbying
strategyused in anyotheravailableequilibriumin whichX*is used.
In whatfollows,the focusis on mostinfluentialequilibria.Giventhe
lexicographicstructure
ofthedefinition,
suchequilibriaalwaysexist.(A
justification
fordefining"mostinfluential"
in thiswayis givenbelow.)
3. Two Benchmarks
Beforeproceeding to resultsfromthemodel,it is usefulto identify
two benchmark cases in whichthe lobbyistplaysno role. In thefirst,
thereis fullinformation:in particular,bothC andH knowthetruevalue
of t. Andin thesecond,thecommittee is fullyinformed, buttheHouse
andlobbyistare uninformed. The former case has beenmuchstudiedin
the structure-induced equilibrialiterature (e.g., Denzau and MacKay
1983),and thelattercase is analyzedin Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987).
Figure2 illustratestheequilibrium proposalsand outcomesforthe
fullinformation case. In equilibrium, the committee proposesits most
favoredalternative fromtheset of policiesthatbothC and H preferto
thestatusquo. Whenthissetis empty,C mayproposeanypolicythatit
prefers to s, knowingit willbe rejected;in Figure2, it is assumedthat
in suchcases C simplyproposesthestatusquo.
If no agentis informed, thenthe equilibrium policyproposaland
expectedoutcomeforany s can be read offfromFigure2 by settingt
equal to its expectedvalue. The situationis morecomplicatedforthe
asymmetric informationcase. Gilliganand Krehbiel(1987)demonstrate
thatthemostinfluential equilibrium (suitablydefinedforthiscase) is of
theformillustrated in Figure3.
For smallandlargevaluesoft,thecommittee's equilibrium proposal
revealsall theinformation, and C is able to extractall of its monopoly
agenda-setting rentsas in thefullinformation case. For intermediate val-
ues of t, however,thisis notso. In particular, thecommittee is unable
crediblyto offerany proposalfort E (s, s + xc) thatcan defeatthe
statusquo. In thefullinformation case, thereis sucha proposalforevery
t in thisrange,and all of theseproposalshave an equilibrium outcome
equal to t - s.
4. Results
In whatfollows,let c* denotean arbitrary
equilibrium.Unlessex-
plicitlystatedotherwise, statements
equilibrium referto mostinfluential
equilibria.Formalstatementsof,andproofsfor,resultsare containedin
theappendix.
Figure 2. C, H Fully Informed
Proposals, Outcomes
7r(s, t)
Xc W/ t) = 7r - t
~~~~~y(IT, I
XC
.L ~ ~~~~~~
\
y(s, t) =s - \
The firsttwo results,althoughof someindependent serve

interest,
to simplify
principally findingequilibria.
LEMMA 1: The House,H, neverrandomizes inequilibrium.In partic-
ular,if thereis no influential
lobbyingat thevotingstage,thenH
choosesthecommittee's proposalwhenever H is indifferent
between
thatproposaland thestatusquo.
Despitebeingessentially Lemma1 does havesomesubstantive
technical,
implicationsforthepredictedpatternof vote stagelobbying,
and these
are discussedlater.
8io David Austen-Smith
Figure 3. C Fully Informed,H Uninformed
Proposals, Outcomes
r\
< 7r~~~~(S,
t)
s yi r, t) = IT - t
XCW --
XH
sX + XC s+ 3xc 1
_ X
Y(S, t) = S - t\
LEMMA 2: There exists no equilibriumin whichL strictlyprefersto

acquire information at thevote stage ratherthanat theagenda-setting
stage or not at all.
To all intentsand purposes, therefore,if ever L chooses to become
informed,thenL does so at the agenda-settingstage of thegame. Specifi-
cally, ifwaitinguntilthe vote stage to purchase data is a best response,
thenit is also a best response to acquire the information at the agenda-
settingstage. This is because waitinguntilthe vote stage has no strategic
or payoff-relevant forL, C, or H.
iimplications
LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8II
The nextresultis substantive, a simplecharacterization

providing of
thecircumstancesunderwhichL can influenceH's voteoncetheagenda
has been set.
PROPOSITION 1: Fix an agenda{b, s}. Then vote stagelobbyingis
ifand onlyif
influential
(b + s)I2 xL>(b + s - 2)I2and(b + s)12 ? -xL>(b + s - 2)12.
The sameresultholdsforb < s withtheinequalities
reversed.
It is easilyseenfromthisresultthatthecloserare thelobbyist'sprefer-
encesoverconsequencesto thoseoftheHouse (XH = 0), themorelikely
itis thattherecan be influential votestagelobbying.
Let L(t) denotean informed lobbyistwho has observedt and let
T(b, s) C T be thesubsetof L(t) thatweaklypreferthestatusquo s to
thealternative b; T(b, s) = {t E TIuL(t)(b)- uL(t)(s)}. Thenthecondition
inProposition 1 forb > s is equivalentto E H[tIt E T()] - (b + s)/2<
E H[tIt E T\T(-)].6Thus,votestagelobbying can influence theHouse's
decisionifand onlyif,first, thecommittee's proposaland thelobbyist's
preferences jointlyinducea divisionof typesinto"high" and "low,"
and, second,the midpointbetweenthe committee's proposaland the
statusquo lies betweenthe(conditional) expected"high" typeand the
expected"low" type.It followseasilyfromthischaracterization thatif
votestagelobbying then,at thetimeofthevote,theHouse
is influential,
always has strictpreferences overtheagenda.To see this,simplynote
thatindifference requiresthetwo inequalities of Proposition 1 to be re-
placedby equalities.
The resultis drivenbytheagendaconsisting ofat mosttwoalterna-
tivesand by thefact that highervaluesof t inducetheHouse to prefer
higher bills.Ifthemodelwerecomplicated byallowinglongeragendas-
forinstance,through bothmajority and minority members ofa heteroge-
neous committeebeing permittedto introducealternativeproposals
(GilliganandKrehbiel1989)-thenthecharacterization ofinfluential
vote
stagelobbyingwouldlikewisebecomemorecomplex.But in the one-
dimensionalsetting,the basic qualitativestructure of Proposition1 is
unaltered;each proposalon theagendais associatedwithan interval of
L(t) thatstrictlypreferthe proposalto any otheravailablebill, and
61tis incorrectto inferfromthisequivalencethat,say,E H[tit E T(b, s)] = -XL.

Furthermore, theequivalenceholdsonlyundertheassumption ofa uniform distribution
of
t on T = [0, 1]. For moregeneraldistributions,
theinequalities
in termsof expectations
characterizeinfluential
votestagelobbying,
butthoseintermsofXL do not:see theappendix
fordetails.
8I2 David Austen-Smith
lobbying can be influential onlyif,whenall suchtypesinfavorofa given

proposalsendthe same messageto theHouse, theHouse's beliefsare
updatedsufficiently to lead it to supportthatproposal.Unlikewitha
binaryagenda,however,votestagelobbying withlongeragendasmight
be influentialover some pair of alternatives withinthe agendabut not
overall pairsofalternatives.
Proposition1 suggeststhat,froma strategic perspective,onlytwo
messagesare givenin votestagelobbying.This suggestion is discussed
momentarily; beforedoingso, itis convenient to considerhowthecom-
mitteerespondsto anyagendastagelobbying.
Not surprisingly, thecommittee's equilibrium behaviorreflectsthe
equilibrium strategy identified byGilliganandKrehbiel(1987),illustrated
in Figure3. In particular, in a mostinfluentialequilibrium,as theideal
pointXL ofan informed lobbyistconvergesto thatofthecommittee, xc,
thecommittee's proposalstrategy convergesto theGilliganandKrehbiel
committee strategy. In general,however,thelobbyistandthecommittee
willhave distinct preferences overconsequences,and so thenumberof
proposalsthatcan be elicitedin equilibrium is finite.
A partialcharacter-
izationof the strategy is givenin the appendix.For now,however,it
sufficesto reporttwofacts.First,thecommittee willreporta proposal
that(ceterisparibus)inducestheHouse to choosethestatusquo s, say
b = s, onlyifthecommittee believestheexpectedvalueoft to lie within
theinterval (s - Xc, S].7 Andsecond,unlikeinthebenchmark case where
C hasfullinformation, therecan existat mostoneproposalintheinterval
(s, s + 2xc). This is due to thefinitenumberof proposals thatany agenda
stagelobbyingcan elicitwhenit is L who is informed and XL # Xc; the
relevantincentive
compatibility are less demanding.
constraints
WithProposition1, thepartialcharacterization of the committee's
proposalstrategyyieldsthefollowingclaim.
PROPOSITION2: In any(notnecessarily
mostinfluential)
equilibrium:
agendastagelobbyingis not influential
(1) Informative if,forany
message n sent by L to C, Eit [tIn] E [s - xc, s]; and only if,
for any such message, E^J[tIn] E [s - xc, s + xj]. Conse-
quently,agendastagelobbying is rarelyinformative
withoutbe-
inginfluential.
(2) Informativevote stage lobbyingessentiallyinvolvesonlytwo
messages.8Consequently, vote stagelobbyingis ofteninforma-
tivewithoutbeinginfluential.
speaking,C herecan chooseanypolicythatinducesH to votefors in the

7Strictly
absenceofanyvotingstagelobbying byL. To avoidirrelevant
generalities
(andhavingto
duringtheexposition),
makerepeatedqualifications itis assumedthatC simplyreportss.
8Formally:V t E T(-), X*(t, *) E Z C ZH; V t' - T(), A*(t', ) E ZH\Z-
LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 8I3
Proposition2.1 followsfromthecommittee beingable to offerany

proposalon thereallineas an alternative to thestatusquo. Because of
this,anyinformative lobbyingbytheinterest groupwilllead thecommit-
tee to updateitsbeliefsaboutthetruevalueof t and adjustitsproposal
accordingly.Unless all the information thatcould possiblybe offered
leads thecommittee to updateitsbeliefsto expecting
thetruevalueof t
to lie within[s - xc, s], thenthe proposal offeredwill typicallybe sensi-
tiveto the lobbyist'sspeech. In contrast,once the agendais set, the
House can do onlyone of two things:accept or rejectthe proposal.
Consequently, all votestagelobbying amountstoa speecheithersupport-
ing the proposalor supporting the statusquo; Proposition2.2 then
follows.
The argument above dependson legislativedecisionmakingbeing
by closedrule.Underopen rule,wherebytheHouse can freelyamend
anyproposalby thecommittee, theHouse's strategy space is identical
tothatofthecommittee (save forcommittee gatekeeping power).Hence,
thesubstantive implication of Proposition 2 fortherelativeinfluence of
lobbyistsis attenuated.In effect,the distinction betweenthe agenda-
settingstageandthevotestageis blurred underopenrulerelativeto that
underclosedrule.
Proposition 2 is consistentwiththe findings of Hall and Wayman
(1991)andmuchoftheliterature on theimpactofcampaigncontributions
on legislativevoting(e.g., Wright1985). Focusingexclusivelyon the
influenceof campaigncontributions, Hall and Waymanarguethatany
impactofmoneyon politicaldecisionmakingis mostlikelyto be found
at thecommittee (agenda-setting) stageofthelegislative processandnot,
as muchof the empiricalliterature has considered,on the vote stage.
Theirempiricalstudysupportsthishypothesis. Proposition 2, although
evidentlynotconcernedwithmoney,reflects theirfinding;to theextent
thatinformational lobbying is influential,
it is mostlikelyto be so at the
agenda-settingstageandnotovervotebehaviorwithrespecttoanygiven
agenda.But whetheror notthe Hall and Waymanfinding withrespect
to campaigncontributions carriesover to an informational setting,as
Proposition2 predicts,is an empirical issue.
As remarked above, Proposition 2 claimsthatessentially onlytwo
informative messagesare sentto the House at the vote stage.Let the
twomessagessentwithanyequilibrium vote stagelobbyingstrategy be
m andm'. Supposeforthemoment thatall informed typesactivelylobby
H intheequilibrium (i.e., m, m', E MH). Thenall L(t) whostrictly prefer
thestatusquo to thealternative b makethesamespeech(froma strategic
perspective);essentially thespeechis "GivenwhatI know,you should
chooses." Thisspeechis honestinthatitcorrectly revealsL(t)'s prefer-
ences,butitgivescoarseinformation; ifH knowsthevalueoft forsure,
thenH maywell strictly preferb to the statusquo. However,if vote

stagelobbying is influential thentakingthisintoaccountstillleads H to
inferthatchoosings is in H's best interest, and so H votesas recom-
mendedbyL eventhoughthereis a positiveprobability thatH willregret
thedecisionex post. Similarly, all L(t) who prefertheproposalb make
thespeech,"GivenwhatI know,you shouldchooseb."
The theoryassertsthattherecan be at mosttwo informative mes-
sages sentat thevote stage(althoughsuchmessagesmaybe offered in
a varietyof more-or-less eloquentspeeches). Suppose firstthatthe
agendastagelobbyingstrategy is influentialand thatthe committee is
lobbiedactively;hence,theresultant agendaconsistsof thestatusquo
and a proposalselectedon thebasis of a messagem in Mc. The House
directlyobservesthatthe committee is activelylobbied,and, although
theHouse cannothearthemessagem,thecommittee's subsequentequi-
libriumproposalindirectly reveals m to H. Consequently,once the
agendais set,boththeHouse andthecommittee shareidenticalinforma-
tionaboutthetruevalueofL's information, t. In particular,
itis common
knowledge thatL is informed. Therefore, sincelobbying is costless,the
theory placesno further restrictions on themessagesthatcan be sent.In
otherwords,thoseL(t) preferring the statusquo may elect to "stay
home,"and thosesupporting theproposalactivelylobbyH to reaffirm
thissupport; orconversely; orbothsortsoftypemay,as inthediscussion
of thepreceding paragraph, activelylobbytheHouse. Whateverthede
factopattern, theHouse willupdateitsbeliefsaboutwhichalternative is
mostin itsinterest and voteaccordingly.
Now supposethatthe agendastagelobbyingstrategy is influential
butthatthecommittee is notlobbiedactively;so, as Proposition 3 below
makesclear, the alternative offeredby the committee is based on an
equivocalinference-themessage"Not lobby"maymeanthatthelob-
byistis uninformed or thathe is informed and a typewhoseequilibrium
strategy is to "stay home." In thiscase, giventhatvotestagelobbying
is influential,one messagethatmustbe sent in equilibrium is "Not
lobby" an uninformed lobbyistnecessarily"stays home." Conse-
quently, Proposition 2.2 impliesthatifboththoseL(t) favoring thestatus
quo andthosefavoring thealternative activelylobbyH, thenoneofthese
messagesmustlead H to updateitsbeliefsin exactlythesamewayas it
does whenH is notlobbiedat all. To all intents andpurposes,therefore,
H is activelylobbiedhereonlybythoseL(t) favoring one oftheavailable
alternatives on theagenda.
By Lemma 1, whentheproposalis set optimally by thecommittee
to maketheHouse indifferent betweens andb, H will,intheabsenceof
anyinfluential lobbying at thevotestage,chooseb wheneverb # s. For
LOBBYING
FORAGENDAS
ANDVOTES 8I5
thisreason,itis naturalto presume,whenvotestagelobbying is influen-

tial,thatitis onlythetypesfavoring thestatusquo wholobbytheHouse
actively(i.e., X*(t, ) E MH forall t E TA(b,s) andX*(t, ) = + otherwise).
Hereafter, adopttheconvention thatinfluential votestagelobbying fol-
lowsthispattern.
Although L can choosenotto lobbyC activelyat theagendastage,
notlobbyingC can itselfconstitute an informativesignalto C. Thisfol-
lows fromProposition 3. Let T?(s) denotetheset of informed L(t) who
chooseto "stay home" and notlobbythecommittee actively;T?(s) =
{tE TIX*(t,s) = 4}.
3: SupposeXL $ xC and assumeagendastagelobbying

PROPOSITION
is informative
and mostinfluential.
Then T?(s) is an interval;T?(s)
9 {0, T}; and XL > (<) XC impliesE[tlt E T?(s)] < (>) 1/2with
lim min[tE T?(s)] = lim max[tE T?(s)] = 1/2.
IXL-XCI|O IXL-XCI|?
That T? is an intervalfollowsfromthe lobbyist'smostpreferred

proposalbeingmonotonic in t, so thatall equilibriumlobbying
strategies
musthave a partition structure in whichall typesin a partition
sendthe
samemessage.Beyondthis,theproposition saysthatunlessthecommit-
tee's andthelobbyist'spreferences coincide,inanymostinfluentialequi-
libriumthereare alwaysinformed L(t) who choose notto lobbyC ac-
tively.Consequently, giventhe lobbyist'sdata acquisitionstrategyis
unobservable, C is necessarilyunsurewhethernotbeinglobbiedis be-
cause L is uninformed or because L is informed and choosingnot to
lobby.Giventhis,whatC choosesto do whentheagendastagelobbying
strategy is influential
and C is notlobbieddependsbothon C's beliefs
aboutthe likelihoodthatL is informed and on whichof the informed
typeswillbe membersof T?(s).
The remaining statements ofProposition 3 providesomequalitative
information on T?(s). First,it is the relatively"low" (respectively,
"high")typeswhochoosenotto lobbywhenXL > (respectively, <) xc.9
And second,as L's preferences becomemoresimilarto C's, theset of
typeschoosingnotto lobbyshrinks, becomesmorecentrist, and coin-
cidesinthelimitwiththetype(t = 1/2)whosemostpreferred committee
proposal is exactlywhat the committeewould choose on the basis of the
priorinformationonly.
The intuition
forProposition
3 is fairlystraightforward.
Let XL > XC
9It should be emphasized thatforsome parameterizationstherecan exist equilibriain

which,forexample, "high"-typesdo not lobby when XL > xc; but such equilibriacannot
be the most influential.
8i6 David Austen-Smith
and,forsimplicity, supposethestatusquo is sufficiently extremeto be

irrelevant.Now supposethecommittee, ifitis notlobbiedbyL, (naively)
assumesL is uninformed and so proposesan alternative based on the
expectation thatt = 1/2.Thenan informed lobbyist withinformation that
t is infactsomewhatsmallerthan1/2,sayL(t), willchoose"Not lobby."
To see this,recallthat,whenXL > xc, L prefersa higherproposalthan
C foreach valueof t. Consequently, by "stayinghome,"L(t) inducesa
relatively betterpersonaloutcomethanoccursifhe or she revealsthe
information and inducesC to offera smallerproposal.Therefore, C's
naivebeliefsareinconsistent, andso C will(sophisticatedly) takeaccount
of thepossibility thatL is informed whenC is notactivelylobbied.In
equilibrium, C's beliefsand T?(s) mustbe consistent, and thiscannot
happenifT?(s)includesall types(else theagendastagelobbying strategy
couldnotbe informative, sinceonlyone messageis eversent),orifT?(s)
is empty(sincethenonlyan uninformed lobbyist"stayshome,"which,
bythepreceding discussion,cannotbe consistent withinfluential agenda
stagelobbying anddiversepreferences). Thatitis "low" typeswho"stay
home" whenXL > xc similarly followsfromthefactthatthelobbyist
prefers moreextreme policiesthanthecommittee foranyvalueoft. And,
finally, theintuition forthelimiting behaviorof T?(s) is simplythatC's
and L's preferences are identicalin thelimit,so L(1/2)"stayinghome"
givesC exactlythesameinformation as ifL(1/2)lobbiedactively.
An immediate implication ofProposition 3 and thecommittee's best
responseproposalstrategy is that,ceterisparibus,thecommittee's pro-
posal consequenton notbeinglobbiedis typically biasedawayfromthe
proposalit wouldofferiftherewereno lobbyistat all. Specifically, let
IT0-I*((+, s) denotethecommittee's proposalwhenthestatusquo is s
and C is notactivelylobbied(i.e., L "stayshome"),andlet b(s) denote
C's proposalifthereis no influential lobbying at eithertheagenda-setting
stageor thevotestageoftheprocess.Then,foralmostall s, 'Noand b(s)
are distinct in anyinfluential equilibrium. And notethatinfluential vote
stagelobbying aloneis sufficient foran equilibrium to be influential.Con-
sequently,even whenall informed lobbyisttypes"stay home" at the
agenda-setting stage,thefactthatinfluential votestagelobbying is possi-
ble leadsthecommittee to proposea different alternative to thatitwould
offerwerethereno influential lobbyingat any stageof theprocess.In
otherwords,itis possibleforagendastagelobbying notto be influential
according to thedefinition, butforthecommittee's proposalto anticipate
(and so be sensitiveto) votestagelobbying.
The game withouta lobbyistsurelypossesses an equilibrium (see
section3) andso, as discussedinsection2 above,thegamewitha lobby-
istalso has an equilibrium, specifically,one inwhichL does notacquire
information,and,ifeverL does lobbyC orH, L's messagesareignored.

The relevantissue,then,concernsthecircumstances underwhichthere
existsan influential
equilibrium.Proposition1 answersthisquestionfor
votingstagelobbying Because thecommittee's
strategies. strategy
space
an analogousresultforagendastagelobbyingstrategies
is notfinite, is
less immediate.
PROPOSITION 4:
1 + xc). Then there exists an influential
(1) Suppose s 5_(-xc,
in equilibrium
agendastagelobbyingstrategy ifand onlyif IXL
- xci < 1/2.When s E (-xc, 1 + xc), these conditionsare
necessary but not sufficient.
(2) Thereexistsa uniqueequilibrium pricep*(XC,XL, s) suchthatL
choosesto becomeinformed ifand onlyiftherealizedpriceof
information
p is less thanp*(.).
Because xc > XH -0 by assumption, itfollowsfromPropositions 1
and 4.1 thatforsome givendistancesbetweenXL and xc, a lobbyist
havingXL > xCcan, ceterisparibus,be influential onlyat the agenda-
setting stagewhereasa lobbyisthavingXL < xCcan be influentialbothat
theagendasettingand at thevote stage.In otherwords,ifthecommit-
tee's idealpointlies betweenthatofa lobbyistand theHouse, thenthat
lobbyist willingeneralhaveless (butnotnecessarilynegligible)
influence
at thevotestageof thelegislativesequencethanone whoseidealpoint
eitherlies betweenthoseofthecommittee andtheHouse or lies beyond
(butnottoofarbeyond)thatoftheHouse. Similarly, iftheHouse's ideal
pointliesbetweenthatofa lobbyist andthecommittee, thenthatlobbyist
willingeneralhaveless influence at theagendastageoftheprocessthan
a lobbyistwhoseideal pointeitherlies betweenthoseof thecommittee
and theHouse or lies beyondthatofthecommittee.
Assumingit to be commonknowledgethatL has information, and
assumingfurther thatC is freeto implement any policyit chooses (in
effect,that H prefersthe consequence xc to the consequence s - t
forall t E T), Crawfordand Sobel (1982)provethatunderthecurrent
assumptions therecan existan influential
agendastagelobbying strategy
if and onlyif IXL - XCI< 1/4(see also Gilliganand Krehbiel1987).
Because neitherof the Crawfordand Sobel assumptionshold,
Proposition 4.1 is primafaciesurprising.
The intuition fortheresultlies
in"Not lobby"beinga distinguished message.Ifitis common knowledge
thatL is informed, then"Not lobby" is no different froman explicit
speech;in equilibrium, C makestheidenticalinference aboutL's infor-
mationas he or she wouldifL activelylobbiedand deliveredan appro-
priatespeech.Thus,theupperboundof 1/4is necessaryto ensurethat
thereis someseparation oftypeswhoactivelylobbyC. However,when

C is unsurewhether notbeinglobbiedmeansL is uninformed orinformed
but choosingto "stay home," thereis no explicitspeech in Mc that
inducesthesame equilibrium inference.
Consequently, evenifall those
L(t) whoactivelylobbydeliverthesamemessage,so longas thereexist
sometypeswhochoosenotto lobby,theagendastagelobbying strategy
is influential.
Propositions3 and4.1 togetherjustifythelexicographic definition
of
"mostinfluential" used in thispaper:because "Not lobby"is itselfan
informative signal,theagendastagelobbyingstrategy is necessarilyin-
fluentialwhether L electsto speakdirectly to C.
Evidently,therecan be activelobbying ofH onlyifthestatusquo
is notelicitedby agendastagelobbying.And Proposition 4 impliesthat
ifthecommittee and thelobbyisthave sufficiently diversepreferences,
thenat mostthevotingstagelobbyingstrategy can be influential.Less
transparent are givenby Proposition
possibilities 5.
PROPOSITION 5:
(1) Fix an agenda{b, s}. ThenXL > 0 and s < b (orXL < 0 and s >
b) together implythatifthereexistL(t) who preferthe status
quo s to thealternativeb (i.e., T(b, s) =$0), thenthereexistsan
influential
votestagelobbyingstrategy;
(2) For some (XL, XC, s), thereexistmostinfluential equilibriain
whichbothagendastageand vote stagelobbyingstrategies are
influential;
(3) Consideranymostinfluential equilibrium in whichbothagenda
stageand vote stagelobbyingstrategies are influential,
and let
Tr*(respectively,Tr*) be thelowest(respectively, highest)pro-
posalelicitedfromthecommittee byagendastagelobbying. Then
(i) s ? [-rr*,
-rr] almostalways, and (ii) ifXL > xC and the agenda
stagelobbying strategyelicitsonlytwoproposals,thenonlythose
L(t) who do not lobby the committee actively(i.e., X*(t,s)
- O) are capable of inducingtheHouse to vote forthe status
quo.
5.1 givesa simplesufficient
Proposition conditionforvotingstage
lobbying to be influential
strategies (whether agendastagestrategiesare
Suppose, forexample,the statusquo is smallerthanthe
influential).
committee's proposal,s < b, andletthelobbyist'sidealpointbe greater
thanthatof theHouse; so foranyvalue of t,L's mostpreferred policy
is higherthanthatof theHouse. Thenan informed lobbyistwouldonly
lobbyH infavorofthelowerpolicyalternative ifthetruevalueoftwere
indeedverylow, in whichcase it is rationalforH to respondpositively
to L's advocacy.
Proposition 5.2 saysthatinfluential agendastageandinfluential vot-

ingstagestrategies can coexistforsomedistributions ofidealpointsand
the statusquo, and Proposition 5.3 gives a partialdescription of such
situations. Specifically, 5.3(i) claimsthatbothlobbying strategies can be
influential, first,onlyif the statusquo s is not an elicitedproposalin
equilibrium and, second,onlyifall elicitedproposalseitherlie above or
lie belows. FromProposition1, therecan be no influential vote stage
lobbying ifthestatusquo is too extremewithrespectto theHouse's and
thelobbyist'sideal points.With5.3(i), thisimpliesthatforinfluential
lobbying at bothstagesto exist,the statusquo mustbe an appropriate
policyfortheHouse to approveiftis knowntobe closeto zero(implying
s is close to theHouse's idealpointof zero) or close to one (implying s
is close to one).
Proposition 5.3(ii) assertsthatwhenboththeagendastageand the
votingstagelobbyingstrategies are influential,and whenthelobbyistis
sufficiently more"extreme"thanthecommittee thatonlytwoinforma-
tivemessagescan be sentat theagendastage,thenit is notpossible(in
equilibrium) foran informed lobbyist tolobbythecommittee activelyand
inducea proposal,say b, andthengo on to lobbytheHouse successfully
to voteforthestatusquo againstb. In otherwords,giventherestriction
on idealpointsandan agenda{b, s} resulting frominfluential agendastage
lobbying, theset ofL(t) preferring s to b, T(b, s) invariably consistsof
informed typeswhodo notactivelylobbythecommittee (i.e., T(b, s) S
T?(s)). AgainusingProposition1, the resultimpliesthatif some L(t)
activelylobbyboththecommittee and theHouse (i.e., XA*(t, s) $ 4 and
XA*(t,b, s) $ 4 forsomeL(t)) and is influential inbothinstances,thenXL
mustbe "close to" XH. Andthisis intuitive.
5. Examples
Thissectionpresentsfournumerical examplesto illustrate thesorts
of equilibriumphenomenaidentified above. In all of theexampleswith
influential
agendastagelobbying thelobbyist's
strategies, andthecommit-
tee's idealpointsadmitmoreinformative equilibriathanis possibleunder
theassumption thatL is knownto be informed. Throughout, uc*denotes
the most influentialequilibriumstrategiesand numericalvalues are
roundedto fourdecimalplaces.10
Example I
In thisexample,the statusquo is sufficiently
extremethatthereis
no vote stagelobbying.So anyinfluence L has is at theagenda-setting
stage. And the exampleshows thatL can have such influence, even
detailsfortheexamplesare givenin theappendix.

"Computational
though theHouse's idealpoint(XH = 0) liesbetweenthatofthecommit-

tee and thelobbyist.The intuitionforthisis thatthestatusquo is set
highand XL < 0; so an informedlobbyistwho knows t to be low has an
incentive to lobbythecommittee activelyandrevealthisinformation. On
theotherhand,thisincentivevanishesfor"high" L(t). Consequently,
as claimedinProposition 3, suchL(t) "stayhome"andmimicthebehav-
iorofan uninformed lobbyist.
Specifically,let s = 1 + xc, xc = 0.075 and XL = -0.3. Then cr*
is such that:p* = 0.0603; XA*(t, s) = V t - t* and XA*(t,
s) = m E Mc
V t < t*, where tl*= 0.8363. Hence, rr*(4,s) = 0.5794 and Tr*(m,s) =
0.4931.Because s = 1 + xc and XL < 0, all informed L(t) preferthe
alternativeto the status quo: T(-rr, s) = 0 V rrE {rr*(4, s), Tr*(m,s)}.
Hence,XAk) and rris accepted.
Noticethatifthecommittee weresurethatL wereuninformed, then
it would choose b = 0.575 (= xc + Et); and if it were sure L were
informed,then on "hearing" the message "+," it would choose b' -
0.9932 (= xc + E[tIt - t*]). However, since 0 < p* < 1, the message
"+" leaves C uncertain,and so the best response, takingaccount of L's
equilibriumbehavior,is to choose rr*(?,s) E (b, b'). (This property
recursin subsequentexamples.)
Example 2
The situation hereis similarto thatof Example1 in thatthestatus
quo is high.However,thelobbyistis nowrelatively moreextremethan
thecommittee. In equilibrium thereis influential agendastagelobbying
(and here,sinceXL > 0, it is "low" L(t) who mimicthe uninformed
lobbyist),and therecan be some informative, but not influential,vote
stagelobbying.
Let s = 0.8, xc = 0.125and XL = 0.5. Thencr*is suchthat:p*
0.0603; X*(t, s) = V t < t* and XA*(t, s) = m E Mc V t - t*, where
t* = 0.1638.Hence, rr*(4,s) = 0.6207and Tr*(m,s) = 0.7069.In this
case, whileno informed L(t) prefers s to rr*(+,s) (so TQrr*(+,s), s) =
0), thereareL(t) whoprefer s to rr*(m, s), s) = [0.2535,1]).
s) (viz. T(Qr*(m,
However,by Proposition1 (see also Proposition 5.3(ii)),thereexistsno
influentialvotingstagelobbying strategy, sinceEH[tIt E P(Qr*(m,s), s)]
< (s + rr*(m, s))12. So H votesfortheproposalwhether or notL lob-
biesH actively.
Nevertheless, giventheagenda{r*(m,s), s}, thevotestagelobbying
strategy,XA(t,) = n V t E T(Tr*(m,s), s) and XA(t,4) = otherwise,is
informative,since E,H[tIn, {f(T*(m, s), s}] > EgH[tI4+, {f(*(m, s), s}].
Furthermore, givenKv,the committee wouldlike to alterits proposal
ex post(i.e., Kvis also informative
(slightly) forthecommittee). Figure4
illustrates
theequilibrium.
Figure 4. Equilibriumin Example 2
Outcomes
L(t) with0 S t < t4"stay home"

L(t) with t 3 t* send message "m" to C
\ s) = [t', 1]
iTQrr*,
ir*Mr(m,s)
IT 1T(~,~S)
XL
(irr* + s)2
XH 0 i
t 121
S, t) = s t
y(IT*, t) T* - t
E4,t | (I + t')/2 yrT0, t) = - t
Key:
\ = Outcomey(., t),givenL informed
* = C's and H's expected (t, outcome) given L "stays
home"at theagendastage
Example 3
In thisexample,bothagendastageandvotestagelobbying
areinflu-
theclaimsofProposition
ential,illustrating 5.
Let s = XL = 0.3 and xc = 0.05. Then a* is such thatp* = 0.0789;
X*(t,s) = 0 V t < t* and X*(t, s) = m E Mc V t : t*, where t* =
0.3318. Hence, rr*(+,s) = 0.5478, and ar*(m,s) = 0.7159. In thiscase,
thereare L(t) that preferthe statusquo to the proposal Trr*(+,
s),
T(Qr*(4,s), s) = [0, 0.1239]; and thereare no L(t) preferring
the status
quo to a*(m, s), T(rr*(m,s), s) = 0. By Proposition 1, thereexistsan
influential
votingstagelobbyingstrategy, sinceE,H[tI t E T(,ar*(+,s), s)]
< (s + rr*(+, s))12. In particular,
as predictedby Proposition 5.3(ii),it
is thoseL(t) who did notlobbythecommittee activelywho nowlobby
the House actively; T(,ar*(@,s), s) C T?(s) = [0, t*). The relevantvote
stagelobbyingstrategy is thusXA*(t, ) n E MH V t E T(rr*(+,s), s),
and X*(t, ) = v t E T\T(rr*(q),s), s). So H votes for s against
V
Tr*(O, s) if and onlyifH is lobbiedand hearsthe speechn, and votes
againsts in all othercircumstances.Figure5 illustrates
theequilibrium.
(It is worthobservingherethatthe existenceof influentialvote stage
lobbyingbiases the committee'sproposals,relativeto the case of no
influentialvotestagelobbying;thisis a generalproperty.)
Example 4
In contrastto Example1, thesituation hereis one inwhichno influ-
entialagendastagelobbying is possible,butthereis influential
votestage
lobbying.However,as remarked inthediscussion followingProposition3,
the existenceof influential vote stage lobbyingper se is sufficient to
bias thecommittee's proposal.For althoughthecommittee receivesno
informationwhenchoosinga proposal(all informed L(t) "stay home"),
C recognizesthatdifferent agendaswillelicitdifferent votestagelobbying
behaviors.Consequently, C tradesoffchoosinga mostpreferred alterna-
tiveon thebasisofitspriorinformation on t alone,againstthelikelihood
thatsucha proposalwillelicitsuccessfullobbying onbehalfofthestatusquo.
Let s = 0, xc = 0.4, and XL = -0.2. ThenCr* is suchthatXaQ)
+ (byProposition 4.1); p* = 0.0734;andC's bestresponseis (see appen-
dix) 1r*(+, s) = 0.6647. (Note that 7r*(+, s) < b(s) = 0.9.) However,
T(rr*(dC,s), s) = [0, 0.5324] and so E,H[tIt E TQ(r*(4,s), s)] = 0.2662 <
(r*(+, s) + s)/2 = 0.3324.Therefore, by Proposition 1, thereexistsan
influentialvotingstagelobbyingstrategy suchthatX*(t, ) E MH v t E
T(Qr*(q,s), s) and X*(t, 4)= otherwise.Figure6 illustrates theequi-
librium.
Figure 5. Equilibriumin Example 3
Outcomes
L(t) with0 S t < t4"stay home"

L(t) witht t4 send message "m" to C
T(,rr,s) = [0, t'], L(t) witht S t' sendmessage"n" toH
iT Tr(m,s)
IT -=lT~s
IT(C S)\ \
S - XL
XC
XH = 1
y(IT*, t) T*- t
yQrr0, t) = ITO t
y(s, t) = s, t
Key:
\ = Outcome y(.,t) givenL informed

* = C's andH's expected(t,outcome)
givenL "stayshome"at
theagendastage
in Example4
Figure6. Equilibrium
Outcomes
b(s) All L(t) "stay home" at the agenda stage

L(t) witht S t' send message "n" to H
I _ 7T(4, S)
XC
-~~~~~~~~~~~~
S XH= 0
XL
\ X~~~~~~~~Y(M"
t) w' t
sr, s t) = - t
Key:
\ = Outcome
y(.,t)givenL informed
6. Conclusion
Thispaperis concernedwiththeextentto whichinterestgrouplob-
bying,modeledexclusivelyas information can be informa-
transmission,
tiveor influential
at agenda-setting
and votingstagesoflegislativedeci-
sionmaking.Amongtheresultsare thatinformed whochoose
lobbyists
notto lobbyat theagendastageare thosewhoseinformation is "low"
("high")whenL's idealpointin consequenceis higher(lower)thanthat

ofthecommittee; thattherecan coexistinfluential lobbying atbothstages
oftheprocess;thatwhileinformative agendastagelobbying is generically
thesameis nottrueofvotestagelobbying;
influential, thatnotall lobby-
istswillchooseto becomeinformed; and thatuncertainty aboutwhether
a lobbyisthasinformation can inducemoreinformation transmission than
whenthereis no suchuncertainty. And withtheexceptionof thefinal
claim,all oftheseresultsare moreor less testable.Moregenerally, the
modelsuggestsempirical workthatfocuseson lobbying patterns overthe
history ofa bill'spassage,fromitsformulation in committee to itstreat-
menton thefloor.
In the real world,thereare manyinterestgroupsand legislators;
uncertainty is oftenmultidimensional; andgroupsandlegislators interact
through time,developingreputations and so forth.The modelhereis
parsimonious in the extremein theserespects,and as such theresults
mustbe interpreted cautiously. Nevertheless, theyaresuggestive. In par-
ticular, whileit is intuitivethat information
legislators' about whether a
groupis informed shouldaffecttheabilityofa lobbyistto influence deci-
sion making,it is surprising thatsuch uncertainty in principleleads to
moreinfluential behaviorat the agenda-setting stageratherthanless.
Although byno meansa test,theresultis consistent withHansen(1991),
whose studyrevealswidespreadtransmission of information fromthe
farmlobby-whose preferences overissueslikepricesupportsforagri-
cultureare clearlybiasedawayfromthoseoftheHouse as a whole-to
legislatorson committee.
Amongtheassumptions thatitis desirabletorelaxis theassumption
thatthelobbyistmayonlylobbythecommittee, ifanyone,at theagenda-
setting stage.IfthelobbyistchosetolobbyonlytheHouse at theagenda-
setting stage,thecommittee wouldmakesomeinference aboutwhatin-
formation the lobbyistofferedthe House; and it may well be in the
lobbyist'sinterests to inducesuchan inference. Similarissuesariseifthe
grouplobbiesboththe committee and the House at the agenda-setting
stage.Sinceitis knownthat"who lobbieswho" is important forlegisla-
tors'decisions(Kingdon1973),thereis goodempirical reasonto extend
the model in this way. However,I conjecturethatwithoutmultiple
sourcesof uncertainty, littlewouldchangewiththe qualitativeresults
givenhere.
Manuscriptsubmitted10 May 1992

Final manuscriptreceived23 November 1992
APPENDIX
DEFINITION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM: An equilibriumis a list of strategiesay* e ((b* X*

8*, X*), 7r*,v*) and a set of beliefs F = (Lc, ,uJH)such that:
(el) Vp E [0, 1], 8 *(p s) = 1 iffE[UL()IX*, X*, 'IT*, v*] - p 3 E[UL(-)18v*,
Xv*,i*,
(e2) 8 *() = 0 A
Xe 8; *0() = 1 Ea V t E T,
s), v*(A, 'Tr*,s)]
A*(t, s) E argmaxE[UL(. )|t, AX*,Tr*(X,
XEZC
(e3) V m E Zc, r*(m,s) E argmaxE ,[uc( )Im, {*(, b, s), X*( , b, s), v*(, b, s)];
(e4) V (p, b) E [0, 1] x R, 8*(p, b, s) = 1 iff,
8*(p, s) = 0 and E[UL()IAX*(-,b, s), v*] - p : E[UL(O)IV*];
(eS) 8* + V = 0 > X* e * + V > 0 =a V t E T,
X*(t, b, s) E argmaxE[uLO)It, v*(, X, b, s)];
XEZH
(e6) V (k, m, b) E ({C} U ) x ZH x R, v*(k, m, b, s) = 0 (E [0, 1]) [= 1] as
E,1H[UL(b)Ik, m, b] < (=) [>] E"H[UL(S)|k, m, b];
(e7) pc and ALHare derived fromthe priorsand a* by Bayes Rule where defined.
Because H may only randomizein equilibriumif H is indifferentbetween the status
quo and the committee'sproposal, Lemma 1 in the textamountsto thefollowingstatement.
LEMMA 1: Let Tr*(.) = b.
(1) If XA*()is not influentialthen,
E H[UH(b)Ik, m, b] = E1H[UH(s)Ik, m, b] > v*(k, m, b, s) = 1;
(2) If XA*()is influential
then,
E"H[UH(b)Ik, m, b] = E"H[UH(s)Ik, m, b] > v*(k, m, b, s) E {O, 1}.
PROOFOF LEMMA 1.1: This followsfromsequential equilibriabeing subgame perfect:
specifically,ifv* E (0, 1) thenC can do betterthanb by choosingsome proposal arbitrarily
close to b thatH strictlyprefersto s; but thenthisis not a best response, since C's strategy
space is R; hence, the equilibriumrequirementof mutualbest responses impliesH cannot
randomizewhen indifferent (see, e.g., Banks and Gasmi 1987).
LEMMA 1.2: Follows easily from Lemma 1.1 and the definitionof most influ-
ential. QED
The formalstatementof Lemma 2 is simply,
LEMMA 2: 8*( ) = 0 is alwaysa bestresponse.
PROOF:Let nr0be the proposal C offersif C is not lobbied by L. Since C cannotverify
thatL is not informed,nr0will be offeredirrespectiveof L's data acquisitiondecision. Since
this is a pure strategydecision, nr0 (in equilibrium)is fullyanticipatedby L. Therefore,
because L is free to choose not to lobby C at the agenda stage and because the price of
information is invariantbetween stages, L can never be made worse offby choosing to
acquire information at the startof the process ratherthanafterthe agenda is set. QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION1: Supposeb > s. Usingequation(3), deduce:
uj(b) > (-) uj(s) as E[t I -I > () (b + s)12 - xj,Vj E {C, H, L}. (A. 1)
-
By (A.1), t(b, s) = {t E Tit (b + s)12 - XL}. Let XA(t,b, s) = n V t E t(b, s), and Xv
(t, b, s) = 4aV t E T\t(b, s), and suppose v(, n, b, s) = 0 < v(, X, b, s) = 1. By sequential
rationality,XjQ) is a best response to H's strategyv. And since t is uniformly distributed
on T = [0, 1],
E H[t n] = EFH[tI t E t(b, s)] = ((b + s)12 - xL)12;

EFH[tI] = EFH[tIt 0 t(b, s)] = (1 + (b + s)12 - XL)12.
Substitutingthese values into(A. 1) forxj = XH = 0 and collectingtermsyieldstheinequali-

ties of Proposition1; the result now follows fromsequential rationalityand Lemma 1.1.
The case of b < s follows similarly. QED
Proposition2.1 followsdirectlyfromthe committee'sbest response proposal strategy.
In part,thisis given by
LEMMA 3: Assume XA(-) 4. Fix Xa(-) and V m E UT Xa(t, s), let t(m) E,,[tIm].
Then,
(1) (^(m)0 (s - xc, s + 3xc) > r*(m, s) = xc + i(m);
(2) There can exist at most one proposal nr*(,s) E (s, s + 2xc);
(3) [rn*(m',s) < n*(m, s) E (s, s + 2xc)] ti(m) - t(m') 2 XC;
(4) t(m) E (s - xc, s] > Tr*(m,s) = s;
(5) (- [3 i(-) > slTr*(, s) = s]) #' min[rr*(,s) 3 s + 2xc] = xc + t( ).
PROOF:Fix Xa(-) and let ?(ml) s ti(m2) s . . . st i(mN). Thenin equilibrium, (e3)
requiresthe followingincentivecompatibilityconditionsto hold (whetheror not vote stage
lobbyingis influential):
:
EJc[uc(T*(mi, s)) I ?(mi), ] E,c[uc(Tr*(mj, s)) It(mi), ], V i,j. (A.2)
Equations (A.2) and (3) easily yield
s)
Tr*(mi, Is) i = 1,. . ., N - 1. (A.3)
And, using (3), the inequalities(A.2) hold iff,
i(mi) < [,r*(mi, s) + Tr*(mi+1,s)]12 - xc, V i = 1, . . ., N - 1. (A.4)
Finally,note that(e7) implies,in equilibrium,thatH knows C's information

is characterized
by some i E {f(m ) Ii = 1, . , N}.
LEMMA 3.1: Let i(mi) s - xc. Then(A.1) impliesE[UH(XC)Ii(md)] > E[UH(S -
t)Ii(mi)], and Lemma 1 impliesH will vote for Trr= Tr*(mi,s) = Xc + t(mi) against
s whenever this inequalityholds. Therefore'rr*is a best response so long as E ]H
[UH(1rr*)1srr]
: E,H[UH(S)I rrf]. But since K(mi)s s - xc, (A.3) and (A.4) directly
implythis inequality.An identicalargumentapplies fori(mi) : s + 3xc.
LEMMA 3.2: Supposenot.Then3 i(m1), i(m2) E (s, s + xc) such that,by (e3), (e6),
and Lemma 1, 'rr*= 2i(ml) - s and Trr*
= 21(m2) - s. By (A.4), therefore,i(ml) s
i(m1) + i(m2) - XC s. Butthismeanss + XC < i(m2): contradiction.
LEMMA 3.3: Let rr*<
Kr* E (s, s + 2xc). Then, r* = 2i(mi1) - s and:
i(mi+ - i(mi) < Xc > 2i(mi+1) - s < 2i(mi) + 2xC - s
4 i(mi) > [,a* 1 + s]/2 - xc;
contradicting(A.4).
LEMMA 3.4: Let i(mi) E (s - xc, s]. Then thereare no alternativespreferredto s by
both C and H. Therefore,conditionalon C's proposal signalingi(mi), H will reject
any proposal b # s that C prefersto H. By (A.3) and (A.4), C has no incentiveto
make a proposal a *(mp,s), j < i. Wlog, let *,1 be the smallestproposal greaterthan
s; thereare two possibilities.First, a* E (s, s + 2xc): but thenLemma 3.3 implies
thatC cannotprofitably deviate. And second, r* l > s + 2xc: C can profitably

deviate
here only if i(mi) > [s + ir*+]/2 - xc. By (A.3) and sequentialrationality,i*rl ? xc
+ t(mi+). Therefore,C will only deviate froms if f(mi) > [s + xc + i(mi+1)]/2-
XCor, 2i(mi) - t(mi+ ) > s - xc. But i(mi) 6 s by assumption,so thislast inequality
impliess + xc > i(mi+j). Hence, r*+ E [s, s + 2xc): contradiction.
LEMMA 3.5: Let rir = s and ir* :- s + 2xc. By assumption,i(mi) S s. If the claim
is false then,by (A.4), i(mi) > [s + -rr,*+]/2
- xc ? s: contradiction. QED
REMARK 1: When the vote stage lobbyingstrategyis influential the numberof cases
increasesdramatically(recall, thereare threeindependentparameters,{XC, XL, S}). In partic-
ular, given influentialvote stage lobbying,the computationof the committee'sexpected
payoffsas a functionof its proposals becomes considerablymore complicated. Exactly
whatis involvedis illustratedlaterin thediscussionof how Examples 3 and 4 are computed.
Moreover,as the computationsforthese examples demonstrate,such biases are continuous
in perturbationsof the agenda stage lobbyingstrategy.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION2: Proposition2.1: ImmediatefromLemma 3 and Remark 1.
Proposition2.2: Clearly,at mosttwo actions can be elicitedat the votingstage. Hence,
any message sent will be equivalent eitherto the speech "Choose b" or to the speech
"Choose s"; so essentiallyonly two messages can be sent in equilibrium.The second part
of the propositionnow followsfrom(A. 1) (withj = L) and sequentialrationality. QED
LEMMA 4: Assume \*( ) is influential.Then T?(s) # T; T?(s) is an interval;and T?(s)
= 0 => {tLsT*(Xa*(t, s), s) = .r*(4), s)} # 0.
PROOF:Because A*(-) is influential,T?(s) =#T by definitionof an influentialstrategy.

Suppose T?(s) = 0; then X*(t, s) = 4) V t C T. Therefore,by (e7), if C is not lobbied C
knows L is surely uninformedin which case E,J[tj,)] = 1/2.Let .rr' rr*(4),s) be the
equilibriumproposal conditionalon C not beinglobbied. Suppose, by way of contradiction,
that ar*(X*(t,s), s) =#-r' V t E T. Since \*( ) is influential,
thereexist at least two elicited
proposals, say -r < -r'. Let -r [,r'] be the smallest[largest]proposals elicitedby XaQ). By
the supposition,eitherXL > a' and -rr< xr,or XL < 7r - 1 and rr'< rr'.To this,suppose
XL C [-I - 1, r0]. Then ar' - XL C [0, 1], in which case L(-0 - XL) strictly prefersnotto
lobby since, by (3), this yields the maximalpayoffto L(-). If XL > a' and .r*(A\*(t, s), s) =
-r < 'T0, thenL(t) is strictlybetteroffdeviatingto "4)" and inducingar'. And similarly,if
XL K rr - 1 and ar*(XA*(t, s), s) = nr'> -r', thenL(t) is strictlybetteroffdeviatingto "4)"
and inducing irT.So assume XL > iTO and ar' < Tr.Condition (e2) implies the following
incentivecompatibilityconditionson \*(-)
E[U L (M * (a* (t, 5), s))lI t, *] IU (M * (a*(tW,

[L 5), s))lI t, ],V t, t' C T. (A. S)
And V t, t' such that rr*(X*(t,
s), s) < rT*(X*(t',
s), s), (A.S) holds iff,
t s), s) + iT*(X*(t',s), s)]12

[rT*(XA*(t, -XL; and (A.6)
t' s), s) + r*(X*(t,s), s)]2
[.rr*(X*(t, -XL.
Therefore,if T' C T is such that rr*(Xr*(t, s), s) = iTr*(Xa(t,s), s) V t, t' C T', thenT' must
be an interval,as required. Let t E T, send the message, say m E Mc, that elicits 'r.
Because -ris the smallestactivelyelicited proposal, (A.6) implies Tl = [0, tl) for some t,
< 1. Since T?(s) = 0, Ec,[tIm] = t1/2< 1/2.But (A.4) and -rr< -r implyEj[t|m] =
tj/2 > 1/2: contradiction.The remainingcase (XL < 'M' - 1) follows similarly.So the
suppositionthat a *(\* (t, s), s) =#a' V t C T mustbe false. This proves thelemma. QED
LEMMA 5: Suppose XL # Xc and assume X*(-) is most influential.
Then T?(s) # 0.
PROOF:Suppose not. Then by Lemma 4, R(s) = {tlrr*(A\*(t, s), s) = 'rr0}= 0. If

Xa() is an equilibrium strategy, then it is a partitionstrategy.
Moreover, such strategies
are essentiallythe only equilibriumstrategiespossible (Crawfordand Sobel 1982). So given
an equilibriuma, let P(s, N((o)) = (to 0, tl, t2, . . . tN(a) 1) denote the partitionof T
such that X*(t, s) = mi E Zc V t E [ti-1, ti) and mi =$ mi-1, i = 1,. N(a). And by
(A.3), (A.4), and (A.6), P(s, N(o)) must satisfy
ti = [rr*(mi,s) + s*(mi+1, s)]l2 - XL, Vi = 1, . . ., N-1. (A.7)

In particular,since R(s) is an interval,say [tj, tj+,), X*(t, s) = mj#= V t E R(s). Then
fromthe argumentforLemma 4, R(s) # 0 implies
ES,Ctjmj] = ES,[tj|] = 1/2. (A.8)
Now suppose, first,that s is such that there can be no influentialvote stage lobby-
ing.11Then by Lemma 1 and (e3), the House always chooses the committee'sproposal. Let
A XL - XC > 0 (a symmetricargumentapplies forA < 0 and is omitted).By Lemma 3,
Tr*(mi,s) = i(mi) + xc, and (A.7) can be solved (Crawfordand Sobel 1982) to yield the
conditioncharacterizingany equilibriumpartition:
ti=tli + 2i(i-1)A, V i = 1, . . ., N, (A.9)

with to a 0 and tN 1. Since \*( ) is influential,N : 2; indeed, N : 3 since, by (A.8),
= [tj + tj+1]/2 = 1/2. But (A.9) implies tj+. - tj > tj - t,l, V i = 1, ..
E[tIt E R(s)]
N - 1. Therefore(A.8) cannot possibly hold. Hence, T?(s) # 0, provingthe lemma when
s is irrelevant.Now suppose s is such thatvote stage lobbyingcan be influential.But then
the resultfollowsa fortiori,since (A.4) and (A.7) mustcontinueto hold in equilibrium,and
by Proposition4.1 below, the maximalequilibriumpartitionsize when s is relevantcan be
no greaterthan when s is irrelevant. QED
PROOFOF PROPOSITION3: By Lemmas 4 and 5, it only remainsto establishthe claims
on E[tIt E T?(s)]. Suppose A > 0 (a symmetricargumentapplies forA < 0 and is omitted)
and set T?(s) = [tj,tj+1). As forLemma 5, it sufficesto prove the claim whens is irrelevant;
so assume this. By (e7),
E t)] = prob[L informed1][tj+I + tj]/2+ prob[L uninformed

|]Et
= (p(tj+l - tj)/[l - p + p(tj+l - tj)])[tj + tj+1]/2 (A. 10)
+ (1 - p)/[l - p + p(tj+1 - tj)])12
=[1-p + p(t - t)/2[1 - p + p(tj+l - tj)],
wherep is the equilibriumprice above which L chooses not to acquire information (that
this is well defined is proved below). Now, since s is irrelevant,Lemma 3 implies
lr*(X*(-),s) = xc + EJ[tja*( )], in which case (A.7) (which necessarilyholds in equilib-
rium)and (A.10) can be solved to yield the system(*):
(*) t = tli + 2i(i - I)A,Vi = 1,. . . j- 1;

tj = (tjl - 4A + [I1- p + p(tj2+ - tj)[1-p + p(tj+l -tj))13;
tj+1 = (tj+2 - 4A + [1 - p + p(t]+I - tj)]ll- p + p(tj+I - tj)])13;
tj+l+i = i(tj+2 - tj+) + tj+l + 2i(i - I)A,Vi =1, . . . ,N((*) -j - 1,
"1Ingeneral,thiswilldepend on therelativelocationsofs, XL, and xc. An unambiguous

sufficientconditionforinfluentialvote stage lobbyingto be impossibleforall XL iS S (
(1 + xc), (2 - xc)).
withto 0 and tN 1. It follows directlyfromthis systemand A > 0 (in particular,from

thefactthaton T\T?, ti+l - ti > ti - ti-1) thatin any mostinfluentialequilibrium,j is such
that[tj + tj+ ]/2 < E,j[t|4] < 1/2< [tj+I + tj+21/2; and thisestablishesthe claim on E[tIt
E T?]. And as A -O 0, the maximal partitionsize goes to infinity,and so all informed
typesseparate in the limit;the last statementof Proposition3 now followsfromLemma 4.
QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION4: By Crawfordand Sobel (1982), ifthereexists an equilibrium
in which a(-) is influential,then there exists an equilibriuma* with P(s, N(o.*)) =
(0, t(o.*), 1). Hence, it sufficesto considersuch binarypartitionequilibria.Moreover,since
therealways exist equilibriain which thereis no influentialvote stage lobbying,set A*( )
- 4 wlog.
Proposition4.1: Let s i (-xc, xc + 1), and A XL - XC. Suppose (0, to, 1) is an
equilibriumbinarypartitionof T such thatXa(t,s) = V t < t?, and Xa(t,s) = m # + V t
V
> to. By (A.3), irTE rr(4,s) < rra rr(m,s); and by (A.7), to E (0, 1) implies
to = [rro+ n]/2- XL. (A.l1)

Further,(e7) impliesE ,Cjt|] = [1 - p + pto2]/2[I - p + pto] and E,c[tIm] = (1 + t?)/
2. By Lemma 1, (el) implies
P= J O[UL - - nr)(1 - to)2,

t) - UL(OT - t)]dt = (Trr (A. 12)
with the second equality followingon substitutionfrom(A. 1). By Lemma 3 and s

(-xc, xc + 1), ir(, s) = xc + i(t); so, Tro= xc + E,CEtj4] and 'r = xc + [(1 + to)/2].
Substitutinginto (A. 11) and (A. 12) and rearrangingyields,
3t? = [1 - 4A + (1 - p + pto2)/(l - p + pto)]; (A.13)
p = p2(l - to) + to(l - to)2/2. (A. 14)

Then A E (1/4,1/2)implies:
t?(O)= (2 - 4A)/3 > O > t?(l) = (1 - 4A)/2.
(A.13) and collectingtermsyields

Moreover, implicitlydifferentiating
dtldp -(1 - to)to/[(l- p + pto)(3(I - p) + pto) + (p(l - p + pto2)] < 0.
Finally,
p(O) = p(l) = O; and V toE (O, 1), 0 < p(to) < 1.
Therefore,V A E (1/4, 1/2),3(p(t0), to(p)) E (0, 1) x (0, 1) solving (A.13) and (A.14).
Mutatismutandis,a symmetricargumentshows that,V A E (- 1/2,- 1/4),therecan exist
an influentialequilibriumin which X,(t,s) = m # 8 V t < to, X,(t,s) = V t : to. Since
8
the numberof elicited actions in a most influentialequilibriumis nonincreasingin A, this
establishesthe requiredresultfors - (-xc, xc + 1). Clearly,ifthereexists no equilibrium
when s is essentiallyirrelevant,there can exist no influentialequilibriumagenda stage
lobbyingwhen s mightbe elicited; hence, the bounds derivedabove are necessaryforsuch
equilibriumstrategies.To see thattheyare not sufficient, suppose XL = 3/4 - ?, ? > 0 and
small, and xc = 1/4.Then A = 1/2- ?, and by the precedingargument,thereis a unique
influentialequilibriumpartitionof T, (0, to, 1), if, say, s > 7/4; furthermore, Xa(t,s) =
41 V t S tonecessarily.By (A.13) and (A.14), (to,p) (0, 0), so E,c[tI1] = 1/2- Xq,ir(, s)
LOBBYING FOR AGENDAS AND VOTES 83I
= XC + 1/2 - I and r(m, s) = Xc + 1/2 + 'q', with ,' > O and small.Now lets =
1/2.Then,s - xc = 1/4< 1/2 - Jt I?] < s = 1/2.Butby Lemma3, s willbe elicited
by Xa(t, s) = ?. Hence, (0, to, 1) cannotbe an equilibriumpartition,in whichcase, ifthere
is an influentialequilibriumhere, s mustbe elicitedby the message ?. Let t' be the type
indifferent between elicitings and elicitingthe proposal (1 + t')/2. By (A.1 1), t' = 2[s -
XL + 1/2 - A]/3. Substituting,t' = 2[2, - 1/4]/3< 0, which is absurd. So thereis no
influential agenda stage lobbyingin this case.
Proposition4.2: Let {'rr*,'r* . . . . n} denote equilibriumproposals; where 'rr*=
rr*(mi,s), mi E Zc. Let P(s, N) = (tO 0, tl,..., tN a 1) be such thatV t E [ti-1,ti),
X*(t,s) = m E Zc, i = 1, . N - 1, ml# mi-I. Set mj = +. Then(el) implies8*(p,
s) = 1 iff,
i=N
p 2fJ~ ULQrr*(Mi,S) t- d - JU(Tj'I

L - t)dt.
Since UL iS strictlyconcave and rr*(-) is a well-definedfunctionof its arguments,the RHS

of the inequalitylies in R+ and is uniquelydefinedby the partitionof T. QED
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: fromProposition1
Proposition5.1: Follows straightforwardly
andXH = 0.
Proposition5.2: See Example 3.
Proposition5.3(i): Since cX*is an equilibrium,(A.7) holds and implies that if s is
elicited,thenX*(-) and XA*() cannot both be influential;so assume s is not elicitedand s E
(rr*, rr*1)for some i = 1,. N - 1. Then by (A.1) and (A.7),
T('rr*,s) = [(Tr*+ s)/2 - XL, (Xr* + 'rrl*)/2- XL) = 0; and
T(irr*I, s) [(Xir + irr1)/2 - XL, (s + irr* )/2 - XL) #0.
By (A.7),
EslH[tl tET(*trr+lS)] < [rr s]l2 E

E, tET s SA
-rl*+
+ s]/2;
E ,[t| t E- t(r+,a s)] > [,a+ + s]l2 l> E [tIt E- t(,rr s)] :-: [,rr + s]l/2-
Wlog, assume the formercase obtains: then t E T('rr, s) will deviate fromthe conjectured
strategiesby, first,sendingthe agenda stage message mi+I to elicit *(mi+ 1,s) and, second,
lobbyingH with the vote stage message otherwise sent by t E T(r'Ml*+,s) to elicit (by
Proposition1) a vote fors against *rr*+
1 Therefore,neitherof the cases above can occur;
thatis,
E T(-rr*1,
EF,H[tIt s)] r* + s]l2 and E H[t(tE s)] ? ['rrs+ s]12
(-rrl,
musthold. But given (A.7) and s exogenous, this is nongeneric.
Proposition5.3(ii): Let XL > Xc and considera mostinfluential equilibrium0r*in which
exactly two committeeproposals are elicitedby Xa(). let rl = {n', r*} be the proposals,
whereTrr= r*(4,s); by Proposition 3 andXL > Xc, ro < rr*.Since\*( ) is influential by
assumption,s ? II. By Proposition5.3(i), s _[,r', ar*]. Now suppose the resultis false, so
s > ar*.Then, since s ? II, a* = r*(m, s) withm = X*(t,s) E Mc V E [tl, 1]. By X*( )
3 t' > t1 such that:V t E [t', 1], X*(t,Tr*, s) = n # 4; V t < t', X*(t, ar*,s) =
influential,
4; and v*(C, n, rr*,s) = 0 < v(C, 4), rr*,s) = 1. (In words, thereexists a set of L(t) that
activelyelicita proposal (specifically,rr*)at the agenda stage, some of whichsubsequently
activelylobby the House to secure a vote forthe statusquo against rr*.)By (A.1), t' = (s
+ rr*)/2- XL. By (A.7), t1 = (rr?+ rr*)/2- XL. But by (e7), on hearingthe agenda stage
message "m," C knows for sure thatL is informed.So given the partition(O a tO, t1, tN
1), C knows for sure thats will be the outcome ifL(t) is such thatt : t'; in particular,
given{s, at', rr*},t' is commonknowledgeand a knownfunctionof 'r*. Hence, sequential
rationalityrequires
Irr*=argmax*Prob[t t'|8*(p) = 1,t tl]-Ec[uc(b)It, t t']

b
+ prob[t> t' 8*(p) = 1, t ? tl]. ESUC(S) It' < t1].
Clearly, rr*S argmax. Ec[uc(b)jtj S t S 1] = b(tl), C's best response if X*(-) is not
By (A.1) andXL > xc> O,therefore,ifeverboth *(-) and *(-) canbeinfluential
influential.
as specifiedhere,thentheymustbe so when s is such thatt' = 1 - ?, ? > 0 and arbitrarily
small. For ? sufficiently
small, t' 1, prob[t> t'l ] 0, and so r*- b(tl). Consider s =
2(1 + XL - ?) - b(tl). Then s > rr*.(If not, s S -r b(tl), implying(1 + XL - ?)
b(tl). Now b(tl) < 1 + xc by (e3), so (1 + XL - ?) < 1 + xc; but thisis impossiblesince
= O0 and XL > Xc.) By Proposition1, XA*()influential
implies,
1 -XL > (rr* + s)/2 (b(tj) + s)/2 = 1 + XL -
Hence, XL < ?/2.But ? O by constructionand xc > 0. Therefore,X*() cannotbe influential

here: contradiction. QED
ComputationalDetails for the Examples

Examples 1 and 2 are computedby firstassumingXL and xc are such thatthe most
influentialequilibriuminvolves a binarypartitionat the agenda-settingstage and presuming
thatthe statusquo is irrelevant.Then by Lemma 3, the committeewill choose it*(m, s) =
XC + t(m). The equilibriumpartitions(0, to, 1) and associated proposals are then derived
usingthe equilibriumconditions(A. 11) through(A. 14) (mutatismutandis).For Example 2,
the statusquo is thenchosen to ensure informative but not influential vote stage lobbying,
forin thiscase the committee'sproposal choices are unaffected.DerivingExamples 3 and
4, as indicatedin Remark1, is somewhatmorecomplex. ConsiderExample 3; thetechnique
forExample 4 is similarand omittedhere.
As before, firstassume XL > XC such that the most influentialequilibriumagenda
lobbyingstrategyis binary,say (0, t?, 1). Let a' =rr*(4, s) and aT ia*(m, s) where,by
Proposition 3, X*(t, s) = v t < to and X*(t, s) = m V t : to. So ito < rr.Since XA*() is
V
to be influential, Proposition 5 and (A.1) yield s < rroand X*(t, rro,s) = n V t S t' (s +
rro)/2- XL, Xv*(t,) = ' otherwise.Because s < ro < rr,it followsfromLemma 3 that r
= XC + (1 + to)/2. By (A.7), to = (it0 + r)/2 - XL. Hence, we can write(in equilibrium)
-rras a functionof rr0and x = (XL, Xc): i = a(i,t X). Now, (e7) implies
prob[LinformedI ] = pt?/[l - p + pt?].
And since XA*()is influential,s will be the outcome if H hears the message n when the
agenda is {tr , s}. So given {s, r0, it}, the argument for Proposition 4.2 yields
p = (it0 _ S)t,2 + (it -_t0)(l - to)2.
Hence, we can write p (in equilibrium) as a function of irr, x, and s: p = p(it0, x, s). Hence,
prob[L informedI ] can also be writtenP = P(ita, x, s). Finally,note
prob[tS t'i X*(t,s) = 4 and L is informed]= t'It?,
which(in equilibrium)can be writtenQ = Q(rro,x, s). Given these substitutions

(legitimate
only in equilibrium)and assuming influentialvote stage lobbyingfor sure, consider the

program:
max. V(Qr0,
x, s) P.{Q. EFC[uc(s) t < t'] + (1 - Q). E,c[uc(r0) It E (t', t?)]}
+ (1 - P).E*c[uc(,r0)ItE T].
This problemis solved numericallyfor the parameterization(x, s) given in the text. The
impliedvalues for to, t', p, and -r are then recovered fromthe solution (which is unique
given ar0E [0, 1]). By construction,these values constitutean equilibriumso long as the
impliedvalue of ('r0 + s)/2 satisfiesthe conditionsforinfluentialvote stage lobbying(cf.
Proposition1); and it does. QED
REFERENCES
Austen-Smith,David. 1990. "InformationTransmissionin Debate." AmericanJournalof

Political Science 34:124-52.
. 1993. "InterestedExpertsand Policy Advice: MultipleReferralsunderOpen Rule."
Games and Economic Behavior, 5:3-43.
Austen-Smith,David, and JohnR. Wright.1992. "CompetitiveLobbyingfora Legislator's
Vote." Social Choice and Welfare9:229-57.
Banks, Jeffrey, and Farid Gasmi. 1987. "Endogenous Agenda Formationin Three-Person
Committees." Social Choice and Welfare4:133-52.
Crawford,Vincent, and Joel Sobel. 1982. "Strategic InformationTransmission." Econo-
metrica50:1431-51.
Denzau, Arthur,and Robert MacKay. 1983. "Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Com-
mittees:An Analysis of Sincere and SophisticatedBehavior." American Journalof
Political Science 27:740-61.
Farrell,Joseph. 1993. "Meaning and Credibilityin Cheap Talk Games." In Mathematical
Models in Economics, ed. Michael Bacharach. Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.
Farrell,Joseph,and Robert Gibbons. 1989. "Cheap Talk withTwo Audiences." American
Economic Review 79:1214-23.
Gilligan,Thomas, and Keith Krehbiel. 1987. "Collective Decision Making and Standing
Committees:An InformationalRationale for RestrictiveAmendmentProcedures."
Journalof Law, Economics, and Organization3:145-93.
. 1989. "AsymmetricInformationand Legislative Rules witha HeterogenousCom-
mittee." AmericanJournalof Political Science 33:459-90.
. 1990. "Organizationof InformativeCommitteesby a Rational Legislature." Ameri-
can Journalof Political Science 34:531-64.
Hall, Richard,and FrankWayman. 1990. "Buying Time: Moneyed Interestsand theMobili-
zation of Bias in Congressional Committees." American Political Science Review
84:797-820.
Hansen, JohnM. 1991. Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919-1981. Chi-
cago: Universityof Chicago Press.
Kingdom,John. 1973. Congressmen's VotingDecisions. New York: Harper and Row.
Okuno-Fujiwara,Masahiro, Andrew Postlewaite,and Kotaro Suzumura. 1990. "Strategic
Revelation of Information."Review of Economic Studies 57:25-48.
Rothenberg,Larry. 1989. "Do InterestGroups Make a Difference?Lobbying,Constituency
Influenceand Public Policy." WorkingPaper, Universityof Rochester.
Wright,JohnR. 1985. "PACs, Contributions,and Roll Calls: An OrganizationalPerspec-
tive." AmericanPolitical Science Review 79:400-14.

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Midwest Political Science Association

Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes

David Austen-Smith,Universityof Rochester

Thispaperexplorestheextentandcharacter ofinterestgroupinfluence on legislative

AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience, Vol. 37, No. 3, August 1993, Pp. 799-833

existcircumstances underwhichinfluential lobbyingcan take place at

Naturechooses Naturechoosest; C chooses L observest

L privatelyobservesp L chooseswhetherL chooseswhetherH votes

information (but not what thatinformation is); but, on the otherhand, L

'See Okuno-Fujiwara, andSuzumura(1990)fora discussionofthediffi-

privately revealsthetruevalue of t E T to L.2 Moreover,as remarked

Givenequations(1) and(2),j's inducedpreferences

lobbyist's message is identically"+"; underthe verifiability

5Strictly, "Not lobby" is itselfa message,and in theanalysisto followit willbe

observepriorto makinganyproposalis themessage,ifany,thatL sends

ria. Thereare twojustifications forthisselection.The first,as already

available equilibrium,and, given X*, the votingstage lobbying

Figure 2. C, H Fully Informed

The firsttwo results,althoughof someindependent serve

Figure 3. C Fully Informed,H Uninformed

LEMMA 2: There exists no equilibriumin whichL strictlyprefersto

The nextresultis substantive, a simplecharacterization

61tis incorrectto inferfromthisequivalencethat,say,E H[tit E T(b, s)] = -XL.

lobbying can be influential onlyif,whenall suchtypesinfavorofa given

speaking,C herecan chooseanypolicythatinducesH to votefors in the

Proposition2.1 followsfromthecommittee beingable to offerany

thenH maywell strictly preferb to the statusquo. However,if vote

thisreason,itis naturalto presume,whenvotestagelobbying is influen-

3: SupposeXL $ xC and assumeagendastagelobbying

That T? is an intervalfollowsfromthe lobbyist'smostpreferred

9It should be emphasized thatforsome parameterizationstherecan exist equilibriain

and,forsimplicity, supposethestatusquo is sufficiently extremeto be

information,and,ifeverL does lobbyC orH, L's messagesareignored.

thereis someseparation oftypeswhoactivelylobbyC. However,when

Proposition 5.2 saysthatinfluential agendastageandinfluential vot-

detailsfortheexamplesare givenin theappendix.

though theHouse's idealpoint(XH = 0) liesbetweenthatofthecommit-

L(t) with0 S t < t4"stay home"

E4,t | (I + t')/2 yrT0, t) = - t

L(t) with0 S t < t4"stay home"

\ = Outcome y(.,t) givenL informed

b(s) All L(t) "stay home" at the agenda stage

("high")whenL's idealpointin consequenceis higher(lower)thanthat

Manuscriptsubmitted10 May 1992

DEFINITION OF AN EQUILIBRIUM: An equilibriumis a list of strategiesay* e ((b* X*

E H[t n] = EFH[tI t E t(b, s)] = ((b + s)12 - xL)12;

Substitutingthese values into(A. 1) forxj = XH = 0 and collectingtermsyieldstheinequali-

Equations (A.2) and (3) easily yield

i(mi) < [,r*(mi, s) + Tr*(mi+1,s)]12 - xc, V i = 1, . . ., N - 1. (A.4)

Finally,note that(e7) implies,in equilibrium,thatH knows C's information

thatC cannotprofitably deviate. And second, r* l > s + 2xc: C can profitably

PROOF:Because A*(-) is influential,T?(s) =#T by definitionof an influentialstrategy.

E[U L (M * (a* (t, 5), s))lI t, *] IU (M * (a*(tW,

t s), s) + iT*(X*(t',s), s)]12

PROOF:Suppose not. Then by Lemma 4, R(s) = {tlrr*(A\*(t, s), s) = 'rr0}= 0. If

ti = [rr*(mi,s) + s*(mi+1, s)]l2 - XL, Vi = 1, . . ., N-1. (A.7)

ES,Ctjmj] = ES,[tj|] = 1/2. (A.8)

ti=tli + 2i(i-1)A, V i = 1, . . ., N, (A.9)

E t)] = prob[L informed1][tj+I + tj]/2+ prob[L uninformed

(*) t = tli + 2i(i - I)A,Vi = 1,. . . j- 1;

"1Ingeneral,thiswilldepend on therelativelocationsofs, XL, and xc. An unambiguous

withto 0 and tN 1. It follows directlyfromthis systemand A > 0 (in particular,from

to = [rro+ n]/2- XL. (A.l1)

i(mi) < [,r(mi, s) + Tr(mi+1,s)]12 - xc, V i = 1, . . ., N - 1. (A.4)

E[U L (M * (a* (t, 5), s))lI t, ] IU (M (a*(tW,

t s), s) + iT(X(t',s), s)]12

PROOF:Suppose not. Then by Lemma 4, R(s) = {tlrr(A\(t, s), s) = 'rr0}= 0. If

ti = [rr(mi,s) + s(mi+1, s)]l2 - XL, Vi = 1, . . ., N-1. (A.7)

T('rr,s) = [(Tr+ s)/2 - XL, (Xr* + 'rrl*)/2- XL) = 0; and

T(irrI, s) [(Xir + irr1)/2 - XL, (s + irr )/2 - XL) #0.

Irr=argmaxProb[t t'|8*(p) = 1,t tl]-Ec[uc(b)It, t t']