Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method

Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory by Peter Hedström; Richard

Swedberg; Fuzzy-Set Social Science by Charles C. Ragin
Review by: James Mahoney
Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Sep., 2001), pp. 575-593
Published by: Springer
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Sociological Forum, Vol. 16, No. 3, September 2001 (( 2001)

Review Essay

Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent

Innovations in Theory and Method
James Mahoney1

Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory. Peter

Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, eds. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998.
Fuzzy-Set Social Science. Charles C. Ragin. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2000.

INTRODUCTION

Correlational analysis is the basis for much explanation in contemporary

sociology. Mainstream sociologists often infer causation through the use of
quantitative techniques that depend, in one way or another, on the existence
of bivariate correlations. Even sophisticated multivariate statistical methods
that allow for the parceling of variables and the estimation of average net
causal effects ultimately rely on such correlations. Correlational analysis so
is central to explanation that many sociologists simply take it for granted,
assuming that the existence of a correlation is a basic component of causality.
The two books reviewed in this essay, however, argue that correlational
analysis is by itself an inadequate mode of causal assessment. The prob-
lems identified are not simply familiar themes such as a correlation fails
to represent causation because it might be spurious or because the time
order of correlated variables may not be clear. Rather, these works sug-
gest that even nonspurious correlations in which the time order of vari-
ables is well-established may be inherently limited representations of causal
processes.

Department of Sociology, Box 1916, Maxcy Hall, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
02912; e-mail: james_mahoney@brown.edu.

575
0884-8971/01/0900-0575$19.50/0 ? 2001 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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576 Mahoney

In Social Mechanisms:An Analytical Approach to Social Theory, edited

by Peter Hedstrom and Richard Swedberg, contributors argue that correla-
tional analysis fails to identify the mechanisms that produce observed associ-
ations and that explain why empirical associations exist in the first place. The
authors of this volume-many of them statistical researchers who employ
the conventional methods-call for a new "tool kit" of mechanisms that will
enable sociologists to make sense of their empirical correlations. In Fuzzy-
Set Social Science, Charles C. Ragin suggests that correlational analysis is
based on strong assumptions about unit homogeneity and linear causation
that often do not hold in comparative research. He calls on researchers who
study complex patterns of causation to go beyond statistical correlations
by employing fuzzy-set methods that assume causal heterogeneity and that
allow for the analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.
These books reflect a broader trend in the literature toward questioning
the utility of conventional techniques for analyzing causation (e.g., Abbott,
1988). However, the works do not reject the enterprise of causal analysis
itself. Both studies are intended for mainstream sociologists who accept that
explanation and causal analysis are basic tools of the trade, but who may
have some healthy skepticism about the utility of conventional techniques
for achieving these goals.

SOCIAL THEORY AND THE IMPROVEMENT

OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

The central goal of the volume edited by Hedstrom and Swedberg is

"to explicate the social mechanisms that generate and explain observed as-
sociations between events" (p. 1). In this section, I explore how and why
such an enterprise can offer important advances for social analysis. I be-
gin by considering the limitations of correlational analysis from the stand-
point of a social mechanisms perspective. I then examine how a focus on
mechanisms-conceptualized here as unobserved relations or processes that
generate outcomes-can allow researchers to go beyond correlations. I con-
clude the section by considering how a mechanisms perspective might help
sociologists overcome the gap that currently exists between social theory
and quantitative research.

Correlational Analysis and Its Limitations

Three basic limitations of correlational analysis can be identified from

the articles in the Social Mechanisms volume and related writings in the

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 577

philosophy of science. First, on a substantive level, analysts have expressed

concerns that correlational analysis provides a weak foundation for integrat-
ing diverse quantitative findings into a single coherent framework that can
sustain knowledge accumulation. With conventional methods, researchers
typically discover that a highly heterogeneous group of variables are as-
sociated with an outcome, and these kinds of methods offer no basis for
understanding why such diverse factors are related to the phenomenon of
interest. The result is a lack of theoretical integration, which in turn con-
tributes to the fragmentation of knowledge that currently characterizes the
social sciences (Dessler, 1991; S0rensen, 1998).
Second, according to critics, correlational analysis relies on the ques-
tionable assumption that causation exists only to the degree that empirical
regularities also exist. In other words, correlational analysts implicitly as-
sume that if there is no empirical regularity, there is no causation, or at least
causal forces cannot be identified without such regularities. Given that corre-
lational analysts usually "explain" only a portion of the variation of interest,
however, they must also assume that much or most of the world is governed
by stochastic forces or unknown variables.2This conclusion is somewhat dis-
illusioning in light of the substantial research that has been focused on many
outcomes of interest (see S0rensen, 1998; Stinchcombe, 1998).
Finally, various analysts argue that correlational analysis is limited be-
cause its fails to explore the so-called black box that connects independent
and dependent variables in a causal relationship (e.g., Boudon, 1998; Cowen,
1998; Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998; Hernes, 1998). On this view, "we are
not satisfied with merely establishing systematic covariation between vari-
ables or events; a satisfactory explanation requires that we are also able
to specify the social 'cogs and wheels' that have brought the relationship
into existence" (p. 7; see also Elster, 1989:3). Knowledge of this black box
is needed to develop "deeper, more direct, and more fine grained expla-
nations... [and] to distinguish between genuine causality and coincidental
association" (pp. 8-9).

Conceptualizing Causal Mechanisms

The proposed solution to the problems of correlational analysis offered

in the Hedstrom-Swedberg volume is the development of theories of social
mechanisms, or what I prefer to call "causal mechanisms." This concern with
causal mechanisms grows out of a distinction sometimes made in the phi-
losophy of science between correlational analysis and causal analysis. While
correlational analysis involves identifying antecedents regularly conjoined

2Measurement error may also account for some of the unexplained variance.

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578 Mahoney

with outcomes, causal analysis consists of identifying the mechanism that

underlies and generates empirical regularities and outcomes. With causal
analysis, the challenge of explanation involves postulating "entities, proper-
ties, processes, relations... that are held to be causally responsible for the
empirical regularities to be explained" (McMullin, 1984:210). These mech-
anisms or causal agents explain why correlations exist in the first place;
knowledge of their operation allows researchers to go beyond correlations
(Harre, 1970:230, 1972:170).
Unfortunately, a good deal of confusion currently surrounds the precise
meaning of causal mechanism, including in the volume under review (see
Table I). To sort out this confusion, I separate different definitions found in
the literature, beginning with two common definitions that I do not believe
take us beyond correlational analysis. I then discuss a third definition that I
do believe offers a real alternative to correlational research.
First, a causal mechanism is often understood as an intervening vari-
able or set of intervening variables that explain why a correlation exists
between an independent and dependent variable (e.g., Bennett and George,
1997; Glennan, 1996; Goldthorpe, 1998;Hedstrom and Swedberg, 1998;King
et al., 1994; Kiser and Hechter, 1991; Somers, 1998). In this formulation, the
specification of a mechanism helps researchers make an observed associa-
tion more intelligible by filling in the black box between independent and
dependent variables. Yet, while the notion of mechanism as intervening pro-
cess is useful, this definition unfortunately does not go beyond correlational
assumptions. Causal mechanisms as intervening variables must be identi-
fied and analyzed with correlational tools. Indeed, a variable's status as a
"mechanism" as opposed to an "independent variable" is arbitrary. With
this definition, then, a correlation is "explained" simply by appealing to an-
other correlation of observed variables (see Goldthorpe, 1998:19;King et al.,
1994:86;McMullin, 1984:206).
A second definition views causal mechanisms as mid-level theories or
variables that can be used to explain a fairly wide range of outcomes. In
Stinchcombe's vivid formulation (Stinchcombe, 1998:267) causal mecha-
nisms are "bits of sometimes true theory"; or, as Elster (1998:45) puts it,
"mechanisms are frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal pat-
terns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or with inde-
terminate consequences." Although we need better mid-level theories, this
definition has the disadvantage of not clearly differentiating the concept of
mechanism from the idea of a probabilistically formulated hypothesis - the
very essence of most correlational research. In other words, in asserting that
a causal mechanism entails a probabilistic hypothesis, scholars who employ
this definition in no way break with any of the correlational assumptions that
guide standard sociological analyses.

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 579

Table I. Glossary of Definitions of "Mechanism"

Bennett and George (1997, p. 1): "the processes and intervening variables through which
causal or explanatory variables produce causal effects."
Bhaskar (1979, p. 15): "the construction of an explanation for... some identified phenomenon
will involve the building of a model, utilizing such cognitive materials and operating under
the control of something like a logic of analogy and metaphor, of a mechanism, which
if it were to exist and act in the postulated way would account for the phenomenon in
question."
Boudon (1998, p. 172): "A SM [social mechanism] is, in other words, the well-articulated set
of causes responsible for a given social phenomenon. With the exception of typical simple
ones, SMs tend to be idiosyncratic and singular."
Cowen (1998, p. 125): "I interpret social mechanisms (defined in greater detail below) as
rational-choice accounts of how a specified combination of preferences and constraints can
give rise to more complex social outcomes."
Elster (1989, p. 3): "nots and bolts, cogs and wheels-that can be used to explain quite complex
social phenomena."
Elster (1998,45, his emphasis): "Roughly speaking, mechanisms are frequently occurring and
easily recognizable causal patterns that are triggered under generally unknown conditions or
with indeterminate consequences."
Gambetta (1998, p. 102): "I take 'mechanisms' to be hypothetical causal models that make
sense of individual behavior. They have the form, 'Given certain conditions K, an agent
will do x because of M with probability p.' M refers either to forms of reasoning govern-
ing decision making (of which rational choice models are a subset) or to subintentional
processes that affect action both directly (as impulsiveness) or by shaping preferences or
beliefs."
Goldthorpe (1998, p. 18): "some process existing in time and space, even if not perhaps directly
observable, that actually generates the causal effect of X on Y and, in doing so, produces
the statistical relationship that is empirically in evidence."
Harre (1970, pp. 101,102, 104): "the structures, states and inner constitutions from which the
phenomena of nature flow.... the permanent or enduring conditions under which a certain
kind of phenomenon will occur." "The inner constitutions, structures,powers, encompassing
systems, and so on, of which natural generative mechanisms are constituted, and of which
the connection between cause and effect usually consists."
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998, p. 11): "Mechanism-based explanations usually invoke some
form of 'causal agent' that is assumed to have generated the relationship between the
entities observed."
Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998, p. 13): "Mechanisms... are analytical constructs that provide
hypothetical links between observable events."
Hernes (1998, p. 74): "A mechanism is a set of interacting parts - an assembly of elements
producing an effect not inherent in any one of them. A mechanism is not so much about
'nuts and bolts' as about 'cogs and wheels' - the wheelwork or agency by which an effect is
produced. But a mechanism or inner workings is an abstract, dynamic logic by which social
scientists render understandable the reality they depict."
Keat and Urry (1982, p. 30): "causal explanations require the discovery both of regular rela-
tions between phenomena, and of some kind of mechanism that links them.... In describ-
ing these mechanisms and structures we will often, in effect, be characterizing the 'nature,'
'essense,' or 'inner constitution' of various types of entity."
King et al. (1994, p. 85): "Some scholars argue the central idea of causality is that of a
set of 'causal mechanisms' posited to exist between cause and effect. This view makes
intuitive sense: any coherent account of causality needs to specify how the effects are
exerted."
Kiser and Hechter (1991, p. 5): "A complete explanation also must specify a mechanism that
describes the process by which one variable influences the other, in other words, how it is
that Xproduces Y."
(Continued)

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580 Mahoney

Table I. (Continued)
Koslowski (1996, p. 6): "A causal mechanism is the process by which a cause brings about an
effect. A mechanism is a theory or an explanation, and what it explains is how one event
causes another."
Little (1991, p. 15): "A causal mechanism, then, is a series of events governed by lawlike
regularities that lead from the explanans to the explanandum."
Schelling (1998, pp. 32-33): "I propose... that a social mechanism is a plausible hypothesis,
or set of plausible hypotheses, that could be the explanation of some social phenomenon,
the explanation being in terms of interactions between individuals and other individuals,
or between individuals and some social aggregate."
Somers (1998, p. 726, citing Coleman, 1986:1328): "meaningful connection between events as
the basic tool of description and analysis."
S0rensen (1998, p. 240): "My definition of 'mechanism' is simple: It is an account of how
change in some variable is brought about - a conceptualization of what 'goes into' a
process."
Steinmetz (1998, pp. 177-178): "Within critical realism, a law is not a constant conjunction
of events but the characteristic pattern of activity, or tendency, of a mechanism. More
specifically, real structures possess causal powers which, when triggered or realized, act with
natural necessity and universality as generative mechanisms." [Accompanying footnote:
"Generative mechanisms are 'tendencies' rather than 'powers' because they are not just
potentialities but potentialities that may be exercised without being manifested."]
Stinchcombe (1993, pp. 24-25): "As I use the word, mechanism means (1) a piece of scientific
reasoning which is independently verifiable and independently gives rise to theoretical
reasoning, which (2) gives knowledge about a component process (generally one with
units of analysis at a 'lower level') of another theory (ordinarily a theory with units at
a different 'higher' level), thereby (3) increasing the suppleness, precision, complexity,
elegance, or believability of the higher-level theory with excessive 'multiplication of entities'
in it, (4) without doing too much violence (in the necessary simplification at the lower
level to the make the higher-level theory go) to what we know as the facts at the lower
level."
Stinchcombe (1998, p. 267): "I have defined mechanisms before as bits of 'sometimes true
theory' or 'model' that represent a causal process, that have some actual or possible empir-
ical support separate from the larger theory in which it is a mechanism, and that generate
increased precision, power, or elegance in the large-scale theories."
Tilly (in press): "mechanism-based explanations aim at modest ends: selective explanation of
salient features by means of partial analogy.... Mechanisms are events that alter relations
among some specified set of elements."

I believe a third definition-derived from the realist school in the philos-

ophy of science-does take us beyond a correlational approach. According
to this definition, a causal mechanism is an unobserved entity that-when
activated-generates an outcome of interest. This understanding of mecha-
nism goes beyond correlational analysis in at least two essential ways. First, it
assumes that the activation of a mechanism actually generates an outcome in
the sense that the mechanism is sufficient to produce the outcome of interest;
that is, if the mechanism actually operates, it will always produce the out-
come of interest. This notion differs from most conventional analyses, which
typically assume that a causal variable increases or decreases the probability
of having higher or lower values on an outcome, net of the effects of all other
variables.

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 581

The second distinctive feature of casual mechanisms concerns their

status as unobserved entities. Causal mechanisms are posited relations or
processes that the researcher imagines to exist; they do not refer to any
particular set of empirical conditions. As a consequence, they cannot
enter into a correlational analysis as an empirical state to be measured
across cases for its covariation with some outcome. Social analysts who posit
unobservables-analogous to theorists in the natural sciences3-try to spec-
ify the shape or content of things they cannot directly see. Not every posited
causal mechanism is useful. Useful causal mechanisms are those that help
analysts make sense of diverse observable phenomena and integrate ex-
isting correlational knowledge into a coherent framework. For example, a
useful causal mechanism should be able to explain why diverse kinds of vari-
ables are empirically correlated with a phenomenon of interest. Likewise,
a useful causal mechanism should suggest new correlations not previously
discovered.
Most contributors to the Social Mechanisms volume assume that ratio-
nal choice models developed at an individual level provide the best causal
mechanisms (e.g., Cowen, 1998; Goldthorpe, 1998; Hedstr6m and Swedberg,
1998; Schelling, 1998). These models are indeed potentially useful mecha-
nisms, given that they explain outcomes through unobserved entities (e.g.,
utility functions) that may directly generate behavior. However, causal
mechanisms need not be developed using rational actor assumptions at an
individual level of analysis (Harr6, 1970:35). For example, structural func-
tionalists treat social systems with unobserved needs such as integration
or survival as causal mechanisms that can explain various observable phe-
nomena. Likewise, and more compellingly, many historical sociologists treat
power relations within societies as unobserved forces that generate out-
comes in the social world. A nice example is the work of Rueschemeyer
et al. (1992), which posits a hypothetical set of power relations that, when
equitably distributed, will generate democratic outcomes. By employing this
mechanism, the authors are able to explain certain longstanding correlations
(e.g., economic development is positively associated with democracy) and
identify many new correlations (e.g., the observable size and organization
of the working class is positively correlated with democracy) in terms of
the ways in which independent variables trigger shifts in the distribution of
power relations within society.

3Natural scientists posit and use unobservables such as strings in superstring theory, spring-like
balls in elasticity theory, waves in Boyle's theory of light, molecules in theories of Brownian
motion, and quarks in particle theory (Hacking, 1983; Musgrave, 1985). The utility of these
entities in scientific explanation is not as independent variables that can explain variation
on an outcome; rather, these entities are useful because they are believed to be the real
mechanisms that physically generate outcomes in the natural world.

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582 Mahoney

Unifying Sociology

Few would deny that there is a division within sociology between social
theorists and quantitative researchers. The division derives as much from
mutual neglect as from any open hostility; thoughtful analysts recognize
that the cleavage serves neither side well. In one of the best chapters in the
Social Mechanisms volume, for example, the quantitative sociologist Aage
S0rensen (1998, pp. 238-239) writes that

Quantitative sociology remains very theory-poor. In fact, the mainstream has re-
gressed rather than progressed. Quantitative sociology is now less theoretically in-
formed and less relevant for theoretical progress than it was three decades ago ... the
enormous progress in methodological power has turned quantitative methodology
into a branch of statistics. This has led to a fascination, if not obsession, with statis-
tical models and concerns, and a neglect of the need to develop sociological models
mirroring conceptions of mechanisms of social processes.

Similar claims can be made for social theory and its relationship to quanti-
tative sociology. Social theorists are often so concerned with their concepts
and frameworks that they pay little attention to the findings of quantitative
sociology; as a result, social theorists forfeit powerful evidence that could be
used to adjudicate among rival theoretical frameworks.
Clearly, neither statistical researchers nor social theorists can afford to
live without one another. Correlational findings are incomplete and not fully
intelligible without an understanding of the mechanisms that generate those
findings; by contrast, theories of causal mechanisms are entirely specula-
tive until their power is revealed through empirical correlations. Hence, a
complete science must strive to identify both correlations and causal mech-
anisms; as such, quantitative research and social theory are complimentary
and should be united.

A METHODOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE TO
CORRELATIONAL ANALYSIS

Charles Ragin's book presents a methodological critique of standard

correlational analyses and introduces "fuzzy-set" methods as an alternative
approach. Among other things, fuzzy-set methods provide tools for ana-
lyzing necessary and sufficient causes, and thus address the concerns of re-
searchers who believe that these causes are little more than nonfalsifiable
tautologies. Furthermore, by offering concrete procedures for identifying
sufficient causes, Ragin's work can be linked to the study of causal mecha-
nisms, although he himself does not do so.

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 583

Methodological Limitations of Correlational Analysis

In the first half of Fuzzy-Set Social Science, Ragin outlines his pre-
ferred methodology for social analysis-what he calls "diversity-oriented
research"-through a contrast with correlational methods. Although this
discussion repeats certain themes offered in Ragin's earlier work (Ragin,
1987), it also updates his critique of conventional tools. Here I review three
aspects of this critique.
First, Ragin argues that scholars who employ conventional methods
typically treat their population of cases as a "given," offering little reflec-
tion on why cases are included and rarely revising their understanding of the
population in the course of research. By using unproblematized populations,
Ragin argues, conventional researchers frequently and inappropriately in-
clude heterogeneous cases in their studies. The consequence is that they
"may relegate unrecognized heterogeneity to the error vector of probabilis-
tic models when it should be conceived, if properly recognized, as multiple
populations" (p. 50). To avoid treating heterogeneity as unexplained vari-
ance, Ragin argues that scholars who study complex social phenomena must
assume causal heterogeneity is the norm and treat populations as evolving
constructs to be modified in light of theoretical and substantive knowledge.
Second, Ragin is critical of the conventional practice of treating cases
as collections of analytically separate variables that exert causal effects in-
dependent of one another. When analyzing complex social phenomena, he
suggests that the effects of any given variable will depend on the broader
context within which that variable is situated. As a result, researchers must
treat their cases as configurations of aspects that are examined together,
as overall "packages." Statistical researchers could try to study cases in
this fashion by applying saturated interaction models to all variables, but
these models would generally be difficult to interpret due to collinearity
among interaction terms and the tendency of multiple models to fit the
data (p. 72).
Third, Ragin argues that correlational methods are insensitive to nec-
essary and sufficient conditions. The conventional approach of treating vari-
ables as open-ended categories and exploring their covariation with one an-
other is not designed to locate necessary and sufficient conditions, especially
combinations of variables that join together to produce a sufficient cause.
To analyze these conditions, Ragin points out, one must treat variables as
qualitative states in which cases are either "in" or "out" of the category, or
are partially in or partially out of the category. For example, to argue that
some condition X is a sufficient cause of some outcome Y, one must be able
to distinguish cases that are full or partial members of condition X from

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584 Mahoney

those that completely lack condition X. From the perspective of correla-

tional research, however, the idea that some cases may be a "full" member
of a category or that some cases may be "completely outside" a category are
foreign notions.
The first half of Fuzzy-Set Social Science goes beyond Ragin's previous
work by elaborating a partial and probabilistic approach to the analysis of
necessary and sufficient conditions. There are two central innovations here.
First, Ragin notes that random error, measurement error, and human error
will often make it difficult to locate any cause or combination of causes that
are necessary and/or sufficient. As a result, he develops terminology and
benchmark proportions for analyzing causes at different degrees of necessity
or sufficiency. For instance, a benchmark of 0.5 is used for causes that are
"more often than not" necessary or sufficient (i.e., causes that are necessary
or sufficient at least half of the time), while a benchmark of 0.8 is used
for causes that are "almost always" necessary or sufficient. Second, using a
simple binominal test, he calculates the minimal number of consistent cases
at each benchmark needed to reach statistical significance across various
levels (e.g., at the levels of 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance). For instance,
when analyzing a "usually" necessary cause (i.e., a cause that is necessary
at a 0.65 benchmark), seven or more consistent cases are needed to reach a
0.05 level of significance.
Quantitative macrosociologists must seriously consider Ragin's criti-
cisms and his proposal for analyzing necessary and sufficient conditions.
While statistical solutions may exist for some of the methodological problems
identified by Ragin, these solutions are rarely applied in practice. Moreover,
the point of Ragin's discussion is not simply to illustrate the shortcomings of
statistical research, but to show how qualitative research overcomes these
limitations. In Ragin's view, the challenge is for statistical researchers to
adapt their research to the more demanding standards of qualitative analy-
sis rather than the reverse.
Ragin's innovative discussion is not without limitations. For example, he
offers no sustained discussion of how qualitative and quantitative methods
can be combined in research. Although he believes there is a place for both
kinds of research (p. xv), the main thrust of his argument is to show how
quantitative analysis embodies major deficiencies that qualitative research
can overcome. In making this argument, he overlooks the ways in which
analysts frequently combine the two approaches in their empirical research
(see Mahoney, 2000).
There are also limitations that stem from Ragin's decision not to address
issues related to temporality and sequencing. This omission is important not
only because temporality is fundamental to any understanding of causation,

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 585

but also because qualitative methods are often designed to deal with tempo-
ral issues (see Aminzade, 1992; Pierson, 2000; Rueschemeyer and Stephens,
1997). Furthermore, the omission leads Ragin not to discuss how qualitative
methods may be especially appropriate for the study of causal mechanisms.
While causal mechanisms do not refer to any observable set of conditions,
the ability of researchers to find combinations of observable variables that
are usually or almost always sufficient can provide supporting evidence in
favor of the existence of a given mechanism. In this sense, Ragin's agenda
might be more closely linked to the developments in social theory considered
in the Hedstr6m-Swedberg volume.

Measuring Fuzzy Membership

The second half of Ragin's book introduces fuzzy-set methods as a

means to overcome the limitations of correlational analyses. These methods
will seem so foreign to some quantitative researchers that their initial reac-
tion may be to assume that Ragin fails to understand conventional statistics.
In fact, however, Ragin presents a sophisticated argument that anticipates
many criticisms that these researchers would raise.
Fuzzy-set measurement differs from both the binary categorization ad-
vocated by Ragin in his earlier work and the continuous scales usually sought
by conventional researchers. With fuzzy sets, cases are scored from 0 to 1
based on their degree of membership in a category. Some cases will be "full"
instances of the category and thus receive a score of "1," even if these cases
would have different scores on an interval scale. For example, with respect to
the category of "rich country," both the United States and England are full
members, and thus both receive the same score of "1," despite the fact that
these countries have different levels of wealth on an interval scale. Other
countries receive scores based on the extent to which they overlap with
the category "rich country." For example, a country that is "mostly in" the
category will receive a score only slightly less than one (e.g., 0.83), while a
country that is "mostly out" of the category will receive a score closer to zero
(e.g., 0.17). The decision to assign fuzzy-set membership scores to cases is
based on the analyst's substantive and theoretical knowledge. In this sense,
according to Ragin, fuzzy-set categories can be more empirically grounded
than conventional variables.
How one feels about this approach to measurement will depend in part
on whether one believes qualitative categories should be employed in social
science analysis. From the perspective of quantitative research, the deci-
sion to ignore variation is viewed as a potential source of systematic error.

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586 Mahoney

However, when assessing necessary and sufficient conditions, this problem of

bias does not arise (in fact, error could be introduced if the additional vari-
ation were included). Moreover, recent work in cognitive science suggests
that the human mind processes the world in a manner that closely parallels
fuzzy-set categories (e.g., Lakoff, 1987). Given these considerations, I see
little compelling reason why fuzzy-set measurement should be dismissed ei-
ther on the grounds that it introduces bias into research or that it fails to
map the way in which ordinary language-users employ categories.
Nevertheless, I do believe there is a real potential for "overfitting" the
data when using fuzzy-set measures. Precisely because researchers must
revise their measures in light of new evidence, they may be tempted to
rescale or recode data until they reveal a desired or otherwise interesting
finding. Although Ragin is aware of this problem (pp. 309-311; 316-321),
straightforward solutions are not identified in the book.

Assessing Necessary and Sufficient Causes With Fuzzy-Set Methods

To see how fuzzy-set methods assess necessary and sufficient causes,

it is helpful to imagine a scattergram in which cases are plotted based on
their fuzzy membership in an hypothesized causal factor and an outcome.
With a necessary cause, fuzzy membership scores on the outcome are less
than or equal to fuzzy membership scores on the cause. The resulting scat-
tergram thus has a triangular shape, with all points on or beneath the main
diagonal. For example, the hypothetical data in Fig. 1 plot countries based
on their fuzzy-set membership in "social revolution" (outcome) and "state
breakdown" (cause). These data support the notion that state breakdown
is a necessary condition for social revolution, given that all scores on the
outcome are less than or equal to scores on the cause. By contrast, with a
sufficient cause, fuzzy membership scores on the cause are less than or equal
to fuzzy membership scores on the outcome. Hence, all points will be located
on or above the main diagonal. Ragin formally elaborates the logic behind
these procedures, including the important issues that arise when considering
combinations of variables that are necessary or sufficient.
Several techniques are discussed to deal with the partial and probabilis-
tic nature of necessary and sufficient causation. For example, the researcher
might argue that if no case's score on the outcome (or cause) exceeds its
score on the cause (or outcome) by more than a small portion of a fuzzy-
membership unit (e.g., 0.10 unit), then the pattern is still consistent with the
interpretation of causal necessity (or sufficiency). Likewise, the probabilistic
benchmarks and significance tests mentioned above can be applied when
using fuzzy measures of variables. For example, Fig. 2 presents a simple

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BeyondCorrelationalAnalysis:RecentInnovationsin Theoryand Method 587

1
0.9 -
a 0.8 -
X 0.7 -
' -
0.6

% 0.5 -
0.4 -
; 0.3-

I 0.2-
0.1 - *

O I I I I I I I I I I

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Membership in Set of "State Breakdown"

Fig. 1. Example of necessary condition: Plot of "social revolution" against "state

breakdown." Source: Ragin (2000, pp. 216-217).

illustration of a probabilistic approach to analyzing causal sufficiency. In

this hypothetical example, 18 countries are plotted based on their fuzzy
membership in "strong labor movements" (cause) and "generous welfare
states" (outcome). The plot has the characteristic shape of causal sufficiency,
but two of the countries are below the main diagonal. In this sense, the cause
would fail a nonprobabilistic test of sufficiency. However, using probabilis-
tic criteria, this cause passes the test of "usually sufficient" at a 0.05 level
of significance. Although the mathematics involved becomes complicated
when combinations of variables are considered using probabilistic criteria,
a free software package that performs the statistical operations is already
available (Drass and Ragin, 1999).
Fuzzy-set methods are a major breakthrough for the study of necessary
and sufficient conditions. They avoid the four most common failures of this
kind of analysis: (1) the failure to recognize that many variables cannot be
adequately measured using dichotomous indicators; (2) the failure to assess
combinations of causal factors; (3) the failure to include a partial and proba-
bilistic understanding of causation; and (4) the failure to consider statistical

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588 Mahoney

0.9-
0.8-
0.7 -
0.6- .
0.5 -
0.4 -

:. 0.3 -

I 0.2-

? 0.1 -.

0 I I I I I I I I

0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1

Membership in Set of "Strong Labor Movements"

Fig. 2. Example of probabilistic sufficient condition: Plot of "generous welfare state"

against "strong labor movement." Source: Adapted from Ragin (2000, p. 251).

significance. Although other scholars may have previously considered the

application of fuzzy-set methods to social science, Ragin systematically ad-
dresses all of the methodological issues involved in employing this kind of
analysis. As a result, he advances the discussion of qualitative methods to an
entirely new level.
Having acknowledged this fundamental contribution, I recognize the
real trade-offs that face the researcher who chooses to use fuzzy-set meth-
ods. For one thing, these methods require that one construct a population
with enough cases to pass statistical significance tests. Typically, this will in-
volve selecting more than just a handful of cases (though not a "large-N").
Selecting a "medium-N" is a problem, however, because fuzzy-set methods
also demand the researcher has an excellent knowledge of all cases in order
to make sound judgements about measurement. When the analyst selects
more than a handful of cases, achieving this knowledge may be difficult. In

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 589

short, there is a tension between selecting enough cases to obtain statisti-

cal significance and selecting a small enough number of cases to maintain
conceptual validity.
Equally important, these methods cannot be used to detect standard
linear correlations when such associations are in fact present. Despite the
limitations of correlational techniques as a basis for representing causation,
we know that correlational associations frequently are discovered by re-
searchers. It is in fact an open question whether relationships based on the
logic of necessary and sufficient conditions or relationships derived from lin-
ear correlations will be found more frequently by researchers. At this point,
it is still too early to assume that social scientists will have more success find-
ing convincing examples of necessary and sufficient conditions than they
have had at locating strong correlational associations.
Ragin himself notes that fuzzy-set methods are most powerful as a tech-
nique of "discovery,"not a technique for testing theory (p. 310). This observa-
tion points to the value of these methods for uncovering causal mechanisms.
Specifically, the discovery of combinations of factors that are sufficient (or
almost sufficient) for an outcome can help researchers develop theories of
causal mechanisms.
To elaborate this idea a little further, it is useful to consider Ragin's
discussion of the origins of IMF protest in 35 Third World countries (i.e.,
developing countries that experienced protest against austerity measures
mandated by the IMF). Ragin explores several possible causes of this out-
come, including urbanization, economic hardship, investment dependence,
political liberalization, and government activism. These causal factors and
the outcome are conceptualized as fuzzy sets and measured accordingly.
Using the procedures discussed above, Ragin tests all possible combinations
of factors for sufficiency, applying logical rules for simplifying combinations
when appropriate. He ultimately identifies three combinations of factors that
are "almost always" sufficient at a 0.01 level of significance. For example, the
combination of political liberalization, economic hardship, and investment
dependence is almost always sufficient to produce IMF protest. That is, when
a country facing IMF pressure experiences political liberalization (measured
in terms of civil and political rights), economic hardship (measured in terms
of inflation and consumer prices), and dependence on foreign investment
(measured in terms of foreign capital distribution), protests against IMF
austerity plans will almost always take place.
A finding such as this one can help social theorists conceptualize the
causal mechanism that generates IMF protest. For instance, one possibil-
ity would be to view societal groups as a transportable entity that can be
pushed from a state of nonprotest to a state of IMF protest by prevailing

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590 Mahoney

NO OBSTRUCTION
(Political Liberalization)

IMF Protest
PUSH ^ Societal
(Economic Groups DIRECTION
Hardship) (Dependence on
NoProtest Investment)

OtherProtest

Barrier
to Protest
Fig. 3. Hypothetical causal mechanism generating IMF protest.

conditions in society (see Fig. 3). In this example, the presence of economic
hardship is important because it provides the kind of impetus that would
move groups toward protest. However, in the example, the ability of soci-
etal groups to move from nonprotest to protest also depends on the absence
of any obstructions or blocking forces. The existence of political liberaliza-
tion might therefore be important because it removes potential barriers to
protest. Finally, once the entity moves to a state of protest, it must be di-
rected specifically toward anti-IMF protest. The presence of dependence on
foreign investment might serve the role of directing societal groups toward
precisely this kind of protest activity.
The elements in Fig. 3 are postulated entities and relations that may
or may not adequately capture the causal mechanism that generates IMF
protest. The utility of this causal mechanism would have to be evaluated

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Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and Method 591

based on its ability to explain other empirical findings and to suggest new
empirical associations. Nevertheless, the example does show how Ragin's
methods can be closely linked to theory building through the specification
of the causal mechanisms that generate outcomes in the social world.

CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF

CASE-ORIENTED RESEARCH

The two books under review suggest that case-oriented research has
a crucial role to play in social explanation. The importance of this kind
of research is illuminated through recent innovations in both theory and
method. First, with respect to theory, we know from the natural sciences
that discovering causal mechanisms requires taking a close look at actual
instances of the phenomenon under investigation and working backward
from outcomes to causal mechanisms (e.g., see Hanson, 1958:85-86, and
McMullin, 1984, on "retroductive" explanation). If investigators lack knowl-
edge of actual instances of the phenomena of interest, they are unlikely to
make good decisions about how to conceptualize the mechanisms that gen-
erate these phenomena. Likewise, contrary to what is sometimes asserted,
scientists do not formulate mechanisms purely or primarily through deduc-
tive analysis; rather, they employ what sociologists call "analytic induction"
to accomplish this task. Thus, should social scientists seek to replicate the
kind of theory-building employed in the natural sciences, they must postu-
late causal mechanisms based on intensive examinations of particular cases.
Furthermore, they must in part work backward from the observed outcome
to the theoretical mechanism in question.
Second, with respect to methodology, the examination of necessary and
sufficient conditions requires much substantive and theoretical knowledge of
particular cases. This is true because fuzzy-set measurement-which is now
the best tool available for assessing these conditions-cannot be adequately
calibrated if the analyst has a poor understanding of the cases that define
a population. Furthermore, as Ragin suggests, many of the limitations of
conventional techniques grow out of the researcher's inadequate knowledge
of the cases included in the analysis. In this sense, the improvement of both
methodologies designed to identify necessary and sufficient conditions and
methodologies designed to locate correlational associations depends on the
availability of good case-study research.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I thank Jeff Goodwin and Gerardo L. Munck for helpful comments on

a previous draft.

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592
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