Elcano v.
Hill postulated that the same given act can result in civil liability
Fact: This case in an appeal from the order of the CFI of
Quezon City dated January 29, 1995 in Civil Case No. Q-8102,
Pedro Elcano v. Reginald Hill dismissing, upon motion to
dismiss of defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery
of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor, married at
the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence,
for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
AgapitoElcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said
accused was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal, because of lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake.
The motion to dismiss was based on violation of Rule III of the
Revised Rules of Court, res judicata, and that the complaint
had no cause of action against defendant Marvin Hill, because
he was relieved as guardian of the other defendant through
emancipation by marriage.
Issue: 1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the
acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action
for civil liability was not reversed? - NO
2. May Article 2180 of the Civil Code be applied against
Marvin Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the
time of the occurrence complained of, Reginald, though a
minor, living with and getting subsistence from his father,
was already legally married?YES
Ruling:1.Article 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence
under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal
Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the defendant.
The foregoing provision, though at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact nature
of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a violation of
the criminal law, while the latter is a “culpa aquiliana” or
quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own
foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
negligence. Therefore, under Article 2177, acquittal from an
accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable
doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for
damages due to a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a
reiteration and further clarification of the dual character,
criminal and civil, of fault or negligence as a source of
obligation. In the case of Barredo v. Garcia, the Court
not only under the Penal Code but also under the Civil Code.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the
criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-
delict,hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action
against him.
2. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child, and under Article 397,
emancipation takes place by “the marriage of the minor”, it is,
however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus, emancipation by marriage or by voluntary
concession shall terminate parental authority over the child’s
person. It shall enable the minor to administer property as
though he was of age, but he cannot borrow money or
alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father, mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court
only with the assistance of his father, mother, or guardian.
Now under Article 2180, “the obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omission,
but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father, and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother,
are responsible for the damages caused by minor children
who live in their company”. In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with
his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the
occurrence in question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which
is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that the reason behind the joint and
solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child
under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent to
supervise their minor children in order to prevent them from
causing damage to 3rd persons. On the other hand, the clear
implication of Article 399 is that such emancipation does not
carry with it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act
that can give rise to judicial litigation. Otherwise stated, the
marriage of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the
duty to see to it that the child, while still a minor, does not
give answerable for the borrowings of money and alienation
or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by
their minor married child without their consent.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH v CA (FALSE PROMISE OF
MARRIAGE)
Principle:Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept
of torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral
wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
FACTS: Marilou Gonzales, private respondent, without the
assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. She alleges in
said complaint that: she is 22 years old, single, Filipino and a
pretty lass of good moral character and reputation duly
respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is
an Iranian citizen residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig,
Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical
course at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City;
before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to
marry her; she accepted his love on the condition that they
would get married; they therefore agreed to get married
after the end of the school semester, which was in October of
that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Bañaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their
approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano
Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him;
a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude
towards her started to change; he maltreated and threatened
to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained
injuries; during a confrontation with a representative of the
barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the
complaint, petitioner repudiated their marriage agreement
and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the
petitioner is already married to someone living in Bacolod
City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering
the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount of not less
than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses
amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees and costs, and
granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just
and equitable.
Petitioner claimed that he never proposed marriage to or
agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced
her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but only
told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered
that she had deceived him by stealing his money and
passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a
representative of the barangay captain. He filed a
Counterclaim for the complaint is baseless and unfounded
and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation.
The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code,
rendered a decision favoring the private respondent. The
petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and
attorney's fees. CA AFFIRMED.
ISSUE:Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to
the case at bar.
RULING: YES
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable
because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury or
violated any good custom or public policy. He criticizes the
trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs, traditions
and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner,
he is not conversant with such Filipino customs, traditions
and culture. Finally, petitioner asseverates that even if it was
to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the
private respondent and had also promised to marry her, such
acts would not be actionable in view of the special
circumstances of the case. The mere breach of promise is not
actionable.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is
not an actionable wrong. Congress deliberately eliminated
from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that
would have made it so.
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision,
Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of torts
or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal
remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and
punish in the statute books.
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We
are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise
to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of
his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that
promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the
giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he
had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to
entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent
to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry
but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful
injury to her honor and reputation which followed
thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should
have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the
petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love
for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender
her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the
honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise,
and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's
part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's
living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage." In
short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of
lust but because of moral seduction — the kind illustrated by
the Code Commission in its example earlier adverted to. The
petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction
punished under either Article 337 or Article 338 of the
Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was
above eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21
may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where the
woman is a victim of moral seduction.
In his annotations on the Civil Code, Associate Justice Edgardo
L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court, opined that in
a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal
knowledge, moral damages may be recovered:. . . if there
be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was
due to mutual lust.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws,
customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while
indeed, the private respondent may not have been impelled
by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the
petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but because of
moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of
conscience about the entire episode for as soon as she found
out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all,
she left him. She is not, therefore, in pari delicto with the
petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar
offense or crime; equal in guilt or in legal fault." At most, it
could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Coca Cola v CA & Geronimo (fiber sa coke)
FACTS: Geronimo was a proprietress of Kindergarten
Wonderland Canteen an enterprise engaged in the sale of
soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to the
students of the kindergarten and to the public. Later, some
parents of the students complained to her that the Coke and
Sprite soft drinks sold by her contained fiber-like matter and
other foreign substances.
She then went over her stock of softdrinks and discovered the
presence of some fiber-like substances in the contents of
some unopened Coke bottles and a plastic matter in the
contents of an unopened Sprite bottle. She brought the said
bottles to the Regional Health Office of the Department of
Health for examination. Subsequently, she received a letter
from the DOH informing her that the samples she submitted
"are adulterated”.
As a consequence of the discovery of the foreign substances
in the beverages, her sales of soft drinks severely plummeted
resulting in losses and not long after that she had to lose shop.
Thus, respondent filed a case against petitioner for damages.
The petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
prescription. Petitioner argued that since the complaint is for
breach of warranty (based on a contract), it should have been
brought within 6 months from the delivery of the goods.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that the complaint is
one for damages which does not involve an administrative
action and that her cause of action is based on an injury to
plaintiff's right (quasi-delict) which can be brought within 4
years pursuant to Article 1146 of the CC.
RTC granted the motion to dismiss but was reversed by the
CA hence the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the cause of action is based on quasi-delict
RULING: YES. The cause of action is based on quasi-delict
hence the action prescribes in 4 years.
The public respondent's conclusion that the cause of action is
founded on quasi-delict and that, therefore, pursuant to
Article 1146 of the CC, it prescribes in 4 years is supported by
the allegations in the complaint which makes reference to the
reckless and negligent manufacture of "adulterated food
items intended to be sold for public consumption."
While it may be true that the pre-existing contract between
the parties may, as a general rule, bar the applicability of the
law on quasi-delict, the liability may itself be deemed to arise
from quasi-delict, i.e., the act which breaks the contract may
also be a quasi-delict.
In Singson vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, the SC stated:
"We have repeatedly held, however, that the
existence of a contract between the parties does not
bar the commission of a tort by the one against the
other and the consequent recovery of damages
therefor.”
Otherwise put, liability for quasi-delict may still exist despite
the presence of contractual relations.
Navida et. Al. v Dizon et. Al. (worm killer)
FACTS: Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits
were filed in different Texas state courts by citizens of twelve
foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of
plaintiffs sought damages for injuries they allegedly sustained
from their exposure to dibromochloropropane (DBCP), a
chemical used to kill worms, while working on farms in 23
foreign countries. The defendants in the consolidated cases
prayed for the dismissal of all the actions
In a Memorandum and Order, the Federal District
Court conditionally granted the defendants motion to
dismiss.
In accordance with the Memorandum and Order, a total of
336 plaintiffs from General Santos City filed a Joint Complaint
in the RTC of GenSan. Several companies were made
defendants to the said case (DOLE, among others)
NAVIDA, et al., prayed for the payment of damages in view of
the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which
they allegedly suffered because of their exposure to DBCP.
They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to this
chemical during the early 1970s up to the early 1980s when
they used the same in the banana plantations where they
worked at; and/or when they resided within the agricultural
area where such chemical was used.
NAVIDA, et al., claimed that their illnesses and injuries were
due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant
companies in that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put
into the stream of commerce DBCP-containing
products. According to them, they were allowed to be
exposed to the said products, which the defendant
companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly
injurious to the formers health and well-being.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction hence
the case at bar.
ISSUE: WON the RTC of GenSan has jurisdiction
RULING: YES. The RTC of GenSan has jurisdiction.
NAVIDA, et al., argue that the allegedly tortious acts and/or
omissions of defendant companies occurred within Philippine
territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP that
was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into the
stream of commerce by defendant companies happened in
the Philippines. Thus, NAVIDA, et al., pray that the ruling of
the RTC be reversed and that the said cases be remanded to
the courts a quo for further proceedings.
The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is conferred by law and is determined by the
allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to
all or some of the claims asserted therein. What determines
the jurisdiction of the court is the nature of the action
pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the
complaint. The averments therein and the character of the
relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the claim for damages is
the main cause of action and that the total amount sought in
the complaints is approximately P2.7 million for each of the
plaintiff claimants. The RTCs unmistakably have jurisdiction
over the cases filed.
Quite evidently, the allegations in the Joint-Complaints of
NAVIDA, et al. attribute to defendant companies certain acts
and/or omissions which led to their exposure to nematocides
containing the chemical DBCP. According to NAVIDA, et al.,
such exposure to the said chemical caused ill effects, injuries
and illnesses, specifically to their reproductive system.
Thus, these allegations in the complaints constitute the
cause of action of plaintiff claimants a quasi-delict, which
under the CC is defined as an act, or omission which causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence.
In a very real sense, most of the evidence required to prove
the claims of NAVIDA, et al., are available only in
the Philippines. First, plaintiff claimants are all residents of
the Philippines. Second, the specific areas where they were
allegedly exposed to the chemical DBCP are within the
territorial jurisdiction of the courts a quo wherein NAVIDA, et
al. initially filed their claims for damages. Third, the
testimonial and documentary evidence from important
witnesses, such as doctors, co-workers, family members and
other members of the community, would be easier to gather
in the Philippines.
Thus, these additional factors, coupled with the fact that the
alleged cause of action of NAVIDA, et al. against the
defendant companies for damages occurred in the
Philippines, demonstrate that, apart from the RTC having
jurisdiction over the subject matter in the instant civil cases,
they are, indeed, the convenient fora for trying these cases.
Child Learning Center vs. Timothy Tagario et al
Facts:
Timothy a Grade School student entered into a comfort room.
He however found himself locked and started to panick and
looked for a way out. In the process he opened a window,
went through it and fell 3 stories below. He suffered multiple
physical injuries. He and his parents are now suing Child
Learning Center under Art. 2176. In its defense, CLC
maintained that there was nothing defective about the
locking mechanism of the door and that the fall of Timothy
was not due to its fault or negligence. CLC further maintained
that it had exercised the due care and diligence of a good
father of a family to ensure the safety, well-being and
convenience of its students.
TC ruled in favor of Timothy and ordered CLC to pay. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the Trial Court
ruling?
Held:
No. In every tort case filed under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, plaintiff has to prove by a preponderance of evidence:
(1) the damages suffered by the plaintiff; (2) the fault or
negligence of the Timothy’s or some other person for whose
act he must respond; and (3) the connection of cause and
effect between the fault or negligence and the damages
incurred. Fault, in general, signifies a voluntary act or
omission which causes damage to the right of another giving
rise to an obligation on the part of the actor to repair such
damage. Negligence is the failure to observe for the
protection of the interest of another person that degree of
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly
demand. Fault requires the execution of a positive act which
causes damage to another while negligence consists of the
omission to do acts which result in damage to another.
In this tort case, Timothy contend that CLC failed to provide
precautionary measures to avoid harm and injury to its
students in two instances: (1) failure to fix a defective door
knob despite having been notified of the problem; and (2)
failure to install safety grills on the window where Timothy
fell from. The fact, however, that Timothy fell out through the
window shows that the door could not be opened from the
inside. That sufficiently points to the fact that something was
wrong with the door, if not the door knob, under the
principle of res ipsaloquitor. The doctrine of res ipsaloquitor
applies where (1) the accident was of such character as to
warrant an inference that it would not have happened except
for the Timothy’ss negligence; (2) the accident must have
been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with
the negligence complained of; and (3) the accident must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.
As to the absence of grills on the window, CLC contend that
there was no such requirement under the Building Code.
Nevertheless, the fact is that such window, as CLC themselves
point out, was approximately 1.5 meters from the floor, so
that it was within reach of a student who finds the regular
exit, the door, not functioning. CLC, with the due diligence of
a good father of the family, should have anticipated that a
student, locked in the toilet by a non-working door, would
attempt to use the window to call for help or even to get out.
Considering all the circumstances, therefore, there is
sufficient basis to sustain a finding of liability on CLC part.
Our pronouncement that Timothy climbed out of the window
because he could not get out using the door, negates CLC
other contention that the proximate cause of the accident
was Timothys own negligence. The injuries he sustained from
the fall were the product of a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, that originated
from CLCs own negligence.
BARREDO vs GARCIA and ALMARIO (1942)
Principle:
There is a distinction between civil liability arising from
criminal negligence (RPC) and responsibility for fault or
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and
that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability
arising from a crime under the RPC, or a separate
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code.
Facts:
Pedro Fontanilla was employed by Fausto Barredo as a taxi
driver. Fontanilla had a collision with a carretela, where
Faustino Garcia, a passenger of the carretela, suffered injuries
and later on died. Defendants herein who are the parents of
the deceased, filed a criminal case against Fontanilla who was
later on convicted. In the same case, the court granted their
petition to reserve the right for a separate civil action. The
defendants brought a civil action for damages against
Barredo who was the sole properietor of Malate Taxicab and
the employer of Fontanilla, for failure of Barredo to exercise
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of his employee. The trial court awarded
damages to the defendants, which amount was reduced by
the CA. It was undisputed that Fontanilla’s negligence was the
cause of the mishap since he was driving at the wrong side of
the road at a high speed.
Barredo contended that his liability is governed by the
Revised Penal Code, hence, only subsidiary, and since no civil
action has been filed against Fontanilla, the person criminally
laible, he cannot be responsible in the case. Considering that
his liability is only subsidiary, Fontanilla’s property should
have been exhausted first.
Issue:
WON a separate civil action against Barredo may be brought, cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a
thus, making him primarily and directly responsible under remedy under our laws, but there is also a more expeditious
Article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Fontanilla. way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility
of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. The
Ruling: procedure indicated by Barredo is wasteful and productive of
delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
YES. (Taas ni na kaso kay naa pa murag history and daghan
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance
gipang cite na jurisprudence, but balik balik ra man, so
usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
nideretso nalang ko dayon sa ratio decidendi sa kaning kaso
damages. In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
jud. Naa sad gi pang cite na cases si Barredo, pero na
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
contradict hinuon ang iyang arguments. Nitaas sad ni siya kay
ganahan ang SC na ipasabot jud daw sa tao na pwede jud
The primary and direct responsibility of employers and their
makafile separate civil action, which is dili makaintindi daw
presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
ang mga tao ani, as can be read in the last paragraph.)
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen
and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the
There is a distinction between civil liability arising from
masters or employers who principally reap the profits
criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and
resulting from the services of these servants and employees.
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to
It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others.
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the
Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or
Because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the
negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. It
Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given
inescapable to conclude that the employer Barredo is
rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already
primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil
discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
Code.
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up
a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil
The Art. 365 of RPC punishes not only reckless but also simple
responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by
by law, according to the literal import of article 1093 of the
our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based
very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury
on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual.
to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence — even the slightest — would have to be
indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime.

LUIS JOSEPH vs HON. BAUTISTA, et.al.

To find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt
(Double Overtake, Bone Fracture)
beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case,
preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the
FACTS: Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the
defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
cargo truck owned by respondent Perez at Dagupan City after
criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
paying the sum of P9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela,
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of
Bulacan. While traversing the National Highway towards
evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be
Manila, the driver of the said truck tried to overtake a tricycle.
made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910
Simultaneously, the driver of another pick-up truck, owned by
of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances
respondents Sioson and Pagarigan, tried to overtake the
of unvindicated civil wrongs.
overtaking cargo truck, thereby forcing the cargo truck to
veer towards the shoulder of the road and to ram a mango
To hold that there is only one way to make Barredo's liability
tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the
of his legs.
latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling
the plaintiff (defendants in this case) to follow a devious and
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against Perez based
on a breach of contract of carriage and against Sioson and
Villanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up
truck, based on quasi-delict.
Respondents (except Perez), thru their insurer, Insurance
Corporation of the Philippines, paid petitioner's claim for
injuries sustained in the amount of P1,300.00. By reason
thereof, petitioner executed a release of claim releasing them
from liability. The same respondents also paid, thru their
insurer, Perez’ claim for the damages to her cargo truck.
They then filed a Motion to Exonerate and Exclude
themselves from the case, as well as a Counter Motion to
Dismiss but this was opposed by Perez. The latter motion was
premised on the fact that the release of claim executed by
petitioner inured to the benefit of respondent Perez,
considering that all the respondents are solidarity liable to
herein petitioner. Judge Bautista dismissed the case.
ISSUE:W/N Judge Bautista erred in declaring that the release
of claim executed by Joseph in favor of respondents Sioson,
Villanueva and Pagarigan inured to the benefit of respondent
Perez; ergo, it likewise erred in dismissing the case (NO)
HELD: The argument that there are two causes of action
embodied in petitioner's complaint, hence the judgment on
the compromise agreement under the cause of action based
on quasi-delict is not a bar to the cause of action for breach
of contract of carriage, is untenable.
A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful
act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of
the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or
omission can be violative of various rights at the same time,
as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several
separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there
is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of
action regardless of the number of rights that may have been
violated belonging to one person.
The singleness of a cause of action lies in the singleness of
the- delict or wrong violating the rights of one person.
Nevertheless, if only one injury resulted from several
wrongful acts, only one cause of action arises. In the case at
bar, there is no question that the petitioner sustained a single
injury on his person. That vested in him a single cause of
action, albeit with the correlative rights of action against the
different respondents through the appropriate remedies
allowed by law.
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there
was only one cause of action involved although the bases of
recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants
therein were not necessarily Identical since the respondents
were not identically circumstanced. However, a recovery by
the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery
under the other. This, in essence, is the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery for the same
act or omission which, obviously, stems from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.
RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION VS PEOPLE (San
Mig Beer driver)
PRINCIPLE: In negligence cases, the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability: civil liability ex delicto and quasi
delicto. However, the offended party cannot recover
damages from both. // The vicarious liability of employer is
founded in Article 2176 in relation to 2180, and on Article 103
of the RPC. In Art. 2176, the liability if the employer is direct
and primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in
supervision and selection of employees. Enforcement of such
liability does not require the employee to be insolvent since
the nature of such liability is solidary (with employee). //
Reservation of right to file separate civil action waives other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission
of the driver. //
FACTS: The provincial fiscal filed an information charging
Romeo Dunca, the driver of a trailer truck of petitioner
carrying bottles of San Miguel beer, for “reckless imprudence
resulting to double homicide and damage to property”. He
was negligently driving along the highway in Isabela when he
bumped a Nissan pick-up after going to the opposing lane to
avoid the damaged road in his lane. He pleaded not guilty in
the arraignment. PetitionerRRT Corporation alleged that the
truck was roadworthy and the driver was licensed and well
trained.
The offended party made a reservation to file a separate civil
action for quasi delict. However, they later on withdrew the
reservation but didNOT withdraw the separate civil action on
quasi delict. RTC, in a joint decision, ruled in favor of the
offended parties by sentencing the driver and awarding
damages. However, the offended party moved for the
amendment of the dispositive portion of the joint decision
asking to hold the petitioner subsidiarily liable. The accused
meanwhile appealed but fled to a foreign country. The
petitioner corporation filed an appeal questioning its
subsidiary liability.
ISSUES: WON the employer is subsidarily liable? WON the
court may grant damages in a CRIMINAL case despite filing of
a CIVIL ACTION against employer? Both: NO.
RULING: NO to both issues. In negligence cases, the aggrieved
party has the choice between (1) an action to enforce civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the
choice is made, the injured party can not avail himself of any
other remedy because he may not recover damages twice for
the same negligent act or omission of the accused.[23] This is
the rule against double recovery.
In the instant case, the offended parties elected to file a
separate civil action for damages against petitioner as
employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Private respondents
sued petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as the
employer of the accused, to be vicariously liable for the fault
or negligence of the latter. Under the law, this vicarious
liability of the employer is founded on at least two specific
provisions of law.
The first is expressed in Article 2176 in relation to Article
2180 of the Civil Code. Here, the liability of the employer for
the negligent conduct of the subordinate is direct and
primary, subject to the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement
of the judgment against the employer in an action based on
Article 2176 does not require the employee to be insolvent
since the nature of the liability of the employer with that of
the employee, the two being statutorily considered joint
tortfeasors, is solidary.[25] The second, predicated on Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that an employer
may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed
by his employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability
attaches when the employee is convicted of a crime done in
the performance of his work and is found to be insolvent that
renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged.[26]
As regards the first issue, the answer is in the negative. Rafael
Reyes Trucking Corporation, as employer of the accused who
has been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless
imprudence, can not be held subsidiarily liable because of the
filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against
it. In view of the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing
of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same was
not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil
action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code, arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.[27]
Pursuant to the provision of Rule 111, Section 1, paragraph 3
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private
respondents, as complainants in the criminal action, reserved
the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other
available civil actions predicated on the same act or omission
of the accused-driver. Such civil action includes the recovery
of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages
under Articles 32, 33, and 34 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the
accused.[28]
Consequently, the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred
in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer
of the accused subsidiarily liable for damage. It might be
argued that private respondents as complainants in the
criminal case withdrew the reservation to file a civil action
against the driver (accused) and manifested that they would
pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal action.
However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect
of the reservation earlier made because private respondents
did not withdraw the civil action against petitioner based
on quasi delict.The rationale behind this rule is the avoidance
of multiple suits between the same litigants arising out of the
same act or omission of the offender. The restrictive
phraseology of the section under consideration is meant to
cover all kinds of civil actions, regardless of their source in law,
provided that the action has for its basis the same act or
omission of the offender.[29]However, petitioner as defendant
in the separate civil action for damages filed against it, based
on quasi delict, may be held liable thereon. The Court,
however, in exceptional cases has relaxed the rules "in order
to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding"[31] or exempted "a particular case from the
operation of the rules."[32]
Invoking this principle, we rule that the trial court erred in
awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in dismissing
the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private
respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case.
However, petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be
remanded to the trial court so that it may render decision in
the civil case awarding damages as may be warranted by the
evidence.[33]
With regard to the second issue, the award of damages in the
criminal case was improper because the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by
the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. As
enunciated in Ramos vs. Gonong,[34]"civil indemnity is not
part of the penalty for the crime committed." In this case,
accused-driver jumped bail pending his appeal from his
conviction. Thus, the judgment convicting the accused
became final and executory, but only insofar as the penalty in
the criminal action is concerned. The damages awarded in the
criminal action was invalid because of its effective waiver.
The pronouncement was void because the action for recovery
of the civil liability arising from the crime has been waived in
said criminal action.
With respect to the issue that the award of damages in the
criminal action exceeded the amount of damages alleged in
the amended information, the issue is de minimis. At any rate,
the trial court erred in awarding damages in the criminal case
because by virtue of the reservation of the right to bring a
separate civil action or the filing thereof, "there would be no
possibility that the employer would be held liable because in
such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil
liability of the accused.[35]
Parenthetically, the trial court found the accused "guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Double Homicide
Through Reckless Imprudence with violation of the Motor
Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136)." There is no such
nomenclature of an offense under the Revised Penal Code.
Unfortunately, we can no longer correct this judgment even if
erroneous, as it is, because it has become final and
executory.There is need, therefore, to rectify the designation
of the offense without disturbing the imposed penalty for the
guidance of bench and bar in strict adherence to precedent.
SPS. SANTOS et al vs. PIZARDO et al
DOCTRINE: prescription of action based on quasi delict does
not bar the filing of action based on culpa criminal
FACTS:
Dionisio Sibayan (one of the respondents), was
charged with Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple
Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries because he drove a
Viron transit bus which collided with a van, resulting to
multiple fatalities and injuries. He was convicted. However,
there was a reservation to file a separate civil action, thus no
pronouncement of civil liability was made. Decision was
dated Dec. 1998.
On October 20, 2000, petitioners filed a complaint
for damages against Sibayan, Viron Transit and its president
Virgilio Rondaris, pursuant to their reservation. Viron Transit
moved to dismiss on the grounds of improper service of
summons, prescription and laches, defective certification of
non-forum shopping, as well as seeking the dropping of
Rondaris as a defendant in view of the separate personality of
Viron Transit from its officers.
Petitioners oppose that the right to file a separate
civil action prescribes in 10 years, and since no appeal was
made of the conviction, the complaint filed 2 years after was
filed within the prescriptive period.
RTC dismissed the action due to improper service of
summons, and more importantly, prescription, stating that
actions based on quasi delict prescribe 4 years from the
accrual of the cause of action (from the vehicular accident).
Thus, despite reservation, the action prescribed.
Petitioners sought reconsideration arguing that their
action not based on quasi delict, but on the final judgment
of conviction in the criminal case which prescribes in 10
years from finality of judgment. This was denied. They went
to CA through a petition for certiorari but it was denied since
it was not the proper remedy, but instead, it should have
been appeal. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE:
1) WON appeal, and not certiorari is the remedy. –
calls for relaxation of rules to further substantial
justice.
2) Is the action based on quasi delict or ex delicto
(criminal conviction)? – ex delicto
RULING:
CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS
The averments in the complaint make out a cause of
action for quasi delict, hence the 4 years prescriptive period
should be reckoned from the accrual of the cause of action
(accident).
Viron Transit’s subsidiary liability cannot be enforced
because Sibayan was not ordered to pay damages in the
criminal case, since said liability
 SC DECISION – PETITION GRANTED
GR: RPC provides that every person criminally liable is also
civilly liable. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil
liability is impliedly instituted.
EXC: 1) waiver of the right to recover damages by the injured
party;
2) reservation was made to file a separate civil action –
should be made before the prosecution starts presenting its
evidence;
3) injured party institutes a civil action prior to the filing of
the criminal case.
An act or omission causing damage to another may
give rise to two separate civil liabilities:
1) civil liability ex delicto (culpa criminal) (Art. 100 RPC); and
2) independent civil liabilities
a. Not arising from an act or omission complained as felony:
a.1) culpa contractual or obligations arising from law
(Art. 31 CC)
a.2) intentional torts (Arts. 32, 34 CC)
a.3) culpa aquiliana (Art. 2176 CC)
b. injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Art.
33 CC.
CAVEAT: DOUBLE RECOVERY IS PROHIBITED
IN THIS CASE:
Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their
right to file a separate civil action. Moreover, a reading of the
complaint reveals that the allegations therein are consistent
with their claim that the action was brought to recover civil
liability arising from crime
Notwithstanding that there was an allegation of
negligence on the part of Sibayan and Viron Transit, it does
not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a cause
of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of
the filing of the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi
delicto had already prescribed. Besides, in cases of
negligence, the offended party has the choice between an
action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under the
Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi delict under the
Civil Code.
 Even if the action based on quasi delict had already
prescribed, it does not operate to bar the action based
on ex delicto (culpa criminal)
 Moreover, the policy that the reservation or institution
of a separate civil action waives other civil action is NOT
offended. iIts rationale is to avoid multiple suits arising
out of the same act. Petitioners CANNOT file multiple
suits since in the first place, the action under quasi delict
has already prescribed, hence, the only recourse is
damages ex delicto.
GRANTED.
Manliclic V. Canlaunan
Facts:The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine
Rabbit Bus No. 353 with plate number CVD-478, owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic;
and (2) owner-type jeep with plate number PER-290, owned
by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo
Mendoza.
At around 6:00 to 7:00 oclock in the morning of 12 July 1988,
respondent Calaunan, together with Marcelo Mendoza, was
on his way to Manila from Pangasinan on board his owner-
type jeep. The Philippine Rabbit Bus was likewise bound
for Manila from Concepcion, Tarlac. At approximately
Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear
left side of the jeep causing the latter to move to the
shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch with water
resulting to further extensive damage. The bus veered to the
left and stopped 7 to 8 meters from point of
collision.Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver
was unhurt. This prompted respondent to file a civil case for
damages against petitioner for damages. A criminal case for
reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with
physical injuries was also filed against petitioner. The criminal
case was tried ahead of the civil case. Respondent Canlaunan,
during the pendency of the case died, thus he was replaced
by his wife and children.
Petitioner Manliclic, was then acquitted in the criminal case
filed against him. In the said criminal case, petitioner was
acquitted not on reasonable doubt but on the ground that he
is not the author of the act complained. Petitioner argues
that since his criminal liability is extinguished, it follows that
his civil liability is also extinguished according to Rule 111 of
Criminal procedure which provides that:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not
carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final
judgment that the fact from which the civil might
arise did not exist.
Issue:Does the acquittal in the criminal case extinguishes civil
liability?
Ruling:No. The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil
action arising from crime or ex delicto and not to a civil action
arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana. The extinction of
civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111 [now
Section 2 (b) of Rule 111], refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution
under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and
individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability
arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence
causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-
delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code.It is
now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a
finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the
extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict.
In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on
reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the
crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence
only.However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he
was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or
that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes
the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In
this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak
of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In
this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds
other than the delict complained of.
As regards civil liability arising from quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an
acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or
that accused was not the author of the act or omission
complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment
that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in
a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.An
acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely
irrelevant in the civil casebased on quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana
Lumantas vs. Calapiz, G.R. No. 163753, January 15, 2014
Facts: Respondent spouses Calapiz brought their son Hanz
to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City,
for an emergency appendectomy and there, they were
attended to by petitioner. Petitioner suggested that Hanz
should also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare
him the pain to which the parents agreed. This however
caused pain in the penis of Hanz, which exhibited blisters and
his testicles got swollen. They then noticed that Hanz
urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the
catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as
normal. Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his
parents’ protestations, and was directed to continue taking
antibiotics.
Several days later, Hanz was againconfined in a hospital
because of the abscess formation between the base and the
shaft of his penis and the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry
Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a damaged
urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter
was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.
Unfortunately, Hanz’s damaged urethra could not be fully
repaired and reconstructed. Hanz’s parents brought a
criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries in the MTCC
which was later transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme
Court Circular No. 11-99.
An expert witness testified against petitioner saying that
there was urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left
secondary to trauma that had necessitated the conduct of
two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra.
Although satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the
urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not
determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.
RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for
insufficiency of the evidence but it awarded moral damages
because there was a preponderance of evidence showing
that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his
circumcision by the petitioner.
The CA affirmed the RTC,7 sustaining the award of moral
damages ruling that the Prosecution had preponderantly
established the sufferings of Hanz as the result of the
circumcision.
Issue: WON petitioner is liable for moral damages despite
his acquittal in the criminal case.
Held: Yes, petitioner is still liable for moral damages
despite his acquittal because the acquittal was based on
insufficiency of evidence or acquittal based on reasonable
doubt.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime
charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In
Manantan v. Court of Appeals,10the Court elucidates on the
two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as well as on the
different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the
accused.
Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused.First is an acquittal
on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or
omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil
liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be
held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if
any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other
than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second
instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the
guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the
accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence only.
The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the
judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the
prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused
or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or
omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist."
Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of
an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being
rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case
unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
The Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the
evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of
civil liability should be through the institution of a separate
civil action for that purpose.
The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly
liable because there was no proof of his negligence deserves
scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove
his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a
finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of
his negligence to hold him civilly liable.14With the RTC and the
CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma
from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or
incidental to the circumcision, and that the trauma could
have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform
findings.The Court, by virtue of its not being a trier of facts,
should now accord the highest respect to the factual findings
of the trial court as affirmed by the CA in the absence of a
clear showing by the petitioner that such findings were
tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.
Although we have long advocated the view that any physical
injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of
one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not
susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages
should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of
one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for
the physical injuries sustained.
Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury.
Interest of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the
award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award
to a level that is not only reasonable but just and
commensurate.
TMBI VS FEB
Facts:
On October 7, 2000, a shipment of various electronic goods
from Thailand and Malaysia arrived at the Port of Manila for
Sony Philippines, Inc. (Sony). Previous to the arrival, Sony had
engaged the services of TMBI to facilitate, process, withdraw,
and deliver the shipment from the port to its warehouse in
Biñan, Laguna. TMBI – who did not own any delivery trucks –
subcontracted the services of Benjamin Manalastas’ company,
BMT Trucking Services (BMT), to transport the shipment from
the port to the Biñan warehouse. Incidentally, TMBI notified
Sony who had no objections to the arrangement.
Four BMT trucks picked up the shipment from the port at
about 11:00 a.m. of October 7, 2000. However, BMT could
not immediately undertake the delivery because of the truck
ban and because the following day was a Sunday. Thus, BMT
scheduled the delivery on October 9, 2000. In the early
morning of October 9, 2000, the four trucks left BMT’s garage
for Laguna.5 However, only three trucks arrived at Sony’s
Biñan warehouse.
At around 12:00 noon, the truck driven by Rufo Reynaldo
Lapesura (NSF-391) was found abandoned along the
Diversion Road in Filinvest, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. Both
the driver and the shipment were missing. Victor Torres then
filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) against Lapesura, the driver of the vehicle, for
"hijacking”.
TMBI notified SONY of the loss, however BMT refused to pay
insisting the goods were hijacked. Mitsui, the insurer of SONY,
then paid SONY and eventually was subrogated into the rights
of the former. Mitsui sent TMBI a demand letter dated
August 30, 2001 for payment of the lost goods. TMBI refused
to pay Mitsui’s claim. As a result, Mitsui filed a complaint
against TMBI on November 6, 2001.
RTC held that TMBI and Manalastas were common carriers
and acted negligently. They are solidarily liable. This was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: WON BMT would be liable for the lost goods and
WON BMT would be directly liable to Mitsui/Sony
Held:
Theft or the robbery of the goods is not considered a
fortuitous event or a force majeure. Nevertheless, a common
carrier may absolve itself of liability for a resulting loss: (1) if
it proves that it exercised extraordinary diligence in
transporting and safekeeping the goods; or (2) if it stipulated
with the shipper/owner of the goods to limit its liability for
the loss, destruction, or deterioration of the goods to a
degree less than extraordinary diligence. In the present case,
the shipper, Sony, engaged the services of TMBI, a common
carrier, to facilitate the release of its shipment and deliver the
goods to its warehouse. In turn, TMBI subcontracted a
portion of its obligation – the delivery of the cargo – to
another common carrier, BMT.
Despite the subcontract, TMBI remained responsible for the
cargo. Under Article 1736, a common carrier’s extraordinary
responsibility over the shipper’s goods lasts from the time
these goods are unconditionally placed in the possession of,
and received by, the carrier for transportation, until they are
delivered, actually or constructively, by the carrier to the
consignee. That the cargo disappeared during transit while
under the custody of BMT – TMBI’s subcontractor – did not
diminish nor terminate TMBI’s responsibility over the cargo.
Instead of showing that it had acted with extraordinary
diligence, TMBI simply argued that it was not a common
carrier bound to observe extraordinary diligence. Its failure to
successfully establish this premise carries with it the
presumption of fault or negligence, thus rendering it liable to
Sony/Mitsui for breach of contract.
However, We disagree with the lower courts’ ruling that TMBI
and BMT are solidarily liable to Mitsui for the loss as joint
tortfeasors. The ruling was based on Article 2194 of the Civil
Code:
Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for quasi-delict is solidary.
Notably, TMBI’s liability to Mitsui does not stem from a quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana) but from its breach of contract (culpa
contractual). The tie that binds TMBI with Mitsui is
contractual, albeit one that passed on to Mitsui as a result of
TMBI’s contract of carriage with Sony to which Mitsui had
been subrogated as an insurer who had paid Sony’s insurance
claim. The legal reality that results from this contractual tie
precludes the application of quasi-delict based Article 2194.
We likewise disagree with the finding that BMT is directly
liable to Sony/Mitsui for the loss of the cargo. While it is
undisputed that the cargo was lost under the actual custody
of BMT (whose employee is the primary suspect in the
hijacking or robbery of the shipment), no direct contractual
relationship existed between Sony/Mitsui and BMT. If at all,
Sony/Mitsui’s cause of action against BMT could only arise
from quasi-delict, as a third party suffering damage from the
action of another due to the latter’s fault or negligence,
pursuant to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.51
We have repeatedly distinguished between an action for
breach of contract (culpa contractual) and an action for quasi-
delict (culpa aquiliana).
In culpa contractual, the plaintiff only needs to establish the
existence of the contract and the obligor’s failure to perform
his obligation. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove or
even allege that the obligor’s non-compliance was due to
fault or negligence because Article 1735 already presumes
that the common carrier is negligent. The common carrier
can only free itself from liability by proving that it observed
extraordinary diligence. It cannot discharge this liability by
shifting the blame on its agents or servants.
On the other hand, the plaintiff in culpa aquiliana must
clearly establish the defendant’s fault or negligence because
this is the very basis of the action. Moreover, if the injury to
the plaintiff resulted from the act or omission of the
defendant’s employee or servant, the defendant may absolve
himself by proving that he observed the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage.
In the present case, Mitsui’s action is solely premised on
TMBI’s breach of contract. Mitsui did not even sue BMT,
much less prove any negligence on its part. If BMT has
entered the picture at all, it is because TMBI sued it for
reimbursement for the liability that TMBI might incur from its
contract of carriage with Sony/Mitsui. Accordingly, there is no
basis to directly hold BMT liable to Mitsui for quasi-delict.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby ORDERS petitioner
TorresMadrid Brokerage, Inc. to pay the respondent FEB
Mitsui Marine Insurance Co", Inc. Respondent Benjamin P.
Manalastas is in turn ORDERED to REIMBURSE Torres-Madrid
Brokerage, Inc. of the above-mentioned amounts.
G.R. No. 170071 March 9, 2011The Flying Taxicab of
Doom
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Petitioners,
vs.
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Respondent.
This case is about the death of Jose Marcial Ochoa
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. No. 170125
G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA,
MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, Respondents.
This case is about the compulsory counterclaim by the
Company.
Facts:
Jose Marcial K. Ochoa (Jose Marcial) was on his way home to
Teacher’s Village in Quezon City when the taxi cab driven by
Padilla, which was owned by defendant Corporation having
the business name of “Avis Coupon Tax”, figured in an
accident. They were cruising along EDSA at a high speed
when it tried to pass a ten-wheeler truck. he Avis cab was
unable to pass and because of its speed, its driver (Padilla)
was unable to control it. To avoid colliding with the truck,
Padilla turned the wheel to the left causing his taxicab to ram
the railing throwing itself off the fly-over and fell on the
middle surface of EDSA below. The forceful drop of the
vehicle on the floor of the road broke and split it into two
parts. Jose Marcial died.
Jose Marcial’s wife and children demanded indemnity for his
death, loss of earning capacity, and funeral expanses
amounting to P15M. They alleged that the Company failed to
exercise extraordinary diligence. The Company denied this,
alleging that the taxicab was bumped by an on-rushing
delivery van which caused it to ram through the railings and
fall off the fly-over. They alleged that the death was caused
by a fortuitous event and/or the fault or negligence of the
driver of the delivery van. By way of compulsory counterclaim,
G & S sought to recover from the heirs the amount of
₱300,000.00 as attorney’s fees and costs of suit.
The RTC ruled that G&S was civilly liable to the family
because it failed to show that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its
employees. The Company filed a Notice of Appeal and the
heirs filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration because they
wanted moral damages. With respect to their claim for
exemplary damages, the heirs relied upon Article 2232 of the
Civil Code which provides that in contracts and quasi-
contracts, the court may award exemplary damages if the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive
or malevolent manner. And, since Padilla was declared by the
trial court to have been grossly negligent in driving the
taxicab, the heirs claimed that they are likewise entitled to
exemplary damages. The RTC ruled that they were entitled to
moral and exemplary damages.
Before the CA, the Company insisted it exercised the diligence
required in the selection and supervision of its employees.
The employees were made to attend seminars and even had
periodic performance evaluations. They also did monthly
check-ups of its vehicles.The CA ruled in favor of the heirs,
but deleted the damages for loss of income because these
were unsubstantiated.
Issues:
1. What is the proximate cause of the death of Jose Marcial?
Is the testimony of prosecution witness Clave credible? Did G
& S exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees?
2. Whether or not CA gravely erred in completely deleting the
award for the loss of earning capacity of the deceased and in
reducing the award for moral damages.
Ruling:
1st Issue
A contract of carriage existed between G & S and Jose Marcial.
As a common carrier, G & S "is bound to carry safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances."However, Jose Marcial was not able to reach
his destination safely as he died during the travel. "In a
contract of carriage, it is presumed that the common carrier
is at fault or is negligent when a passenger dies or is injured.
In fact, there is even no need for the court to make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the
common carrier. This statutory presumption may only be
overcome by evidence that the carrier exercised
extraordinary diligence."Unfortunately, G & S miserably failed
to overcome this presumption. The acquittal of Padilla in the
criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of
contract (He was declared guilty in the MTC, acquitted by the
RTC). This thus now leaves us with the remaining issue raised
by G & S, that is, whether the CA gravely erred in not taking
note of the fact that Padilla has already been acquitted of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, a charge
which arose from the same incident subject of this case.
Article 31 of the Civil Code provides When the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of
the result of the latter. In the instant case, it must be stressed
that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil
action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Not being deemed
instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal, a
ruling on the culpability of the offender will haveno bearing
on said independent civil action based on an entirely different
cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual." In this case, the
action filed by the heirs is primarily for the recovery of
damages arising from breach of contract of carriage allegedly
committed by G & S. Clearly, it is an independent civil action
arising from contract which is separate and distinct from the
criminal action for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide
filed by the heirs against Padilla because of the same incident.
Hence, regardless of Padilla’s acquittal or conviction in said
criminal case, same has no bearing in the resolution of the
present case. There was therefore no error on the part of the
CA when it resolved this case without regard to the fact that
Padilla has already been acquitted by the RTC in the criminal
case. Moreover, while the CA quoted some portions of the
MTC Decision in said criminal case, we however find that
those quoted portions were only meant to belie G & S’ claim
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence
of the driver of the delivery van which allegedly hit the Avis
taxicab. Even without those quoted portions, the appellate
court’s ultimate finding that it was Padilla’s negligence which
was the proximate cause of the mishap would still be the
same. This is because the CA has, in fact, already made this
declaration in the earlier part of its assailed Decision. The fact
that the MTC Decision from which the subject quoted
portions were lifted has already been reversed by the RTC is
therefore immaterial.
2nd Issue
The denial by the CA of the heirs’ claim for lost earnings is
unwarranted CA erred in deleting the award for lost income
because the USAID Certification supporting such claim is self-
serving and unreliable. The CA sweepingly concluded that the
USAID Certification is self-serving and unreliable without
elaborating on how it could arrive at such a conclusion. A
research on USAID reveals that it is the "principal [United
States] agency to extend assistance to countries recovering
from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in
democratic reforms." It is an "independent federal
government agency that receives over-all foreign policy
guidance from the Secretary of the State [of the United
States]."Given this background, it is highly improbable that
such an agency will issue a certification containing unreliable
information regarding an employee’s income. Besides, there
exists a presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed. On the contrary, we find said certification
sufficient basis for the court to make a fair and reasonable
estimate of Jose Marcial’s loss of earning capacity just like in
Tamayo v. Señora where we based the victim’s gross annual
income on his pay slip from the Philippine National Police.
Hence, we uphold the trial court’s award for Jose Marcial’s
loss of earning capacity.
The award of moral damages should be modified
Moral and exemplary damages are based on different jural
foundations. They are different in nature and require
separate determination. The amount of one cannot be made
to depend on the other. Here, there is no question that the
heirs are likewise entitled to moral damages, considering the
mental anguish suffered by them because of Jose Marcial’s
untimely death.
G.R. No. 34840 September 23, 1931
NARCISO GUTIERREZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BONIFACIO
GUTIERREZ, MARIA V. DE GUTIERREZ, MANUEL GUTIERREZ,
ABELARDO VELASCO, and SATURNINO CORTEZ, defendants-
appellants.
Action to recover damages for physical injuries suffered as a
result of an automobile accident.
FACTS:
On February 2, 1930, a passenger truck and an automobile of
private ownership collided while attempting to pass each
other on the Talon bridge (Manila South Road, Las Piñas,
Rizal). The truck was driven by the chauffeur Abelardo
Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino Cortez. The automobile
was being operated by Bonifacio Gutierrez (18 years old) and
owned by his father and mother. At the time of the collision,
the father was not in the car, but the mother, together with
several other members of the Gutierrez family, seven in all,
were accommodated therein. The collision resulted in Narciso
Gutierrez, a passenger in the autobus, suffering a fracture
right leg which required medical attendance for a
considerable period of time, and which even at the date of
the trial appears not to have healed properly.
It is conceded that the collision was caused by negligence
pure and simple. The difference between the parties is that,
while the plaintiff blames both sets of defendants, the owner
of the passenger truck blames the automobile, and the owner
of the automobile, in turn, blames the truck.
ISSUE:
Are the drivers of the truck and automobile liable for
damages and indemnification due to their negligence?
RULING:
Bonifacio Gutierrez’s obligation arises from culpa aquiliana.
On the other hand, Saturnino Cortez’s and his chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco’s obligation rise from culpa contractual.
On culpa aquliana:
It may be explained that the Bonifacio was an incompetent
chauffeur; that he was driving at an excessive rate of speed;
and that, on approaching the bridge and the truck, he lost his
head and so contributed by his negligence to the accident.
The guaranty given by the father at the time the son was
granted a license to operate motor vehicles made the father
responsible for the acts of his son. Based on these facts,
pursuant to the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the father alone and not the minor or the mother, would be
liable for the damages caused by the minor.
This case pertains to the civil law liability of parties for
obligations which arise from fault or negligence. At the same
time, we believe that, as has been done in other cases, we
can take cognizance of the common law rule on the same
subject. In the United States, it is uniformly held that the
head of a house, the owner of an automobile, who maintains
it for the general use of his family is liable for its negligent
operation by one of his children, whom he designates or
permits to run it, where the car is occupied and being used at
the time of the injury for the pleasure of other members of
the owner's family than the child driving it. The theory of the
law is that the running of the machine by a child to carry
other members of the family is within the scope of the
owner's business, so that he is liable for the negligence of the
child because of the relationship of master and servant.
On culpa contractual:
The liability of Cortez and Velasco rests on a different basis,
that of contract. This has been sufficiently demonstrated by
the uncontroverted allegations of the complaint and the
evidence, as has been found by the trial court based on the
position of the truck on the bridge, the speed in operating the
machine, and the lack of care employed by the chauffeur. In
its broader aspects, the case is one of two drivers
approaching a narrow bridge from opposite directions, with
neither being willing to slow up and give the right of way to
the other, with the inevitable result of a collision and an
accident.
On contributory negligence and amount of damages:
There was no contributory negligence on the part of the
plaintiff, as argued based on his keeping his foot outside the
truck. In this connection, it is sufficient to state that, aside
from the fact that the defense of contributory negligence was
not pleaded, the evidence bearing out this theory of the case
is contradictory in the extreme and leads us far afield into
speculative matters.
The appellee suggests that the amount could justly be raised
to P16,517, but naturally is not serious in asking for this sum,
since no appeal was taken by him from the judgment. The
other parties unite in challenging the award of P10,000, as
excessive.All facts considered, including actual expenditures
and damages for the injury to the leg of the plaintiff, which
may cause him permanent lameness, in connection with
other adjudications of this court, lead us to conclude that a
total sum for the plaintiff of P5,000 would be fair and
reasonable. The difficulty in approximating the damages by
monetary compensation is well elucidated by the divergence
of opinion among the members of the court, three of whom
have inclined to the view that P3,000 would be amply
sufficient, while a fourth member has argued that P7,500
would be none too much.
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. CA
“Stabbed by an outsider”
FACTS:
Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine
School of Business Administration. Bautista was stabbed to
death in the second floor of the school premises. Assailants
were not members of the schools academic community. This
incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and
its corporate officers for damages due to their alleged
negligence, recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the attack on
the victim.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the
compliant states no cause of action against them based on
Article 2180 of the Civil Code quasi-delicts, as the said rule
does not cover academic institutions. The trial court denied
the motion to dismiss. Their motion for reconsideration was
likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the appellate court.
Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable under Article 2180 quasi
delicts?
RULING:
Court of appeals was proper to deny the motion to dismiss.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
establishes the rule of in loco parentis. The doctrine has been
discussed in many cases and stresses that Article 2180 plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or
inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution.
However, the assailants in the present case were not
students of the school.
This does not mean that the school is exculpated from liability.
When an academic institution accepts students for
enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound
to comply with. The school undertakes to provide the student
with proper education. the student covenants to abide by the
school's academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations. Because the circumstances of the present case
evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern.
What comes to mind is Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or
injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good custom or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however,
there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between the
school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition
is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, Br. 47) is hereby
ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of
the Court.
Air France vs. Carrascoso “Kicked out of First Class”
FACTS:
Air France, through Philippine Airlines (PAL), issued
Carrascoso a first-class round trip ticket from Manila to Rome.
From Manila to Bangkok, he travelled in first class but in
Bangkok, PAL manager forced him to vacate his seat because
there was a white man who the manager alleged had a
“better right” to the seat. Carrascoso refused to vacate his
seat, but was later convinced by some Filipino passengers to
give up his seat.
Carrascoso filed a case for damages against Air France. The
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila ordered Air France to
pay Carrascoso moral and exemplary damages as well as the
difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the
portion of the trip.
Petitioner Air France now claims that the first-class ticket did
not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of
the parties. It asserts that Carrascoso knew that he did not
have confirmed reservations for first class though he had
tourist class protection. Thus, the ticket was no guarantee
that he would have a first-class seat since such would depend
on the availability of first-class seats.
ISSUES:
Procedural
1. WON the CA failed to make a complete findings of fact on
all the issues properly laid before it, and if such, WON the
Court could review the questions of fact
Substantive
2. WON Carrascoso was entitled to the “first class” seat he
claims, as proved by written documents (tickets…)
3. WON Carrascoso was entitled to moral damages, when his
action is planted upon breach of contract and thus, there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith which the CA
allegedly failed to find
4. WON moral damages could be recovered from Air France,
granted that their employee was accused of the tortuous act
5. WON damages are proper in a breach contract
6. WON the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso regarding
the account made by the air-carrier’s purser is admissible in
evidence as hearsay
7. WON Carrascoso was entitled to exemplary damages
HELD
1. NO. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that
prolixity, if not confusion, may result. So long as the decision
of the Court of Appeals, contains the necessary facts to
warrant its conclusions, it. is no error for said court to
withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with respect
to the evidence for the defense". "The mere failure to specify
(in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold
the same contrary to the requirements of the provisions of
law and the Constitution"; "only questions of law may be
raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Court of Appeals.
2. YES, the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket
without any reservation whatever.
-Petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true
and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said
respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he
had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of
a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first
class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability
of first class seats. However, CA held that Air France should
know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored
or not. The trial court also accepted as evidence the written
documents submitted by Carrasco and even the testimony of
the air-carrier’s employees attested that indeed, Carrasco
was issued a “first class ticket”.
- If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not
entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that
seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then
an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an
airline.
-Also, when Carrascoso was asked to confirm his seat in
Bangkok, he was granted the “first class” seat. If there had
been no seat, and if the “white man” had a better right to the
seat, then why did they confirm Carrasco his seat?
3. YES. It is (therefore) unnecessary to inquire as to whether
there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. Whether or not
there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an
award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any,
was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required.
-There was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first class passage
covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second,
said contract was breached when petitioner failed to furnish
first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, there was
bad faith when petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso
to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was
already seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by
reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation,
resulting in moral damages.- Air France did not present
evidence that the “Whiteman” made a prior reservation, nor
proved that the“ white man” had “better right” over the seat;
also, if the manager’s actions could be justified, they should
have presented the manager to testify in court– but they did
not do so-
-The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying
his right to a first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary
will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer
the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class
compartment-just to give way to another passenger whose
right thereto has not been established. Certainly this is bad
faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning
different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith"
contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating with
furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or
for ulterior purposes.
4. YES- The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act
of its employees need not. be essayed. For the willful
malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer.
5. YES- Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso, is one attended
with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's. action as we have
said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation
of public duty by the petitioner-air carrier-a case of quasi-
delict. Damages are proper.(note: it was held that it was a
case of quasi-delict even though it was a breach of contract)
6. YES, if forms part of the res gestae.
Testimony of the entry does not come within the proscription
of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible.
Carrascoso testified that the purser of the air-carrier made an
entry in his notebooks reading "First class passenger was
forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene". The petitioner contents that it
should not be admitted as evidence, as it was only hearsay.
However, the subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the
ouster incident. Also, the said entry was made outside the
Philippines and by an employee of petitioner. It would have
been easy for Air France to contradict Carrascoso’s testimony
if they had presented the purser.

7. YES. The Civil Code gives the Court ample power to grant
exemplary damages-in contracts and quasi contracts. The
only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent
manner".
G.R. No. 156109 November 18, 2004
KHRISTINE REA M. REGINO, Assisted and Represented by
ARMANDO REGINO, petitioner, vs. PANGASINAN COLLEGES
OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, RACHELLE A. GAMUROT and
ELISSA BALADAD, respondents.
Principle: Generally, liability for tort arises only between
parties not otherwise bound by a contract. An academic
institution, however, may be held liable for tort even if it has
an existing contract with its students, since the act that
violated the contract may also be a tort.
FACTS:
Khristine Rea M. Regino was a 1st year computer science
student at Pangasinan Colleges of Science and Technology
(PCST). Reared in a poor family, Regino went to college
mainly through the financial support of her relatives. During
the second semester of school year 2001-2002, she enrolled
in logic and statistics subjects under Respondents Gamurot
and Baladad (teachers). PCST held a fund raising campaign,
"Rave Party and Dance Revolution," the proceeds were to go
to the construction of the school's tennis and volleyball
courts. Each student was required to pay for two tickets at
the price of P100 each. The project was allegedly
implemented by recompensing students who purchased
tickets with additional points in their test scores; those who
refused to pay were denied the opportunity to take the final
examinations.
Financially strapped and prohibited by her religion from
attending dance parties and celebrations, Regino refused to
pay for the tickets. On the scheduled dates of the final
examinations, her teachers - Respondents Gamurot and
Baladad -- disallowed her from taking the tests. She was
made to sit out and was ejected from the classroom while her
classmates were taking their examinations for both subjects
under said respondent-teachers. Petitioner's pleas ostensibly
went unheeded by Gamurot and Baladad, who unrelentingly
defended their positions as compliance with PCST's policy.
Petitioner filed, as a pauper litigant, a Complaint5 for damages
against herein respondents. Respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of petitioner's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, as accordingly, “the question raised
involved the determination of the wisdom of an
administrative policy of the PCST; hence, the case should
have been initiated before the proper administrative body
(CHED).”
Petitioner argued that prior exhaustion of administrative
remedies was unnecessary, because her action was not
administrative in nature, but one purely for damages arising
from respondents' breach of the laws on human relations. As
such, jurisdiction lay with the courts.
RTC dismissed the Complaint for lack of cause of action. It
ruled that the CHED, not the courts, had jurisdiction over the
controversy. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the present Petition
on pure questions of law.
ISSUES:
Case: Is the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
is applicable? Did the Complaint state sufficient cause(s) of
action?
Topic: Being that there is a contractual relationship between
the petitioner and the school, may the latter be liable for
torts against the former?
RULING: The SC decided in favor of Regino.
On Liability for Tort
Petitioner also charged that private respondents "inhumanly
punish students x xx by reason only of their poverty, religious
practice or lowly station in life, which inculcated upon
[petitioner] the feelings of guilt, disgrace and
unworthiness;" as a result of such punishment, she was
allegedly unable to finish any of her subjects for the second
semester of that school year and had to lag behind in her
studies by a full year. The acts of respondents supposedly
caused her extreme humiliation, mental agony and
"demoralization of unimaginable proportions" in violation of
Articles 19, 21 and 26 of the Civil Code. These provisions of
the law state thus:
"Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights
and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
"Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
"Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they
may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other
personal condition."
Generally, liability for tort arises only between parties not
otherwise bound by a contract. An academic institution,
however, may be held liable for tort even if it has an existing
contract with its students, since the act that violated the
contract may also be a tort. We ruled thus in PSBA vs. CA,
from which we quote:
 "x xx A perusal of Article 2176 [of the Civil Code] shows that
obligations arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as
extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties
not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or
implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when
there obtains a contract. In Air France v. Carrascoso (124
Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages
for his unwarranted expulsion from a first-class seat aboard
the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court
referred to the petitioner-airline's liability as one arising
from tort, not one arising form a contract of carriage. In
effect, Air France is authority for the view that liability from
tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. x xx This view was
not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this
Court was already of a similar mind. In Cangco v. Manila
Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus: 'x
xx. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may
break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation
had no contract existed between the parties.'
"Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the
Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21 x xx."
On Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no
bearing on the present case. Petitioner is not asking for the
reversal of the policies of PCST. Neither is she demanding it to
allow her to take her final examinations; she was already
enrolled in another educational institution. A reversal of the
acts complained of would not adequately redress her
grievances; under the circumstances, the consequences of
respondents' acts could no longer be undone or rectified.
Exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable when
there is competence on the part of the administrative body to
act upon the matter complained of. Administrative agencies
are not courts; they are neither part of the judicial system,
nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. Specifically, the CHED
does not have the power to award damages. Hence,
petitioner could not have commenced her case before the
Commission. The exhaustion doctrine admits of exceptions,
one of which arises when the issue is purely legal and well
within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Petitioner's action for
damages inevitably calls for the application and the
interpretation of the Civil Code, a function that falls within
the jurisdiction of the courts.
On sufficiency of Cause of Action
As a rule, every complaint must sufficiently allege a cause of
action; failure to do so warrants its dismissal. A complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what
appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be
entitled to the relief prayed for. Assuming the facts that are
alleged to be true, the court should be able to render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the alleged facts. In their
Motion to Dismiss, respondents did not dispute any of
petitioner's allegations and based on the factual allegations in
the complaint show two causes of action; first, breach of
contract; and second, liability for tort.
Reciprocity of the School-Student Contract
The school-student relationship is also reciprocal. Thus, it has
consequences appurtenant to and inherent in all contracts of
such kind -- it gives rise to bilateral or reciprocal rights and
obligations. The school undertakes to provide students with
education sufficient to enable them to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the students
agree to abide by the academic requirements of the school
and to observe its rules and regulations. The terms of the
school-student contract are defined at the moment of its
inception -- upon enrolment of the student. Standards of
academic performance and the code of behavior and
discipline are usually set forth in manuals distributed to new
students at the start of every school year. Further, schools
inform prospective enrollees the amount of fees and the
terms of payment.
Education is not a measurable commodity. It is not possible
to determine who is "better educated" than another.
Nevertheless, a student's grades are an accepted
approximation of what would otherwise be an intangible
product of countless hours of study. The importance of
grades cannot be discounted in a setting where education is
generally the gate pass to employment opportunities and
better life; such grades are often the means by which a
prospective employer measures whether a job applicant has
acquired the necessary tools or skills for a particular
profession or trade. Thus, students expect that upon their
payment of tuition fees, satisfaction of the set academic
standards, completion of academic requirements and
observance of school rules and regulations, the school would
reward them by recognizing their "completion" of the course
enrolled in.
In previous cases the Court held that, barring any violation of
the rules on the part of the students, an institution of higher
learning has a contractual obligation to afford its students a
fair opportunity to complete the course they seek to pursue.
PCST imposed the assailed revenue-raising measure belatedly,
in the middle of the semester. It exacted the dance party fee
as a condition for the students' taking the final examinations,
and ultimately for its recognition of their ability to finish a
course. The fee, however, was not part of the school-student
contract entered into at the start of the school year. Hence, it
could not be unilaterally imposed to the prejudice of the
enrollees.
The respondents’ defense of academic freedom only
encompasses the independence of an academic institution to
determine for itself (1) who may teach, (2) what may be
taught, (3) how it shall teach, and (4) who may be admitted to
study. Once a school has, in the name of academic freedom,
set its standards, these should be meticulously observed and
should not be used to discriminate against certain students.
After accepting them upon enrollment, the school cannot
renege on its contractual obligation on grounds other than
those made known to, and accepted by, students at the start
of the school year.
In sum, the Court holds that the Complaint alleges sufficient
causes of action against respondents, and that it should not
have been summarily dismissed. Needless to say, the Court is
not holding respondents liable for the acts complained of.
That will have to be ruled upon in due course by the court a
quo.
THE MANILA RAILROAD CO. v LA COMPAÑIA
TRANSATLANTICA, THE ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO.
G.R. No. L-11318 October 26, 1918
Facts:
Two locomotive boilers owned by The Manila Railroad
Company arrived at Manila via the Steamship Alicante
owned by CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona.The
equipment of the ship for discharging heavy cargo was not
sufficiently strong to handle these boilers, so the Steamship
Company had to procure assistance from The Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Company (hereafter called the Atlantic
Company). The service to be performed by the Atlantic
Company consisted in bringing its floating crane alongside
the Alicante, lifting the boilers out of the ship's hold, and
transferring them to a barge which would be placed ready
to receive them.
While the boiler was being hoisted, it was not properly
done as the rivet near the head of the boiler was caught
under the edge of the hatch. The weight on the crane was
thus increased by a strain estimated at fifteen tons with the
result that the cable of the sling parted and the boiler fell
to the bottom of the ship's hold.
The boiler was badly damaged that it had to be reshipped
to England where it was rebuilt, and afterwards was
returned to Manila. The Railroad Company's damage by
reason of the cost of repairs, expenses, and loss of the use
of the boiler proved to be P22,343.29; and as to the
amount of the damage so resulting there is practically no
dispute. To recover these damages the present action was
instituted by the Railroad Company against the Steamship
Company who in turn caused the Atlantic Company to be
brought in as a codefendant, and insisted that whatever
liability existed should be fixed upon the Atlantic Company
as an independent contractor who had undertaken to
discharge the boilers and had become responsible for such
damage as had been done.
The judge of the Court of First Instance gave judgment in
favor of the plaintiff against the Atlantic Company, but
absolved the Steamship Company from the complaint.
Issue:
(1) Is the Steamship Company liable to the plaintiff by
reason of having delivered the boiler in question in a
damaged condition? (2) W/N Atlantic should be absolved (3)
Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the
Railroad Company?
Ruling:
The accident is to be attributed to the failure of Leyden
(foreman) to exercise the degree of care which an
ordinarily competent and prudent person would have
exhibited under the circumstances which then confronted
him. This conclusion of fact cannot be refuted; and, indeed,
no attempt is here made by the appellant to reverse this
finding of the trial court.
It will be observed that a contractual relation existed
between the Railroad Company and the Steamship
Company; and the duties of the latter with respect to the
carrying and delivery of the boilers are to be discovered by
considering the terms and legal effect of that contract. A
contractual relation also existed between the Steamship
Company and the Atlantic Company; and the duties owing
by the latter to the former with respect to the lifting and
the transferring of the boilers are likewise to be discovered
by considering the terms and legal effect of the contract
between these parties. On the other hand, no contractual
relation existed directly between the Railroad Company
and the Atlantic Company.
Under the contract for transportation from England to
Manila, the Steamship Company is liable to the plaintiff for
the injury done to the boiler while it was being discharged
from the ship under articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil
Code, for the consequences of the omission of the care
necessary to the proper performance of its obligation. The
contract to transport and deliver at the port of Manila a
locomotive boiler, which was received by it in proper
condition, is not complied with by delivery at the port of
destination of a mass of iron the utility of which had been
destroyed.
The Steamship Company cannot escape liability by reason
of the fact that it employed a competent independent
contractor to discharge the boilers.
W/N Atlantic should be absolved

We now proceed to consider the contention that the
Atlantic Company should be absolved from liability to the
Steamship Company under the last paragraph of article
1903 of the Civil Code, which declares that the liability
there referred to shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to avoid the damage. Even when
Atlantic used proper care in the selection of Leyden, the
obligation of the Atlantic Company was created by
contract, and article 1903 is not applicable to negligence
arising in the course of the performance of a contractual
obligation. Article 1903 is exclusively concerned with
cases where the negligence arises in the absence of
agreement.
In discussing the liability of the Steamship Company to the
plaintiff Railroad Company we have already shown that a
party is bound to the full performance of his contractual
engagements under articles 1101 et seq. of the Civil Code,
and other special provisions of the Code relative to
contractual obligations; and if he falls short of complete
performance by reason of his own negligence or that of any
person to whom he may commit the work, he is liable for
the damages resulting therefrom.. It is desirable, however,
in this connection, to bring out somewhat more fully the
distinction between negligence in the performance of a
contractual obligation (culpa contractual) and negligence
considered as an independent source of obligation
between parties not previously bound (culpa aquiliana).
The principle that negligence in the performance of a
contract is not governed by article 1903 of the Civil Code
but rather by article 1104 of the same Code was directly
applied by this court in the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s
Successors vs. CompañiaMaritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215); and
the same idea has been impliedly if not expressly
recognized in other cases (N. T. Hashim& Co. vs. Rocha &
Co., 18 Phil. Rep., 315; Tan Chiong Sian vs. Inchausti& Co.,
22 Phil. Rep., 152).
What has been said suffices in our opinion to demonstrate
that the Atlantic Company is liable to the Steamship
Company for the damages brought upon the latter by the
failure of the Atlantic Company to use due care in
discharging the boiler, regardless of the fact that the
damage was caused by the negligence of an employee
who was qualified for the work and who had been chosen
by the Atlantic Company with due care.
Can the Atlantic Company be held directly liable to the
Railroad Company?
Having regard then to the bare fact that the Atlantic
Company undertook to remove the boiler from the ship's
hold and for this purpose took the property into its power
and control, there arose a duty to the owner to use due
care in the performance of that service and to avoid
damaging the property in the course of such operation.
This duty was obviously in existence before the negligent
act was done which resulted in damage, and said negligent
act may, if we still ignore the existence of the express
contract, be considered as an act done in violation of this
duty.
The duty thus to use due care is an implied obligation, of a
quasi contractual nature, since it is created by implication
of law in the absence of express agreement. The
conception of liability with which we are here confronted is
somewhat similar to that which is revealed in the case of
the depositary, or commodatary, whose legal duty with
respect to the property committed to their care is defined
by law even in the absence of express contract; and it can
not be doubted that a person who takes possession of the
property of another for the purpose of moving or
conveying it from one place to another, or for the purpose
of performing any other service in connection therewith
(locatiooperisfaciendi), owes to the owner a positive duty
to refrain from damaging it, to the same extent as if an
agreement for the performance of such service had been
expressly made with the owner. The obligation here is
really a species of contract re, and it has its source and
explanation in the vital fact that the active party has taken
upon himself to do something with or to the property and
has taken it into his power and control for the purpose of
performing such service. (Compare art. 1889, Civil Code.)
this Court recognized the fact that the violation of a quasi
contractual duty is subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104
of the Civil Code and not within the purview of article 1903.
Manresa also is of the opinion that negligence, considered
as a substantive and independent source of liability, does
not include cases where the parties are previously bound
by any other obligation. Again, it is instructive in this
connection to refer to the contents of article 1103 of the
Civil Code, where it is declared that the liability proceeding
from negligence is demandable in the fulfillment of all
kinds of obligations. These words evidently comprehend
both forms of positive obligations, whether arising from
express contract or from implied contract (quasi contract).
The conclusion must therefore be that if there had been no
contract of any sort between the Atlantic Company and the
Steamship Company, an action could have been maintained
by the Railroad Company, as owner, against the Atlantic
Company to recover the damages sustained by the former.
Such damages would have been demandable under article
1103 of the Civil Code and the action would not have been
subject to the qualification expressed in the last paragraph
of article 1903.
Now, it cannot be admitted that a person who contracts to
do a service like that rendered by the Atlantic Company in
this case incurs a double responsibility upon entering upon
performance, namely, a responsibility to the party with
whom he contracted, and another entirely different
responsibility to the owner, based on an implied contract.
The two liabilities can not in our opinion coexist. It is a
general rule that an implied contract never arises where an
express contract has been made.
If double responsibility existed in such a case as this, it
would result that a person who had limited his liability by
express stipulation might find himself liable to the owner
without regard to the limitation which he had seen fit to
impose by contract. There appears to be no possibility of
reconciling the conflict that would be developed in
attempting to give effect to those inconsistent liabilities.
The contract which was in fact made, in our opinion,
determines not only the character and extent of the
liability of the Atlantic Company but also the person or
entity by whom the obligation is exigible. It is of course
quite clear that if the Atlantic Company had refused to
carry out its agreement to discharge the cargo, the plaintiff
could not have enforced specific performance and could
not have recovered damages for non-performance. (Art.
1257, Civil Code; Donaldson, Sim & Co. vs. Smith, Bell & Co.,
2 Phil. Rep., 766; Uy Tam and Uy Yet vs. Leonard, 30 Phil.
Rep., 471.) In view of the preceding discussion it is equally
obvious that, for lack of privity with the contract, the
Railroad Company can have no right of action to recover
damages from the Atlantic Company for the wrongful act
which constituted the violation of said contract. The rights
of the plaintiff can only be made effective through
the CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona with whom the
contract of affreightment was made.
The judgment entered in the Court of First Instance must,
therefore, be reversed not only with respect to the
judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff directly against
the Atlantic Company but also with respect to the
absolution of the Steamship Company and the further
failure of the court to enter judgment in favor of the latter
against the Atlantic Company. The CompañiaTrasatlantica
de Barcelona should be and is hereby adjudged to pay to
the Manila Railroad Company the sum of twenty two
thousand three hundred forty three pesos and twenty nine
centavos (P22,343.29), with interest from May 11, 1914,
until paid; and when this judgment is satisfied,
the CompañiaTrasatlantica de Barcelona is declared to be
entitled to recover the same amount from the Atlantic Gulf
& Pacific Company, against whom judgment is to this end
hereby rendered in favor of the CompañiaTrasatlantica de
Barcelona. No express adjudication of costs of either
instance will be made. So ordered.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA
JUJEURCHE SUNGA and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents
 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756
of the Civil Code provides that common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and
1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to
the common carrier the burden of proof.
 It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the
collision between the jeepney and the truck was the
negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of
proximate cause is applicable only in actions for
quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract.
Facts:
At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private
respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman
majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took
a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner
Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about
24 passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an
"extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to PoblacionSibulan, Negros Occidental, the
jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was seated at
the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing
passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by
Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the
left rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-
fibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed
reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case
wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in the
hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic
surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a period of
three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during
said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages
against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of carriage
by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of
him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a
third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of
the Isuzu truck.
Issue:
Whether or notCalalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
Ruling:
Yes, Calalas is liable on his contract of carriage.
The first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa
extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of the
tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa
contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should
be clearly established because it is the basis of the action,
whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted
merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact
that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to
transport his passenger safely to his destination.
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the
Civil Code provides that common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they
prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined
in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily
shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision
between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the
truck driver. The doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach
of contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a
person where there is no relation between him and another
party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself.
But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create
the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the
presumption of negligence at once arose, and it became the
duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
The driver of jeepney did not carry Sunga "safely as far as
human care and foresight could provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances" as required by Art. 1755.
The jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being
exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the
highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more
passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the jeepney,
a violation of 32(a) of the same law.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed
her in a peril greater than that to which the other passengers
were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for
the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows
he was actually negligent in transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners
contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat" amounted
to an implied assumption of risk.
CONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES v. REBECCA G. ESTRELLA, RACHEL E. FLETCHER,
PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY & INSURANCE INC., BATANGAS
LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO., and WILFREDO DATINGUINOO
G.R. No. 147791 September 8, 2006
FACTS:
On December 29, 1978, respondents Rebecca G.
Estrella and her granddaughter, Rachel E. Fletcher, boarded
in San Pablo City, a BLTB bus bound for Pasay City. However,
they never reached their destination because their bus was
rammed from behind by a tractor-truck of CDCP in the South
Expressway. The strong impact pushed forward their seats
and pinned their knees to the seats in front of them. They
regained consciousness only when rescuers created a hole in
the bus and extricated their legs from under the seats. They
were brought to the Makati Medical Center to be
treated.Thereafter, respondents filed a Complaint for
damages against CDCP, BLTB, EspiridionPayunan, Jr. and
Wilfredo Datinguinoo before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 13.
On February 9, 1993, the trial court rendered a
decision finding CDCP and BLTB and their employees liable for
damages. BLTB, Wilfredo Datinguinoo, Construction and
Development Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
EspiridionPayunan, Jr., shall pay jointly and severally the
plaintiffs the sum of P79,254.43 as actual damages and to pay
the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees or a total of
P89,254.43; and Construction and Development Corporation
of the Philippines and defendant EspiridionPayunan, Jr., shall
pay the plaintiffs the amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00)
Pesos to plaintiff Rachel Fletcher and Twenty Five Thousand
(P25,000.00) Pesos to plaintiff Rebecca Estrella.
Unsatisfied with the award of damages and
attorney's fees by the trial court, respondents moved that the
decision be reconsidered but was denied. Respondents
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the trial court but modified the amount of
damages, the dispositive portion of which provides: the
interest of six (6) percent per annum on the actual damages
of P79,354.43 should commence to run from the time the
judicial demand was made or from the filing of the complaint
on February 4, 1980; thirty (30) percent of the total amount
recovered is hereby awarded as attorney's fees; and
Defendants-appellants Construction and Development
Corporation of the Philippines (now PNCC) and
EspiridionPayunan, Jr. are ordered to pay plaintiff-appellants
Rebecca Estrella and Rachel Fletcher the amount of Twenty
Thousand (P20,000.00) each as exemplary damages and
P80,000.00 by way of moral damages to Rachel Fletcher.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not BLTB and its driver Wilfredo
Datinguinoo are solely liable for the damages
sustained by respondents.
(2) Whether or not the damages, attorney's fees and
legal interest awarded by the CA are excessive and
unfounded.
(3) Whether or not CDCP can recover under its
insurance policy from Phoenix.
RULING:
(1) NO.
The case filed by respondents against petitioner is an
action for culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict under Article 2176 of
the Civil Code. In this regard, Article 2180 provides that the
obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable for the acts
or omissions of those persons for whom one is responsible.
Consequently, an action based on quasi-delict may be
instituted against the employer for an employee's act or
omission. The liability for the negligent conduct of the
subordinate is direct and primary, but is subject to the
defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of
the employee. In the instant case, the trial court found that
petitioner failed to prove that it exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
Payunan, Jr.
It is well-settled in Fabre, Jr. v. Court of Appeals that
the owner of the other vehicle which collided with a common
carrier is solidarily liable to the injured passenger of the same.
Nor should it make any difference that the liability of
petitioner [bus owner] springs from contract while that of
respondents [owner and driver of other vehicle] arises
from quasi-delict.
As in the case of BLTB, private respondents in this
case and her co-plaintiffs did not stake out their claim against
the carrier and the driver exclusively on one theory, much
less on that of breach of contract alone. After all, it was
permitted for them to allege alternative causes of action
and join as many parties as may be liable on such causes of
action so long as private respondent and her co-plaintiffs do
not recover twice for the same injury. What is clear from the
cases is the intent of the plaintiff there to recover from both
the carrier and the driver, thus justifying the holding that the
carrier and the driver were jointly and severally liable
because their separate and distinct acts concurred to produce
the same injury.
In a "joint" obligation, each obligor answers only for
a part of the whole liability; in a "solidary" or "joint and
several" obligation, the relationship between the active and
the passive subjects is so close that each of them must
comply with or demand the fulfillment of the whole
obligation.
(2) YES. Moral damages may be recovered in quasi-
delicts causing physical injuries. The award of moral
damages in favor of Fletcher and Estrella in the amount of
P80,000.00 must be reduced since prevailing jurisprudence
fixed the same at P50,000.00. While moral damages are not
intended to enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the
defendant, the award should nonetheless be commensurate
to the suffering inflicted.
NO. The Court of Appeals correctly awarded
respondentsexemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00
each. Exemplary damages may be awarded in addition to
moral and compensatory damages. Article 2231 of the Civil
Code also states that in quasi-delicts, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence. In this case, petitioner's driver was driving
recklessly at the time its truck rammed the BLTB bus.
Petitioner, who has direct and primary liability for the
negligent conduct of its subordinates, was also found
negligent in the selection and supervision of its employees.
NO. Regarding attorney's fees, we held in Traders
Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. National Labor
Relations Commission that: There are two commonly
accepted concepts of attorney's fees, the so-called ordinary
and extraordinary. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney's
fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be
paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any
of the cases provided by law where such award can be made,
such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is
payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have
agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as
additional compensation or as part thereof.
The Court of Appeals correctly awarded attorney's
fees and other expenses of litigation as they may be
recovered as actual or compensatory damages when
exemplary damages are awarded; when the defendant acted
in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the
plaintiff's valid, just and demandable claim; and in any other
case where the court deems it just and equitable that
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered.
(3) NO.
As regards the liability of Phoenix, CDCP's claim
against Phoenix already prescribed pursuant to Section 384 of
P.D. 612, as amended, which provides that a written notice of
claim must be filed within six months from the date of the
accident. Since petitioner never made any claim within six
months from the date of the accident, its claim has already
prescribed. The law is clear and leaves no room for
interpretation.